Airworthiness Directives; Boeing Model 767 Airplanes, 38304-38311 [E6-10536]
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Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 129 / Thursday, July 6, 2006 / Proposed Rules
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Fresh fruits and vegetables are generally
imported for immediate distribution and
sale to the consuming public and would
remain in foreign commerce until sold
to the ultimate consumer. The question
of when foreign commerce ceases in
other cases must be addressed on a caseby-case basis. If this proposed rule is
adopted, no retroactive effect will be
given to this rule, and this rule will not
require administrative proceedings
before parties may file suit in court
challenging this rule.
Paperwork Reduction Act
In accordance with section 3507(d) of
the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995
(44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.), the information
collection or recordkeeping
requirements included in this proposed
rule have been submitted for approval to
the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB). Please send written comments
to the Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs, OMB, Attention:
Desk Officer for APHIS, Washington, DC
20503. Please state that your comments
refer to APHIS–2006–0073. Please send
a copy of your comments to: (1) APHIS–
2006–0073, Regulatory Analysis and
Development, PPD, APHIS, Station 3A–
03.8, 4700 River Road Unit 118,
Riverdale, MD 20737–1238, and (2)
Clearance Officer, OCIO, USDA, room
404–W, 14th Street and Independence
Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20250. A
comment to OMB is best assured of
having its full effect if OMB receives it
within 30 days of publication of this
proposed rule.
This proposed rule would amend the
fruits and vegetables regulations to
allow the importation of shelled garden
peas from Kenya into the continental
United States. In order to be eligible for
importation, the peas would have to be
shelled, washed, and inspected and
accompanied by a phytosanitary
certificate issued by KEPHIS. The
phytosanitary certificate would have to
bear an additional declaration stating
that the peas had been shelled and
washed in accordance with the
proposed requirements and had been
inspected and found free of pests.
We are soliciting comments from the
public (as well as affected agencies)
concerning our proposed information
collection and recordkeeping
requirements. These comments will
help us:
(1) Evaluate whether the proposed
information collection is necessary for
the proper performance of our agency’s
functions, including whether the
information will have practical utility;
(2) Evaluate the accuracy of our
estimate of the burden of the proposed
information collection, including the
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validity of the methodology and
assumptions used;
(3) Enhance the quality, utility, and
clarity of the information to be
collected; and
(4) Minimize the burden of the
information collection on those who are
to respond (such as through the use of
appropriate automated, electronic,
mechanical, or other technological
collection techniques or other forms of
information technology; e.g., permitting
electronic submission of responses).
Estimate of burden: Public reporting
burden for this collection of information
is estimated to average 0.15 hour per
response.
Respondents: Importers of peas,
KEPHIS.
Estimated annual number of
respondents: 2.
Estimated annual number of
responses per respondent: 20.
Estimated annual number of
responses: 40.
Estimated total annual burden on
respondents: 6 hours. (Due to averaging,
the total annual burden hours may not
equal the product of the annual number
of responses multiplied by the reporting
burden per response.)
Copies of this information collection
can be obtained from Mrs. Celeste
Sickles, APHIS’ Information Collection
Coordinator, at (301) 734–7477.
Government Paperwork Elimination
Act Compliance
The Animal and Plant Health
Inspection Service is committed to
compliance with the Government
Paperwork Elimination Act (GPEA),
which requires Government agencies in
general to provide the public the option
of submitting information or transacting
business electronically to the maximum
extent possible. For information
pertinent to GPEA compliance related to
this proposed rule, please contact Mrs.
Celeste Sickles, APHIS’ Information
Collection Coordinator, at (301) 734–
7477.
List of Subjects in 7 CFR Part 319
Coffee, Cotton, Fruits, Imports, Logs,
Nursery stock, Plant diseases and pests,
Quarantine, Reporting and
recordkeeping requirements, Rice,
Vegetables.
Accordingly, we propose to amend 7
CFR part 319 as follows:
PART 319—FOREIGN QUARANTINE
NOTICES
1. The authority citation for part 319
would continue to read as follows:
Authority: 7 U.S.C. 450, 7701–7772, and
7781–7786; 21 U.S.C. 136 and 136a; 7 CFR
2.22, 2.80, and 371.3.
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2. A new § 319.56–2ss would be
added to read as follows:
§ 319.56–2ss Conditions governing the
entry of shelled garden peas from Kenya.
Garden peas (Pisum sativum) may be
imported into the continental United
States from Kenya only under the
following conditions:
(a) The peas must be shelled from the
pod.
(b) The peas must be washed in
disinfectant water at 3 to 5 °C
containing 50 ppm chlorine.
(c) Each shipment of peas must be
accompanied by a phytosanitary
certificate of inspection issued by the
national plant protection organization of
Kenya bearing the following additional
declaration: ‘‘These peas have been
shelled and washed in accordance with
7 CFR 319.56–2ss and have been
inspected and found free of pests.’’
Done in Washington, DC, this 29th day of
June 2006.
Kevin Shea,
Acting Administrator, Animal and Plant
Health Inspection Service.
[FR Doc. E6–10551 Filed 7–5–06; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3410–34–P
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. FAA–2005–20351; Directorate
Identifier 2003–NM–269–AD]
RIN 2120–AA64
Airworthiness Directives; Boeing
Model 767 Airplanes
Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Supplemental notice of
proposed rulemaking (NPRM);
reopening of comment period.
AGENCY:
SUMMARY: The FAA is revising an earlier
proposed airworthiness directive (AD)
for all Boeing Model 767 airplanes. The
original NPRM would have required an
inspection of each main tank fuel boost
pump for the presence of a pump shaft
flame arrestor, and if the flame arrestor
is missing, replacement of that pump
with a pump having a pump shaft flame
arrestor. The original NPRM would also
have required repetitive measurements
of the flame arrestor’s position in the
pump, and corrective actions if
necessary. The original NPRM resulted
from reports that certain fuel boost
pumps may not have flame arrestors
installed in the pump shaft and reports
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that the pin that holds the flame arrestor
in place can break due to metal fatigue.
This action revises the original NPRM
by proposing the replacement of the
pump with a new or modified pump,
which would end the repetitive
measurements. This action also revises
the compliance times for certain
airplanes. We are proposing this
supplemental NPRM to prevent the
possible migration of a flame from a
main tank fuel boost pump inlet to the
vapor space of that fuel tank, and
consequent ignition of fuel vapors,
which could result in a fire or
explosion.
DATES: We must receive comments on
this supplemental NPRM by July 31,
2006.
ADDRESSES: Use one of the following
addresses to submit comments on this
supplemental NPRM.
• DOT Docket Web site: Go to
https://dms.dot.gov and follow the
instructions for sending your comments
electronically.
• Government-wide rulemaking Web
site: Go to https://www.regulations.gov
and follow the instructions for sending
your comments electronically.
• Mail: Docket Management Facility;
U.S. Department of Transportation, 400
Seventh Street, SW., Nassif Building,
room PL–401, Washington, DC 20590.
• Fax: (202) 493–2251.
• Hand Delivery: Room PL–401 on
the plaza level of the Nassif Building,
400 Seventh Street, SW., Washington,
DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday
through Friday, except Federal holidays.
Contact Boeing Commercial
Airplanes, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle,
Washington 98124–2207, for service
information identified in this proposed
AD.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: John
Vann, Aerospace Engineer, Propulsion
Branch, ANM–140S, FAA, Seattle
Aircraft Certification Office, 1601 Lind
Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington
98055–4056; telephone (425) 917–6513;
fax (425) 917–6590.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Comments Invited
We invite you to submit any relevant
written data, views, or arguments
regarding this supplemental NPRM.
Send your comments to an address
listed in the ADDRESSES section. Include
the docket number ‘‘FAA–2005–20351;
Directorate Identifier 2003–NM–269–
AD’’ at the beginning of your comments.
We specifically invite comments on the
overall regulatory, economic,
environmental, and energy aspects of
this supplemental NPRM. We will
consider all comments received by the
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closing date and may amend this
supplemental NPRM in light of those
comments.
We will post all comments submitted,
without change, to https://dms.dot.gov,
including any personal information you
provide. We will also post a report
summarizing each substantive verbal
contact with FAA personnel concerning
this supplemental NPRM. Using the
search function of that Web site, anyone
can find and read the comments in any
of our dockets, including the name of
the individual who sent the comment
(or signed the comment on behalf of an
association, business, labor union, etc.).
You may review the DOT’s complete
Privacy Act Statement in the Federal
Register published on April 11, 2000
(65 FR 19477–78), or you may visit
https://dms.dot.gov.
Examining the Docket
You may examine the AD docket on
the Internet at https://dms.dot.gov, or in
person at the Docket Management
Facility office between 9 a.m. and 5
p.m., Monday through Friday, except
Federal holidays. The Docket
Management Facility office (telephone
(800) 647–5227) is located on the plaza
level in the Nassif Building at the DOT
street address stated in ADDRESSES.
Comments will be available in the AD
docket shortly after the Docket
Management System receives them.
Discussion
We proposed to amend 14 CFR part
39 with a notice of proposed rulemaking
(NPRM) for an AD (the ‘‘original
NPRM’’) for all Boeing Model 767 series
airplanes. The original NPRM was
published in the Federal Register on
February 15, 2005 (70 FR 7678). The
original NPRM proposed to require an
inspection of each main tank fuel boost
pump for the presence of a pump shaft
flame arrestor, and if the flame arrestor
is missing, replacement of that pump
with a pump having a pump shaft flame
arrestor. The original NPRM also
proposed to require repetitive
measurements of the flame arrestor’s
position in the pump, and corrective
actions if necessary.
Actions Since Original NPRM Was
Issued
The preamble to the original NPRM
explains that we consider the proposed
requirements ‘‘interim action’’ and were
considering further rulemaking. Since
we issued the original NPRM, the
manufacturer has issued new service
information, which specifies actions
that terminate the repetitive
measurements proposed in the original
NPRM. This supplemental NPRM
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follows from the determination that the
additional actions are necessary.
Relevant Service Information
We have reviewed Boeing Alert
Service Bulletins 767–28A0088 (for
Model 767–200, –300, and –300F series
airplanes) and 767–28A0089 (for Model
767–400ER series airplanes), both dated
February 24, 2005. The alert service
bulletins describe procedures for
replacing the left and right main tank
fuel boost pumps with new or modified
pumps that have a better flame arrestor
installation. Doing the replacements
ends the inspections specified in Boeing
Alert Service Bulletin 767–28A0077 (for
Model 767–200, –300, and –300F series
airplanes) or 767–28A0081 (for Model
767–400ER series airplanes), both
Revision 1, both dated July 8, 2004, as
applicable.
Accomplishing the actions specified
in the service information is intended to
adequately address the unsafe
condition.
Boeing Alert Service Bulletins 767–
28A0088 and 767–28A0089 reference
Hamilton Sundstrand Service Bulletin
5006003–28–3, dated December 8, 2004,
as the appropriate source of service
information for modifying the pump.
Comments
We have considered the following
comments on the original NPRM.
Support for the Original NPRM
The Air Line Pilots Association agrees
with the original NPRM.
Request To Allow Credit
ABX Air requests that actions done in
accordance with Boeing Alert Service
Bulletin 767–28A0077, dated March 6,
2003, be accepted as a method of
compliance with the requirements of the
original NPRM. The commenter
indicates that there are no substantive
differences between the actions of the
original version and Boeing Alert
Service Bulletin 767–28A0077, Revision
1, dated July 8, 2004 (Revision 1 is
listed as the appropriate source of
service information for doing the actions
specified in paragraph (g) of the original
NPRM for Model 767–200, –300, and
–300F series airplanes).
We agree that any work done before
the effective date of the AD in
accordance with Boeing Alert Service
Bulletin 767–28A0077, dated March 6,
2003, is acceptable for compliance with
the actions specified in paragraphs (f)
and (g) of this supplemental NPRM
(specified as paragraph (g) in the
original NPRM) for Model 767–200,
–300, and –300F series airplanes. In
addition, we have determined that any
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work done before the effective date of
the AD in accordance with Boeing Alert
Service Bulletin 767–28A0081, dated
March 6, 2003, is acceptable for
compliance with the actions specified in
paragraphs (f) and (g) of this
supplemental NPRM for Model 767–
400ER series airplanes (Boeing Alert
Service Bulletin 767–28A0081, Revision
1, dated July 8, 2004, is listed as the
appropriate source of service
information for doing the actions
specified in paragraph (g) of the original
NPRM for Model 767–400ER series
airplanes).
We have added new paragraph (j) to
this supplemental NPRM to give credit
for actions done before the effective date
of the AD in accordance with these
service bulletins. We have also removed
the service bulletin reference paragraph
from this supplemental NPRM
(specified as paragraph (f) in the original
NPRM) and we have included the
service bulletin information in
paragraphs (f) and (g) of this
supplemental NPRM (specified as
paragraph (g) in the original NPRM).
Request To Add Terminating Action
ABX Air, Continental Airlines, All
Nippon Airways (ANA), UPS, and
Boeing state that there is now a
terminating action for the repetitive
inspections (measurements) specified in
paragraph (g) of original NPRM since
Boeing has issued Alert Service
Bulletins 767–28A0088 and 767–
28A0089, both dated February 24, 2005,
which replace the main tank fuel boost
pumps with new or modified pumps.
Several commenters request that a
statement be added to the original
NPRM that the incorporation of the
above service bulletins constitutes an
optional terminating action for the
repetitive inspections of paragraph (g) of
the original NPRM. ANA also requests
clarification that the new pumps are not
subject to the repetitive inspections.
Several commenters also point out that
Note 3 of the original NPRM specifies
that there is no terminating action
available for the actions in paragraph (g)
and request that Note 3 be deleted
because there is an optional terminating
action.
We agree with the commenters that
the replacements specified in Boeing
Alert Service Bulletins 767–28A0088
and 767–28A0089 are terminating
action for the repetitive measurements
specified in paragraphs (f) and (g) of this
supplemental NPRM. However, we do
not agree that the replacement should be
optional. Paragraph (i) of this
supplemental NPRM would require
replacing the fuel pumps and is a
terminating action for the repetitive
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measurements specified in paragraphs
(f) and (g) of this supplemental NPRM.
We have also removed Note 3 from this
supplemental NPRM because there is
now terminating action.
Request To Exclude Part From
Requirements of Paragraph (h)
ABX Air requests that pump assembly
part number (P/N) 5006003D be
excluded from the requirements of
paragraph (h) of the original NPRM. The
commenter indicates that P/N 5006003D
is approved to be installed on Model
767 airplanes per Boeing Alert Service
Bulletins 767–28A0088 and 767–
28A0089.
We agree. We have revised paragraph
(k) of this supplemental NPRM
(specified as paragraph (h) in the
original NPRM) to allow the installation
of the main fuel tank boost pump P/N
5006003D.
Request To Revise Compliance Times
To Match Service Bulletins
ANA requests that the compliance
times for the original NPRM follow the
compliance times specified in Boeing
Alert Service Bulletins 767–28A0077
and 767–28A0081. The commenter
notes that the original NPRM specifies
that ‘‘prior to the accumulation of
15,000 total flight hours, or within 365
days after the effective date of this AD,
whichever is later; do a detailed
inspection * * *.’’ The commenter
contends that this is different from the
alert service bulletins. The commenter
notes that it is performing the
inspections in accordance with the alert
service bulletins.
We agree with the commenter’s
request to follow the compliance times
in the alert service bulletins. For certain
airplanes specified in the alert service
bulletins, the initial inspections should
be done within 365 days after the
airplane has accumulated 15,000 total
flight hours. We recognize that the
compliance times in the original NPRM
penalize the operators with airplanes
that have accumulated fewer flight
hours, and that the start of the repetitive
inspections should be based on the
number of hours the airplane has
accumulated. Therefore, we have
revised the compliance times in this
supplemental NPRM to align with the
compliance times specified in the alert
service bulletins.
Request To Extend Initial Compliance
Times to Within 24 Months
The Air Transport Association
requests that the compliance time for
the initial inspections be extended to 24
months. The commenter indicates that a
compliance time of 24 months would
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better align with the scheduled
maintenance of operators of Model 767
airplanes and would align with other
fuel tank system actions that may be
required as a result of Special Federal
Aviation Regulation No. 88 (‘‘SFAR 88,’’
Amendment 21–78, and subsequent
Amendments 21–82 and 21–83). The
commenter also contends that dry
running pumps in the main tanks does
not present a meaningful risk during
ground or flight operations because
those concerns would be eclipsed by
fuel starvation of the engine. The
commenter also states that although
there is the risk of dry running pumps
during defueling operations, it looks to
proper maintenance procedures for
mitigation. The commenter concludes
that allowing 24 months to do the initial
inspection would not impair the
intended level of safety.
We do not agree with the commenter
to allow the initial inspections within
24 months after the effective date of the
AD. A study made by Hamilton
Sundstrand, the manufacturer of the
affected fuel pumps, shows that up to
25% of the pumps could have loose or
missing flame arrestors. For this reason,
it is necessary to divide the airplanes
into two groups. For airplanes having
line numbers (L/Ns) 1 through 914, an
investigation has indicated that the
subject fuel pumps might not have
flame arrestors. These airplanes would
need to be inspected for missing flame
arrestors within 365 days as specified in
Boeing Alert Service Bulletins 767–
28A0077 and 767–28A0081. For
airplanes having L/Ns 915 and
subsequent: The inspection would need
to done within 365 days on airplanes
that have accumulated more than 15,000
total flight hours; and on airplanes that
accumulated less than 15,000 total flight
hours, the inspection would need to be
done within 365 days after the airplane
accumulates 15,000 total flight hours.
As there are many Model 767 airplanes
in the world fleet that have accumulated
more than 15,000 flight hours, we find
that the compliance time of 365 days
would provide an adequate level of
safety.
We also do not agree that dry running
pumps in the main tank does not
present a meaningful risk during ground
or flight operations. We are concerned
that dry running pumps without flame
arrestors are hazardous due to the lack
of data on the ability of the flame front
to propagate to the ullage through some
depth of fuel prior to fuel starvation of
the engine. Additionally, airplane
attitude variation during flight
operations can uncover at least one of
the fuel pump inlets prior to fuel
starvation, especially during a low fuel
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go around on approach. Proper
maintenance procedures mitigate the
risk during defueling operations;
however, defueling can occur with
passengers on board and we have
concerns with improperly conducted
maintenance procedures.
The basis for the compliance times
specified by this supplemental NPRM
includes the fact that a missing flame
arrestor does not present a very high
risk for most flight conditions when
there is enough fuel to cover the pump
inlet as the probability of a flame
reaching the fuel tank is significantly
reduced if fuel covers the pump inlet.
In developing appropriate compliance
times for this supplemental NPRM, we
considered the manufacturer’s
recommendation specified in the alert
service bulletins, the degree of urgency
associated with the subject unsafe
condition, the average utilization of the
affected fleet and the time necessary to
perform the actions. In light of all of
these factors, we find that the
compliance times specified in this
supplemental NPRM represent an
appropriate interval of time for affected
airplanes to continue to operate without
compromising safety. However, an
operator may request an alternative
method of compliance (AMOC) to
extend the compliance time in
accordance with paragraph (l) of this
supplemental NPRM.
Request To Revise Applicability and
Compliance Times
Boeing recommends that the
compliance times for airplanes having
L/Ns 915 through 926 be revised to
match the compliance times specified in
the alert service bulletins for airplanes
having L/Ns 1 through 914. The
commenter notes that the applicability
of L/Ns 1 through 914 for the one set of
compliance times was based on
Hamilton Sundstrand determining
which pumps had the missing flame
arrestors. However, the commenter
states that the terminating action design
was incorporated at L/N 927 with the
new main boost pump part number
specified in Boeing Alert Service
Bulletins 767–28A0088 and 767–
28A0089. Therefore, the commenter
notes that including airplanes having L/
Ns 915 through 926 in the compliance
times for L/Ns 1 through 914 would
clarify when the new pump number was
installed. The commenter recommends
the following compliance times for the
original NPRM:
‘‘For aircraft having L/N 1–926, do an
initial inspection within 365 days. For those
aircraft with more than 15,000 hours, do the
inspection again at each 6,000 flight interval
or 24 months whichever comes first. For
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those aircraft with less than 15,000 hours, do
the inspection again within 365 days from
the date the aircraft reaches 15,000 hours.
Repeat the inspection at each 6,000 flight
interval or 24 months whichever comes
first.’’
Since Boeing’s comments were not
consistent with its own service bulletin
recommendation, we contacted the
manufacturer for clarification on its
position. Boeing revised its position to
be consistent with Boeing Alert Service
Bulletins 767–28A0077 and 767–
28A0081 for airplanes having L/Ns 1
through 926 and further recommended
that for airplanes having L/N 927 and
on, an inspection is not required since
the airplane already has the new part
number installed.
While we acknowledge that airplanes
having L/N 927 and subsequent have
been equipped with the new pumps in
production, the pumps may have been
replaced since then. Therefore, all
airplanes must be inspected. However,
operators may examine their records to
determine if the new fuel pumps are
installed. If it is conclusively
determined that the new pumps are
installed, no further action is necessary.
We have added new paragraph (h) to
allow a records review to determine if
the new pump is installed.
Request To Reference Future Revision
of Service Bulletin
ATA, on behalf of its members,
American Airlines and United Airlines,
requests that the original NPRM
reference Revision 2 of the Boeing Alert
Service Bulletins 767–28A0077 and
767–28A0081. The commenter states
that Revision 2 will cite HamiltonSundstrand Service Bulletin 5006003–
28–3, which would provide the
instructions to incorporate into the
subject fuel pumps a new shaft and
rotor assembly designed to correct the
problem.
We do not agree. We have confirmed
with Boeing that Alert Service Bulletins
767–28A0077 and 767–28A0081 will
not be revised to provide a terminating
action. As discussed previously, Boeing
has issued Alert Service Bulletins 767–
28A0088 and 767–28A0089, which
constitute terminating actions for the
repetitive actions of paragraphs (f) and
(g) of this supplemental NPRM.
Request To Revise Cost
ATA, on behalf of its member United
Airlines, requests that the cost analysis
be revised. ATA requests that the cost
analysis include items such as the
impact of airplanes rerouting to a
maintenance facility, aircraft
preparation, access, correction of
discrepancies found, aircraft close-up,
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and any additional test necessary to put
the airplane back in operation. United
Airlines states that the repair cost of
pumps should be included because
Hamilton-Sundstrand quoted a 25%
failure rate. United Airlines also notes
that 60% of the pumps it has inspected
had inlet diffuser struts eroded beyond
the specified limits and therefore, pump
repairs and replacement sleeve costs
should be included.
We do not agree to revise the cost
analysis. In establishing the
requirements of all ADs, we do consider
cost impact to operators beyond the
estimates of parts and labor costs
contained in AD preambles. For
example, where safety considerations
allow, we attempt to set compliance
times that generally coincide with
operators’ maintenance schedules.
However, because operators’ schedules
vary substantially, we cannot
accommodate every operator’s optimal
scheduling in each AD. Each AD does
allow individual operators to obtain
approval for extensions of compliance
times, based on a showing that the
extension will not affect safety
adversely. Therefore, we do not
consider it appropriate to attribute to
this supplemental NPRM the costs
associated with the type of special
scheduling that might otherwise be
required.
Furthermore, we do not consider it
appropriate to attribute the costs
associated with aircraft ‘‘down time’’ to
this supplemental NPRM. Normally,
compliance with an AD will not
necessitate any additional down time
beyond that of a regularly scheduled
maintenance hold. Even if additional
down time is necessary for some
airplanes in some cases, we do not have
sufficient information to evaluate the
number of airplanes that may be so
affected or the amount of additional
down time that may be required as this
may vary from operator to operator.
Therefore, attempting to estimate such
costs is not appropriate.
In addition, the economic analysis
does not consider the costs of
conditional actions, such as repairing a
crack detected during a required
inspection (‘‘repair, if necessary’’). Such
conditional repairs would be required,
regardless of AD direction, to correct an
unsafe condition identified in an
airplane and to ensure that the airplane
is operated in an airworthy condition, as
required by the Federal Aviation
Regulations.
The compliance times presented in
this supplemental NPRM were
developed to minimize the economic
impact on operators as much as possible
while being consistent with the safety
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objectives associated with this
supplemental NPRM and the referenced
alert service bulletins. We have not
revised this supplemental NPRM in this
regard.
rwilkins on PROD1PC63 with PROPOSAL
Request for SFAR 88 Information
ATA questions if the original NPRM
originated from the SFAR 88 fuel tank
system safety review.
We confirm that this supplemental
NPRM did not originate from the SFAR
88 fuel tank system safety review.
Request To Remove Repetitive
Inspections
Delta Airlines states that it is not
convinced the repetitive inspections
specified in the original NPRM are
necessary. We infer that the commenter
requests that the repetitive inspections
be removed. The commenter states that
the risk of problems associated with
missing or loose boost pump flame
arrestors is not great enough to justify
repetitive inspections fleetwide. The
commenter also states that the pump
flame arrestors have been found loose
but not missing, and that they retain
their flame arresting qualities if loose. In
addition, the commenter states that if a
sheared roll pin is going to cause a
problem, it is going to occur
immediately after the pin fails; since the
roll pin can shear at any time, no
amount of inspections would prevent
pin failures.
The commenter believes that the more
likely scenario, dry running pumps in
the main tanks during ground or flight
operations, is not a meaningful risk
because those concerns would be
eclipsed by fuel starvation of the
engines. The commenter notes that it
looks to proper maintenance procedures
for mitigation of the risk of dry running
pumps during defueling operations. The
commenter suggests that installation of
an improved pin or a pin replacement
program would solve the problem better
than repetitive inspections.
We understand Delta’s concerns;
however, we do not agree to remove the
repetitive inspections. The objective of
the flame arrestor is to preclude a flame
originated in the reprime unit or beyond
from moving to the fuel tank. The flame
arrestor may drop into the reprime unit
area if the flame arrestor pin is broken
and contacts rotating parts; in this
position, a flame arrestor might create
sparks that ignite the fuel vapors. A
misplaced or missing flame arrestor
represents a latent failure that leaves the
airplane one failure away from a fuel
tank ignition.
The probability of a flame reaching
the fuel tank is significantly reduced if
fuel covers the pump inlet. The
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compliance times specified by this
supplemental NPRM recognize the fact
that a missing flame arrestor does not
present a very high risk for most flight
conditions when there is enough fuel to
cover the pump inlet. We find that, to
achieve an adequate level of safety for
the affected fleet, repetitive inspections
are necessary. We have not revised this
supplemental NPRM in this regard.
Request To Reference Part Numbers
The Modification and Replacement
Parts Association (MARPA) requests
that we identify the affected fuel pumps
in the original NPRM by either Boeing
or Hamilton Sundstrand (or both) part
numbers. The MARPA also requests that
we include any possible defective parts
manufacturer approval (PMA)
alternative parts so that any defective
PMA parts are also subject to the
original NPRM.
The commenter asserts that, under 14
CFR 21.303, there may be fuel pumps
that could be approved replacement
parts for the affected fuel pumps. If
replacement parts do exist, the MARPA
states that the PMA fuel pumps may
have a different part number from the
affected fuel pumps and therefore will
not likely be addressed by model or
serial number in the service
information. Therefore, the MARPA
asserts that a regulatory loophole is
created if a ‘‘defective’’ PMA part is
installed, because only the original
equipment manufacturer (OEM) part
will be identified in the manufacturer
service information. In addition, the
MARPA states that the affected fuel
pumps are identified in proprietary
service information that is not available
to the general public and that the
proprietary service information may
also not be available to supplier or
repair facilities. Therefore, the MARPA
concludes that repair and supply
facilities might have defective OEM or
PMA parts in stock that could be put
into service unless such parts are
identified as subject to the requirements
of the original NPRM.
We acknowledge the MARPA’s
concerns; however, we do not agree that
it is necessary to identify the
manufacturer and part numbers of the
subject fuel pumps. At this time, we are
not aware of other PMA parts equivalent
to the affected fuel pumps. Also, this
supplemental NPRM would require that
all fuel pumps be inspected, regardless
of origin. Since the part numbers of the
affected fuel pumps are identified in the
applicable Boeing and Hamilton
Sundstrand service bulletins specified
in the supplemental NPRM, it is
unnecessary to specify part numbers in
the supplemental NPRM.
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Sfmt 4702
We concur with the MARPA’s general
request that, if we know that an unsafe
condition also exists in PMA parts, the
AD should address those parts, as well
as the original parts. The MARPA’s
remarks are timely in that the Transport
Airplane Directorate currently is in the
process of reviewing this issue as it
applies to transport category airplanes.
We acknowledge that there may be other
ways of addressing this issue to ensure
that unsafe PMA parts are identified and
addressed. Once we have thoroughly
examined all aspects of this issue,
including input from industry, and have
made a final determination, we will
consider whether our policy regarding
addressing PMA parts in ADs needs to
be revised.
In response to the commenter’s
statement regarding a ‘‘regulatory
loophole,’’ this statement appears to
reflect a misunderstanding of the
relationship between ADs and the
certification procedural regulations of
part 21 of the Federal Aviation
Regulations (14 CFR part 21). Those
regulations, including section 21.303 of
the Federal Aviation Regulations (14
CFR 21.203), are intended to ensure that
aeronautical products comply with the
applicable airworthiness standards. But
ADs are issued when, notwithstanding
those procedures, we become aware of
unsafe conditions in these products or
parts. Therefore, an AD takes
precedence over design approvals when
we identify an unsafe condition.
Since we have determined that an
unsafe condition exists and that
replacement of certain parts must be
accomplished to ensure continued
safety, no additional change has been
made to the supplemental NPRM in this
regard.
Request To Reference PMA Parts
The MARPA requests that the
language in the original NPRM be
changed to embrace any PMA
alternatives.
We infer that the MARPA would like
the original NPRM to permit installation
of any equivalent PMA parts so that it
is not necessary for an operator to
request approval of an AMOC in order
to install an ‘‘equivalent’’ PMA part.
Whether an alternative part is
‘‘equivalent’’ in adequately resolving the
unsafe condition can only be
determined on a case-by-case basis
based on a complete understanding of
the unsafe condition. We are not
currently aware of any such parts. Our
policy is that, in order for operators to
replace a part with one that is not
specified in an AD, they must request an
AMOC. This is necessary so that we can
make a specific determination that an
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Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 129 / Thursday, July 6, 2006 / Proposed Rules
alternative part is or is not susceptible
to the same unsafe condition.
An AD provides a means of
compliance for operators to ensure that
the identified unsafe condition is
addressed appropriately. For an unsafe
condition attributable to a part, an AD
normally identifies the replacement
parts necessary to obtain that
compliance. As stated in section 39.7 of
the Federal Aviation Regulations (14
CFR 39.7), ‘‘Anyone who operates a
product that does not meet the
requirements of an applicable
airworthiness directive is in violation of
this section.’’ Unless an operator obtains
approval for an AMOC, replacing a part
with one not specified by an AD would
make the operator subject to an
enforcement action and result in a civil
penalty. No change to this supplemental
NPRM is necessary in this regard.
this will provide flexibility to operators.
The commenter notes that it does not
have many spare pumps.
We acknowledge that doing the
actions in the supplemental NPRM at a
separate time for each main fuel tank
would provide flexibility to the
operators. Operators may do the actions
for each pump separately provided that
operators have done the actions on all
pumps within the applicable
compliance times specified in the
supplemental NPRM. We have added
Note 1, Note 4, and Note 5 to this
supplemental NPRM to clarify that the
actions may be done separately
provided that all actions are done
within the applicable compliance times.
Request To Allow Doing Actions on the
Main Fuel Tanks Separately
ANA requests that we permit
operators to do the inspection of each
main fuel tank separately and not
require operators to do an inspection of
all main fuel tanks on an airplane at the
same maintenance stop. Also, the
commenter requests that we permit
operators to do any terminating action
for each main fuel tank independent of
the other. The commenter states that
Certain changes discussed above
expand the scope of the original NPRM;
therefore, we have determined that it is
necessary to reopen the comment period
to provide additional opportunity for
public comment on this supplemental
NPRM.
FAA’s Determination and Proposed
Requirements of the Supplemental
NPRM
Explanation of Change to Applicability
We have revised the applicability of
the original NPRM to identify model
designations as published in the most
recent type certificate data sheet for the
affected models.
Clarification of Unsafe Condition
Statement
The original NPRM specified the
unsafe condition as ‘‘the possible
migration of a flame from a main tank
fuel boost pump inlet to the vapor space
of that fuel tank, and consequent
ignition of fuel vapors, which could
result in a fire or explosion, should the
pump inlets become uncovered.’’ We
have revised the unsafe condition
statement in this supplemental NPRM
by removing the phrase ‘‘should the
pump inlets become uncovered.’’ The
pump inlet does not need to be
uncovered for ignited vapors in the
pump to cause a tank explosion.
Clarification of AMOC Paragraph
We have revised this action to clarify
the appropriate procedure for notifying
the principal inspector before using any
approved AMOC on any airplane to
which the AMOC applies.
Costs of Compliance
This supplemental NPRM affects
about 915 airplanes worldwide, and 400
airplanes of U.S. registry. The following
table provides the estimated costs for
U.S. operators to comply with this
supplemental NPRM.
ESTIMATED COSTS
Work
hours
Action
Inspection of flame arrestor presence/
Position.
Replacement ..........................................
Average
labor rate
per hour
Parts
Cost per airplane
Fleet cost
5
$80
None ........
$400, per inspection cycle ........
$160,000, per inspection cycle.
3
80
$25,004 ...
$25,244 .....................................
$10,097,600. 1
1 However, the parts manufacturer states that it may cover the cost of replacement parts associated with this supplemental NPRM for certain
affected airplanes, subject to warranty conditions. As a result, the costs attributable to the supplemental NPRM may be less than stated above.
rwilkins on PROD1PC63 with PROPOSAL
Authority for This Rulemaking
Title 49 of the United States Code
specifies the FAA’s authority to issue
rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I,
section 106, describes the authority of
the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII,
Aviation Programs, describes in more
detail the scope of the Agency’s
authority.
We are issuing this rulemaking under
the authority described in subtitle VII,
part A, subpart III, section 44701,
‘‘General requirements.’’ Under that
section, Congress charges the FAA with
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in
air commerce by prescribing regulations
for practices, methods, and procedures
the Administrator finds necessary for
safety in air commerce. This regulation
is within the scope of that authority
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because it addresses an unsafe condition
that is likely to exist or develop on
products identified in this rulemaking
action.
Regulatory Findings
We have determined that this
proposed AD would not have federalism
implications under Executive Order
13132. This proposed AD would not
have a substantial direct effect on the
States, on the relationship between the
national Government and the States, or
on the distribution of power and
responsibilities among the various
levels of government.
For the reasons discussed above, I
certify that the proposed regulation:
1. Is not a ‘‘significant regulatory
action’’ under Executive Order 12866;
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Fmt 4702
Sfmt 4702
2. Is not a ‘‘significant rule’’ under the
DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures
(44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and
3. Will not have a significant
economic impact, positive or negative,
on a substantial number of small entities
under the criteria of the Regulatory
Flexibility Act.
We prepared a regulatory evaluation
of the estimated costs to comply with
this supplemental NPRM and placed it
in the AD docket. See the ADDRESSES
section for a location to examine the
regulatory evaluation.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39
Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation
safety, Safety.
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Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 129 / Thursday, July 6, 2006 / Proposed Rules
The Proposed Amendment
Accordingly, under the authority
delegated to me by the Administrator,
the FAA proposes to amend 14 CFR part
39 as follows:
PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS
DIRECTIVES
1. The authority citation for part 39
continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.
§ 39.13
[Amended]
2. The Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) amends § 39.13
by adding the following new
airworthiness directive (AD):
Boeing: Docket No. FAA–2005–20351;
Directorate Identifier 2003–NM–269–AD.
Comments Due Date
(a) The FAA must receive comments on
this AD action by July 31, 2006.
Affected ADs
(b) None.
Applicability
(c) This AD applies to all Boeing Model
767–200, –300, –300F, and –400ER series
airplanes, certificated in any category.
Unsafe Condition
(d) This AD results from reports that
certain fuel boost pumps may not have flame
arrestors installed in the pump shaft and
reports that the pin that holds the flame
arrestor in place can break due to metal
fatigue. We are issuing this AD to prevent the
possible migration of a flame from a main
tank fuel boost pump inlet to the vapor space
of that fuel tank, and consequent ignition of
fuel vapors, which could result in a fire or
explosion.
rwilkins on PROD1PC63 with PROPOSAL
Compliance
(e) You are responsible for having the
actions required by this AD performed within
the compliance times specified, unless the
actions have already been done.
Inspection for Presence/Position of Flame
Arrestor in Main Tank Fuel Boost Pumps
(f) For airplanes having line numbers (L/
Ns) 1 through 914 inclusive, except as
provided by paragraph (h) of this AD: Within
365 days after the effective date of this AD,
do a detailed inspection of each main tank
fuel boost pump to determine if the pump
shaft flame arrestor is installed, a
measurement of the flame arrestor’s position
in the pump, and all applicable corrective
actions, by accomplishing all the actions
specified in the Accomplishment
Instructions of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin
767–28A0077 (for Model 767–200, –300, and
–300F series airplanes) or Boeing Alert
Service Bulletin 767–28A0081 (for Model
767–400ER series airplanes), both Revision 1,
both dated July 8, 2004, as applicable. Repeat
the measurement of the flame arrestor’s
position in the pump thereafter at intervals
not to exceed the applicable time specified in
paragraph (f)(1) or (f)(2) of this AD, until the
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16:49 Jul 05, 2006
Jkt 208001
replacement required by paragraph (i) of this
AD is accomplished. All applicable
corrective actions must be done before
further flight.
Note 1: Any inspection/measurement of
the pumps on the left and right main fuel
tanks may be done separately provided that
the actions are done on all pumps within the
compliance time specified in paragraph (f) of
this AD.
(1) For airplanes that have accumulated
more than 15,000 total flight hours as of the
date the initial actions are done in
accordance with paragraph (f) of this AD:
Repeat the measurement thereafter at
intervals not to exceed 6,000 flight hours or
24 months, whichever comes first.
(2) For airplanes that have accumulated
15,000 total flight hours or fewer as of the
date the initial actions are done in
accordance with paragraph (f) of this AD: Do
the measurement specified in paragraph (f) of
this AD within 365 days after the date on
which the airplane accumulates 15,000 total
flight hours. Repeat the measurement
thereafter at intervals not to exceed 6,000
flight hours or 24 months, whichever comes
first.
Note 2: The Boeing alert service bulletins
reference Hamilton Sundstrand Service
Bulletin 5006003–28–2, dated October 25,
2002, as an additional source of service
information for accomplishment of the
inspection and corrective actions. Although
the Hamilton Sundstrand service bulletin
specifies to return main tank fuel boost
pumps with damaged, broken, or out-ofposition flame arrestors to a repair shop, that
action is not required by this AD.
Note 3: For the purposes of this AD, a
detailed inspection is: ‘‘An intensive
examination of a specific item, installation,
or assembly to detect damage, failure, or
irregularity. Available lighting is normally
supplemented with a direct source of good
lighting at an intensity deemed appropriate.
Inspection aids such as mirror, magnifying
lenses, etc., may be necessary. Surface
cleaning and elaborate procedures may be
required.’’
(g) For airplanes having L/Ns 915 and on,
except as provided by paragraph (h) of this
AD: At the applicable time specified in
paragraph (g)(1) or (g)(2) of this AD, do a
detailed inspection of each main tank fuel
boost pump to determine if the pump shaft
flame arrestor is installed, a measurement of
the flame arrestor’s position in the pump,
and all applicable corrective actions, by
accomplishing all the actions specified in the
Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing Alert
Service Bulletin 767–28A0077 (for Model
767–200, –300, and –300F series airplanes) or
Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 767–28A0081
(for Model 767–400ER series airplanes), both
Revision 1, both dated July 8, 2004, as
applicable. Repeat the measurement of the
flame arrestor’s position in the pump
thereafter at intervals not to exceed 6,000
flight hours or 24 months, whichever comes
first, until the replacement required by
paragraph (i) of this AD is accomplished. All
applicable corrective actions must be done
before further flight.
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Sfmt 4702
Note 4: Any inspection/measurement of
the pumps on the left and right main fuel
tanks may be done separately provided that
the actions are done on all pumps within the
compliance time specified in paragraph (g) of
this AD.
(1) For airplanes that have accumulated
more than 15,000 total flight hours as of the
effective date of this AD, do the actions
within 365 days after the effective date of this
AD.
(2) For airplanes that have accumulated
15,000 total flight hours or fewer as of the
effective date of this AD, do the actions
within 365 days after the date on which the
airplane accumulates 15,000 total flight
hours.
Optional Terminating Action—Records
Review
(h) For any period when the part number
(P/N) of a main tank fuel boost pump
installed on any airplane, as conclusively
determined from a review of airplane
maintenance records, is P/N 5006003D, no
further action is required by paragraphs (f),
(g), and (i) of this AD for that pump only.
Replacement of the Main Tank Fuel Boost
Pumps
(i) Within 36 months after the effective
date of this AD, replace the left and right
main tank fuel boost pumps with new or
modified pumps in accordance with the
Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing Alert
Service Bulletin 767–28A0088 (for Model
767–200, –300, and –300F series airplanes) or
Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 767–28A0089
(for Model 767–400ER series airplanes), both
dated February 24, 2005, as applicable.
Accomplishment of the replacement
terminates the repetitive measurement
requirements of paragraphs (f) and (g) of this
AD for that pump only.
Note 5: Any replacement of the pumps on
the left and right main fuel tanks may be
done separately provided that all pumps are
replaced within the compliance time
specified in paragraph (i) of this AD.
Note 6: The Boeing alert service bulletins
reference Hamilton Sundstrand Service
Bulletin 5006003–28–3, dated December 8,
2004, as the appropriate source of service
information for modifying the pump.
Inspections Accomplished According to
Previous Issue of Service Bulletin
(j) Inspections accomplished before the
effective date of this AD according to Boeing
Alert Service Bulletin 767–28A0077, dated
March 6, 2003; or Boeing Alert Service
Bulletin 767–28A0081, dated March 6, 2003;
are considered acceptable for compliance
with the corresponding action specified in
paragraphs (f) and (g) of this AD.
Parts Installation
(k) As of the effective date of this AD, only
main tank fuel boost pumps identified in
paragraphs (k)(1) and (k)(2) of this AD may
be installed on any airplane.
(1) Any main tank fuel boost pump that has
been inspected, and on which all applicable
corrective actions have been performed, in
accordance with paragraph (f) or (g) of this
AD.
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Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 129 / Thursday, July 6, 2006 / Proposed Rules
(2) Any main tank fuel boost pump having
P/N 5006003D.
Alternative Methods of Compliance
(AMOCs)
(l)(1) The Manager, Seattle Aircraft
Certification Office, FAA, has the authority to
approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested in
accordance with the procedures found in 14
CFR 39.19.
(2) Before using any AMOC approved in
accordance with § 39.19 on any airplane to
which the AMOC applies, notify the
appropriate principal inspector in the FAA
Flight Standards Certificate Holding District
Office.
Issued in Renton, Washington, on June 13,
2006.
Ali Bahrami,
Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate,
Aircraft Certification Service.
[FR Doc. E6–10536 Filed 7–5–06; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–13–P
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. FAA–2006–25271; Directorate
Identifier 2006–NM–067–AD]
RIN 2120–AA64
Airworthiness Directives; Saab Model
SAAB-Fairchild SF340A (SAAB/
SF340A) and SAAB 340B Airplanes
We must receive comments on
this proposed AD by August 7, 2006.
ADDRESSES: Use one of the following
addresses to submit comments on this
proposed AD.
• DOT Docket Web site: Go to
https://dms.dot.gov and follow the
instructions for sending your comments
electronically.
• Government-wide rulemaking Web
site: Go to https://www.regulations.gov
and follow the instructions for sending
your comments electronically.
• Mail: Docket Management Facility;
U.S. Department of Transportation, 400
Seventh Street, SW., Nassif Building,
Room PL–401, Washington, DC 20590.
• Fax: (202) 493–2251.
• Hand Delivery: Room PL–401 on
the plaza level of the Nassif Building,
400 Seventh Street, SW., Washington,
DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday
through Friday, except Federal holidays.
Contact Saab Aircraft AB, SAAB
Aircraft Product Support, S–581.88,
¨
Linkoping, Sweden, for service
information identified in this proposed
AD.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Mike Borfitz, Aerospace Engineer,
International Branch, ANM–116, FAA,
Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601
Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington
98055–4056; telephone (425) 227–2677;
fax (425) 227–1149.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
DATES:
AGENCY:
Comments Invited
SUMMARY: The FAA proposes to
supersede an existing airworthiness
directive (AD) that applies to certain
Model SAAB-Fairchild SF340A and
SAAB 340B airplanes. The existing AD
currently requires repetitive inspections
for wear of the brushes and leads and
for loose rivets of the direct current (DC)
starter generator, and related
investigative/corrective actions if
necessary. This proposed AD would
require installing new improved
generator control units (GCUs).
Installing the GCUs would end the
repetitive inspection requirements of
the existing AD. This proposed AD
results from reports of premature
failures of the DC starter generator prior
to scheduled overhaul. We are
proposing this AD to prevent failure of
the starter generator, which could cause
a low voltage situation in flight and
result in increased pilot workload and
reduced redundancy of the electrical
powered systems.
We invite you to submit any relevant
written data, views, or arguments
regarding this proposed AD. Send your
comments to an address listed in the
ADDRESSES section. Include the docket
number ‘‘Docket No. FAA–2006–25271;
Directorate Identifier 2006–NM–067–
AD’’ at the beginning of your comments.
We specifically invite comments on the
overall regulatory, economic,
environmental, and energy aspects of
the proposed AD. We will consider all
comments received by the closing date
and may amend the proposed AD in
light of those comments.
We will post all comments we
receive, without change, to https://
dms.dot.gov, including any personal
information you provide. We will also
post a report summarizing each
substantive verbal contact with FAA
personnel concerning this proposed AD.
Using the search function of that Web
site, anyone can find and read the
comments in any of our dockets,
including the name of the individual
who sent the comment (or signed the
comment on behalf of an association,
business, labor union, etc.). You may
review the DOT’s complete Privacy Act
rwilkins on PROD1PC63 with PROPOSAL
Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking
(NPRM).
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38311
Statement in the Federal Register
published on April 11, 2000 (65 FR
19477–78), or you may visit https://
dms.dot.gov.
Examining the Docket
You may examine the AD docket on
the Internet at https://dms.dot.gov, or in
person at the Docket Management
Facility office between 9 a.m. and 5
p.m., Monday through Friday, except
Federal holidays. The Docket
Management Facility office (telephone
(800) 647–5227) is located on the plaza
level of the Nassif Building at the DOT
street address stated in the ADDRESSES
section. Comments will be available in
the AD docket shortly after the Docket
Management System receives them.
Discussion
On February 11, 2005, we issued AD
2005–04–12, amendment 39–13984 (70
FR 9215, February 25, 2005), for certain
Saab Model SAAB SF340A and SAAB
340B series airplanes. That AD requires
repetitive inspections for wear of the
brushes and leads and for loose rivets of
the direct current (DC) starter generator,
and related investigative/corrective
actions if necessary. That AD resulted
from reports of premature failures of the
DC starter generator prior to scheduled
overhaul. We issued that AD to prevent
failure of the starter generator, which
could cause a low voltage situation in
flight and result in increased pilot
workload and reduced redundancy of
the electrical powered systems.
Actions Since Existing AD Was Issued
The preamble to AD 2005–04–12
explains that we considered the
requirements ‘‘interim action’’ and were
considering further rulemaking if a final
action is identified. The manufacturer
has now designed a new improved
generator control unit (GCU), and we
have determined that further
rulemaking is indeed necessary; this
proposed AD follows from that
determination.
Relevant Service Information
Saab has issued Saab 340 Service
Bulletin 340–24–026, Revision 03, dated
December 20, 2004. The service bulletin
describes procedures for installing new
improved GCUs. Accomplishing the
actions specified in the service
information is intended to adequately
address the unsafe condition. The
Luftfartsverket (LFS), which is the
airworthiness authority for Sweden,
mandated the service information and
issued Swedish airworthiness directive
1–197, dated November 5, 2004, to
ensure the continued airworthiness of
these airplanes in Sweden.
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]]>Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 71, Number 129 (Thursday, July 6, 2006)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 38304-38311]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E6-10536]
=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. FAA-2005-20351; Directorate Identifier 2003-NM-269-AD]
RIN 2120-AA64
Airworthiness Directives; Boeing Model 767 Airplanes
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Supplemental notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM); reopening of
comment period.
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SUMMARY: The FAA is revising an earlier proposed airworthiness
directive (AD) for all Boeing Model 767 airplanes. The original NPRM
would have required an inspection of each main tank fuel boost pump for
the presence of a pump shaft flame arrestor, and if the flame arrestor
is missing, replacement of that pump with a pump having a pump shaft
flame arrestor. The original NPRM would also have required repetitive
measurements of the flame arrestor's position in the pump, and
corrective actions if necessary. The original NPRM resulted from
reports that certain fuel boost pumps may not have flame arrestors
installed in the pump shaft and reports
[[Page 38305]]
that the pin that holds the flame arrestor in place can break due to
metal fatigue. This action revises the original NPRM by proposing the
replacement of the pump with a new or modified pump, which would end
the repetitive measurements. This action also revises the compliance
times for certain airplanes. We are proposing this supplemental NPRM to
prevent the possible migration of a flame from a main tank fuel boost
pump inlet to the vapor space of that fuel tank, and consequent
ignition of fuel vapors, which could result in a fire or explosion.
DATES: We must receive comments on this supplemental NPRM by July 31,
2006.
ADDRESSES: Use one of the following addresses to submit comments on
this supplemental NPRM.
DOT Docket Web site: Go to https://dms.dot.gov and follow
the instructions for sending your comments electronically.
Government-wide rulemaking Web site: Go to https://
www.regulations.gov and follow the instructions for sending your
comments electronically.
Mail: Docket Management Facility; U.S. Department of
Transportation, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Nassif Building, room PL-401,
Washington, DC 20590.
Fax: (202) 493-2251.
Hand Delivery: Room PL-401 on the plaza level of the
Nassif Building, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Washington, DC, between 9
a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.
Contact Boeing Commercial Airplanes, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle,
Washington 98124-2207, for service information identified in this
proposed AD.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: John Vann, Aerospace Engineer,
Propulsion Branch, ANM-140S, FAA, Seattle Aircraft Certification
Office, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98055-4056; telephone
(425) 917-6513; fax (425) 917-6590.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Comments Invited
We invite you to submit any relevant written data, views, or
arguments regarding this supplemental NPRM. Send your comments to an
address listed in the ADDRESSES section. Include the docket number
``FAA-2005-20351; Directorate Identifier 2003-NM-269-AD'' at the
beginning of your comments. We specifically invite comments on the
overall regulatory, economic, environmental, and energy aspects of this
supplemental NPRM. We will consider all comments received by the
closing date and may amend this supplemental NPRM in light of those
comments.
We will post all comments submitted, without change, to https://
dms.dot.gov, including any personal information you provide. We will
also post a report summarizing each substantive verbal contact with FAA
personnel concerning this supplemental NPRM. Using the search function
of that Web site, anyone can find and read the comments in any of our
dockets, including the name of the individual who sent the comment (or
signed the comment on behalf of an association, business, labor union,
etc.). You may review the DOT's complete Privacy Act Statement in the
Federal Register published on April 11, 2000 (65 FR 19477-78), or you
may visit https://dms.dot.gov.
Examining the Docket
You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at https://
dms.dot.gov, or in person at the Docket Management Facility office
between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal
holidays. The Docket Management Facility office (telephone (800) 647-
5227) is located on the plaza level in the Nassif Building at the DOT
street address stated in ADDRESSES. Comments will be available in the
AD docket shortly after the Docket Management System receives them.
Discussion
We proposed to amend 14 CFR part 39 with a notice of proposed
rulemaking (NPRM) for an AD (the ``original NPRM'') for all Boeing
Model 767 series airplanes. The original NPRM was published in the
Federal Register on February 15, 2005 (70 FR 7678). The original NPRM
proposed to require an inspection of each main tank fuel boost pump for
the presence of a pump shaft flame arrestor, and if the flame arrestor
is missing, replacement of that pump with a pump having a pump shaft
flame arrestor. The original NPRM also proposed to require repetitive
measurements of the flame arrestor's position in the pump, and
corrective actions if necessary.
Actions Since Original NPRM Was Issued
The preamble to the original NPRM explains that we consider the
proposed requirements ``interim action'' and were considering further
rulemaking. Since we issued the original NPRM, the manufacturer has
issued new service information, which specifies actions that terminate
the repetitive measurements proposed in the original NPRM. This
supplemental NPRM follows from the determination that the additional
actions are necessary.
Relevant Service Information
We have reviewed Boeing Alert Service Bulletins 767-28A0088 (for
Model 767-200, -300, and -300F series airplanes) and 767-28A0089 (for
Model 767-400ER series airplanes), both dated February 24, 2005. The
alert service bulletins describe procedures for replacing the left and
right main tank fuel boost pumps with new or modified pumps that have a
better flame arrestor installation. Doing the replacements ends the
inspections specified in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 767-28A0077 (for
Model 767-200, -300, and -300F series airplanes) or 767-28A0081 (for
Model 767-400ER series airplanes), both Revision 1, both dated July 8,
2004, as applicable.
Accomplishing the actions specified in the service information is
intended to adequately address the unsafe condition.
Boeing Alert Service Bulletins 767-28A0088 and 767-28A0089
reference Hamilton Sundstrand Service Bulletin 5006003-28-3, dated
December 8, 2004, as the appropriate source of service information for
modifying the pump.
Comments
We have considered the following comments on the original NPRM.
Support for the Original NPRM
The Air Line Pilots Association agrees with the original NPRM.
Request To Allow Credit
ABX Air requests that actions done in accordance with Boeing Alert
Service Bulletin 767-28A0077, dated March 6, 2003, be accepted as a
method of compliance with the requirements of the original NPRM. The
commenter indicates that there are no substantive differences between
the actions of the original version and Boeing Alert Service Bulletin
767-28A0077, Revision 1, dated July 8, 2004 (Revision 1 is listed as
the appropriate source of service information for doing the actions
specified in paragraph (g) of the original NPRM for Model 767-200, -
300, and -300F series airplanes).
We agree that any work done before the effective date of the AD in
accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 767-28A0077, dated March
6, 2003, is acceptable for compliance with the actions specified in
paragraphs (f) and (g) of this supplemental NPRM (specified as
paragraph (g) in the original NPRM) for Model 767-200, -300, and -300F
series airplanes. In addition, we have determined that any
[[Page 38306]]
work done before the effective date of the AD in accordance with Boeing
Alert Service Bulletin 767-28A0081, dated March 6, 2003, is acceptable
for compliance with the actions specified in paragraphs (f) and (g) of
this supplemental NPRM for Model 767-400ER series airplanes (Boeing
Alert Service Bulletin 767-28A0081, Revision 1, dated July 8, 2004, is
listed as the appropriate source of service information for doing the
actions specified in paragraph (g) of the original NPRM for Model 767-
400ER series airplanes).
We have added new paragraph (j) to this supplemental NPRM to give
credit for actions done before the effective date of the AD in
accordance with these service bulletins. We have also removed the
service bulletin reference paragraph from this supplemental NPRM
(specified as paragraph (f) in the original NPRM) and we have included
the service bulletin information in paragraphs (f) and (g) of this
supplemental NPRM (specified as paragraph (g) in the original NPRM).
Request To Add Terminating Action
ABX Air, Continental Airlines, All Nippon Airways (ANA), UPS, and
Boeing state that there is now a terminating action for the repetitive
inspections (measurements) specified in paragraph (g) of original NPRM
since Boeing has issued Alert Service Bulletins 767-28A0088 and 767-
28A0089, both dated February 24, 2005, which replace the main tank fuel
boost pumps with new or modified pumps. Several commenters request that
a statement be added to the original NPRM that the incorporation of the
above service bulletins constitutes an optional terminating action for
the repetitive inspections of paragraph (g) of the original NPRM. ANA
also requests clarification that the new pumps are not subject to the
repetitive inspections. Several commenters also point out that Note 3
of the original NPRM specifies that there is no terminating action
available for the actions in paragraph (g) and request that Note 3 be
deleted because there is an optional terminating action.
We agree with the commenters that the replacements specified in
Boeing Alert Service Bulletins 767-28A0088 and 767-28A0089 are
terminating action for the repetitive measurements specified in
paragraphs (f) and (g) of this supplemental NPRM. However, we do not
agree that the replacement should be optional. Paragraph (i) of this
supplemental NPRM would require replacing the fuel pumps and is a
terminating action for the repetitive measurements specified in
paragraphs (f) and (g) of this supplemental NPRM. We have also removed
Note 3 from this supplemental NPRM because there is now terminating
action.
Request To Exclude Part From Requirements of Paragraph (h)
ABX Air requests that pump assembly part number (P/N) 5006003D be
excluded from the requirements of paragraph (h) of the original NPRM.
The commenter indicates that P/N 5006003D is approved to be installed
on Model 767 airplanes per Boeing Alert Service Bulletins 767-28A0088
and 767-28A0089.
We agree. We have revised paragraph (k) of this supplemental NPRM
(specified as paragraph (h) in the original NPRM) to allow the
installation of the main fuel tank boost pump P/N 5006003D.
Request To Revise Compliance Times To Match Service Bulletins
ANA requests that the compliance times for the original NPRM follow
the compliance times specified in Boeing Alert Service Bulletins 767-
28A0077 and 767-28A0081. The commenter notes that the original NPRM
specifies that ``prior to the accumulation of 15,000 total flight
hours, or within 365 days after the effective date of this AD,
whichever is later; do a detailed inspection * * *.'' The commenter
contends that this is different from the alert service bulletins. The
commenter notes that it is performing the inspections in accordance
with the alert service bulletins.
We agree with the commenter's request to follow the compliance
times in the alert service bulletins. For certain airplanes specified
in the alert service bulletins, the initial inspections should be done
within 365 days after the airplane has accumulated 15,000 total flight
hours. We recognize that the compliance times in the original NPRM
penalize the operators with airplanes that have accumulated fewer
flight hours, and that the start of the repetitive inspections should
be based on the number of hours the airplane has accumulated.
Therefore, we have revised the compliance times in this supplemental
NPRM to align with the compliance times specified in the alert service
bulletins.
Request To Extend Initial Compliance Times to Within 24 Months
The Air Transport Association requests that the compliance time for
the initial inspections be extended to 24 months. The commenter
indicates that a compliance time of 24 months would better align with
the scheduled maintenance of operators of Model 767 airplanes and would
align with other fuel tank system actions that may be required as a
result of Special Federal Aviation Regulation No. 88 (``SFAR 88,''
Amendment 21-78, and subsequent Amendments 21-82 and 21-83). The
commenter also contends that dry running pumps in the main tanks does
not present a meaningful risk during ground or flight operations
because those concerns would be eclipsed by fuel starvation of the
engine. The commenter also states that although there is the risk of
dry running pumps during defueling operations, it looks to proper
maintenance procedures for mitigation. The commenter concludes that
allowing 24 months to do the initial inspection would not impair the
intended level of safety.
We do not agree with the commenter to allow the initial inspections
within 24 months after the effective date of the AD. A study made by
Hamilton Sundstrand, the manufacturer of the affected fuel pumps, shows
that up to 25% of the pumps could have loose or missing flame
arrestors. For this reason, it is necessary to divide the airplanes
into two groups. For airplanes having line numbers (L/Ns) 1 through
914, an investigation has indicated that the subject fuel pumps might
not have flame arrestors. These airplanes would need to be inspected
for missing flame arrestors within 365 days as specified in Boeing
Alert Service Bulletins 767-28A0077 and 767-28A0081. For airplanes
having L/Ns 915 and subsequent: The inspection would need to done
within 365 days on airplanes that have accumulated more than 15,000
total flight hours; and on airplanes that accumulated less than 15,000
total flight hours, the inspection would need to be done within 365
days after the airplane accumulates 15,000 total flight hours. As there
are many Model 767 airplanes in the world fleet that have accumulated
more than 15,000 flight hours, we find that the compliance time of 365
days would provide an adequate level of safety.
We also do not agree that dry running pumps in the main tank does
not present a meaningful risk during ground or flight operations. We
are concerned that dry running pumps without flame arrestors are
hazardous due to the lack of data on the ability of the flame front to
propagate to the ullage through some depth of fuel prior to fuel
starvation of the engine. Additionally, airplane attitude variation
during flight operations can uncover at least one of the fuel pump
inlets prior to fuel starvation, especially during a low fuel
[[Page 38307]]
go around on approach. Proper maintenance procedures mitigate the risk
during defueling operations; however, defueling can occur with
passengers on board and we have concerns with improperly conducted
maintenance procedures.
The basis for the compliance times specified by this supplemental
NPRM includes the fact that a missing flame arrestor does not present a
very high risk for most flight conditions when there is enough fuel to
cover the pump inlet as the probability of a flame reaching the fuel
tank is significantly reduced if fuel covers the pump inlet.
In developing appropriate compliance times for this supplemental
NPRM, we considered the manufacturer's recommendation specified in the
alert service bulletins, the degree of urgency associated with the
subject unsafe condition, the average utilization of the affected fleet
and the time necessary to perform the actions. In light of all of these
factors, we find that the compliance times specified in this
supplemental NPRM represent an appropriate interval of time for
affected airplanes to continue to operate without compromising safety.
However, an operator may request an alternative method of compliance
(AMOC) to extend the compliance time in accordance with paragraph (l)
of this supplemental NPRM.
Request To Revise Applicability and Compliance Times
Boeing recommends that the compliance times for airplanes having L/
Ns 915 through 926 be revised to match the compliance times specified
in the alert service bulletins for airplanes having L/Ns 1 through 914.
The commenter notes that the applicability of L/Ns 1 through 914 for
the one set of compliance times was based on Hamilton Sundstrand
determining which pumps had the missing flame arrestors. However, the
commenter states that the terminating action design was incorporated at
L/N 927 with the new main boost pump part number specified in Boeing
Alert Service Bulletins 767-28A0088 and 767-28A0089. Therefore, the
commenter notes that including airplanes having L/Ns 915 through 926 in
the compliance times for L/Ns 1 through 914 would clarify when the new
pump number was installed. The commenter recommends the following
compliance times for the original NPRM:
``For aircraft having L/N 1-926, do an initial inspection within
365 days. For those aircraft with more than 15,000 hours, do the
inspection again at each 6,000 flight interval or 24 months
whichever comes first. For those aircraft with less than 15,000
hours, do the inspection again within 365 days from the date the
aircraft reaches 15,000 hours. Repeat the inspection at each 6,000
flight interval or 24 months whichever comes first.''
Since Boeing's comments were not consistent with its own service
bulletin recommendation, we contacted the manufacturer for
clarification on its position. Boeing revised its position to be
consistent with Boeing Alert Service Bulletins 767-28A0077 and 767-
28A0081 for airplanes having L/Ns 1 through 926 and further recommended
that for airplanes having L/N 927 and on, an inspection is not required
since the airplane already has the new part number installed.
While we acknowledge that airplanes having L/N 927 and subsequent
have been equipped with the new pumps in production, the pumps may have
been replaced since then. Therefore, all airplanes must be inspected.
However, operators may examine their records to determine if the new
fuel pumps are installed. If it is conclusively determined that the new
pumps are installed, no further action is necessary. We have added new
paragraph (h) to allow a records review to determine if the new pump is
installed.
Request To Reference Future Revision of Service Bulletin
ATA, on behalf of its members, American Airlines and United
Airlines, requests that the original NPRM reference Revision 2 of the
Boeing Alert Service Bulletins 767-28A0077 and 767-28A0081. The
commenter states that Revision 2 will cite Hamilton-Sundstrand Service
Bulletin 5006003-28-3, which would provide the instructions to
incorporate into the subject fuel pumps a new shaft and rotor assembly
designed to correct the problem.
We do not agree. We have confirmed with Boeing that Alert Service
Bulletins 767-28A0077 and 767-28A0081 will not be revised to provide a
terminating action. As discussed previously, Boeing has issued Alert
Service Bulletins 767-28A0088 and 767-28A0089, which constitute
terminating actions for the repetitive actions of paragraphs (f) and
(g) of this supplemental NPRM.
Request To Revise Cost
ATA, on behalf of its member United Airlines, requests that the
cost analysis be revised. ATA requests that the cost analysis include
items such as the impact of airplanes rerouting to a maintenance
facility, aircraft preparation, access, correction of discrepancies
found, aircraft close-up, and any additional test necessary to put the
airplane back in operation. United Airlines states that the repair cost
of pumps should be included because Hamilton-Sundstrand quoted a 25%
failure rate. United Airlines also notes that 60% of the pumps it has
inspected had inlet diffuser struts eroded beyond the specified limits
and therefore, pump repairs and replacement sleeve costs should be
included.
We do not agree to revise the cost analysis. In establishing the
requirements of all ADs, we do consider cost impact to operators beyond
the estimates of parts and labor costs contained in AD preambles. For
example, where safety considerations allow, we attempt to set
compliance times that generally coincide with operators' maintenance
schedules. However, because operators' schedules vary substantially, we
cannot accommodate every operator's optimal scheduling in each AD. Each
AD does allow individual operators to obtain approval for extensions of
compliance times, based on a showing that the extension will not affect
safety adversely. Therefore, we do not consider it appropriate to
attribute to this supplemental NPRM the costs associated with the type
of special scheduling that might otherwise be required.
Furthermore, we do not consider it appropriate to attribute the
costs associated with aircraft ``down time'' to this supplemental NPRM.
Normally, compliance with an AD will not necessitate any additional
down time beyond that of a regularly scheduled maintenance hold. Even
if additional down time is necessary for some airplanes in some cases,
we do not have sufficient information to evaluate the number of
airplanes that may be so affected or the amount of additional down time
that may be required as this may vary from operator to operator.
Therefore, attempting to estimate such costs is not appropriate.
In addition, the economic analysis does not consider the costs of
conditional actions, such as repairing a crack detected during a
required inspection (``repair, if necessary''). Such conditional
repairs would be required, regardless of AD direction, to correct an
unsafe condition identified in an airplane and to ensure that the
airplane is operated in an airworthy condition, as required by the
Federal Aviation Regulations.
The compliance times presented in this supplemental NPRM were
developed to minimize the economic impact on operators as much as
possible while being consistent with the safety
[[Page 38308]]
objectives associated with this supplemental NPRM and the referenced
alert service bulletins. We have not revised this supplemental NPRM in
this regard.
Request for SFAR 88 Information
ATA questions if the original NPRM originated from the SFAR 88 fuel
tank system safety review.
We confirm that this supplemental NPRM did not originate from the
SFAR 88 fuel tank system safety review.
Request To Remove Repetitive Inspections
Delta Airlines states that it is not convinced the repetitive
inspections specified in the original NPRM are necessary. We infer that
the commenter requests that the repetitive inspections be removed. The
commenter states that the risk of problems associated with missing or
loose boost pump flame arrestors is not great enough to justify
repetitive inspections fleetwide. The commenter also states that the
pump flame arrestors have been found loose but not missing, and that
they retain their flame arresting qualities if loose. In addition, the
commenter states that if a sheared roll pin is going to cause a
problem, it is going to occur immediately after the pin fails; since
the roll pin can shear at any time, no amount of inspections would
prevent pin failures.
The commenter believes that the more likely scenario, dry running
pumps in the main tanks during ground or flight operations, is not a
meaningful risk because those concerns would be eclipsed by fuel
starvation of the engines. The commenter notes that it looks to proper
maintenance procedures for mitigation of the risk of dry running pumps
during defueling operations. The commenter suggests that installation
of an improved pin or a pin replacement program would solve the problem
better than repetitive inspections.
We understand Delta's concerns; however, we do not agree to remove
the repetitive inspections. The objective of the flame arrestor is to
preclude a flame originated in the reprime unit or beyond from moving
to the fuel tank. The flame arrestor may drop into the reprime unit
area if the flame arrestor pin is broken and contacts rotating parts;
in this position, a flame arrestor might create sparks that ignite the
fuel vapors. A misplaced or missing flame arrestor represents a latent
failure that leaves the airplane one failure away from a fuel tank
ignition.
The probability of a flame reaching the fuel tank is significantly
reduced if fuel covers the pump inlet. The compliance times specified
by this supplemental NPRM recognize the fact that a missing flame
arrestor does not present a very high risk for most flight conditions
when there is enough fuel to cover the pump inlet. We find that, to
achieve an adequate level of safety for the affected fleet, repetitive
inspections are necessary. We have not revised this supplemental NPRM
in this regard.
Request To Reference Part Numbers
The Modification and Replacement Parts Association (MARPA) requests
that we identify the affected fuel pumps in the original NPRM by either
Boeing or Hamilton Sundstrand (or both) part numbers. The MARPA also
requests that we include any possible defective parts manufacturer
approval (PMA) alternative parts so that any defective PMA parts are
also subject to the original NPRM.
The commenter asserts that, under 14 CFR 21.303, there may be fuel
pumps that could be approved replacement parts for the affected fuel
pumps. If replacement parts do exist, the MARPA states that the PMA
fuel pumps may have a different part number from the affected fuel
pumps and therefore will not likely be addressed by model or serial
number in the service information. Therefore, the MARPA asserts that a
regulatory loophole is created if a ``defective'' PMA part is
installed, because only the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) part
will be identified in the manufacturer service information. In
addition, the MARPA states that the affected fuel pumps are identified
in proprietary service information that is not available to the general
public and that the proprietary service information may also not be
available to supplier or repair facilities. Therefore, the MARPA
concludes that repair and supply facilities might have defective OEM or
PMA parts in stock that could be put into service unless such parts are
identified as subject to the requirements of the original NPRM.
We acknowledge the MARPA's concerns; however, we do not agree that
it is necessary to identify the manufacturer and part numbers of the
subject fuel pumps. At this time, we are not aware of other PMA parts
equivalent to the affected fuel pumps. Also, this supplemental NPRM
would require that all fuel pumps be inspected, regardless of origin.
Since the part numbers of the affected fuel pumps are identified in the
applicable Boeing and Hamilton Sundstrand service bulletins specified
in the supplemental NPRM, it is unnecessary to specify part numbers in
the supplemental NPRM.
We concur with the MARPA's general request that, if we know that an
unsafe condition also exists in PMA parts, the AD should address those
parts, as well as the original parts. The MARPA's remarks are timely in
that the Transport Airplane Directorate currently is in the process of
reviewing this issue as it applies to transport category airplanes. We
acknowledge that there may be other ways of addressing this issue to
ensure that unsafe PMA parts are identified and addressed. Once we have
thoroughly examined all aspects of this issue, including input from
industry, and have made a final determination, we will consider whether
our policy regarding addressing PMA parts in ADs needs to be revised.
In response to the commenter's statement regarding a ``regulatory
loophole,'' this statement appears to reflect a misunderstanding of the
relationship between ADs and the certification procedural regulations
of part 21 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 21). Those
regulations, including section 21.303 of the Federal Aviation
Regulations (14 CFR 21.203), are intended to ensure that aeronautical
products comply with the applicable airworthiness standards. But ADs
are issued when, notwithstanding those procedures, we become aware of
unsafe conditions in these products or parts. Therefore, an AD takes
precedence over design approvals when we identify an unsafe condition.
Since we have determined that an unsafe condition exists and that
replacement of certain parts must be accomplished to ensure continued
safety, no additional change has been made to the supplemental NPRM in
this regard.
Request To Reference PMA Parts
The MARPA requests that the language in the original NPRM be
changed to embrace any PMA alternatives.
We infer that the MARPA would like the original NPRM to permit
installation of any equivalent PMA parts so that it is not necessary
for an operator to request approval of an AMOC in order to install an
``equivalent'' PMA part. Whether an alternative part is ``equivalent''
in adequately resolving the unsafe condition can only be determined on
a case-by-case basis based on a complete understanding of the unsafe
condition. We are not currently aware of any such parts. Our policy is
that, in order for operators to replace a part with one that is not
specified in an AD, they must request an AMOC. This is necessary so
that we can make a specific determination that an
[[Page 38309]]
alternative part is or is not susceptible to the same unsafe condition.
An AD provides a means of compliance for operators to ensure that
the identified unsafe condition is addressed appropriately. For an
unsafe condition attributable to a part, an AD normally identifies the
replacement parts necessary to obtain that compliance. As stated in
section 39.7 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 39.7),
``Anyone who operates a product that does not meet the requirements of
an applicable airworthiness directive is in violation of this
section.'' Unless an operator obtains approval for an AMOC, replacing a
part with one not specified by an AD would make the operator subject to
an enforcement action and result in a civil penalty. No change to this
supplemental NPRM is necessary in this regard.
Request To Allow Doing Actions on the Main Fuel Tanks Separately
ANA requests that we permit operators to do the inspection of each
main fuel tank separately and not require operators to do an inspection
of all main fuel tanks on an airplane at the same maintenance stop.
Also, the commenter requests that we permit operators to do any
terminating action for each main fuel tank independent of the other.
The commenter states that this will provide flexibility to operators.
The commenter notes that it does not have many spare pumps.
We acknowledge that doing the actions in the supplemental NPRM at a
separate time for each main fuel tank would provide flexibility to the
operators. Operators may do the actions for each pump separately
provided that operators have done the actions on all pumps within the
applicable compliance times specified in the supplemental NPRM. We have
added Note 1, Note 4, and Note 5 to this supplemental NPRM to clarify
that the actions may be done separately provided that all actions are
done within the applicable compliance times.
FAA's Determination and Proposed Requirements of the Supplemental NPRM
Certain changes discussed above expand the scope of the original
NPRM; therefore, we have determined that it is necessary to reopen the
comment period to provide additional opportunity for public comment on
this supplemental NPRM.
Explanation of Change to Applicability
We have revised the applicability of the original NPRM to identify
model designations as published in the most recent type certificate
data sheet for the affected models.
Clarification of Unsafe Condition Statement
The original NPRM specified the unsafe condition as ``the possible
migration of a flame from a main tank fuel boost pump inlet to the
vapor space of that fuel tank, and consequent ignition of fuel vapors,
which could result in a fire or explosion, should the pump inlets
become uncovered.'' We have revised the unsafe condition statement in
this supplemental NPRM by removing the phrase ``should the pump inlets
become uncovered.'' The pump inlet does not need to be uncovered for
ignited vapors in the pump to cause a tank explosion.
Clarification of AMOC Paragraph
We have revised this action to clarify the appropriate procedure
for notifying the principal inspector before using any approved AMOC on
any airplane to which the AMOC applies.
Costs of Compliance
This supplemental NPRM affects about 915 airplanes worldwide, and
400 airplanes of U.S. registry. The following table provides the
estimated costs for U.S. operators to comply with this supplemental
NPRM.
Estimated Costs
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Average
Work labor
Action hours rate per Parts Cost per airplane Fleet cost
hour
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Inspection of flame arrestor 5 $80 None............ $400, per $160,000, per
presence/Position. inspection cycle. inspection cycle.
Replacement..................... 3 80 $25,004......... $25,244............ $10,097,600. \1\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ However, the parts manufacturer states that it may cover the cost of replacement parts associated with this
supplemental NPRM for certain affected airplanes, subject to warranty conditions. As a result, the costs
attributable to the supplemental NPRM may be less than stated above.
Authority for This Rulemaking
Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the
authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII, Aviation Programs,
describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.
We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in
subtitle VII, part A, subpart III, section 44701, ``General
requirements.'' Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing
regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator
finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within
the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition
that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this
rulemaking action.
Regulatory Findings
We have determined that this proposed AD would not have federalism
implications under Executive Order 13132. This proposed AD would not
have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship
between the national Government and the States, or on the distribution
of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.
For the reasons discussed above, I certify that the proposed
regulation:
1. Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive Order
12866;
2. Is not a ``significant rule'' under the DOT Regulatory Policies
and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and
3. Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
We prepared a regulatory evaluation of the estimated costs to
comply with this supplemental NPRM and placed it in the AD docket. See
the ADDRESSES section for a location to examine the regulatory
evaluation.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39
Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Safety.
[[Page 38310]]
The Proposed Amendment
Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the
Administrator, the FAA proposes to amend 14 CFR part 39 as follows:
PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.
Sec. 39.13 [Amended]
2. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) amends Sec. 39.13 by
adding the following new airworthiness directive (AD):
Boeing: Docket No. FAA-2005-20351; Directorate Identifier 2003-NM-
269-AD.
Comments Due Date
(a) The FAA must receive comments on this AD action by July 31,
2006.
Affected ADs
(b) None.
Applicability
(c) This AD applies to all Boeing Model 767-200, -300, -300F,
and -400ER series airplanes, certificated in any category.
Unsafe Condition
(d) This AD results from reports that certain fuel boost pumps
may not have flame arrestors installed in the pump shaft and reports
that the pin that holds the flame arrestor in place can break due to
metal fatigue. We are issuing this AD to prevent the possible
migration of a flame from a main tank fuel boost pump inlet to the
vapor space of that fuel tank, and consequent ignition of fuel
vapors, which could result in a fire or explosion.
Compliance
(e) You are responsible for having the actions required by this
AD performed within the compliance times specified, unless the
actions have already been done.
Inspection for Presence/Position of Flame Arrestor in Main Tank Fuel
Boost Pumps
(f) For airplanes having line numbers (L/Ns) 1 through 914
inclusive, except as provided by paragraph (h) of this AD: Within
365 days after the effective date of this AD, do a detailed
inspection of each main tank fuel boost pump to determine if the
pump shaft flame arrestor is installed, a measurement of the flame
arrestor's position in the pump, and all applicable corrective
actions, by accomplishing all the actions specified in the
Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 767-
28A0077 (for Model 767-200, -300, and -300F series airplanes) or
Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 767-28A0081 (for Model 767-400ER
series airplanes), both Revision 1, both dated July 8, 2004, as
applicable. Repeat the measurement of the flame arrestor's position
in the pump thereafter at intervals not to exceed the applicable
time specified in paragraph (f)(1) or (f)(2) of this AD, until the
replacement required by paragraph (i) of this AD is accomplished.
All applicable corrective actions must be done before further
flight.
Note 1: Any inspection/measurement of the pumps on the left and
right main fuel tanks may be done separately provided that the
actions are done on all pumps within the compliance time specified
in paragraph (f) of this AD.
(1) For airplanes that have accumulated more than 15,000 total
flight hours as of the date the initial actions are done in
accordance with paragraph (f) of this AD: Repeat the measurement
thereafter at intervals not to exceed 6,000 flight hours or 24
months, whichever comes first.
(2) For airplanes that have accumulated 15,000 total flight
hours or fewer as of the date the initial actions are done in
accordance with paragraph (f) of this AD: Do the measurement
specified in paragraph (f) of this AD within 365 days after the date
on which the airplane accumulates 15,000 total flight hours. Repeat
the measurement thereafter at intervals not to exceed 6,000 flight
hours or 24 months, whichever comes first.
Note 2: The Boeing alert service bulletins reference Hamilton
Sundstrand Service Bulletin 5006003-28-2, dated October 25, 2002, as
an additional source of service information for accomplishment of
the inspection and corrective actions. Although the Hamilton
Sundstrand service bulletin specifies to return main tank fuel boost
pumps with damaged, broken, or out-of-position flame arrestors to a
repair shop, that action is not required by this AD.
Note 3: For the purposes of this AD, a detailed inspection is:
``An intensive examination of a specific item, installation, or
assembly to detect damage, failure, or irregularity. Available
lighting is normally supplemented with a direct source of good
lighting at an intensity deemed appropriate. Inspection aids such as
mirror, magnifying lenses, etc., may be necessary. Surface cleaning
and elaborate procedures may be required.''
(g) For airplanes having L/Ns 915 and on, except as provided by
paragraph (h) of this AD: At the applicable time specified in
paragraph (g)(1) or (g)(2) of this AD, do a detailed inspection of
each main tank fuel boost pump to determine if the pump shaft flame
arrestor is installed, a measurement of the flame arrestor's
position in the pump, and all applicable corrective actions, by
accomplishing all the actions specified in the Accomplishment
Instructions of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 767-28A0077 (for Model
767-200, -300, and -300F series airplanes) or Boeing Alert Service
Bulletin 767-28A0081 (for Model 767-400ER series airplanes), both
Revision 1, both dated July 8, 2004, as applicable. Repeat the
measurement of the flame arrestor's position in the pump thereafter
at intervals not to exceed 6,000 flight hours or 24 months,
whichever comes first, until the replacement required by paragraph
(i) of this AD is accomplished. All applicable corrective actions
must be done before further flight.
Note 4: Any inspection/measurement of the pumps on the left and
right main fuel tanks may be done separately provided that the
actions are done on all pumps within the compliance time specified
in paragraph (g) of this AD.
(1) For airplanes that have accumulated more than 15,000 total
flight hours as of the effective date of this AD, do the actions
within 365 days after the effective date of this AD.
(2) For airplanes that have accumulated 15,000 total flight
hours or fewer as of the effective date of this AD, do the actions
within 365 days after the date on which the airplane accumulates
15,000 total flight hours.
Optional Terminating Action--Records Review
(h) For any period when the part number (P/N) of a main tank
fuel boost pump installed on any airplane, as conclusively
determined from a review of airplane maintenance records, is P/N
5006003D, no further action is required by paragraphs (f), (g), and
(i) of this AD for that pump only.
Replacement of the Main Tank Fuel Boost Pumps
(i) Within 36 months after the effective date of this AD,
replace the left and right main tank fuel boost pumps with new or
modified pumps in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of
Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 767-28A0088 (for Model 767-200, -300,
and -300F series airplanes) or Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 767-
28A0089 (for Model 767-400ER series airplanes), both dated February
24, 2005, as applicable. Accomplishment of the replacement
terminates the repetitive measurement requirements of paragraphs (f)
and (g) of this AD for that pump only.
Note 5: Any replacement of the pumps on the left and right main
fuel tanks may be done separately provided that all pumps are
replaced within the compliance time specified in paragraph (i) of
this AD.
Note 6: The Boeing alert service bulletins reference Hamilton
Sundstrand Service Bulletin 5006003-28-3, dated December 8, 2004, as
the appropriate source of service information for modifying the
pump.
Inspections Accomplished According to Previous Issue of Service
Bulletin
(j) Inspections accomplished before the effective date of this
AD according to Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 767-28A0077, dated
March 6, 2003; or Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 767-28A0081, dated
March 6, 2003; are considered acceptable for compliance with the
corresponding action specified in paragraphs (f) and (g) of this AD.
Parts Installation
(k) As of the effective date of this AD, only main tank fuel
boost pumps identified in paragraphs (k)(1) and (k)(2) of this AD
may be installed on any airplane.
(1) Any main tank fuel boost pump that has been inspected, and
on which all applicable corrective actions have been performed, in
accordance with paragraph (f) or (g) of this AD.
[[Page 38311]]
(2) Any main tank fuel boost pump having P/N 5006003D.
Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)
(l)(1) The Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA,
has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested in
accordance with the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19.
(2) Before using any AMOC approved in accordance with Sec.
39.19 on any airplane to which the AMOC applies, notify the
appropriate principal inspector in the FAA Flight Standards
Certificate Holding District Office.
Issued in Renton, Washington, on June 13, 2006.
Ali Bahrami,
Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification
Service.
[FR Doc. E6-10536 Filed 7-5-06; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P
