Locomotive Crashworthiness, 36888-36917 [06-5667]

Agencies

• Federal Railroad Administration
• DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

[Federal Register Volume 71, Number 124 (Wednesday, June 28, 2006)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 36888-36917]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 06-5667]



[[Page 36887]]

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Part II





Department of Transportation





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Federal Railroad Administration



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49 CFR Parts 229 and 238



Locomotive Crashworthiness; Final Rule

Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 124 / Wednesday, June 28, 2006 / 
Rules and Regulations

[[Page 36888]]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Railroad Administration

49 CFR Parts 229 and 238

[Docket No. FRA-2004-17645, Notice No. 3]
RIN 2130-AB23


Locomotive Crashworthiness

AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), Department of 
Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: FRA is issuing comprehensive, minimum standards for locomotive 
crashworthiness. These crashworthiness standards are intended to help 
protect locomotive cab occupants in the event of a locomotive 
collision. Examples of locomotive collision scenarios considered in 
this rulemaking include collisions with another locomotive, the rear of 
another train, a piece of on-track equipment, a shifted load on a 
freight car on an adjacent parallel track, and a highway vehicle at a 
rail-highway grade crossing. Locomotive crashworthiness must be 
demonstrated by complying with either the final rule's new performance 
standards or an FRA-approved design standard.

DATES: Effective Date: This final rule is effective August 28, 2006. 
The incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in the 
rule is approved by the Director of the Federal Register as of August 
28, 2006.

ADDRESSES: For access to the docket to read background documents or 
comments received, go to https://dms.dot.gov at any time or to Room PL-
401 on the plaza level of the Nassif Building, 400 Seventh Street, SW., 
Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, 
except Federal Holidays.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: John Punwani, Office of Research and 
Development, Federal Railroad Administration, 1120 Vermont Avenue, NW., 
Mail Stop 20, Washington, DC 20590 (telephone: 202-493-6369); Charles 
L. Bielitz, Mechanical Engineer, Office of Safety Assurance and 
Compliance, Federal Railroad Administration, 1120 Vermont Avenue, NW., 
Mail Stop 25, Washington, DC 20590 (telephone: 202-493-6314); or 
Melissa Porter, Trial Attorney, Office of Chief Counsel, Federal 
Railroad Administration, 1120 Vermont Avenue, NW., Mail Stop 10, 
Washington, DC 20590 (telephone: 202-493-6034).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Statutory and Regulatory Background

A. FRA Regulatory Authority

    FRA has broad statutory authority to regulate railroad safety. The 
Locomotive Inspection Act (LIA) (formerly 45 U.S.C. 22-34, now 49 
U.S.C. 20701-20703) was enacted in 1911. It prohibits the use of unsafe 
locomotives and authorizes FRA (by delegation from the Secretary of 
Transportation) to issue standards for locomotive maintenance and 
testing. In order to further FRA's ability to respond effectively to 
contemporary safety problems and hazards as they arise in the railroad 
industry, Congress enacted the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 
(Safety Act) (formerly 45 U.S.C. 421, 431 et seq., now found primarily 
in chapter 201 of Title 49). The Safety Act grants the Secretary of 
Transportation rulemaking authority over all areas of railroad safety 
(49 U.S.C. 20103(a)) and authority to investigate and penalize 
violations of any rail safety law. This authority was subsequently 
delegated to the FRA Administrator (49 CFR 1.49). (Until July 5, 1994, 
the Federal railroad safety statutes existed as separate acts found 
primarily in Title 45 of the United States Code. On that date, all of 
the acts were repealed, and their provisions were recodified into Title 
49.)

    The term ``railroad'' is defined in the Safety Act to include 
all forms of non-highway ground transportation that runs on rails or 
electromagnetic guideways, * * * other than rapid transit operations 
within an urban area that are not connected to the general railroad 
system of transportation.

    This definition makes clear that FRA has jurisdiction over (1) 
rapid transit operations within an urban area that are connected to the 
general railroad system of transportation, and (2) all freight, 
intercity, passenger, and commuter rail passenger operations regardless 
of their connection to the general railroad system of transportation or 
their status as a common carrier engaged in interstate commerce. FRA 
has issued a policy statement describing how it determines whether 
particular rail passenger operations are subject to FRA's jurisdiction 
(65 FR 42529 (July 2, 2000)); the policy statement can be found in 
Appendix A to parts 209 and 211 of Title 49 of the Code of Federal 
Regulations (hereinafter, all references to CFR parts and sections will 
refer to parts and sections in Title 49 of the Code of Federal 
Regulations).
    Pursuant to its statutory authority, FRA promulgates and enforces a 
comprehensive regulatory program to address railroad track; signal 
systems; railroad communications; rolling stock; rear-end marking 
devices; safety glazing; railroad accident/incident reporting; 
locational requirements for dispatching of U.S. rail operations; safety 
integration plans governing railroad consolidations; merger and 
acquisitions of control; operating practices; passenger train emergency 
preparedness; alcohol and drug testing; locomotive engineer 
certification; and workplace safety.
    In part 229, FRA established minimum federal safety standards for 
locomotives. These regulations prescribe inspection and testing 
requirements for locomotive components and systems, minimum locomotive 
cab safety requirements, and even basic crashworthiness design 
requirements for electric multiple-unit type locomotives. On May 12, 
1999, FRA issued regulations addressing the safety of passenger rail 
equipment, including passenger-occupied locomotives (i.e., cab control 
cars, powered multiple-unit passenger cars). These are found in part 
238. However, FRA's existing locomotive safety standards do not address 
the crashworthiness of conventional locomotives, which comprise the 
majority of locomotives in use today.

B. Rail Safety Enforcement and Review Act

    In 1992, Congress passed The Rail Safety Enforcement and Review Act 
(RSERA). Pub. L. 102-365, September 3, 1992. In response to concerns 
raised by railroad employee organizations, members of Congress, and 
recommendations of the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) 
concerning locomotive crew safety, Congress included mandates 
concerning locomotive crashworthiness and cab working conditions in the 
legislation. Section 10 of RSERA, entitled ``Locomotive Crashworthiness 
and Working Conditions,'' required FRA ``to complete a rulemaking 
proceeding to consider prescribing regulations to improve the safety 
and working conditions of locomotive cabs.'' In order to determine 
whether crashworthiness regulations would be necessary, Congress tasked 
FRA with assessing the adequacy of Locomotive Crashworthiness 
Requirements Standard S-580, or any successor standard thereto, adopted 
by the Association of American Railroads in 1989, in improving the 
safety of locomotive cabs. Furthermore, Congress specifically mandated 
that the Secretary, in support of the rulemaking proceeding, consider 
the costs and benefits associated with equipping locomotives with each 
of a number of specified design features.

[[Page 36889]]

    FRA agrees that locomotive crashworthiness protection is necessary 
because train collisions and derailments can result in crew fatalities 
and injuries. In the period from 1995 to 1997, 26 locomotive cab 
occupants were killed and 289 were injured in freight and passenger 
train accidents in the United States, a yearly average of 105 
casualties.\1\
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    \1\ Regulatory Impact Analysis, p. iii of Appendix B of the 
Analysis. These statistics were taken from the data set of injuries/
fatalities that, because of their circumstances, could have been 
prevented by the crashworthiness standards contained in this rule. 
Thus, this set does not include the total number of all locomotive 
cab occupant fatalities/injuries that occurred during this time 
period.
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    Adopted in 1989, Association of American Railroads (AAR) 
Specification S-580 (``S-580'') has served as the industry standard for 
crashworthiness design specifications of new road freight locomotives. 
At the time of its development, S-580 provided basic enhancements to 
the crashworthiness of road locomotives. Many of the units built to 
this specification are of wide-nose cab design, often referred to as 
the North American cab design. It is generally held throughout the 
industry that S-580 represented a significant step on the part of the 
railroad industry to improve the crashworthiness of locomotives.

II. FRA's Response to Section 10 of RSERA

    In response to the mandate of Section 10 of RSERA, FRA conducted 
the necessary research and analysis. FRA undertook steps to determine 
the health and safety effects of locomotive cab working conditions and 
evaluated the effectiveness of S-580, along with the benefits and costs 
of RSERA's specified locomotive crashworthiness features (i.e., braced 
collision posts, rollover protection devices, deflection plates, 
shatterproof windows, readily accessible crash refuges, uniform sill 
heights, anticlimbers, or other equipment designed to prevent overrides 
resulting from head-on locomotive collisions, equipment to deter post-
collision entry of flammable liquids into locomotive cabs, any other 
device intended to provide crash protection for occupants of locomotive 
cabs). In an effort to fully address the broad range of issues 
presented in the RSERA, FRA (1) conducted an industry-wide public 
meeting to gather information regarding the areas of concern identified 
in the RSERA, (2) established a locomotive collision database based on 
detailed accident information gathered from actual collisions, (3) 
established a research contract to develop and verify a computer model 
capable of predicting how each of the crashworthiness features in S-580 
and in the RSERA affect the collision dynamics and probability of crew 
injury, and (4) conducted a detailed survey of locomotive crews' cab 
working conditions and environment. FRA detailed the results of these 
actions in ``Locomotive Crashworthiness and Cab Working Conditions 
Report to Congress,'' dated September 18, 1996. A copy of this report 
has been placed in the docket of this rulemaking as Document No. FRA-
2004-17645-9. Actions taken to gather information for that report are 
described below.
    First, meetings with all segments of the railroad industry formed 
an essential part of FRA's plan to meet the requirements of the RSERA. 
FRA held an industry-wide public meeting on June 23, 1993, to gather 
information from the industry on each of the areas of concern 
identified in Section 10 of the RSERA and to inform the industry of 
FRA's approach. This meeting was well attended by all segments of the 
rail industry, including rail labor, freight railroads, locomotive 
builders, the National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak), and 
commuter railroads.
    At this initial meeting, some of the railroads urged that 
improvements in crash avoidance technology should be pursued in lieu of 
improved crashworthiness features. FRA is currently pursuing crash 
avoidance technology and on March 7, 2005, published a separate rule 
(part 236, subpart H) on performance standards for the use and 
development of processor-based signal and train control systems. See 70 
FR 11052. The issue of collision avoidance is more fully discussed 
below in section IV of the preamble.
    Several participants in the public meeting expressed an opinion 
that a series of smaller, informal meetings with the separate segments 
of the rail industry would provide more detailed information regarding 
locomotive crashworthiness. As a result, FRA held a number of such 
meetings which included the following organizations:

American Public Transportation Association (APTA);
American Short Line and Regional Railroad Association (ASLRRA);
Amtrak;
AAR;
Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers (now Brotherhood of Locomotive 
Engineers and Trainmen (BLET);
Burlington Northern (now Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway) (BNSF);
DuPont (glazing);
General Electric Transportation Systems (GE);
General Motors-Electro-Motive Division (GM/EMD);
Morrison Knudsen (MK); NTSB; Sierracin (glazing); and
United Transportation Union (UTU).

    These meetings generated considerable discussion about the adequacy 
of the AAR's Locomotive Crashworthiness Standard S-580 (1989), the 
requirement to conduct research and analysis, including computer 
modeling and full-scale crash testing of the safety of locomotives, and 
the costs and benefits associated with RSERA's specified locomotive 
crashworthiness features. During the meetings, FRA requested specific 
cost or test data to support the positions taken by the various 
organizations. Some supply industry organizations were forthcoming with 
this data, while other organizations were apparently unable or 
unwilling to respond.
    Second, FRA proceeded based on the understanding that earlier 
locomotive collision accident reports did not contain the data 
necessary to support crash modeling. Thus, in 1992, FRA instructed 
field inspectors to investigate all accidents involving either a 
collision of two trains or a collision of one train with an object 
weighing ten tons or more, regardless of monetary damage thresholds and 
locomotive design. This accident data provided information which FRA 
used to determine the possible benefits of a crashworthiness 
regulation.
    Third, with the support of the Volpe National Transportation 
Systems Center (``Volpe Center''), FRA contracted with Arthur D. 
Little, Inc. (ADL) to predict the benefit, if any, of each of the 
locomotive crashworthiness features listed in Section 10 of the RSERA. 
Using the collision data collected by FRA, ADL performed a series of 
analyses using computer models to evaluate the effectiveness of 
specific crashworthiness design features.\2\
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    \2\ Mayville, R. A., Stringfellow, R. G., Rancatore, R. J., 
Hosmer, T. P., 1995, ``Locomotive Crashworthiness Research, Volumes 
1 through 5,'' DOT/FRA/ORD-95/8.1-8.5. A copy of each cited report 
has been placed in the docket of this rulemaking as Document No. FRA 
2004-17645-13.
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    Lastly, FRA's approach to the research and analysis tasks focused 
on the cost and benefits of design changes to conventional locomotives 
operating at speeds of less than 80 mph. The work done to meet the 
requirements of the RSERA was not intended to address safety concerns 
unique to high speed rail transportation. FRA has addressed high speed 
rail safety concerns,

[[Page 36890]]

including crashworthiness design, in part 238.
    FRA's Report to Congress contained an implementation strategy to 
address each of the issues raised by the RSERA.\3\ FRA determined that 
S-580, which provided for improvements in collision posts, anti-
climbing arrangements, and the short hood structure, represented a 
significant step on the part of the railroad industry to improve 
locomotive crashworthiness. The research and analysis conducted in 
response to the RSERA showed that S-580 could be further improved to 
reduce casualties without significantly impacting locomotive design. 
FRA also found that (1) modified front-end structural designs 
incorporating stronger collision posts, (2) full-height corner posts 
with increased strength, and (3) utilization of roof longitudinal 
strength to support structural members from crushing may provide 
opportunities for additional protection for locomotive cab occupants. 
FRA even evaluated the potential to create a designated crash refuge 
within the space that these measures would help to protect. 
Furthermore, based on accident/incident experience and recent advances 
in fuel tank design being undertaken by the industry, FRA concluded 
that fuel tank design could be significantly improved to minimize the 
risk and severity of future fuel spills. Finally, FRA identified 
locomotive cab emergency lighting and more reliable means of rapid 
egress during derailments and collisions as additional subject areas 
which appeared to warrant further exploration.
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    \3\ ``Locomotive Crashworthiness and Cab Working Conditions 
Report to Congress'', Office of Safety Assurance and Compliance, 
Federal Railroad Administration, 1996.
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    While the study findings clearly indicate that several 
crashworthiness features warranted further exploration, the findings 
also indicated that several features, including rollover protection, 
uniform sill heights, and deflection plates did not warrant further 
action. Rollover protection costs would be substantial, and no material 
need for such protection was demonstrated by the accident data. Design 
limitations of multi-use freight locomotives all but preclude practical 
design possibilities for deflection plates, and FRA found that a 
successful deflection device would cause collateral safety problems. 
Uniform sill heights were found not to significantly reduce life-
threatening collision damage, would have a high cost, and any benefit 
would accrue only after an extended period over which older standard 
locomotives would be phased out of service. The perceived benefits of 
uniform sill height might be more reliably achieved by improved anti-
climbing arrangements, and the report proposed that development and 
evaluation of a design concept be explored.
    Many of the proposed measures were practical for application only 
to newly constructed locomotives. Further, additional information and 
research were required to determine the cost-effective basis of these 
concepts, and to assure the acceptance of these measures by locomotive 
crews. In order for protective features to be effective, crew members 
must have confidence that they will function as intended. Crew members 
who lack confidence in the safety measures employed may be inclined to 
jump from a locomotive prior to a collision, resulting in a high 
probability of serious injury or death.
    FRA determined that it would use its Railroad Safety Advisory 
Committee to further develop these safety issues thereby tapping the 
knowledge and energies of a wide range of interested parties.

III. Railroad Safety Advisory Committee (RSAC) Recommendations

    In March 1996, FRA established the RSAC, which provides a forum for 
consensual rulemaking and program development. The Committee includes 
representation from all of the agency's major customer groups, 
including railroads, labor organizations, suppliers and manufacturers, 
and other interested parties. A list of member groups follows:

AAR;
American Association of Private Railroad Car Owners (AARPCO);
American Association of State Highway & Transportation Officials 
(AASHTO);
American Train Dispatchers Department/BLE (ATDD/BLE) (now American 
Train Dispatcher Association);
Amtrak;
APTA;
ASLRRA;
Association of Railway Museums (ARM);
Association of State Rail Safety Managers (ASRSM);
BLET;
Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employes (now Brotherhood of 
Maintenance of Way Employes Division (BMWED);
Brotherhood of Railroad Signalmen (BRS);
Federal Transit Administration (FTA) (associate member);
High Speed Ground Transportation Association;
Hotel Employees & Restaurant Employees International Union;
International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers;
International Brotherhood of Boilermakers and Blacksmiths;
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW);
Labor Council for Latin American Advancement (LCLAA) (associate 
member);
League of Railway Industry Women (associate member);
National Association of Railroad Passengers (NARP);
National Association of Railway Business Women (associate member);
National Conference of Firemen & Oilers;
National Railroad Construction and Maintenance Association;
NTSB (associate member);
Railway Supply Institute (RSI);
Safe Travel America;
Secretaria de Communicaciones y Transporte (associate member);
Sheet Metal Workers International Association (SMW);
Tourist Railway Association Inc.;
Transport Canada (associate member);
Transportation Communications International Union/BRC (TCIU/BRC);
Transport Workers Union of America (TWUA); and
UTU.

    When appropriate, FRA assigns a task to RSAC, and after 
consideration and debate, RSAC may accept or reject the task. If the 
task is accepted, RSAC establishes a working group that possesses the 
appropriate expertise and representation of interests to develop 
recommendations to FRA for action on the task. The working group 
develops the recommendations by consensus. The working group may 
establish one or more task forces to develop the facts and options on a 
particular aspect of a given task. The task force reports to the 
working group. If a working group comes to unanimous consensus on 
recommendations for action, the working group presents the package to 
the RSAC for a vote. If a simple majority of the RSAC accepts the 
proposal, the RSAC formally recommends the proposal to FRA.
    FRA then determines what action to take on the recommendation. 
Because FRA staff has played an active role at the working group level 
in discussing the issues and options and in drafting the language of 
the consensus proposal, and because the RSAC recommendation constitutes 
the consensus of some of the industry's leading experts on a given 
subject, FRA is often favorably inclined toward the RSAC 
recommendation. However, FRA is in no way bound to follow the 
recommendation, and the

[[Page 36891]]

agency exercises its independent judgement on whether the recommended 
rule achieves the agency's regulatory goal, is soundly supported, and 
is in accordance with policy and legal requirements. Often, FRA varies 
in some respects from the RSAC recommendation in developing the actual 
regulatory proposal. If the working group or RSAC is unable to reach 
consensus on recommendations for action, FRA moves ahead to resolve the 
issue through traditional rulemaking proceedings.
    On June 24, 1997, FRA tasked RSAC with the responsibility of making 
recommendations concerning standards for locomotive crashworthiness. 
Specifically, RSAC was charged with the investigation and development, 
if necessary, of crashworthiness standards to ensure the integrity of 
locomotive cabs in collisions, thereby minimizing fatalities and 
injuries to train crews. This task was to be performed in three phases. 
RSAC would first review relevant accident data and existing industry 
standards to determine which, if any, appropriate modifications to the 
cab structure are required to provide additional protection above that 
provided by S-580. In particular, RSAC was to specifically consider the 
following features: full-height corner posts; improved glazing design 
and support structure; equipment to prevent the post-collision entry of 
flammable liquids; and improved fuel tank design. Second, RSAC would 
examine to what extent improved anticlimber designs and/or 
incorporation of shelf couplers, used to complement the existing S-580 
standards, serve to mitigate the effects of the above-listed collision 
scenarios. Third, RSAC would examine past and present methods of cab 
egress, along with the benefits of emergency lighting in the event of a 
collision. Based on a review of relevant accident data, available 
technology, implementation costs, and other applicable factors, RSAC 
would then develop appropriate recommendations.
    To accomplish the above goals, RSAC created the Locomotive 
Crashworthiness Working Group (``Working Group''). Created on June 24, 
1997, this group of about 40 members consisted of FRA personnel and 
representatives from railroad labor and management, States, and two 
major manufacturers of locomotives. The following organizations 
provided representatives to serve on the Working Group:

AAR;
AASHTO;
APTA;
ASLRRA;
BLET;
BMWED;
FRA;
IBEW;
RSI;
SMW;
UTU; and
NTSB.

    The Working Group broke the task into three distinct phases. The 
first phase included review of accident data to formulate the most 
prevalent accident scenarios involving injuries and deaths. Second, the 
Volpe Center, along with contractor ADL, performed detailed analyses of 
how design improvements/additions to S-580 would affect the probable 
resulting injuries/deaths in each of five accident scenarios described 
later in this preamble.\4\ Third, the Working Group analyzed and 
deliberated the proposed costs and benefits to determine the 
effectiveness of each of the proposed changes to S-580. The Working 
Group then presented its findings to the full RSAC Committee.
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    \4\ Tyrell, D., Severson, K., Marquis, B., Martinez, E., 
Mayville, R., Rancatore, R., Stringfellow, R., Hammond, R., Perlman, 
A.B., 1999, ``Locomotive Crashworthiness Design Modifications 
Study,'' Proceedings of the 1999 IEEE/ASME Joint Railroad 
Conference, April 13-15, 1999, IEEE Catalog Number 99CH36340, ASME 
RTD Volume 16; Tyrell, D.C., Martinez, E.E., Wierzbicki, T., 
``Crashworthiness Studies of Locomotive Wide Nose Short Hood 
Designs,'' Proceedings of the 8th ASME Symposium on Crashworthiness, 
Occupant Protection and Biomechanics in Transportation November 14-
19, 1999; Nashville, Tennessee; Tyrell, D., Severson, K., Marquis, 
B., Perlman, A.B., ``Simulation of an Oblique Collision of a 
Locomotive and an Intermodal Container,'' Proceedings of the 8th 
ASME Symposium on Crashworthiness, Occupant Protection and 
Biomechanics in Transportation November 14-19, 1999; Nashville, 
Tennessee.
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    The Working Group conducted its meetings on the following dates at 
the following locations:

(1) September 8-9, 1997, Washington, DC;
(2) February 2-3, 1998, Jacksonville, FL;
(3) April 9-10, 1998, Fort Pierce, FL;
(4) July 14-15, 1998, Las Vegas, NV;
(5) October 28-29, 1998, Kansas City, MO;
(6) February 25-26, 1999, Washington, DC;
(7) June 15-16, 1999, Las Vegas, NV;
(8) October 19-20, 1999, Sterling, VA;
(9) December 13-14, 1999, Jacksonville, FL;
(10) October 9-10, 2001, Washington, DC;
(11) January 17-18, 2002, Jacksonville, FL; and
(12) June 28-29, 2005, San Francisco, CA.

Minutes from the above-referenced meetings have been placed in the 
docket of this proceeding.
    The Working Group had its inaugural meeting on September 8-9, 1997, 
in Washington, DC. After reviewing its formal Task Statement to gain an 
understanding of the scope of its mission, the Working Group recognized 
that a smaller, more manageable group could more effectively consider 
the technical requirements and debate the advantages and disadvantages 
of the technical options available. Thus, the S-580/Engineering Review 
Task Force (``Engineering Task Force'') was created for this sole 
purpose. The Engineering Task Force was made up of Working Group 
members who either volunteered or named a fellow member as a 
representative. The Engineering Task Force met four times and conducted 
meetings by telephone conference on three occasions. These task force 
meetings served to progress the technical aspects of the issues and 
were open to all members of the Working Group. These meetings were 
somewhat less formal and were conducive to free exchange of technical 
information and ideas. A summary report on the Engineering Task Force's 
deliberations was made at each subsequent Working Group meeting.
    The Working Group acknowledged the three distinct elements to the 
task. First, the group would need to identify, using recent accident 
data, the most prevalent locomotive collision scenarios which involve 
injuries and deaths. To this end, the Working Group requested that FRA 
review pertinent accidents for presentation at the February 2-3, 1998 
Working Group meeting. The second element involved detailed engineering 
analysis of the effectiveness of specific crashworthiness features. To 
this end, FRA pledged the technical assistance of the Volpe Center, 
along with required support from outside contractors as needed. Third, 
the Working Group expressed interest in understanding the projected 
economic impact of any new requirements.
    FRA commenced a review of locomotive accident data from 1995 to 
1996 as a representative sampling of accidents. FRA then narrowed the 
pool of accidents to 23 and presented summaries of them to the 
Engineering Task Force at its first meeting. Collective discussion of 
these accidents with railroad and labor members of the Engineering Task 
Force helped to flesh out all the details of the locomotive types and 
designs. The Engineering Task Force then classified all 23 collisions 
into five major categories and developed a sequence of events, or 
scenario, for each accident. These five scenarios are:

[[Page 36892]]

    (1) Coupled locomotive override resulting from a head-on train-to-
train collision;
    (2) Colliding locomotive override resulting from a head-on train-
to-train collision;
    (3)\5\ Rear end/overtaking collision between a locomotive and a 
freight car;
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    \5\ The report from the Accident/Data Analysis and Benefits 
Assessment Task Force describes 6 scenarios. It contains 2 scenarios 
in which the window structure is impacted. In one, an overriding 
freight car impacts the window structure during a rear-end 
collision; in the other, logs impact the window structure in a grade 
crossing collision with a truck carrying logs. The Working Group 
initially considered the former, but the latter was used for the 
basis for crashworthiness evaluation of the window structure. See 
Table 1.
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    (4) Oblique/raking collision between a locomotive and a freight car 
or part thereof, at a switch or upon passing a train on the adjacent 
track; and
    (5) Offset collision between locomotive and freight car.
    Once these scenarios were identified, a representative accident for 
each scenario was chosen to be studied in detail. The Engineering Task 
Force next gathered as many details as possible concerning the 
accidents and determined the crashworthiness features which were 
involved or could have had an effect in each scenario. Table 1 shows 
the scenarios, collision mode, relevant crashworthiness features, and 
representative accidents.

             Table 1.--Collision Scenario, Collision Mode, and Accident Representative of Scenario.
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                                                                                          Accident location and
          Collision scenario                Collision mode         Modified component              date
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1. Head-on collision between two       Coupled locomotive       Anti-climber Shelf-      Smithfield, WV, August
 freight trains.                        override.                coupler.                 20, 1996.
2. Head-on collision between two       Colliding locomotive     Collision post           West Eola, IL, January
 freight trains.                        override.                                         20, 1993.
3a. Overtaking collision, locomotive   Loading of window frame  Window frame structure.  Phoenixville, PA,
 to flat car.                           structure.                                        August 23, 1996.
3b. Grade crossing collision with      Loading of window frame  Window frame structure.  Phoenixville, PA,
 highway truck carrying logs.           structure.                                        August 23, 1996.
4. Object, such as a trailer, fouling  Corner loading of        Short hood.............  Selma, NC, May 16,
 right-of-way of locomotive.            locomotive short hood.                            1994.
5. Offset collision between a          Corner loading of        Front plate............  Madrone, NM, October
 locomotive and a freight car.          locomotive underframe.                            13, 1995.
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Figure 1 shows schematic illustrations for the inline collision 
scenarios--Scenarios 1, 2, and 3b. In Scenario 1, the principal concern 
is a trailing locomotive overriding the leading locomotive, 
consequently eliminating the operator's cab (survival space) during the 
collision. In scenario 2 the principal concern is the relatively strong 
underframe of one colliding locomotive overriding the underframe of the 
other locomotive. In this scenario, the overriding locomotive crushes 
the operator's cab of the overriden locomotive. In scenario 3, the 
principal concern is the destruction of the upper portion (window area) 
of the operator's cab.

[[Page 36893]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR28JN06.002

    Figure 2 shows schematic illustrations of the oblique collision 
scenarios--Scenarios 4 and 5. The illustration for Scenario 4 shows an 
intermodal trailer fouling the right of way of an oncoming locomotive. 
The principal concern is with the trailer striking the short hood 
outboard of the collision post and consequently causing sufficient 
damage to intrude into the operator's cab. The illustration of Scenario 
5 shows a locomotive obliquely colliding with a freight car at a 
switch. The principal concern is that the freight car can intrude into 
the operator's volume by raking down the side of the locomotive.

[[Page 36894]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR28JN06.003

    Each collision scenario presents a significant risk of injury or 
death to locomotive cab occupants, and the Working Group recognized 
that effective reduction of this risk is the primary goal when 
considering locomotive crashworthiness standards.
    The Working Group next examined a list of crash survival concepts 
that FRA had previously assembled. The Engineering Task Force discussed 
each concept in light of the accidents reviewed. There was general 
agreement among Task Force members about the continued need for braced 
collision posts, corner posts, and the utilization of crash energy 
management principles to minimize secondary collisions within the 
locomotive cab. The Task Force also discussed the variance of 
underframe sill heights, the frequency of locomotive roll-over 
occurrences, and the concept of crash refuges, but ultimately agreed 
with FRA's Report to Congress that these features held little promise 
as effective locomotive crashworthiness features and that further use 
of resources in pursuit of these concepts was not warranted. The Task 
Force then discussed collision post strength, wide-nose locomotive cabs 
and cab corner strength as well as locomotive front end strength up to 
the window level. The Task Force felt that these concepts required 
further development in order to further mitigate the consequences from 
the reviewed accidents, which included side/oblique collisions, coupled 
locomotive override, and shifted load collisions.
    Standard S-580 includes the use of collision posts, wide-nose cab 
configurations of greater strength, and anti-climbing means to prevent 
override. The Working Group found that the accident survey showed the 
effects of S-580 on the survivability of locomotive crews to be 
substantial. However, they also recognized that higher levels of 
protection could be achieved by enhancing the strength requirements for 
future locomotive designs and by fortifying the current design of 
locomotives where possible and economically practicable. Thus, for 
comparison purposes, the group decided to model each of the collision 
scenarios to gauge the performance of each of the crashworthiness 
features under consideration. Data from the accidents was used for 
comparison with the analytic models and, where possible, for 
information on the crashworthiness performance of the baseline S-580 
locomotive design. For Scenarios 3a and 3b, the model was compared with 
the accident that occurred in Phoenixville, PA, on August 23, 1996, but 
the grade crossing collision, also occurring on August 23, 1996 in 
Phoenixville, with logs impacting the window structure was used to 
evaluate the influences of changes in the window structure.
    The Volpe Center, locomotive manufacturers and remanufacturers, and 
manufacturers of locomotive components made presentations to the 
Working Group on the current strength of the crash-related components 
and discussed the possibility of further strengthening of these 
components to improve overall crashworthiness. In addition, all members 
of the Working Group engaged in extensive discussion of these issues. 
Thus, only enhancements which were currently feasible were modeled.

[[Page 36895]]

    In all, the Working Group considered the following locomotive 
crashworthiness features:
    --Shelf couplers: A representative of the Mechanical Committee of 
Standard Coupler Manufacturers (MCSCM) reviewed the ``shelf coupler'' 
concept with the Working Group and traced its development from concept 
to the current status. Every freight car has a bottom-shelf E head 
coupler. Double shelf (top- and bottom-shelf) couplers are mandated by 
FRA on tank cars used to haul hazardous materials. These shelves limit 
vertical motion between two coupled couplers to approximately 7\1/4\ inches (184 mm). Passenger cars are typically equipped 
with tightlock couplers which keep the coupler faces at the same 
height. These couplers have demonstrated their effectiveness in 
preventing override for their respective equipment. During the 
discussion it was pointed out that a top shelf might assist in 
preventing override in a rear-end collision although it would require 
that a coupling actually occur for the shelf to be effective. However, 
type-F couplers commonly applied to locomotives already incorporate a 
top shelf feature. After deliberations, the Working Group decided not 
to pursue the concept of double shelf couplers as effective 
crashworthiness improvements. It was further noted that the coupling of 
MU cables and the air hoses between locomotives would be made more 
difficult if shelf couplers were required on locomotives. The potential 
for such coupler designs in preventing locomotive-to-locomotive 
override in a head-on collision was nonetheless evaluated.

--Interlocking anti-climber: The anti-climber design employed by the 
Canadian National Railway Company (CN) was evaluated. This design 
incorporates thicker webs and flanges than typical North American 
designs, and also includes exposed flanges running the width of the 
anti-climber.
--Stronger collision posts: Preliminary designs of collision posts with 
strengths up to the strength of the main underframe structure of the 
locomotive were developed and evaluated. Principal modifications 
considered were the addition of flanges and tapering the collision 
post.
--Stronger window area structure: Increased cab strength above the 
short hood was evaluated. Modifications considered included the use of 
thicker sheet metal for the window frame members.
--Stronger short hood: The influence of short hood strength on 
locomotive crashworthiness in an oblique collision was evaluated. 
Modifications evaluated included thickness of the short hood and the 
material used to make the short hood.
--Front plate: Increased front plate strength was considered as a 
potential modification for increased locomotive crashworthiness in an 
oblique collision with a freight car. The modification considered 
consisted of increased front plate thickness.
    The results of the study indicate that strengthened collision posts 
and short hoods resulted in increased crashworthiness for particular 
collision scenarios. Shelf couplers were found not to be effective in 
preventing coupled locomotive override. Due to the fracture that occurs 
as the CN anti-climber design longitudinally crushes, this design was 
found to be ineffective in supporting the vertical forces that occur 
during locomotive-to-locomotive override, consequently allowing such 
overrides to occur. For an oblique collision of a locomotive with an 
empty hopper car, in which the locomotive is principally engaged below 
the underframe, modifications to the locomotive are not likely to 
influence the outcome of the collision.
    ADL and Volpe Center representatives, presented results from their 
detailed analyses of how design improvements/additions in S-580 would 
affect the probable resulting injuries/deaths in each of the five 
scenarios (a copy of the results has been placed in the docket of this 
proceeding). Then, the Working Group analyzed and considered the 
proposed costs and benefits to determine the effectiveness of each of 
the proposed changes to S-580. The group also considered a performance 
standard for locomotive crashworthiness design.
    From this point forward, the Working Group, assisted by the Task 
Force, debated the format for specifying the crashworthiness 
requirements, many issues relating to feasibility of alternative 
structures, and the economic impact of the proposed new requirements. 
Throughout, the group remained convinced that significant safety 
benefits could be achieved. The AAR members volunteered to adopt a 
specification (which would become AAR S-580-2005) meeting the 
performance criteria under discussion. This would act as a model design 
standard which satisfies the crashworthiness performance requirements. 
The group then focused its attention on the details of AAR S-580-2005 
in order to refine and optimize them.
    On November 2, 2004, FRA published a notice of proposed rulemaking 
(NPRM) addressing locomotive crashworthiness. In issuing the NPRM, FRA 
adopted the recommendations of the Working Group and the full RSAC. See 
69 FR 63890. The NPRM provided for a 60-day comment period and provided 
interested parties the opportunity to request a public hearing. Based 
upon a request from an interested party, FRA issued a notice on January 
12, 2005 extending the comment period from January 3, 2005 until 
February 3, 2005. See 70 FR 2105. FRA received comments from six 
interested parties.
    On June 28 and 29, 2005, the Working Group conducted a meeting to 
review and discuss the comments received in response to the NPRM. 
Minutes from this meeting have been placed in the docket of this 
proceeding. The Working Group discussed all of the issues raised in the 
comments and considered various methods by which to address the 
comments. Based on information and discussions held at this meeting, 
the Working Group developed a recommendation for a final rule.
    In July 2005, the Working Group presented its recommendations for 
resolution of the public comments to the full RSAC. On August 5, 2005, 
the RSAC voted to recommend issuance of the final rule while addressing 
the comments as proposed by the Working Group. FRA, having fully 
participated in the RSAC review, and finding that the final rule will 
improve rail safety, has accepted the recommendations of the RSAC in 
completing this final rule. FRA has also made various editorial 
corrections necessary to present in a clear, concise, and technically 
correct manner the intended final rule.
    FRA has worked closely with the RSAC in the development of its 
recommendations and believes that the RSAC effectively addressed 
locomotive crashworthiness standards. FRA has greatly benefitted from 
the open, informed exchange of information that has taken place during 
meetings. There is general consensus among labor, management, and 
manufacturers concerning the primary principles FRA sets forth in this 
final rule. FRA believes that the expertise possessed by the RSAC 
representatives enhances the value of the recommendations, and FRA has 
made every effort to incorporate them in this final rule.

IV. Major Issues

A. Promulgation of Performance Standards Where Possible

    FRA has endeavored to promulgate performance requirements in this 
final

[[Page 36896]]

rule rather than the more prescriptive design standards. FRA 
understands that this approach allows for greater flexibility in the 
design of locomotives and believes this approach has a better chance of 
encouraging innovation in locomotive design than less flexible design 
standards.
    The following discussion includes a description of performance and 
design standards, the advantages and disadvantages of each, and the 
relationship between the design and performance standards.
    Performance standards describe the behavior, or performance, of 
systems under prescribed circumstances. The principal advantage of such 
standards is that how the performance is achieved is not specified; any 
design approach can be used. The principal drawback to such standards 
for crashworthiness is that either destructive tests or detailed 
analyses (i.e., computer simulation) are required in order to assure 
that the system can achieve the desired level of performance.
    Design standards prescribe conditions which do not explicitly 
relate to the performance of the system. The principal advantage of 
such standards is that compliance can be verified with either non-
destructive tests or closed-form analyses (i.e., hand calculations). 
The principal disadvantages are that the desired level of performance 
is not guaranteed, assumptions about performance must be made when 
fashioning a particular design approach, and innovative approaches to 
achieving the regulatory objective may be precluded.
    The Working Group considered specifying crashworthiness through 
design standards and performance standards. The Working Group 
recommended that design standards be employed for industry standards, 
and that a combination of design and performance standards for the 
federal regulations. The Working Group endeavored to have the 
recommended industry standards and the recommended federal regulations 
provide equivalent levels of crashworthiness.
    This final rule includes both performance requirements and design 
requirements. The Working Group recognized that in certain cases, 
design standards are identified as presumptively responsive to 
performance requirements. This approach permits builders to use 
accepted designs without conducting costly analyses.
    While the Working Group endeavored in its recommendations to make 
both sets of requirements as equivalent as possible, because of the 
differences in their nature, it is impossible to make them completely 
equivalent. The equivalence of the design and performance standards is 
discussed in detail in: Martinez, E., Tyrell, D., ``Alternative 
Analyses of Locomotive Structural Designs for Crashworthiness,'' 
presented at the 2000 International Mechanical Engineering Congress and 
Exposition, November 6, 2000, Orlando, FL, and included in the docket 
of this proceeding as Document No. FRA 2004-17645-10. There are no 
guarantees that a locomotive built to the design specification will 
have the performance required by the performance specification. If some 
aspect of the design approach assumed in developing the design 
requirements is changed, it may be possible to meet the design 
requirements but not meet the level of desired performance. 
Nevertheless, FRA believes that this final rule will accomplish the 
intended risk reduction.
    Since performance standards are not appropriate for every 
regulation, it must first be determined whether certain factors 
preclude their use. For example, performance standards are not 
effective for regulation in areas where it is difficult to determine 
compliance (i.e., a regulation requiring safer piloting of aircraft) or 
where determination of a proper minimum level of performance cannot be 
made easily or cost-effectively (see ``Performance-Based Regulations 
Guide,'' Federal Aviation Administration, October 31, 1997, a copy of 
which has been placed in the docket of this proceeding).
    The Working Group sought to recommend locomotive crashworthiness 
performance standards where possible and identified the locomotive 
front end structure design as the best candidate for regulation through 
performance requirements. There was some concern among the Working 
Group members that if FRA issued performance requirements in this area, 
computer models would be required to show compliance with performance 
requirements for each new locomotive design. Thus, the Working Group 
decided to recommend that S-580 be incorporated by reference in its 
entirety. This concept became further refined by maintaining the 
performance requirements, yet providing a model design standard which, 
if met, would likely satisfy the performance requirements.
    The Working Group's approach encourages introduction of more 
innovative designs. As previously noted, AAR agreed to provide the 
model design standard in the form of an enhanced S-580. Thus, the 
Working Group focused its efforts on developing a model design standard 
for locomotives of conventional design, herein called AAR S-580-2005.
    Rather than requiring every design to show satisfaction of the 
performance standards here, FRA has offered AAR S-580-2005 as a 
conventional model design standard. FRA, in consultation with the RSAC 
Working Group, has performed the necessary analysis to show that AAR S-
580-2005 meets the performance standards in most instances.
    All of the subject areas covered by this final rule, other than 
locomotive front end, are presented in terms of design standards rather 
than performance requirements. This formulation required in-depth 
analysis of accident history, creation and validation of computer 
models, and comparison of various design improvements versus their 
baseline design. This was necessary to ensure that the minimum 
requirements being developed were in fact feasible and necessary. Also, 
S-580 provided a convenient and appropriate benchmark for testing of 
further improvements in this field, whereas FRA is not aware of any 
standards for subject areas such as locomotive cab interior 
configuration or locomotive cab emergency egress.
    FRA will regulate designs for anti-climbing devices and underframe 
strength through design standards, in accordance with AAR S-580-2005. 
Under this standard, underframe strength is maintained at the level 
utilized in prior construction, providing basic compatibility among old 
and new locomotives. During preparation of the proposed rule, the AAR 
revised its anti-climbing standard to make it more rigorous by 
specifying that the required load (100,000 pounds) be met as applied to 
a 12 inch width anywhere along the anti-climber perimeter, in contrast 
to 200,000 pounds applied across the full width of the anti-climber. 
The Working Group recognized that even this improved structure would be 
of limited use in a head-on collision with another locomotive, because 
of horizontal crushing that would typically occur before the device 
could engage vertically. However, the group did find evidence that 
anti-climbing devices do provide protection to cab occupants in the 
event of a collision with a highway vehicle. FRA plans additional 
research in this area in the future.
    FRA understands that these standards will not create absolutely 
crashworthy locomotives, but rather will tend to optimize 
crashworthiness design features in order to increase cab occupant 
safety under some of the most

[[Page 36897]]

common collision conditions. Since its inception in the early 1990's, 
S-580 has had a positive effect on locomotive crashworthiness design. 
This final rule is intended to capture the benefits of the industry's 
initiative and improve upon it where possible. FRA believes the RSAC 
resources were the best forum for recognizing and generating such 
improvements.
    Other efforts are being undertaken by the industry and by FRA to 
reduce the risk of locomotive collisions. For instance, on March 7, 
2005, FRA issued a rule on performance standards for the use and 
development of processor-based signal and train control systems (part 
236, subpart H). See 70 FR 11052. The implementation of positive train 
control \6\ (PTC) technology could reduce the number of train-to-train 
collisions. Current federal and state programs encourage the safety 
improvement of highway-rail at-grade crossings (including initiatives 
targeted at drivers of heavy trucks) and help reduce the risk of 
locomotive collisions. The risks associated with locomotive collisions 
with offset intermodal containers on freight cars on parallel tracks 
are being addressed by joint industry/FRA programs to promote better 
securement of trailers and containers.
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    \6\ PTC is a type of train control system containing modern 
processor-based technology that is defined by the protective 
functions that it provides. As a minimum, the core functions of a 
PTC system are: (1) Prevent train-to-train collisions (positive 
train separation), (2) enforce speed restrictions, including civil 
engineering restrictions (curves, bridges, etc.) and temporary slow 
orders, and (3) provide protection for roadway workers and their 
equipment operating under specific authorities. A PTC system can be 
classified into one of four levels of a system hierarchy depending 
on safety features or additional functions that it contains beyond 
the basic core functions.
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    However, all of these collision avoidance strategies require time 
and resources to work, and there is significant uncertainty regarding 
their full implementation. Further, as rail operations and highway 
traffic grow, significant effort may be required to ensure that 
collision-related casualties do not grow as well. Accordingly, taking 
action to mitigate the effects of collisions remains a prudent element 
of public policy, and is likely to remain so for some years to come.

B. Application to New Locomotives (See Also Section-by-Section Analysis 
for Sec.  229.203)

    It should be emphasized that FRA is not imposing these locomotive 
crashworthiness requirements on the current locomotive fleet. At this 
time, FRA believes safety benefits resulting from crashworthiness 
improvements would be best realized through future locomotive designs, 
rather than by retrofitting the current fleet. However, what ought to 
be considered a ``new locomotive'' for purposes of this final rule 
merits discussion.
    FRA uses the locomotive build date of on or after January 1, 2009, 
for determining whether the locomotive is subject to the requirements 
of this final rule. This should give railroads and locomotive 
manufacturers adequate time to take necessary steps to ensure that 
these new locomotives will be in compliance with these requirements, 
and it corresponds with the date selected by the AAR for the revised S-
580 standard to be implemented by manufacturers.
    In the NPRM, FRA was particularly interested in whether a 
locomotive rebuilt with new components atop a previously-used 
underframe, or ``decked'' locomotive, should qualify as a new 
locomotive. These ``remanufactured'' locomotives may have a future life 
span nearly equivalent to a locomotive constructed on a new underframe. 
FRA previously defined ``new locomotive'' to include those locomotives 
rebuilt with a previously-used underframe and containing no more than 
25% previously-used parts (weighted by cost). FRA invited comment on 
this issue and whether any other distinct class of locomotive should be 
considered a ``new locomotive'' for the purposes of this rule. FRA 
received comments from three parties seeking clarification of FRA's 
definition of ``remanufactured'' locomotive. These comments are 
addressed and discussed in the section-by-section analysis of ``Section 
229.5 Definitions.''
    FRA encourages, as discussed by the Working Group, the use of sound 
consist \7\ management principles to place improved, more crashworthy 
locomotives as lead locomotives in consists. As these new locomotives 
are phased in, they will only comprise a portion of the fleet, and 
railroads will be faced with making decisions regarding their placement 
in a consist. FRA believes the benefits of this rule are maximized when 
these newer locomotives are used in the lead position to provide 
additional protection to the operating crews, and not in trailing 
positions behind older, less crashworthy locomotives, but FRA has not 
mandated the placement of the newer locomotives. The Working Group did 
not believe a requirement to mandate placement of these newer 
locomotives in the lead position would be beneficial, and further 
believed that the issue is relevant only during the phase-in period. In 
any event, in the future the entire locomotive fleet will be built to 
these or future crashworthiness standards. In the NPRM, commenters were 
invited to address this issue.
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    \7\ As used in this context, ``consist'' means the composition 
of a train.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    FRA received one comment on this issue. The commenter believed that 
since all future locomotives will be built to these new crashworthiness 
standards, a placement requirement would soon be unnecessary. In 
addition, the commenter believed that the requirement to place newer 
locomotives in the lead position would prove to be an ``operational 
nightmare'' for railroads to implement. The RSAC, through the Working 
Group, discussed this issue and agreed with the commenter that a 
placement requirement should not be implemented. As FRA has found that 
there is no current need to mandate the placement of newer locomotives 
in the lead position, FRA has adopted the RSAC's recommendation.

V. Section-by-Section Analysis

Amendments to Part 229

    In contrast to requirements for passenger-occupied cab control cars 
and multiple unit (MU) locomotives, there are no current federal 
regulations governing conventional locomotive crashworthiness design. 
These new regulations revise subpart D of part 229 to address 
locomotive crashworthiness design for conventional locomotives.

Subpart A--General

Section 229.5 Definitions
    This section contains an extensive set of definitions. FRA intends 
for these definitions to clarify the meaning of terms as they are used 
in the text of the final rule. The final rule retains all of the 
definitions proposed in the NPRM, with the exception of the definition 
of ``MU locomotive'', which will keep its existing definition as 
amended by FRA's Locomotive Event Recorder Rule, which was published 
subsequent to the NPRM. See 70 FR 37920 (June 30, 2005). FRA received 
one comment asking FRA to reconcile the potential conflict between the 
definition of ``MU locomotive'' proposed in the NPRM and the existing 
definition of ``MU locomotive'' contained in part 238. As the 
crashworthiness standards of this final rule do not apply to ``MU 
locomotives,'' FRA finds no need to further modify the existing ``MU 
locomotive'' definition. FRA will address the general issue of 
definitions related to MU locomotives in a forthcoming proposal 
originated by the Passenger Safety Working Group of the RSAC.

[[Page 36898]]

    The following terms have the same meaning as provided in part 238: 
``corner post,'' ``lateral,'' ``locomotive cab,'' ``longitudinal,'' 
``permanent deformation,'' ``power car,'' ``roof rail,'' ``semi-
permanently coupled,'' ``Tier II,'' and ``ultimate strength.''
    The term ``anti-climber'' is intended to have the same meaning as 
``anti-climbing mechanism'' as it is used in part 238. The term ``anti-
climber'' is used in place of ``anti-climbing mechanism'' to more 
accurately represent the name used in the rail industry.
    The term ``collision post'' has essentially the same meaning as it 
is used in part 238; however, the definition is modified slightly in 
this final rule to narrow its application only to locomotives.
    The term ``build date'' means the date on which the completed 
locomotive is actually shipped by the manufacturer or remanufacturer to 
the customer, or if the railroad manufactures or remanufactures the 
locomotive itself, the date on which the locomotive is released from 
the manufacture or remanufacture facility. In the NPRM, FRA asked for 
comment as to whether this definition accurately represents the 
industry's definition of ``build date.'' FRA received two comments 
addressing this issue. One commenter suggested that the Working Group 
revise the definition to reflect the date on which the locomotive is 
ready for delivery to a customer, regardless of when the customer 
actually takes delivery. However, another commenter suggested that the 
definition of ``build date'' remain unchanged. The Working Group 
discussed this issue and agreed with one of the commenters that the 
definition should remain unchanged. FRA agrees with the Working Group's 
recommendation based on the fact that the existing definition of 
``build date'' will be simpler to apply uniformly to all affected 
parties. Subsequent to the RSAC providing recommendations on this final 
rule, FRA also added language to the definition to reflect what a build 
date for a locomotive would be if a railroad manufactured or 
remanufactured a locomotive itself. This addition captures the intent 
of the ``build date'' definition proposed in the NPRM and discussed by 
the Working Group, however, it contemplates the possibility that a 
railroad may manufacture or remanufacture its own locomotives.
    The term ``designated service'' has the same meaning as provided in 
part 223.
    The term ``design standard'' means a specification for the 
crashworthiness design of locomotives. This will usually contain a set 
of design requirements which do not specify ultimate performance, yet 
are not so specific in nature that they leave little flexibility to the 
designer. The overall design of the locomotive is allowed to vary, so 
long as the specified crashworthiness design requirements are met.
    The term ``fuel tank, external'' differs slightly from the current 
part 238 definition and revises that definition by replacing the word 
``volume'' with the word ``vessel.'' FRA believes that this is a more 
accurate and grammatically correct definition. In this rulemaking, FRA 
is also revising the current part 238 definition to mirror the 
definition in part 229.
    The term ``fuel tank, internal'' differs slightly from the current 
part 238 definition and revises that definition by replacing the word 
``volume'' with the word ``vessel.'' FRA believes that this is a more 
accurate and grammatically correct definition. In this rulemaking, FRA 
is also revising the current part 238 definition to mirror the 
definition in part 229.
    FRA received one comment concerning the definitions of ``fuel tank, 
external'' and ``fuel tank, internal.'' This commenter agreed that the 
new definitions are ``more accurate and grammatically correct''; 
however, this commenter sought clarification as to what structural 
protection would be required for a fuel tank to be considered 
``internal'' or within the ``car body structure.'' In response to this 
comment, FRA provides further clarification as to what is considered an 
``internal'' fuel tank. A ``fuel tank, internal,'' as defined in this 
rule, is a fuel tank which ``does not extend outside the car body 
structure of the locomotive.'' In order to be considered ``internal,'' 
a fuel tank must be surrounded by more than just a min