Air Cargo Security Requirements, 30478-30517 [06-4800]

Agencies

• DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
• Transportation Security Administration

[Federal Register Volume 71, Number 102 (Friday, May 26, 2006)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 30478-30517]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 06-4800]



[[Page 30477]]

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Part II





Department of Homeland Security





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Transportation Security Administration



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49 CFR Parts 1520, 1540, 1542, et al.



Air Cargo Security Requirements; Final Rule

Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 102 / Friday, May 26, 2006 / Rules 
and Regulations

[[Page 30478]]


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DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Transportation Security Administration

49 CFR Parts 1520, 1540, 1542, 1544, 1546, and 1548

[Docket No. TSA-2004-19515; Amendment Nos. 1520-4, 1540-7, 1542-2, 
1544-5, 1546-2, and 1548-2]
RIN 1652-AA23


Air Cargo Security Requirements

AGENCY: Transportation Security Administration (TSA), DHS.

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: The Transportation Security Administration is amending its 
regulations to enhance and improve the security of air cargo 
transportation. This final rule requires airport operators, aircraft 
operators, foreign air carriers, and indirect air carriers to implement 
security measures in the air cargo supply chain as directed under the 
Aviation and Transportation Security Act. This final rule also amends 
the applicability of the requirement for a ``twelve-five'' security 
program for aircraft with a maximum certificated takeoff weight of 
12,500 pounds or more to those aircraft with a maximum certificated 
takeoff weight of more than 12,500 pounds to conform to recent 
legislation.

DATES: Effective Date: This final rule is effective October 23, 2006.
    Compliance Date: By November 22, 2006, Indirect air carriers must 
comply with the requirements for Indirect air carrier training under 
Sec.  1548.11.
    By December 1, 2006, aircraft operators, foreign air carriers, and 
indirect air carriers must comply with the requirements for--
    Security threat assessments under Sec. Sec.  1544.228, 1546.213, 
1548.15, and 1548.16; and
    Indirect air carriers that do not currently hold a security program 
under part 1548, and that offer cargo to an aircraft operator operating 
under a full all-cargo program or a comparable foreign air carrier 
under Sec.  1546.101(e), establishment of, and operation under, a TSA 
security program in part 1548.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Tamika McCree, Office of 
Transportation Sector Network Management (TSA-28), Transportation 
Security Administration, 601 South 12th Street, Arlington, VA 22202; 
(571-227-2632); tamika.mccree@dhs.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Availability of Rulemaking Documents

    You can get an electronic copy using the Internet by--
    (1) Searching the Department of Transportation's electronic Docket 
Management System (DMS) Web page (https://dms.dot.gov/search);
    (2) Accessing the Government Printing Office's Web page at https://
www.gpoaccess.gov/fr/; or
    (3) Visiting TSA's Law and Policy Web page at https://www.tsa.gov 
and accessing the link for ``Law and Policy'' at the top of the page.
    In addition, copies are available by writing or calling the 
individual in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section. Make sure to 
identify the docket number of this rulemaking.

Small Entity Inquiries

    The Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA) of 
1996 requires TSA to comply with small entity requests for information 
and advice about compliance with statutes and regulations within TSA's 
jurisdiction. Any small entity that has a question regarding this 
document may contact the person listed in FOR FURTHER INFORMATION 
CONTACT. Persons can obtain further information regarding SBREFA on the 
Small Business Administration's Web page at https://www.sba.gov/advo/
laws/law_lib.html.

Abbreviations and Terms Used in This Preamble

AAAE American Association of Airport Executives
AAPA Association of Asia Pacific Airlines
ACCA Air Courier Conference of America
ACISP All-Cargo International Security Procedures
ACI-NA Airports Council International-North America
AEA Association of European Airlines
AES Automated Export System
ALPA Air Line Pilots Association International
AOPA Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association
ASAC Aviation Security Advisory Committee
ATA Air Transport Association
ATSA Aviation and Transportation Security Act
CAA Cargo Airline Association
CBP U.S. Customs and Border Protection
CFR Code of Federal Regulations
CHRC Criminal History Records Check
DHS Department of Homeland Security
DSIP Domestic Security Integration Program
EA Emergency Amendment
FAA Federal Aviation Administration
HAZMAT Hazardous Materials
IAC Indirect Air Carrier
IACSSP Indirect Air Carrier Standard Security Program
IATA International Air Transport Association
MSP Model Security Program
MTOW Maximum certificated take-off weight
NACA National Armored Car Association
NATA National Air Transport Association
NCBFAA National Customs Brokers and Forwarders Association
RAA Regional Airline Association
RACCA Regional Air Cargo Carriers Association
SIDA Security Identification Display Area
SD Security Directive
SSI Sensitive Security Information
STA Security Threat Assessment
TSA Transportation Security Administration
TFSSP Twelve-Five Standard Security Program
UPS United Parcel Service

Outline of Final Rule

I. Background
II. Comment Disposition
    A. Security Threat Assessments
    B. Acceptance and Screening of Cargo
    C. Security Identification Display Area
    D. Known Shipper Program
    E. Adoption and Implementation of the Security Programs
    F. Cost of IAC Training and Materials
    G. Cost Benefit Analysis
    H. 100 Percent Inspection of Cargo
    I. Unknown Shipper Cargo
    J. Terms Used in This Chapter
    K. Persons and Property Aboard the Aircraft
    L. Other Issues and Sections
III. Section-by-Section Analysis of Changes
IV. Fee Authority for Security Threat Assessment
V. Rulemaking Analyses and Notices
    A. Regulatory Evaluation Summary
    B. Paperwork Reduction Act
    C. International Compatibility
    D. International Trade Impact Assessment
    E. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act Analyses
    F. Executive Order 13132, Federalism
    G. Environmental Analysis
    H. Energy Impact
VI. List of Subjects
VII. The Amendment

I. Background

    This final rule implements air cargo security requirements under 
the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA), Pub. L. 107-71. 
ATSA requires TSA to implement the following requirements:
     Provide for screening of all property, cargo, carry-on and 
checked baggage, and other articles, that will be carried aboard a 
passenger aircraft operated by a domestic or foreign air carrier;\1\ 
and
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    \1\ 49 U.S.C. 44901(a).
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     Establish a system to screen, inspect, or otherwise ensure 
the security of freight that is to be transported in all-cargo aircraft 
as soon as practicable.\2\
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    \2\ 49 U.S.C. 44901(f).
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    TSA published a notice of proposed rulemaking in the Federal 
Register on

[[Page 30479]]

November 10, 2004, at 69 FR 65258, to solicit public comment on the 
proposed air cargo regulations. Please see the NPRM for additional 
background information on the development of these regulations. The 
NPRM proposed, among other requirements, to:
     Address two critical risks in the air cargo environment: 
(1) The hostile takeover of an all-cargo aircraft leading to its use as 
a weapon; and (2) the use of cargo to introduce an explosive device 
onboard a passenger aircraft.
     Create a new mandatory security regime for aircraft 
operators and foreign air carriers in all-cargo operations using 
aircraft with a maximum certificated take-off weight more than 45,500 
kg.
     Create requirements for foreign air carriers in all-cargo 
operation with an aircraft having a maximum certificated take-off 
weight more than 12,500 pounds but no more than 45,500 kg, and a 
separate program for aircraft with a maximum certificated take-off 
weight more than 45,500 kg.
     Require a Security Threat Assessment for individuals with 
unescorted access to air cargo.
     Enhance existing requirements for indirect air carriers 
(IAC).
     Expand Security Identification Display Area requirements 
at regulated airports to include areas where cargo is loaded and 
unloaded.
    The NPRM was based in part on recommendations received from the 
Department of Transportation Office of Inspector General's (DOT OIG's) 
September 2002 audit of the air cargo security program,\3\ the General 
Accounting Office's (GAO's) December 2002 report entitled, 
``Vulnerabilities and Potential Improvements for the Air Cargo 
System'',\4\ and the Aviation Security Advisory Committee 
recommendations of October 1, 2003. TSA was also guided by the Air 
Cargo Strategic Plan, which was completed in November 2003, and 
approved by the Department of Homeland Security in January 2004. The 
NPRM proposed a threat-based, risk-managed program for securing the air 
cargo transportation system.
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    \3\ Report Number SC-2002-113, September 19, 2002. This report 
is SSI.
    \4\ GAO-03-344, December 20, 2002.
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    This final rule adopts the regulations proposed in the NPRM with 
minor revisions to clarify certain provisions from the proposed rule. 
Specifically, the final rule clarifies both of the populations who are 
subject to Security Threat Assessments (STAs), and the areas where 
airports must extend Security Identification Display Area (SIDA) 
measures for cargo.
    During this rulemaking, another critical security enhancement has 
been implemented, that is, an increase in the inspection of cargo by 
aircraft operators and foreign air carriers. The NPRM proposed to 
codify the requirement for the aircraft operators and foreign air 
carriers to inspect cargo in accordance with their security programs. 
These operators already were inspecting a portion of their cargo as 
required by Security Directives issued by TSA in November 2003.
    Following the publication of the NPRM, the Department of Homeland 
Security Appropriations Act, 2005 was enacted.\5\ Section 513 of the 
Act requires TSA to amend Security Directives and programs to triple 
the percentage of cargo inspected on passenger aircraft, which TSA did. 
Details of these security measures are protected by TSA as Sensitive 
Security Information,\6\ and therefore are not available for release to 
the general public.
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    \5\ FY `05, Pub. L. 108-334.
    \6\ ``Sensitive Security Information'' or ``SSI'' is information 
obtained or developed in the conduct of security activities, the 
disclosure of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of 
privacy, reveal trade secrets or privileged or confidential 
information, or be detrimental to the security of transportation. 
The protection of SSI is governed by 49 CFR part 1520.
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    Although the details are not in the rule, the regulatory evaluation 
for this final rule analyzes the cost incurred by aircraft operators 
and foreign air carriers to comply with this inspection requirement. 
The cost of inspection of air cargo on passenger aircraft accounts for 
about $1.491 billion of the total $2 billion costs of this rule, as 
discussed further in the Regulatory Evaluation Summary (Section V.A.) 
of this preamble. This inspection requirement accounts for the largest 
single cost of this final rule. This inspection requirement is not a 
new responsibility under this final rule; rather, TSA is taking this 
opportunity to provide a cost estimate for inspection of air cargo on 
passenger aircraft, as currently required under existing Security 
Directives. TSA provided cost estimates for these inspections in the 
NPRM, and has since revised them to account for the effect of the 
congressional directive and public comments. These Security Directives 
were first issued in November 2003. TSA subsequently issued security 
program amendments to reflect the inspection requirements of the 
Security Directives and the congressional mandates. These amendments 
have been implemented since July 2005. This rulemaking marks TSA's 
first opportunity to account for costs associated with the issuance of 
these security measures. The specific requirements for these 
inspections are SSI and are not appropriate for public disclosure as 
part of this rulemaking.
    Accordingly, about 75 percent of the approximately $2 billion 
overall 10-year cost of the requirements implemented under this rule 
are associated with requirements that did not originate with this rule. 
These costs originated with TSA Security Directives issued in November 
2003 and security program amendments issued in March 2005. The cost of 
implementing requirements that originate under this final rule is 
estimated to be about $167 million over a 10-year period.
    In conjunction with the publication of this final rule, TSA is 
issuing to regulated parties for comment proposed amendments to their 
security programs to implement this final rule as authorized under 49 
CFR 1542.105, 1544.105, 1546.105, and 1548.5.

II. Comment Disposition

    TSA received 134 letters commenting on the NPRM. These comments 
were submitted by a broad cross-section of parties with an interest in 
air cargo security; including aircraft operators, foreign air carriers, 
trade associations, airports, state and local governments, and indirect 
air carriers (IACs).\7\ These comments are addressed below, organized 
by major issues.
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    \7\ ``Indirect air carrier'' or ``IAC'' means any person or 
entity within the United States not in possession of an FAA air 
carrier operating certificate, which undertakes to engage indirectly 
in air transportation of property, and uses for all, or any part, of 
such transportation the services of an air carrier. This does not 
include the U.S. Postal Service (USPS) or its representative while 
acting on the behalf of the USPS. See 49 CFR 1540.5. This definition 
reflects an amendment pursuant to this final rulemaking.
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II.A. Security Threat Assessments (STAs)

    TSA received approximately 140 comments on the proposed requirement 
for security threat assessments (STAs) for persons with access to air 
cargo. The STA proposed by TSA would include a search by TSA of 
domestic and international databases to assess any potential terrorist 
threats from those individuals with access to air cargo. TSA currently 
requires a variety of individuals working in aviation to submit to a 
criminal history records check and an additional name-based background 
check. Generally, these individuals work on airport grounds and have 
access to secure areas. However, many other persons who have not been 
subjected to such background checks have access to air cargo. TSA

[[Page 30480]]

proposed to require that STAs be conducted on additional categories of 
persons who have unescorted access to air cargo to verify that these 
individuals do not pose a security threat. Individuals who undergo 
security checks required for unescorted access to a security 
identification display area (SIDA), or who have successfully completed 
another STA that TSA approves as comparable, would not be required to 
submit to an STA.
Applicability and Definitions
    Comment: The majority of comments addressing the proposed STA 
requirement expressed uncertainty about which employees would be 
required to have an STA, and what TSA considers to be ``unescorted 
access to cargo'' for purpose of triggering the STA requirement. In 
addition, the Regional Airline Association (RAA) states that the 
proposed language appears much broader than the scope previously 
recommended by the Aviation Security Advisory Committee (ASAC) because 
the requirement conceivably could apply to individuals who work outside 
of the airport environment. RAA believes that only individuals under 
the direct control of all-cargo airlines working at the airport should 
be subject to the STA requirement.
    The National Air Transport Association (NATA) suggests that TSA 
clarify specifically which persons are covered by the STA requirement--
either under this rule or by amendment to a security program--and which 
persons are excluded from the STA requirement. NATA states that because 
of industry confusion, a number of aircraft operators are unclear of 
their status with regard to the threat assessment requirement.
    The Air Transport Association (ATA) commented that they fully 
support TSA's conclusion that it is not necessary to require every 
employee of an entity regulated by TSA that is in the business of cargo 
transportation to submit to an STA. However, ATA believes that the 
proposed language in Sec. Sec.  1540.201 and 1544.228 is overly broad 
and subject to various interpretations.
    ATA states that, as written, the rules could apply to individuals 
who work outside the airport perimeter in cargo storage facilities or 
holding areas, truck drivers, and others who move cargo to airports on 
behalf of shippers. ATA believes that the rule also could apply to 
individuals who work at non-U.S. locations and employees of entities at 
the airport who share space or have access to air cargo areas operated 
by the regulated party, such as employees of fixed base operators who 
provide fuel and other supplies to regulated parties. ATA states that 
such broad coverage would be impractical and disruptive to timely air 
cargo transport, and urges TSA to clarify the language to limit the 
applicability.
    In addition, ATA recommends amending this section to apply to 
direct employees and authorized representatives of aircraft operators 
with unescorted access to cargo accepted by such aircraft operator. 
Federal Express (FedEx) recommends that TSA limit the STA requirement, 
to the extent permitted by applicable law, to employees who have 
unescorted access to the aircraft or cargo, or employees who they know 
or have reason to know will have access to cargo that will be tendered 
to a passenger carrier to be flown on a passenger aircraft.
    A number of comments asked for clarification as to what other 
security checks are approved by TSA, and, thus, would not require 
completion of an STA for that individual.
    TSA response: TSA agrees that not every employee should be subject 
to the STA requirement. Instead, TSA requires an STA for employees and 
agents of aircraft operators, foreign air carriers, and IACs who have 
unescorted access to cargo at certain times. TSA also requires an STA 
for certain IAC principals. TSA has revised the provisions of the 
regulations to clarify the STA requirement. While these revisions 
comport with the scope of the NPRM, we have restructured the sections 
to indicate more clearly which personnel are required to meet the STA 
requirements. The revisions clarify that the STA requirements apply:
     Only in the United States.
     To aircraft operators with a full program, or a full all-
cargo program; foreign air carriers under Sec.  1546.101(a), (b), or 
(e); and indirect air carriers.
     To individuals with unescorted access to cargo who are 
employees or agents of-- \8\
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    \8\ The STA requirements also extend to an officer, director, 
and person who holds 25 percent or more of total outstanding voting 
stock of an IAC. However, TSA did not receive requests for 
clarification to this requirement.
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     Aircraft operators with a full program and foreign air 
carriers under Sec.  1546.101(a) or (b) where they accept cargo;
     Aircraft operators with a full all-cargo program and 
foreign air carriers under Sec.  1546.101(e) where they consolidate or 
inspect cargo;
     IACs which accept cargo for transportation on aircraft 
operated by an aircraft operator with a full program, or a foreign air 
carrier under Sec.  1546.101(a) or (b); or
     IACs where they consolidate or hold cargo for 
transportation aboard an aircraft operated by an aircraft operator with 
a full or full all-cargo program, or a foreign air carrier under Sec.  
1546.101(a), (b) or (e).
     Unless the employee or agent has a Criminal History 
Records Check (CHRC) for unescorted authority to a SIDA, or another STA 
approved by TSA as comparable to an STA under subpart C.
    It is helpful to note where employees and agents are not required 
to have an STA. Appropriate background checks for access to airport-
restricted areas are obligatory under International Civil Aviation 
Organization (ICAO) Annex 17 Standards. TSA does not require STAs for 
unescorted access to cargo at foreign locations.
    Individuals do not need an STA if a person with the appropriate 
background check escorts them. Individuals who work near cargo, but do 
not require unescorted access to cargo, do not need an STA where the 
regulated entity has adopted access control measures to prevent 
unescorted access to the cargo. TSA will provide guidance on specific 
access control measures in their security programs and regulated 
entities may work with TSA to establish additional measures for TSA 
approval.
    Ensuring that individuals are properly escorted, or that cargo is 
in a locked, inaccessible area, are two of many possible examples of 
access control measures that may be available to regulated entities. 
Generally, TSA relies on the access control measures that have been in 
place through FAA and TSA regulations for many years. Regulated 
entities should contact their TSA principal security inspectors, or 
other appropriate TSA point of contact, if they have further questions 
regarding access control measures.
    Where employees and agents subject to STA requirements have 
successfully completed a CHRC for unescorted access authority to a 
SIDA, they have met their requirement and do not need to get a separate 
STA under this final rule. TSA already requires airport operators to 
send to TSA certain personal information for each individual who has 
undergone a CHRC for a current SIDA or sterile area ID in order to 
perform an additional background check that is comparable to an STA.
    TSA is providing instruction to aircraft operators with a full or 
full-all-cargo program to send to TSA the same type of information for 
cargo screeners who do not have current SIDA or sterile area IDs, and 
will also perform the additional check on this population. Most of 
these cargo screeners already

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have SIDA IDs; and, thus, already are checked. Likewise, an employee or 
agent who has undergone another STA that TSA approves as being 
comparable does not need a separate STA under this rule. TSA considers 
the threat assessments it conducts for a person holding a commercial 
driver's license with a hazardous materials endorsement as comparable 
to an STA for purposes of this rule. See 49 CFR part 1572. TSA may 
determine that other threat assessments are comparable to the STA 
requirement under this rule and will expressly notify regulated 
entities with security program amendments from TSA upon making that 
determination. An employee or agent authorized to engage in the actions 
described below, who does not meet one of these means of compliance, 
must obtain an STA as directed in part 1540 of this rulemaking.
    For cargo accepted by an aircraft operator with a full program and 
a foreign air carrier under Sec.  1546.101(a) and (b), each employee or 
agent, whom the operator authorizes to have unescorted access, must 
have an STA.\9\ The STA requirement for these employees and agents 
applies at the point of acceptance, whether from a shipper, another 
aircraft operator, foreign air carrier, or indirect air carrier.
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    \9\ Employees and agents do not need this STA if they have 
successfully completed a background check for unescorted access to 
SIDA, or have another threat assessment that TSA approves in this 
context.
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    For cargo accepted in the United States by an aircraft operator 
under a full all-cargo program, or a foreign air carrier under Sec.  
1546.101(e), this provision applies to each employee or agent 
authorized to have unescorted access to cargo from the time the 
regulated entity consolidates or inspects cargo until it is loaded on 
an aircraft. TSA has determined that security procedures for these all-
cargo operations are best focused, and more efficiently applied, at 
locations where cargo is consolidated or inspected. Reasons for this 
determination include the layered security approach and the focus on 
interdicting stowaways.
    STA requirements for IAC employees and agents parallel measures 
from both passenger and all-cargo aircraft operators. Each IAC employee 
or agent who has unescorted access to cargo for transportation on a 
passenger aircraft must have an STA. For transportation aboard an all-
cargo aircraft, each IAC employee and agent must have an STA, if the 
IAC authorizes them to have unescorted access to cargo, from the time 
the cargo reaches an IAC facility where the IAC consolidates or holds 
the cargo.
    Comment: A few commenters note that there seems to be a conflict 
between proposed Sec.  1540.201 and proposed Sec.  1544.228; 
specifically, proposed part 1544 includes a provision of applicability 
of STAs to operators, but part 1540 does not. The commenters request 
that TSA clarify the scope of these sections, recognizing that the 
exclusion of all-cargo operators from Sec.  1540.201 may have been 
inadvertent.
    TSA response: TSA's omission of aircraft operators under a full 
all-cargo security program in Sec.  1540.201(a)(1) was an oversight. We 
have provided a technical amendment to that subparagraph, adding ``or 
(h)'' to the end of the provision.
Operators' Responsibility
    Comment: The Air Line Pilots Association International (ALPA) does 
not support the STA requirement because ALPA favors requiring persons 
with unescorted access to cargo to submit to a CHRC. ALPA argues that 
under the proposed rules, TSA could approve for unescorted access to 
air cargo an individual convicted of any of the 28 defined crimes 
because his or her name does not appear on government-maintained lists 
of individuals suspected of having a link to terrorism. ALPA states 
that criminal history, financial status, and many other factors can be 
indicators of an individual's character, reliability, maturity, and 
susceptibility to compromise.
    TSA response: TSA recognizes that there are a number of background 
check techniques that potentially could be applied to various persons 
in the supply chain. In accordance with our risk based, threat managed 
approach; TSA has determined that requiring persons with unescorted 
access to cargo to submit to an STA provides a significant enhancement 
while limiting costs. We note that persons with more sensitive 
positions, such as cargo screeners, are subject to CHRCs and additional 
background checks.
    Comment: Federal Express (FedEx) states, that in many cases, it 
would be unlawful for operators to conduct background checks on persons 
not directly employed by them. FedEx recommends requiring an operator 
to conduct such checks only on its direct employees. FedEx also 
expresses concern about requirements to have STAs for agents due to 
possible labor and employment law issues.
    FedEx also commented that for an IAC to fulfill this requirement, 
it will have to maintain employee records for all the truckers and 
warehousemen used by the IAC. Further, IACs will have to ensure that 
their vendors provide them timely updates of changes in employment and 
monitor unescorted access to cargo. FedEx believes that for the 
majority of IACs this would be an impossible task.
    Another comment supports the proposed section, but asserts that 
carriers should not be responsible for completing third party STAs. The 
commenter asserts that each entity should be responsible for completing 
its own STAs, and TSA should be responsible for funding any new 
background checks.
    TSA response: Aircraft operators, foreign air carriers, and IACs 
are responsible for carrying out all security measures as regulated 
parties. They do so using employees and agents, as they choose. They 
authorize unescorted access to cargo by agents and employees. Under 
these regulations, however, these regulated parties are not responsible 
for conducting the required background checks; rather they must ensure 
that the necessary information about their employees and agents is 
transferred to TSA for TSA to conduct the STA.
    TSA has carefully examined the scope of the need for an STA. TSA 
has revised the language of proposed Sec. Sec.  1544.228, 1546.213, and 
1548.15 to pertain to those individuals specifically authorized to have 
unescorted access to cargo. This final rule provides the aircraft 
operator, foreign air carrier, and IAC latitude in authorizing 
unescorted access to cargo in order to limit the number of persons 
requiring an STA. The requirement for an STA does not extend to 
employees or agents who are only near air cargo where the aircraft 
operator, foreign air carrier, or IAC has in place other security 
measures to control access to the cargo.
    If a regulated entity uses a third party agent to meet its security 
program requirements, which regulated entity is responsible for 
ensuring that the third party has an STA, just as they are responsible 
for other security duties their agents carry out. TSA is aware of no 
conflict with other laws with regard to collecting STA information.
    Comment: National Armored Car Association (NACA) states that 
requiring additional background checks on employees, who have already 
been investigated and certified by State agencies charged with 
licensing security personnel, is redundant and wasteful. NACA suggests 
that TSA accept certifications based on State investigations which 
include FBI fingerprint examinations, and issue any necessary TSA 
credentials based on these background checks.

[[Page 30482]]

    The American Trucking Association states that placing direct 
responsibility on operators to perform STAs on their agents, 
contractors, or subcontractors places a substantial financial burden on 
the operator and driver, and potentially will create a confusing, 
frustrating, and unworkable system.
    Other concerns of the American Trucking Association include whether 
STAs are transferable (i.e., would follow the employee as he or she 
changes employment), and how often individuals are required to renew 
their security authorization. The American Trucking Association 
proposes the use of TSA's Transportation Worker Identification 
Credential as an alternative solution to implementing STAs on 
individuals having unescorted access to air cargo.
    TSA response: In general, TSA does not anticipate accepting the 
background check of a private company or a state agency as comparable 
to a CHRC or STA approved by TSA. The TSA STA checks intelligence 
databases that are inaccessible to the private sector and not widely 
used by state agencies. As mentioned under Sec.  1540.201, STA 
requirements apply to those aircraft operators, foreign air carriers, 
and IAC employees and agents who are authorized and required to handle 
air cargo in the performance of their duties. STA requirements do not 
apply to employees and agents who have only incidental access to air 
cargo, or employees and agents who are required to submit to another 
TSA-approved STA, such as TSA HAZMAT driver's license requirements.\10\ 
TSA will consider accepting other TSA-approved STAs, such as the 
Transportation Worker Identity Credential upon broader implementation 
of its use.
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    \10\ See 70 FR 22268 (Apr. 29, 2005), to be codified at 49 CFR 
part 383.
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    Consistent with TSA policy on transferability of a CHRC conducted 
for unescorted access authority to a SIDA, an employee or agent who has 
successfully completed an STA for one employer need not complete it for 
another employer if the employee or agent has been continuously 
employed in a position that requires an STA. Additionally, as detailed 
in the response to the first comment on `Notification' below, there is 
no requirement to renew an STA as long as the STA-holder qualifies as 
continuously employed. TSA will provide further guidance to aircraft 
operators, foreign air carriers, and indirect air carriers upon 
request.
Notification
    Comment: Several commenters note the potential lengthy turn-around 
time for STA notifications under Sec.  1540.205 and recommend that TSA 
include a time frame in which it will make the notification. Many of 
these commenters propose that TSA should specify an anticipated 
response time of 10 working days to provide authorization or initial 
denial to submitted STAs. One commenter notes that TSA will need to 
increase staffing to handle the impact of processing the STAs in a 
timely manner.
    The American Trucking Association commented that the proposed rule 
excludes certain employers from receiving STA results on their drivers. 
Without employer notification, trucking companies are unable to make 
informed personnel decisions regarding their drivers. The American 
Trucking Association recommends amending this section to include 
notification to the individual, operator, and employer.
    TSA response: TSA agrees that an anticipated response time of 10 
working days in providing authorization or initial denial is 
appropriate and achievable in most cases. While some individual 
situations may require a longer timeframe for adjudication, TSA should 
provide the vast majority of approvals well within 10 working days. TSA 
further notes that once it approves an STA, by issuing a 
``Determination of No Security Threat'', the STA will remain valid for 
an employee or agent from one job to another in accordance with 
Sec. Sec.  1544.228(b)(2), 1546.213(b)(2), and 1548.15(b)(2), and 
consistent with TSA policy on continuous employment for holders of 
unescorted access authority to SIDA. However, TSA notes that the 
regulated party and the agent's direct employer are not prohibited from 
communicating about the notification.
Appeals Procedures
    Comment: The Airport Consultants Council proposes new language to 
clarify the requests for materials under the appeals procedure of Sec.  
1540.207(c)(1).
    TSA response: Rather than adopt new language, TSA revised Sec.  
1540.205(c)(4) by adding a cross-reference to Sec.  1540.207. Section 
1540.207(c) allows an appeal, including a written request for 
materials, within 30 days of receipt of the ``Initial Determination of 
Threat Assessment'' from TSA.
STA Fee
    Comment: United Parcel Service (UPS) states that they already 
conduct extensive background checks, including checking all airline 
employees against Federal governmental watch lists. If the TSA check 
merely duplicates what the air carrier already is doing, UPS contends 
there is no need for TSA to conduct the test and for the air carriers 
to pay the fee under Sec.  1540.209. UPS suggests that if TSA wants 
additional name checks with the proposed STA, then TSA should add the 
additional checks to the current listings and let the air carriers run 
them. This method does not place additional costs on TSA or the air 
carrier because the programming and personnel already are in place.
    Additional commenters request clarification on the procedures 
involved in an STA, because they do not understand the nature of the 
analysis or the basis of the $39 cost figure in the NPRM. The 
commenters believe that the proposed cost for the STA is excessive, 
given the cost of the comparable and more extensive CHRC checks.
    The Air Courier Conference of America (ACCA) and Purolator Courier 
oppose the fee, and state that TSA should carefully define the 
applicable population before it requires any new screening. They 
recommend that TSA conduct the screening against watch lists and the 
National Crime Information Center.
    FedEx states that, the new STA program will, contrary to TSA's 
expectations, increase both direct and indirect costs. They state that 
the direct cost of $39 for each STA is significantly more than the 
average cost of a CHRC. In addition, FedEx contends that the name-based 
methodology of an STA will result in indirect costs resulting from 
operational delays and disruptions due to false positives. FedEx argues 
that such indirect costs will exceed those that currently result from 
the CHRC.
    Like UPS, FedEx believes that air carriers should not have to pay 
TSA or another party to do something that they are already doing. The 
International Air Transport Association (IATA), Yellow Roadway, British 
Airways, Delta, and other commenters oppose the fee proposed in this 
section and believe that it is the Government's responsibility to 
provide protection from terrorists and to absorb any costs related to 
the STAs.
    TSA response: Private companies do not have access to all of the 
intelligence databases that TSA will use to conduct STAs. Further, TSA 
must make judgments as to the information received from the databases, 
which it has the expertise to apply. Accordingly, TSA has decided to 
conduct the STAs. Statutory provisions \11\ require that

[[Page 30483]]

industry should reimburse the agency for direct costs associated with 
accomplishing STAs. The STAs will not duplicate checks that the 
carriers are already accomplishing, as TSA has access to a variety of 
Government watch lists that are not appropriate for dissemination to 
the private sector. The $39 fee referenced in the NPRM assumed TSA 
would need to pay the FBI for access to the FBI's Automated Case System 
files. Subsequent to NPRM publication, TSA decided not to include the 
Automated Case System component in its STA. With increased vetting and 
credentialing experience, TSA has refined the necessary threat 
assessment sources to be included. As a result, the revised STA fee is 
$28.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \11\ Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2004, 
Sec. 520 (Pub. L. 108-90, Oct. 1, 2003, 117 Stat. 1137).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The rule provides for a phased-in implementation for compliance 
with the STA requirements. Regulated entities may mitigate delay in 
processing by timely submitting the STA application. Subsequent to the 
compliance date, any possible delay due to a false positive would occur 
prior to the applicant's authorization to have unescorted access to 
cargo. These new hires would constitute a small portion of the entire 
population subject to the STA. TSA expects that the percentage of false 
positives among these new hires will be minimal. Further, TSA analysts 
will be able to resolve most false positives quickly within the 
anticipated time frame for returning results.

Section 1546.213 STAs for Cargo Personnel in the United States

    Comment: Japan Airlines wants TSA to clarify whether this section 
would require foreign air carrier employees to undergo STAs or other 
checks when accessing off-airport facilities, despite the non-
application of SIDA-like requirements to such facilities. Nippon Cargo 
Airlines asks if the rule will apply only to new employees or if it 
will affect existing employees.
    TSA response: Foreign air carrier employees and agents within the 
United States are subject to the same requirements off-airport as 
corresponding U.S. aircraft operator employees and agents.
    If the foreign air carrier authorizes its employee or agent to have 
unescorted access to cargo at an off-airport facility and this facility 
is used to consolidate or inspect cargo until it is loaded on the 
aircraft, or an employee or agent accepts cargo from a known shipper, 
then the requirements of Sec.  1546.213 apply. The requirements apply 
to both new and existing employees and agents who have unescorted 
access authority granted by the foreign air carrier.

Section 1548.15 STAs for Individuals With Unescorted Access to Air 
Cargo

    TSA received 15 comments on this section. Most commenters have 
doubts about the responsibilities of IACs regarding this rule. They 
want to know who will need the STA and whether the requirements are 
retroactive for current employees.
    Comment: Atlanta-Hartsfield International Airport (ATL) asks if 
this requirement includes personnel in the manufacturing and shipping 
phase of preparing air cargo, and if so, whether an IAC will be 
responsible for filing an STA application on each loading dock employee 
and transport driver in the shipping chain. ATL also asks if these 
requirements are retroactive for current IAC employees or other cargo 
related businesses, and if so, for how many years into the past and how 
soon will the applications need to be filed.
    TSA response: The STA requirements apply to those aircraft 
operator, foreign air carrier, and IAC employees and agents who are 
authorized to have unescorted access to air cargo in the performance of 
their duties. Manufacturing or shipping personnel would only be 
required to have an STA if they are acting as an agent and have 
unescorted access to cargo for an aircraft operator, foreign air 
carrier, or IAC.
    Current IAC employees and agents are required to complete an STA 
successfully. TSA is providing 180 days from the date of publication of 
this rule for aircraft operators, foreign air carriers, and IACs to 
comply with the STA requirements.
    Comment: Air Courier Conference of America (ACCA) asks to which 
employees this section will apply, and why some employees will need to 
undergo a background check against TSA's lists while others may undergo 
a CHRC. They note that most ACCA members already check employee names 
against the ``no fly'' and ``selectee'' watch lists as a standard 
element of their Security Directives, and as an added safeguard.
    TSA response: This rule requires STAs within the United States for 
employees and agents authorized by aircraft operators, foreign air 
carriers, and indirect air carriers to have unescorted access to cargo. 
Persons who have CHRCs for unescorted access authority to a SIDA 
already have undergone TSA name-based checks comparable to the STA and 
therefore will not have to undergo another one.
    Comment: ATA supports a reasonable extension of STAs for IACs, but 
warns of significant potential for system disruptions, unless TSA 
defines IAC and air carrier responsibilities with regard to STA 
clearance. ATA asserts that air carriers cannot be responsible for 
ensuring the clearance of each IAC handler who may have contact with 
cargo before the delivery to the air carrier. ATA believes that this is 
not a workable process given the inherent time sensitivities in air 
cargo transport, the number of IACs providing cargo to air carriers, 
and the nature of an IAC's workforce scheduling.
    TSA response: TSA inspectors verify IAC compliance with STA 
requirements in the normal course of regulatory compliance inspections. 
Air carriers are not required to verify the IAC's compliance as part of 
the air cargo acceptance process.
    Comment: National Customs Brokers and Forwarders Association 
(NCBFAA) questions whether longtime employees, and licensed customs 
brokers, many of whom are also IACs and certified by U.S. Customs and 
Border Protection (CBP) under the Customs-Trade Partnership Against 
Terrorism program (C-TPAT), are subject to STA requirements. NCBFAA 
believes that these employees have proven their reliability and 
conscientiousness on security matters and it would be inefficient and 
unnecessary to subject them to background checks. NCBFAA recommends 
that TSA either exempt individuals previously approved by the CBP, or 
work with CBP to harmonize their respective screening processes. NCBFAA 
also proposes that TSA exempt IAC employees with a certain level of 
experience. NCBFAA believes it would be redundant to require a second 
DHS screening for many IAC employees. In addition, the NCBFAA 
recommends that TSA limit STA screening to a five-year period for 
persons who remain in good standing.
    TSA response: TSA will not exempt any employee from STA 
requirements based on length of service. TSA believes that performing 
background checks on individuals playing critical roles in the air 
cargo supply chain is a necessary step in ensuring aviation security. 
TSA currently is working with other DHS components to consider 
background checks performed by those components to determine if they 
are comparable to checks performed by TSA. Regulated entities will be 
able to refer to their security programs as provided by TSA for 
information on comparable checks. Regulated entities have incentive to 
determine whether an applicant has already completed a comparable check 
because the employee would not have to wait for clearance for 
unescorted access to cargo. Also TSA is providing in security programs 
that regulated entities

[[Page 30484]]

must accept the comparable check in lieu of the STA.

II.B. Acceptance and Screening of Cargo

    Comment: The majority of commenters on Sec. Sec.  1544.205, 
1546.205, and 1548.9 regarding inspection and screening of cargo are 
not sure how to accomplish compliance.
    TSA response: Specific Sensitive Security Information (SSI) 
measures will be proposed as amendments to airport, aircraft operator, 
foreign air carrier, and IAC security programs. The contents of these 
programs are not appropriate for public disclosure as part of this 
rulemaking. TSA is providing airport operators, aircraft operators, 
foreign air carriers, and IACs the opportunity to comment on the 
proposed amendments to their security programs upon issuance, and 
before the effective date of this final rule. It is helpful to note 
that many of these measures already appear in current Security 
Directives and security program requirements.
    Comment: UPS, ATA, Regional Airline Association (RAA), and Cargo 
Airline Association (CAA) state that Sec.  1544.205(a) and (b) are 
imprecise and redundant, and propose alternative language to 
consolidate the paragraphs.
    TSA response: Paragraph (a) of Sec.  1544.205 provides the general 
requirement and performance standard for carriage of cargo. Paragraph 
(b) provides the specific requirement for screening and inspecting 
cargo. Other paragraphs provide other specific requirements. The 
revision also extends those requirements to all-cargo aircraft 
operations with a maximum certificated take-off weight (MTOW) of more 
than 45,500 kg (100,309.3 lbs.). These paragraphs do not provide 
details of how these requirements must be met, because such details are 
Sensitive Security Information under 49 CFR part 1520 and are contained 
in security programs that are available only to persons with a need to 
know.
    Comment: Several commenters oppose requiring regulated entities to 
refuse cargo for transport if the shipper does not consent to screening 
and inspection of the cargo under Sec. Sec.  1544.205(d) and 
1546.205(b). They state that high cash value cargo, such as jewelry, 
currency, bullion, and other sensitive cargo, is shipped in sealed 
containers that cause damage or losses to cargo when opened. They 
suggest additional consideration and industry input on how to deal with 
these situations and ask whether the Government will provide 
indemnification if damage occurs during inspection by the Government or 
Government contractor personnel.
    TSA response: Regulated entities must refuse to transport cargo as 
required under, and consistent with, their security programs. TSA 
understands that requiring shippers, like drug companies, to consent to 
inspection of cargo is problematic. TSA agrees that the screening of 
certain types of cargo present unique challenges, and recognizes the 
safety and security concerns related to screening such cargo. TSA 
revised the wording in sections that require consent to screen cargo, 
and provides specific exceptions and alternative procedures in the 
proposed security program amendments for shipments whose contents would 
be damaged or compromised if the aircraft operator inspected the cargo. 
These procedures largely will be transferred from current Security 
Directives that address these concerns for later consideration in 
amendments to applicable security programs.
    Comment: NACA and NATA ask if the terms ``inspect'' and ``screen'' 
are interchangeable.
    TSA response: The terms ``inspect'' and ``screen'' are not 
interchangeable. Generally, screening means the systematic evaluation 
of a person or property to assess whether either poses a threat to 
security. TSA interprets inspection as a subset of screening. An 
inspection is a method of conducting such an evaluation, but is not the 
only method. For instance, the known shipper program is an information-
based method of screening. The known shipper program involves the 
screening of cargo based upon information known to an aircraft 
operator, foreign air carrier, or indirect air carrier about the 
shipper of the cargo. Additionally, a certain percentage of that cargo 
is inspected for the presence of persons and any unauthorized 
explosives, incendiaries, and other destructive substances or items.
    TSA will provide specific guidance to regulated entities in their 
respective security program amendments.
    Comment: FedEx wants TSA to clarify that the proposed rule does not 
require or authorize TSA to impose any additional screening beyond the 
screening they already are doing under SDs and security program 
amendments. Several all-cargo air carriers ask if TSA will bear the 
costs of the screening workforce and equipment required under Sec.  
1544.205, and want TSA to clarify who has the responsibility for 
screening cargo.
    TSA response: Aircraft operators incur the cost for the screening 
of cargo transported aboard their aircraft and must comply with the 
procedures for screening incorporated in their security programs. 
Specific screening requirements are promulgated in amendments to such 
programs and regulated parties are provided the opportunity to comment 
on these amendments, as appropriate.
    Regarding screening of cargo for transportation aboard passenger 
aircraft, 49 U.S.C. 44901(a) provided an exception for Federal 
screening for the known shipper program. The inspection of a portion of 
known shipper cargo is considered a part of the known shipper program 
and need not be conducted by Federal employees. This rule does not 
address the amount or type of cargo screening that is required. TSA 
will respond to changing conditions as needed. Additionally, TSA is 
considering whether the current system for selecting cargo for 
inspection will be changed with the TSA Freight Assessment System 
(FAS). The FAS might be used to identify cargo posing an elevated risk 
for the application of security measures in the aircraft operator's 
security program.
    Comment: FedEx, UPS, CAA, and ATA note that Sec.  1544.205(e) 
appears to prohibit the acceptance of cargo for air transportation from 
a variety of retail outlets, such as the UPS Store, FedEx, Kinko's, and 
other authorized shipping outlets. The commenters note that these 
outlets are neither the shipper nor an entity specifically mentioned 
with a comparable security program under Sec.  1544.205(e). However, 
the commenters believe that the exception under Sec.  1544.205(e) will 
permit them to continue to accept cargo from these retail outlets as is 
currently allowed in their security programs. The commenters want TSA 
to clarify that this is, in fact, TSA's intention. Further, if this is 
not the intention of TSA, they recommend excluding carriers operating 
under all-cargo programs from the application of this section, and 
propose using the following language for Sec.  1544.205(e): ``Each 
aircraft operator operating under a full program or an all-cargo 
program may accept cargo for air transportation on a passenger air 
carrier only from a known shipper, or from an aircraft operator, 
foreign air carrier, or IAC operating under a security program under 
this chapter with a comparable cargo security program.''
    TSA response: Aircraft operators under a full all-cargo security 
program are not prohibited from accepting cargo from retail entities as 
described in these comments. Under these rules, such retail outlets may 
operate either under an IACSSP, or as an agent with security 
responsibilities under the aircraft

[[Page 30485]]

operator's security program. For a further discussion of the 
differences between IACs and agents of aircraft operators, please see 
the Section-by-Section Analysis for Sec.  1548.5.
    Comment: UPS, CAA, ATA, and others commenters express concern about 
the extraterritorial applicability of Sec.  1544.205(f). CAA states 
that the rule seems to apply to international air cargo movements and 
notes that commercial realities and foreign government resistance make 
the application of this rule unattainable. UPS wants TSA to clarify 
this section to recognize that foreign law may limit the extent to 
which carriers may be able to comply with security programs outside the 
United States. ATA states that foreign countries may impose screening 
requirements that differ and even conflict with those in the carrier's 
security program and recommends that TSA permit air carriers to comply 
with either the security programs imposed by the foreign country or 
those contained in the TSA-approved security program.
    TSA response: TSA recognizes, as indicated by the commenters, that 
the imposition of regulatory requirements on a U.S. aircraft operator 
operating from foreign locations may be impacted by the legal 
requirements applied by the host government at such foreign locations. 
The requirement for a U.S aircraft operator to screen cargo at foreign 
locations is no different from any other current or proposed aviation 
security requirement placed upon a U.S. aircraft operator operating 
outside the United States. The specific security program mandates for 
the screening of cargo outside of the United States take into 
consideration cargo security restrictions, as well as requirements 
mandated at some foreign locations.
    Comment: Several smaller air carriers state that they cannot comply 
with the proposed rule requirement to open packages before loading at 
unsecured airports.
    TSA response: This rule codifies requirements for screening that 
already are in place through SDs and security program amendments. The 
fact that an aircraft operator operates at an airport without a 
security program has not been found to inhibit screening.
    Comment: Several airport operators and air carriers ask how to 
accomplish screening at rural airports.
    TSA response: Each aircraft operator and foreign air carrier 
security program must take into consideration the different locations 
at which cargo must be screened. Aircraft operators and foreign air 
carriers must conduct screening at rural airports in accordance with 
the specific requirements of their security programs.
Acceptance and Screening of Cargo From Locations Outside the United 
States
    Comment: Association of Asia Pacific Airlines (AAPA), British 
Airways, Association of European Airlines (AEA), and Singapore Airlines 
state that Sec.  1546.205 lacks provisions regarding the acceptance and 
recognition of National Aviation Security Program requirements that 
many foreign airlines use. They recommend standardizing requirements 
for acceptance and screening of cargo, and implementing threat-based 
measures for inspection of cargo.
    TSA response: TSA continues to recognize National Aviation Security 
Programs of foreign countries in accepted security programs.
    Comment: Several commenters, including British Airways, IATA, and 
AEA want TSA to clarify the term comparable security program in Sec.  
1546.205(e), and ask what this term includes. In addition, these 
commenters recommend amending Sec.  1546.205(f) to clarify that it 
applies only to cargo loaded outside the United States that is destined 
for the United States and that foreign air carriers may accept cargo 
destined for the United States from any lawful entity, subject to a 
compatible National Aviation Security Program as approved by the 
carrier's national government.
    TSA response: A comparable security program includes cargo security 
measures identical or equivalent to those required of the accepting 
aircraft operator or foreign air carrier. If the transferring aircraft 
operator, foreign air carrier, or IAC, has performed these cargo 
security measures, there is no further need for the accepting aircraft 
operator or foreign air carrier to repeat those measures. For instance, 
for transfers to aircraft operators with a full program, TSA will 
consider such security measures as: Whether the known shipper program 
was applied, from whom the operator accepted the cargo, the type of 
cargo screening or inspection that was done, and other relevant 
security measures.
    Overall, part 1546 applies to the operation, landing, or taking off 
within the United States of a foreign air carrier. Only cargo destined 
to, or transported through, the United States is subject to this final 
rule when loaded at a foreign airport. Section 1546.205(f) requires 
that foreign air carriers subject to this part carry out the 
requirements of their security programs. Section 1546.101 applies where 
a foreign air carrier lands or takes off in the United States.
Acceptance of Cargo by an Indirect Air Carrier
    Comment: Most comments to Sec.  1548.9 support this section and 
recommend that TSA allow IACs to screen cargo provided they demonstrate 
the capability to do so. The Yellow Road Corporation expresses concerns 
about the costs and redundancy associated with enforcing cargo security 
requirements for IACs, and recommends the adoption of varying levels of 
cargo screening with emphasis on loading cargo on the aircraft. IBM 
wants clarification on the requirement to obtain the shipper's consent 
to search or inspect cargo, and suggests allowing the shipper to give a 
blanket authorization to the IAC as part of its contract.
    TSA response: While TSA does not state in which manner the 
shipper's consent to search or inspect cargo be obtained, it does 
require that the consent be explicit and in writing. TSA allows 
aircraft operators, foreign air carriers, and IACs to manage the 
collection of consent to search in a manner consistent with individual 
operational needs. The regulations allow a shipper to provide a blanket 
authorization, as proposed by IBM.

II.C. Security Identification Display Area (SIDA)

    Comment: American Association of Airport Executives (AAAE) 
disagrees with TSA's assessment that airports easily will be able to 
extend SIDAs to areas where cargo is loaded and unloaded under Sec.  
1542.205. AAAE states that the rule does not adequately address the 
complexities of expanding SIDAs at airports with diverse operational 
configurations, property ownership, and jurisdictional control.
    Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA) states that while 
this rule may not impose direct mandates for general aviation areas at 
airports regulated by TSA under 49 CFR part 1542, AOPA is concerned 
that the practical implementation of this requirement will result in 
SIDA requirements in many general aviation areas. In addition, AOPA 
notes that many airports specifically exclude general aviation areas 
from the SIDA because of time and distance separation from the air 
carrier areas. This layered approach to security limits access points 
and the number of individuals needing the background check and 
identification requirements for the SIDA, and establishes clear 
distinctions of security areas.

[[Page 30486]]

    AOPA recommends using the standard of the operational area of the 
aircraft principle for air cargo operations at part 1542 regulated 
airports, similar to that proposed for operations at non-part 1542 TSA 
regulated airports. AOPA further states that the operational area of 
the aircraft should include the immediate footprint of the cargo 
aircraft and handling area, with a procedure to limit unauthorized 
persons near the aircraft while it is being loaded and unloaded, but 
not the entire ramp.
    The Department of Transportation of Alaska states that this final 
rule will require CHRCs for most people working at an airport, and 
contends that expansion of the CHRC requirement will not effectively 
increase security for air cargo.
    TSA received some comments that relate to the fact that areas 
designated as SIDAs primarily are subject to airport operator control 
rather than aircraft operator control.
    CAA states that expansion of the SIDA is not the best way to secure 
the area surrounding cargo aircraft. It further asserts that the ASAC 
Working Groups did not recommend such a SIDA expansion, but rather 
recommended the imposition of SIDA-like requirements on air carriers 
operating from these cargo areas. CAA, UPS, DHL, and FedEx comments 
that the difference is significant from an operational, but not a 
security, standpoint, noting that it is essential that the all-cargo 
air carriers retain access control so they can carry out their 
requirements and internal company procedures. CAA recommends requiring 
air carriers to amend security programs to include SIDA-like measures 
at non-SIDA operational areas of U.S. airports where cargo is loaded or 
unloaded from aircraft.
    FedEx states that this section extends SIDA requirements to areas 
where operators sort loaded or unloaded cargo on airport grounds. 
However, Sec.  1542.205(a)(2) does not contain this important language. 
FedEx recommends adding the phrase ``on airport grounds'' after every 
reference to ``each area'' in the rule to clarify that facilities such 
as FedEx stations, world service centers, and non-airport sort 
locations are not to be included in SIDAs. UPS also proposes extensive 
revisions to this section.
    Airports Council International-North America (ACI-NA), ATA, and RAA 
do not support the extension of SIDA requirements. They state that the 
language is very broad and could potentially extend SIDA requirements 
far beyond what is necessary to ensure air cargo security. They 
recommend amending the SIDA requirements only to airport areas used to 
load or unload cargo from aircraft.
    The Miami International Airport, Atlanta-Hartsfield International 
Airport, ACI-NA, and the Airports Consultants Council agree that the 
new requirement will enhance the overall level of security, but only if 
designated in those areas under airport control. They argue that the 
SIDA should begin at the wall of the cargo facility adjacent to the 
airside ramp locations. The commenters also oppose requiring airports 
to extend, or enforce the security of the SIDA into tenant-leased 
facilities.
    Eleven small aircraft operators, AOPA, and Regional Air Cargo 
Carriers Association (RACCA) express concern about extending SIDA to 
cargo operating areas. The commenters state that the SIDA extension is 
impractical for aircraft operating under the TFSSP, since operations 
are conducted on common public areas like the gene