Notice of Opportunity To Comment on Model Safety Evaluation and Model License Amendment Request on Technical Specification Improvement Regarding Use of the Improved Bank Position Withdrawal Sequence for General Electric Boiling Water Reactors Using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process, 26118-26122 [E6-6678]

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Crosby, Executive Officer and NSB Office Director. [FR Doc. 06–4183 Filed 5–1–06; 9:48 am] BILLING CODE 7555–01–P NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Notice of Opportunity To Comment on Model Safety Evaluation and Model License Amendment Request on Technical Specification Improvement Regarding Use of the Improved Bank Position Withdrawal Sequence for General Electric Boiling Water Reactors Using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process Nuclear Regulatory Commission. ACTION: Request for comment. AGENCY: SUMMARY: Notice is hereby given that the staff of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has prepared a model license amendment request (LAR), model safety evaluation (SE), and model proposed no significant hazards consideration (NSHC) determination related to changes to Standard PO 00000 Frm 00101 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 Technical Specification (STS) 3.1.6, ‘‘Rod Pattern Control,’’ and STS 3.3.2.1, ‘‘Control Rod Block Instrumentation’’ for NUREG–1433 and NUREG–1434. The proposed changes would revise the Bases for STS 3.1.6, ‘‘Rod Pattern Control,’’ and STS 3.3.2.1, ‘‘Control Rod Block Instrumentation’’ to allow licensees to use an improved control rod bank position withdrawal sequence (BPWS) when performing a reactor shutdown. In addition, for NUREG– 1434 licensees, the proposed changes would add a footnote to Table 3.3.2.1– 1, ‘‘Control Rod Block Instrumentation.’’ The requirements for implementing the improved BPWS are described in General Electric Licensing Topical Report (LTR) NEDO–33091–A, Revision 2, ‘‘Improved BPWS Control Rod Insertion Process,’’ dated July 2004. The General Electric Boiling Water Reactor Owners Group (BWROG) participants in the Technical Specifications Task Force (TSTF) proposed these changes to the STS in TSTF–476, Revision 0, ‘‘Improved BPWS Control Rod Insertion Process (NEDO–33091).’’ The purpose of these models is to permit the NRC to efficiently process amendments to incorporate these changes into plant-specific Technical Specifications (TS) for General Electric Boiling Water Reactors (BWRs). Licensees of nuclear power reactors to which the models apply can request amendments conforming to the models. In such a request, a licensee should confirm the applicability of the model LAR, model SE and NSHC determination to its plant. The NRC staff is requesting comments on the model LAR, model SE and NSHC determination before announcing their availability for referencing in license amendment applications. DATES: The comment period expires 30 days from the date of this publication. Comments received after this date will be considered if it is practical to do so, but the Commission is able to ensure consideration only for comments received on or before this date. ADDRESSES: Comments may be submitted either electronically or via U.S. mail. Submit written comments to: Chief, Rules and Directives Branch, Division of Administrative Services, Office of Administration, Mail Stop: T–6 D59, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555–0001. Hand deliver comments to: 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland, between 7:45 a.m. and 4:15 p.m. on Federal workdays. Submit comments by electronic mail to: CLIIP@nrc.gov. E:\FR\FM\03MYN1.SGM 03MYN1 Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 85 / Wednesday, May 3, 2006 / Notices Copies of comments received may be examined at the NRC’s Public Document Room, One White Flint North, Public File Area O1–F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Eric Thomas, Mail Stop: O–12H2, Division of Inspection and Regional Support, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555–0001, telephone (301) 415–6772. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: jlentini on PROD1PC65 with NOTICES Background Regulatory Issue Summary 2000–06, ‘‘Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process [CLIIP] for Adopting Standard Technical Specifications Changes for Power Reactors,’’ was issued on March 20, 2000. The CLIIP is intended to improve the efficiency and transparency of NRC licensing processes. This is accomplished by processing proposed changes to the STS in a manner that supports subsequent license amendment applications. The CLIIP includes an opportunity for the public to comment on proposed changes to the STS following a preliminary assessment by the NRC staff and finding that the change will likely be offered for adoption by licensees. This notice is soliciting comment on a proposed change to the STS that changes the Bases for sections 3.1.6 and 3.3.2.1 of the General Electric BWR STS, Revision 3 of NUREG–1433 and NUREG–1434, and Table 3.3.2.1–1 in the NUREG–1434 STS. The CLIIP directs the NRC staff to evaluate any comments received for a proposed change to the STS and to either reconsider the change or proceed with announcing the availability of the change for proposed adoption by licensees. Those licensees opting to apply for the subject change to TSs are responsible for reviewing the staff’s evaluation, referencing the applicable technical justifications, and providing any necessary plant-specific information. Following the public comment period, the model LAR and model SE will be finalized, and posted on the NRC Web page. Each amendment application made in response to the notice of availability will be processed and noticed in accordance with applicable NRC rules and procedures. This notice involves implementation of an improved BPWS, which would allow licensees of General Electric BWRs to follow the improved BPWS when inserting control rods into the core during a reactor shutdown. By letter dated August 30, 2004, the BWROG proposed these changes for incorporation into the STS as TSTF– VerDate Aug<31>2005 17:19 May 02, 2006 Jkt 208001 476, Revision 0. These changes are based on the NRC staff-approved LTR NEDO–33091–A, ‘‘Improved BPWS Control Rod Insertion Process,’’ dated July 2004, as approved by NRC in an SE dated June 16, 2004, accessible electronically from the Agency-wide Documents Access and Management System’s (ADAMS) Public Electronic Reading Room on the Internet (ADAMS Accession No. ML041700479) at the NRC Web site https://www.nrc.gov/ reading-rm/adams.html. Persons who do not have access to ADAMS or who encounter problems in accessing the documents located in ADAMS should contact the NRC Public Document Room Reference staff by telephone at 1–800– 397–4209, 301–415–4737, or by e-mail to pdr@nrc.gov. Applicability These proposed changes will revise the Section 3.6.1 and Section 3.3.2.1 TS Bases for General Electric BWR/4 and BWR/6 plants, and TS Table 3.3.2.1–1 for BWR/6 plants. To efficiently process the incoming license amendment applications, the NRC staff requests that each licensee applying for the changes addressed by TSTF–476, Revision 0, using the CLIIP submit an LAR that adheres to the following model. Any variations from the model LAR should be explained in the licensee’s submittal. Variations from the approach recommended in this notice may require additional review by the NRC staff, and may increase the time and resources needed for the review. Significant variations from the approach, or inclusion of additional changes to the license, will result in staff rejection of the submittal. Instead, licensees desiring significant variations and/or additional changes should submit a LAR that does not claim to adopt TSTF–476. Public Notices This notice requests comments from interested members of the public within 30 days of the date of this publication. Following the NRC staff’s evaluation of comments received as a result of this notice, the NRC staff may reconsider the proposed change or may proceed with announcing the availability of the change in a subsequent notice (perhaps with some changes to the model LAR, model SE or model NSHC determination as a result of public comments). If the NRC staff announces the availability of the change, licensees wishing to adopt the change will submit an application in accordance with applicable rules and other regulatory requirements. The NRC staff will, in turn, issue for each application a notice of consideration of PO 00000 Frm 00102 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 26119 issuance of amendment to facility operating license(s), a proposed NSHC determination, and an opportunity for a hearing. A notice of issuance of an amendment to operating license(s) will also be issued to announce the revised requirements for each plant that applies for and receives the requested change. Dated at Rockville, Maryland this 7th day of April 2006. For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Thomas H. Boyce, Chief, Technical Specifications Branch, Division of Inspection and Regional Support, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. Attachments—For Inclusion on the Technical Specification Web Page the Following Example of an Application Was Prepared by the NRC Staff to Facilitate the Adoption of Technical Specifications Task Force (TSTF) Traveler TSTF–476, Revision 0 ‘‘Improved BPWS Control Rod Insertion Process (Nedo-33091).’’ The Model Provides the Expected Level Of Detail and Content for an Application to Adopt TSTF–476, Revision 0. Licensees Remain Responsible for Ensuring That Their Actual Application Fulfills Their Administrative Requirements as Well as NRC Regulations. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555. Subject: Plant Name, Docket No. 50–[XXX,] Re: Application For Technical Specification Improvement To Adopt TSTF–476, Revision 0, ‘‘Improved BPWS Control ROD Insertion Process (NEDO– 33091)’’. Dear Sir or Madam: In accordance with the provisions of Section 50.90 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), [LICENSEE] is submitting a request for an amendment to the technical specifications (TS) for [PLANT NAME, UNIT NOS.]. The proposed changes would revise Sections 3.1.6, ‘‘Rod Pattern Control,’’ and 3.3.2.1, ‘‘Control Rod Block Instrumentation,’’ to allow [PLANT NAME] to reference a new Banked Position Withdrawal Sequence (BPWS) shutdown sequence in the TS Bases. [(BWR/6 only), In addition, a footnote is added to Table 3.3.2.1–1, ‘‘Control Rod Block Instrumentation.’’] The changes are consistent with NRCapproved Industry Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) Standard Technical Specification Change Traveler, TSTF–476, Revision 0, ‘‘Improved BPWS Control Rod Insertion Process (NEDO–33091).’’ The availability of this TS improvement was announced in the Federal Register on [DATE] ([ ]FR[ ]) as part of the consolidated line item improvement process (CLIIP). Enclosure 1 provides a description and assessment of the proposed changes, as well as confirmation of applicability. Enclosure 2 provides the existing TS pages and TS Bases marked-up to show the proposed changes. Enclosure 3 provides final TS pages and TS Bases pages. [LICENSEE] requests approval of the proposed license amendment by [DATE], with the amendment being implemented [BY E:\FR\FM\03MYN1.SGM 03MYN1 26120 Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 85 / Wednesday, May 3, 2006 / Notices DATE OR WITHIN X DAYS]. In accordance with 10 CFR 50.91, a copy of this application, with enclosures, is being provided to the designated [STATE] Official. I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that I am authorized by [LICENSEE] to make this request and that the foregoing is true and correct. [Note that request may be notarized in lieu of using this oath or affirmation statement]. If you should have any questions regarding this submittal, please contact [ ]. Sincerely, Name, Title Enclosures: 1. Description and Assessment of Proposed Changes 2. Proposed Technical Specification Changes and Technical Specification Bases Changes 3. Final Technical Specification and Bases pages cc: NRR Project Manager, Regional Office, Resident Inspector, State Contact, ITSB Branch Chief. jlentini on PROD1PC65 with NOTICES 1.0 Description This letter is a request to amend Operating License(s) [LICENSE NUMBER(S)] for [PLANT/UNIT NAME(S)]. The proposed changes would revise Technical Specification (TS) 3.1.6, ‘‘Rod Pattern Control’’, and 3.3.2.1, ‘‘Control Rod Block Instrumentation,’’ [(BWR/6 only) along with TS Table 3.3.2.1–1, ‘‘Control Rod Block Instrumentation,’’] to allow reference to an improved, optional Bank Position Withdrawal Sequence (BPWS) in the TS Bases for use during reactor shutdown. The new BPWS is described in Topical Report NEDO–33091–A, Revision 2, ‘‘Improved BPWS Control Rod Insertion Process,’’ dated July 2004 (Reference 1), and approved by the NRC by Safety Evaluation (SE) dated June 16, 2004 (ADAMS ML041700479) (Reference 2). Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) change traveler TSTF–476, Revision 0, ‘‘Improved BPWS Control Rod Insertion Process (NEDO– 33091)’’ was announced for availability in the Federal Register on [DATE] as part of the consolidated line item improvement process (CLIIP). 2.0 Proposed Changes Consistent with NRC-approved TSTF–476, Revision 0, the proposed TS changes include: • Revised TS Section 3.6.1 Bases to allow use of an optional BPWS during plant shutdown. • Revised TS Section 3.3.2.1 Bases to allow reprogramming of the rod worth minimizer during the optional BPWS shutdown sequence. • [(BWR/6 only): Revised Table 3.3.2.1–1, ‘‘Control Rod Block Instrumentation,’’ which adds a footnote that allows operators to bypass the rod pattern controller if conditions for the optional BPWS shutdown process are satisfied.] 3.0 Background The background for this application is as stated in the model SE in NRC’s Notice of Availability published on [DATE ]([ ] FR [ ]), the NRC Notice for Comment published on VerDate Aug<31>2005 17:19 May 02, 2006 Jkt 208001 [DATE] ([ ] FR [ ]), and TSTF–476, Revision 0. 4.0 Technical Analysis [LICENSEE] has reviewed References 1 and 2, and the model SE published on [DATE] ([ ] FR [ ]) as part of the CLIIP Notice for Comment. [LICENSEE] has applied the methodology in Reference 1 to develop the proposed TS changes. [LICENSEE] has also concluded that the justifications presented in TSTF–476, Revision 0 and the model SE prepared by the NRC staff are applicable to [PLANT, UNIT NOS.], and justify this amendment for the incorporation of the changes to the [PLANT] TS. 5.0 Regulatory Analysis A description of this proposed change and its relationship to applicable regulatory requirements and guidance was provided in the NRC Notice of Availability published on [DATE] ([ ] FR [ ]), the NRC Notice for Comment published on [DATE] ([ ] FR [ ]), and TSTF–476, Revision 0. 5.1 Regulatory Commitments As discussed in the model SE published in the Federal Register on [DATE] ([ ] FR [ ]) for this technical specification improvement, the following plant-specific verifications/ commitments were performed. In Reference 2 the NRC staff explained that the potential for the control rod drop accident (CRDA) will be eliminated by the following changes to the operational procedures, which [PLANT NAME] [has made/will commit to make prior to implementation]: 1. Before reducing power to the low power setpoint (LPSP), operators shall confirm control rod coupling integrity for all rods that are fully withdrawn. Control rods that have not been confirmed coupled and are in intermediate positions must be fully inserted prior to power reduction to the LPSP. No action is required for fully-inserted control rods. If a shutdown is required and all rods, which are not confirmed coupled, cannot be fully inserted prior to the power dropping below the LPSP, then the original/standard BPWS must be adhered to. 2. After reactor power drops below the LPSP, rods may be inserted from notch position 48 to notch position 00 without stopping at the intermediate positions. However, GE Nuclear Energy recommends that, to the maximum extent possible, operators insert rods in the same order as specified for the original/standard BPWS. If a plant is in the process of shutting down following improved BPWS with the power below the LPSP, no control rod shall be withdrawn unless the control rod pattern is in compliance with standard BPWS requirements. In addition to the procedure changes specified above, the staff previously concluded, based on its review of NEDO– 33091–A, that no single failure of the boiling water reactor CRD mechanical or hydraulic system can cause a control rod to drop completely out of the reactor core during the shutdown process. Therefore, the proper use of the improved BPWS will prevent a CRDA from occurring while power is below the LPSP. [LICENSEE] has verified, in PO 00000 Frm 00103 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 accordance with NEDO–33091–A, Revision 2, that no single failure of the boiling water reactor CRD mechanical or hydraulic system can cause a control rod to drop completely out of the reactor core during the shutdown process. 6.0 No Significant Hazards Consideration [LICENSEE] has reviewed the proposed no significant hazards consideration determination published in the Federal Register on [DATE] ([ ] FR [ ]) as part of the CLIIP. [LICENSEE] has concluded that the proposed determination presented in the notice is applicable to [PLANT] and the determination is hereby incorporated by reference to satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR 50.91(a). 7.0 Environmental Evaluation [LICENSEE] has reviewed the environmental consideration included in the model SE published in the Federal Register on [DATE] ([ ] FR [ ]) as part of the CLIIP. [LICENSEE] has concluded that the staff’s findings presented therein are applicable to [PLANT] and the determination is hereby incorporated by reference for this application. 8.0 References 1. Topical Report NEDO–33091–A, Revision 2, ‘‘Improved BPWS Control Rod Insertion Process,’’ dated July 2004. 2. NRC Safety Evaluation (SE) approving Topical Report NEDO–33091, Revision 2, ‘‘Improved BPWS Control Rod Insertion Process,’’ dated June 16, 2004. 3. Federal Register Notices: Notice for Comment published on [DATE] ([ ] FR [ ]) Notice of Availability published on [DATE] ([ ] FR [ ]) Model Safety Evaluation—U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation— ‘‘Technical Specification Task Force TSTF– 476, Revision 0—‘‘Improved BPWS Control Rod Insertion Process (NEDO–33091) 1.0 Introduction By letter dated [lll, 20l], [LICENSEE] (the licensee) proposed changes to the technical specifications (TS) for [PLANT NAME]. The requested changes are the adoption of TSTF–476, Revision 0, ‘‘Improved BPWS Control Rod Insertion Process (NEDO–33091–A),’’ to the Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) Standard Technical Specifications (STS), which was proposed by the Technical Specifications Task Force (TSTF) by letter on August 30, 2004. This TSTF involves changes to NUREG–1433 and NUREG–1434 Section 3.1.6 ‘‘Rod Pattern Control,’’ Section 3.3.2.1 ‘‘Control Rod Block Instrumentation,’’ and Table 3.3.2.1–1 (NUREG–1434 only). The proposed TSTF would allow the use of the improved bank position withdrawal sequence (BPWS) during normal shutdowns if the conditions of NEDO–33091–A, Revision 2, ‘‘Improved BPWS Control Rod Insertion Process,’’ dated July 2004, have been satisfied. E:\FR\FM\03MYN1.SGM 03MYN1 Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 85 / Wednesday, May 3, 2006 / Notices jlentini on PROD1PC65 with NOTICES 2.0 Regulatory Evaluation The control rod drop accident (CRDA) is the design basis accident for the subject TS changes. In order to minimize the impact of a CRDA, the BPWS process was developed to minimize control rod reactivity worth for BWR plants. The proposed improved BPWS further simplifies the control rod insertion process, and in order to evaluate it, the staff followed the guidelines of Standard Review Plan Section 15.4.9, and referred to General Design Criterion (GDC) 28 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50 as its regulatory requirement. GDC 28 states that the reactivity control systems shall be designed with appropriate limits on the potential amount and rate of reactivity increase to assure that the effects of postulated reactivity accidents can neither (1) result in damage to the reactor coolant pressure boundary greater than limited local yielding nor (2) sufficiently disturb the core, its support structures or other reactor pressure vessel internals to impair significantly the capability to cool the core. 3.0 Technical Evaluation In its safety evaluation for Licensing Topical Report NEDO–33091–A, ‘‘Improved BPWS Control Rod Insertion Process,’’ dated June 16, 2004, (ADAMS ML041700479) the staff determined that the methodology described in TSTF–476, Revision 0, to incorporate the improved BPWS into the STS, is acceptable. TSTF–476, Revision 0, states that the improved BPWS provides the following benefits: (1) Allows the plant to reach the allrods-in condition prior to significant reactor cool down, which reduces the potential for re-criticality as the reactor cools down; (2) reduces the potential for an operator reactivity control error by reducing the total number of control rod manipulations; (3) minimizes the need for manual scrams during plant shutdowns, resulting in less wear on control rod drive (CRD) system components and CRD mechanisms; and, (4) eliminates unnecessary control rod manipulations at low power, resulting in less wear on reactor manual control and CRD system components. [PLANT NAME] has been approved to use the improved BPWS, and the potential for a CRDA with power below the low power setpoint (LPSP) has been eliminated. The safety evaluation for NEDO–33091–A explained that the potential for the CRDA will be eliminated by the following changes to operational procedures, which [PLANT NAME] [has made/will commit to make prior to implementation]: 1. Before reducing power to the LPSP, operators shall confirm control rod coupling integrity for all rods that are fully withdrawn. Control rods that have not been confirmed coupled and are in intermediate positions must be fully inserted prior to power reduction to the LPSP. No action is required for fully-inserted control rods. If a shutdown is required and all rods that are not confirmed coupled cannot be fully inserted prior to power dropping below the LPSP, then the original/standard BPWS must be adhered to. 2. After reactor power drops below the LPSP, rods may be inserted from notch VerDate Aug<31>2005 17:19 May 02, 2006 Jkt 208001 position 48 to notch position 00 without stopping at the intermediate positions. However, GE Nuclear Energy recommends that, to the maximum extent possible, operators insert rods in the same order as specified for the original/standard BPWS. If a plant is in the process of shutting down following improved BPWS with the power below the LPSP, no control rod shall be withdrawn unless the control rod pattern is in compliance with standard BPWS requirements. In addition to the procedure changes specified above, the staff previously verified during its review of NEDO–33091–A, Revision 2, that no single failure of the boiling water reactor CRD mechanical or hydraulic system can cause a control rod to drop completely out of the reactor core during the shutdown process. Therefore, the proper use of the improved BPWS will prevent a CRDA from occurring while power is below the LPSP. The staff finds the proposed Technical Specification changes in [PLANT NAME’s] amendment request properly incorporate the improved BPWS procedure into the STS, and that [PLANT NAME] accurately adopted TSTF–476 and the requisite procedural changes. Therefore, the staff approves the [PLANT NAME] license amendment request to adopt TSTF–476, Revision 0. 4.0 State Consultation In accordance with the Commission’s regulations, the [lll] State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official had [(1) no comments or (2) the following comments— with subsequent disposition by the staff]. 5.0 Environmental Consideration The amendment[s] change[s] a requirement with respect to the installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR part 20 or surveillance requirements. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding published [DATE] ([ ] FR [ ]). Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment. 6.0 Conclusion The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission’s regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the PO 00000 Frm 00104 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 26121 common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public. Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination Description of Amendment Request: [Plant name] requests adoption of an approved change to the standard technical specifications (STS) for Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) Plants (NUREG–1433 & NUREG–1434) and plant specific technical specifications (TS), to allow the use of the improved bank position withdrawal sequence (BPWS) during normal shutdowns in accordance with NEDO–33091–A, Revision 2, ‘‘Improved BPWS Control Rod Insertion Process,’’ dated July 2004. The changes are consistent with NRC approved Industry/Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) Standard Technical Specification Change Traveler, TSTF–476. Basis for proposed no-significant-hazardsconsideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), an analysis of the issue of no-significant-hazards-consideration is presented below: Criterion 1—The Proposed Change Does Not Involve a Significant Increase in the Probability or Consequences of an Accident Previously Evaluated. The proposed changes modify the TS to allow the use of the improved bank position withdrawal sequence (BPWS) during normal shutdowns if the conditions of NEDO– 33091–A, Revision 2, ‘‘Improved BPWS Control Rod Insertion Process,’’ July 2004, have been satisfied. The staff finds that the licensee’s justifications to support the specific TS changes are consistent with the approved topical report and TSTF–476. Since the change only involves changes in control rod sequencing, the probability of an accident previously evaluated is not significantly increased, if at all. The consequences of an accident after adopting TSTF–476 are no different than the consequences of an accident prior to adopting TSTF–476. Therefore, the consequences of an accident previously evaluated are not significantly affected by this change. Therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. Criterion 2—The Proposed Change Does Not Create the Possibility of a New or Different Kind of Accident from any Previously Evaluated. The proposed change will not introduce new failure modes or effects and will not, in the absence of other unrelated failures, lead to an accident whose consequences exceed the consequences of accidents previously evaluated. The control rod drop accident (CRDA) is the design basis accident for the subject TS changes. This change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from an accident previously evaluated. Criterion 3—The Proposed Change Does Not Involve a Significant Reduction in the Margin of Safety. The proposed change, TSTF–476, incorporates the improved BPWS, previously approved in NEDO–33091–A, into the improved TS. Control rod drop accident E:\FR\FM\03MYN1.SGM 03MYN1 26122 Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 85 / Wednesday, May 3, 2006 / Notices (CRDA) is the design basis accident for the subject TS changes. In order to minimize the impact of a CRDA, the BPWS process was developed to minimize control rod reactivity worth for BWR plants. The proposed improved BPWS further simplifies the control rod insertion process and, in order to evaluate it, the staff followed the guidelines of Standard Review Plan Section 15.4.9, and referred to General Design Criterion 28 of Appendix A to 10 CFR part 50 as its regulatory requirement. The TSTF stated the improved BPWS provides the following benefits: (1) Allows the plant to reach the allrods-in condition prior to significant reactor cool down, which reduces the potential for re-criticality as the reactor cools down; (2) reduces the potential for an operator reactivity control error by reducing the total number of control rod manipulations; (3) minimizes the need for manual scrams during plant shutdowns, resulting in less wear on control rod drive (CRD) system components and CRD mechanisms; and, (4) eliminates unnecessary control rod manipulations at low power, resulting in less wear on reactor manual control and CRD system components. The addition of procedural requirements and verifications specified in NEDO–33091–A, along with the proper use of the BPWS will prevent a control rod drop accident (CRDA) from occurring while power is below the low power setpoint (LPSP). The net change to the margin of safety is insignificant. Therefore, this change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. Based upon the reasoning presented above and the previous discussion of the amendment request, the requested change does not involve a significant hazards consideration. Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this ll day of llllll, 2006. For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Project Manager, Plant Licensing Branch [ ], Division of Operating Reactor Licensing, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. [FR Doc. E6–6678 Filed 5–2–06; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7590–01–P SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION [Rel. No. IC–27306; File No. 812–13188] The Variable Annuity Life Insurance Company, et al., Notice of Application April 27, 2006. Securities and Exchange Commission (the ‘‘Commission’’). ACTION: Notice of application for an order of approval pursuant to Section 26(c) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, as amended (the ‘‘Act’’), and an order of exemption pursuant to Section 17(b) of the Act from Section 17(a) of the Act. jlentini on PROD1PC65 with NOTICES AGENCY: Applicants: The Variable Annuity Life Insurance Company (‘‘VALIC’’), VALIC VerDate Aug<31>2005 17:19 May 02, 2006 Jkt 208001 Separate Account A (‘‘Separate Account A’’ and, collectively with VALIC, the ‘‘Applicants’’), and VALIC Company I (‘‘VALIC I’’ and, collectively with VALIC and Separate Account A, the ‘‘Section 17 Applicants’’). Summary of Application: Applicants seek an order approving the proposed substitution of shares of Evergreen Fundamental Large Cap Fund with Large Cap Core Fund; Evergreen Equity Income Fund with Broad Cap Value Fund; American Century Ultra Fund with VALIC Ultra Fund; AIM Large Cap Growth Fund, Janus Fund and Putnam New Opportunities Fund with Large Capital Growth Fund; MSIF Mid Cap Growth Fund, Putnam OTC & Emerging Growth Fund and SIT Mid Cap Growth Fund with Mid Cap Strategic Growth Fund; Evergreen Special Values Fund with Small Cap Special Values Fund; SIT Small Cap Growth Fund and Evergreen Special Equity Fund with Small Cap Strategic Growth Fund; Credit Suisse Small Cap Growth Fund with Small Cap Aggressive Growth Fund; Janus Adviser Worldwide Fund and Putnam Global Equity Fund with Global Equity Fund; Templeton Global Asset Allocation Fund with Global Strategy Fund; Templeton Foreign Fund with Foreign Value Fund; and Dreyfus Basic U.S. Mortgage Securities Fund with Capital Conservation Fund (the ‘‘Substitution’’). Section 17 Applicants seek an order pursuant to Section 17(b) of the Act to permit certain in-kind transactions in connection with the Substitution. Filing Date: The application was originally filed on May 6, 2005, and an amended and restated application was filed on April 26, 2006. Hearing or Notification of Hearing: An order granting the application will be issued unless the Commission orders a hearing. Interested persons may request a hearing by writing to the Secretary of the Commission and serving Applicants with a copy of the request, personally or by mail. Hearing requests must be received by the Commission by 5:30 p.m. on May 22, 2006, and should be accompanied by proof of service on Applicants in the form of an affidavit or, for lawyers, a certificate of service. Hearing requests should state the nature of the requester’s interest, the reason for the request, and the issues contested. Persons who wish to be notified of a hearing may request notification by writing to the Secretary of the Commission. Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street, NE., Washington, DC 20549–1090. ADDRESSES: PO 00000 Frm 00105 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 Applicants, 2929 Allen Parkway, Houston, Texas 77019. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Rebecca A. Marquigny, Senior Counsel, or Joyce M. Pickholz, Branch Chief, Office of Insurance Products, Division of Investment Management, at (202) 551– 6795. The following is a summary of the application. The complete application is available for a fee from the Public Reference Branch of the Commission, 100 F Street, NE., Washington, DC 20549 (202–551–8090). SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Applicants’ and Section 17 Applicants’ Representations 1. VALIC is a stock life insurance company originally organized in 1955 under the laws of Washington, DC and reorganized in Texas in 1968. VALIC is an indirect wholly-owned subsidiary of American International Group, Inc., a United States based international insurance and financial services organization. 2. Separate Account A was established in 1979. Separate Account A is registered under the Act as a unit investment trust (File No. 811–3240) and is used to fund variable annuity contracts (the ‘‘Contracts’’) (File No. 33– 75292) issued by VALIC. 3. VALIC I was incorporated in Maryland on December 7, 1984 and is registered under the Act as an open-end management investment company (File Nos. 811–3738 and 002–83631). 4. Purchase payments under the Contracts may be allocated to one or more divisions (‘‘Divisions’’) of Separate Account A. Income, gains and losses, whether or not realized, from assets allocated to Separate Account A are, as provided in the Contracts, credited to or charged against Separate Account A without regard to other income, gains or losses of VALIC. The assets maintained in Separate Account A will not be charged with any liabilities arising out of any other business conducted by VALIC. Nevertheless, all obligations arising under the Contracts, including the commitment to make annuity payments or death benefit payments, are general corporate obligations of VALIC. Accordingly, Applicants represent that all of VALIC’s assets are available to meet its obligations under the Contracts. 5. The Contracts permit allocations of account value to available Divisions that invest in specific investment portfolios of underlying registered investment companies (a ‘‘Fund’’ and, collectively, the ‘‘Mutual Funds’’). VALIC I is one of the available Mutual Funds and each of the following is a series of VALIC I: E:\FR\FM\03MYN1.SGM 03MYN1

Agencies

[Federal Register Volume 71, Number 85 (Wednesday, May 3, 2006)]
[Notices]
[Pages 26118-26122]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E6-6678]


=======================================================================
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION


Notice of Opportunity To Comment on Model Safety Evaluation and 
Model License Amendment Request on Technical Specification Improvement 
Regarding Use of the Improved Bank Position Withdrawal Sequence for 
General Electric Boiling Water Reactors Using the Consolidated Line 
Item Improvement Process

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Request for comment.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: Notice is hereby given that the staff of the U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC) has prepared a model license amendment 
request (LAR), model safety evaluation (SE), and model proposed no 
significant hazards consideration (NSHC) determination related to 
changes to Standard Technical Specification (STS) 3.1.6, ``Rod Pattern 
Control,'' and STS 3.3.2.1, ``Control Rod Block Instrumentation'' for 
NUREG-1433 and NUREG-1434. The proposed changes would revise the Bases 
for STS 3.1.6, ``Rod Pattern Control,'' and STS 3.3.2.1, ``Control Rod 
Block Instrumentation'' to allow licensees to use an improved control 
rod bank position withdrawal sequence (BPWS) when performing a reactor 
shutdown. In addition, for NUREG-1434 licensees, the proposed changes 
would add a footnote to Table 3.3.2.1-1, ``Control Rod Block 
Instrumentation.'' The requirements for implementing the improved BPWS 
are described in General Electric Licensing Topical Report (LTR) NEDO-
33091-A, Revision 2, ``Improved BPWS Control Rod Insertion Process,'' 
dated July 2004. The General Electric Boiling Water Reactor Owners 
Group (BWROG) participants in the Technical Specifications Task Force 
(TSTF) proposed these changes to the STS in TSTF-476, Revision 0, 
``Improved BPWS Control Rod Insertion Process (NEDO-33091).''
    The purpose of these models is to permit the NRC to efficiently 
process amendments to incorporate these changes into plant-specific 
Technical Specifications (TS) for General Electric Boiling Water 
Reactors (BWRs). Licensees of nuclear power reactors to which the 
models apply can request amendments conforming to the models. In such a 
request, a licensee should confirm the applicability of the model LAR, 
model SE and NSHC determination to its plant. The NRC staff is 
requesting comments on the model LAR, model SE and NSHC determination 
before announcing their availability for referencing in license 
amendment applications.

DATES: The comment period expires 30 days from the date of this 
publication. Comments received after this date will be considered if it 
is practical to do so, but the Commission is able to ensure 
consideration only for comments received on or before this date.

ADDRESSES: Comments may be submitted either electronically or via U.S. 
mail.
    Submit written comments to: Chief, Rules and Directives Branch, 
Division of Administrative Services, Office of Administration, Mail 
Stop: T-6 D59, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 
20555-0001.
    Hand deliver comments to: 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville, 
Maryland, between 7:45 a.m. and 4:15 p.m. on Federal workdays.
    Submit comments by electronic mail to: CLIIP@nrc.gov.

[[Page 26119]]

    Copies of comments received may be examined at the NRC's Public 
Document Room, One White Flint North, Public File Area O1-F21, 11555 
Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Eric Thomas, Mail Stop: O-12H2, 
Division of Inspection and Regional Support, Office of Nuclear Reactor 
Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-
0001, telephone (301) 415-6772.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

    Regulatory Issue Summary 2000-06, ``Consolidated Line Item 
Improvement Process [CLIIP] for Adopting Standard Technical 
Specifications Changes for Power Reactors,'' was issued on March 20, 
2000. The CLIIP is intended to improve the efficiency and transparency 
of NRC licensing processes. This is accomplished by processing proposed 
changes to the STS in a manner that supports subsequent license 
amendment applications. The CLIIP includes an opportunity for the 
public to comment on proposed changes to the STS following a 
preliminary assessment by the NRC staff and finding that the change 
will likely be offered for adoption by licensees. This notice is 
soliciting comment on a proposed change to the STS that changes the 
Bases for sections 3.1.6 and 3.3.2.1 of the General Electric BWR STS, 
Revision 3 of NUREG-1433 and NUREG-1434, and Table 3.3.2.1-1 in the 
NUREG-1434 STS. The CLIIP directs the NRC staff to evaluate any 
comments received for a proposed change to the STS and to either 
reconsider the change or proceed with announcing the availability of 
the change for proposed adoption by licensees. Those licensees opting 
to apply for the subject change to TSs are responsible for reviewing 
the staff's evaluation, referencing the applicable technical 
justifications, and providing any necessary plant-specific information. 
Following the public comment period, the model LAR and model SE will be 
finalized, and posted on the NRC Web page. Each amendment application 
made in response to the notice of availability will be processed and 
noticed in accordance with applicable NRC rules and procedures.
    This notice involves implementation of an improved BPWS, which 
would allow licensees of General Electric BWRs to follow the improved 
BPWS when inserting control rods into the core during a reactor 
shutdown. By letter dated August 30, 2004, the BWROG proposed these 
changes for incorporation into the STS as TSTF-476, Revision 0. These 
changes are based on the NRC staff-approved LTR NEDO-33091-A, 
``Improved BPWS Control Rod Insertion Process,'' dated July 2004, as 
approved by NRC in an SE dated June 16, 2004, accessible electronically 
from the Agency-wide Documents Access and Management System's (ADAMS) 
Public Electronic Reading Room on the Internet (ADAMS Accession No. 
ML041700479) at the NRC Web site https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/
adams.html. Persons who do not have access to ADAMS or who encounter 
problems in accessing the documents located in ADAMS should contact the 
NRC Public Document Room Reference staff by telephone at 1-800-397-
4209, 301-415-4737, or by e-mail to pdr@nrc.gov.

Applicability

    These proposed changes will revise the Section 3.6.1 and Section 
3.3.2.1 TS Bases for General Electric BWR/4 and BWR/6 plants, and TS 
Table 3.3.2.1-1 for BWR/6 plants.
    To efficiently process the incoming license amendment applications, 
the NRC staff requests that each licensee applying for the changes 
addressed by TSTF-476, Revision 0, using the CLIIP submit an LAR that 
adheres to the following model. Any variations from the model LAR 
should be explained in the licensee's submittal. Variations from the 
approach recommended in this notice may require additional review by 
the NRC staff, and may increase the time and resources needed for the 
review. Significant variations from the approach, or inclusion of 
additional changes to the license, will result in staff rejection of 
the submittal. Instead, licensees desiring significant variations and/
or additional changes should submit a LAR that does not claim to adopt 
TSTF-476.

Public Notices

    This notice requests comments from interested members of the public 
within 30 days of the date of this publication. Following the NRC 
staff's evaluation of comments received as a result of this notice, the 
NRC staff may reconsider the proposed change or may proceed with 
announcing the availability of the change in a subsequent notice 
(perhaps with some changes to the model LAR, model SE or model NSHC 
determination as a result of public comments). If the NRC staff 
announces the availability of the change, licensees wishing to adopt 
the change will submit an application in accordance with applicable 
rules and other regulatory requirements. The NRC staff will, in turn, 
issue for each application a notice of consideration of issuance of 
amendment to facility operating license(s), a proposed NSHC 
determination, and an opportunity for a hearing. A notice of issuance 
of an amendment to operating license(s) will also be issued to announce 
the revised requirements for each plant that applies for and receives 
the requested change.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland this 7th day of April 2006.
    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Thomas H. Boyce,
Chief, Technical Specifications Branch, Division of Inspection and 
Regional Support, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

Attachments--For Inclusion on the Technical Specification Web Page the 
Following Example of an Application Was Prepared by the NRC Staff to 
Facilitate the Adoption of Technical Specifications Task Force (TSTF) 
Traveler TSTF-476, Revision 0 ``Improved BPWS Control Rod Insertion 
Process (Nedo-33091).'' The Model Provides the Expected Level Of Detail 
and Content for an Application to Adopt TSTF-476, Revision 0. Licensees 
Remain Responsible for Ensuring That Their Actual Application Fulfills 
Their Administrative Requirements as Well as NRC Regulations.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Document Control Desk, 
Washington, DC 20555.

Subject: Plant Name, Docket No. 50-[XXX,] Re: Application For 
Technical Specification Improvement To Adopt TSTF-476, Revision 0, 
``Improved BPWS Control ROD Insertion Process (NEDO-33091)''.

    Dear Sir or Madam: In accordance with the provisions of Section 
50.90 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), 
[LICENSEE] is submitting a request for an amendment to the technical 
specifications (TS) for [PLANT NAME, UNIT NOS.]. The proposed 
changes would revise Sections 3.1.6, ``Rod Pattern Control,'' and 
3.3.2.1, ``Control Rod Block Instrumentation,'' to allow [PLANT 
NAME] to reference a new Banked Position Withdrawal Sequence (BPWS) 
shutdown sequence in the TS Bases. [(BWR/6 only), In addition, a 
footnote is added to Table 3.3.2.1-1, ``Control Rod Block 
Instrumentation.'']
    The changes are consistent with NRC-approved Industry Technical 
Specification Task Force (TSTF) Standard Technical Specification 
Change Traveler, TSTF-476, Revision 0, ``Improved BPWS Control Rod 
Insertion Process (NEDO-33091).'' The availability of this TS 
improvement was announced in the Federal Register on [DATE] ([ ]FR[ 
]) as part of the consolidated line item improvement process 
(CLIIP).
    Enclosure 1 provides a description and assessment of the 
proposed changes, as well as confirmation of applicability. 
Enclosure 2 provides the existing TS pages and TS Bases marked-up to 
show the proposed changes. Enclosure 3 provides final TS pages and 
TS Bases pages.
    [LICENSEE] requests approval of the proposed license amendment 
by [DATE], with the amendment being implemented [BY

[[Page 26120]]

DATE OR WITHIN X DAYS]. In accordance with 10 CFR 50.91, a copy of 
this application, with enclosures, is being provided to the 
designated [STATE] Official.
    I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United 
States of America that I am authorized by [LICENSEE] to make this 
request and that the foregoing is true and correct. [Note that 
request may be notarized in lieu of using this oath or affirmation 
statement]. If you should have any questions regarding this 
submittal, please contact [ ].

 Sincerely,

Name, Title

    Enclosures:

1. Description and Assessment of Proposed Changes
2. Proposed Technical Specification Changes and Technical 
Specification Bases Changes
3. Final Technical Specification and Bases pages
cc: NRR Project Manager, Regional Office, Resident Inspector, State 
Contact, ITSB Branch Chief.

1.0 Description

    This letter is a request to amend Operating License(s) [LICENSE 
NUMBER(S)] for [PLANT/UNIT NAME(S)].
    The proposed changes would revise Technical Specification (TS) 
3.1.6, ``Rod Pattern Control'', and 3.3.2.1, ``Control Rod Block 
Instrumentation,'' [(BWR/6 only) along with TS Table 3.3.2.1-1, 
``Control Rod Block Instrumentation,''] to allow reference to an 
improved, optional Bank Position Withdrawal Sequence (BPWS) in the 
TS Bases for use during reactor shutdown.
    The new BPWS is described in Topical Report NEDO-33091-A, 
Revision 2, ``Improved BPWS Control Rod Insertion Process,'' dated 
July 2004 (Reference 1), and approved by the NRC by Safety 
Evaluation (SE) dated June 16, 2004 (ADAMS ML041700479) (Reference 
2). Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) change traveler TSTF-
476, Revision 0, ``Improved BPWS Control Rod Insertion Process 
(NEDO-33091)'' was announced for availability in the Federal 
Register on [DATE] as part of the consolidated line item improvement 
process (CLIIP).

2.0 Proposed Changes

    Consistent with NRC-approved TSTF-476, Revision 0, the proposed 
TS changes include:
     Revised TS Section 3.6.1 Bases to allow use of an 
optional BPWS during plant shutdown.
     Revised TS Section 3.3.2.1 Bases to allow reprogramming 
of the rod worth minimizer during the optional BPWS shutdown 
sequence.
     [(BWR/6 only): Revised Table 3.3.2.1-1, ``Control Rod 
Block Instrumentation,'' which adds a footnote that allows operators 
to bypass the rod pattern controller if conditions for the optional 
BPWS shutdown process are satisfied.]

3.0 Background

    The background for this application is as stated in the model SE 
in NRC's Notice of Availability published on [DATE ]([ ] FR [ ]), 
the NRC Notice for Comment published on [DATE] ([ ] FR [ ]), and 
TSTF-476, Revision 0.

4.0 Technical Analysis

    [LICENSEE] has reviewed References 1 and 2, and the model SE 
published on [DATE] ([ ] FR [ ]) as part of the CLIIP Notice for 
Comment. [LICENSEE] has applied the methodology in Reference 1 to 
develop the proposed TS changes. [LICENSEE] has also concluded that 
the justifications presented in TSTF-476, Revision 0 and the model 
SE prepared by the NRC staff are applicable to [PLANT, UNIT NOS.], 
and justify this amendment for the incorporation of the changes to 
the [PLANT] TS.

5.0 Regulatory Analysis

    A description of this proposed change and its relationship to 
applicable regulatory requirements and guidance was provided in the 
NRC Notice of Availability published on [DATE] ([ ] FR [ ]), the NRC 
Notice for Comment published on [DATE] ([ ] FR [ ]), and TSTF-476, 
Revision 0.

5.1 Regulatory Commitments

    As discussed in the model SE published in the Federal Register 
on [DATE] ([ ] FR [ ]) for this technical specification improvement, 
the following plant-specific verifications/commitments were 
performed. In Reference 2 the NRC staff explained that the potential 
for the control rod drop accident (CRDA) will be eliminated by the 
following changes to the operational procedures, which [PLANT NAME] 
[has made/will commit to make prior to implementation]:
    1. Before reducing power to the low power setpoint (LPSP), 
operators shall confirm control rod coupling integrity for all rods 
that are fully withdrawn. Control rods that have not been confirmed 
coupled and are in intermediate positions must be fully inserted 
prior to power reduction to the LPSP. No action is required for 
fully-inserted control rods.
    If a shutdown is required and all rods, which are not confirmed 
coupled, cannot be fully inserted prior to the power dropping below 
the LPSP, then the original/standard BPWS must be adhered to.
    2. After reactor power drops below the LPSP, rods may be 
inserted from notch position 48 to notch position 00 without 
stopping at the intermediate positions. However, GE Nuclear Energy 
recommends that, to the maximum extent possible, operators insert 
rods in the same order as specified for the original/standard BPWS. 
If a plant is in the process of shutting down following improved 
BPWS with the power below the LPSP, no control rod shall be 
withdrawn unless the control rod pattern is in compliance with 
standard BPWS requirements.
    In addition to the procedure changes specified above, the staff 
previously concluded, based on its review of NEDO-33091-A, that no 
single failure of the boiling water reactor CRD mechanical or 
hydraulic system can cause a control rod to drop completely out of 
the reactor core during the shutdown process. Therefore, the proper 
use of the improved BPWS will prevent a CRDA from occurring while 
power is below the LPSP. [LICENSEE] has verified, in accordance with 
NEDO-33091-A, Revision 2, that no single failure of the boiling 
water reactor CRD mechanical or hydraulic system can cause a control 
rod to drop completely out of the reactor core during the shutdown 
process.

6.0 No Significant Hazards Consideration

    [LICENSEE] has reviewed the proposed no significant hazards 
consideration determination published in the Federal Register on 
[DATE] ([ ] FR [ ]) as part of the CLIIP. [LICENSEE] has concluded 
that the proposed determination presented in the notice is 
applicable to [PLANT] and the determination is hereby incorporated 
by reference to satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR 50.91(a).

7.0 Environmental Evaluation

    [LICENSEE] has reviewed the environmental consideration included 
in the model SE published in the Federal Register on [DATE] ([ ] FR 
[ ]) as part of the CLIIP. [LICENSEE] has concluded that the staff's 
findings presented therein are applicable to [PLANT] and the 
determination is hereby incorporated by reference for this 
application.

8.0 References

    1. Topical Report NEDO-33091-A, Revision 2, ``Improved BPWS 
Control Rod Insertion Process,'' dated July 2004.
    2. NRC Safety Evaluation (SE) approving Topical Report NEDO-
33091, Revision 2, ``Improved BPWS Control Rod Insertion Process,'' 
dated June 16, 2004.
    3. Federal Register Notices:
Notice for Comment published on [DATE] ([ ] FR [ ])
Notice of Availability published on [DATE] ([ ] FR [ ])

Model Safety Evaluation--U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation--``Technical Specification 
Task Force TSTF-476, Revision 0--``Improved BPWS Control Rod 
Insertion Process (NEDO-33091)

1.0 Introduction

    By letter dated [------, 20--], [LICENSEE] (the licensee) 
proposed changes to the technical specifications (TS) for [PLANT 
NAME]. The requested changes are the adoption of TSTF-476, Revision 
0, ``Improved BPWS Control Rod Insertion Process (NEDO-33091-A),'' 
to the Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) Standard Technical Specifications 
(STS), which was proposed by the Technical Specifications Task Force 
(TSTF) by letter on August 30, 2004. This TSTF involves changes to 
NUREG-1433 and NUREG-1434 Section 3.1.6 ``Rod Pattern Control,'' 
Section 3.3.2.1 ``Control Rod Block Instrumentation,'' and Table 
3.3.2.1-1 (NUREG-1434 only). The proposed TSTF would allow the use 
of the improved bank position withdrawal sequence (BPWS) during 
normal shutdowns if the conditions of NEDO-33091-A, Revision 2, 
``Improved BPWS Control Rod Insertion Process,'' dated July 2004, 
have been satisfied.

[[Page 26121]]

2.0 Regulatory Evaluation

    The control rod drop accident (CRDA) is the design basis 
accident for the subject TS changes. In order to minimize the impact 
of a CRDA, the BPWS process was developed to minimize control rod 
reactivity worth for BWR plants. The proposed improved BPWS further 
simplifies the control rod insertion process, and in order to 
evaluate it, the staff followed the guidelines of Standard Review 
Plan Section 15.4.9, and referred to General Design Criterion (GDC) 
28 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50 as its regulatory requirement. 
GDC 28 states that the reactivity control systems shall be designed 
with appropriate limits on the potential amount and rate of 
reactivity increase to assure that the effects of postulated 
reactivity accidents can neither (1) result in damage to the reactor 
coolant pressure boundary greater than limited local yielding nor 
(2) sufficiently disturb the core, its support structures or other 
reactor pressure vessel internals to impair significantly the 
capability to cool the core.

3.0 Technical Evaluation

    In its safety evaluation for Licensing Topical Report NEDO-
33091-A, ``Improved BPWS Control Rod Insertion Process,'' dated June 
16, 2004, (ADAMS ML041700479) the staff determined that the 
methodology described in TSTF-476, Revision 0, to incorporate the 
improved BPWS into the STS, is acceptable.
    TSTF-476, Revision 0, states that the improved BPWS provides the 
following benefits: (1) Allows the plant to reach the all-rods-in 
condition prior to significant reactor cool down, which reduces the 
potential for re-criticality as the reactor cools down; (2) reduces 
the potential for an operator reactivity control error by reducing 
the total number of control rod manipulations; (3) minimizes the 
need for manual scrams during plant shutdowns, resulting in less 
wear on control rod drive (CRD) system components and CRD 
mechanisms; and, (4) eliminates unnecessary control rod 
manipulations at low power, resulting in less wear on reactor manual 
control and CRD system components.
    [PLANT NAME] has been approved to use the improved BPWS, and the 
potential for a CRDA with power below the low power setpoint (LPSP) 
has been eliminated. The safety evaluation for NEDO-33091-A 
explained that the potential for the CRDA will be eliminated by the 
following changes to operational procedures, which [PLANT NAME] [has 
made/will commit to make prior to implementation]:
    1. Before reducing power to the LPSP, operators shall confirm 
control rod coupling integrity for all rods that are fully 
withdrawn. Control rods that have not been confirmed coupled and are 
in intermediate positions must be fully inserted prior to power 
reduction to the LPSP. No action is required for fully-inserted 
control rods.
    If a shutdown is required and all rods that are not confirmed 
coupled cannot be fully inserted prior to power dropping below the 
LPSP, then the original/standard BPWS must be adhered to.
    2. After reactor power drops below the LPSP, rods may be 
inserted from notch position 48 to notch position 00 without 
stopping at the intermediate positions. However, GE Nuclear Energy 
recommends that, to the maximum extent possible, operators insert 
rods in the same order as specified for the original/standard BPWS. 
If a plant is in the process of shutting down following improved 
BPWS with the power below the LPSP, no control rod shall be 
withdrawn unless the control rod pattern is in compliance with 
standard BPWS requirements.
    In addition to the procedure changes specified above, the staff 
previously verified during its review of NEDO-33091-A, Revision 2, 
that no single failure of the boiling water reactor CRD mechanical 
or hydraulic system can cause a control rod to drop completely out 
of the reactor core during the shutdown process. Therefore, the 
proper use of the improved BPWS will prevent a CRDA from occurring 
while power is below the LPSP.
    The staff finds the proposed Technical Specification changes in 
[PLANT NAME's] amendment request properly incorporate the improved 
BPWS procedure into the STS, and that [PLANT NAME] accurately 
adopted TSTF-476 and the requisite procedural changes. Therefore, 
the staff approves the [PLANT NAME] license amendment request to 
adopt TSTF-476, Revision 0.

4.0 State Consultation

    In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the [------] 
State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the 
amendment. The State official had [(1) no comments or (2) the 
following comments--with subsequent disposition by the staff].

5.0 Environmental Consideration

    The amendment[s] change[s] a requirement with respect to the 
installation or use of a facility component located within the 
restricted area as defined in 10 CFR part 20 or surveillance 
requirements. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment 
involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant 
change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, 
and that there is no significant increase in individual or 
cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has 
previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no 
significant hazards consideration and there has been no public 
comment on such finding published [DATE] ([ ] FR [ ]). Accordingly, 
the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical 
exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 
51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental 
assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the 
amendment.

6.0 Conclusion

    The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations 
discussed above, that (1) there is reasonable assurance that the 
health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation 
in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in 
compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance 
of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and 
security or to the health and safety of the public.

Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination

    Description of Amendment Request: [Plant name] requests adoption 
of an approved change to the standard technical specifications (STS) 
for Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) Plants (NUREG-1433 & NUREG-1434) and 
plant specific technical specifications (TS), to allow the use of 
the improved bank position withdrawal sequence (BPWS) during normal 
shutdowns in accordance with NEDO-33091-A, Revision 2, ``Improved 
BPWS Control Rod Insertion Process,'' dated July 2004. The changes 
are consistent with NRC approved Industry/Technical Specification 
Task Force (TSTF) Standard Technical Specification Change Traveler, 
TSTF-476.
    Basis for proposed no-significant-hazards-consideration 
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), an analysis of the 
issue of no-significant-hazards-consideration is presented below:
    Criterion 1--The Proposed Change Does Not Involve a Significant 
Increase in the Probability or Consequences of an Accident 
Previously Evaluated.
    The proposed changes modify the TS to allow the use of the 
improved bank position withdrawal sequence (BPWS) during normal 
shutdowns if the conditions of NEDO-33091-A, Revision 2, ``Improved 
BPWS Control Rod Insertion Process,'' July 2004, have been 
satisfied. The staff finds that the licensee's justifications to 
support the specific TS changes are consistent with the approved 
topical report and TSTF-476. Since the change only involves changes 
in control rod sequencing, the probability of an accident previously 
evaluated is not significantly increased, if at all. The 
consequences of an accident after adopting TSTF-476 are no different 
than the consequences of an accident prior to adopting TSTF-476. 
Therefore, the consequences of an accident previously evaluated are 
not significantly affected by this change. Therefore, this change 
does not involve a significant increase in the probability or 
consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
    Criterion 2--The Proposed Change Does Not Create the Possibility 
of a New or Different Kind of Accident from any Previously 
Evaluated.
    The proposed change will not introduce new failure modes or 
effects and will not, in the absence of other unrelated failures, 
lead to an accident whose consequences exceed the consequences of 
accidents previously evaluated. The control rod drop accident (CRDA) 
is the design basis accident for the subject TS changes. This change 
does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of 
accident from an accident previously evaluated.
    Criterion 3--The Proposed Change Does Not Involve a Significant 
Reduction in the Margin of Safety.
    The proposed change, TSTF-476, incorporates the improved BPWS, 
previously approved in NEDO-33091-A, into the improved TS. Control 
rod drop accident

[[Page 26122]]

(CRDA) is the design basis accident for the subject TS changes. In 
order to minimize the impact of a CRDA, the BPWS process was 
developed to minimize control rod reactivity worth for BWR plants. 
The proposed improved BPWS further simplifies the control rod 
insertion process and, in order to evaluate it, the staff followed 
the guidelines of Standard Review Plan Section 15.4.9, and referred 
to General Design Criterion 28 of Appendix A to 10 CFR part 50 as 
its regulatory requirement. The TSTF stated the improved BPWS 
provides the following benefits: (1) Allows the plant to reach the 
all-rods-in condition prior to significant reactor cool down, which 
reduces the potential for re-criticality as the reactor cools down; 
(2) reduces the potential for an operator reactivity control error 
by reducing the total number of control rod manipulations; (3) 
minimizes the need for manual scrams during plant shutdowns, 
resulting in less wear on control rod drive (CRD) system components 
and CRD mechanisms; and, (4) eliminates unnecessary control rod 
manipulations at low power, resulting in less wear on reactor manual 
control and CRD system components. The addition of procedural 
requirements and verifications specified in NEDO-33091-A, along with 
the proper use of the BPWS will prevent a control rod drop accident 
(CRDA) from occurring while power is below the low power setpoint 
(LPSP). The net change to the margin of safety is insignificant. 
Therefore, this change does not involve a significant reduction in a 
margin of safety.
    Based upon the reasoning presented above and the previous 
discussion of the amendment request, the requested change does not 
involve a significant hazards consideration.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this ---- day of ------------, 2006.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Project Manager, Plant Licensing Branch [ ], Division of Operating 
Reactor Licensing, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

[FR Doc. E6-6678 Filed 5-2-06; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P
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