Pipeline Safety: Meetings of the Pipeline Safety Standards Advisory Committees and Two Public Workshops, 25640-25644 [06-4093]

Agencies

• Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
• DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

[Federal Register Volume 71, Number 83 (Monday, May 1, 2006)]
[Notices]
[Pages 25640-25644]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 06-4093]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration

[Docket Nos. PHMSA-98-4470, PHMSA-2004-18938, and PHMSA-2004-18584]


Pipeline Safety: Meetings of the Pipeline Safety Standards 
Advisory Committees and Two Public Workshops

AGENCY: Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), 
Department of Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Notice of advisory committee meetings and two workshops.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: This notice announces public meetings of PHMSA's Technical 
Pipeline Safety Standards Committee (TPSSC) and Technical Hazardous 
Liquid Pipeline Safety Standards Committee (THLPSSC). The Committees 
will discuss regulatory issues and vote on two rulemaking proposals: 
Integrity management program changes and clarifications, and design and 
construction standards to reduce internal corrosion in gas transmission 
pipelines. In conjunction with the advisory committee meetings, PHMSA 
will hold two public workshops.
    PHMSA will hold a half day public workshop on Hazardous Liquid Low 
Stress Pipelines to solicit comments on a risk-based approach to 
protecting unusually sensitive areas from risks associated with low 
stress lines. PHMSA also will conduct a public workshop to discuss the 
effectiveness of pipeline control room operations and to obtain 
comments on ways to enhance the effectiveness of pipeline control room 
operations and on findings from the Controller Certification Project 
(CCERT).

Dates and Times: PHMSA will hold advisory committee meetings and public 
workshops on June 26-28, 2006. The dates and times are:
     Monday, June 26 from 1 p.m. to 5 p.m.--THLPSSC and Public 
Workshop on Hazardous Liquid Low Stress Pipelines.
     Tuesday, June 27 from 8 a.m. to 5 p.m.--THLPSSC/TPSSC 
Public Workshop on Effectiveness of Pipeline Control Room Operations.
     Wednesday, June 28 from 8 a.m. to 9 a.m.--THLPSSC Meeting 
to vote on the NPRM to address integrity management modifications.
     Wednesday, June 28 from 9:30 a.m. to 4:30 p.m.--Joint 
meetings of the THLPSSC and TPSSC.
     Wednesday, June 28 from 5 p.m. to 6 p.m.--TPSSC meeting to 
vote on the NPRM to address internal corrosion in gas transmission 
pipelines.

ADDRESSES: The meetings will be at the Hilton Alexandria Old Town, 1767 
King Street, Alexandria, Virginia, 22314. Telephone: 1-703-837-0440, 
Fax 1-703-837-0454.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
     Technical Advisory Committee Meetings: Cheryl Whetsel 
(202) 366-4431, cheryl.whetsel@dot.gov;
     Hazardous Liquid Low Stress Lines Public Workshop: Dewitt 
Burdeaux (405) 954-7220, dewitt.burdeaux@dot.gov or Chris Hoidal (720) 
963-3171, chris.hoidal@dot.gov; and
     Effectiveness of Pipeline Control Room Operations Public 
Workshop: Byron Coy (609) 989-2180, byron.coy@dot.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

General Meeting Details

    Attendees staying at the hotel must make reservations by Friday, 
May 26. The phone number for reservations at the hotel is 1-800-HILTONS 
(445-8667). The hotel will give priority to the Committee members and 
State Pipeline Safety Representatives for rooms blocked under ``DOT 
Technical Advisory Committee Meetings.''
    PHMSA plans to hold panel discussions during the public workshops. 
Individuals interested in participating as a panelist/commenter during 
the workshops should contact the individual listed under FOR FURTHER 
INFORMATION CONTACT. Members of the public may make short statements on 
the topics under discussion during the advisory committee sessions. 
Anyone wishing to make an oral statement should contact one of the 
individuals listed under FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT by June 9, 
with the topic and the estimated time needed to present. The presiding 
officer at each meeting may deny a request to present an oral statement 
based on time availability.
    You may send written comments by mail or deliver them to the 
Dockets Facility, U.S. Department of Transportation, Room PL-401, 400 
Seventh Street, SW., Washington, DC 20590-0001. The Dockets Facility is 
open from 9 a.m. to 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal 
holidays. You also may send written comments to the docket 
electronically by logging onto the following Internet Web address: 
https://dms.dot.gov. Click on ``Help & Information'' for instructions on 
how to file a document electronically. All written comments should 
reference docket number PHMSA-98-4470 for advisory committee issues; 
PHMSA-2004-18938 for hazardous liquid low stress line issues; and 
PHMSA-2004-18584 for controller certification issues. Anyone who would 
like confirmation of mailed comments must include a self-addressed 
stamped postcard. These dockets will remain open pending the completion 
of a rulemaking.
    Privacy Act Statement: Anyone may search the electronic form of all 
comments received for any of our dockets. You may review DOT's complete 
Privacy Act Statement in the Federal Register published on April 11, 
2000 (65 FR 19477) or you may visit https://dms.dot.gov.
    Information on Services for Individuals with Disabilities: For 
information on facilities or services for individuals with 
disabilities, or to request special assistance at the meeting, please 
contact Cheryl Whetsel at (202) 366-4431 by June 2.

Background of Technical Advisory Committees

    The TPSSC and the THLPSSC are statutorily mandated advisory 
committees advising PHMSA on proposed safety standards, risk 
assessments, and safety policies for natural gas and hazardous liquid 
pipelines. These advisory committees are established under section 9(c) 
(App. 2) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (Pub. L. 92-463) (5 
U.S.C. App. 1). The committees consist of 15 members--five each 
representing government, industry, and the public. The TPSSC and the 
THLPSSC determine reasonableness, cost-effectiveness, and 
practicability of PHMSA's regulatory initiatives.
    Federal law requires PHMSA to submit cost-benefit analysis and risk 
assessment information on each proposed safety standard to the advisory 
committees. The committees evaluate the merits of the data and methods 
used within the analysis, and when fitting, provide recommendations 
about the cost-benefit analysis.

Hazardous Liquid Low Stress Line Public Workshop

June 26 (1 p.m. until 5 p.m.)

    On Monday, June 26 in conjunction with the THLPSSC meeting, PHMSA 
will hold a half day public workshop on

[[Page 25641]]

protecting unusually sensitive areas from hazardous liquid low stress 
lines.

Background on Regulation of Hazardous Liquid Low Stress Lines

    The original safety regulations for hazardous liquid pipelines did 
not apply to low stress pipelines. Because of their low operating 
pressures and minimal accident history, the agency thought low stress 
hazardous liquid pipelines posed little risk to public safety. 
Following a prominent accident in 1990 involving the spill of about 
500,000 gallons of heating oil from an underwater Exxon pipeline in 
Arthur Kill Channel in New York, PHMSA began rulemaking on hazardous 
liquid low stress lines. Further, in the Pipeline Safety Act of 1992, 
Congress provided guidance for the rulemaking by limiting the authority 
to exempt a pipeline from regulation solely because it operated at a 
low stress level.
    In 1990, PHMSA published an advance notice of proposed rulemaking 
(ANPRM) on low stress pipelines. (55 FR 45822; October 31, 1990.) In 
the ANPRM, PHMSA sought information about the costs and benefits of 
regulating low stress lines. The analysis of the data received in 
response to the ANPRM showed regulation of all low stress pipelines 
could impose costs disproportionate to benefits. PHMSA, therefore, 
focused on those low stress pipelines that posed a higher risk to 
people and the environment. The risk factors identified were the 
commodity in transportation and the location of the pipeline.
    In 1993, PHMSA published an NPRM proposing to apply parts 195 and 
199 to low stress transmission pipelines that transport highly volatile 
liquids, traverse a populated area or traverse a navigable waterway (58 
FR 12213; March 3, 2003). In 1994, PHMSA committed to consider 
regulating rural low stress lines in a future rulemaking based on 
locations and other risk factors. The agency said that it was 
developing a better concept of what constitutes an environmentally 
sensitive area for purposes of pipeline regulation and this would 
provide the groundwork for the future rulemaking on rural low stress 
lines. PHMSA said it needed the time to learn the extent to which low 
stress pipeline spills affect environmentally sensitive areas. It 
believed the definition used in the part 194 (Response Plans for 
Onshore Oil Pipelines) was too broad for part 195.
    In 2000, PHMSA issued a final rule to define unusually sensitive 
areas (USAs) (65 FR 246). In this rule, PHMSA noted its 1994 decision 
to defer regulating nonvolatile products in low stress pipelines in 
rural sensitive areas since there was not a definition. It further 
noted its intention to reconsider the issue once there was a sensitive 
area definition. In 2000, PHMSA defined protection of USAs for most 
hazardous liquid pipelines through its integrity management 
regulations. This meeting is a crucial step in gathering information 
needed to complete the protection of USAs from risks of spills from 
hazardous liquid low stress lines.
    PHMSA has gathered data from State agencies and industry and 
evaluated several accidents that involve hazardous liquid low stress 
lines. Based on its evaluation of data and comments received earlier on 
this issue, PHMSA would like to consider a risk-based approach to 
addressing unregulated hazardous liquid low stress lines. PHMSA would 
require operators of these lines to follow certain safety rules for 
design, construction, testing, and maximum operating pressure. It would 
also require these operators to protect the lines from corrosion and 
excavation damage, provide public education, operator qualification, 
and report accident and safety-related conditions.

Preliminary Agenda--Workshop Questions for Hazardous Liquid Low Stress 
Lines

    During the public workshop, PHMSA plans to present its viewpoint 
and then hold panel discussions. The agency seeks comments on its risk-
based approach to addressing unregulated low stress lines. In 
discussion of concepts, PHMSA asks interested parties to discuss the 
following agenda topics:

Criteria for Applicability of Regulation

    PHMSA believes it should regulate any pipeline that affects USAs, 
including those not crossing a public domain.
     Should low stress lines that remain on leased property or 
low stress lines not crossing into a public domain be considered a 
transportation pipeline?
     Should PHMSA only regulate pipelines that intersect or 
could affect USAs?

Use of Buffer Zones

    PHMSA is considering using the criteria in part 194 to determine 
whether a low stress line could affect a USA.
     In determining whether a low stress line could affect a 
USA, should PHMSA use criteria similar to the requirements in part 194 
or are there other tried and tested criteria, such as buffer zones, we 
should consider?

Physical Pipeline Characteristics

    PHMSA believes it may be appropriate to regulate pipelines 
containing a certain amount of product by volume.
     Throughput: What is the average daily throughput, and type 
of product transported?
     Location: Where are low stress lines geographically 
located?
     Diameter: What are the diameter ranges for pipelines 
transporting products through low stress pipelines other than gathering 
lines?

Safety Requirements

    PHMSA believes that it may be appropriate to apply a limited subset 
of compliance activities, similar to those prescribed in part 192 for 
gas gathering lines.
     Leak Detection: Do hazardous liquid low stress line 
operators currently employ some type of leak detection techniques? If 
so, what techniques are used? What is an acceptable margin of error? 
Are margins determined daily?
     Operator Qualification: Should we apply Subpart N or a 
modified approach? If so, what should that modified approach be?
     Maintenance: Should federal regulations address 
preventative measures, such as the routine use of corrosion prevention 
and smart pigs which are capable of detecting corrosion? Do operators 
routinely run cleaning pigs on its low stress lines?
     Implementation Timeframes: Are 18-month through 2-year 
timeframes adequate for operators to address new construction, 
corrosion, operator qualification and excavation damage; to provide 
public education; and to report accident and safety-related conditions?

Costs/Benefits

    PHMSA must address cost and benefits in developing all regulatory 
proposals. PHMSA is gathering cost data to justify a proposal.
     How many pipelines will be impacted?
     What is the mileage?
     What is the average length of those lines?
     What is the cost of bringing unregulated lines into 
compliance with part 195?

Effectiveness of Pipeline Control Room Management Public Workshop

June 27 (8 a.m.-5 p.m.)

    In conjunction with the Joint Committee meetings, PHMSA will hold a 
public workshop on opportunities to improve the effectiveness of 
pipeline

[[Page 25642]]

control room operations. This workshop will provide the public and 
industry an opportunity to discuss options for effectiveness of 
pipeline control room operations and assessing management processes, 
human fatigue issues, qualification, and other programs affecting 
pipeline control.

Background of Controller Certification Pilot Program

    In addressing the requirements in the Pipeline Safety Improvement 
Act (PSIA) of 2002, section 13(b), PHMSA conducted a Controller 
Certification Pilot Program (CCERT). The purpose of the pilot program 
was to: (1) Review training programs, qualification requirements, 
evaluation methods, evaluation criteria, success thresholds, and 
reevaluation intervals to determine their adequacy and thoroughness in 
the controller qualification process; (2) evaluate the effectiveness of 
the practices and administrative processes currently used by operators 
in the qualification of controllers; (3) examine the thoroughness of 
operating procedures and practices used by controllers which impact 
safety and integrity; and (4) explore how these processes and 
evaluation criteria could be used to develop uniform protocols and 
acceptance criteria for the validation of pipeline operators' 
controller qualification processes. Despite differences between natural 
gas and hazardous liquid pipelines, PHMSA believes controllers for both 
types of pipelines require similar cognitive and analytical skills.
    During the same period of time in which PHMSA was conducting the 
ongoing CCERT Project, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) 
was conducting a separate study on hazardous liquid pipeline 
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems (2002-2005). 
The NTSB study examined how pipeline companies use SCADA systems to 
monitor and record operating data and to evaluate the role of SCADA 
systems in leak detection. The impetus of the NTSB study was the number 
of hazardous liquid accidents the NTSB investigated in which leaks went 
undetected after the SCADA system indicated the leak. While the NTSB 
SCADA Safety Study specifically addresses hazardous liquid pipelines, 
they previously issued about 30 recommendations over the past 30 years 
either directly or indirectly related to SCADA systems involving both 
hazardous liquid and natural gas pipeline systems. The NTSB's SCADA 
Safety Study and the CCERT project yielded many similar findings. PHMSA 
identified some additional areas of concern. The recommendations from 
the NTSB's SCADA Safety Study are as follows:
     Require operators of hazardous liquid pipelines to follow 
the American Petroleum Institute's Recommended Practice 1165 [API RP 
1165] for the use of graphics on the SCADA screens.
     Require pipeline companies to have a policy for the 
review/audit of alarms.
     Require controller training to include simulator or non-
computerized simulations for controller recognition of abnormal 
operating conditions, in particular, leak events.
     Change the liquid accident reporting form (PHMSA F 7000-1) 
and require operators to provide data related to controller fatigue.
     Require operators to install computer-based leak detection 
systems on all lines unless engineering analysis determined that such a 
system is not necessary.
    PHMSA plans to address the first four recommendations listed above 
within the CCERT Project. PHMSA plans to address the leak detection 
recommendation separately.
    The NTSB previously recommended PHMSA address human factors by 
establishing scientifically based hours of service regulations that set 
limits on hours of service, provide predictable work and rest 
schedules, and consider circadian rhythms and human sleep and rest 
requirements. The NTSB also recommended PHMSA assess the potential 
safety risks associated with rotating pipeline controller shifts and 
establish industry guidelines for the development and implementation of 
pipeline controller work schedules to reduce the likelihood of 
accidents attributable to controller fatigue. In response, PHMSA held a 
meeting on fatigue and issued Advisory Bulletin ADB-05-06, 
``Countermeasures to Prevent Human Fatigue in the Control Room'' (70 FR 
46917; August 11, 2005).
    This workshop will provide information and promote discussion on 
the most critical factors emerging from the certification study project 
and the NTSB recommendations affecting controlling the operation of 
natural gas and hazardous liquid pipelines. Meetings with state 
pipeline regulators, pipeline operators, academia, members of the 
public, parallel industry representatives, vendors and simulator 
specialists to conduct analyses and evaluations help frame PHMSA's 
findings. PHMSA is preparing a Report to Congress summarizing its 
findings regarding pipeline controller training, qualification programs 
and validation techniques to address the PSIA 2002 section 13(b)(2). 
PHMSA plans to submit its findings to Congress by the end of the year.
    In the workshop, PHMSA will first present pilot program initial 
findings. PHMSA will provide an opportunity to discuss these findings 
as a basis for potential future regulatory enhancements and other 
actions to provide further assurance about the effectiveness of 
pipeline control and the skills and qualifications of controllers. 
PHMSA is encouraging public participation on the path forward. PHMSA 
will want to discuss what follow-up action is needed for each topic--
for example, regulation, consensus standard, or advisory.

Preliminary Meeting Agenda for CCERT Workshop

    This workshop will focus on the topics listed below. PHMSA will 
provide a summary on the critical nature of each topic in validating 
the effectiveness of pipeline control room operations and controller 
programs, followed by panel discussions and an opportunity for 
interested parties to provide comments.

Shift Operations

    The exchange of information between controllers at shift change is 
critical for the controller going on shift who needs to know about 
operating conditions that may directly impact pipeline safety. PHMSA 
believes operators should have formalized procedures to control shift 
rotation schedules and guide shift change-over practices.
     What role do shift change procedures have in averting the 
development of abnormal and emergency situations?
     Do existing shift rotation schedules, shift length, and 
hours of service protect against the onset of fatigue?

Effectiveness of Pipeline Control Room Operations

    PHMSA believes operators need to provide clear direction regarding 
the controller's authority and responsibility to ensure prompt 
detection and appropriate response to abnormal and emergency operating 
conditions.
     Do operators clearly communicate authority and 
responsibility expectations to their controllers?

Fatigue

    PHMSA believes operators should limit controller shifts and provide 
periodic training on fatigue issues to controllers.
     What should be done regarding controller work hour 
limitations?

[[Page 25643]]

     Should we be concerned about employees' non-work hours 
that contribute to fatigue?
     Should PHMSA modify its reporting criteria on accident 
causes to reflect controller issues? If so, what areas should we 
address?

Management of Change

    PHMSA believes operators should establish programs to: Periodically 
audit field data points with SCADA displays; develop integration plans 
affecting controllers during acquisition and divestitures; ensure 
including consultation with controllers when considering pipeline 
hydraulic, SCADA, or configuration changes; and track expedient 
resolution of controller-oriented changes and repairs.
     When changes occur in the operating environment affecting 
controllers, how do we ensure those changes are fully addressed and 
conveyed to controllers?

Alarms and Event Displays

    Alarms and event displays provide information on potential 
precursors or indicators of abnormal operating conditions. Controllers 
should clearly understand displayed information and what specific 
alarms and event displays indicate. PHMSA believes it is important for 
operators to routinely review alarms and event displays to identify the 
need for revisions to alarm and event management systems.
     How significant are alarm parameters, alarm management, 
and the periodic review of alarms to pipeline safety and integrity?
     What impacts do alarm descriptors, display parameters, and 
the use of color have on providing precise operational information to 
controllers?

Access Control

    PHMSA believes operators should have measures in place to protect 
against unauthorized access to SCADA control consoles; configure SCADA 
systems for individual log-ins; and perform background checks on 
controllers.
     Are there additional measures needed to address controller 
room access to SCADA systems?

Qualification of Personnel

    PHMSA believes simulators and tabletop exercises are valuable tools 
to help familiarize controllers with the hydraulic response of the 
pipeline system and improve their recognition of abnormal and emergency 
conditions. A controller's thorough knowledge of pipeline system 
hydraulic response is critical to recognizing abnormal operating 
condition development. PHMSA believes operators should incorporate 
tabletop exercises, and/or computerized simulations and field visits to 
enhance controller training.
     How can computer-based simulator training and tabletop 
exercises enhance controller skills?
     What are the benefits of training controllers on specific 
pipeline hydraulic parameters and response to various abnormal 
operating conditions?
     What value can controllers get from facility visits and 
site-specific emergency issues?

Regulating Operating Conditions

    Incidents, accidents, safety-related condition reports and operator 
qualification inspections indicate the need for enhanced controller 
skills on prompt, appropriate response regarding the recognition of 
abnormal operating conditions and emergency conditions. Parallel 
industries have identified the need to develop training around 
combinations of abnormal operating conditions and operating experience. 
PHMSA believes operators should address abnormal operating conditions 
occurring frequently and in combinations.
     How can we better identify and train operators to handle 
abnormal operating events?
     What roles can operational events play in identifying 
emergency operating conditions?
     How do we plan for and identify multiple contributing 
causes/factors when incidents and accidents occur?
     What role do controllers have in reacting and responding 
to incidents/accidents?

Maintaining Personnel Qualifications

    Operator qualification inspection summaries and CCERT industry 
review indicate operators frequently do not substantiate re-
qualification intervals for controllers. Many operators' programs do 
not provide guidance to determine when a controller needs refresher 
training, needs more training, or needs to requalify after 
disqualification. PHMSA believes these attributes should be 
incorporated into operators' qualification programs.
     What process best serves to validate controllers' skills 
and knowledge?
     What forms of justification are adequate to substantiate 
requalification intervals?
     Should the operator qualification process include 
documentation of revocation and restoration criteria?

Monitoring Performance

    PHMSA has determined that some operators configure SCADA systems to 
portray critical information using color alone without verifying the 
controllers' ability to perceive color. Similar circumstances may exist 
concerning eyesight and hearing. PHMSA believes that operators should 
periodically verify that controllers have adequate color perception, 
eyesight, and hearing.
     What practical techniques can be used to track ongoing 
performance and monitor for performance degradation over time?
     How would a pipeline operator determine and test for 
adequate color perception, eyesight, and hearing?

Path Forward

    PHMSA believes these findings apply in varying degrees to both 
hazardous liquid and natural gas pipeline operators. The path forward 
may include some of the following options: Public workshop discussions, 
reinforcement of existing regulations, consensus standards development, 
advisory bulletins, revised inspection guidance, accident/incident form 
revisions, enhancements to PHMSA incident/accident inspector training, 
SCADA inspections, or rulemaking.
     Which of these recommendations should apply to both 
hazardous liquid and natural gas pipeline operators?
     What areas should we focus on in addressing the NTSB 
recommendations and CCERT Project findings?
     What findings need regulatory action, if any? Are there 
other types of actions needed, such as consensus standards or 
advisories?

The Technical Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety Standards Advisory 
Committee

Wednesday, June 28 (8 a.m. to 9 a.m.)

    The THLPSSC will meet to discuss and vote on the NPRM, Integrity 
Management: Program Modifications and Clarifications (70 FR 74265; 
December 5, 2005). PHMSA proposes revisions to the current Pipeline 
Safety Regulations for Pipeline Integrity Management in High 
Consequence Areas. The revisions address a petition from the hazardous 
liquid pipeline industry. The proposed revisions are to: (1) Allow more 
flexibility in reassessment intervals for hazardous liquid pipelines by 
adding an eight-month window to the five-year time frame for operators 
to complete reassessment; and (2) require both hazardous liquid 
pipeline and transmission pipeline operators to notify PHMSA whenever 
they reduce pipeline pressure to make a repair and to provide reasons 
for pressure reduction. Another notification,

[[Page 25644]]

including reasons for repair delay, would occur when a pressure 
reduction exceeds 365 days. Also, PHMSA proposes to correct existing 
provisions for calculating a pressure reduction when making an 
immediate repair on a hazardous liquid pipeline. The proposed 
correction would allow operators to use another acceptable method to 
calculate reduced operating pressure when a specified formula is not 
applicable or results in a calculated pressure higher than operating 
pressure. Finally, PHMSA seeks the submittal of engineering analyses 
and technical data. These submittals are to provide the basis for 
modifying the required time periods for remediating certain conditions 
found during a hazardous liquid pipeline integrity assessment. PHMSA 
will use this data to evaluate the scope and scale of repair issues to 
develop an accurate basis for determining if any additional flexibility 
is needed in the repair schedules.

Joint Meetings of the Technical Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety 
Standards Committee and the Technical Pipelines Safety Standards 
Committee

Wednesday, June 28 (9:30 a.m. to 4:30 p.m.)

    The THLPSSC and TPSSC will hold a joint session from 9:30 am. to 
4:30 p.m. to discuss the following regulatory matters.

Preliminary Agenda for the Joint Meetings

    The day's agenda includes these topics:
     Reauthorization of the Pipeline Safety Act--Discuss 
status.
     Data Improvement/Balance Scorecard--Discuss a variety of 
data quality improvements. Introduce the concept of a company 
performance scorecard to measure and manage company safety and 
compliance programs.
     Performance Measures/Metrics--Discuss continuing efforts 
to improve pipeline safety by concentrating performance measures on 
serious incidents as a natural outgrowth of integrity management.
     Maximum Allowable Operating Pressure--Discuss the waiver 
process criteria for reconsideration of the maximum allowable operating 
pressure of pipelines in certain class locations.
     Operator Qualification--Discuss the comments received from 
the public meeting on the subject held on December 15, 2005 (70 FR 
62162). The meeting provided an opportunity to discuss progress on the 
operator qualification program and to help PHMSA prepare the Report to 
Congress and the potential the American Society of Mechanical Engineers 
consensus standard offers for strengthening operator qualification 
programs.
     Controller Certification Pilot Program--Provide a summary 
of the comprehensive review of existing controller qualification 
procedures and practices in industry and describe the recommendations 
drafted for inclusion in the draft report to Congress. Discuss NTSB 
recommendations on SCADA and human fatigue and report on solutions 
considered in preparation for the public workshop.
     Public Education (PANEL)--Discuss the PHMSA Public 
Education Policy Statement and the status of a national clearinghouse 
to review updated operator plans. Brief members on the status of the 
sensitive security information designation of the PHMSA National 
Pipeline Mapping System availability to the public. Discuss the Common 
Ground Alliances' status of the Dial 811 initiative and promote the 
success of the Regional Common Ground Alliances and the need to have 
one in every state.

Technical Pipeline Safety Standards Committee Meeting

Wednesday, June 28 (5 p.m. to 6 p.m.)

    The TPSSC will meet from 5 p.m. to 6 p.m. to address the following 
two topics:
     Internal Corrosion--Discuss and vote on ``Design and 
Construction Standards to Reduce Internal Corrosion in Gas Transmission 
Pipelines'' (70 FR 74262; 12-15-05). This document proposes regulations 
on the control of internal corrosion when designing and constructing 
new and replaced gas transmission pipelines. The proposed rule would 
require an operator to take steps in design and construction to reduce 
the risk that liquids collecting within the pipeline could result in 
failures because of internal corrosion. These changes would ease steps 
an operator must take in operating and maintaining the pipeline to 
minimize internal corrosion.
     Gas Distribution-DIMP/Excess Flow Valves--Provide an 
update on the regulatory proposal and an update on Gas Pipeline 
Technology Committee guidance development.
    PHMSA will post more detailed agendas and any additional 
information or changes on its Web page (https://phmsa.dot.gov) 
approximately 15 days before the meeting date.

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 60102, 60115.

    Issued in Washington, DC, on April 26, 2006.
Stacey L. Gerard,
Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety.
[FR Doc. 06-4093 Filed 4-27-06; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-60-P