Auction of Advanced Wireless Services Licenses Scheduled for June 29, 2006; Notice of Filing Requirements, Minimum Opening Bids, Upfront Payments and Other Procedures for Auction No. 66, 20672-20694 [06-3819]
Download as PDF
20672
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 77 / Friday, April 21, 2006 / Notices
Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) part
or section number.
iii. Explain why you agree or disagree;
suggest alternatives and substitute
language for your requested changes.
iv. Describe any assumptions and
provide any technical information and/
or data that you used.
v. If you estimate potential costs or
burdens, explain how you arrived at
your estimate in sufficient detail to
allow for it to be reproduced.
vi. Provide specific examples to
illustrate your concerns and suggest
alternatives.
vii. Explain your views as clearly as
possible, avoiding the use of profanity
or personal threats.
viii. Make sure to submit your
comments by the comment period
deadline identified.
II. What Action is the Agency Taking?
EPA is printing a summary of a
pesticide petition received under
section 408 of the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA), 21 U.S.C.
346a, proposing the establishment or
amendment of regulations in 40 CFR
part 180 for residues of pesticide
chemicals in or on various food
commodities. EPA has determined that
this pesticide petition contains data or
information regarding the elements set
forth in FFDCA section 408(d)(2);
however, EPA has not fully evaluated
the sufficiency of the submitted data at
this time or whether the data support
granting of the pesticide petition.
Additional data may be needed before
EPA rules on this pesticide petition.
Pursuant to 40 CFR 180.7(f), a
summary of the petition included in this
notice, prepared by the petitioner is
available on EPA’s Electronic Docket at
https://www.regulations.gov. To locate
this information on the home page of
EPA’s Electronic Docket, select ‘‘Quick
Search’’ and type the OPP docket ID
number. Once the search has located the
docket, clicking on the ‘‘Docket ID’’ will
bring up a list of all documents in the
docket for the pesticide including the
petition summary.
rwilkins on PROD1PC63 with NOTICES
New Exemption from Tolerance
PP 6E7028. Phyton Corporation, 7449
Cahill Road, Edina, MN 55439, proposes
to establish an exemption from the
requirement of a tolerance for residues
of ammonium formate (CAS Reg. No.
540–69–2) in or on all food commodities
when used as an inert ingredient in
pesticide products. Because this petition
is a request for an exemption from the
requirement of a tolerance without
numerical limitations, no analytical
method is required.
VerDate Aug<31>2005
17:21 Apr 20, 2006
Jkt 208001
List of Subjects
Environmental protection,
Agricultural commodities, Feed
additives, Food additives, Pesticides
and pests, Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements.
Dated: April 11, 2006.
Donald R. Stubbs,
Acting Director, Registration Division, Office
of Pesticide Programs.
[FR Doc. E6–6011 Filed 4–20–06; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6560–50–S
Printing, Inc. (BCPI), Portals II, 445 12th
Street, SW., Room CY–B402,
Washington, DC 20554, telephone 202–
488–5300, facsimile 202–488–5563, or
you may contact BCPI at its Web site:
https://www.BCPIWEB.com. When
ordering documents from BCPI please
provide the appropriate FCC document
number, for example, FCC 06–47. The
Auction No. 66 Procedures Public
Notice and related documents are also
available on the Internet at the
Commission’s Web site: https://
wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/66/.
I. General Information
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION
A. Introduction
1. The Federal Communications
[AU Docket No. 06–30; Report No. AUC–
Commission (FCC or Commission)
06–66–B; (Auction No. 66) FCC 06–47]
announces the procedures, minimum
opening bids, and reserve price for the
Auction of Advanced Wireless
Services Licenses Scheduled for June upcoming auction of Advanced Wireless
Services licenses in the 1710–1755 MHz
29, 2006; Notice of Filing
Requirements, Minimum Opening Bids, and 2110–2155 MHz bands (AWS–1)
scheduled for June 29, 2006 (Auction
Upfront Payments and Other
No. 66). On January 31, 2006, in
Procedures for Auction No. 66
accordance with section 309(j)(3) of the
AGENCY: Federal Communications
Communications Act of 1934, as
Commission.
amended, the Wireless
ACTION: Notice.
Telecommunications Bureau (Bureau)
released a public notice seeking
SUMMARY: This document announces the
comment on a reserve price and
procedures and minimum opening bids
minimum opening bid amounts and the
for the upcoming auction of Advanced
procedures to be used in Auction No.
Wireless Services licenses in the 1710–
66. Interested parties submitted 54
1755 MHz and 21102155 MHz bands.
comments and 16 reply comments in
This document is intended to
response to the Auction No. 66
familiarize prospective bidders with the
Comment Public Notice, 71 FR 6486,
procedures, minimum opening bids and
February 8, 2006, as well as a number
reserve price for this auction.
of ex parte or late-filed submissions.
DATES: Auction No. 66 is scheduled to
2. In the Auction No. 66 Comment
begin on June 29, 2006.
Public Notice, the Bureau proposed to
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For
include all 1,122 AWS–1 licenses in a
legal questions: Scott Mackoul at (202)
single auction using the Commission’s
418–0660. For general auction
standard simultaneous multiple-round
questions: Roy Knowles or Lisa Stover
(SMR) auction format. The Bureau
at (717) 338–2888. For service rules
sought comment on the feasibility and
questions: David Hu or John Spencer at
desirability of allocating the AWS–1
(202) 418–0200; Beth Fishel at (717)
licenses among two auctions, run
338–2649.
concurrently, with one of the auctions
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a
using the standard SMR format and the
summary of the Auction No. 66
other using the Commission’s package
Procedures Public Notice released on
bidding format (SMR–PB). Based on the
April 12, 2006. The complete text of the record and the particular circumstances
Auction No. 66 Procedures Public
of the auction of AWS–1 licenses, the
Notice, including attachments and
Commission, will include all 1,122
related Commission documents is
AWS–1 licenses in a single auction
available for public inspection and
using the Commission’s standard SMR
copying from 8 a.m. to 4:30 p.m.
format, as proposed. Package bidding
Monday through Thursday or from 8
will not be used in Auction No. 66.
3. The Bureau also proposed in the
a.m. to 11:30 a.m. on Friday at the FCC
Reference Information Center, Portals II, Auction No. 66 Comment Public Notice
to withhold certain information on
445 12th Street, SW., Room CY–A257,
Washington, DC 20554. The Auction No. bidder interests, bids and bidder
66 Procedures Public Notice and related identities that typically has been
revealed prior to and during past
Commission documents may also be
Commission auctions. The proposal was
purchased from the Commission’s
made in response to analysis suggesting
duplicating contractor, Best Copy and
PO 00000
Frm 00033
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
E:\FR\FM\21APN1.SGM
21APN1
rwilkins on PROD1PC63 with NOTICES
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 77 / Friday, April 21, 2006 / Notices
that under certain circumstances the
competitiveness and economic
efficiency of an SMR auction may be
enhanced if such information is
withheld until after the close of the
auction.
4. Taking into account concerns
raised in the record, the Commission
has decided to modify its proposal.
First, consistent with a suggested
compromise between the proposal and
the Commission’s past practice that was
the subject of extensive comment in the
record, the Commission will withhold
certain information unless it appears
that the auction will be sufficiently
competitive that any anti-competitive
behavior addressed by the original
proposal would be unlikely to be
successful. To gauge the likely level of
competition in this upcoming auction,
the Commission will evaluate the level
of prospective bidders’ bidding
eligibility. Specifically, if all the
bidders’ bidding eligibility, measured in
bidding units (subject to a cap on the
amount of any one bidder’s eligibility)
divided by all licenses in the auction,
measured in bidding units is equal to or
greater than three, the Commission
believes the auction will be sufficiently
competitive. For the purposes of
determining the modified eligibility
ratio, the bidding eligibility of any one
bidder may be no more than 50 percent
of the bidding units of all licenses in the
auction. If the modified eligibility ratio
is three or greater, the likely level of
competition should be sufficient to
make anti-competitive outcomes
difficult to sustain. Second, if the
modified eligibility ratio is less than
three and, therefore, certain information
is withheld, the Commission will follow
the original proposal with two changes:
(1) The Commission will release each
bidder’s eligibility and upfront payment
made prior to the start of the auction;
and (2) the Commission will release all
gross bids for each license (including
the losing bids) after each round, but not
bidder identities. The Commission
believes this compromise provides
bidders with additional information
regarding license valuations without
compromising the proposal’s goal of
reducing the potential for anticompetitive outcomes.
5. Pursuant to these procedures,
license selection information will be
withheld, at least initially. Therefore, to
enable applicants to comply with the
Commission’s anti-collusion rules, each
applicant with a short-form application
to participate in a pending auction will
receive a letter that lists the applicants
in Auction No. 66 that have applied for
licenses in any of the same geographic
areas as the applicant, once the
VerDate Aug<31>2005
17:21 Apr 20, 2006
Jkt 208001
Commission has conducted its initial
review of applications to participate in
Auction No. 66.
6. The Auction No. 66 Comment
Public Notice proposed an aggregate
reserve price of $1,029,534,343.20 for all
AWS–1 licenses in order to implement
a Congressional mandate to recover
estimated relocation costs for
government incumbent operators in the
lower (1710–1755 MHz) AWS–1
spectrum band. Under the Commercial
Spectrum Enhancement Act (CSEA), the
Commission cannot conclude any
auction of statutorily-defined eligible
frequencies if the total cash proceeds
attributable to such spectrum are less
than 110 percent of the total estimated
relocation costs of eligible federal
entities assigned to the frequencies. The
lower half of the frequencies covered by
AWS–1 licenses, 1710–1755 MHz, are
eligible frequencies. Accordingly, the
Commission will cancel the auction if
the winning bids net of applicable
discounts at the end of bidding that are
attributable to such spectrum are less
than 110 percent of the total estimated
relocation costs, or $1,029,534,343.20.
Given that one-half of the frequencies
authorized for use by each license are
CSEA eligible frequencies, one-half of
each winning bid, net of any applicable
bidding credit discounts at the end of
bidding (e.g., exclusive of tribal land
bidding credits), will be counted toward
meeting this reserve price. Therefore,
the winning bids (net of bidding credits)
in the auction must total at least
approximately $2.06 billion in order for
the Commission to conclude the auction
and award the licenses.
i. Background of Proceeding
7. Growth in demand for mobile
wireless services, coupled with the rise
of the Internet and greater broadband
availability, have increased the need for
additional spectrum and advanced
technologies capable of providing
advanced wireless services, including
wireless Internet access and other highspeed information and entertainment
services. Enhancements to current
wireless network technologies, as well
as the development of new technologies,
are continuing to improve and expand
the deployment of wireless broadband.
8. In order to facilitate the rapid
deployment of broadband technologies,
the Commission has allocated spectrum
to meet the demand for advanced
wireless services. In the Second Report
and Order in ET Docket No. 00–258, 66
FR 47618, September 13, 2001, the
Commission allocated the 1710–1755,
2110–2150 and 2150–2155 MHz bands
for AWS–1 and combined these latter
two bands into a single 45-megahertz
PO 00000
Frm 00034
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
20673
allocation (i.e., 2110–2155 MHz). The
Commission subsequently adopted
service rules for AWS in these bands,
including application, licensing,
operating and technical rules.
9. Making this spectrum available
requires relocating incumbent
operations, both Federal Government
(Government) and non-Federal
Government (non-Government).
Relocation of Government operations is
subject to the CSEA. For nonGovernment operations, the
Commission’s Emerging Technologies
proceeding adopted a relocation policy
designed to allow early entry for new
technology providers into reallocated
spectrum by allowing providers of new
services to negotiate financial
arrangements for reaccommodation of
incumbent licensees.
ii. Licenses To Be Auctioned
10. Auction No. 66 will offer 1,122
licenses: 36 Regional Economic Area
Grouping (REAG) licenses, 352
Economic Area (EA) licenses, and 734
Cellular Market Area (CMA) licenses. A
complete list of the AWS–1 licenses
available in Auction No. 66 can be
found in Attachment A of Auction No.
66 Procedures Public Notice.
B. Rules and Disclaimers
i. Relevant Authority
11. Prospective applicants must
familiarize themselves thoroughly with
the Commission’s general competitive
bidding rules set forth in Title 47, part
1, of the Code of Federal Regulations,
including recent amendments and
clarifications; rules relating to the
Advanced Wireless Services and
emerging technologies contained in
Title 47, parts 27 and 101, of the Code
of Federal Regulations; and rules
relating to applications, practice and
procedure contained in Title 47, part 1,
of the Code of Federal Regulations.
Prospective applicants must also be
thoroughly familiar with the
procedures, terms and conditions
contained in the Auction No. 66
Procedures Public Notice and the
Commission’s decisions in proceedings
regarding competitive bidding
procedures, application requirements,
and obligations of Commission
licensees.
12. The terms contained in the
Commission’s rules, relevant orders,
and public notices are not negotiable.
The Commission may amend or
supplement the information contained
in its public notices at any time, and
will issue public notices to convey any
new or supplemental information to
applicants. It is the responsibility of all
E:\FR\FM\21APN1.SGM
21APN1
20674
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 77 / Friday, April 21, 2006 / Notices
rwilkins on PROD1PC63 with NOTICES
applicants to remain current with all
Commission rules and with all public
notices pertaining to this auction.
ii. Prohibition of Collusion; Compliance
With Antitrust Laws
13. To ensure the competitiveness of
the auction process, § 1.2105(c) of the
Commission’s rules prohibit applicants
competing for licenses in any of the
same geographic license areas from
communicating with each other about
bids, bidding strategies, or settlements
unless such applicants have identified
each other on their short-form
applications (FCC Forms 175) as parties
with whom they have entered into
agreements pursuant to
§ 1.2105(a)(2)(viii). In Auction No. 66,
the rule would apply to any applicants
bidding for the same CMA, EA, or
REAG. The rule would also apply to
applicants bidding for licenses in
overlapping CMAs, EAs, and REAGs. In
addition, the rule would preclude
applicants that apply to bid for all
markets from communicating with all
other applicants. Applicants that have
applied for the same markets (unless
they have identified each other on their
FCC Form 175 applications as parties
with whom they have entered into
agreements under § 1.2105(a)(2)(viii))
must affirmatively avoid all
communications with or disclosures to
each other that affect or have the
potential to affect bids or bidding
strategy, which may include
communications regarding the postauction market structure. This
prohibition begins at the short-form
application filing deadline and ends at
the down payment deadline after the
auction. This prohibition applies to all
applicants regardless of whether such
applicants become qualified bidders or
actually bid.
14. For purposes of this prohibition,
§ 1.2105(c)(7)(i) defines applicant as
including all officers and directors of
the entity submitting a short-form
application to participate in the auction,
all controlling interests of that entity, as
well as all holders of partnership and
other ownership interests and any stock
interest amounting to 10 percent or
more of the entity, or outstanding stock,
or outstanding voting stock of the entity
submitting a short-form application.
15. Applicants for licenses for any of
the same geographic license areas must
not communicate directly or indirectly
about bids or bidding strategy.
Accordingly, such applicants are
encouraged not to use the same
individual as an authorized bidder. A
violation of the anti-collusion rule could
occur if an individual acts as the
authorized bidder for two or more
VerDate Aug<31>2005
17:21 Apr 20, 2006
Jkt 208001
applicants, and conveys information
concerning the substance of bids or
bidding strategies between such
applicants. Also, if the authorized
bidders are different individuals
employed by the same organization
(e.g., law firm or engineering firm or
consulting firm), a violation similarly
could occur. In such a case, at a
minimum, applicants should certify on
their applications that precautionary
steps have been taken to prevent
communication between authorized
bidders and that applicants and their
bidding agents will comply with the
anti-collusion rule. Auction participants
are hereby placed on notice that public
disclosure of information on bidder
interests, bids and bidder identities that
typically has been revealed prior to and
during past Commission auctions may
violate the anti-collusion rule. Bidders
should use caution in their dealings
with other parties, such as members of
the press, financial analysts, or others
who might become a conduit for the
communication of prohibited bidding
information.
16. The Commission’s rules do not
prohibit applicants from entering into
otherwise lawful bidding agreements
before filing their short-form
applications, as long as they disclose the
existence of the agreement(s) in their
short-form application. If parties agree
in principle on all material terms prior
to the short-form filing deadline, each
party to the agreement must identify the
other party or parties to the agreement
on its short-form application under
§ 1.2105(c), even if the agreement has
not been reduced to writing. If the
parties have not agreed in principle by
the short-form filing deadline, they
should not include the names of parties
to discussions on their applications, and
they may not continue negotiations,
discussions or communications with
any other applicants after the short-form
filing deadline. By electronically
submitting its short-form application,
each applicant certifies its compliance
with § 1.2105(c). Any applicant found to
have violated the anti-collusion rule
may be subject to sanctions.
17. By electronically submitting its
short-form application, each applicant
certified its compliance with
§ 1.2105(c). However, the Commission
cautions that merely filing a certifying
statement as part of an application will
not outweigh specific evidence that
collusive behavior has occurred, nor
will it preclude the initiation of an
investigation when warranted. Any
applicant found to have violated the
anti-collusion rule may be subject to
sanctions.
PO 00000
Frm 00035
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
18. Applicants are also reminded that,
regardless of compliance with the
Commission’s rules, they remain subject
to the antitrust laws, which are designed
to prevent anticompetitive behavior in
the marketplace. Compliance with the
disclosure requirements of the
Commission’s anti-collusion rule will
not insulate a party from enforcement of
the antitrust laws. To the extent the
Commission becomes aware of specific
allegations that may give rise to
violations of the federal antitrust laws
the Commission may refer such
allegations to the United States
Department of Justice for investigation.
If an applicant is found to have violated
the antitrust laws or the Commission’s
rules in connection with its
participation in the competitive bidding
process, it may be subject to forfeiture
of its upfront payment, down payment,
or full bid amount and may be
prohibited from participating in future
auctions, among other sanctions.
19. Section 1.65 of the Commission’s
rules requires an applicant to maintain
the accuracy and completeness of
information furnished in its pending
application and to notify the
Commission within 30 days of any
substantial change that may be of
decisional significance to that
application. Applicants are therefore
required by § 1.65 to report to the
Commission any communications they
have made to or received from another
applicant after the short-form filing
deadline that affect or have the potential
to affect bids or bidding strategy unless
such communications are made to or
received from parties to agreements
identified under § 1.2105(a)(2)(viii).
20. Applicants that are winning
bidders will be required to disclose in
their long-form applications the specific
terms, conditions, and parties involved
in all bidding consortia, joint ventures,
partnerships, and other arrangements
entered into relating to the competitive
bidding process.
21. A summary listing of documents
issued by the Commission and the
Bureau addressing the application of the
anti-collusion rule may be found in
Attachment G of the Auction No. 66
Procedures Public Notice.
iii. Incumbency Issues
22. The AWS–1 bands are now being
used for a variety of Government and
non-Government services. The 1710–
1755 MHz band is currently a
Government band. The 2110–2150 MHz
band is used by private (including state
and local governmental public safety
services) and common carrier fixed
microwave services. The 2150–2155
E:\FR\FM\21APN1.SGM
21APN1
rwilkins on PROD1PC63 with NOTICES
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 77 / Friday, April 21, 2006 / Notices
MHz band is currently used by the
Broadband Radio Service (BRS).
23. Relocation of Government
Incumbents; Spectrum Relocation Fund.
The 1710–1755 MHz spectrum is
covered by a Congressional mandate
that requires that auction proceeds fund
the estimated relocation costs of
incumbent Federal entities. Specifically,
the CSEA established a Spectrum
Relocation Fund (SRF), to which the
cash proceeds attributable to eligible
frequencies in the AWS–1 license
auction will be deposited.
24. CSEA also prohibits the
Commission from concluding any
auction of eligible frequencies if the
total cash proceeds attributable to such
spectrum are less than 110 percent of
the estimated relocation costs provided
to the Commission by the National
Telecommunications and Information
Administration (NTIA). NTIA has
collected estimates of the relocation
costs for the eligible frequencies in the
AWS–1 band. On December 27, 2005,
pursuant to CSEA, NTIA notified the
Commission of the estimated relocation
costs and timelines for relocation of
eligible Federal entities assigned to
frequencies from 1710 to 1755 MHz.
NTIA reported that the total estimated
relocation costs equal $935,940,312.
25. Relocation of Non-Government
Incumbents. The Commission is in the
process of determining how to apply the
policies adopted in the Emerging
Technologies proceeding to the
relocation of incumbent fixed
microwave and BRS licensees in the
2110–2150 and 2150–2155 MHz bands,
respectively. In the Fifth Notice of
Proposed Rule Making (AWS Fifth
Notice) in ET Docket No. 00–258, 70 FR
61752, October 26, 2005, the
Commission is seeking comment on the
specific relocation and cost-sharing
procedures applicable to BRS operations
in the 2150–2160/62 MHz band, which
the Commission recently decided will
be relocated to the newly restructured
2495–2690 MHz band. In the AWS Fifth
Notice, the Commission is also seeking
comment on cost-sharing obligations
and procedures associated with
relocation obligations for the 2110–2155
MHz band. In doing so, the AWS Fifth
Notice also referenced an earlier request
by the Commission for comments on the
appropriate procedures for apportioning
relocation costs among multiple AWS
licensees in the 2110–2150 MHz band.
The Commission is also currently
considering petitions for
reconsideration that raise issues
concerning the conditions under which
the 2495–2500 MHz band would be
available to BRS and the suitability of
that spectrum for BRS operations.
VerDate Aug<31>2005
17:21 Apr 20, 2006
Jkt 208001
iv. Protection of Incumbent Government
and Non-Government Operations
26. AWS licensees must comply with
the technical and operational rules set
forth in 47 CFR 27.50–27.66 and
27.1131–27.1135. The latter set of rules
describes the procedures AWS licensees
must follow to protect co-channel and
adjacent channel incumbent
Government and non-Government
operations from interference.
27. The 1710–1755 MHz band.
According to NTIA, this spectrum is
used by the Federal Government for
both military and non-military
operations. Sixteen Department of
Defense (DOD) facilities in the country
are classified as protected facilities, and
various types of systems operate at these
locations. AWS licensees must protect
systems operating at these facilities from
interference until such systems are
relocated to other spectrum. These
restrictions shall apply until such time
as the relocation of the Federal systems
has been completed, and indefinitely in
the case of systems at the Yuma,
Arizona, and Cherry Point, North
Carolina, locations. Furthermore, AWS
licensees will be required to accept any
interference received from operations at
the 16 facilities. Such interference could
occur at large distances outside the
facilities’ operating radii due to airborne
operations within the radii.
28. The CSEA permits the
Commission to grant commercial
licenses in these bands prior to
relocation of Federal government
operations and the termination of a
Federal entity’s authorization. Until
such time as the Government licensees
have relocated to other spectrum, or
NTIA de-authorizes an operation
pursuant to CSEA, AWS operators shall
be required to protect non-DOD
Government systems operating in the
1710–1755 and 1755–1761 MHz bands
in accordance with the provisions set
forth in § 27.1134(b) of the
Commission’s rules.
29. AWS licensees operating fixed
stations in the 1710–1755 MHz band, if
notified that such stations are causing
interference to radiosonde receivers
operating in the Meteorological Aids
Service in the 1675’1700 MHz band or
meteorological-satellite earth receivers
operating in the Meteorological-Satellite
Service in the 1675–1710 MHz band,
shall be required to modify the stations’
location and/or technical parameters as
necessary to eliminate the interference.
30. The 2110–2155 MHz Band. Fixed
point-to-point microwave systems
authorized under part 101 of the
Commission’s rules will maintain
primary status in the 2110–2150 MHz
PO 00000
Frm 00036
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
20675
band unless and until an AWS or other
emerging technology licensee requires
use of the spectrum. AWS licensees are
required, prior to initiating operations
from any base or fixed station, to
coordinate their frequency usage with
co-channel and adjacent channel
incumbent part 101 fixed-point-to-point
microwave licensees operating in the
2110–2150 MHz band. Similarly, BRS
operations in the 2150–2160/62 MHz
band will be relocated to other
spectrum. Until that occurs, AWS
licensees, prior to initiating operations
from any base or fixed station, must
coordinate their frequency usage with
co-channel and adjacent channel
incumbent BRS licensees operating in
the 2150–2160 MHz band.
31. AWS licensees operating in the
2110–2155 MHz band must protect
previously licensed Broadcast Auxiliary
Service (BAS) and Cable Television
Radio Service (CARS) operations in the
adjacent 2025–2110 MHz band. In
satisfying this requirement AWS
licensees must, before constructing and
operating any base or fixed station,
determine the location and licensee of
all BAS or CARS stations authorized in
their area of operation, and coordinate
their planned stations with those
licensees.
32. The National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA) operates
the Deep Space Network (DSN) in the
2110–2120 MHz band at Goldstone,
California. NASA will continue its
operations of high power transmitters
(nominal EIRP of 105.5 dBW with EIRP
up to 119.5 dBW used under emergency
conditions) in this band at this location.
AWS licensees must accept any
interference received from the
Goldstone DSN facility in this band.
a. International Coordination
33. Operations in the 1710–1755 and
2110–2155 MHz bands must not cause
harmful interference across the borders
with Mexico and Canada. Until such
time as agreements between the United
States, Mexico and Canada become
effective, the same technical restrictions
at the border that are adopted for
operation between geographic service
areas will apply, to the extent they are
not in violation of current bilateral
agreements and arrangements. When
interim arrangements or agreements
between the United States, Mexico and
Canada are final and become effective,
licensees in the 1710–1755 and 2110–
2155 MHz bands must comply with
these agreements. In addition, if these
agreements are modified in the future,
licensees in the 1710–1755 and 2110–
2155 MHz bands must comply with
these modifications.
E:\FR\FM\21APN1.SGM
21APN1
20676
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 77 / Friday, April 21, 2006 / Notices
b. Quiet Zones
34. Advanced Wireless Services
licensees must protect the radio quiet
zones set forth in the Commission’s
rules. Licensees are cautioned that they
must receive the appropriate approvals
directly from the relevant quiet zone
entity prior to operating within the areas
described in the Commission’s rules.
rwilkins on PROD1PC63 with NOTICES
v. Due Diligence
35. The Commission cautions
potential applicants formulating their
bidding strategies to investigate and
consider the extent to which AWS
frequencies are occupied. Operations in
the AWS–1 bands must be protected
and/or relocated to available frequencies
typically in higher bands or to other
media. These limitations may restrict
the ability of AWS geographic area
licensees to use certain portions of the
electromagnetic spectrum or provide
service to certain areas in their
geographic license areas. Bidders should
become familiar with the status of these
operations and relocation requirements,
and applicable Commission rules,
orders and any pending proceedings
related to the service, in order to make
reasoned, appropriate decisions about
their participation in Auction No. 66
and their bidding strategy.
36. Potential bidders are reminded
that they are solely responsible for
investigating and evaluating all
technical and marketplace factors that
may have a bearing on the value of the
AWS–1 licenses in this auction. The
FCC makes no representations or
warranties about the use of this
spectrum for particular services.
Applicants should be aware that an FCC
auction represents an opportunity to
become an FCC licensee in the
Advanced Wireless Services subject to
certain conditions and regulations. An
FCC auction does not constitute an
endorsement by the FCC of any
particular service, technology, or
product, nor does an FCC license
constitute a guarantee of business
success. Applicants should perform
their individual due diligence before
proceeding as they would with any new
business venture.
37. Potential bidders are strongly
encouraged to conduct their own
research prior to the beginning of
bidding in Auction No. 66 in order to
determine the existence of any pending
administrative or judicial proceedings
that might affect their decision
regarding participation in the auction.
Participants in Auction No. 66 are
strongly encouraged to continue such
research throughout the auction. In
addition, potential bidders should
VerDate Aug<31>2005
17:21 Apr 20, 2006
Jkt 208001
perform technical analyses sufficient to
assure themselves that, should they
prevail in competitive bidding for a
specific license, they will be able to
build and operate facilities that will
fully comply with the Commission’s
technical and legal requirements.
38. Applicants should also be aware
that certain pending and future
proceedings, including applications
(including those for modification),
petitions for rulemaking, requests for
special temporary authority, waiver
requests, petitions to deny, petitions for
reconsideration, informal oppositions,
and applications for review, before the
Commission may relate to particular
applicants or incumbent licensees or the
licenses available in Auction No. 66. In
addition, pending and future judicial
proceedings may relate to particular
applicants or incumbent licensees, or
the licenses available in Auction No. 66.
Prospective bidders are responsible for
assessing the likelihood of the various
possible outcomes, and considering
their potential impact on spectrum
licenses available in this auction.
39. Applicants should perform due
diligence to identify and consider all
proceedings that may affect the
spectrum licenses being auctioned and
that could have an impact on the
availability of spectrum for Auction No.
66. In addition, although the
Commission may continue to act on
various pending applications, informal
objections, petitions, and other requests
for Commission relief, some of these
matters may not be resolved by the time
of the auction.
40. Applicants are solely responsible
for identifying associated risks and for
investigating and evaluating the degree
to which such matters may affect their
ability to bid on, otherwise acquire, or
make use of licenses available in
Auction No. 66.
41. Applicants may obtain
information about non-Federal
Government incumbent licenses that
may have an effect on availability of
licenses in Auction No. 66 through the
Commission’s licensing databases on
the World Wide Web.
42. To further assist potential bidders
in determining the scope of the new
AWS entrants’ relocation obligations in
the 2150–2155 MHz band, the
Commission ordered BRS licensees in
the 2150–2160/62 MHz band to submit
information on the locations and
operating characteristics of BRS systems
in that band. Each application will need
to be viewed to determine if it is a BRS
Channel 1, 2/ 2A Notification.
43. The Commission makes no
representations or guarantees regarding
the accuracy or completeness of
PO 00000
Frm 00037
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
information in its databases or any third
party databases. The Commission’s
databases may not include all
information deemed necessary or
desirable by an applicant, applicants
may obtain or verify such information
from independent sources or assume the
risk of any incompleteness or
inaccuracy in said databases.
Furthermore, the Commission makes no
representations or guarantees regarding
the accuracy or completeness of
information that has been provided by
incumbent licensees and incorporated
into its databases.
44. Potential applicants are strongly
encouraged to physically inspect any
prospective sites located in, or near, the
service area for which they plan to bid,
and also to familiarize themselves with
the environmental assessment
obligations.
vi. Use of Integrated Spectrum Auction
System
45. The Commission will make
available a browser-based bidding
system to allow bidders to participate in
Auction No. 66 over the Internet using
the Commission’s Integrated Spectrum
Auction System (ISAS or FCC Auction
System). The Commission makes no
warranty whatsoever with respect to the
FCC Auction System. In no event shall
the Commission, or any of its officers,
employees or agents, be liable for any
damages whatsoever (including, but not
limited to, loss of business profits,
business interruption, loss of business
information, or any other loss) arising
out of or relating to the existence,
furnishing, functioning or use of the
FCC Auction System that is accessible
to bidders in connection with this
auction. Moreover, no obligation or
liability will arise out of the
Commission’s technical, programming
or other advice or service provided in
connection with the FCC Auction
System.
vii. Bidder Alerts
46. As is the case with many business
investment opportunities, some
unscrupulous entrepreneurs may
attempt to use Auction No. 66 to
deceive and defraud unsuspecting
investors. Information about deceptive
telemarketing investment schemes is
available from the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) and from the
Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC).
viii. National Environmental Policy Act
Requirements
47. Licensees must comply with the
Commission’s rules regarding
implementation of the National
E:\FR\FM\21APN1.SGM
21APN1
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 77 / Friday, April 21, 2006 / Notices
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). The
construction of a wireless antenna
facility is a federal action and the
licensee must comply with the
Commission’s NEPA rules for each such
facility. The Commission’s NEPA rules
require, among other things, that the
licensee consult with expert agencies
having NEPA responsibilities, including
the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, the
State Historic Preservation Office, the
Army Corps of Engineers and the
Federal Emergency Management
Agency. In assessing the effect of
facilities construction on historic
properties, the licensee must follow the
provisions of the Nationwide
Programmatic Agreement Regarding the
Section 106 National Historic
Preservation Act Review Process.
C. Auction Specifics
i. Auction Date
48. Bidding in Auction No. 66 will
begin on Thursday, June 29, 2006, as
announced in the Auction No. 66
Comment Public Notice. The initial
schedule for bidding will be announced
by public notice at least one week before
the start of the auction.
49. Several commenters addressed the
date on which bidding in Auction No.
66 will commence. Generally,
commenters expressed support for
commencing the auction on June 29,
2006. A few commenters, however,
expressed concern about the start date.
50. The Commission does not find
sufficient cause to delay the start of
Auction No. 66, and therefore, will
commence the competitive bidding as
scheduled, i.e., on June 29, 2006. The
Commission agrees with the majority of
the parties who commented on this
issue that it is in the public interest to
make AWS spectrum available as soon
as it is both reasonable and consistent
with CSEA. Therefore, the concerns
raised by some about time needed to
prepare for package bidding are moot.
The Commission has decided to proceed
with standard, single SMR auction for
the AWS–1 licenses.
51. Unless otherwise announced,
bidding on all licenses will be
conducted on each business day until
bidding has stopped on all licenses.
ii. Auction Title
rwilkins on PROD1PC63 with NOTICES
52. Auction No. 66—Advanced
Wireless Services (AWS–1)
iii. Bidding Methodology
53. The bidding methodology for
Auction No. 66 will be simultaneous
multiple round bidding. The
Commission will conduct this auction
over the Internet using the FCC Auction
VerDate Aug<31>2005
17:21 Apr 20, 2006
Jkt 208001
System, and telephonic bidding will be
available as well. Qualified bidders are
permitted to bid electronically via the
Internet or by telephone.
iv. Pre-Auction Dates and Deadlines
54. Dates and Deadlines:
Auction Seminar: April 24, 2006.
Short-Form Application (FCC Form
175) Filing Window Opens: April 24,
2006; 12 p.m. ET.
Short-Form Application (FCC Form
175) Filing Window Deadline: May 10,
2006; 6 p.m. ET.
Upfront Payments (via wire transfer):
June 1, 2006; 6 p.m. ET.
Mock Auction: June 26, 2006.
Auction Begins: June 29, 2006.
v. Requirements for Participation
55. Those wishing to participate in
the auction must: (a) Submit a shortform application (FCC Form 175)
electronically prior to 6 p.m. Eastern
Time (ET), May 10, 2006, following the
electronic filing procedures set forth in
Attachment D of the Auction No. 66
Procedures Public Notice; (b) submit a
sufficient upfront payment and an FCC
Remittance Advice Form (FCC Form
159) before 6 p.m. ET, June 1, 2006; and
(c) comply with all provisions outlined
in this Public Notice and applicable
Commission rules.
vi. General Contact Information
56. See Auction No. 66 Procedures
Public Notice for General Contract
information table.
II. Short-Form Application (FCC Form
175) Requirements
57. An application to participate in an
FCC auction, referred to as a short-form
application or FCC Form 175, provides
information used in determining
whether the applicant is legally,
technically, and financially qualified to
participate in Commission auctions for
licenses or permits.
58. Entities seeking licenses available
in Auction No. 66 must file a short-form
application electronically via the FCC
Auction System before 6 p.m. ET on
May 10, 2006, following the procedures
prescribed in Attachment D of the
Auction No. 66 Procedures Public
Notice. If an applicant claims eligibility
for a bidding credit, the information
provided in its FCC Form 175 will be
used in determining whether the
applicant is eligible for the claimed
bidding credit. Applicants bear full
responsibility for submitting accurate,
complete and timely short-form
applications. All applicants must certify
on their short-form applications under
penalty of perjury that they are legally,
technically, financially and otherwise
qualified to hold a license.
PO 00000
Frm 00038
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
20677
59. An entity may not submit more
than one short-form application for a
single auction. In the event that a party
submits multiple short-form
applications, only one application will
be accepted for filing. Applicants also
should note that submission of a shortform application constitutes a
representation by the certifying official
that he or she is an authorized
representative of the applicant, that he
or she has read the form’s instructions
and certifications, and that the contents
of the application, its certifications, and
any attachments are true and correct.
Submission of a false certification to the
Commission may result in penalties,
including monetary forfeitures, license
forfeitures, ineligibility to participate in
future auctions, and/or criminal
prosecution.
A. Preferences for Small Businesses and
Others
i. Size Standards for Bidding Credits
60. A bidding credit represents the
amount by which a bidder’s winning
bid will be discounted. For Auction No.
66, bidding credits will be available to
small businesses and very small
businesses, and consortia thereof, as
follows: (1) A bidder with attributed
average annual gross revenues that
exceed $15 million and do not exceed
$40 million for the preceding three
years (small business) will receive a 15
percent discount on its winning bid; (2)
a bidder with attributed average annual
gross revenues that do not exceed $15
million for the preceding three years
(very small business) will receive a 25
percent discount on its winning bid.
61. Bidding credits are not
cumulative; a qualifying applicant
receives either the 15 percent or 25
percent bidding credit on its winning
bid, but not both.
62. Every applicant that claims
eligibility for a bidding credit as either
a small business or a very small
business, or a consortium of small
businesses or very small businesses,
will be required to provide information
regarding revenues attributable to the
applicant, its affiliates, its controlling
interests, and the affiliates of its
controlling interests on its FCC Form
175 short-form application to establish
that it satisfies the applicable eligibility
requirement. Applicants considering
claiming eligibility as a designated
entity in Auction No. 66 should review
carefully the recently released CSEA/
Part 1 Designated Entity FNPRM, 71 FR
6992, February 10, 2006. Applicants
considering claiming eligibility as a
designated entity in Auction No. 66
should monitor further proceedings
E:\FR\FM\21APN1.SGM
21APN1
20678
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 77 / Friday, April 21, 2006 / Notices
pursuant to the CSEA/Part 1 Designated
Entity FNPRM to assure their ability to
comply with any changes to the
designated entity rules that the
Commission may adopt that are
applicable to applicants in Auction No.
66.
ii. Tribal Lands Bidding Credit
63. To encourage the growth of
wireless services in federally recognized
tribal lands the Commission has
implemented a tribal land bidding
credit. The Commission will award pro
rata tribal lands bidding credits in the
event that the sum of all net winning
bids at the close of bidding, exclusive of
tribal lands bidding credits, is not
sufficient funds both to meet the reserve
price and to award all eligible
applicants full tribal lands bidding
credits.
iii. Installment Payments
64. Installment payment plans will
not be available in Auction No. 66.
rwilkins on PROD1PC63 with NOTICES
B. License Selection
65. In Auction No. 66, applicants
must select the licenses on which they
want to bid from the Eligible Licenses
list. In Auction No. 66, FCC Form 175
will include a filtering mechanism that
allows an applicant to filter the
available licenses. The applicant will
make selections for one or more of the
filter criteria and the system will
produce a list of licenses satisfying the
specified criteria. The applicant may
select all the licenses in the customized
list or select individual licenses from
the list. Applicants also will be able to
select licenses from one customized list
and then create additional customized
lists to select additional licenses. There
will be no opportunity to change license
selection after the short-form filing
deadline. It is critically important that
an applicant confirm its license
selections before submitting its shortform application because the FCC
Auction System will not accept bids on
licenses that an applicant has not
selected on its FCC Form 175.
C. Disclosure of Bidding Arrangements
66. Applicants will be required to
identify in their short-form applications
all parties with whom they have entered
into any agreements, arrangements, or
understandings of any kind relating to
the licenses being auctioned, including
any agreements relating to post-auction
market structure. Applicants also will
be required to certify under penalty of
perjury in their short-form applications
that they have not entered and will not
enter into any explicit or implicit
agreements, arrangements or
VerDate Aug<31>2005
17:21 Apr 20, 2006
Jkt 208001
understandings of any kind with any
parties, other than those identified in
the application, regarding the amount of
their bids, bidding strategies, or the
particular licenses on which they will or
will not bid. If an applicant has had
discussions, but has not reached a joint
bidding agreement by the short-form
application filing deadline, it would not
include the names of parties to the
discussions on its application and may
not continue such discussions with any
applicants after the deadline.
67. After the filing of short-form
applications, the Commission’s rules do
not prohibit a party holding a noncontrolling, attributable interest in one
applicant from acquiring an ownership
interest in or entering into a joint
bidding arrangement with other
applicants provided that (i) the
attributable interest holder certifies that
it has not and will not communicate
with any party concerning the bids or
bidding strategies of more than one of
the applicants in which it holds an
attributable interest, or with which it
has entered into a joint bidding
arrangement; and (ii) the arrangements
do not result in a change in control of
any of the applicants. While the anticollusion rules do not prohibit nonauction related business negotiations
among auction applicants, applicants
are reminded that certain discussions or
exchanges could touch upon
impermissible subject matters because
they may convey pricing information
and bidding strategies. Further, as
discussed above, compliance with the
disclosure requirements of the
Commission’s anti-collusion rule will
not insulate a party from enforcement of
the antitrust laws.
D. Ownership Disclosure Requirements
68. All applicants must comply with
the uniform Part 1 ownership disclosure
standards and provide information
required by §§ 1.2105 and 1.2112 of the
Commission’s rules. Specifically, in
completing the short-form application,
applicants will be required to fully
disclose information on the real party or
parties-in-interest and ownership
structure of the applicant.
69. Applicants considering claiming
eligibility as a designated entity in
Auction No. 66 should review carefully
and monitor the recently initiated
rulemaking proceeding concerning the
Commission’s designated entity rules.
The Commission also sought comment
on whether to restrict the award of
designated entity benefits where an
otherwise qualified designated entity
has a material relationship with a large
entity that has a significant interest in
communications services. The
PO 00000
Frm 00039
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
Commission stated that it intended any
changes adopted in this proceeding to
apply to AWS licenses to be offered in
Auction No. 66. Depending upon the
outcome of that proceeding, applicants
may be required to disclose additional
ownership information in order to
comply with any changes to the
designated entity rules that the
Commission may adopt that are
applicable to applicants in Auction No.
66.
70. Applicants are responsible for
ensuring that the information submitted
in their Form 175 for Auction No. 66 is
complete and accurate. Accordingly,
applicants should carefully review any
information automatically entered to
confirm that it is complete and accurate
as of the deadline for filing the shortform application. Applicants can update
any information that was entered
automatically and needs to be changed
directly in the short-form application.
E. Bidding Credit Revenue Disclosures
71. To determine which applicants
qualify for bidding credits as small
businesses or very small businesses, the
Commission considers the gross
revenues of the applicant, its affiliates,
its controlling interests, and the
affiliates of its controlling interests.
Therefore, entities applying to bid as
small businesses or very small
businesses (or consortia of small
businesses or very small businesses)
will be required to disclose on their FCC
Form 175 short-form applications the
gross revenues of each of the following
for the preceding three years: (1) The
applicant, (2) its affiliates, (3) its
controlling interests, and (4) the
affiliates of its controlling interests. In
order to comply with the Commission’s
disclosure requirements for bidding
credit eligibility, an applicant must
provide separately for itself, its
affiliates, its controlling interests, and
the affiliates of its controlling interests,
the gross revenues for each of the
preceding three years. If the applicant is
applying as a consortium of small
businesses or very small businesses, this
information must be provided for each
consortium member.
72. Applicants considering claiming
eligibility as a designated entity in
Auction No. 66 should review carefully
the recently released CSEA/Part 1
Designated Entity FNPRM. Depending
upon the outcome of that proceeding,
applicants may be required to disclose
additional information regarding gross
revenues of related parties in order to
comply with any changes to the
designated entity rules that the
Commission may adopt that are
E:\FR\FM\21APN1.SGM
21APN1
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 77 / Friday, April 21, 2006 / Notices
rwilkins on PROD1PC63 with NOTICES
applicable to applicants in Auction No.
66.
73. Controlling interests of an
applicant include individuals and
entities with either de facto or de jure
control of the applicant. Typically,
ownership of at least 50.1 percent of an
entity’s voting stock evidences de jure
control. De facto control is determined
on a case-by-case basis.
74. Officers and directors of an
applicant are also considered to have
controlling interest in the applicant.
Once the principals or entities with a
controlling interest are determined, only
the revenues of those principals or
entities, the affiliates of those principals
or entities, and the applicant and its
affiliates will be counted in determining
small business eligibility.
75. Each member of a consortium of
small or very small businesses that
applies to participate in Auction No. 66
must individually meet the definition of
small business or very small business
adopted by the Commission for the
Advanced Wireless Services. Each
consortium member must disclose its
gross revenues along with those of its
affiliates, its controlling interests, and
the affiliates of its controlling interests.
Although the gross revenues of the
consortium members will not be
aggregated for purposes of determining
the consortium’s eligibility as a small
business or very small business, this
information must be provided to ensure
that each individual consortium
member qualifies for any bidding credit
awarded to the consortium.
F. Provisions Regarding Former and
Current Defaulters
76. Each applicant must state under
penalty of perjury on its short-form
application whether or not the
applicant, its affiliates, its controlling
interests, and the affiliates of its
controlling interests, as defined by
§ 1.2110, have ever been in default on
any Commission licenses or have ever
been delinquent on any non-tax debt
owed to any Federal agency. In
addition, each applicant must certify
under penalty of perjury on its shortform application that as of the shortform filing deadline, the applicant, its
affiliates, its controlling interests, and
the affiliates of its controlling interests,
as defined by § 1.2110, are not in default
on any payment for Commission
licenses (including down payments) and
that they are not delinquent on any nontax debt owed to any Federal agency.
Prospective applicants are reminded
that submission of a false certification to
the Commission is a serious matter that
may result in severe penalties, including
monetary forfeitures, license
VerDate Aug<31>2005
17:21 Apr 20, 2006
Jkt 208001
revocations, exclusion from
participation in future auctions, and/or
criminal prosecution.
77. Former defaulters, i.e., applicants,
including any of their affiliates, any of
their controlling interests, or any of the
affiliates of its controlling interests, that
in the past have defaulted on any
Commission licenses or been delinquent
on any non-tax debt owed to any
Federal agency, but that have since
remedied all such defaults and cured all
of their outstanding non-tax
delinquencies—are eligible to bid in
Auction No. 66, provided that they are
otherwise qualified.
78. Current defaulters, i.e., applicants,
including any of their affiliates, any of
their controlling interests, or any of the
affiliates of their controlling interests,
that are in default on any payment for
any Commission licenses (including
down payments) or are delinquent on
any non-tax debt owed to any Federal
agency as of the filing deadline for
applications to participate in this
auction—are not eligible to bid in
Auction No. 66.
79. Applicants are encouraged to
review the Commission’s previous
guidance on default and delinquency
disclosure requirements in the context
of the short-form application process.
Therefore, with respect to regulatory or
application fees, the provisions of
§§ 1.2105(a) and 1.2106(a) regarding
default and delinquency in connection
with competitive bidding are limited to
circumstances in which the relevant
party has not complied with a final
Commission payment deadline.
80. The Commission considers
outstanding debts owed to the United
States Government, in any amount, to be
a serious matter. The Commission
adopted rules, including a provision
referred to as the red light rule, that
implement the Commission’s
obligations under the Debt Collection
Improvement Act of 1996, which
governs the collection of claims owed to
the United States. Under the red light
rule, the Commission will not process
applications and other requests for
benefits filed by parties that have
outstanding debts owed to the
Commission. In the same rulemaking
order, the Commission explicitly
declared, however, that the
Commission’s competitive bidding rules
are not affected by the red light rule. As
a consequence, the Commission’s
adoption of the red light rule does not
alter the applicability of any of the
Commission’s competitive bidding
rules, including the provisions and
certifications of §§ 1.2105 and 1.2106,
with regard to current and former
defaults or delinquencies. Applicants
PO 00000
Frm 00040
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
20679
are reminded, however, that the
Commission’s Red Light Display
System, which provides information
regarding debts owed to the
Commission, may not be determinative
of an auction applicant’s ability to
comply with the default and
delinquency disclosure requirements of
§ 1.2105. Thus, while the red light rule
ultimately may prevent the processing
of long-form applications by auction
winners, an auction applicant’s red light
status is not necessarily determinative
of its eligibility to participate in this
auction or of its upfront payment
obligation.
81. Prospective applicants in Auction
No. 66 should note that any long-form
applications filed after the close of
competitive bidding will be reviewed
for compliance with the Commission’s
red light rule, and such review may
result in the dismissal of a winning
bidder’s long-form application.
G. Other Information
82. Applicants owned by member of
minority groups and/or women, as
defined in § 1.2110(c)(3), may identify
themselves in filling out their shortform applications regarding this status.
This applicant status information is
collected for statistical purposes only
and assists the Commission in
monitoring the participation of
designated entities in its auctions.
H. Minor Modifications to Short-Form
Applications (FCC Form 175)
83. After the deadline for filing shortform applications (FCC Forms 175) at 6
p.m. ET on May 10, 2006, applicants are
permitted to make only minor changes
to their applications. Applicants are not
permitted to make major modifications
to their applications (e.g., change their
license selections, change control of the
applicant, or claim eligibility for a
higher bidding credit).
84. Any application amendment and
related statements of fact must be
certified by: (1) The applicant, if the
applicant is an individual, (2) one of the
partners if the applicant is a
partnership, (3) an officer, director, or
duly authorized employee, if the
applicant is a corporation, (4) by a
member who is an officer, if the
applicant is an unincorporated
association, (5) the trustee if the
applicant is an amateur radio service
club, or (6) a duly elected or appointed
official who is authorized to make such
certifications under the laws of the
applicable jurisdiction, if the applicant
is a governmental entity.
85. An applicant must make
permissible minor changes to its shortform application as such changes are
E:\FR\FM\21APN1.SGM
21APN1
20680
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 77 / Friday, April 21, 2006 / Notices
rwilkins on PROD1PC63 with NOTICES
defined by § 1.2105(b), on-line. In
addition, in the event that changes
cannot be made immediately in ISAS for
any reason, an applicant should submit
a letter briefly summarizing the changes
and subsequently update their shortform applications in ISAS as soon as
possible. Any letter describing changes
to applicant’s short-form application
should be submitted by electronic mail
to the following address:
auction66@fcc.gov.
86. Applicants should not submit
application-specific material through
the Commission’s Electronic Comment
Filing System (ECFS), which was used
for submitting comments regarding
Auction No. 66 procedures.
I. Maintaining Current Information in
Short-Form Applications (FCC Form
175)
87. Section 1.65 of the Commission’s
rules requires an applicant to maintain
the accuracy and completeness of
information furnished in its pending
application and to notify the
Commission within 30 days of any
substantial change that may be of
decisional significance to that
application. Changes that cause a loss of
or reduction in eligibility for a bidding
credit must be reported immediately. If
an amendment reporting substantial
changes is a major amendment as
defined by 47 CFR 1.2105, the major
amendment will not be accepted and
may result in the dismissal of the shortform application.
88. In the event that the new rules
regarding applicants and applications
become effective after the deadline for
filing short-form applications (FCC
Form 175), applicants may be required
to submit additional information not
required in the initial form. In this
regard, applicants considering claiming
eligibility as a designated entity in
Auction No. 66 should review carefully
the recently released CSEA/Part 1
Designated Entity FNPRM. The
Commission stated in the CSEA/Part 1
Designated Entity FNPRM that it intends
to complete that proceeding in time so
that any resulting rule modifications
will apply to Auction No. 66. Moreover,
the Commission proposed that in the
event that any designated entity
applicants have filed an application to
participate in an auction prior to the
effective date of any designated entity
rule changes adopted pursuant to the
CSEA/Part 1 Designated Entity FNPRM,
such applicants would be required to
amend their applications on or after the
effective date of the rule changes with
a statement declaring, under penalty of
perjury, that the applicant is qualified as
a designated entity pursuant to § 1.2110
VerDate Aug<31>2005
17:21 Apr 20, 2006
Jkt 208001
of the Commission’s rules effective as of
the date of the statement. Finally, the
Commission noted that under this
proposal the Bureau will establish any
detailed procedures necessary for
making required amendments and
announce such procedures by public
notice. Accordingly, applicants
considering claiming eligibility as a
designated entity in Auction No. 66
should monitor further proceedings
pursuant to the CSEA/Part 1 Designated
Entity FNPRM.
III. Pre-Auction Procedures
A. Auction Seminar—April 24, 2006
89. On Monday, April 24, 2006, the
FCC will sponsor a seminar for parties
interested in participating in Auction
No. 66 at the FCC headquarters, located
at 445 12th Street, SW., Washington,
DC. For individuals who are unable to
attend, an Audio/Video webcast of this
seminar will be available from the FCC’s
Auction No. 66 Web page.
90. To register, complete the
registration form Attachment C of the
Auction No. 66 Procedures Public
Notice and submit it by Thursday, April
20, 2006. Registrations are accepted on
a first-come, first-served basis.
B. Short-Form Application (FCC Form
175)—Due Before 6:00 p.m. ET on May
10, 2006
91. In order to be eligible to bid in this
auction, applicants must first submit an
FCC Form 175 application electronically
via the FCC Auction System. This
application must be received at the
Commission prior to 6 p.m. ET on May
10, 2006. Late applications will not be
accepted. There is no application fee
required when filing an FCC Form 175.
However, to be eligible to bid, an
applicant must submit an upfront
payment.
92. Applications may generally be
filed at any time beginning at noon ET
on April 24, 2006, until 6 p.m. ET on
May 10, 2006. Applicants are strongly
encouraged to file early and are
responsible for allowing adequate time
for filing their applications. Applicants
may update or amend their applications
multiple times until the filing deadline
on May 10, 2006. Information about
accessing, completing, and viewing the
FCC Form 175 is included in
Attachment D of the Auction No. 66
Procedures Public Notice.
C. Application Processing and Minor
Corrections
93. After the deadline for filing the
FCC Form 175 applications has passed,
the FCC will process all timely
submitted applications to determine
PO 00000
Frm 00041
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
which are acceptable for filing, and
subsequently will issue a public notice
identifying: (1) Those applications
accepted for filing; (2) those
applications rejected; and (3) those
applications which have minor defects
that may be corrected, and the deadline
for resubmitting corrected applications.
D. Upfront Payments—Due June 1, 2006
94. In order to be eligible to bid in the
auction, applicants must submit an
upfront payment accompanied by an
FCC Remittance Advice Form (FCC
Form 159). After completing the FCC
Form 175, filers will have access to an
electronic version of the FCC Form 159
that can be printed and sent by facsimile
to Mellon Bank in Pittsburgh, PA. All
upfront payments must be received in
the proper account at Mellon Bank
before 6 p.m. ET on June 1, 2006.
i. Making Auction Payments by Wire
Transfer
95. Wire transfer payments must be
received before 6 p.m. ET on June 1,
2006. To avoid untimely payments,
applicants should discuss arrangements
(including bank closing schedules) with
their banker several days before they
plan to make the wire transfer, and
allow sufficient time for the transfer to
be initiated and completed before the
deadline.
96. At least one hour before placing
the order for the wire transfer (but on
the same business day), applicants must
send by facsimile a completed FCC
Form 159 (Revised 2/03) to Mellon Bank
at (412) 209–6045. On the cover sheet of
the facsimile, write Wire Transfer—
Auction Payment for Auction No. 66. In
order to meet the Commission’s upfront
payment deadline, an applicant’s
payment must be credited to the
Commission’s account before the
deadline.
97. Please note that: (a) All payments
must be made in U.S. dollars; (b) All
payments must be made by wire
transfer; (c) upfront payments for
Auction No. 66 go to a lockbox number
different from the lockboxes used in
previous FCC auctions, and different
from the lockbox number to be used for
post-auction payments and (d) failure to
deliver the upfront payment by the June
1, 2006, deadline will result in
dismissal of the application and
disqualification from participation in
the auction.
ii. FCC Form 159
98. A completed FCC Remittance
Advice Form (FCC Form 159, Revised 2/
03) must be faxed to Mellon Bank to
accompany each upfront payment.
Proper completion of FCC Form 159
E:\FR\FM\21APN1.SGM
21APN1
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 77 / Friday, April 21, 2006 / Notices
(Revised 2/03) is critical to ensuring
correct crediting of upfront payments.
Detailed instructions for completion of
FCC Form 159 are included in
Attachment E of the Auction No. 66
Procedures Public Notice. An electronic
pre-filled version of the FCC Form 159
is available after submitting the FCC
Form 175. The FCC Form 159 can be
completed electronically, but must be
filed with Mellon Bank via facsimile.
rwilkins on PROD1PC63 with NOTICES
iii. Upfront Payments and Bidding
Eligibility
99. In the Part 1 Order, 62 FR 13540,
March 21, 1997, the Commission
delegated to the Bureau the authority
and discretion to determine appropriate
upfront payment(s) for each auction. In
addition, in the Part 1 Fifth Report and
Order, 65 FR 52323, August 29, 2000,
the Commission ordered that applicants
that are former defaulters be required to
pay upfront payments 50 percent greater
than non-former defaulters. For
purposes of this calculation, the
applicant includes the applicant itself,
its affiliates, its controlling interests,
and affiliates of its controlling interests,
as defined by 47 CFR 1.2110 of the
Commission’s rules.
100. In the Auction No. 66 Comment
Public Notice, the Bureau proposed that
the amount of the upfront payment
would determine a bidder’s initial
bidding eligibility, the maximum
number of bidding units on which a
bidder may place bids. In order to bid
on a license, otherwise qualified bidders
that selected that license on Form 175
must have a current eligibility level that
meets or exceeds the number of bidding
units assigned to that license. At a
minimum, therefore, an applicant’s total
upfront payment must be enough to
establish eligibility to bid on at least one
of the licenses selected on its Form 175,
or else the applicant will not be eligible
to participate in the auction. An
applicant does not have to make an
upfront payment to cover all licenses
the applicant selected on its Form 175,
but rather to cover the maximum
number of bidding units that are
associated with licenses on which the
bidder wishes to place bids and hold
provisionally winning bids at any given
time.
101. In the Auction No. 66 Comment
Public Notice, the Bureau proposed to
calculate upfront payments for Auction
No. 66 on a license-by-license basis
using the following formula:
$0.05 * MHz * License Area
Population.
The Bureau set forth the specific
upfront payments and bidding units for
each license in Attachment A of the
VerDate Aug<31>2005
17:21 Apr 20, 2006
Jkt 208001
Auction No. 66 Comment Public Notice
and sought comment on the proposal.
102. Commenters presented a number
of views on the proposed level of
upfront payments. Some comments
support the proposed upfront payments.
Others argue for lowering upfront
payments for specific licenses, usually
either for all CMA licenses
(Metropolitan Statistical Service Areas
(MSAs) and Rural Service Areas (RSAs))
or only for the rural RSA licenses. Other
comments propose lowering upfront
payments for bidders that qualify as
designated entities or replacing the
upfront payment proposal with a
straight percentage deposit.
103. Upfront payments help deter
frivolous or insincere bidding. In
addition, upfront payments provide the
Commission with a source of funds in
the event that the bidder incurs liability
during the auction. Applicants must
make upfront payments sufficient to
obtain bidding eligibility on the licenses
on which they will bid.
104. In connection with minimum
opening bids, the Commission is
persuaded by the arguments of
numerous commenters that for Auction
No. 66, the formula to determine
upfront payments and minimum
opening bids should not apply the same
figure to a rural population unit as it
does to an urban population unit.
Commenters assert that because of
higher buildout costs, upfront payments
and minimum opening bids for less
densely populated areas should be
calculated at a lower rate than those for
higher density areas. More specifically,
many commenters contend that upfront
payments on licenses covering RSAs
should be lowered from $0.05 per
MHz*Pop to $0.01, 0.02, or 0.025 per
MHz*Pop.
105. The Commission will reduce
upfront payments for RSA licenses by
forty percent (40%) from the initial
proposal, i.e., to $0.03 per MHz*Pop.
While some commenters argue for an
even greater reduction, the Commission
is not persuaded that it should lower
upfront payments any further. With
respect to licenses for the more densely
populated MSAs, the Commission will
not reduce the proposed upfront
payments. The Commission adopts the
initial proposal with respect to such
licenses and set the upfront payments
for MSAs using the proposed formula,
i.e., $0.05 per MHz*Pop.
106. The Commission also will lower
the number of bidding units associated
with the RSA licenses by 40%, in order
to maintain the one-to-one relationship
between bidding units and upfront
payment amounts. The number of
bidding units associated with the MSA
PO 00000
Frm 00042
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
20681
licenses will remain unchanged since
the upfront payment amounts for those
licenses are unchanged.
107. In order to take into account that
rural and urban populations are mixed
within a single license in the larger
geographic licensing areas, the
Commission will apply the lower
upfront payment formula for rural areas
on a county-by-county basis for all
licenses. More specifically, the
Commission will first break down the
larger geographic areas into their
component counties. The lower upfront
payment formula of $0.03 per MHz*Pop
will be applied to the population of
those counties that are included in an
RSA. The formula of $0.05 per
MHz*Pop will be applied to the
population of the remaining counties.
The upfront payment amount for an EA
or REAG license will be calculated as
the sum of upfront payments for the
counties in the EA or REAG. The
Commission will maintain the one-toone relationship between bidding units
and upfront payment amounts, so that
bidding unit amounts will change with
the changes in upfront payments.
108. The Commission is not
persuaded by comments proposing that
the Commission alter its upfront
payment proposal in other ways. A
commenter argues that designated
entities should be able to make lower
upfront payments than other bidders. In
light of the purpose of the upfront
payments, the Commission does not
believe a different upfront payment for
designated entities is appropriate.
Finally, another commenter suggests
that the Commission forego its usual
procedure of determining upfront
payments and bidding eligibility and
replace it with a requirement that
bidders have a certain percentage of
their bids on deposit with the
Commission. The Commission believes,
however, that the use of upfront
payments in connection with bidding
eligibility in past auctions has been
successful and no radical departure is
needed.
109. The specific upfront payment
amounts and associated bidding units
for each license available in Auction No.
66 calculated pursuant to the
procedures as well as the aggregate
reserve price for all AWS–1 licenses, are
set forth in Attachment A of the Auction
No. 66 Procedures Public Notice.
110. In calculating its upfront
payment amount, an applicant should
determine the maximum number of
bidding units on which it may wish to
be active (bid on or hold provisionally
winning bids on) in any single round,
and submit an upfront payment amount
covering that number of bidding units.
E:\FR\FM\21APN1.SGM
21APN1
20682
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 77 / Friday, April 21, 2006 / Notices
In order to make this calculation, an
applicant should add together the
upfront payments for all licenses on
which it seeks to be active in any given
round. Applicants should check their
calculations carefully, as there is no
provision for increasing a bidder’s
eligibility after the upfront payment
deadline.
111. Former defaulters should
calculate their upfront payment for all
licenses by multiplying the number of
bidding units on which they wish to be
active by 1.5. In order to calculate the
number of bidding units to assign to
former defaulters, the Commission will
divide the upfront payment received by
1.5 and round the result up to the
nearest bidding unit. If a former
defaulter fails to submit a sufficient
upfront payment to establish eligibility
to bid on at least one of the licenses
applied for on its Form 175, the
applicant will not be eligible to
participate in the auction.
rwilkins on PROD1PC63 with NOTICES
iv. Applicant’s Wire Transfer
Information for Purposes of Refunds of
Upfront Payments
112. The Commission will use wire
transfers for all Auction No. 66 refunds.
To ensure that refunds of upfront
payments are processed in an
expeditious manner, the Commission is
requesting that all pertinent information
listed below be supplied to the FCC.
Applicants can provide the information
electronically during the initial shortform filing window after the form has
been submitted.
E. Auction Registration
113. Approximately ten days before
the auction, the FCC will issue a public
notice announcing all qualified bidders
for the auction. Qualified bidders are
those applicants whose FCC Form 175
applications have been accepted for
filing and have timely submitted
upfront payments sufficient to make
them eligible to bid.
114. All qualified bidders are
automatically registered for the auction.
Registration materials will be
distributed prior to the auction by
overnight mail. The mailing will be sent
only to the contact person at the contact
address listed in the FCC Form 175 and
will include the SecurID cards that
will be required to place bids, the
Integrated Spectrum Auction System
(ISAS) Bidder’s Guide, and the Auction
Bidder Line phone number.
115. Qualified bidders that do not
receive this registration mailing will not
be able to submit bids. Therefore, any
qualified bidder that has not received
this mailing by noon on Thursday, June
22, 2006, should call (717) 338–2868.
VerDate Aug<31>2005
17:21 Apr 20, 2006
Jkt 208001
Receipt of this registration mailing is
critical to participating in the auction,
and each applicant is responsible for
ensuring it has received all of the
registration material.
116. In the event that SecurID cards
are lost or damaged, only a person who
has been designated as an authorized
bidder, the contact person, or the
certifying official on the applicant’s
short-form application may request
replacement registration material.
Qualified bidders requiring the
replacement of these items must call
Technical Support.
F. Remote Electronic Bidding
117. The Commission will conduct
this auction over the Internet, and
telephonic bidding will be available as
well. Qualified bidders are permitted to
bid electronically and telephonically.
Each applicant should indicate its
bidding preference—electronic or
telephonic—on the FCC Form 175. In
either case, each authorized bidder must
have its own SecurID card, which the
FCC will provide at no charge. Each
applicant with one authorized bidder
will be issued two SecurID cards, while
applicants with two or three authorized
bidders will be issued three cards. For
security purposes, the SecurID cards,
the telephonic bidding phone number,
and the Integrated Spectrum Auction
System (ISAS) Bidder’s Guide are only
mailed to the contact person at the
contact address listed on the FCC Form
175. Please note that each SecurID card
is tailored to a specific auction;
therefore, SecurID cards issued for
other auctions or obtained from a source
other than the FCC will not work for
Auction No. 66.
G. Mock Auction—June 26, 2006
118. All qualified bidders will be
eligible to participate in a mock auction
on Monday, June 26, 2006. The mock
auction will enable applicants to
become familiar with the FCC Auction
System prior to the auction.
Participation by all bidders is strongly
recommended. Details will be
announced by public notice.
IV. Auction Event
119. The first round of bidding for
Auction No. 66 will begin on Thursday,
June 29, 2006. The initial bidding
schedule will be announced in a public
notice listing the qualified bidders,
which is to be released approximately
10 days before the start of the auction.
PO 00000
Frm 00043
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
A. Auction Structure
i. Simultaneous Multiple Round
Auction
120. In the Auction No. 66 Comment
Public Notice, the Bureau proposed to
auction all AWS–1 licenses in a single
auction using the Commission’s
standard simultaneous multiple-round
(SMR) auction format. This type of
auction offers every license for bid at
the same time and consists of successive
bidding rounds in which eligible
bidders may place bids on individual
licenses. A bidder may bid on, and
potentially win, any number of licenses.
Typically, bidding remains open on all
licenses until bidding stops on every
license, unless a modified stopping rule
is invoked.
121. The Bureau also sought comment
on the feasibility and desirability of
allocating the AWS–1 licenses among
two auctions, run concurrently, with
one of the auctions using the standard
SMR format and the other using the
FCC’s package bidding format (SMR–
PB). Under the SMR–PB format, bidders
can place bids on groups of licenses
they wish to win in combination, with
the result that they win either all of the
licenses in a group or none of them, in
contrast to the license-by-license
bidding in the FCC’s SMR format. In the
SMR–PB auction format, each bidder
can have at most a single winning bid,
so that in order to win any particular
license combination, the bidder must
have placed a package bid on that
license or specific group of licenses.
122. Based on the record and the
Commission’s belief that a single SMR
auction offers bidders a simple and
effective means of bidding on single or
multiple licenses without the additional
complications that participating in two
concurrent auctions would involve, the
Commission will proceed with its
proposal to auction all AWS–1 licenses
in a single auction using the
Commission’s standard SMR auction
format.
123. Nearly all of the parties
commenting on the issue of auction
format support its proposal for one SMR
auction for AWS–1. While some express
concern or opposition to using package
bidding generally, nearly all
commenters oppose the option of
running a package bidding auction
concurrently with an SMR auction.
Those concerned with the complexity in
bidding in two auctions at the same
time stress difficulty in managing
eligibility between the two, submitting
upfront payments to participate in both,
and keeping track of bidding among the
auctions. The complexity level increases
further given that the two concurrent
E:\FR\FM\21APN1.SGM
21APN1
rwilkins on PROD1PC63 with NOTICES
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 77 / Friday, April 21, 2006 / Notices
auctions would have different auction
designs.
124. A number of commenters express
concern that smaller bidders, including
rural carriers and new entrants, would
be hardest hit by the increased
complexity of two concurrent auctions
and package bidding. Some commenters
raise the possibility that an auction
using a package bidding format, due to
the so-called threshold problem, may
not assign licenses to the entities that
value them most highly. Only two
commenters favor allocating some
AWS–1 licenses to a second auction
with package bidding. A commenter
suggests that package bidding would
allow bidders to aggregate licenses more
efficiently in order to acquire a
nationwide footprint. The Commission
agrees with those commenters who
assert that an SMR auction of the AWS–
1 licenses, which includes several large
regional area blocks, will provide
opportunities for bidders to aggregate
licenses in order to obtain nationwide
coverage.
125. While a commenter supports
package bidding for the E and F Block
AWS–1 licenses, it advocates that the
auctions be run sequentially, not
concurrently. In particular, the
commenter suggests that the
Commission run the SMR auction for A
to D Blocks first using the standard SMR
auction, followed shortly by an auction
for the E and F blocks, allowing for
package bidding. Comments filed jointly
agree in principle with sequential
auctions, but specifically advocate the
reverse order—i.e., run the SMR–PB
auction before the standard SMR one.
126. The Commission finds the choice
of sequential auctions undesirable in
these circumstances. First, it eliminates
flexibility for the bidders, as the results
from the first auction will stand
regardless of how the second auction
plays out. Second, the AWS–1 licenses
are subject to the CSEA aggregate
reserve. Determining whether this is met
is made much more difficult if two
sequential auctions are held.
127. The Commission concludes that
it is operationally feasible and
appropriate to auction the AWS–1
licenses through a single auction using
the Commission’s standard SMR auction
format. Unless otherwise announced,
bids will be accepted on all licenses in
each round of the auction until bidding
stops on every license. This approach,
the Commission believes, allows
bidders to take advantage of synergies
that exist among licenses and is
administratively efficient.
128. The Commission’s decision not
to employ an SMR–PB format for some
AWS–1 licenses does not reflect on
VerDate Aug<31>2005
17:21 Apr 20, 2006
Jkt 208001
future use of package bidding in
Commission auctions.
ii. Information Available to Bidders
Before and During the Auction
129. In the Auction No. 66 Comment
Public Notice, the Bureau proposed to
withhold certain information on bidder
interests, bids and bidder identities that
typically has been revealed prior to and
during past FCC auctions, in the event
that a single SMR auction is held. In
particular, the Bureau proposed not to
reveal until the close of the auction: (1)
Bidders’ license selections on their short
form applications and the amount of
their upfront payments; (2) the amounts
of non-provisionally winning bids and
the identities of bidders placing those
bids; and (3) the identities of bidders
making provisionally winning bids.
130. The proposal attracted a number
of comments, both in support of the
Bureau’s proposal and opposed to it.
The Commission believes, as the Bureau
noted in the Auction No. 66 Comment
Public Notice, that there are benefits as
well as potential harms from publicly
revealing all information during the
auction process. Also as stated in the
Auction No. 66 Comment Public Notice,
the Commission believes that the
potential harms from anti-competitive
behavior facilitated by the release of
extensive information relating to bidder
interests, bids, and bidder identities is
likely to be greater when the auction is
less competitive—that is, when the
number of bidders and the level of
upfront payments are relatively low
compared to the number of licenses
offered. Therefore, in balancing the
likely disadvantages of making such
information available with the potential
advantages to bidders from being able to
formulate more accurate assessments of
license values, the Commission will
make its approach contingent on the
likely competitiveness of the auction. If
the Commission determines that the
auction is likely to be highly
competitive based on the number of
bidders and upfront payments, and
therefore, that the risk of successful
collusion is low, the Commission will
make available bidding information that
the Commission typically have made
available in previous Commission
auctions. If, on the other hand, it
appears that the auction may be less
competitive, making it easier for bidders
to signal and enforce cooperative
divisions of the market, the Commission
will limit the information relating to
bids and bidder identities in a manner
that is largely consistent with its
proposal in the Auction No. 66
Comment Public Notice. In this way,
unless it appears that the costs to
PO 00000
Frm 00044
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
20683
providing information is likely to be
particularly high, the Commission will
provide bidders with information that
may enhance their abilities to
participate confidently and effectively
in the auction.
131. The Commission will estimate
the level of competition in the auction
by calculating a modified eligibility
ratio based on upfront payments
submitted by bidders. Using this
estimate, the Commisssion will
determine the information procedures
that will apply during bidding rounds.
Specifically, if a modified eligibility
ratio, defined as the total number of
bidding units of eligibility purchased by
bidders, relative to the total number of
bidding units for the licenses in the
auction, is equal to at least three, the
auction will proceed under the
information procedures typically used
for past FCC auctions. For the purposes
of calculating the modified eligibility
ratio, a single bidder’s eligibility will be
capped at 50% of the total bidding units
in the auction.
132. Alternatively, if the level of
competition appears insufficient, that is
if the modified eligibility ratio is less
than three, the Commission will limit
the information that is released prior to
and during the auction in a way that is
substantially consistent with, but not
identical to its proposal in the Auction
No. 66 Comment Public Notice. The
Commission will make available the
total eligibility level for the auction as
well as bidder-specific eligibility,
although the Commission will not
identify bidders’ license selections.
After each round of bidding, the
amounts of each bid placed will be
made available, but not the identities of
the bidders. Under the the original
proposal, for each license only the
amounts of the provisionally winning
bids and the number of bids on the
license, not the amounts of nonprovisionally winning bids, were to
have been made available.
133. Discussion. As stated in the
Auction No. 66 Comment Public Notice,
the Commission has reserved the option
to limit the availability of information
on an auction-by-auction basis, and the
Bureau retains discretion to limit the
information disclosed to bidders. With a
single early exception, the Commission
has elected not to limit such
information. Notwithstanding past
decisions, the Commission believes that
the public interest will best be served by
limiting certain information relating to
bidder interests, bids, and bidder
identities in Auction No. 66, when it
appears that the competitiveness of the
auction is likely to be relatively low, as
E:\FR\FM\21APN1.SGM
21APN1
rwilkins on PROD1PC63 with NOTICES
20684
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 77 / Friday, April 21, 2006 / Notices
measured by the modified eligibility
ratio.
134. This decision to make the
availability of information contingent
upon competitiveness is supported by a
number of commenters. The notion of
using a measure of likely
competitiveness to determine how
much information would be made
available was first proposed by a
commenter. Subsequently, other
commenters have voiced support for
compromise proposals that involve,
among other criteria, basing the decision
on information availability on a similar
measure of total eligibility.
135. A number of commenters oppose
the proposal to withhold certain
information for the AWS–1 licenses,
challenging the need to undertake
measures to deter anti-competitive
behavior in FCC auctions generally, and
in particular, they question making
changes to an established auction
process immediately prior to a large
auction of licenses suitable for highvalued uses. Some commenters note
that the Commission has already
modified its auction design to deter
signaling, and claim that there is little
or no evidence of coordinated bidding
behavior in recent auctions.
136. In response, the Commission
notes that it is in large part because the
upcoming AWS–1 auction will make
available a significant number of
potentially valuable licenses that the
Commission will modify its usual bid
and bidder information procedures at
this time, if it appears that the auction
may not be sufficiently competitive.
With fewer bidders, the chances are
greater that signaling and retaliatory
behavior will be successful, with the
result that licenses may not be assigned
to the entities that value them most
highly. The AWS–1 licenses open up a
new band to commercial wireless
services, and represent a sizeable
portion of existing spectrum available
for innovative wireless services.
Licensees will have considerable
flexibility to respond to consumer
demand for innovative advanced
services, and the Commission feels
particularly obligated to assure that
these licenses are assigned to those
entities that will put them to their
highest valued uses.
137. With respect to arguments that
the Commission has already eliminated
the possibility of bid signaling and has
no evidence on which to base its beliefs
that such behavior may occur in
Auction No. 66, the Commission notes
that at least two papers mentioned in
this proceeding rely on signaling
consistent with the Commission’s
current standard SMR auction format.
VerDate Aug<31>2005
17:21 Apr 20, 2006
Jkt 208001
Furthermore, since some types of
signaling and coordinated bidding are
very hard to detect in auction data,
making it difficult to pursue
enforcement actions after such alleged
activity has occurred, it is important to
reduce the potential for such collusive
bidding behavior to occur in the first
place, in circumstances in which the
Commission believes collusion is most
likely to occur.
138. At the same time, the
Commission recognizes that the
information that has typically been
provided during FCC auctions may be of
value in helping bidders to form more
accurate and confident assessments of
license values, thus allowing them to
participate more effectively in the
auction. The Commission believes that,
under circumstances in which collusion
is less likely to be successful, the
benefits to bidders from making
information available are likely to
outweigh the potential harms from
facilitating collusive behavior. As a
result, the Commission will not adopt
its proposal to limit information when
the auction is expected to be
competitive as indicated by the
modified eligibility ratio of three or
more—that is, when coordinated
bidding activity is unlikely to be
sustainable.
139. A number of commenters
addressed the various benefits that
information provides to bidders,
especially to bidders with fewer
resources, including many new entrants
and rural carriers. In particular, these
commenters suggest that knowing the
identities of bidders active in particular
markets yields useful data on such
factors as the potential for negotiating
roaming agreements; on the likelihood
that infrastructure and equipment for
certain technologies will be available;
and on whether the structure of
competition in a given market is likely
to support the bidder’s business plan.
Some of the commenters also claim that
the uncertainty inherent in opening up
a new spectrum band for as yet
unknown services and technologies
makes it all the more useful to
participants to have such information as
may be available, including round-byround information on bids and bidders
identities.
140. Some commenters opposing the
proposal to withhold information state
that the advantages gained by knowing
bidder identities are particularly
important to small and mid-sized
entities and to new entrants and that
consequently, they argue, limiting bid
and bidder information will
disadvantage those bidders
disproportionately. Specifically,
PO 00000
Frm 00045
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
commenters suggest that smaller
businesses rely more heavily on the
need to negotiate agreements with
neighboring service providers and
therefore have a greater interest in
knowing who adjacent licensees are
likely to be. Some point out that niche
service providers, and their financial
backers, are particularly interested in
knowing whether another entity
targeting the same demographic
population is likely to be competing in
a given market. In addition, commenters
say that financial backers of smaller
firms trust that a bid by a market leader
reflects a well-researched valuation and
are more likely to be comfortable
investing in a smaller entity if the
smaller firm’s bids are not out of line
with those of the large entities.
Accordingly, they claim, if investors do
not have the reassurance of knowing
how the large bidders are bidding, the
additional risk will reduce the amount
of capital they are willing to lend and,
consequently, reduce what smaller firms
are able to bid for and win at auction.
141. Commenters also suggest that the
additional uncertainty about the value
of licenses introduced by the lack of
information on bidder identities will
increase bidders’ fear of the winners
curse, leading them to bid below their
valuations for the licenses. Some assert
that those most affected by the
uncertainty will scale back their bids
more than proportionately and that
therefore, small bidders may fail to win
licenses for which they are the highest
valuing bidder, thereby lowering
auction efficiency.
142. The costs to releasing
information as some commenters
request, however, likely will outweigh
the potential advantages of releasing the
information, if the level of competition
in the auction seems insufficient to
make cooperative divisions of the
market difficult to signal and sustain.
Accordingly, if the auction is not
sufficiently competitive as indicated by
the modified eligibility ratio, the
Commission will not provide the
information, notwithstanding any
potential benefits doing so might
provide to some bidders.
143. Parties opposing the proposal to
limit information point out a number of
other factors which the Commission
also does not regard as sufficient to
dissuade it from its decision to limit the
information that will be made available
if the modified eligibility ratio is below
three for Auction No. 66. Some
commenters warn that deliberate and
inadvertent disclosures of information
may represent a threat to the validity of
the auction. The Commission does not
believe that significant disclosures are
E:\FR\FM\21APN1.SGM
21APN1
rwilkins on PROD1PC63 with NOTICES
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 77 / Friday, April 21, 2006 / Notices
likely to occur, in part because revealing
bids or bid strategies violates the
Commission’s anti-collusion rules, and
in part because bidders will regard it as
being in their interest to preserve the
secrecy of their bidding activity.
Furthermore, if an occasional disclosure
does occur, the Commission does not
believe the auction is likely to be
affected in a way which will
compromise its validity. With respect to
bidding data, much of the data that is
generated after a round of a large SMR
auction is superseded by data for the
next round, so that the advantage to a
bidder from knowing improperly
disclosed information is likely to
disappear within several hours.
144. Several commenters suggest that
a policy of limiting information relating
to bidder interests prior to the auction,
and limiting bidder identities during the
auction constitutes a departure from the
Commission’s traditional commitment
to a transparent auction process. The
Commission disagrees. As discussed in
the Auction No. 66 Comment Public
Notice, the Commission plans to release
all withheld information at the close of
the auction. Bidders and the public will
be able to examine all round-by-round
bidding activity, and any allegations of
irregular bidding conduct will be
investigated. The Commission notes
that, even when bid and bidder
information is not withheld, it is its
policy generally to address any such
concerns after the close of an auction,
when there is greater opportunity for
investigation of such allegations.
145. Commenters present various
arguments regarding what information
should be released and when, in the
event that the Commission limits the
information revealed in any way, as will
be the case if the modified eligibility
ratio is less than three. Some argue that
particular information should be
released, while others argue that the
Commission should release all
information but do so only at intervals.
While these proposals may achieve
some benefits by disclosing information,
the Commission is not persuaded any of
them would be effective in preventing
coordinated and retaliatory bidding,
especially when competition in the
auction is relatively weak, e.g., the
modified eligibility ratio is less than
three, and, therefore, the risk of
collusion is greatest.
146. The Commission notes again that
even if the limited information
procedures are in effect, it plans to make
available during the auction the
amounts of all bids placed on each
license in each round. Even absent
bidder identities, this information will
give bidders an indication of demand
VerDate Aug<31>2005
17:21 Apr 20, 2006
Jkt 208001
for the licenses. Bidders and their
investors will be able to observe the bids
for licenses in the six offered spectrum
blocks, which will help them assess
whether their bids are likely to be
consistent with the valuations of other
bidders. This information will reduce
uncertainty about license valuations,
mitigating fear of the winner’s curse for
bidders and their financial backers.
147. Other Issues. The Commission
does not believe that the information
disclosure procedures established for
this auction will interfere with the
administration of or compliance with
the Commission’s anti-collusion rule.
§ 1.2105(c)(1) of the Commission’s rules
provides that after the short-form
application filing deadline, all
applicants for licenses in any of the
same geographic license areas are
prohibited from disclosing to each other
in any manner the substance of bids or
bidding strategies until after the down
payment deadline, subject to specified
exceptions. In past auctions, each
applicant’s selection of licenses has
been publicly available through the
Commission’s on-line short-form
application database. In Auction No. 66,
however, the Commission may not
disclose information regarding license
selection until after the auction closes.
As in the past, the Commission will
disclose the other portions of
applicants’ short-form applications,
through its on-line database and certain
application-based information through
public notices. Thus, even without
information regarding license selection,
applicants would be able to comply
with § 1.2105(c) by not disclosing bids
or bidding strategies to any other
applicants in the auction. This
approach, however, could inhibit
otherwise lawful communications with
applicants for licenses in other
geographic license areas, which the
Commission’s rule permits.
Consequently, the Commission will
notify separately each applicant with
short-form applications to participate in
a pending auction, including but not
limited to Auction No. 66, whether
applicants in Auction No. 66 have
applied for licenses in any of the same
geographic areas as that applicant. After
the Commission conducts its initial
review of applications to participate in
Auction No. 66, each applicant with a
short-form application to participate in
a pending auction will receive a letter
that lists the applicants in Auction No.
66 that have applied for licenses in any
of the same geographic areas as the
applicant. The list will identify the
Auction No. 66 applicant(s) by name but
will not list the license selections of the
PO 00000
Frm 00046
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
20685
Auction No. 66 applicant(s). As in past
auctions, additional information
regarding applicants in Auction No. 66
that is needed to comply with
§ 1.2105(c), e.g., the identities of
controlling interest in the applicant and
ownership interests greater than ten
percent (10%), will be available through
the publicly accessible on-line shortform application database.
148. Finally, the Commission does not
agree with commenters that suggest that
SEC rules requiring bidders to disclose
material financial information might
require bidders to disclose bidding
information during the auction. Until
the SEC addresses the issue, the
Commission will not presume that SEC
rules require public disclosure of
information about bidding while an
auction is still underway.
iii. Eligibility and Activity Rules
149. In the Auction No. 66 Comment
Public Notice, the Bureau proposed that
the amount of the upfront payment
submitted by a bidder would determine
the initial (maximum) eligibility (as
measured in bidding units) for each
bidder. One commenter suggested that
the Commission eliminate the use of
bidding units. A commenter suggests
that the Commission define a bidder’s
eligibility simply as a multiple of the
amount the bidder places on deposit
with the Commission. This proposal
ignores the Commission’s use of bidding
units to measure bidder participation in
the auction pursuant to the
Commission’s activity rules. The
Commission uses activity rules to move
the auction at an appropriate speed
while providing sufficient flexibility to
permit bidders to pursue a wide range
of alternative bidding strategies. The
Commission believes its activity rules
serve an important purpose and decline
to adopt the suggestion of the
commenter, which would undermine
those rules.
150. Accordingly, the Commission
adopts the proposed use of upfront
payments to determine initial
(maximum) eligibility (as measured in
bidding units) for Auction No. 66. The
amount of the upfront payment
submitted by a bidder determines initial
bidding eligibility, the maximum
number of bidding units on which a
bidder may be active. Each license is
assigned a specific number of bidding
units equal to the upfront payment
listed in Attachment A of the Auction
No. 66 Procedures Public Notice on a
bidding unit per dollar basis. Bidding
units for a given license do not change
as prices rise during the auction. A
bidder’s upfront payment is not
attributed to specific licenses. Rather, a
E:\FR\FM\21APN1.SGM
21APN1
rwilkins on PROD1PC63 with NOTICES
20686
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 77 / Friday, April 21, 2006 / Notices
bidder may place bids on any of the
licenses selected on its FCC Form 175
as long as the total number of bidding
units associated with those licenses
does not exceed its current eligibility.
Eligibility cannot be increased during
the auction; it can only remain the same
or decrease. Thus, in calculating its
upfront payment amount, an applicant
must determine the maximum number
of bidding units it may wish to bid on
or hold provisionally winning bids on
in any single round, and submit an
upfront payment amount covering that
total number of bidding units. The total
upfront payment does not affect the
total dollar amount a bidder may bid on
any given license.
151. In order to ensure that an auction
closes within a reasonable period of
time, an activity rule requires bidders to
bid actively throughout the auction,
rather than wait until late in the auction
before participating. Bidders are
required to be active on a specific
percentage of their current bidding
eligibility during each round of the
auction.
152. A bidder’s activity level in a
round is the sum of the bidding units
associated with licenses on which the
bidder is active. A bidder is considered
active on a license in the current round
if it is either the provisionally winning
bidder at the end of the previous
bidding round and does not withdraw
the provisionally winning bid in the
current round, or if it submits a bid in
the current round. The minimum
required activity is expressed as a
percentage of the bidder’s current
eligibility, and increases by stage as the
auction progresses. A commenter urges
that no minimum activity requirements
be imposed on designated entities that
apply to bid on less than one percent
(1%) of the licenses available in Auction
No. 66. In addition, the commenter
urges that a reduced minimum activity
requirement should apply to all
designated entities. No persuasive
reason has been presented for applying
different activity requirements to
bidders that are designated entities than
to other bidders. The Commission’s
activity rule paces the auction by
requiring bidders to bid actively. There
is no reason to modify this requirement
based on either the number of licenses
for which the bidder has applied or the
bidder’s status as a designated entity.
Bidders applying for few licenses or that
are designated entities suffer no
disadvantage from complying with the
same activity rule as other bidders.
Because these procedures have proven
successful in maintaining the pace of
previous auctions the Commission
adopts them for Auction No. 66.
VerDate Aug<31>2005
17:21 Apr 20, 2006
Jkt 208001
iv. Auction Stages
153. In the Auction No. 66 Comment
Public Notice, the Bureau proposed to
conduct the auction in two stages and
employ an activity rule. The Bureau
further proposed that, in each round of
Stage One, a bidder desiring to maintain
its current bidding eligibility would be
required to be active on licenses
representing at least 80 percent of its
current bidding eligibility. Finally, the
Bureau proposed that in each round of
Stage Two, a bidder desiring to maintain
its current bidding eligibility would be
required to be active on at least 95
percent of its current bidding eligibility.
One commenter directly addresses the
Bureau’s proposal, expressing support.
154. The Commission adopts the
proposals for the activity rules and
stages. The Commission reserves the
discretion to further alter the activity
percentages before and/or during the
auction.
155. Stage One: During the first stage
of the auction, a bidder desiring to
maintain its current bidding eligibility
will be required to be active on licenses
representing at least 80 percent of its
current bidding eligibility in each
bidding round. Failure to maintain the
required activity level will result in a
reduction in the bidder’s bidding
eligibility in the next round of bidding
unless an activity rule waiver is used.
During Stage One, reduced eligibility for
the next round will be calculated by
multiplying the bidder’s current round
activity (the sum of bidding units of the
bidder’s provisionally winning bids and
bids during the current round) by fivefourths (5/4).
156. Stage Two: During the second
stage of the auction, a bidder desiring to
maintain its current bidding eligibility
is required to be active on 95 percent of
its current bidding eligibility. Failure to
maintain the required activity level will
result in a reduction in the bidder’s
bidding eligibility in the next round of
bidding unless an activity rule waiver is
used. During Stage Two, reduced
eligibility for the next round will be
calculated by multiplying the bidder’s
current round activity (the sum of
bidding units of the bidder’s
provisionally winning bids and bids
during the current round) by twentynineteenths (20/19).
157. CAUTION: Since activity
requirements increase in Stage Two,
bidders must carefully check their
activity during the first round following
a stage transition to ensure that they are
meeting the increased activity
requirement. This is especially critical
for bidders that have provisionally
winning bids and do not plan to submit
PO 00000
Frm 00047
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
new bids. In past auctions, some bidders
have inadvertently lost bidding
eligibility or used an activity rule
waiver because they did not re-verify
their activity status at stage transitions.
Bidders may check their activity against
the required activity level by logging
into the FCC Auction System.
158. Because the foregoing procedures
have proven successful in maintaining
the proper pace in previous auctions,
the Commission adopts them for
Auction No. 66.
v. Stage Transitions
159. In the Auction No. 66 Comment
Public Notice, the Bureau proposed that
the auction would generally advance to
the next stage (i.e., from Stage One to
Stage Two) when the auction activity
level, as measured by the percentage of
bidding units receiving new
provisionally winning bids, is
approximately 20 percent or lower for
three consecutive rounds of bidding.
The Bureau further proposed that it
would retain the discretion to change
stages unilaterally by announcement
during the auction. This determination,
the Bureau proposed, would be based
on a variety of measures of bidder
activity, including, but not limited to,
the auction activity level, the
percentages of licenses (as measured in
bidding units) on which there are new
bids, the number of new bids, and the
percentage increase in revenue. The one
commenter addressing the proposal
directly supports it.
160. The Commission adopts the
proposal. Thus, the auction will start in
Stage One and will generally advance to
Stage Two when, in each of three
consecutive rounds of bidding, the
provisionally winning bids have been
placed on 20 percent or less of the
licenses being auctioned (as measured
in bidding units). In addition, the
Commission will retain the discretion to
regulate the pace of the auction by
announcement.
vi. Activity Rule Waivers
161. In the Auction No. 66 Comment
Public Notice, the Bureau proposed that
each bidder in the auction be provided
with three activity rule waivers. Three
commenters address the proposal. One
commenter supports the proposal and
two argue that designated entities
should receive additional waivers, to
have the ability to take a time out during
the late stages of the auction. The
comments requesting additional waivers
do not demonstrate why the proposed
three waivers are insufficient, or why
designated entities might have a greater
need for a time out than any other
bidder. The Commission adopts the
E:\FR\FM\21APN1.SGM
21APN1
rwilkins on PROD1PC63 with NOTICES
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 77 / Friday, April 21, 2006 / Notices
proposal that each bidder be provided
three activity rule waivers. The
Commission is satisfied that providing
three waivers over the course of the
auction will give bidders a sufficient
number of waivers and flexibility, while
also safeguarding the integrity of the
auction.
162. Bidders may use an activity rule
waiver in any round during the course
of the auction. Use of an activity rule
waiver preserves the bidder’s current
bidding eligibility despite the bidder’s
activity in the current round being
below the required minimum activity
level. An activity rule waiver applies to
an entire round of bidding and not to a
particular license. Activity rule waivers
can be either applied proactively by the
bidder (a proactive waiver) or applied
automatically by the FCC Auction
System (an automatic waiver) and are
principally a mechanism for auction
participants to avoid the loss of bidding
eligibility in the event that exigent
circumstances prevent them from
placing a bid in a particular round.
163. The FCC Auction System
assumes that bidders with insufficient
activity would prefer to apply an
activity rule waiver (if available) rather
than lose bidding eligibility. Therefore,
the system will automatically apply a
waiver at the end of any bidding round
where a bidder’s activity level is below
the minimum required unless: (1) There
are no activity rule waivers available; or
(2) the bidder overrides the automatic
application of a waiver by reducing
eligibility. If a bidder has no waivers
remaining and does not satisfy the
activity requirement, the FCC Auction
System will permanently reduce the
bidder’s eligibility, possibly curtailing
or eliminating the bidder’s ability to
place additional bids in the auction.
164. A bidder with insufficient
activity that wants to reduce its bidding
eligibility rather than use an activity
rule waiver must affirmatively override
the automatic waiver mechanism during
the bidding round by using the reduce
eligibility function in the FCC Auction
System. In this case, the bidder’s
eligibility is permanently reduced to
bring the bidder into compliance with
the activity rules as described in
Auction Stages. Once eligibility has
been reduced, a bidder will not be
permitted to regain its lost bidding
eligibility even if the round has not yet
closed.
165. Finally, a bidder may apply an
activity rule waiver proactively as a
means to keep the auction open without
placing a bid. If a bidder proactively
applies an activity waiver (using the
apply waiver function in the FCC
Auction System) during a bidding round
VerDate Aug<31>2005
17:21 Apr 20, 2006
Jkt 208001
in which no bids or withdrawals are
submitted, the auction will remain open
and the bidder’s eligibility will be
preserved. However, an automatic
waiver applied by the FCC Auction
System in a round in which there are no
new bids or withdrawals will not keep
the auction open. A bidder cannot
submit a proactive waiver after
submitting a bid in a round, and
submitting a proactive waiver will
preclude a bidder from placing any bids
in that round.
Note: Applying a waiver is irreversible;
once a proactive waiver is submitted that
waiver cannot be unsubmitted, even if the
round has not yet closed.
vii. Auction Stopping Rules
166. For Auction No. 66, the Bureau
proposed to employ a simultaneous
stopping rule approach. The Bureau also
sought comment on a modified version
of the simultaneous stopping rule. The
modified version of the stopping rule
would close the auction for all licenses
after the first round in which no bidder
applies a waiver, places a withdrawal,
or submits any new bids on any license
on which it is not the provisionally
winning bidder. Thus, absent any other
bidding activity, a bidder placing a new
bid on a license for which it is the
provisionally winning bidder would not
keep the auction open under this
modified stopping rule.
167. The Bureau further proposed
retaining the discretion to keep the
auction open even if no new bids or
proactive waivers are submitted and no
provisionally winning bids are
withdrawn in a round. In this event, the
effect will be the same as if a bidder had
applied a waiver. Thus, the activity rule
will apply as usual, and a bidder with
insufficient activity will either use an
activity rule waiver (if it has any left) or
lose bidding eligibility.
168. In addition, the Bureau proposed
that it reserve the right to declare that
the auction will end after a specified
number of additional rounds (special
stopping rule). If the Bureau invokes
this special stopping rule, it will accept
bids in the specified final round(s) and
the auction will close.
169. The Bureau proposed to exercise
these options only in circumstances
such as where the auction is proceeding
very slowly, where there is minimal
overall bidding activity or where it
appears likely that the auction will not
close within a reasonable period of time.
The Bureau noted that before exercising
these options, the Bureau is likely to
attempt to increase the pace of the
auction by, for example, increasing the
number of bidding rounds per day, and/
PO 00000
Frm 00048
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
20687
or increasing the amount of the
minimum bid increments for the limited
number of licenses where there is still
a high level of bidding activity.
170. In comments filed in response to
the Auction No. 66 Comment Public
Notice, a commenter asserts that the
Commission should modify its
simultaneous stopping rule to avoid the
possibility that the stopping rule might
close bidding before the net winning
bids meet the reserve price. The
commenter suggests that in the event
the net winning bids do not meet the
reserve price at the close of a round that
would otherwise trigger the stopping
rule, the Commission should announce
that fact and hold the auction open for
at least one more round. If subsequently
the net winning bids do not meet the
reserve price at the close of a round that
would otherwise trigger the stopping
rule, the Commission could close
bidding and, if necessary, cancel the
auction pursuant to statute. In a
subsequent reply comment, a comment
supported the suggestion.
171. The Commission believes that it
would retain its discretion to keep the
auction open even if no new bids or
proactive waivers are submitted and no
provisionally winning bids are
withdrawn in a round is sufficient to
address the concerns raised in the
comments. This differs from the
commenter’s proposal to the extent that
the decision to keep bidding open will
be within the Bureau’s discretion.
Unlike a fixed rule that the auction will
remain open at least one more round,
this discretionary approach will not
unnecessarily encourage bidders to wait
and see if other bidders will raise bids
to meet the reserve.
172. The Commission believes that
the proposed stopping rules are
appropriate for Auction No. 66, because
of the Commission’s experience in prior
auctions demonstrates that these
stopping rules balance interests of
administrative efficiency and maximum
bidder participation. Therefore the
Commission adopts the proposals made
in the Auction No. 66 Comment Public
Notice. Auction No. 66 will begin under
the simultaneous stopping rule
approach, and the Commission will
retain the discretion to employ the other
versions of the stopping rule.
viii. Auction Delay, Suspension, or
Cancellation
173. In the Auction No. 66 Comment
Public Notice, the Bureau proposed that,
by public notice or by announcement
during the auction, the Bureau may
delay, suspend, or cancel the auction in
the event of natural disaster, technical
obstacle, evidence of an auction security
E:\FR\FM\21APN1.SGM
21APN1
20688
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 77 / Friday, April 21, 2006 / Notices
breach, unlawful bidding activity,
administrative or weather necessity, or
for any other reason that affects the fair
conduct of competitive bidding. The
Commission received no comment on
this issue.
174. Because the Commission’s
approach to notification of delay during
an auction has proven effective in
resolving exigent circumstances in
previous auctions, the Commission
adopts the proposed rules regarding
auction delay, suspension, or
cancellation. By public notice or by
announcement during the auction, the
Commission may delay, suspend, or
cancel the auction in the event of
natural disaster, technical obstacle,
evidence of an auction security breach,
unlawful bidding activity,
administrative or weather necessity, or
for any other reason that affects the fair
and competitive conduct of competitive
bidding. In such cases, the Commission
or the Bureau, in their sole discretion,
may elect to resume the auction starting
from the beginning of the current round,
resume the auction starting from some
previous round, or cancel the auction in
its entirety. Network interruption may
cause the Commission to delay or
suspend the auction. The Commission
emphasizes that exercise of this
authority is solely within the discretion
of the Commission or the Bureau, and
its use is not intended to be a substitute
for situations in which bidders may
wish to apply their activity rule waivers.
B. Bidding Procedures
rwilkins on PROD1PC63 with NOTICES
i. Round Structure
175. The initial schedule of bidding
rounds will be announced in the public
notice listing the qualified bidders,
which is released approximately 10
days before the start of the auction. Each
bidding round is followed by the release
of round results. Multiple bidding
rounds may be conducted in a given
day. Details regarding round results
formats and locations will also be
included in the qualified bidders public
notice.
176. The Bureau has discretion to
change the bidding schedule in order to
foster an auction pace that reasonably
balances speed with the bidders’ need to
study round results and adjust their
bidding strategies. The Bureau may
increase or decrease the amount of time
for the bidding rounds and review
periods, or the number of rounds per
day, depending upon the bidding
activity level and other factors.
VerDate Aug<31>2005
17:21 Apr 20, 2006
Jkt 208001
ii. Reserve Price and Minimum Opening
Bids
177. Section 309(j) of the
Communications Act of 1934, as
amended, calls upon the Commission to
prescribe methods by which a
reasonable reserve price will be required
or a minimum opening bid established
when applications for FCC licenses are
subject to auction (i.e., because they are
mutually exclusive), unless the
Commission determines that a reserve
price or minimum opening bid is not in
the public interest. Consistent with this
mandate, the Commission directed the
Bureau to seek comment on the use of
a minimum opening bid and/or reserve
price prior to the start of each auction.
Among other factors, the Commission
must consider the amount of spectrum
being auctioned, levels of incumbency,
the availability of technology to provide
service, the extent of interference with
other spectrum bands, and any other
relevant factors that could have an
impact on the spectrum being
auctioned. The Commission concluded
that the Bureau should have the
discretion to employ either or both of
these mechanisms for future auctions.
178. Congress recently required the
Commission to revise existing
regulations regarding reserve prices for
auctions involving eligible frequencies
subject to CSEA. CSEA defines eligible
frequencies as including frequencies
from 1710–1755 MHz. Thus, each
AWS–1 license authorizes use of
frequencies, one-half of which are
subject to CSEA requirements. In CSEA,
Congress directed the Commission to
make revisions that would to prescribe
methods by which the total cash
proceeds from any auction of licenses
authorizing use of eligible frequencies
shall equal at least 110 percent of the
total estimated relocation costs provided
to the Commission pursuant to CSEA.
Accordingly, the Commission recently
revised its reserve price rule.
179. CSEA also imposes other related
requirements regarding the proceeds
from an auction involving eligible
frequencies. Pursuant to CSEA, the total
cash proceeds attributable to eligible
spectrum must be at least 110 percent of
the total estimated relocation costs
before the Commission may conclude
the auction. If this condition is not met,
CSEA requires that the Commission
shall cancel the auction.
a. Reserve Price
180. Pursuant to CSEA, on December
27, 2005, NTIA notified the Commission
of the estimated relocation costs and
timelines for relocation of eligible
Federal entities assigned to frequencies
PO 00000
Frm 00049
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
from 1710 to 1755 MHz. NTIA reported
that the total estimated relocation costs
equal $935,940,312.
181. Accordingly, in the Auction No.
66 Comment Public Notice, the Bureau
proposed to establish an aggregate
reserve price of $1,029,534,343.20 for all
AWS–1 licenses. This aggregate reserve
price is 110 percent of total estimated
relocation costs of $935,940,312 and
therefore the minimum reserve price
required by CSEA.
182. For purposes of determining
whether a CSEA revenue requirement
has been met, the Commission has
determined that total cash proceeds
means winning bids net of any
applicable bidding credit discounts at
the end of bidding (e.g., exclusive of
tribal land bidding credits). Given that
one-half of the frequencies authorized
for use by each AWS–1 license is
subject to CSEA, the Bureau proposed in
the Auction No. 66 Comment Public
Notice, that one-half of each relevant
bid for each license would be
considered attributable to eligible
frequencies for purposes of CSEA.
Accordingly, for determining whether
the reserve price is met in Auction No.
66, one-half of each winning bid, net of
any applicable bidding credit discounts
at the end of bidding (e.g., exclusive of
tribal land bidding credits) would be
counted toward meeting the reserve
price. Furthermore, consistent with the
statute, the same amount would
determine whether the auction may
conclude pursuant to CSEA.
183. A few commenters disagree with
the Bureau’s proposal to consider onehalf of each relevant bid when
determining whether the reserve price
has been met. A commenter objects that
the proposal wrongly ‘‘assumes that
precisely one-half of any AWS–1 bid
can be attributed to one-half the
spectrum.’’ The Commenter also argues
that by attributing only half of each
relevant bid to meeting the reserve, the
Commission is improperly ‘‘mandat[ing]
how those funds should be apportioned
over the 45 MHz of spectrum that will
be cleared’’ and ‘‘ensur[ing] that a
minimum of additional funds be
secured for auctioning other spectrum
separate from this band [i.e., the other
half of each license.’’ This, according to
the commenter, amounts to the
Commission ‘‘attempt[ing] to assess a
value [of] the spectrum being
auctioned.’’ In reply comments, two
commenters second the arguments. The
Commission is not persuaded by these
arguments.
184. CSEA plainly provides that the
Commission may attribute a portion of
bids for licenses that authorize use of
both eligible and non-eligible
E:\FR\FM\21APN1.SGM
21APN1
rwilkins on PROD1PC63 with NOTICES
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 77 / Friday, April 21, 2006 / Notices
frequencies to the amounts used to
determine whether CSEA requirements
have been met. Furthermore, it is
reasonable to attribute one-half of
relevant bids to determine whether the
CSEA-required reserve price is met
given that every AWS–1 license
authorizes use of frequencies of which
one-half are eligible frequencies. The
fact that some parties may not value a
license authorizing use of one-half of
the frequencies of an AWS–1 license at
precisely one-half the value of the
corresponding AWS–1 license does not
make this proposal unreasonable.
185. Attributing one-half of relevant
bids to meeting the CSEA-required
reserve price means that the reserve
price only will be met if the full amount
of relevant bids is double the reserve
price. As reflected by the commenters
arguments, this could be viewed as
effectively establishing a reserve price
on the non-CSEA-eligible frequencies
covered by the AWS–1 licenses.
Contrary to the commenter, however,
any effective reserve price for nonCSEA-eligible spectrum is well within
the Commission’s authority. Moreover,
under present circumstances, the
amount of the effective reserve is
appropriate.
186. The Communications Act
expressly contemplates that the
Commission may adopt a reserve price
in any competitive bidding for licenses
and construction permits, not only
when CSEA eligible frequencies are
involved. The Commission’s authority
to do so furthers the Commission’s
statutory mandate to recover for the
public a portion of the value of the
public spectrum resource. The
commenter alleges that the proposed
reserve price attempts to set the value of
non-CSEA-eligible frequencies, which
the commenter contends the
Commission should not do. In the
present circumstances, however, the
amount of the effective reserve price on
non-CSEA-eligible spectrum is
determined by the reserve price on
CSEA eligible spectrum. That amount,
in turn, is based on NTIA’s estimates of
relocation costs to reimburse eligible
federal entities. Thus, the reserve price
does not attempt to, and does not set the
value of the non-CSEA eligible
spectrum, any more than it sets the
value of the CSEA eligible spectrum.
187. Finally, the Commission believes
that effectively requiring that the full
amount of relevant bids to be twice the
estimated relocations costs of eligible
federal entities is consistent with CSEA.
The AWS–1 licenses were defined prior
to the adoption of CSEA and Congress
knew when it referred to proceeds
attributable to eligible frequencies that
VerDate Aug<31>2005
17:21 Apr 20, 2006
Jkt 208001
the Commission intended to make
available licenses combining eligible
and non-eligible frequencies.
188. The Commission adopts the
proposal in the Auction No. 66
Comment Public Notice. The
Commission will apply an aggregate
reserve price of $1,029,534,343.20 to all
AWS–1 licenses in Auction No. 66.
Given that one-half of the frequencies
authorized for use by each license are
CSEA eligible frequencies, one-half of
each winning bid, net of any applicable
bidding credit discounts at the end of
bidding (e.g., exclusive of tribal land
bidding credits), will be counted toward
meeting the reserve price.
189. In light of the proposed
procedures regarding information
available to bidders, the Bureau also
sought comment in the Auction No. 66
Comment Public Notice on whether the
Commission should announce before
the close of bidding whether the reserve
price has been met. In comments, a
commenter stated that if the
Commission proceeds with its proposal
to limit information regarding
provisionally winning bids, it should
make an announcement when the
reserve price has been met.
190. If information on net bids is
withheld during the auction (i.e., if the
modified eligibility ratio is less than
three), the Commission agrees with the
commenter that an announcement
should be made when the reserve price
has been met. Therefore, if information
regarding net bids is not provided, the
Commission will issue an
announcement in the FCC Auction
System stating that the reserve has been
met immediately following the first
round in which that occurs. Both the
registered bidders and the general
public will be able to view such
announcements through the
Commission’s website. The Commission
cautions, however, that an
announcement that the reserve price has
been met following a round of the
auction does not guarantee that the
reserve price will continue to be met.
Accordingly, after making the initial
announcement that the reserve has been
met, the Commission will make a
further announcement in the FCC
Auction System after any round in
which the reserve price status changes.
As noted in the Auction No. 66
Comment Public Notice, the amount of
net winning bids may decline during an
auction, if either provisionally winning
bids are withdrawn or a higher gross but
lower net bid displaces a prior
provisional winner.
PO 00000
Frm 00050
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
20689
b. Minimum Opening Bids
191. In addition to proposing an
aggregate reserve price, the Bureau
proposed in the Auction No. 66
Comment Public Notice to establish
minimum opening bids for each license,
while retaining discretion to lower the
minimum opening bids. Specifically, for
Auction No. 66, the Bureau proposed
the following formula for calculating
license-by-license minimum opening
bids: $0.05 * MHz * License Area
Population.
The Bureau sought comment on this
proposal and, in the alternative,
whether, consistent with the section
309(j), the public interest would be
served by having no minimum opening
bid.
192. The Bureau received a variety of
comments on the proposed level of
minimum opening bids. Some
commenters support the Bureau’s
proposal. A few commenters assert that
no minimum opening bids should be
established, given the use of a reserve
price. Numerous commenters believe
that the formula to determine upfront
payments and minimum opening bids
should not apply the same figure to a
rural population as it does to an urban
population. They assert that because of
higher buildout costs, upfront payments
and minimum opening bids for less
densely populated areas should be
lower than those for more densely
populated areas. More specifically,
many commenters contend that
minimum opening bids for licenses
covering RSAs should be lowered from
$0.05 per MHz*Pop to $0.01, 0.02, or
0.025 per MHz*Pop.
193. In addition, some commenters
have argued that prior auction results
and private market sales indicate that
the proposed minimum opening bids for
sparsely populated areas may exceed
the market price of the license,
potentially resulting in a number of
unsold licenses.
194. In Commission auctions,
minimum opening bids are intended to
serve as useful starting points for
bidding. Minimum opening bids are not
intended to be estimates of final auction
prices or to reflect all differences
between license values. Accordingly,
differences in license characteristics,
such as population density, that may
result in different final prices do not
always necessitate different minimum
opening bids for the licenses.
195. The Commission is persuaded by
the record, however, that minimum
opening bids based on its proposal may
be too high for licenses covering low
density RSAs. The Commission
concludes that it is appropriate to
E:\FR\FM\21APN1.SGM
21APN1
rwilkins on PROD1PC63 with NOTICES
20690
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 77 / Friday, April 21, 2006 / Notices
reduce minimum opening bids for RSAs
by forty percent (40%) from its initial
proposal, i.e. to $0.03 per MHz*Pop.
While some commenters argue for an
even greater reduction, the Commission
is not persuaded that it should lower
minimum opening bids any further.
196. No equivalent evidence supports
a similar reduction in the minimum
opening bids for licenses covering
MSAs. Accordingly, the Commission
will adopt its initial proposal with
respect to such licenses and set the
minimum opening bids using the
proposed formula, i.e., $0.05 per
MHz*Pop.
197. In order to take into account that
rural and urban populations are covered
by a single license in larger geographic
area licenses, the Commission will
apply the lower minimum opening bid
formula for rural areas on a county-bycounty basis for all licenses. More
specifically, the Commission first will
break down the larger geographic areas
into their component counties. The
lower minimum opening bid formula of
$0.03 per MHz*Pop will be applied to
the population of those rural counties
that are included in an RSA. The
formula of $0.05 per MHz*Pop will be
applied to the population of the
remaining counties. The minimum
opening bid for an EA or REAG license
will be calculated as the sum of
minimum opening bids for the counties
in the EA or REAG. Finally, the
Commission has made corresponding
changes in the upfront payments and
bidding units for each license.
198. The Bureau did not receive any
comments addressing its proposal that it
retain the discretion to reduce minimum
opening bid amounts. The Commission
adopts this proposal. The minimum
opening bid amounts the Commission
adopts for Auction No. 66 is reducible
at the discretion of the Bureau. The
Commission emphasizes, however, that
such discretion will be exercised, if at
all, sparingly and early in the auction,
i.e., before bidders lose all activity
waivers. During the course of the
auction, the Commission will not
entertain requests to reduce the
minimum opening bid amount on
specific licenses.
199. The specific minimum opening
bid amounts for each license available
in Auction No. 66 calculated pursuant
to the procedure describe above, as well
as the aggregate reserve price for all
AWS–1 licenses, are set forth in
Attachment A of the Auction No. 66
Procedures Public Notice.
iii. Bid Amounts
200. In each round, each eligible
bidder will be able to place a bid on a
VerDate Aug<31>2005
17:21 Apr 20, 2006
Jkt 208001
particular license for which it applied in
any of nine different amounts. The FCC
Auction System will list the nine bid
amounts for each license. The nine bid
amounts for each license consist of the
minimum acceptable bid amount
calculated using an activity-based
formula and additional amounts
calculated using a bid increment
percentage.
a. Minimum Acceptable Bid Amounts
and Bid Increment Amounts
201. In the Auction No. 66 Comment
Public Notice, the Bureau proposed that
the minimum acceptable bid amount for
a license would be equal to its
minimum opening bid amount until
there is a provisionally winning bid for
the license. After there is a provisionally
winning bid for a license, the minimum
acceptable bid amount for that license
would be equal to the amount of the
provisionally winning bid plus an
additional amount calculated using an
activity-based formula described below.
The Bureau further proposed to retain
the discretion to change the minimum
acceptable bid amounts and bid
increment amounts if circumstances so
dictated. A commenter supports the
proposal. Another commenter suggests
that the Commission should reduce the
percentage used to determine the
minimum acceptable bid as the ratio of
bidder eligibility to licenses, measured
in bidding units, declines. In
subsequent reply comments, a
commenter supports this suggestion. In
light of the Bureau’s discretion to
change the percentages during the
auction, this suggestion can be taken
into account without modifying the
original proposal. The Commission will
consider the suggestion as it exercises
its discretion during the auction.
202. A commenter argues that the
Commission should use a smaller
percentage to determine acceptable bids
for designated entities, in order to
encourage designated entities to remain
in the auction. Pursuant to the proposal,
the Bureau has discretion to change the
percentage in appropriate
circumstances. It may be appropriate to
reduce the percentage to encourage
bidders to continue bidding on a license
in certain circumstances. However, the
Commission is not persuaded that the
percentage should be reduced solely for
designated entities, or any other
particular class of bidder. The
Commission does not believe it is
necessary or appropriate to supplement
the bidding credits the Commission
provides to designated entities with
customized bidding procedures.
203. As another alternative, a
commenter argues that the Commission
PO 00000
Frm 00051
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
should simplify the determination of
minimum acceptable bids using a
simple percentage in place of an
activity-based formula. It further argues
that the Commission should permit
bidders to bid in any amount above the
minimum. The Commission declines to
adopt these alternatives. Determining
minimum acceptable bid amounts based
in part on bidding activity on a license
helps pace the auction. The Commission
cannot be certain in advance of an
auction that using a simple percentage
will approximate results based on
activity. Accordingly, the Commission
believes it is appropriate to use an
activity-based formula to determine
minimum acceptable bids, as well as
additional bid amounts. Finally, with
respect to amounts greater than the
minimum acceptable bid, providing
specified bid amounts both prevents
bidders from sending signals in their
bids and helps bidders avoid errors
when inputting their bids. The
Commission has successfully used this
procedure to help achieve these
purposes.
204. Based on the Commission’s
experience in prior auctions and taking
into account the comments submitted
on this issue, the Commission adopts its
original proposals for Auction No. 66.
The activity-based formula calculates
minimum acceptable bid amounts by
first calculating a percentage increment.
The percentage increment for each
license is a function of bidding activity
on that license in prior rounds;
therefore, a license that has received
many bids will have a higher percentage
increment than a license that has
received few bids. This allows the
minimum acceptable bid amounts to be
tailored to the activity on a license,
decreasing the number of rounds it takes
for license receiving many bids to reach
their final prices. Equations and
examples are shown in Attachment F of
the Auction No. 66 Procedures Public
Notice.
205. The calculation of the percentage
increment used to determine the
minimum acceptable bid amounts for
each license for the next round is made
at the end of each round. The
computation is based on an activity
index, which is a weighted average of
the number of bids in that round and
the activity index from the prior round.
The current activity index is equal to a
weighting factor times the number of
bidders that submit bids on the license
in the most recent bidding round plus
one minus the weighting factor times
the activity index from the prior round.
The activity index is then used to
calculate a percentage increment by
multiplying a minimum percentage
E:\FR\FM\21APN1.SGM
21APN1
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 77 / Friday, April 21, 2006 / Notices
rwilkins on PROD1PC63 with NOTICES
increment by one plus the activity index
with that result being subject to a
maximum percentage increment. The
Bureau proposed to initially set the
weighting factor at 0.5, the minimum
percentage increment at 0.1 (10%), and
the maximum percentage increment at
0.2 (20%). Hence, at these initial
settings, the percentage increment will
fluctuate between 10% and 20%
depending upon the number of bids for
the license. The Commission will round
the result using its standard rounding
procedures.
206. In the case of a license for which
the provisionally winning bid has been
withdrawn, the minimum acceptable
bid amount will equal the second
highest bid received for the license.
207. The minimum acceptable bid
amount for a license will be equal to its
minimum opening bid amount until
there is a provisionally winning bid for
the license. After there is a provisionally
winning bid for a license, the minimum
acceptable bid amount for that license
will be equal to the amount of the
provisionally winning bid plus an
additional amount. Using the activitybased formula described above, the FCC
Auction system will calculate a
percentage increment at the end of each
round to determine the minimum
acceptable bid amount for each license
for the next round.
b. Additional Bid Amounts
208. The acceptable bid amounts in
addition to the minimum acceptable bid
amount for each license are calculated
using a bid increment percentage. The
first additional acceptable bid amount
equals the minimum acceptable bid
amount times one plus the bid
increment percentage, rounded—e.g., if
the increment percentage is 10 percent,
the calculation is (minimum acceptable
bid amount) * (1 + 0.10), rounded, or
(minimum acceptable bid amount) *
1.10, rounded; the second additional
acceptable bid amount equals the
minimum acceptable bid amount times
one plus two times the bid increment
percentage, rounded, or (minimum
acceptable bid amount) * 1.20, rounded;
the third additional acceptable bid
amount equals the minimum acceptable
bid amount times one plus three times
the bid increment percentage, rounded,
or (minimum acceptable bid amount) *
1.30, rounded; etc. The Bureau will
begin the auction with a bid increment
percentage of 10 percent.
209. The Bureau retains the discretion
to change the minimum acceptable bid
amounts, the parameters of the formula
to determine the percentage increment,
and the bid increment percentage if it
determines that circumstances so
VerDate Aug<31>2005
17:21 Apr 20, 2006
Jkt 208001
dictate. The Bureau will do so by
announcement in the FCC Auction
System during the auction. The Bureau
may also use its discretion to adjust the
minimum bid increment amount
without prior notice if circumstances
warrant.
iv. Provisionally Winning Bids
210. At the end of each bidding
round, a provisionally winning bid will
be determined based on the highest bid
amount received for each license. A
provisionally winning bid will remain
the provisionally winning bid until
there is a higher bid on the same license
at the close of a subsequent round.
Provisionally winning bids at the end of
the auction become the winning bids.
Bidders are reminded that provisionally
winning bids count toward activity for
purposes of the activity rule.
211. In the Auction No. 66 Comment
Public Notice, the Bureau proposed to
use a random number generator to select
a single provisionally winning bid in
the event of identical high bid amounts
being submitted on a license in a given
round (i.e., tied bids). One commenter
addressed the Bureau’s proposed
method for breaking ties. A commenter
asserts that the use of a random number
generator to break ties among bids
amounts to using a system of random
selection beyond the Commission’s
statutory authority to assign licenses.
The Commission disagrees. Using a
random number generator to break ties
among bids submitted as part of a
system of competitive bidding does not
amount to random assignment of
licenses. The statutory provision cited
by the commenter, which terminates the
Commission’s prior authority pursuant
to section 309(i) of the Communications
Act, simply does not apply to the
Commission’s authority to conduct
competitive bidding pursuant to section
309(j) of the Communications Act.
Moreover, the random number generator
only determines the provisionally
winning bid after a round in which
bidders submit tie bids. Bidders that
lose a tie-break in one round are able to
raise their bids in subsequent rounds.
Consequently, a license only will be
awarded to a bid that wins a tie-break
if other bidders decline to raise their
bids. This does not amount to a system
of random selection. The Commission
did not receive any comments
addressing the merits of the proposed
method of breaking ties. In light of its
successful use in prior auctions, the
Commission adopts the proposal.
v. Bid Removal and Bid Withdrawal
212. In the Auction No. 66 Comment
Public Notice, the Commission
PO 00000
Frm 00052
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
20691
proposed bid removal and bid
withdrawal procedures. With respect to
bid withdrawals, the Commission
proposed limiting each bidder to
withdrawals in no more than two
rounds during the course of the auction.
The round in which withdrawals are
used would be at each bidder’s
discretion. One commenter expressed
support for the Bureau’s proposal
concerning bid withdrawals. The
Commission adopts the proposal.
213. Procedures. Before the close of a
bidding round, a bidder has the option
of removing any bids placed in that
round. Removing a bid will affect a
bidder’s activity for the round in which
it is removed, i.e., a bid that is removed
does not count toward bidding activity.
These procedures will enhance bidder
flexibility during the auction, and
therefore the Commission adopts them
for Auction No. 66.
214. Once a round closes, a bidder
may no longer remove a bid. However,
in later rounds, a bidder may withdraw
provisionally winning bids from
previous rounds using the withdraw
bids function in the FCC Auction
System. A provisionally winning bidder
that withdraws its provisionally
winning bid from a previous round
during the auction is subject to the bid
withdrawal payments specified in 47
CFR 1.2104(g).
215. In previous auctions, the
Commission has detected bidder
conduct that, arguably, may have
constituted anti-competitive behavior
through the use of bid withdrawals.
While the Commission continues to
recognize the important role that bid
withdrawals may play in an auction, the
Commission concludes that, for Auction
No. 66, adoption of a limit on the use
of withdrawals to two rounds per bidder
is appropriate. By doing so the
Commission believes it strikes a
reasonable compromise that will allow
bidders to use withdrawals. The
Commission based its decision on this
issue upon its experience with bid
withdrawals in prior auctions, including
PCS D, E and F block and 800 MHz
SMR, and FM broadcast auctions.
216. The Commission will therefore
limit the number of rounds in which
bidders may place withdrawals to two
rounds. These rounds will be at the
bidder’s discretion and there will be no
limit on the number of bids that may be
withdrawn in either of these rounds.
Withdrawals during the auction will be
subject to the bid withdrawal payments
specified in 47 CFR 1.2104(g). Bidders
should note that abuse of the
Commission’s bid withdrawal
procedures could result in the denial of
the ability to bid on a market.
E:\FR\FM\21APN1.SGM
21APN1
rwilkins on PROD1PC63 with NOTICES
20692
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 77 / Friday, April 21, 2006 / Notices
217. If a provisionally winning bid is
withdrawn, the minimum acceptable
bid amount will equal the amount of the
second highest bid received for the
license, which may be less than, or in
the case of tied bids, equal to, the
amount of the withdrawn bid. To set the
additional bid amounts, the second
highest bid amount also will be used in
place of the provisionally winning bid
in the formula used to calculate bid
increment amounts. The Commission
will serve as a place holder
provisionally winning bidder on the
license until a new bid is submitted on
that license.
218. Calculation. Generally, the
Commission imposes payments on
bidders that withdraw high bids during
the course of an auction. If a bidder
withdraws its bid and there is no higher
bid in the same or subsequent
auction(s), the bidder that withdrew its
bid is responsible for the difference
between its withdrawn bid and the
provisionally winning bid in the same
or subsequent auction(s). In the case of
multiple bid withdrawals on a single
license, within the same or subsequent
auctions(s), the payment for each bid
withdrawal will be calculated based on
the sequence of bid withdrawals and the
amounts withdrawn. No withdrawal
payment will be assessed for a
withdrawn bid if either the subsequent
winning bid or any of the intervening
subsequent withdrawn bids, in either
the same or subsequent auctions(s),
equals or exceeds that withdrawn bid.
Thus, a bidder that withdraws a bid will
not be responsible for any withdrawal
payments if there is a subsequent higher
bid in the same or subsequent
auction(s). This policy allows bidders
most efficiently to allocate their
resources as well as to evaluate their
bidding strategies and business plans
during an auction while, at the same
time, maintaining the integrity of the
auction process. The Bureau retains the
discretion to scrutinize multiple bid
withdrawals on a single license for
evidence of anti-competitive strategic
behavior and take appropriate action
when deemed necessary.
219. Section 1.2104(g)(1) of the rules
sets forth the payment obligations of a
bidder that withdraws a high bid on a
license during the course of an auction,
and provides for the assessment of
interim bid withdrawal payments. The
Commission recently revised
§ 1.2104(g)(1) to provide that in advance
of each auction it shall establish the
percentage of the withdrawn bid to be
assessed as an interim bid withdrawal
payment between three percent (3%)
and twenty percent (20%). Further, the
rule provides that the Commission will
VerDate Aug<31>2005
17:21 Apr 20, 2006
Jkt 208001
set the percentage of withdrawn bids to
be assessed as interim bid withdrawal
payments prior to each auction. In the
Auction No. 66 Comment Public Notice,
the Bureau proposed to establish the
percentage at ten percent (10%) for the
AWS–1 auction and sought comment on
the proposal.
220. Commenters divided on the
proposed interim bid withdrawal
percentage, with some arguing that it
would be too high, others too low, and
others supporting the Bureau’s proposal.
221. The Commission adopts the
proposal. The Commission will assess
an interim withdrawal payment equal to
ten percent (10%) of the amount of the
withdrawn bids. The ten percent (10%)
interim payment will be applied toward
any final bid withdrawal payment that
will be assessed after subsequent
auction of the license. Assessing an
interim bid withdrawal payment
ensures that the Commission receives a
minimal withdrawal payment pending
assessment of any final withdrawal
payment. § 1.2104(g) provides specific
examples showing application of the bid
withdrawal payment rule.
vi. Round Results
222. The information available after
each round will vary depending on
whether the modified eligibility ratio
indicates the strong likelihood of a
highly competitive auction. If the
modified eligibility ratio is less than
three and information is withheld in
accordance with the proposed as
modified above, information about the
results of a round will be made public
after the conclusion of the round.
Specifically, after a round closes, the
Commission will compile a report
listing each license, its current
provisionally winning bid amount, the
minimum acceptable bid amount for the
following round, the number of bids
placed on the license during the round,
and whether the license is FCC held.
The Commission will post the report so
that it is publicly accessible. Moreover,
after the auction, the Commission will
release complete reports of all bids
placed during each round of the
auction, including bidder identities. The
Commission will post those reports so
that they are publicly accessible.
223. If, however, the modified
eligibility ratio indicates the strong
likelihood of a highly competitive
auction (i.e., the modified eligibility
ratio is three or greater), information
will be provided in the same fashion
typically provided after each round in
the auction. Bids placed during a round
will be made public at the conclusion of
that round. Specifically, after a round
closes, the Commission will compile
PO 00000
Frm 00053
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
reports of all bids placed and which
bidders made them, current
provisionally winning bids, new
minimum acceptable bid amounts, and
bidder eligibility status (bidding
eligibility and activity rule waivers) and
will post the reports for public access.
vii. Auction Announcements
224. The Commission will use auction
announcements to announce items such
as schedule changes and stage
transitions. All Commission auction
announcements will be available by
clicking a link in the FCC Auction
System.
viii. Maintaining the Accuracy of FCC
Form 175 Information
225. After the short-form filing
deadline, applicants may make only
minor changes to their FCC Form 175
applications. In addition, applicants
should submit a letter, briefly
summarizing the changes, by electronic
mail to the attention of Margaret
Wiener, Chief, Auctions and Spectrum
Access Division, at the following
address: auction66@fcc.gov. The
electronic mail summarizing the
changes must include a subject or
caption referring to Auction No. 66 and
the name of the applicant.
226. Applicants should not submit
application-specific material through
ECFS into the record of the proceeding
concerning Auction No. 66 procedures.
V. Post-Auction Procedures
A. Down Payments
227. After bidding has ended, the
Commission will issue a public notice
declaring the auction closed and
identifying winning bidders, down
payments and final payments due.
228. Within ten business days after
release of the auction closing notice,
each winning bidder must submit
sufficient funds (in addition to its
upfront payment) to bring its total
amount of money on deposit with the
Commission for Auction No. 66 to 20
percent of the net amount of its winning
bids (gross bids less any applicable
small business or very small business
bidding credits).
B. Final Payments
229. Each winning bidder will be
required to submit the balance of the net
amount of its winning bids within 10
business days after the deadline for
submitting down payments.
C. Long-Form Application (FCC Form
601)
230. Within ten business days after
release of the auction closing notice,
winning bidders must electronically
E:\FR\FM\21APN1.SGM
21APN1
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 77 / Friday, April 21, 2006 / Notices
submit a properly completed long-form
application (FCC Form 601) for each
license won through Auction No. 66.
Winning bidders that are small
businesses or very small businesses
must demonstrate their eligibility for a
small business or very small business
bidding credit.
231. The recently adopted CSEA/Part
1 Report and Order, 71 FR 6214,
February 7, 2006, modifies the
procedure by which a consortium that is
a winning bidder in Auction No. 66 will
apply for a license. In particular, (a)
each member or group of members of a
winning consortium seeking separate
licenses will be required to file a
separate long-form application for its
respective license(s) and, in the case of
a license to be partitioned or
disaggregated, the member or group
filing the applicable long-form
application shall provide the parties’
partitioning or disaggregation agreement
in its long-form application; (b) two or
more consortium members seeking to be
licensed together shall first form a legal
business entity; and (c) any such entity
must meet the applicable eligibility
requirements in the Commission’s rules
for small business or entrepreneur
status. Applicants applying as consortia
should review the CSEA/Part 1 Report
and Order in detail and monitor any
relevant future proceedings to
understand how the members of the
consortia will apply for a license in the
event they are winning bidders.
D. Ownership Disclosure Information
Report (FCC Form 602)
232. At the time it submits its longform application (FCC Form 601), each
winning bidder also must comply with
the ownership reporting requirements as
set forth in 47 CFR 1.913, 1.919, and
1.2112. An ownership disclosure record
is automatically created in the Universal
Licensing System (ULS) for any
applicant that submits an FCC Form
175. However, winning bidders will be
required to review and confirm that it is
complete and accurate as of the date of
filing Form 601.
rwilkins on PROD1PC63 with NOTICES
E. Tribal Lands Bidding Credit
233. A winning bidder that intends to
use its license(s) to deploy facilities and
provide services to federally recognized
tribal lands that are unserved by any
telecommunications carrier or that have
a wireline penetration rate equal to or
below 85 percent is eligible to receive a
tribal lands bidding credit (TLBC) as set
forth in 47 CFR 1.2107 and 1.2110(f). A
TLBC is in addition to, and separate
from, any other bidding credit for which
a winning bidder may qualify.
VerDate Aug<31>2005
17:21 Apr 20, 2006
Jkt 208001
234. Unlike other bidding credits that
are requested prior to the auction, a
winning bidder applies for the TLBC
after winning the auction when it files
its long-form application (FCC Form
601). When initially filing the long-form
application, the winning bidder will be
required to advise the Commission
whether it intends to seek a TLBC, for
each market won in the auction, by
checking the designated box(es). After
stating its intent to seek a TLBC, the
applicant will have 180 days from the
close of the long-form filing window to
amend its application to select the
specific tribal lands to be served and
provide the required tribal government
certifications. Licensees receiving a
TLBC are subject to performance criteria
as set forth in 47 CFR 1.2110(f)(3)(vi).
235. After all such applications have
been finally resolved, the Commission
will recalculate the amount of pro rata
credits using the aggregate amount of
actual full credits—i.e., the TLBCs for
which the applicants would have
qualified absent the limitations resulting
from the reserve price—rather than the
hypothetical maximum aggregate
amount for which all applicants might
have qualified. In other words, the ratio
of (a) each applicant’s recalculated pro
rata credit to (b) the total funds available
for TLBCs will equal the ratio of (a) the
applicant’s full credit (the TLBC for
which that applicant would have
qualified absent limitations resulting
from the reserve price) to (b) the
aggregate amount of the actual full
credits. In the event that the
recalculated pro rata credit is larger than
the initial pro rata credit, the
Commission will award the difference.
If the second calculation produces a
different result from the first, it will
reflect the fact that when the amount of
any one applicant’s portion of the fixed
funds available for TLBCs decreases, the
amounts of other applicants’ portions
should increase. An applicant’s portion
of the fixed funds might decrease, for
example, if it reaches agreements with
tribal governments regarding service for
less than the full area of tribal land
covered by the license. Consequently,
that applicant may be eligible for a
credit smaller than the largest credit
possible.
F. Default and Disqualification
236. Any high bidder that defaults or
is disqualified after the close of the
auction (i.e., fails to remit the required
down payment within the prescribed
period of time, fails to submit a timely
long-form application, fails to make full
payment, or is otherwise disqualified)
will be subject to the payments
described in 47 CFR 1.2104(g)(2). The
PO 00000
Frm 00054
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
20693
payments include both a deficiency
payment, equal to the difference
between the amount of the bidder’s bid
and the amount of the winning bid the
next time a license covering the same
spectrum is won in an auction, plus an
additional payment equal to a
percentage of the defaulter’s bid or of
the subsequent winning bid, whichever
is less. Pursuant to recent modifications
to the rule governing default payments,
the percentage of the applicable bid to
be assessed as an additional payment for
defaults in a particular auction will be
established in advance of the auction.
Accordingly, in the Auction No. 66
Comment Public Notice, the Bureau
proposed to set the additional default
payment for the auction of AWS–1
licenses at ten percent (10%) of the
applicable bid. The Bureau sought
comment on its proposal.
237. Some commenters supported the
proposal as setting an appropriate
deterrent to default. Others contend that
there is no reason to increase the
percentage of the additional default
payment from three percent (3%) as
provided under prior rules. As these
comments reflect, the primary purpose
of setting the additional default
payment is to deter defaults. The precise
level of deterrence provided by any
particular percentage is difficult to
determine. However, continued defaults
in past Commission auctions indicate
that the prior level of three percent (3%)
is not sufficient. Moreover, as noted in
the Auction No. 66 Comment Public
Notice, the public interest in rapid
deployment of new advanced wireless
services using licenses available for the
first time in Auction No. 66 would be
adversely affected by defaults. The
Commission continues to believe its
proposal to increase the percentage from
three percent (3%) to ten percent (10%)
is in the public interest. The
Commission therefore adopts its
proposal and set the additional default
payment for the auction of AWS–1
licenses at ten percent (10%) of the
applicable bid.
238. Finally, the Commission notes
that in the event of a default, it may reauction the license or offer it to the next
highest bidder (in descending order) at
its final bid amount. In addition, if a
default or disqualification involves
gross misconduct, misrepresentation, or
bad faith by an applicant, the
Commission may declare the applicant
and its principals ineligible to bid in
future auctions, and may take any other
action that it deems necessary,
including institution of proceedings to
revoke any existing licenses held by the
applicant.
E:\FR\FM\21APN1.SGM
21APN1
20694
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 77 / Friday, April 21, 2006 / Notices
G. Refund of Remaining Upfront
Payment Balance
239. All applicants that submit
upfront payments but after the close of
the auction are not winning bidders for
a license in Auction No. 66 may be
entitled to a refund of their remaining
upfront payment balance after the
conclusion of the auction.
240. Bidders that drop out of the
auction completely may be eligible for
a refund of their upfront payments
before the close of the auction. Qualified
bidders that have exhausted all of their
activity rule waivers, have no remaining
bidding eligibility, and have not
withdrawn a provisionally winning bid
during the auction must submit a
written refund request. If the applicant
has completed the refund instructions
electronically, then a written request for
the refund is not necessary. If not, the
request must be in writing and include
wire transfer instructions, Taxpayer
Identification Number (TIN) and FCC
Registration Number (FRN). Send
refund requests to: Federal
Communications Commission,
Financial Operations Center, Auctions
Accounting Group, Attn: Gail Glasser,
445 12th Street, SW., Room 1–C864,
Washington, DC 20554.
Federal Communications Commission.
Marlene H. Dortch,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 06–3819 Filed 4–20–06; 8:45 am]
Peachtree Street, N.E., Atlanta, Georgia
30303:
1. Robin and Cherie Arkley Revocable
Algiers Bancorp Stock Trust, Eureka,
California, with Robin P. Arkley II and
Cherie P. Arkley, Eureka, California, as
trustees; the Allison E. Arkley Trust No.
5, Eureka, California, with Russell N.
Bacon, managing member of CTT, LLC,
Eureka, California, and John L. Piland as
trustees; and the Elizabeth A. Arkley
Trust No. 5, with Russell N. Bacon,
managing member of CTT, LLC, Eureka,
California, and John L. Piland as
trustees; and Jack J. Mendheim and
Stephanie C. Mendheim, Folsom,
Louisiana; to acquire voting shares of
Algiers Bancorp, Inc., Baton Rouge,
Louisiana, and thereby indirectly
acquire voting shares of StatewideBank,
Terrytown, Louisiana.
B. Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
(Patrick M. Wilder, Assistant Vice
President) 230 South LaSalle Street,
Chicago, Illinois 60690-1414:
1. The Valley Community Bancorp,
Inc. Voting Trust, Robert Hoge, Kenneth
Kaergard, and Larry Breon, trustees, all
of St. Charles, Illinois; to acquire voting
shares of Valley Community Bancorp,
Inc., St. Charles, Illinois, and thereby
indirectly acquire voting shares of
Valley Community Bank, St. Charles,
Illinois.
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, April 18, 2006.
Robert deV. Frierson,
Deputy Secretary of the Board.
[FR Doc. E6–5996 Filed 4–20–06; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6712–01–P
writing on the standards enumerated in
the BHC Act (12 U.S.C. 1842(c)). If the
proposal also involves the acquisition of
a nonbanking company, the review also
includes whether the acquisition of the
nonbanking company complies with the
standards in section 4 of the BHC Act
(12 U.S.C. 1843). Unless otherwise
noted, nonbanking activities will be
conducted throughout the United States.
Additional information on all bank
holding companies may be obtained
from the National Information Center
website at www.ffiec.gov/nic/.
Unless otherwise noted, comments
regarding each of these applications
must be received at the Reserve Bank
indicated or the offices of the Board of
Governors not later than May 18, 2006.
A. Federal Reserve Bank of San
Francisco (Tracy Basinger, Director,
Regional and Community Bank Group)
101 Market Street, San Francisco,
California 94105-1579:
1. RiverBank Holding Company,
Spokane, Washington; to become a bank
holding company by acquiring 100
percent of the voting shares of
RiverBank, Spokane, Washington (in
organization).
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, April 18, 2006.
Robert deV. Frierson,
Deputy Secretary of the Board.
[FR Doc. E6–5997 Filed 4–20–06; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6210–01–S
BILLING CODE 6210–01–S
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES
FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM
Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention
Formations of, Acquisitions by, and
Mergers of Bank Holding Companies
Board of Scientific Counselors,
National Center for Infectious Diseases
The companies listed in this notice
have applied to the Board for approval,
pursuant to the Bank Holding Company
Act of 1956 (12 U.S.C. 1841 et seq.)
(BHC Act), Regulation Y (12 CFR Part
225), and all other applicable statutes
and regulations to become a bank
holding company and/or to acquire the
assets or the ownership of, control of, or
the power to vote shares of a bank or
bank holding company and all of the
banks and nonbanking companies
owned by the bank holding company,
including the companies listed below.
The applications listed below, as well
as other related filings required by the
Board, are available for immediate
inspection at the Federal Reserve Bank
indicated. The application also will be
available for inspection at the offices of
the Board of Governors. Interested
persons may express their views in
In accordance with section 10(a)(2) of
the Federal Advisory Committee Act
(Pub. L. 92–463), the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC)
announces the following committee
meeting.
Name: Board of Scientific Counselors
(BSC), National Center for Infectious
Diseases (NCID).
Times and Dates: 9 a.m.–5:30 p.m.,
May 11, 2006. 8:30 a.m.–2 p.m., May 12,
2006.
Place: CDC, Building 19, 1600 Clifton
Road, NE., Atlanta, Georgia 30333.
Status: Open to the public, limited
only by the space available.
Purpose: The BSC, NCID, provides
advice and guidance to the Director,
CDC, and Director, NCID, in the
following areas: Program goals and
objectives; strategies; program
organization and resources for
FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM
rwilkins on PROD1PC63 with NOTICES
Change in Bank Control Notices;
Acquisition of Shares of Bank or Bank
Holding Companies
The notificants listed below have
applied under the Change in Bank
Control Act (12 U.S.C. 1817(j)) and
§ 225.41 of the Board’s Regulation Y (12
CFR 225.41) to acquire a bank or bank
holding company. The factors that are
considered in acting on the notices are
set forth in paragraph 7 of the Act (12
U.S.C. 1817(j)(7)).
The notices are available for
immediate inspection at the Federal
Reserve Bank indicated. The notices
also will be available for inspection at
the office of the Board of Governors.
Interested persons may express their
views in writing to the Reserve Bank
indicated for that notice or to the offices
of the Board of Governors. Comments
must be received not later than May 8,
2006.
A. Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta
(Andre Anderson, Vice President) 1000
VerDate Aug<31>2005
17:21 Apr 20, 2006
Jkt 208001
PO 00000
Frm 00055
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
E:\FR\FM\21APN1.SGM
21APN1
Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 71, Number 77 (Friday, April 21, 2006)]
[Notices]
[Pages 20672-20694]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 06-3819]
=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
[AU Docket No. 06-30; Report No. AUC-06-66-B; (Auction No. 66) FCC 06-
47]
Auction of Advanced Wireless Services Licenses Scheduled for June
29, 2006; Notice of Filing Requirements, Minimum Opening Bids, Upfront
Payments and Other Procedures for Auction No. 66
AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission.
ACTION: Notice.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: This document announces the procedures and minimum opening
bids for the upcoming auction of Advanced Wireless Services licenses in
the 1710-1755 MHz and 21102155 MHz bands. This document is intended to
familiarize prospective bidders with the procedures, minimum opening
bids and reserve price for this auction.
DATES: Auction No. 66 is scheduled to begin on June 29, 2006.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For legal questions: Scott Mackoul at
(202) 418-0660. For general auction questions: Roy Knowles or Lisa
Stover at (717) 338-2888. For service rules questions: David Hu or John
Spencer at (202) 418-0200; Beth Fishel at (717) 338-2649.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a summary of the Auction No. 66
Procedures Public Notice released on April 12, 2006. The complete text
of the Auction No. 66 Procedures Public Notice, including attachments
and related Commission documents is available for public inspection and
copying from 8 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. Monday through Thursday or from 8 a.m.
to 11:30 a.m. on Friday at the FCC Reference Information Center,
Portals II, 445 12th Street, SW., Room CY-A257, Washington, DC 20554.
The Auction No. 66 Procedures Public Notice and related Commission
documents may also be purchased from the Commission's duplicating
contractor, Best Copy and Printing, Inc. (BCPI), Portals II, 445 12th
Street, SW., Room CY-B402, Washington, DC 20554, telephone 202-488-
5300, facsimile 202-488-5563, or you may contact BCPI at its Web site:
https://www.BCPIWEB.com. When ordering documents from BCPI please
provide the appropriate FCC document number, for example, FCC 06-47.
The Auction No. 66 Procedures Public Notice and related documents are
also available on the Internet at the Commission's Web site: https://
wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/66/.
I. General Information
A. Introduction
1. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC or Commission)
announces the procedures, minimum opening bids, and reserve price for
the upcoming auction of Advanced Wireless Services licenses in the
1710-1755 MHz and 2110-2155 MHz bands (AWS-1) scheduled for June 29,
2006 (Auction No. 66). On January 31, 2006, in accordance with section
309(j)(3) of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, the Wireless
Telecommunications Bureau (Bureau) released a public notice seeking
comment on a reserve price and minimum opening bid amounts and the
procedures to be used in Auction No. 66. Interested parties submitted
54 comments and 16 reply comments in response to the Auction No. 66
Comment Public Notice, 71 FR 6486, February 8, 2006, as well as a
number of ex parte or late-filed submissions.
2. In the Auction No. 66 Comment Public Notice, the Bureau proposed
to include all 1,122 AWS-1 licenses in a single auction using the
Commission's standard simultaneous multiple-round (SMR) auction format.
The Bureau sought comment on the feasibility and desirability of
allocating the AWS-1 licenses among two auctions, run concurrently,
with one of the auctions using the standard SMR format and the other
using the Commission's package bidding format (SMR-PB). Based on the
record and the particular circumstances of the auction of AWS-1
licenses, the Commission, will include all 1,122 AWS-1 licenses in a
single auction using the Commission's standard SMR format, as proposed.
Package bidding will not be used in Auction No. 66.
3. The Bureau also proposed in the Auction No. 66 Comment Public
Notice to withhold certain information on bidder interests, bids and
bidder identities that typically has been revealed prior to and during
past Commission auctions. The proposal was made in response to analysis
suggesting
[[Page 20673]]
that under certain circumstances the competitiveness and economic
efficiency of an SMR auction may be enhanced if such information is
withheld until after the close of the auction.
4. Taking into account concerns raised in the record, the
Commission has decided to modify its proposal. First, consistent with a
suggested compromise between the proposal and the Commission's past
practice that was the subject of extensive comment in the record, the
Commission will withhold certain information unless it appears that the
auction will be sufficiently competitive that any anti-competitive
behavior addressed by the original proposal would be unlikely to be
successful. To gauge the likely level of competition in this upcoming
auction, the Commission will evaluate the level of prospective bidders'
bidding eligibility. Specifically, if all the bidders' bidding
eligibility, measured in bidding units (subject to a cap on the amount
of any one bidder's eligibility) divided by all licenses in the
auction, measured in bidding units is equal to or greater than three,
the Commission believes the auction will be sufficiently competitive.
For the purposes of determining the modified eligibility ratio, the
bidding eligibility of any one bidder may be no more than 50 percent of
the bidding units of all licenses in the auction. If the modified
eligibility ratio is three or greater, the likely level of competition
should be sufficient to make anti-competitive outcomes difficult to
sustain. Second, if the modified eligibility ratio is less than three
and, therefore, certain information is withheld, the Commission will
follow the original proposal with two changes: (1) The Commission will
release each bidder's eligibility and upfront payment made prior to the
start of the auction; and (2) the Commission will release all gross
bids for each license (including the losing bids) after each round, but
not bidder identities. The Commission believes this compromise provides
bidders with additional information regarding license valuations
without compromising the proposal's goal of reducing the potential for
anti-competitive outcomes.
5. Pursuant to these procedures, license selection information will
be withheld, at least initially. Therefore, to enable applicants to
comply with the Commission's anti-collusion rules, each applicant with
a short-form application to participate in a pending auction will
receive a letter that lists the applicants in Auction No. 66 that have
applied for licenses in any of the same geographic areas as the
applicant, once the Commission has conducted its initial review of
applications to participate in Auction No. 66.
6. The Auction No. 66 Comment Public Notice proposed an aggregate
reserve price of $1,029,534,343.20 for all AWS-1 licenses in order to
implement a Congressional mandate to recover estimated relocation costs
for government incumbent operators in the lower (1710-1755 MHz) AWS-1
spectrum band. Under the Commercial Spectrum Enhancement Act (CSEA),
the Commission cannot conclude any auction of statutorily-defined
eligible frequencies if the total cash proceeds attributable to such
spectrum are less than 110 percent of the total estimated relocation
costs of eligible federal entities assigned to the frequencies. The
lower half of the frequencies covered by AWS-1 licenses, 1710-1755 MHz,
are eligible frequencies. Accordingly, the Commission will cancel the
auction if the winning bids net of applicable discounts at the end of
bidding that are attributable to such spectrum are less than 110
percent of the total estimated relocation costs, or $1,029,534,343.20.
Given that one-half of the frequencies authorized for use by each
license are CSEA eligible frequencies, one-half of each winning bid,
net of any applicable bidding credit discounts at the end of bidding
(e.g., exclusive of tribal land bidding credits), will be counted
toward meeting this reserve price. Therefore, the winning bids (net of
bidding credits) in the auction must total at least approximately $2.06
billion in order for the Commission to conclude the auction and award
the licenses.
i. Background of Proceeding
7. Growth in demand for mobile wireless services, coupled with the
rise of the Internet and greater broadband availability, have increased
the need for additional spectrum and advanced technologies capable of
providing advanced wireless services, including wireless Internet
access and other high-speed information and entertainment services.
Enhancements to current wireless network technologies, as well as the
development of new technologies, are continuing to improve and expand
the deployment of wireless broadband.
8. In order to facilitate the rapid deployment of broadband
technologies, the Commission has allocated spectrum to meet the demand
for advanced wireless services. In the Second Report and Order in ET
Docket No. 00-258, 66 FR 47618, September 13, 2001, the Commission
allocated the 1710-1755, 2110-2150 and 2150-2155 MHz bands for AWS-1
and combined these latter two bands into a single 45-megahertz
allocation (i.e., 2110-2155 MHz). The Commission subsequently adopted
service rules for AWS in these bands, including application, licensing,
operating and technical rules.
9. Making this spectrum available requires relocating incumbent
operations, both Federal Government (Government) and non-Federal
Government (non-Government). Relocation of Government operations is
subject to the CSEA. For non-Government operations, the Commission's
Emerging Technologies proceeding adopted a relocation policy designed
to allow early entry for new technology providers into reallocated
spectrum by allowing providers of new services to negotiate financial
arrangements for reaccommodation of incumbent licensees.
ii. Licenses To Be Auctioned
10. Auction No. 66 will offer 1,122 licenses: 36 Regional Economic
Area Grouping (REAG) licenses, 352 Economic Area (EA) licenses, and 734
Cellular Market Area (CMA) licenses. A complete list of the AWS-1
licenses available in Auction No. 66 can be found in Attachment A of
Auction No. 66 Procedures Public Notice.
B. Rules and Disclaimers
i. Relevant Authority
11. Prospective applicants must familiarize themselves thoroughly
with the Commission's general competitive bidding rules set forth in
Title 47, part 1, of the Code of Federal Regulations, including recent
amendments and clarifications; rules relating to the Advanced Wireless
Services and emerging technologies contained in Title 47, parts 27 and
101, of the Code of Federal Regulations; and rules relating to
applications, practice and procedure contained in Title 47, part 1, of
the Code of Federal Regulations. Prospective applicants must also be
thoroughly familiar with the procedures, terms and conditions contained
in the Auction No. 66 Procedures Public Notice and the Commission's
decisions in proceedings regarding competitive bidding procedures,
application requirements, and obligations of Commission licensees.
12. The terms contained in the Commission's rules, relevant orders,
and public notices are not negotiable. The Commission may amend or
supplement the information contained in its public notices at any time,
and will issue public notices to convey any new or supplemental
information to applicants. It is the responsibility of all
[[Page 20674]]
applicants to remain current with all Commission rules and with all
public notices pertaining to this auction.
ii. Prohibition of Collusion; Compliance With Antitrust Laws
13. To ensure the competitiveness of the auction process, Sec.
1.2105(c) of the Commission's rules prohibit applicants competing for
licenses in any of the same geographic license areas from communicating
with each other about bids, bidding strategies, or settlements unless
such applicants have identified each other on their short-form
applications (FCC Forms 175) as parties with whom they have entered
into agreements pursuant to Sec. 1.2105(a)(2)(viii). In Auction No.
66, the rule would apply to any applicants bidding for the same CMA,
EA, or REAG. The rule would also apply to applicants bidding for
licenses in overlapping CMAs, EAs, and REAGs. In addition, the rule
would preclude applicants that apply to bid for all markets from
communicating with all other applicants. Applicants that have applied
for the same markets (unless they have identified each other on their
FCC Form 175 applications as parties with whom they have entered into
agreements under Sec. 1.2105(a)(2)(viii)) must affirmatively avoid all
communications with or disclosures to each other that affect or have
the potential to affect bids or bidding strategy, which may include
communications regarding the post-auction market structure. This
prohibition begins at the short-form application filing deadline and
ends at the down payment deadline after the auction. This prohibition
applies to all applicants regardless of whether such applicants become
qualified bidders or actually bid.
14. For purposes of this prohibition, Sec. 1.2105(c)(7)(i) defines
applicant as including all officers and directors of the entity
submitting a short-form application to participate in the auction, all
controlling interests of that entity, as well as all holders of
partnership and other ownership interests and any stock interest
amounting to 10 percent or more of the entity, or outstanding stock, or
outstanding voting stock of the entity submitting a short-form
application.
15. Applicants for licenses for any of the same geographic license
areas must not communicate directly or indirectly about bids or bidding
strategy. Accordingly, such applicants are encouraged not to use the
same individual as an authorized bidder. A violation of the anti-
collusion rule could occur if an individual acts as the authorized
bidder for two or more applicants, and conveys information concerning
the substance of bids or bidding strategies between such applicants.
Also, if the authorized bidders are different individuals employed by
the same organization (e.g., law firm or engineering firm or consulting
firm), a violation similarly could occur. In such a case, at a minimum,
applicants should certify on their applications that precautionary
steps have been taken to prevent communication between authorized
bidders and that applicants and their bidding agents will comply with
the anti-collusion rule. Auction participants are hereby placed on
notice that public disclosure of information on bidder interests, bids
and bidder identities that typically has been revealed prior to and
during past Commission auctions may violate the anti-collusion rule.
Bidders should use caution in their dealings with other parties, such
as members of the press, financial analysts, or others who might become
a conduit for the communication of prohibited bidding information.
16. The Commission's rules do not prohibit applicants from entering
into otherwise lawful bidding agreements before filing their short-form
applications, as long as they disclose the existence of the
agreement(s) in their short-form application. If parties agree in
principle on all material terms prior to the short-form filing
deadline, each party to the agreement must identify the other party or
parties to the agreement on its short-form application under Sec.
1.2105(c), even if the agreement has not been reduced to writing. If
the parties have not agreed in principle by the short-form filing
deadline, they should not include the names of parties to discussions
on their applications, and they may not continue negotiations,
discussions or communications with any other applicants after the
short-form filing deadline. By electronically submitting its short-form
application, each applicant certifies its compliance with Sec.
1.2105(c). Any applicant found to have violated the anti-collusion rule
may be subject to sanctions.
17. By electronically submitting its short-form application, each
applicant certified its compliance with Sec. 1.2105(c). However, the
Commission cautions that merely filing a certifying statement as part
of an application will not outweigh specific evidence that collusive
behavior has occurred, nor will it preclude the initiation of an
investigation when warranted. Any applicant found to have violated the
anti-collusion rule may be subject to sanctions.
18. Applicants are also reminded that, regardless of compliance
with the Commission's rules, they remain subject to the antitrust laws,
which are designed to prevent anticompetitive behavior in the
marketplace. Compliance with the disclosure requirements of the
Commission's anti-collusion rule will not insulate a party from
enforcement of the antitrust laws. To the extent the Commission becomes
aware of specific allegations that may give rise to violations of the
federal antitrust laws the Commission may refer such allegations to the
United States Department of Justice for investigation. If an applicant
is found to have violated the antitrust laws or the Commission's rules
in connection with its participation in the competitive bidding
process, it may be subject to forfeiture of its upfront payment, down
payment, or full bid amount and may be prohibited from participating in
future auctions, among other sanctions.
19. Section 1.65 of the Commission's rules requires an applicant to
maintain the accuracy and completeness of information furnished in its
pending application and to notify the Commission within 30 days of any
substantial change that may be of decisional significance to that
application. Applicants are therefore required by Sec. 1.65 to report
to the Commission any communications they have made to or received from
another applicant after the short-form filing deadline that affect or
have the potential to affect bids or bidding strategy unless such
communications are made to or received from parties to agreements
identified under Sec. 1.2105(a)(2)(viii).
20. Applicants that are winning bidders will be required to
disclose in their long-form applications the specific terms,
conditions, and parties involved in all bidding consortia, joint
ventures, partnerships, and other arrangements entered into relating to
the competitive bidding process.
21. A summary listing of documents issued by the Commission and the
Bureau addressing the application of the anti-collusion rule may be
found in Attachment G of the Auction No. 66 Procedures Public Notice.
iii. Incumbency Issues
22. The AWS-1 bands are now being used for a variety of Government
and non-Government services. The 1710-1755 MHz band is currently a
Government band. The 2110-2150 MHz band is used by private (including
state and local governmental public safety services) and common carrier
fixed microwave services. The 2150-2155
[[Page 20675]]
MHz band is currently used by the Broadband Radio Service (BRS).
23. Relocation of Government Incumbents; Spectrum Relocation Fund.
The 1710-1755 MHz spectrum is covered by a Congressional mandate that
requires that auction proceeds fund the estimated relocation costs of
incumbent Federal entities. Specifically, the CSEA established a
Spectrum Relocation Fund (SRF), to which the cash proceeds attributable
to eligible frequencies in the AWS-1 license auction will be deposited.
24. CSEA also prohibits the Commission from concluding any auction
of eligible frequencies if the total cash proceeds attributable to such
spectrum are less than 110 percent of the estimated relocation costs
provided to the Commission by the National Telecommunications and
Information Administration (NTIA). NTIA has collected estimates of the
relocation costs for the eligible frequencies in the AWS-1 band. On
December 27, 2005, pursuant to CSEA, NTIA notified the Commission of
the estimated relocation costs and timelines for relocation of eligible
Federal entities assigned to frequencies from 1710 to 1755 MHz. NTIA
reported that the total estimated relocation costs equal $935,940,312.
25. Relocation of Non-Government Incumbents. The Commission is in
the process of determining how to apply the policies adopted in the
Emerging Technologies proceeding to the relocation of incumbent fixed
microwave and BRS licensees in the 2110-2150 and 2150-2155 MHz bands,
respectively. In the Fifth Notice of Proposed Rule Making (AWS Fifth
Notice) in ET Docket No. 00-258, 70 FR 61752, October 26, 2005, the
Commission is seeking comment on the specific relocation and cost-
sharing procedures applicable to BRS operations in the 2150-2160/62 MHz
band, which the Commission recently decided will be relocated to the
newly restructured 2495-2690 MHz band. In the AWS Fifth Notice, the
Commission is also seeking comment on cost-sharing obligations and
procedures associated with relocation obligations for the 2110-2155 MHz
band. In doing so, the AWS Fifth Notice also referenced an earlier
request by the Commission for comments on the appropriate procedures
for apportioning relocation costs among multiple AWS licensees in the
2110-2150 MHz band. The Commission is also currently considering
petitions for reconsideration that raise issues concerning the
conditions under which the 2495-2500 MHz band would be available to BRS
and the suitability of that spectrum for BRS operations.
iv. Protection of Incumbent Government and Non-Government Operations
26. AWS licensees must comply with the technical and operational
rules set forth in 47 CFR 27.50-27.66 and 27.1131-27.1135. The latter
set of rules describes the procedures AWS licensees must follow to
protect co-channel and adjacent channel incumbent Government and non-
Government operations from interference.
27. The 1710-1755 MHz band. According to NTIA, this spectrum is
used by the Federal Government for both military and non-military
operations. Sixteen Department of Defense (DOD) facilities in the
country are classified as protected facilities, and various types of
systems operate at these locations. AWS licensees must protect systems
operating at these facilities from interference until such systems are
relocated to other spectrum. These restrictions shall apply until such
time as the relocation of the Federal systems has been completed, and
indefinitely in the case of systems at the Yuma, Arizona, and Cherry
Point, North Carolina, locations. Furthermore, AWS licensees will be
required to accept any interference received from operations at the 16
facilities. Such interference could occur at large distances outside
the facilities' operating radii due to airborne operations within the
radii.
28. The CSEA permits the Commission to grant commercial licenses in
these bands prior to relocation of Federal government operations and
the termination of a Federal entity's authorization. Until such time as
the Government licensees have relocated to other spectrum, or NTIA de-
authorizes an operation pursuant to CSEA, AWS operators shall be
required to protect non-DOD Government systems operating in the 1710-
1755 and 1755-1761 MHz bands in accordance with the provisions set
forth in Sec. 27.1134(b) of the Commission's rules.
29. AWS licensees operating fixed stations in the 1710-1755 MHz
band, if notified that such stations are causing interference to
radiosonde receivers operating in the Meteorological Aids Service in
the 1675'1700 MHz band or meteorological-satellite earth receivers
operating in the Meteorological-Satellite Service in the 1675-1710 MHz
band, shall be required to modify the stations' location and/or
technical parameters as necessary to eliminate the interference.
30. The 2110-2155 MHz Band. Fixed point-to-point microwave systems
authorized under part 101 of the Commission's rules will maintain
primary status in the 2110-2150 MHz band unless and until an AWS or
other emerging technology licensee requires use of the spectrum. AWS
licensees are required, prior to initiating operations from any base or
fixed station, to coordinate their frequency usage with co-channel and
adjacent channel incumbent part 101 fixed-point-to-point microwave
licensees operating in the 2110-2150 MHz band. Similarly, BRS
operations in the 2150-2160/62 MHz band will be relocated to other
spectrum. Until that occurs, AWS licensees, prior to initiating
operations from any base or fixed station, must coordinate their
frequency usage with co-channel and adjacent channel incumbent BRS
licensees operating in the 2150-2160 MHz band.
31. AWS licensees operating in the 2110-2155 MHz band must protect
previously licensed Broadcast Auxiliary Service (BAS) and Cable
Television Radio Service (CARS) operations in the adjacent 2025-2110
MHz band. In satisfying this requirement AWS licensees must, before
constructing and operating any base or fixed station, determine the
location and licensee of all BAS or CARS stations authorized in their
area of operation, and coordinate their planned stations with those
licensees.
32. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
operates the Deep Space Network (DSN) in the 2110-2120 MHz band at
Goldstone, California. NASA will continue its operations of high power
transmitters (nominal EIRP of 105.5 dBW with EIRP up to 119.5 dBW used
under emergency conditions) in this band at this location. AWS
licensees must accept any interference received from the Goldstone DSN
facility in this band.
a. International Coordination
33. Operations in the 1710-1755 and 2110-2155 MHz bands must not
cause harmful interference across the borders with Mexico and Canada.
Until such time as agreements between the United States, Mexico and
Canada become effective, the same technical restrictions at the border
that are adopted for operation between geographic service areas will
apply, to the extent they are not in violation of current bilateral
agreements and arrangements. When interim arrangements or agreements
between the United States, Mexico and Canada are final and become
effective, licensees in the 1710-1755 and 2110-2155 MHz bands must
comply with these agreements. In addition, if these agreements are
modified in the future, licensees in the 1710-1755 and 2110-2155 MHz
bands must comply with these modifications.
[[Page 20676]]
b. Quiet Zones
34. Advanced Wireless Services licensees must protect the radio
quiet zones set forth in the Commission's rules. Licensees are
cautioned that they must receive the appropriate approvals directly
from the relevant quiet zone entity prior to operating within the areas
described in the Commission's rules.
v. Due Diligence
35. The Commission cautions potential applicants formulating their
bidding strategies to investigate and consider the extent to which AWS
frequencies are occupied. Operations in the AWS-1 bands must be
protected and/or relocated to available frequencies typically in higher
bands or to other media. These limitations may restrict the ability of
AWS geographic area licensees to use certain portions of the
electromagnetic spectrum or provide service to certain areas in their
geographic license areas. Bidders should become familiar with the
status of these operations and relocation requirements, and applicable
Commission rules, orders and any pending proceedings related to the
service, in order to make reasoned, appropriate decisions about their
participation in Auction No. 66 and their bidding strategy.
36. Potential bidders are reminded that they are solely responsible
for investigating and evaluating all technical and marketplace factors
that may have a bearing on the value of the AWS-1 licenses in this
auction. The FCC makes no representations or warranties about the use
of this spectrum for particular services. Applicants should be aware
that an FCC auction represents an opportunity to become an FCC licensee
in the Advanced Wireless Services subject to certain conditions and
regulations. An FCC auction does not constitute an endorsement by the
FCC of any particular service, technology, or product, nor does an FCC
license constitute a guarantee of business success. Applicants should
perform their individual due diligence before proceeding as they would
with any new business venture.
37. Potential bidders are strongly encouraged to conduct their own
research prior to the beginning of bidding in Auction No. 66 in order
to determine the existence of any pending administrative or judicial
proceedings that might affect their decision regarding participation in
the auction. Participants in Auction No. 66 are strongly encouraged to
continue such research throughout the auction. In addition, potential
bidders should perform technical analyses sufficient to assure
themselves that, should they prevail in competitive bidding for a
specific license, they will be able to build and operate facilities
that will fully comply with the Commission's technical and legal
requirements.
38. Applicants should also be aware that certain pending and future
proceedings, including applications (including those for modification),
petitions for rulemaking, requests for special temporary authority,
waiver requests, petitions to deny, petitions for reconsideration,
informal oppositions, and applications for review, before the
Commission may relate to particular applicants or incumbent licensees
or the licenses available in Auction No. 66. In addition, pending and
future judicial proceedings may relate to particular applicants or
incumbent licensees, or the licenses available in Auction No. 66.
Prospective bidders are responsible for assessing the likelihood of the
various possible outcomes, and considering their potential impact on
spectrum licenses available in this auction.
39. Applicants should perform due diligence to identify and
consider all proceedings that may affect the spectrum licenses being
auctioned and that could have an impact on the availability of spectrum
for Auction No. 66. In addition, although the Commission may continue
to act on various pending applications, informal objections, petitions,
and other requests for Commission relief, some of these matters may not
be resolved by the time of the auction.
40. Applicants are solely responsible for identifying associated
risks and for investigating and evaluating the degree to which such
matters may affect their ability to bid on, otherwise acquire, or make
use of licenses available in Auction No. 66.
41. Applicants may obtain information about non-Federal Government
incumbent licenses that may have an effect on availability of licenses
in Auction No. 66 through the Commission's licensing databases on the
World Wide Web.
42. To further assist potential bidders in determining the scope of
the new AWS entrants' relocation obligations in the 2150-2155 MHz band,
the Commission ordered BRS licensees in the 2150-2160/62 MHz band to
submit information on the locations and operating characteristics of
BRS systems in that band. Each application will need to be viewed to
determine if it is a BRS Channel 1, 2/ 2A Notification.
43. The Commission makes no representations or guarantees regarding
the accuracy or completeness of information in its databases or any
third party databases. The Commission's databases may not include all
information deemed necessary or desirable by an applicant, applicants
may obtain or verify such information from independent sources or
assume the risk of any incompleteness or inaccuracy in said databases.
Furthermore, the Commission makes no representations or guarantees
regarding the accuracy or completeness of information that has been
provided by incumbent licensees and incorporated into its databases.
44. Potential applicants are strongly encouraged to physically
inspect any prospective sites located in, or near, the service area for
which they plan to bid, and also to familiarize themselves with the
environmental assessment obligations.
vi. Use of Integrated Spectrum Auction System
45. The Commission will make available a browser-based bidding
system to allow bidders to participate in Auction No. 66 over the
Internet using the Commission's Integrated Spectrum Auction System
(ISAS or FCC Auction System). The Commission makes no warranty
whatsoever with respect to the FCC Auction System. In no event shall
the Commission, or any of its officers, employees or agents, be liable
for any damages whatsoever (including, but not limited to, loss of
business profits, business interruption, loss of business information,
or any other loss) arising out of or relating to the existence,
furnishing, functioning or use of the FCC Auction System that is
accessible to bidders in connection with this auction. Moreover, no
obligation or liability will arise out of the Commission's technical,
programming or other advice or service provided in connection with the
FCC Auction System.
vii. Bidder Alerts
46. As is the case with many business investment opportunities,
some unscrupulous entrepreneurs may attempt to use Auction No. 66 to
deceive and defraud unsuspecting investors. Information about deceptive
telemarketing investment schemes is available from the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) and from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
viii. National Environmental Policy Act Requirements
47. Licensees must comply with the Commission's rules regarding
implementation of the National
[[Page 20677]]
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). The construction of a wireless antenna
facility is a federal action and the licensee must comply with the
Commission's NEPA rules for each such facility. The Commission's NEPA
rules require, among other things, that the licensee consult with
expert agencies having NEPA responsibilities, including the U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service, the State Historic Preservation Office, the Army
Corps of Engineers and the Federal Emergency Management Agency. In
assessing the effect of facilities construction on historic properties,
the licensee must follow the provisions of the Nationwide Programmatic
Agreement Regarding the Section 106 National Historic Preservation Act
Review Process.
C. Auction Specifics
i. Auction Date
48. Bidding in Auction No. 66 will begin on Thursday, June 29,
2006, as announced in the Auction No. 66 Comment Public Notice. The
initial schedule for bidding will be announced by public notice at
least one week before the start of the auction.
49. Several commenters addressed the date on which bidding in
Auction No. 66 will commence. Generally, commenters expressed support
for commencing the auction on June 29, 2006. A few commenters, however,
expressed concern about the start date.
50. The Commission does not find sufficient cause to delay the
start of Auction No. 66, and therefore, will commence the competitive
bidding as scheduled, i.e., on June 29, 2006. The Commission agrees
with the majority of the parties who commented on this issue that it is
in the public interest to make AWS spectrum available as soon as it is
both reasonable and consistent with CSEA. Therefore, the concerns
raised by some about time needed to prepare for package bidding are
moot. The Commission has decided to proceed with standard, single SMR
auction for the AWS-1 licenses.
51. Unless otherwise announced, bidding on all licenses will be
conducted on each business day until bidding has stopped on all
licenses.
ii. Auction Title
52. Auction No. 66--Advanced Wireless Services (AWS-1)
iii. Bidding Methodology
53. The bidding methodology for Auction No. 66 will be simultaneous
multiple round bidding. The Commission will conduct this auction over
the Internet using the FCC Auction System, and telephonic bidding will
be available as well. Qualified bidders are permitted to bid
electronically via the Internet or by telephone.
iv. Pre-Auction Dates and Deadlines
54. Dates and Deadlines:
Auction Seminar: April 24, 2006.
Short-Form Application (FCC Form 175) Filing Window Opens: April
24, 2006; 12 p.m. ET.
Short-Form Application (FCC Form 175) Filing Window Deadline: May
10, 2006; 6 p.m. ET.
Upfront Payments (via wire transfer): June 1, 2006; 6 p.m. ET.
Mock Auction: June 26, 2006.
Auction Begins: June 29, 2006.
v. Requirements for Participation
55. Those wishing to participate in the auction must: (a) Submit a
short-form application (FCC Form 175) electronically prior to 6 p.m.
Eastern Time (ET), May 10, 2006, following the electronic filing
procedures set forth in Attachment D of the Auction No. 66 Procedures
Public Notice; (b) submit a sufficient upfront payment and an FCC
Remittance Advice Form (FCC Form 159) before 6 p.m. ET, June 1, 2006;
and (c) comply with all provisions outlined in this Public Notice and
applicable Commission rules.
vi. General Contact Information
56. See Auction No. 66 Procedures Public Notice for General
Contract information table.
II. Short-Form Application (FCC Form 175) Requirements
57. An application to participate in an FCC auction, referred to as
a short-form application or FCC Form 175, provides information used in
determining whether the applicant is legally, technically, and
financially qualified to participate in Commission auctions for
licenses or permits.
58. Entities seeking licenses available in Auction No. 66 must file
a short-form application electronically via the FCC Auction System
before 6 p.m. ET on May 10, 2006, following the procedures prescribed
in Attachment D of the Auction No. 66 Procedures Public Notice. If an
applicant claims eligibility for a bidding credit, the information
provided in its FCC Form 175 will be used in determining whether the
applicant is eligible for the claimed bidding credit. Applicants bear
full responsibility for submitting accurate, complete and timely short-
form applications. All applicants must certify on their short-form
applications under penalty of perjury that they are legally,
technically, financially and otherwise qualified to hold a license.
59. An entity may not submit more than one short-form application
for a single auction. In the event that a party submits multiple short-
form applications, only one application will be accepted for filing.
Applicants also should note that submission of a short-form application
constitutes a representation by the certifying official that he or she
is an authorized representative of the applicant, that he or she has
read the form's instructions and certifications, and that the contents
of the application, its certifications, and any attachments are true
and correct. Submission of a false certification to the Commission may
result in penalties, including monetary forfeitures, license
forfeitures, ineligibility to participate in future auctions, and/or
criminal prosecution.
A. Preferences for Small Businesses and Others
i. Size Standards for Bidding Credits
60. A bidding credit represents the amount by which a bidder's
winning bid will be discounted. For Auction No. 66, bidding credits
will be available to small businesses and very small businesses, and
consortia thereof, as follows: (1) A bidder with attributed average
annual gross revenues that exceed $15 million and do not exceed $40
million for the preceding three years (small business) will receive a
15 percent discount on its winning bid; (2) a bidder with attributed
average annual gross revenues that do not exceed $15 million for the
preceding three years (very small business) will receive a 25 percent
discount on its winning bid.
61. Bidding credits are not cumulative; a qualifying applicant
receives either the 15 percent or 25 percent bidding credit on its
winning bid, but not both.
62. Every applicant that claims eligibility for a bidding credit as
either a small business or a very small business, or a consortium of
small businesses or very small businesses, will be required to provide
information regarding revenues attributable to the applicant, its
affiliates, its controlling interests, and the affiliates of its
controlling interests on its FCC Form 175 short-form application to
establish that it satisfies the applicable eligibility requirement.
Applicants considering claiming eligibility as a designated entity in
Auction No. 66 should review carefully the recently released CSEA/Part
1 Designated Entity FNPRM, 71 FR 6992, February 10, 2006. Applicants
considering claiming eligibility as a designated entity in Auction No.
66 should monitor further proceedings
[[Page 20678]]
pursuant to the CSEA/Part 1 Designated Entity FNPRM to assure their
ability to comply with any changes to the designated entity rules that
the Commission may adopt that are applicable to applicants in Auction
No. 66.
ii. Tribal Lands Bidding Credit
63. To encourage the growth of wireless services in federally
recognized tribal lands the Commission has implemented a tribal land
bidding credit. The Commission will award pro rata tribal lands bidding
credits in the event that the sum of all net winning bids at the close
of bidding, exclusive of tribal lands bidding credits, is not
sufficient funds both to meet the reserve price and to award all
eligible applicants full tribal lands bidding credits.
iii. Installment Payments
64. Installment payment plans will not be available in Auction No.
66.
B. License Selection
65. In Auction No. 66, applicants must select the licenses on which
they want to bid from the Eligible Licenses list. In Auction No. 66,
FCC Form 175 will include a filtering mechanism that allows an
applicant to filter the available licenses. The applicant will make
selections for one or more of the filter criteria and the system will
produce a list of licenses satisfying the specified criteria. The
applicant may select all the licenses in the customized list or select
individual licenses from the list. Applicants also will be able to
select licenses from one customized list and then create additional
customized lists to select additional licenses. There will be no
opportunity to change license selection after the short-form filing
deadline. It is critically important that an applicant confirm its
license selections before submitting its short-form application because
the FCC Auction System will not accept bids on licenses that an
applicant has not selected on its FCC Form 175.
C. Disclosure of Bidding Arrangements
66. Applicants will be required to identify in their short-form
applications all parties with whom they have entered into any
agreements, arrangements, or understandings of any kind relating to the
licenses being auctioned, including any agreements relating to post-
auction market structure. Applicants also will be required to certify
under penalty of perjury in their short-form applications that they
have not entered and will not enter into any explicit or implicit
agreements, arrangements or understandings of any kind with any
parties, other than those identified in the application, regarding the
amount of their bids, bidding strategies, or the particular licenses on
which they will or will not bid. If an applicant has had discussions,
but has not reached a joint bidding agreement by the short-form
application filing deadline, it would not include the names of parties
to the discussions on its application and may not continue such
discussions with any applicants after the deadline.
67. After the filing of short-form applications, the Commission's
rules do not prohibit a party holding a non-controlling, attributable
interest in one applicant from acquiring an ownership interest in or
entering into a joint bidding arrangement with other applicants
provided that (i) the attributable interest holder certifies that it
has not and will not communicate with any party concerning the bids or
bidding strategies of more than one of the applicants in which it holds
an attributable interest, or with which it has entered into a joint
bidding arrangement; and (ii) the arrangements do not result in a
change in control of any of the applicants. While the anti-collusion
rules do not prohibit non-auction related business negotiations among
auction applicants, applicants are reminded that certain discussions or
exchanges could touch upon impermissible subject matters because they
may convey pricing information and bidding strategies. Further, as
discussed above, compliance with the disclosure requirements of the
Commission's anti-collusion rule will not insulate a party from
enforcement of the antitrust laws.
D. Ownership Disclosure Requirements
68. All applicants must comply with the uniform Part 1 ownership
disclosure standards and provide information required by Sec. Sec.
1.2105 and 1.2112 of the Commission's rules. Specifically, in
completing the short-form application, applicants will be required to
fully disclose information on the real party or parties-in-interest and
ownership structure of the applicant.
69. Applicants considering claiming eligibility as a designated
entity in Auction No. 66 should review carefully and monitor the
recently initiated rulemaking proceeding concerning the Commission's
designated entity rules. The Commission also sought comment on whether
to restrict the award of designated entity benefits where an otherwise
qualified designated entity has a material relationship with a large
entity that has a significant interest in communications services. The
Commission stated that it intended any changes adopted in this
proceeding to apply to AWS licenses to be offered in Auction No. 66.
Depending upon the outcome of that proceeding, applicants may be
required to disclose additional ownership information in order to
comply with any changes to the designated entity rules that the
Commission may adopt that are applicable to applicants in Auction No.
66.
70. Applicants are responsible for ensuring that the information
submitted in their Form 175 for Auction No. 66 is complete and
accurate. Accordingly, applicants should carefully review any
information automatically entered to confirm that it is complete and
accurate as of the deadline for filing the short-form application.
Applicants can update any information that was entered automatically
and needs to be changed directly in the short-form application.
E. Bidding Credit Revenue Disclosures
71. To determine which applicants qualify for bidding credits as
small businesses or very small businesses, the Commission considers the
gross revenues of the applicant, its affiliates, its controlling
interests, and the affiliates of its controlling interests. Therefore,
entities applying to bid as small businesses or very small businesses
(or consortia of small businesses or very small businesses) will be
required to disclose on their FCC Form 175 short-form applications the
gross revenues of each of the following for the preceding three years:
(1) The applicant, (2) its affiliates, (3) its controlling interests,
and (4) the affiliates of its controlling interests. In order to comply
with the Commission's disclosure requirements for bidding credit
eligibility, an applicant must provide separately for itself, its
affiliates, its controlling interests, and the affiliates of its
controlling interests, the gross revenues for each of the preceding
three years. If the applicant is applying as a consortium of small
businesses or very small businesses, this information must be provided
for each consortium member.
72. Applicants considering claiming eligibility as a designated
entity in Auction No. 66 should review carefully the recently released
CSEA/Part 1 Designated Entity FNPRM. Depending upon the outcome of that
proceeding, applicants may be required to disclose additional
information regarding gross revenues of related parties in order to
comply with any changes to the designated entity rules that the
Commission may adopt that are
[[Page 20679]]
applicable to applicants in Auction No. 66.
73. Controlling interests of an applicant include individuals and
entities with either de facto or de jure control of the applicant.
Typically, ownership of at least 50.1 percent of an entity's voting
stock evidences de jure control. De facto control is determined on a
case-by-case basis.
74. Officers and directors of an applicant are also considered to
have controlling interest in the applicant. Once the principals or
entities with a controlling interest are determined, only the revenues
of those principals or entities, the affiliates of those principals or
entities, and the applicant and its affiliates will be counted in
determining small business eligibility.
75. Each member of a consortium of small or very small businesses
that applies to participate in Auction No. 66 must individually meet
the definition of small business or very small business adopted by the
Commission for the Advanced Wireless Services. Each consortium member
must disclose its gross revenues along with those of its affiliates,
its controlling interests, and the affiliates of its controlling
interests. Although the gross revenues of the consortium members will
not be aggregated for purposes of determining the consortium's
eligibility as a small business or very small business, this
information must be provided to ensure that each individual consortium
member qualifies for any bidding credit awarded to the consortium.
F. Provisions Regarding Former and Current Defaulters
76. Each applicant must state under penalty of perjury on its
short-form application whether or not the applicant, its affiliates,
its controlling interests, and the affiliates of its controlling
interests, as defined by Sec. 1.2110, have ever been in default on any
Commission licenses or have ever been delinquent on any non-tax debt
owed to any Federal agency. In addition, each applicant must certify
under penalty of perjury on its short-form application that as of the
short-form filing deadline, the applicant, its affiliates, its
controlling interests, and the affiliates of its controlling interests,
as defined by Sec. 1.2110, are not in default on any payment for
Commission licenses (including down payments) and that they are not
delinquent on any non-tax debt owed to any Federal agency. Prospective
applicants are reminded that submission of a false certification to the
Commission is a serious matter that may result in severe penalties,
including monetary forfeitures, license revocations, exclusion from
participation in future auctions, and/or criminal prosecution.
77. Former defaulters, i.e., applicants, including any of their
affiliates, any of their controlling interests, or any of the
affiliates of its controlling interests, that in the past have
defaulted on any Commission licenses or been delinquent on any non-tax
debt owed to any Federal agency, but that have since remedied all such
defaults and cured all of their outstanding non-tax delinquencies--are
eligible to bid in Auction No. 66, provided that they are otherwise
qualified.
78. Current defaulters, i.e., applicants, including any of their
affiliates, any of their controlling interests, or any of the
affiliates of their controlling interests, that are in default on any
payment for any Commission licenses (including down payments) or are
delinquent on any non-tax debt owed to any Federal agency as of the
filing deadline for applications to participate in this auction--are
not eligible to bid in Auction No. 66.
79. Applicants are encouraged to review the Commission's previous
guidance on default and delinquency disclosure requirements in the
context of the short-form application process. Therefore, with respect
to regulatory or application fees, the provisions of Sec. Sec.
1.2105(a) and 1.2106(a) regarding default and delinquency in connection
with competitive bidding are limited to circumstances in which the
relevant party has not complied with a final Commission payment
deadline.
80. The Commission considers outstanding debts owed to the United
States Government, in any amount, to be a serious matter. The
Commission adopted rules, including a provision referred to as the red
light rule, that implement the Commission's obligations under the Debt
Collection Improvement Act of 1996, which governs the collection of
claims owed to the United States. Under the red light rule, the
Commission will not process applications and other requests for
benefits filed by parties that have outstanding debts owed to the
Commission. In the same rulemaking order, the Commission explicitly
declared, however, that the Commission's competitive bidding rules are
not affected by the red light rule. As a consequence, the Commission's
adoption of the red light rule does not alter the applicability of any
of the Commission's competitive bidding rules, including the provisions
and certifications of Sec. Sec. 1.2105 and 1.2106, with regard to
current and former defaults or delinquencies. Applicants are reminded,
however, that the Commission's Red Light Display System, which provides
information regarding debts owed to the Commission, may not be
determinative of an auction applicant's ability to comply with the
default and delinquency disclosure requirements of Sec. 1.2105. Thus,
while the red light rule ultimately may prevent the processing of long-
form applications by auction winners, an auction applicant's red light
status is not necessarily determinative of its eligibility to
participate in this auction or of its upfront payment obligation.
81. Prospective applicants in Auction No. 66 should note that any
long-form applications filed after the close of competitive bidding
will be reviewed for compliance with the Commission's red light rule,
and such review may result in the dismissal of a winning bidder's long-
form application.
G. Other Information
82. Applicants owned by member of minority groups and/or women, as
defined in Sec. 1.2110(c)(3), may identify themselves in filling out
their short-form applications regarding this status. This applicant
status information is collected for statistical purposes only and
assists the Commission in monitoring the participation of designated
entities in its auctions.
H. Minor Modifications to Short-Form Applications (FCC Form 175)
83. After the deadline for filing short-form applications (FCC
Forms 175) at 6 p.m. ET on May 10, 2006, applicants are permitted to
make only minor changes to their applications. Applicants are not
permitted to make major modifications to their applications (e.g.,
change their license selections, change control of the applicant, or
claim eligibility for a higher bidding credit).
84. Any application amendment and related statements of fact must
be certified by: (1) The applicant, if the applicant is an individual,
(2) one of the partners if the applicant is a partnership, (3) an
officer, director, or duly authorized employee, if the applicant is a
corporation, (4) by a member who is an officer, if the applicant is an
unincorporated association, (5) the trustee if the applicant is an
amateur radio service club, or (6) a duly elected or appointed official
who is authorized to make such certifications under the laws of the
applicable jurisdiction, if the applicant is a governmental entity.
85. An applicant must make permissible minor changes to its short-
form application as such changes are
[[Page 20680]]
defined by Sec. 1.2105(b), on-line. In addition, in the event that
changes cannot be made immediately in ISAS for any reason, an applicant
should submit a letter briefly summarizing the changes and subsequently
update their short-form applications in ISAS as soon as possible. Any
letter describing changes to applicant's short-form application should
be submitted by electronic mail to the following address:
auction66@fcc.gov.
86. Applicants should not submit application-specific material
through the Commission's Electronic Comment Filing System (ECFS), which
was used for submitting comments regarding Auction No. 66 procedures.
I. Maintaining Current Information in Short-Form Applications (FCC Form
175)
87. Section 1.65 of the Commission's rules requires an applicant to
maintain the accuracy and completeness of information furnished in its
pending application and to notify the Commission within 30 days of any
substantial change that may be of decisional significance to that
application. Changes that cause a loss of or reduction in eligibility
for a bidding credit must be reported immediately. If an amendment
reporting substantial changes is a major amendment as defined by 47 CFR
1.2105, the major amendment will not be accepted and may result in the
dismissal of the short-form application.
88. In the event that the new rules regarding applicants and
applications become effective after the deadline for filing short-form
applications (FCC Form 175), applicants may be required to submit
additional information not required in the initial form. In this
regard, applicants considering claiming eligibility as a designated
entity in Auction No. 66 should review carefully the recently released
CSEA/Part 1 Designated Entity FNPRM. The Commission stated in the CSEA/
Part 1 Designated Entity FNPRM that it intends to complete that
proceeding in time so that any resulting rule modifications will apply
to Auction No. 66. Moreover, the Commission proposed that in the event
that any designated entity applicants have filed an application to
participate in an auction prior to the effective date of any designated
entity rule changes adopted pursuant to the CSEA/Part 1 Designated
Entity FNPRM, such applicants would be required to amend their
applications on or after the effective date of the rule changes with a
statement declaring, under penalty of perjury, that the applicant is
qualified as a designated entity pursuant to Sec. 1.2110 of the
Commission's rules effective as of the date of the statement. Finally,
the Commission noted that under this proposal the Bureau will establish
any detailed procedures necessary for making required amendments and
announce such procedures by public notice. Accordingly, applicants
considering claiming eligibility as a designated entity in Auction No.
66 should monitor further proceedings pursuant to the CSEA/Part 1
Designated Entity FNPRM.
III. Pre-Auction Procedures
A. Auction Seminar--April 24, 2006
89. On Monday, April 24, 2006, the FCC will sponsor a seminar for
parties interested in participating in Auction No. 66 at the FCC
headquarters, located at 445 12th Street, SW., Washington, DC. For
individuals who are unable to attend, an Audio/Video webcast of this
seminar will be available from the FCC's Auction No. 66 Web page.
90. To register, complete the registration form Attachment C of the
Auction No. 66 Procedures Public Notice and submit it by Thursday,
April 20, 2006. Registrations are accepted on a first-come, first-
served basis.
B. Short-Form Application (FCC Form 175)--Due Before 6:00 p.m. ET on
May 10, 2006
91. In order to be eligible to bid in this auction, applicants must
first submit an FCC Form 175 application electronically via the FCC
Auction System. This application must be received at the Commission
prior to 6 p.m. ET on May 10, 2006. Late applications will not be
accepted. There is no application fee required when filing an FCC Form
175. However, to be eligible to bid, an applicant must submit an
upfront payment.
92. Applications may generally be filed at any time beginning at
noon ET on April 24, 2006, until 6 p.m. ET on May 10, 2006. Applicants
are strongly encouraged to file early and are responsible for allowing
adequate time for filing their applications. Applicants may update or
amend their applications multiple times until the filing deadline on
May 10, 2006. Information about accessing, completing, and viewing the
FCC Form 175 is included in Attachment D of the Auction No. 66
Procedures Public Notice.
C. Application Processing and Minor Corrections
93. After the deadline for filing the FCC Form 175 applications has
passed, the FCC will process all timely submitted applications to
determine which are acceptable for filing, and subsequently will issue
a public notice identifying: (1) Those applications accepted for
filing; (2) those applications rejected; and (3) those applications
which have minor defects that may be corrected, and the deadline for
resubmitting corrected applications.
D. Upfront Payments--Due June 1, 2006
94. In order to be eligible to bid in the auction, applicants must
submit an upfront payment accompanied by an FCC Remittance Advice Form
(FCC Form 159). After completing the FCC Form 175, filers will have
access to an electronic version of the FCC Form 159 that can be printed
and sent by facsimile to Mellon Bank in Pittsburgh, PA. All upfront
payments must be received in the proper account at Mellon Bank before 6
p.m. ET on June 1, 2006.
i. Making Auction Payments by Wire Transfer
95. Wire transfer payments must be received before 6 p.m. ET on
June 1, 2006. To avoid untimely payments, applicants should discuss
arrangements (including bank closing schedules) with their banker
several days before they plan to make the wire transfer, and allow
sufficient time for the transfer to be initiated and completed before
the deadline.
96. At least one hour before placing the order for the wire
transfer (but on the same business day), applicants must send by
facsimile a completed FCC Form 159 (Revised 2/03) to Mellon Bank at
(412) 209-6045. On the cover sheet of the facsimile, write Wire
Transfer--Auction Payment for Auction No. 66. In order to meet the
Commission's upfront payment deadline, an applicant's payment must be
credited to the Commission's account before the deadline.
97. Please note that: (a) All payments must be made in U.S.
dollars; (b) All payments must be made by wire transfer; (c) upfront
payments for Auction No. 66 go to a lockbox number different from the
lockboxes used in previous FCC auctions, and different from the lockbox
number to be used for post-auction payments and (d) failure to deliver
the upfront payment by the June 1, 2006, deadline will result in
dismissal of the application and disqualification from participation in
the auction.
ii. FCC Form 159
98. A completed FCC Remittance Advice Form (FCC Form 159, Revised
2/03) must be faxed to Mellon Bank to accompany each upfront payment.
Proper completion of FCC Form 159
[[Page 20681]]
(Revised 2/03) is critical to ensuring correct crediting of upfront
payments. Detailed instructions for completion of FCC Form 159 are
included in Attachment E of the Auction No. 66 Procedures Public
Notice. An electronic pre-filled version of the FCC Form 159 is
available after submitting the FCC Form 175. The FCC Form 159 can be
completed electronically, but must be filed with Mellon Bank via
facsimile.
iii. Upfront Payments and Bidding Eligibility
99. In the Part 1 Order, 62 FR 13540, March 21, 1997, the
Commission delegated to the Bureau the authority and discretion to
determine appropriate upfront payment(s) for each auction. In addition,
in the Part 1 Fifth Report and Order, 65 FR 52323, August 29, 2000, the
Commission ordered that applicants that are former defaulters be
required to pay upfront payments 50 percent greater than non-former
defaulters. For purposes of this calculation, the applicant includes
the applicant itself, its affiliates, its controlling interests, and
affiliates of its controlling interests, as defined by 47 CFR 1.2110 of
the Commission's rules.
100. In the Auction No. 66 Comment Public Notice, the Bureau
proposed that the amount of the upfront payment would determine a
bidder's initial bidding eligibility, the maximum number of bidding
units on which a bidder may place bids. In order to bid on a license,
otherwise qualified bidders that selected that license on Form 175 must
have a current eligibility level that meets or exceeds the number of
b