Airworthiness Directives; McDonnell Douglas Model DC-9-31, DC-9-32, DC-9-32F, DC-9-33F, DC-9-34, and DC-9-34F Airplanes; and Model DC-9-40 and DC-9-50 Series Airplanes, 19140-19142 [E6-5472]
Download as PDF
19140
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 71 / Thursday, April 13, 2006 / Proposed Rules
2. Is not a ‘‘significant rule’’ under the
DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures
(44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and
3. Will not have a significant
economic impact, positive or negative,
on a substantial number of small entities
under the criteria of the Regulatory
Flexibility Act.
We prepared a regulatory evaluation
of the estimated costs to comply with
this proposed AD and placed it in the
AD docket. See the ADDRESSES section
for a location to examine the regulatory
evaluation.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39
Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation
safety, Safety.
The Proposed Amendment
Alternative Methods of Compliance
(AMOCs)
(g)(1) The Manager, International Branch,
ANM–116, FAA, has the authority to approve
AMOCs for this AD, if requested in
accordance with the procedures found in 14
CFR 39.19.
(2) Before using any AMOC approved in
accordance with § 39.19 on any airplane to
which the AMOC applies, notify the
appropriate principal inspector in the FAA
Flight Standards Certificate Holding District
Office.
Related Information
Accordingly, under the authority
delegated to me by the Administrator,
the FAA proposes to amend 14 CFR part
39 as follows:
PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS
DIRECTIVES
1. The authority citation for part 39
continues to read as follows:
(h) Brazilian airworthiness directive 2006–
02–01, dated February 24, 2006, also
addresses the subject of this AD.
Issued in Renton, Washington, on April 5,
2006.
Kevin M. Mullin,
Acting Manager, Transport Airplane
Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.
[FR Doc. E6–5474 Filed 4–12–06; 8:45 am]
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.
§ 39.13
Modification
(f) Within 2,500 flight hours after the
effective date of this AD, modify the flap
system interface wiring, by accomplishing all
of the actions specified in the
Accomplishment Instructions of EMBRAER
Service Bulletin 145–27–0113, dated
December 6, 2005.
[Amended]
BILLING CODE 4910–13–P
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
2. The Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) amends § 39.13
by adding the following new
airworthiness directive (AD):
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
Empresa Brasileira de Aeronautica S.A.
(EMBRAER): Docket No. FAA–2006–
24439; Directorate Identifier 2006-NM–
039–AD.
[Docket No. FAA–2006–24430; Directorate
Identifier 2006–NM–048–AD]
Comments Due Date
(a) The FAA must receive comments on
this AD action by May 15, 2006.
Airworthiness Directives; McDonnell
Douglas Model DC–9–31, DC–9–32,
DC–9–32F, DC–9–33F, DC–9–34, and
DC–9–34F Airplanes; and Model DC–9–
40 and DC–9–50 Series Airplanes
Affected ADs
(b) None.
hsrobinson on PROD1PC68 with PROPOSALS
Applicability
(c) This AD applies to EMBRAER Model
EMB–145XR airplanes, certificated in any
category; as identified in EMBRAER Service
Bulletin 145–27–0113, dated December 6,
2005.
Unsafe Condition
(d) This AD results from a finding that the
aural and visual warnings, which should be
activated when the flaps are set to 22 degrees
during takeoff, were not enabled during the
manufacture of certain Model EMB–145XR
airplanes. We are issuing this AD to prevent
overrunning the runway during takeoff.
Compliance
(e) You are responsible for having the
actions required by this AD performed within
the compliance times specified, unless the
actions have already been done.
VerDate Aug<31>2005
15:29 Apr 12, 2006
Jkt 208001
RIN 2120–AA64
Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking
(NPRM).
AGENCY:
SUMMARY: The FAA proposes to adopt a
new airworthiness directive (AD) for
certain transport category airplanes,
identified above. This proposed AD
would require installing a bonding
jumper from the boost pump volute to
the fuel tank structure, and related
investigative/corrective actions. This
proposed AD results from fuel system
reviews conducted by the manufacturer.
We are proposing this AD to prevent
point-contact arcing or filament heating
in the fuel tank, which, in the event of
a short or ground fault inside the fuel
PO 00000
Frm 00010
Fmt 4702
Sfmt 4702
tank, could result in a fuel tank
explosion and consequent loss of the
airplane.
DATES: We must receive comments on
this proposed AD by May 30, 2006.
ADDRESSES: Use one of the following
addresses to submit comments on this
proposed AD.
• DOT Docket Web site: Go to
https://dms.dot.gov and follow the
instructions for sending your comments
electronically.
• Government-wide rulemaking Web
site: Go to https://www.regulations.gov
and follow the instructions for sending
your comments electronically.
• Mail: Docket Management Facility,
U.S. Department of Transportation, 400
Seventh Street SW., Nassif Building,
room PL–401, Washington, DC 20590.
• Fax: (202) 493–2251.
• Hand Delivery: Room PL–401 on
the plaza level of the Nassif Building,
400 Seventh Street SW., Washington,
DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday
through Friday, except Federal holidays.
Contact Boeing Commercial
Airplanes, Long Beach Division, 3855
Lakewood Boulevard, Long Beach,
California 90846, Attention: Data and
Service Management, Dept. C1-L5A
(D800–0024), for the service information
identified in this proposed AD.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Samuel Lee, Aerospace Engineer,
Propulsion Branch, ANM–140L, FAA,
Los Angeles Aircraft Certification
Office, 3960 Paramount Boulevard,
Lakewood, California 90712–4137;
telephone (562) 627–5262; fax (562)
627–5210.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Comments Invited
We invite you to submit any relevant
written data, views, or arguments
regarding this proposed AD. Send your
comments to an address listed in the
ADDRESSES section. Include the docket
number ‘‘FAA–2006–24430; Directorate
Identifier 2006–NM–048–AD’’ at the
beginning of your comments. We
specifically invite comments on the
overall regulatory, economic,
environmental, and energy aspects of
the proposed AD. We will consider all
comments received by the closing date
and may amend the proposed AD in
light of those comments.
We will post all comments we
receive, without change, to https://
dms.dot.gov, including any personal
information you provide. We will also
post a report summarizing each
substantive verbal contact with FAA
personnel concerning this proposed AD.
Using the search function of that Web
site, anyone can find and read the
E:\FR\FM\13APP1.SGM
13APP1
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 71 / Thursday, April 13, 2006 / Proposed Rules
comments in any of our dockets,
including the name of the individual
who sent the comment (or signed the
comment on behalf of an association,
business, labor union, etc.). You may
review DOT’s complete Privacy Act
Statement in the Federal Register
published on April 11, 2000 (65 FR
19477–78), or you may visit https://
dms.dot.gov.
Examining the Docket
You may examine the AD docket on
the Internet at https://dms.dot.gov, or in
person at the Docket Management
Facility office between 9 a.m. and 5
p.m., Monday through Friday, except
Federal holidays. The Docket
Management Facility office (telephone
(800) 647–5227) is located on the plaza
level of the Nassif Building at the DOT
street address stated in the ADDRESSES
section. Comments will be available in
the AD docket shortly after the Docket
Management System receives them.
hsrobinson on PROD1PC68 with PROPOSALS
Discussion
The FAA has examined the
underlying safety issues involved in fuel
tank explosions on several large
transport airplanes, including the
adequacy of existing regulations, the
service history of airplanes subject to
those regulations, and existing
maintenance practices for fuel tank
systems. As a result of those findings,
we issued a regulation titled ‘‘Transport
Airplane Fuel Tank System Design
Review, Flammability Reduction and
Maintenance and Inspection
Requirements’’ (67 FR 23086, May 7,
2001). In addition to new airworthiness
standards for transport airplanes and
new maintenance requirements, this
rule included Special Federal Aviation
Regulation No. 88 (‘‘SFAR 88,’’
Amendment 21–78, and subsequent
Amendments 21–82 and 21–83).
Among other actions, SFAR 88
requires certain type design (i.e., type
certificate (TC) and supplemental type
certificate (STC)) holders to substantiate
that their fuel tank systems can prevent
ignition sources in the fuel tanks. This
requirement applies to type design
holders for large turbine-powered
transport airplanes and for subsequent
modifications to those airplanes. It
requires them to perform design reviews
and to develop design changes and
maintenance procedures if their designs
do not meet the new fuel tank safety
standards. As explained in the preamble
to the rule, we intended to adopt
airworthiness directives to mandate any
changes found necessary to address
unsafe conditions identified as a result
of these reviews.
VerDate Aug<31>2005
15:29 Apr 12, 2006
Jkt 208001
In evaluating these design reviews, we
have established four criteria intended
to define the unsafe conditions
associated with fuel tank systems that
require corrective actions. The
percentage of operating time during
which fuel tanks are exposed to
flammable conditions is one of these
criteria. The other three criteria address
the failure types under evaluation:
single failures, single failures in
combination with a latent condition(s),
and in-service failure experience. For all
four criteria, the evaluations included
consideration of previous actions taken
that may mitigate the need for further
action.
We have determined that the actions
identified in this AD are necessary to
reduce the potential of ignition sources
inside fuel tanks, which, in combination
with flammable fuel vapors, could result
in fuel tank explosions and consequent
loss of the airplane.
We have received a report indicating
that, on certain McDonnell Douglas
Model DC–9 airplanes with a 580-gallon
forward auxiliary fuel tank, the volute of
the fuel boost pump is bonded to the
inlet basket assembly but not to the tank
structure. At the pump run-out fuel
level, the pump, which receives
155VAC power, is uncovered and there
is fuel vapor in the area. Installing a
new bonding jumper will minimize the
possibilities of point-contact arcing or
filament heating in the fuel tank which,
in the event of a short or ground fault
condition, could result in a fuel tank
explosion and consequent loss of the
airplane.
Relevant Service Information
We have reviewed Boeing Service
Bulletin DC9–28–214, dated December
16, 2005. The service bulletin describes
procedures for installing a bonding
jumper from the boost pump volute to
the fuel tank structure. The installation
includes the related investigative and
corrective actions of testing the bonding
between the jumper and the pump
mounting lug, between the clip and the
lower stanchion support stud, and
between the jumper and the clip, to
verify that the resistance is less than 2.5
milliohms; and reworking, if necessary,
until the resistance is less than 2.5
milliohms. Accomplishing the actions
specified in the service information is
intended to adequately address the
unsafe condition.
FAA’s Determination and Requirements
of the Proposed AD
We have evaluated all pertinent
information and identified an unsafe
condition that is likely to exist or
develop on other airplanes of this same
PO 00000
Frm 00011
Fmt 4702
Sfmt 4702
19141
type design. For this reason, we are
proposing this AD, which would require
accomplishing the actions specified in
the service information described
previously, except as discussed under
‘‘Difference Between the Proposed AD
and the Service Bulletin.’’
Difference Between the Proposed AD
and the Service Bulletin
Although the service bulletin
recommends doing the installation at
the next scheduled fuel tank entry, but
not to exceed 10 years, we have
determined that interval would not
address the identified unsafe condition
soon enough to ensure an adequate level
of safety for the affected fleet. In
developing an appropriate compliance
time for this AD, we considered the
degree of urgency associated with the
subject unsafe condition, the average
utilization of the affected fleet, and the
time necessary to do the installation. In
light of all of these factors, we find that
a compliance time of 60 months
represents an appropriate interval of
time for affected airplanes to continue to
operate without compromising safety.
This difference has been coordinated
with Boeing.
Costs of Compliance
There are about 250 airplanes of the
affected design in the worldwide fleet.
This proposed AD would affect about
152 airplanes of U.S. registry. The
proposed actions would take about 9
work hours per airplane, at an average
labor rate of $80 per work hour.
Required parts would cost about $2,385
per airplane. Based on these figures, the
estimated cost of the proposed AD for
U.S. operators is $471,960, or $3,105 per
airplane.
Authority for This Rulemaking
Title 49 of the United States Code
specifies the FAA’s authority to issue
rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I,
section 106, describes the authority of
the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII,
Aviation Programs, describes in more
detail the scope of the Agency’s
authority.
We are issuing this rulemaking under
the authority described in subtitle VII,
part A, subpart III, section 44701,
‘‘General requirements.’’ Under that
section, Congress charges the FAA with
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in
air commerce by prescribing regulations
for practices, methods, and procedures
the Administrator finds necessary for
safety in air commerce. This regulation
is within the scope of that authority
because it addresses an unsafe condition
that is likely to exist or develop on
E:\FR\FM\13APP1.SGM
13APP1
19142
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 71 / Thursday, April 13, 2006 / Proposed Rules
products identified in this rulemaking
action.
Regulatory Findings
We have determined that this
proposed AD would not have federalism
implications under Executive Order
13132. This proposed AD would not
have a substantial direct effect on the
States, on the relationship between the
national Government and the States, or
on the distribution of power and
responsibilities among the various
levels of government.
For the reasons discussed above, I
certify that the proposed regulation:
1. Is not a ‘‘significant regulatory
action’’ under Executive Order 12866;
2. Is not a ‘‘significant rule’’ under the
DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures
(44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and
3. Will not have a significant
economic impact, positive or negative,
on a substantial number of small entities
under the criteria of the Regulatory
Flexibility Act.
We prepared a regulatory evaluation
of the estimated costs to comply with
this proposed AD and placed it in the
AD docket. See the ADDRESSES section
for a location to examine the regulatory
evaluation.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39
Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation
safety, Safety.
The Proposed Amendment
Accordingly, under the authority
delegated to me by the Administrator,
the FAA proposes to amend 14 CFR part
39 as follows:
PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS
DIRECTIVES
1. The authority citation for part 39
continues to read as follows:
DC–9–51 airplanes, certificated in any
category; as identified in Boeing Service
Bulletin DC9–28–214, dated December 16,
2005.
Unsafe Condition
(d) This AD results from fuel system
reviews conducted by the manufacturer. We
are issuing this AD to prevent point-contact
arcing or filament heating in the fuel tank,
which, in the event of a short or ground fault
inside the fuel tank, could result in a fuel
tank explosion and consequent loss of the
airplane.
Compliance
(e) You are responsible for having the
actions required by this AD performed within
the compliance times specified, unless the
actions have already been done.
Installation
(f) Within 60 months after the effective
date of this AD, install a bonding jumper
from the boost pump volute to the fuel tank
structure, and do all applicable related
investigative and corrective actions before
further flight; by doing all the actions
specified in the Accomplishment
Instructions of Boeing Service Bulletin DC9–
28–214, dated December 16, 2005.
Alternative Methods of Compliance
(AMOCs)
(g)(1) The Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft
Certification Office (ACO), FAA, has the
authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if
requested in accordance with the procedures
found in 14 CFR 39.19.
(2) Before using any AMOC approved in
accordance with § 39.19 on any airplane to
which the AMOC applies, notify the
appropriate principal inspector in the FAA
Flight Standards Certificate Holding District
Office.
Issued in Renton, Washington, on April 4,
2006.
Kevin M. Mullin,
Acting Manager, Transport Airplane
Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.
[FR Doc. E6–5472 Filed 4–12–06; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–13–P
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.
§ 39.13
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
[Amended]
2. The Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) amends § 39.13
by adding the following new
airworthiness directive (AD):
hsrobinson on PROD1PC68 with PROPOSALS
McDonnell Douglas: Docket No. FAA–2006–
24430; Directorate Identifier 2006–NM–
048–AD.
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. FAA–2006–24440; Directorate
Identifier 2006–NM–058–AD]
RIN 2120–AA64
Comments Due Date
(a) The FAA must receive comments on
this AD action by May 30, 2006.
Affected ADs
(b) None.
Airworthiness Directives; Empresa
Brasileira de Aeronautica S.A.
(EMBRAER) Model EMB–145XR
Airplanes
AGENCY:
Applicability
(c) This AD applies to McDonnell Douglas
Model DC–9–31, DC–9–32, DC–9–32F, DC–
9–33F, DC–9–34, DC–9–34F, DC–9–41, and
VerDate Aug<31>2005
15:29 Apr 12, 2006
Jkt 208001
Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking
(NPRM).
PO 00000
Frm 00012
Fmt 4702
Sfmt 4702
SUMMARY: The FAA proposes to adopt a
new airworthiness directive (AD) for
certain EMBRAER Model EMB–145XR
airplanes. This proposed AD would
require replacement of certain segments
of the passenger seat tracks with new,
improved seat tracks. This proposed AD
results from instances where the shear
plungers of the passenger seat legs were
not adequately fastened. We are
proposing this AD to prevent inadequate
fastening of the seat leg shear plungers,
which could result in failure of the
passenger seat tracks during emergency
landing conditions and consequent
injury to passengers.
DATES: We must receive comments on
this proposed AD by May 15, 2006.
ADDRESSES: Use one of the following
addresses to submit comments on this
proposed AD.
• DOT Docket Web site: Go to
https://dms.dot.gov and follow the
instructions for sending your comments
electronically.
• Government-wide rulemaking Web
site: Go to https://www.regulations.gov
and follow the instructions for sending
your comments electronically.
• Mail: Docket Management Facility,
U.S. Department of Transportation, 400
Seventh Street, SW., Nassif Building,
room PL–401, Washington, DC 20590.
• Fax: (202) 493–2251.
• Hand Delivery: Room PL–401 on
the plaza level of the Nassif Building,
400 Seventh Street, SW., Washington,
DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday
through Friday, except Federal holidays.
Contact Empresa Brasileira de
Aeronautica S.A. (EMBRAER), P.O. Box
343—CEP 12.225, Sao Jose dos
Campos—SP, Brazil, for service
information identified in this proposed
AD.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Todd Thompson, Aerospace Engineer,
International Branch, ANM–116, FAA,
Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601
Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington
98055–4056; telephone (425) 227–1175;
fax (425) 227–2125.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Comments Invited
We invite you to submit any relevant
written data, views, or arguments
regarding this proposed AD. Send your
comments to an address listed in the
ADDRESSES section. Include the docket
number ‘‘FAA–2006–24440; Directorate
Identifier 2006–NM–058–AD’’ at the
beginning of your comments. We
specifically invite comments on the
overall regulatory, economic,
environmental, and energy aspects of
the proposed AD. We will consider all
comments received by the closing date
E:\FR\FM\13APP1.SGM
13APP1
Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 71, Number 71 (Thursday, April 13, 2006)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 19140-19142]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E6-5472]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. FAA-2006-24430; Directorate Identifier 2006-NM-048-AD]
RIN 2120-AA64
Airworthiness Directives; McDonnell Douglas Model DC-9-31, DC-9-
32, DC-9-32F, DC-9-33F, DC-9-34, and DC-9-34F Airplanes; and Model DC-
9-40 and DC-9-50 Series Airplanes
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: The FAA proposes to adopt a new airworthiness directive (AD)
for certain transport category airplanes, identified above. This
proposed AD would require installing a bonding jumper from the boost
pump volute to the fuel tank structure, and related investigative/
corrective actions. This proposed AD results from fuel system reviews
conducted by the manufacturer. We are proposing this AD to prevent
point-contact arcing or filament heating in the fuel tank, which, in
the event of a short or ground fault inside the fuel tank, could result
in a fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of the airplane.
DATES: We must receive comments on this proposed AD by May 30, 2006.
ADDRESSES: Use one of the following addresses to submit comments on
this proposed AD.
DOT Docket Web site: Go to https://dms.dot.gov and follow
the instructions for sending your comments electronically.
Government-wide rulemaking Web site: Go to https://
www.regulations.gov and follow the instructions for sending your
comments electronically.
Mail: Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department of
Transportation, 400 Seventh Street SW., Nassif Building, room PL-401,
Washington, DC 20590.
Fax: (202) 493-2251.
Hand Delivery: Room PL-401 on the plaza level of the
Nassif Building, 400 Seventh Street SW., Washington, DC, between 9 a.m.
and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.
Contact Boeing Commercial Airplanes, Long Beach Division, 3855
Lakewood Boulevard, Long Beach, California 90846, Attention: Data and
Service Management, Dept. C1-L5A (D800-0024), for the service
information identified in this proposed AD.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Samuel Lee, Aerospace Engineer,
Propulsion Branch, ANM-140L, FAA, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification
Office, 3960 Paramount Boulevard, Lakewood, California 90712-4137;
telephone (562) 627-5262; fax (562) 627-5210.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Comments Invited
We invite you to submit any relevant written data, views, or
arguments regarding this proposed AD. Send your comments to an address
listed in the ADDRESSES section. Include the docket number ``FAA-2006-
24430; Directorate Identifier 2006-NM-048-AD'' at the beginning of your
comments. We specifically invite comments on the overall regulatory,
economic, environmental, and energy aspects of the proposed AD. We will
consider all comments received by the closing date and may amend the
proposed AD in light of those comments.
We will post all comments we receive, without change, to https://
dms.dot.gov, including any personal information you provide. We will
also post a report summarizing each substantive verbal contact with FAA
personnel concerning this proposed AD. Using the search function of
that Web site, anyone can find and read the
[[Page 19141]]
comments in any of our dockets, including the name of the individual
who sent the comment (or signed the comment on behalf of an
association, business, labor union, etc.). You may review DOT's
complete Privacy Act Statement in the Federal Register published on
April 11, 2000 (65 FR 19477-78), or you may visit https://dms.dot.gov.
Examining the Docket
You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at https://
dms.dot.gov, or in person at the Docket Management Facility office
between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal
holidays. The Docket Management Facility office (telephone (800) 647-
5227) is located on the plaza level of the Nassif Building at the DOT
street address stated in the ADDRESSES section. Comments will be
available in the AD docket shortly after the Docket Management System
receives them.
Discussion
The FAA has examined the underlying safety issues involved in fuel
tank explosions on several large transport airplanes, including the
adequacy of existing regulations, the service history of airplanes
subject to those regulations, and existing maintenance practices for
fuel tank systems. As a result of those findings, we issued a
regulation titled ``Transport Airplane Fuel Tank System Design Review,
Flammability Reduction and Maintenance and Inspection Requirements''
(67 FR 23086, May 7, 2001). In addition to new airworthiness standards
for transport airplanes and new maintenance requirements, this rule
included Special Federal Aviation Regulation No. 88 (``SFAR 88,''
Amendment 21-78, and subsequent Amendments 21-82 and 21-83).
Among other actions, SFAR 88 requires certain type design (i.e.,
type certificate (TC) and supplemental type certificate (STC)) holders
to substantiate that their fuel tank systems can prevent ignition
sources in the fuel tanks. This requirement applies to type design
holders for large turbine-powered transport airplanes and for
subsequent modifications to those airplanes. It requires them to
perform design reviews and to develop design changes and maintenance
procedures if their designs do not meet the new fuel tank safety
standards. As explained in the preamble to the rule, we intended to
adopt airworthiness directives to mandate any changes found necessary
to address unsafe conditions identified as a result of these reviews.
In evaluating these design reviews, we have established four
criteria intended to define the unsafe conditions associated with fuel
tank systems that require corrective actions. The percentage of
operating time during which fuel tanks are exposed to flammable
conditions is one of these criteria. The other three criteria address
the failure types under evaluation: single failures, single failures in
combination with a latent condition(s), and in-service failure
experience. For all four criteria, the evaluations included
consideration of previous actions taken that may mitigate the need for
further action.
We have determined that the actions identified in this AD are
necessary to reduce the potential of ignition sources inside fuel
tanks, which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result
in fuel tank explosions and consequent loss of the airplane.
We have received a report indicating that, on certain McDonnell
Douglas Model DC-9 airplanes with a 580-gallon forward auxiliary fuel
tank, the volute of the fuel boost pump is bonded to the inlet basket
assembly but not to the tank structure. At the pump run-out fuel level,
the pump, which receives 155VAC power, is uncovered and there is fuel
vapor in the area. Installing a new bonding jumper will minimize the
possibilities of point-contact arcing or filament heating in the fuel
tank which, in the event of a short or ground fault condition, could
result in a fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of the airplane.
Relevant Service Information
We have reviewed Boeing Service Bulletin DC9-28-214, dated December
16, 2005. The service bulletin describes procedures for installing a
bonding jumper from the boost pump volute to the fuel tank structure.
The installation includes the related investigative and corrective
actions of testing the bonding between the jumper and the pump mounting
lug, between the clip and the lower stanchion support stud, and between
the jumper and the clip, to verify that the resistance is less than 2.5
milliohms; and reworking, if necessary, until the resistance is less
than 2.5 milliohms. Accomplishing the actions specified in the service
information is intended to adequately address the unsafe condition.
FAA's Determination and Requirements of the Proposed AD
We have evaluated all pertinent information and identified an
unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on other airplanes
of this same type design. For this reason, we are proposing this AD,
which would require accomplishing the actions specified in the service
information described previously, except as discussed under
``Difference Between the Proposed AD and the Service Bulletin.''
Difference Between the Proposed AD and the Service Bulletin
Although the service bulletin recommends doing the installation at
the next scheduled fuel tank entry, but not to exceed 10 years, we have
determined that interval would not address the identified unsafe
condition soon enough to ensure an adequate level of safety for the
affected fleet. In developing an appropriate compliance time for this
AD, we considered the degree of urgency associated with the subject
unsafe condition, the average utilization of the affected fleet, and
the time necessary to do the installation. In light of all of these
factors, we find that a compliance time of 60 months represents an
appropriate interval of time for affected airplanes to continue to
operate without compromising safety. This difference has been
coordinated with Boeing.
Costs of Compliance
There are about 250 airplanes of the affected design in the
worldwide fleet. This proposed AD would affect about 152 airplanes of
U.S. registry. The proposed actions would take about 9 work hours per
airplane, at an average labor rate of $80 per work hour. Required parts
would cost about $2,385 per airplane. Based on these figures, the
estimated cost of the proposed AD for U.S. operators is $471,960, or
$3,105 per airplane.
Authority for This Rulemaking
Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the
authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII, Aviation Programs,
describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.
We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in
subtitle VII, part A, subpart III, section 44701, ``General
requirements.'' Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing
regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator
finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within
the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition
that is likely to exist or develop on
[[Page 19142]]
products identified in this rulemaking action.
Regulatory Findings
We have determined that this proposed AD would not have federalism
implications under Executive Order 13132. This proposed AD would not
have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship
between the national Government and the States, or on the distribution
of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.
For the reasons discussed above, I certify that the proposed
regulation:
1. Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive Order
12866;
2. Is not a ``significant rule'' under the DOT Regulatory Policies
and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and
3. Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
We prepared a regulatory evaluation of the estimated costs to
comply with this proposed AD and placed it in the AD docket. See the
ADDRESSES section for a location to examine the regulatory evaluation.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39
Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Safety.
The Proposed Amendment
Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the
Administrator, the FAA proposes to amend 14 CFR part 39 as follows:
PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.
Sec. 39.13 [Amended]
2. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) amends Sec. 39.13 by
adding the following new airworthiness directive (AD):
McDonnell Douglas: Docket No. FAA-2006-24430; Directorate Identifier
2006-NM-048-AD.
Comments Due Date
(a) The FAA must receive comments on this AD action by May 30,
2006.
Affected ADs
(b) None.
Applicability
(c) This AD applies to McDonnell Douglas Model DC-9-31, DC-9-32,
DC-9-32F, DC-9-33F, DC-9-34, DC-9-34F, DC-9-41, and DC-9-51
airplanes, certificated in any category; as identified in Boeing
Service Bulletin DC9-28-214, dated December 16, 2005.
Unsafe Condition
(d) This AD results from fuel system reviews conducted by the
manufacturer. We are issuing this AD to prevent point-contact arcing
or filament heating in the fuel tank, which, in the event of a short
or ground fault inside the fuel tank, could result in a fuel tank
explosion and consequent loss of the airplane.
Compliance
(e) You are responsible for having the actions required by this
AD performed within the compliance times specified, unless the
actions have already been done.
Installation
(f) Within 60 months after the effective date of this AD,
install a bonding jumper from the boost pump volute to the fuel tank
structure, and do all applicable related investigative and
corrective actions before further flight; by doing all the actions
specified in the Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing Service
Bulletin DC9-28-214, dated December 16, 2005.
Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)
(g)(1) The Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office
(ACO), FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if
requested in accordance with the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19.
(2) Before using any AMOC approved in accordance with Sec.
39.19 on any airplane to which the AMOC applies, notify the
appropriate principal inspector in the FAA Flight Standards
Certificate Holding District Office.
Issued in Renton, Washington, on April 4, 2006.
Kevin M. Mullin,
Acting Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification
Service. 9
[FR Doc. E6-5472 Filed 4-12-06; 8:45 am]
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