Five-Year Review of Oil Pipeline Pricing Index, 15329-15338 [06-2964]
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Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 59 / Tuesday, March 28, 2006 / Rules and Regulations
a subsidiary of its parent on a fullyallocated cost reimbursable basis;
provided, that the operator of the U.S.registered foreign civil aircraft must
hold majority ownership in, be majority
owned by, or have a common parent
with, the company for which it provides
operations;
(b) Interchange operations. A
company may lease a U.S.-registered
foreign civil aircraft to another company
in exchange for equal time when needed
on the other company’s U.S. registered
aircraft, where no charge, assessment, or
fee is made, except that a charge may be
made not to exceed the difference
between the cost of owning, operating,
and maintaining the two aircraft;
(c) Joint ownership operations. A
company that jointly owns a U.S.registered foreign civil aircraft and
furnishes the flight crew for that aircraft
may collect from the other joint owners
of that aircraft a share of the actual costs
involved in the operation of the aircraft;
and
(d) Time-sharing operations. A
company may lease a U.S.-registered
foreign civil aircraft, with crew, to
another company; provided, that the
operator may collect no charge for the
operation of the aircraft except
reimbursement for:
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(1) Fuel, oil, lubricants, and other
additives.
(2) Travel expenses of the crew,
including food, lodging, and ground
transportation.
(3) Hanger and tie-down costs away
from the aircraft’s base of operations.
(4) Insurance obtained for the specific
flight.
(5) Landing fees, airport taxes, and
similar assessments.
(6) Customs, foreign permit, and
similar fees directly related to the flight.
(7) In flight food and beverages.
(8) Passenger ground transportation.
(9) Flight planning and weather
contract services.
(10) An additional charge equal to 100
percent of the expenses for fuel, oil,
lubricants, and other additives.
Issued under authority delegated in 49 CFR
1.56a in Washington, DC, on this 21st day of
March, 2006.
Michael W. Reynolds,
Acting Assistant Secretary for Aviation and
International Affairs.
[FR Doc. 06–2930 Filed 3–27–06; 8:45 am]
15:42 Mar 27, 2006
Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission
18 CFR Part 342
[Docket No. RM05–22–000]
Five-Year Review of Oil Pipeline
Pricing Index
Issued March 21, 2006.
Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission, DOE.
ACTION: Order establishing index for oil
price change ceiling levels.
AGENCY:
SUMMARY: The Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (Commission) is
issuing this final order concluding its
second five-year review of the oil
pricing index, established in Order No.
561, Revisions to Oil Pipeline
Regulations Pursuant to the Energy
Policy Act of 1992, FERC Stats. & Regs.
[Regs. Preambles, 1991–1996] ¶ 30,985
(1993). After consideration of all the
initial, reply and supplemental
comments, the Commission has
concluded that the PPI+1.3 index
should be established for the five-year
period commencing July 1, 2006. At the
end of this period, in July 2011, the
Commission will once again review the
index to determine whether it continues
to measure adequately the cost changes
in the oil pipeline industry.
DATES: March 28, 2006.
ADDRESSES: Secretary of the
Commission, Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission, 888 First Street, NE.,
Washington, DC 20426.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Harris S. Wood (Legal Information),
Office of the General Counsel, 888
First Street, NE., Washington, DC
20426, (202) 502–8224.
Robert W. Fulton (Technical
Information), Office of Energy Markets
and Reliability, 888 First Street, NE.,
Washington, DC 20426, (202) 502–
8003.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Before Commissioners: Joseph T. Kelliher,
Chairman; Nora Mead Brownell, and
Suedeen G. Kelly.
1. On July 6, 2005, the Commission
issued a Notice of Inquiry (NOI),1 in
which it proposed to continue using the
Producer Price Index for Finished
Goods (PPI or PPI–FG) for the next fiveyear period beginning July 1, 2006, to
track oil pipeline industry cost changes.
The Commission applies the index to oil
1 Five-Year Review of Oil Pipeline Pricing Index,
IV FERC Stats. & Regs. [Notices] ¶ 35,552 (2005)
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pipeline transportation tariffs to
establish rate ceiling levels for pipeline
rate changes. The NOI invited interested
persons to submit comments on the
continued use of PPI and to propose,
justify, and fully support, as an
alternative, adjustments to PPI.
Comments and reply comments were
due September 13 and October 13, 2005,
respectively.
2. Based on our review of the
comments and reply comments
received, and for the reasons discussed
below, the Commission determines that
the PPI plus one point three percent
(PPI+1.3) should be established for the
five-year period commencing July 1,
2006, and concludes that this index
satisfies the mandates of the Energy
Policy Act of 1992 (Energy Policy Act).2
Background
3. Congress, in the Energy Policy Act,
required the Commission to establish a
‘‘simplified and generally applicable’’
ratemaking methodology for oil
pipelines, consistent with the just and
reasonable standard of the Interstate
Commerce Act (ICA).3 On October 22,
1993, the Commission issued Order No.
561,4 promulgating regulations
pertaining to the Commission’s
jurisdiction over oil pipelines under the
ICA, and to fulfill the requirements of
the Energy Policy Act. In so doing, the
Commission found that using an
indexing methodology to regulate oil
pipeline rate changes, accompanied
with certain alternative rate-changing
methodologies where either the pipeline
or the shipper could justify departure
from the indexing methodology, would
satisfy both the mandate of Congress
and comply with the requirements of
the ICA. The Commission found that the
indexing methodology adopted in the
final rule would simplify, and thereby
expedite, the process of changing rates
by allowing, as a general rule, such
changes to be made in accordance with
a generally applicable index, and that it
would ensure compliance with the just
and reasonable standard of the ICA by
subjecting the chosen index to periodic
monitoring and, if necessary,
2 42 U.S.C.A. 7172 note (West Supp. 1993). The
Energy Policy Act’s mandate of establishing a
simplified and generally applicable method of
regulating oil transportation rates specifically
excluded the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System (TAPS),
or any pipeline delivering oil, directly or indirectly,
into it.
3 49 U.S.C. app. 1 (1988).
4 Revisions to Oil Pipeline Regulations Pursuant
to the Energy Policy Act, FERC Stats. & Regs. [Regs.
Preambles, 1991–1996] ¶ 30,985 (1993), 58 FR
58753 (Nov. 4, 1993); order on reh’g, Order No.
561–A, FERC Stats. & Regs. [Regs Preambles, 1991–
1996] ¶ 31,000 (1994), 59 FR 40243 (Aug. 8, 1994),
aff’d., Association of Oil Pipe Lines v. FERC, 83
F.3d 1424 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
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adjustment. In determining which index
to use, the Commission obtained the
views of interested parties, including
industry participants, shippers and
others on its proposal to change its
ratemaking methodology for oil
pipelines. Dr. Alfred E. Kahn (Dr. Kahn)
supported the establishment of an index
of PPI–1 on behalf of a group of
shippers, as the index that best tracked
pipeline cost changes over a period of
time. After extensive analysis of various
suggested indices, the Commission
adopted the PPI–1 index for the purpose
of allowing oil pipelines to change rates
without making cost-of-service filings.
This index was chosen over others
because it came the closest to tracking
the historical changes in actual costs as
reported in FERC Form No. 6 and was
to be in effect for the five-year period
July 1996 through June 2001. The
Commission also committed to review
every five years the continued
effectiveness of its index.
4. In the course of establishing the
appropriate index for the first review
period 2001–2006, the Commission
initially deviated from the methodology
it had used in establishing the index as
PPI–1 percent, concluding that the
index should be retained as PPI–1,
based upon a revision to the
methodology established in Order No.
561. The Commission’s order was
reviewed by the U.S. Court of Appeals
and remanded because the Commission
departed from the Order No. 561
methodology. Specifically, the U.S.
Court of Appeals found that the
Commission neither adequately
addressed parties’ concerns over using a
new methodology, nor in the alternative
articulated reasons for changing its
averaging methodology applied in Order
No. 561. Further, the U.S. Court of
Appeals found that the Commission
failed to justify its methodological shifts
from Order No. 561 regarding outliers
and the use of net plant. Upon remand,
the Commission concluded that the
most appropriate way to measure
pipeline costs and rate ceilings, and to
assure that the nexus drawn between
them continued, was to apply the same
methodology as it initially applied in
Order No. 561. The Commission thus
returned to the method adopted in
Order No. 561 in its further analysis on
remand. Utilizing the Kahn
methodology which resulted in an index
of an unadjusted PPI, the Commission
adopted PPI as the appropriate index for
the five-year period beginning July
2001. This order on remand was upheld
by the U.S. Court of Appeals.5 In the
5 102 FERC ¶ 61,195 (2003), aff’d., Flying J Inc.
v. FERC, 363 F.3rd 495 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
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current five-year review, we are
applying that same methodology.
Initial Comments and Initial Reply
Comments
5. On September 13, 2005, the
Association of Oil Pipelines (AOPL)
submitted its comments in response to
the NOI. AOPL, as supported by a study
done by its consultant, Dr. Ramsey
Shehadeh (Dr. Shehadeh), contends that
an index of PPI+1.3 percent rather than
PPI is the appropriate index for the next
five years. AOPL avers that application
of the Commission’s established, U.S.
Court of Appeals-approved
methodology shows that pipeline costs
over the past five years increased at a
rate of PPI+1.3 percent. AOPL maintains
that the increased pipeline costs result
from imposition of new safety and
environmental regulatory obligations,
voluntary security measures in the wake
of 9/11 and increased energy costs.
AOPL states that an index of PPI+1.3
percent will ensure that pipeline rates
are ‘‘just and reasonable’’ while
allowing efficient pipeline carriers to
recover their increased costs over the
next five years. These carriers, AOPL
argues, will also be able to expand
capacity to eliminate existing capacity
constraints, and continue ongoing
efforts to improve pipeline safety,
efficiency, and security.
6. Lion Oil Company, National
Cooperative Refinery Association,
Sinclair Oil Corporation and Tesoro
Refining and Marketing Company
(collectively the Refiners) filed a joint
response on October 13, 2005, to
AOPL’s September 13 initial comments.
The Refiners and the Air Transport
Association of America (ATA), whose
comments are discussed below, are both
supported by the same study prepared
by their consultant, Peter K. Ashton (Mr.
Ashton), who urges the Commission to
keep PPI as the index. The Refiners
contend that the correct analysis of
FERC Form No. 6 data indicates that the
Commission should maintain PPI to
determine annual rate increases. The
Refiners state that PPI was determined
appropriately by applying the
methodology described by the
Commission and the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit over the past 12 years. The
Refiners claim that AOPL failed to
provide any sound support for its claim
that PPI+1.3 percent is the inflationary
index that tracked oil pipeline cost
increases the best over the past five
years. The Refiners contend that Mr.
Ashton demonstrated a sound analysis
of the data whose results indicate the
Commission’s initial view in its NOI
was correct: The PPI without any
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adjustment is the index that has best
tracked oil pipeline cost increases.
7. On October 13, 2005, the ATA also
filed a response to AOPL’s comments.
ATA contends that today’s economic
environment requires careful scrutiny of
any proposed pipeline rate increases.
ATA states the ability of pipelines to
recover costs not generally encompassed
by indexing through the cost-of-service
‘‘safety valve’’ or through the
Commission sanctioned ‘‘security
surcharge’’ ensures that pipelines can
recover normal cost changes through
indexing without, at the same time,
having unjustified across-the-board
burdens placed on the airline industry
by implementation of an unreasonably
high indexing adjustment. As
mentioned above, ATA relied upon the
same Ashton study as the Refiners. ATA
states that its position, and that of its
member airlines, is that the Commission
should adopt a price index of PPI for the
next five-year period.
8. In his Sworn Declaration, Mr.
Ashton claims that he employed the
same methodology in conducting his
analysis of oil pipeline cost increases in
the 1999–2004 period as that used and
adopted by the Commission in its
previous review of the pricing index, as
well as by Dr. Kahn. Based on his
detailed analysis of historical oil
pipeline cost data from 1999–2004,
employing this methodology, Mr.
Ashton concluded that the PPI, without
any adjustment, closely tracked oil
pipeline cost increases for that period.
He states that taking the midpoint
between the two composite averages
(middle 50 percent and middle 80
percent of the sample) yields an annual
rate of increase that is virtually identical
to the increase in the PPI for the
relevant time period. Mr. Ashton
concludes that there is no basis for
modifying the current PPI index since it
already appropriately tracks normal
industry average costs.
9. In addition to conducting his own
analysis, Mr. Ashton reviewed the
submission of AOPL and its expert, Dr.
Shehadeh. Mr. Ashton concluded that
the data and analysis employed by Dr.
Shehadeh are deficient, cannot be
replicated, and therefore cannot be
relied on. Specifically, Mr. Ashton cites
the fact that much of the data pertaining
to the later years of the study were
compiled and supplied by AOPL,
instead of Dr. Shehadeh obtaining his
sample data from FERC Form No. 6. Mr.
Ashton questions the lack of
information concerning the source of Dr.
Shehadeh’s data, and the apparent lack
of any attempt to validate or verify the
information. Mr. Ashton states that,
more significantly, in an attempt to
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increase the sample size, Dr. Shehadeh
made numerous additions and
adjustments to the Form No. 6 data for
‘‘potential omissions and potential
errors,’’ much of which was based on
information supplied by AOPL. Mr.
Ashton claims that Dr. Shehadeh made
such adjustments without any clear
indication as to exactly what those
adjustments were, or how such
adjustments affected the results of the
study. As a result, Mr. Ashton
concludes that any results of Dr.
Shehadeh’s study are deficient and
unreliable.
10. The U.S. Department of
Transportation (DOT) also filed
comments in response to AOPL on
October 13, 2005. DOT expressed no
views on the precise index the
Commission should choose. DOT
submitted its comments to confirm
certain points raised by AOPL with
respect to oil pipeline regulatory
obligations. DOT states that it has
adopted safety regulations that impose
significant obligations and costs on
pipeline operators.6 DOT states that it is
concerned about the capacity of the
underlying infrastructure of the nation’s
transportation networks, including oil
pipelines, to meet growing demands
placed upon them. DOT urges the
Commission to consider seriously the
financial commitment necessary for
operators to maintain and expand
pipeline system capacity.
11. DOT states that in the long run, its
rules will prove beneficial to the public
and pipelines as well, but in the short
run, the ensuing costs will prove
considerable, with the additional effect
of reducing or deferring operator
revenues. DOT estimates that, over the
seven year period 2001 through 2007,
initial baseline assessments would cost
operators more than $120 million;
retesting, $14.5 million annually;
preparation of integrity plans, almost
$18 million; and related implementation
costs, almost $10 million the first year
and $5 million annually thereafter. DOT
states it could not estimate the repair
costs incurred as a result of its required
testing as it is impossible to predict the
number and kind of conditions that
would be disclosed, but given the fact
that most repairs involve excavating
pipeline segments and replacing
sections of pipe, along with the requisite
pressure reductions required to
accommodate repairs, DOT believes
such repair costs would be considerable.
DOT noted that in 2004 pipeline
6 The DOT integrity management regulations are
found at 65 Federal Register 75378, December 1,
2000 and 67 Federal Register 2136 (January 16,
2002).
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operators made more than 1,500 repairs
posing immediate threats to pipeline
integrity, and noted that one operator
reported a single repair cost $8 million
to make. DOT therefore contends that it
is imperative that the Commission factor
these costs into its deliberations in
choosing the appropriate index for the
next five-year period. DOT believes that
failure to do so could lead to various
outcomes inconsistent with the public
interest, such as operators being
disinclined to invest in additional
capacity, abandoning older or
marginally economic pipelines as a costcutting measure, or operators being
tempted to cut corners on safety as a
way of bringing costs more in line with
revenues. DOT also cites evidence
demonstrating a serious
underinvestment in petroleum pipeline
infrastructure and underscoring that
several pipeline systems of national
importance lack redundancy, with
consequences including higher prices
and less competitive markets for
petroleum products in some regions,
supply disruptions and price spikes due
to relatively minor service interruptions,
and diversion of petroleum products to
other, less efficient and desirable
transportation modes.
12. DOT claims that the extent of
capacity restrictions in the nation’s
pipeline infrastructure is becoming
more apparent, as is the realization that
the current regulatory mechanisms may
not lead to appropriate reinvestment in
the industry. DOT suggests that the
Commission consider convening a
workshop or technical conference to
explore regulatory mechanisms that
could facilitate critical investment in
maintaining and expanding pipeline
system capacity.
13. On October 14, 2005, the Pipeline
Safety Trust (Trust), an organization that
promotes fuel transportation safety
through education and advocacy, filed
to respond to AOPL’s comments. The
Trust agrees with AOPL that safety
requirements on the industry have
significantly increased since the last
five-year review, including but not
limited to the new integrity
management regulations. In addition,
the Trust states that it is persuaded by
the 1999–2004 data contained in
AOPL’s draft comments (which were
analyzed by AOPL using a U.S. Court of
Appeals-approved methodology) that
the costs on the industry have increased
enough to justify a PPI+1.3 percent as
the pricing index for the next five years.
However, the Trust requests that prior to
approving PPI+1.3 percent, the FERC
perform its own technical review of the
accuracy and completeness of AOPL’s
cost data, and the reasonableness and
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appropriateness of AOPL’s analytical
methodology.
Exchange of Supporting Data Between
Parties and Filed With the Commission
14. To expedite the index review
process, AOPL and the ATA and
Refiners (hereinafter referred to as
Shippers) agreed to exchange source
data, spreadsheets, and the detail of the
methodology used to support their
respective positions of PPI+1.3 percent,
and PPI. On November 15, 2005, AOPL
and the Shippers filed their supporting
workpapers with the Commission.
Subsequent Reply Comments and
Responses
15. On January 10, 2006, AOPL filed
comments in reply to the study
presented by the Shippers, contending
that their study contains flawed
economic analysis and incomplete and
erroneous sampling of pipeline cost
data. AOPL claims that, when corrected,
the data presented by Shippers support
an adjustment of PPI+1.56 percent,
which supports AOPL’s original
position that the Commission should
establish the index at least at PPI+1.3
percent.
16. On January 23, 2006, the Shippers
filed a joint response to AOPL’s January
10 comments. Shippers claim that
AOPL’s comments distort the position
advocated by Shippers and present nonpublic data upon which AOPL based its
incorrect conclusions. Shippers contend
that the facts they are presenting for
Commission consideration are
supported by a study conducted by Dr.
Paul J. Smith (Dr. Smith), a prominent
mathematician and statistician, as well
as by a supplemental study performed
by their consultant, Mr. Ashton. Based
on new data provided by AOPL, Mr.
Ashton added some pipelines to his
study, and reconciled much of the data
supplied by AOPL with that culled from
FERC Form No. 6 data. Mr. Ashton
concludes that the Commission should
be very cautious about establishing an
index higher than the present PPI.
17. Dr. Smith reviewed the dataset
consisting of 62 firms that Mr. Ashton
originally proposed, as well as the
81firm dataset proposed by Dr.
Shehadeh in his January 10 rebuttal
declaration on behalf of AOPL. Dr.
Smith recommends the use of the
median or geometric mean to estimate
the five-year cost index, given the Form
No. 6 data. In both data sets analyzed,
the median and geometric mean are very
close together. Dr. Smith argued that the
use of the arithmetic mean is clearly not
appropriate for either of these data sets.
Arithmetic means are not representative
of data from skewed distributions.
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18. Shippers conclude that, given the
validation of Mr. Ashton’s methodology,
use of the geometric mean and choice of
sample set, the conclusions reached by
Dr. Smith, and given the real possibility
of substantial errors in the FERC Form
No. 6 data, the PPI should be used as the
inflationary index for the next five
years, or, in the alternative, the
Commission should maintain the PPI
and institute a rulemaking to establish
new criteria and reconsider the
methodology currently being used for
determining such an index. Shippers
contend that the fact that a significant
number of large oil pipelines are
substantially over-recovering their cost
of service lends additional support to
this conclusion.
19. On February 9, 2006, AOPL
submitted its supplemental reply
comments in response to comments
made by Shippers on January 23, 2006.
AOPL claimed that Shippers, even after
admitting to substantial mistakes in
their analysis of oil pipeline cost data,
resulting in flawed evidence and
testimony, nevertheless urged the
Commission to adopt a new
methodology for setting the price cap
index or, alternatively, to retain the PPI
index pending a new rulemaking. AOPL
argued that the Commission should
squarely reject the Shippers’ new
position because, despite correcting
errors in data and sample selection,
Shippers’ position remains
fundamentally flawed. AOPL argued
that Shippers’ own cost evidence
supports a substantial upward
adjustment to the current index. AOPL
states that, in sum, it is clear that
Shippers’ real complaint is not with the
methodology and cost data used by the
Commission to set its price cap index,
but rather with the index level the
faithful application of such
methodology produces. The
Commission must, as required by law,
apply its established, U.S. Court of
Appeals-approved index standard and
set PPI+1.3 percent as its new index for
the next five years.
20. AOPL argued that, while Shippers
purported to apply the Commissionapproved methodology for measuring
pipeline cost changes, Shippers in fact
departed from that standard in several
key respects. Even after correcting the
data from their original analysis,
Shippers’ data sample omitted many
eligible pipelines, failed to account for
mergers, used incorrect data fields and
data not reflected on FERC Form No. 6,
improperly included cost data from
TAPS assets that are not governed by
the index and reflect entirely different
accounting conventions, and most
damaging, performed key calculations
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in the wrong order, thereby
systematically understating cost
changes.
21. AOPL’s comments addressed as
well the report of Dr. Smith, cited by
Shippers as a source of validation of its
calculations. AOPL claimed that Dr.
Smith’s analysis is irrelevant to this
proceeding, as he does not purport to
address Mr. Ashton’s analysis and
expresses no opinion about the
reasonableness of that analysis or its use
of composite measures of central
tendency. Dr. Smith advocates use of an
entirely different standard, the median,
does not approve of calculating cost
changes in the wrong sequence, and in
fact does not even analyze, much less
endorse, use of the unweighted
geometric mean in combination with the
weighted mean and median that Mr.
Ashton used. Nor, argues AOPL, did Dr.
Smith analyze the middle 50 percent
and middle 80 percent data sets. As a
result of all this, any reliance Shippers
placed on the report of Dr. Smith was
misplaced.
22. AOPL addressed Shippers’ claims
that the Commission must abandon its
U.S. Court of Appeals-approved
standard because of ‘‘manifest errors’’
and because its results are sensitive to
‘‘extreme data points’’ by pointing out
that the existence and reasonable
treatment of outlier data was extensively
addressed by the Commission in prior
proceedings, and the Commission’s
methodology was specifically designed
to take such an issue into consideration,
specifically by employing the middle 50
percent and middle 80 percent samples.
As to Shippers’ claim that the
Commission’s methodology is flawed
and it should set the index at PPI
because a small minority of oil pipelines
is over-recovering their cost of service,
AOPL replied that the Commission
recognized that, in adopting a uniform
index for all pipelines, inevitably some
pipelines would over-earn while others
will under-earn. If Shippers truly
believe that individual pipelines are
over-earning such that rates cannot
satisfy the ‘‘just and reasonable’’
requirement, they can file a complaint
against those pipelines. AOPL contends
that the indexing methodology is not
intended to drive rates to cost, but
instead to make sure that any rate
changes were based on expected cost
changes. AOPL further states that the
Commission is not subject to a statutory
duty to examine whole rates when
pipelines propose index rates; rather, its
inquiry is limited to a comparison of
changes in rates and costs from one year
to another.
23. In his Supplemental Rebuttal
Declaration on behalf of AOPL, Dr.
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Shehadeh argues that Mr. Ashton
departed from the very methodology he
purported to support, failed to
implement accurately either the
methodology used by Dr. Kahn or by Dr.
Smith, has no support in any of the
testimonies given in this proceeding for
his findings, and for these reasons, such
findings are unreliable as a basis for
selection of an index for index-based
regulation of oil pipeline tariffs. Dr.
Shehadeh states that the basis for the
differences between his conclusions and
those of Mr. Ashton consist principally
of errors in Mr. Ashton’s data and his
flawed order of operations in
implementing the methods of Dr. Kahn.
Specifically, Dr. Shehadeh cites the fact
that Mr. Ashton calculates his cost
changes in incorrect order—he applied
the geometric mean over time prior to
his application of the arithmetic mean
across pipelines. Dr. Kahn correctly
determined annual average change in
costs by employing the geometric mean
on the average cumulative changes, as
opposed to Mr. Ashton, who in contrast
determined the annual average change
in costs by employing the average of the
geometric means of each pipeline’s
cumulative changes.
24. Rather than addressing the
validity of Dr. Shehadeh’s assertion
concerning the order of his calculations,
Dr. Shehadeh claims that instead, Mr.
Ashton introduced an entirely new
methodology based on measures of
central tendency and composite
averages, purportedly based on Dr.
Smith’s report. Dr. Shehadeh further
states that Mr. Ashton’s new
methodology, especially as it pertains to
use of sensitive data, is flawed and
therefore unreliable.
25. In conclusion, Dr. Shehadeh
continues his support of the use of the
methodology the Commission employed
in its previous analysis, that Dr. Kahn
validated, and that the U.S. Court of
Appeals approved. According to Dr.
Shehadah, Mr. Ashton’s new
methodology is completely unsupported
by factual evidence, lacks economic
foundation, and is unreliable and
uninformative. Employing the same
methodology used by Dr. Kahn and the
Commission and endorsed by the U.S.
Court of Appeals demonstrates that
actual cost changes experienced by oil
pipelines over the last five years almost
equaled PPI+1.5 percent, and
consequently, the Commission should
choose as the index for the next five
year period PPI with an adjustment
factor no less than 1.3 percent.
26. On February 21, 2006, the
American Trucking Association filed
letter comments in response to the
Commission’s NOI. The American
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Trucking Association adopted the
positions espoused by the Shippers and
added no new arguments. On February
28, 2006, the International Air Transport
Association filed letter comments,
similar to that of the American Trucking
Association, in support of the Shippers
and again adding no new arguments.
27. On February 24, 2006, Shippers
filed additional comments, styled
‘‘supplemental rebuttal,’’ and a ‘‘Sworn
Rebuttal Declaration’’ of Mr. Ashton.
The purpose of this filing is to rebut the
Supplemental Reply Comments of
AOPL, which had been filed on
February 9, 2006. Shippers contend that
AOPL has made two fundamental and
related errors in its Supplemental Reply
Comments: AOPL incorrectly states that
the Shippers and Mr. Ashton have
employed a new methodology; and,
even if Shippers have employed a
different methodology, the Commission
is within its rights to rely on that
methodology.
Discussion
Methodology To Calculate the Index
Differential
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28. Since Order Nos. 561 and 561–A,
the Commission has primarily relied
upon Dr. Kahn’s testimony 7 to develop
the methodology to set the index
differential 8, which was subsequently
approved by the U.S. Court of Appeals.9
Within the Commission-established
method, after each firm’s unit cost
changes are calculated and weighted,
two trimmed data sets are extracted
from the master data set. Both parties
have constructed the trimmed data sets
of the middle 50 percent and middle 80
percent. Trimming is done to remove
statistical outliers, or spurious data
points that could bias the mean of the
sample in either direction. Table 1
provides a description of the statistical
values of central tendency used by both
parties to develop the index. The
industry-wide cost index is calculated
by averaging both composites on Line D
and then comparing that value to the
PPI–FG index data over the same
period.
7 Declaration of Alfred E. Kahn, August 31, 2000,
in Review of Pipeline Pricing Index, Docket No.
RM00–11–000.
8 To calculate the index differential, the cost
index is compared to the PPI–FG average index for
the same time period. The remainder of this
calculation [Cost Index–PPI–FG] is the index
differential.
9 Association of Oil Pipe Lines v. FERC, 83 F.3d
at 1437.
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TABLE 1
Line
Middle 80
percent
Middle 50
percent
A ........
B ........
C .......
Median ...............
Weighted Mean
Un-weighted
Mean.
Composite of
80% =
(A+B+C)/3.
Median.
Weighted Mean.
Un-weighted
Mean.
Composite of
50% =
(A+B+C)/3.
D .......
29. Both AOPL and Shippers used the
same sample (with the exception of
SFPP, L.P.10) to describe the central
tendency of the data, in which the cost
index calculation directly follows.
However, the parties have differed in
the way in which they calculated the
pipelines’ cost increases. The result has
been that both parties calculate a
different pipeline industry cost index;
AOPL arriving at an index of PPI+1.49
percent and the Shippers arriving at an
index of PPI+0.675 percent.
30. In simple terms, AOPL and the
Shippers state that they apply the same
methodology but they arrive at different
results. Each party calculates total
industry costs 11 for each pipeline in the
time period between 1999 and 2004,
and then estimates the central tendency
of the results, sums these amounts, and
divides the result by the number of
pipelines to arrive at the industry
average cumulative change in industry
costs (known as the arithmetic mean of
the sample). AOPL then derives an
annual percent change in industry costs
for the 1999 through 2004 period by
employing the geometric mean on this
industry average cumulative change in
costs. AOPL’s methodology tracks the
methodology previously used by the
Commission and approved by the U.S.
Court of Appeals. The Shippers,
however, depart from the prior
approved methodology, in that the
Shippers derive the cumulative change
in costs (between 1999 and 2004) for
each pipeline, by calculating each year’s
cost change for each pipeline. The year
to year cost changes are multiplied
10 SFPP, L.P. was excluded by the Shippers
because its cost as reflected in its Form No. 6 were
being challenged in a current rate proceeding. The
Commission conducted a review of the pipeline
samples submitted by both Dr. Shehadeh and Mr.
Ashton and determined that, using the Court of
Appeals-approved methodology, the exclusion of
SFPP, L.P. causes only a 0.02 percent decrease in
the average annual cost difference. Thus, the
exclusion of SFPP, L.P. still supports the use of
PPI+1.3 percent.
11 Average total cost for an individual pipeline is
the average of the change in operating cost
(weighted by the operating ration) added to the
average of the change in net plant (weighted by the
residual, one minus the operating ratio). References
to individual pipeline costs beyond this point are
assumed to be average total costs.
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together to arrive at the cumulative cost
change for that pipeline. The average
cost change is determined by taking the
geometric mean of that cumulative cost
change.
31. We base our analysis of the
calculations in this proceeding upon the
U.S. Court of Appeals-approved model,
and have found that the methodology
used by Dr. Shehadeh for AOPL in this
proceeding conforms to Dr. Kahn’s U.S.
Court of Appeals-approved
methodology. Our analysis shows that
the Shippers’ methodology, as
represented by Mr. Ashton, is
fundamentally flawed.
32. In delineating the index
differential, Mr. Ashton, in his first
declaration,12 claims to have accurately
applied Dr. Kahn’s methodology in
calculating average annual cost changes,
but our review found that he deviates
from Dr. Kahn’s methodology in certain
respects. In this first attempt, Mr.
Ashton determines the average annual
change in unit costs for years 1999
through 2004 by calculating the
arithmetic average of the geometric
mean of each pipeline’s cumulative unit
cost change, as opposed to Dr. Kahn’s
method of calculating the geometric
mean of the arithmetic average of
cumulative unit cost change (Ashton’s
Decl. at p. 14). On the basis of
determining the average cost change of
each pipeline, the use of Dr. Kahn’s
methodology would calculate the cost
increase between end years 1999 and
2004 by this formula: (final cost ¥
initial cost)/(initial cost)¥1. Mr. Ashton
erred in this step of the calculations by
taking the geometric mean of the
product of the individual company’s
yearly cost increase. Furthermore, Dr.
Shehadeh has shown that Mr. Ashton’s
method results in the underestimation
of costs.13
33. Mr. Ashton responds 14 to Dr.
Shehadeh’s rebuttal, and claims that the
newly added testimony of Dr. Smith
supports Mr. Ashton’s new
methodology.15 However, in examining
Dr. Smith’s analysis, it seems that he
has followed Dr. Kahn’s approach (but
not Mr. Ashton’s) by calculating
percentage cost changes for individual
companies, where Dr. Smith states that
‘‘the five-year percent differences in
costs as reported’’ for individual
companies ‘‘were computed as (final
12 Sworn Declaration of Peter K. Ashton, October
13, 2005 (p. 3).
13 Rebuttal Declaration of Ramsey D. Shehadeh,
PhD at 10–11, January 10, 2006 by use of a theorem
known as Jensen’s Inequality.
14 Supplemental Declaration of Peter K. Ashton,
January 23, 2006.
15 Analysis of Pipeline Index Data, submitted by
Paul J. Smith, January 23, 2006.
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cost ¥ initial cost)/(initial cost)¥1.’’
Therefore, we cannot reconcile Dr.
Smith’s evidence with Mr. Ashton’s
statement that ‘‘Prof. Smith clearly
points out that given the underlying
characteristics of the data and its
skewed distribution, the methodology
that I employ relying on the geometric
mean is the proper methodology for
computing the cost increases of
individual pipeline companies’’
(Supplemental Decl. at p. 2) Dr. Smith’s
testimony regarding his
recommendation of the use of the
geometric mean, was to describe with
relative accuracy the central tendency of
the data, not the calculation of the
individual cost increases themselves.
Further, Dr. Smith’s testimony in regard
to this proceeding is incomplete because
he only trimmed the cost data by 5
percent, and he never analyzed the
‘‘middle 50 percent’’ and ‘‘middle 80
percent’’ data sets, which excluded
‘‘outliers,’’ adopted by the Commission
and approved by the U.S. Court of
Appeals. As the Court of Appeals stated,
‘‘[t]he object of excluding outliers is to
prevent extreme and spurious data from
biasing an analysis, i.e., affecting its
result adversely.’’ 16
34. Also, in the same response, Mr.
Ashton presents an ‘‘update’’ to his
methodology, and supports it again with
the analysis of Dr. Smith (Supplemental
Decl. at p. 7). Originally, Mr. Ashton
measured the central tendency of both
of the trimmed data sets (80 percent and
50 percent) with the median, the
weighted and the un-weighted
arithmetic mean (although he still
wrongly calculates the cost changes for
individual companies by the geometric
mean). In the update, Mr. Ashton
delineates the weighted and unweighted means by now taking the
geometric mean 17
1 n
X g = exp ∑ ln X i
n i =1
Reconciling the Dataset of AOPL and
Mr. Ashton
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of the unit cost change. Mr. Ashton
states that this update is justified ‘‘as Dr.
Smith points out, in measuring the
central tendency it is also appropriate to
take the geometric mean and the
median—not the arithmetic mean.’’ The
supporting evidence by Dr. Smith points
out that both data sets (untrimmed) are
not normally distributed. Dr. Smith
states that, ‘‘the data are more accurately
16 Association of Oil Pipe Lines v. FERC, 281 F.3d
239, 246 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
17 This geometric mean is a statistical treatment
to the data to find central tendency, as opposed to
the geometric mean used previously to calculate the
index of costs over time. In this application, the
general formula (see formula above) was used,
where denotes the cost index of firm i.
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described by a skewed lognormal
distribution than by a bell-shaped
normal distribution, but that neither
distribution accurately described the
data.’’ Dr. Smith then measured the
arithmetic average applied to a 5
percent trimmed sample in which he
concluded in his analysis that, based on
the results, ‘‘the trimmed mean is
substantially less than the arithmetic
mean, illustrating how a few extremely
large indices affect the overall estimate’’
(p.5).
35. Shippers, in their Supplemental
Rebuttal filing of February 24, 2006,
contend that the use of the geometric
mean was but a small change and an
improvement to the Commission’s
methodology to better suit the
underlying data.18 The Shippers’
underlying belief in this order seems to
be that the data in the samples that are
used in the Commission’s methodology
are positively skewed, and therefore, Dr.
Smith never had to prove that our
samples were skewed. However, Dr.
Smith never applied his alternative
approach to our samples to determine,
based on his analysis, what the best
measure of central tendency would be.
He contended that he proved that the
geometric mean approach would be
more accurate on his 5 percent trimmed
sample because his result more closely
matched the median, and therefore was
‘‘more robust.’’ Dr. Smith, though, never
proved that the geometric mean was
‘‘more robust’’ on the 50 and 80 percent
samples.
36. Based on the calculations
presented by the Shippers through Mr.
Ashton’s declarations, it is clear that the
methodology the Shippers use departs
from the methodology presented by Dr.
Kahn. Shippers have not proven that
their methodology is superior to that of
Dr. Kahn.
37. In Shippers’ January 23, 2006 joint
response to comments made on January
10, 2006 by AOPL, Mr. Ashton added
some pipelines to his study, and
reconciled much of the data supplied by
AOPL and culled from FERC Form No.
6 data. Aside from a few remaining
pipelines in which discrepancies appear
between the data that Mr. Ashton used
and the data that Dr. Shehadeh used,
Mr. Ashton is prepared to accept the
reconciliation and changes offered by
Dr. Shehadeh in his Rebuttal
Declaration. Mr. Ashton’s database is
comprised of 79 pipelines that account
18 Supplemental Rebuttal Comments at 2; Ashton
Supplemental Rebuttal Decl. at 3.
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for 92 percent of all barrel-miles
transported in 1999.
38. To investigate the data
discrepancies, the Commission has
examined the hard copy FERC Form No.
6 data filed by individual pipelines to
determine whether complete data for
these pipelines are available and
whether they match the data used by
Mr. Ashton or Dr. Shehadeh. We have
compared, on a pipeline-by-pipeline
basis, every relevant data value in Mr.
Ashton’s sample with the corresponding
values in FERC Form No. 6. We then
have applied to the reconciled data,
which account for the only remaining
discrepancies identified by Mr. Ashton,
the methodology described by Dr. Kahn,
adopted by the Commission and
approved by the U.S. Court of Appeals.
We now discuss those pipeline-bypipeline comparisons.
39. Navajo Pipeline Co. L.P.—Holly
Energy Partners—Operating L.P.—Dr.
Shehadeh correctly points out in Exhibit
A15 of his original declaration and
Exhibit 16 of his rebuttal declaration
that Navajo Pipeline Co. L.P. (Navajo)
was renamed Holly Energy Partners—
Operating L.P. (Holly) in 2004. As a
result, both companies filed a FERC
Form No. 6 in 2004. Mr. Ashton is
correct in noting that the 2004 data
reported by Dr. Shehadeh comes from
only one company, Navajo, and is only
partial year data. The Commission
agrees that the 2004 data for Navajo and
Holly can be aggregated to provide data
for the complete year. However, the
Commission takes issue with the values
Mr. Ashton reports for carrier property
and total barrel-miles. A review of
Navajo’s 2004 FERC Form No. 6 reveals
carrier property totaling $10,186,371
and barrel-miles totaling 4,095,048,097.
Holly’s 2004 FERC Form No. 6 reports
carrier property totaling $22,788,803
and total barrel-miles of 3,330,670,969.
Thus, the Commission will use
$32,975,174 for carrier property and
7,425,719,066 for total barrel-miles.
40. Olympic Pipe Line Company —On
March 31, 2003, Olympic Pipe Line
Company (Olympic) resubmitted its
2001 FERC Form No. 6 to report changes
to carrier property, accrued
depreciation, and operating revenue.
Mr. Ashton is correct to use the data
contained in the resubmitted FERC
Form No. 6. However, Mr. Ashton fails
to reflect the operating expenses
provided in the updated FERC Form No.
6 and continues to use the figure
reported in Olympic’s original 2001
FERC Form No. 6. Thus, the
Commission will use the updated
$59,520,702 for Olympic’s 2001
operating expenses.
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41. Premcor Port Arthur Pipeline
Company—Mr. Ashton states that he
did not include Premcor Port Arthur
Pipeline Company (Premcor) in the
dataset he used to calculate oil pipeline
costs changes because Premcor lacked
complete FERC Form No. 6 data. Dr.
Shehadeh agrees with Mr. Ashton on
this point. No data is reported for
accrued depreciation for the years 2001–
2004 even though Premcor did report
accrued depreciation in 1999–2000.
Without complete data for all six years,
a company cannot be included in the
dataset. Therefore, the Commission
agrees with Mr. Ashton’s
recommendation that Premcor be
excluded from the analysis.
42. Cypress Pipe Line Company,
LLC—Mr. Ashton criticizes Dr.
Shehadeh’s use of barrel-mile data for
Cypress Pipe Line Company, LLC
(Cypress) in 1999 from page 700 of the
FERC Form No. 6, rather than data
reported on page 600. Mr. Ashton states
that the agreed-upon source for barrelmile data is page 600 of the FERC Form
No. 6. Despite this criticism, Mr. Ashton
himself elects to use data from page 700,
not data from page 600 as he describes.
Cypress, however, errs by reporting the
number of barrels received into the
system, rather than total barrel-miles.
This is evident from comparing line 32
of page 600, grand total of barrels
received into system, with page 600 line
33a; the numbers are identical. By
contrast, line 4 of page 700 reports total
throughput in barrel-miles as
78,558,341.83. Thus, the Commission
will use 78,558,342 for Cypress’s 1999
throughput in barrel-miles.
43. Mr. Ashton raises another
substantive issue with respect to the
reconciled dataset contained in Dr.
Shehadeh’s rebuttal declaration. Mr.
Ashton notes that there are differences
between the operating revenues for five
pipelines reported on the FERC Form
No. 6, page 114, and FERC Form No. 6,
page 301. Specifically, these
discrepancies occur with respect to
Mobil Pipe Line Company, Mustang
Pipe Line Partners, Osage Pipe Line
Company, LLC, San Pedro Bay Pipeline
Company, and SouthTex 66 Pipeline
Company, Ltd.
44. In order to rectify these
differences, the Commission adjusted its
cost calculation to use the figures
endorsed by Mr. Ashton. However, the
use of Mr. Ashton’s figures proved
immaterial as the result still supports
the use of PPI+1.3 percent as the new oil
index. When the Commission adopted
the page 301 data for those pipelines for
which Mr. Ashton noted discrepancies,
and applied the U.S. Court of Appeals-
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approved methodology, the results
changed by less than 0.01 percent.
Indexing Methodology
45. In the January 23, 2006, response
of Shippers to AOPL’s January 10
comments, Shippers assert for the first
time that, as an alternative to using the
current methodology for determining
adjustments to PPI after conducting a
five-year review, the Commission
should continue to use the current
unadjusted PPI for the time being and
institute a rulemaking to establish a new
methodology for determining what the
oil pipeline rate change index should be
over the next five years. Shippers
contend this is appropriate because
there are serious defects in the
Commission’s current index review
methodology. AOPL responded to this
assertion on February 9, 2006.
46. Notwithstanding Shippers’
assertions to the contrary contained in
their Supplemental Rebuttal Comments
of February 24, 2006, Shippers’
suggestion that the Commission should
embark upon a new rulemaking
proceeding to establish a new method
for calculating pipeline cost changes to
compare to changes in PPI is beyond the
scope of our five-year review as set forth
in the NOI that instituted this
proceeding. In the NOI, the Commission
asked for comments on whether and to
what extent the PPI should be adjusted
to better reflect those cost changes, not
whether the method for determining
pipeline costs should be changed. The
NOI specifically stated:
The Commission proposes to continue to
utilize PPI for the next five-year period as the
index to track changes to the costs of the oil
pipeline industry and to apply to rate ceiling
levels for oil pipeline rate changes. The
Commission invites interested persons to
submit comments on the continued use of
PPI and to propose, justify, and fully support,
as an alternative, adjustments to PPI. (NOI,
¶ 4)
The parties have filed numerous
comments reflecting their positions on
what adjustments should or should not
be made to the PPI upon review, and
only as a last-minute item has anyone
suggested that the Commission embark
on a course of discarding the
Commission’s current five-year review
methodology of determining pipeline
cost changes to compare to changes in
the PPI–FG over the five-year review
period. The information provided by
Shippers is insufficient to persuade us
that our method should be discarded.
Beyond these issues, no one has
suggested that the Commission look to
change to an index other than PPI–FG
as representative of oil pipeline
industry-wide costs.
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47. Shippers first contend the use of
FERC Form No. 6 data make application
of the cost standard inaccurate. They
claim that the data contained in the
FERC Form No. 6 is sporadic,
incomplete, and contain substantial
errors. Shippers point out that out of
186 FERC regulated pipelines, only 79
pipelines have provided sufficient Form
No. 6 data to warrant being included in
the database for analysis. They believe
the 42 percent sample is too small to
justify the continued use of Form No. 6
data.
48. The FERC Form No. 6 data is the
only systematic source of information
regarding the past costs and revenues of
oil pipelines. As previously mentioned,
Mr. Ashton concedes his sample
contains 79 pipelines that account for
over 92 percent of the 1999 total barrelmiles. In defending Order No. 561–A on
appeal to the D.C. Circuit on this very
issue, the Commission stated that
‘‘[t]here is * * * no reason to believe
that samples representing between 10%
and 33% of the industry, taken from the
median range of the industry cost data,
were too small to produce reliable
results.’’ 19 In addition, the Shippers
argued before the U.S. Court of Appeals
that the, ‘‘[d]ata submitted to FERC have
become increasingly accurate, thus
eliminating the need for a proxy.’’ 20
Further, the U.S. Court of Appeals
agreed that it is evidently uncontested
that the reported data have become
more accurate.
49. Second, Shippers express concern
that a significant number of oil
pipelines are not complying with FERC
Form No. 6 filing requirements.
Specifically, Shippers were concerned
that the Commission has not
consistently enforced these filing
requirements nor has it examined the
Form No. 6 data and required
corrections of the errors noted by Mr.
Ashton in his supplemental declaration.
50. The Commission disagrees with
the Shippers’ assertion that the
Commission has not consistently
enforced the accurate and timely filing
of FERC Form No. 6 data. In 1994, the
Commission addressed additional
revisions to the Form No. 6 in Order
Nos. 571 and 571–A,21 including adding
19 See, Brief for Respondent Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission, Association of Oil
Pipelines v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission,
No. 94–1538, at 36 (July 24, 1995).
20 See, Flying J Inc. v. FERC, 363 F.3d 495 (D.C.
Cir. 2004).
21 Order No. 260, 47 FR 42327 (Sept. 27 1982);
FERC Stats. & Regs. [Regulations Preambles January
1991–June 1996] ¶ 31,006 (Oct. 28 1994). Order No.
571–A, 60 FR 356 (Jan. 4, 1995); FERC Stats. & Regs.
[Regulations Preambles January 1991–June 1996]
¶ 31,012 (Dec. 28, 1994).
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a new page 700. The information
included in the Form No. 6 was
determined at the time to be the
minimum necessary for Shippers to
assess filed rate changes under Order
No. 561.
51. Prior to 2000, FERC Form No. 6
required that a pipeline include its
annual cost of service, operating
revenues, throughput in barrels, and
throughput in barrel-miles. The
Commission found that the Form No. 6
data was inadequate to monitor the
reasonableness of a pipeline’s filed
rates. Thus, the Commission proposed
the addition of the following reporting
requirements: operating and
maintenance expenses, depreciation
expense, AFUDC depreciation,
amortization of deferred earnings, rate
base, rate of return, return on rate base,
and income tax allowance. Since the
Form No. 6 is intended to be both a
financial and ratemaking document,22
these additional requirements ensured
that the Commission had the financial,
operational, and ratemaking information
needed to carry out its regulatory
responsibilities to monitor the oil
pipeline industry in a dynamically
changing environment.
52. In Order No. 620, the Commission
required pipelines to maintain
workpapers that fully support the data
reported on page 700 including but not
limited to the total cost-of-service
calculations and all of its associated
components.23 In addition, Order No.
620 provides that the Commission or its
staff may request that a pipeline make
its work papers available for review.24
53. Finally, Shippers submit that the
U.S. Court of Appeals-approved
methodology is no longer reliable
because the results are sensitive to small
changes in the sample size. Mr. Ashton
argued in his Supplemental Declaration
that the results achieved by using the
Commission’s methodology accords
undue weight to extreme data points at
the high and low end of the spectrum,
with high cost oil pipelines exerting a
disproportionately strong impact. Using
Dr. Smith’s ‘‘trimmed percent sample,’’
Mr. Ashton notes that by simply
22 Cost of Service Reporting and Filing
Requirements for Oil Pipelines, FERC Stats. & Regs.
[Regulations Preambles 1991–1996] ¶ 31,006 at
31,169 and FERC Form No. 6, p.i, I.
23 FERC Stats. & Regs. [Regs. Preambles] ¶ 31,115
(Dec. 13, 2000); 65 FR 81335 (Dec. 26, 2000).
24 Staff examined each pipeline’s compliance
with the requirements for reporting additional
information on page 700 of the FERC Form No. 6.
After substantial follow-up contacts by staff, with
the 183 jurisdictional oil pipelines, only 12
pipelines were not in compliance and expressed the
need for additional accounting help in executing a
complete Form No. 6. Staff referred the pipelines
to either the Association of Oil Pipelines personnel
or staff resources for advice.
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removing the four highest and lowest
pipelines from the data set, the cost
index fell from a range of PPI+0.66
percent and PPI+0.69 percent to
PPI+0.58 percent and PPI+0.68 percent
(middle 80 percent and 50 percent
respectively).25
54. The sensitivity analysis Mr.
Ashton includes in his Supplemental
Declaration does not provide a reasoned
basis for the Commission to abandon its
current methodology because the
existence and proper treatment of
‘‘outlier’’ data were extensively
addressed in prior Commission
proceedings, and the current U.S. Court
of Appeals-approved methodology was
specifically designed to take this matter
into account. To minimize the risk that
extreme and/or erroneous observations
bias the result, the Commission uses
only the middle 50 percent and 80
percent of the relevant cost data, thus
ensuring that the index is not driven by
statistical outliers.
Possible Over-Recovery of Costs-ofService by Large Pipelines
55. Shippers point to the fact that a
significant number of large oil pipelines
are substantially over-recovering their
cost-of-service as further support for
maintaining the PPI without adjustment
as the appropriate index for the
subsequent five-year period. Shippers
maintain that the index methodology
was designed to enable pipelines to
recover costs by permitting them to
increase rates at the same pace as they
are predicted to experience cost
increases. Shippers contend that the
role of the index is to accommodate
normal cost changes, not to guarantee
recovery of all costs at any time and in
full. Shippers state that a concern of the
Commission was that under an indexing
system, rates would diverge from actual
costs and the resulting rates would fail
the just and reasonable test. According
to Shippers, this concern has proven to
be well founded, as evidenced by data
reported on FERC Form No. 6 which
indicate that a number of interstate
pipelines have been charging indexed
rates that permit them to substantially
over-recover their cost-of-service of
fourteen pipelines during the 2002–
2004 period that were subject to
indexing regulation, the total interstate
operating revenues of these pipelines,
and the amount by which each of these
pipelines have been over-recovering its
self-reported cost-of-service. Shippers
conclude that clearly an increase in the
current index will further increase the
25 Supplemental Declaration of Peter K. Ashton at
22–24.
PO 00000
Frm 00014
Fmt 4700
Sfmt 4700
amount of over-recoveries by these
pipelines.
56. AOPL responds that this argument
is flawed as a matter of regulatory policy
and lacks any basis in evidence. The PPI
index reflects the year-to-year changes
in industry costs in general and, as
such, reflects changes in the ‘‘average’’
oil pipeline’s cost of service. Under the
indexing system, existing rates remain
subject to the Commission’s complaint
process. If Shippers believe that
individual pipelines are over-earning
such that their rates cannot satisfy the
just and reasonable requirement for oil
pipeline rates, their remedy would be to
file complaints against those pipelines.
AOPL further argues that another reason
why over-earning pipelines do not
represent a flaw in the Commission’s
index methodology is that the index
governs rate changes based on
‘‘grandfathered’’ rates. AOPL claims that
the rates of most oil pipelines are
deemed to be just and reasonable,
thereby establishing a ‘‘baseline’’ for
future rates. Therefore, to the extent a
carrier was over-earning in 1992, the
indexing methodology was not intended
to drive those rates to cost, but instead
to make sure that any rate changes were
based on expected cost changes. As to
Shippers’ comparison of the cost of
service to revenues for their small
sample of pipelines, AOPL points out
that five of those fourteen pipelines
have, in whole or in part, ‘‘marketbased’’ rates and as such are not fully
subject to the index. In addition, AOPL
claims that another of the pipelines on
their list has rates based on a rate
negotiated with Shippers in 2002. For
all the above reasons, AOPL disputes
the position taken by Shippers.
57. The Commission is not subject to
a statutory duty to examine the whole
rate when an oil pipeline proposes an
indexed rate change. Rather, our inquiry
is limited to a comparison of the
changes in the rates and costs from year
to year. We recognized in adopting a
uniform index for all pipelines that
inevitably some pipelines would overearn while others will under-earn. It is
a fact simply inherent in an industrywide pipeline index. Shippers’ use of a
sample of fourteen pipelines culled
from the entire data set of pipelines
being analyzed only serves to emphasize
this point. Further, Shippers’ own
calculations show that many of these
pipelines actually experienced a
decrease in their over-recoveries over
the short time period being considered.
In addition, even though Shippers’
calculations may accurately measure
over-recovery for a few pipelines, AOPL
shows that, based on Page 700
information for 2003 and 2004, pipeline
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dsatterwhite on PROD1PC76 with RULES
revenues were 20 percent below booked
costs of service. For the above reasons,
the Commission finds that the existence
of such over-recoveries does not mean
that PPI is the most appropriate index.
Structural Changes in the Oil Industry
58. Shippers claim that structural
changes in the oil industry ensure that
adequate capital will be available to
pipelines if they charge rates
determined by the PPI index level. They
point to the emergence of publiclytraded partnerships such as master
limited partnerships (MLPs) and limited
liability companies that have elected to
be taxed as partnerships. According to
Shippers, MLPs have resulted in
increased concentration in the pipeline
industry, and are the forms through
which many pipelines subject to
indexing are owned. To evaluate the
impact of indexing, Shippers state that
the environment of MLPs must be
reviewed as well. According to
Shippers, MLPs continue to enjoy good
access to capital markets, and the
number, size and total amount of capital
raised by MLPs continues to grow.
Shippers argue that MLP’s success at
capital raising is being accompanied by
an active acquisitions market as well as
by partnerships’ continued investment
in energy infrastructure (organized
growth) projects, thus proving that
raising capital is not a problem for the
oil industry. Shippers also argue that
another important consideration is the
use of funds generated from pipeline
operations. Shippers state that MLPs
generally distribute all available cash
flow to unit-holders in the form of
quarterly distributions (similar to
dividends). Thus, Shippers contend,
one cannot assume that increases in
rates resulting from an increase in the
Commission’s index will be used to
offset any increased costs for safety,
efficiency and security, or to fund
capital expansion. Shippers conclude
that no basis exists for the proposition
that extraordinary rate increases must be
approved across-the-board in order to
provide sufficient capital for oil
pipelines to expand and operate their
systems in a safe and secure
environment. On the contrary, Shippers
contend, the available evidence suggests
that more than sufficient capital is
presently available at rates determined
by the PPI to achieve these objectives.
59. AOPL responds that the Shippers
are attributing what is occurring for only
a small sample of the entire pipeline
industry (approximately 38 energyrelated MLPs exist as of August 2005) to
the entire industry. AOPL states that
what happens with MLPs means
absolutely nothing for the majority of oil
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15:42 Mar 27, 2006
Jkt 208001
pipelines that are not owned and
operated by MLPs. According to AOPL,
the very purpose of the five-year review
of the cost index is to ensure that
pipeline rates keep pace with cost
changes in the industry so that past
levels of capital investment can be
maintained. AOPL argues that, to
preserve adequate capital investment,
the Commission must adopt a price
index consistent with its cost standard
of at least PPI+1.3 percent.
60. The fact that oil pipelines have
been able to attract capital in the past
does not establish that they would be
able to do so in the future if the
Commission fails to set an index that is
adequate. We believe the continuation
of the methodology used in Order No.
561 to arrive at the new index
accurately captures costs in the
interstate oil pipeline transportation
sector, and will produce an index
sufficient for pipelines to maintain their
capital investment. We find adherence
to the Order No. 561 methodology
supports an oil index of PPI+1.3 for the
next five years. Finally, we find that no
party has made a convincing showing
that the Order No. 561 methodology is
no longer adequate for computing the
oil index.
Continuation of the Current PPI and
Impairment of Pipeline Expansion
61. Shippers claim that, contrary to
the brief filed by DOT, the current PPI
index will not impair the ability of
pipelines to expand their systems or
invest sufficient capital in
environmental, safety and security
measures, and dispute AOPL’s
contention that failure to increase the
PPI by 1.3 percent would deter such
investment. Shippers restate their
contention that the current index has in
no way slowed pipeline expansion.
They argue that the rate of increase in
trunk revenues at a level greater than
the increase in pipeline costs and the
PPI indicates a widening of pipeline
profit margins during the 1999–2004
period. Shippers point out as well that
the Commission has anticipated that
certain costs, such as those related to
environmental, safety and security
measures, might not be covered by an
index and have provided pipelines with
the ability to address such issues.
Specifically, a pipeline can upon
demonstration that it is affected by
uncontrollable circumstances that
preclude it from recovering all of its
prudently-incurred costs under the
indexing system, depart from indexing
and make a cost-of-service showing to
justify a rate greater than the index
ceiling rate.
PO 00000
Frm 00015
Fmt 4700
Sfmt 4700
15337
62. The Commission disagrees with
Shippers on two levels. First, the brief
filed by DOT specifically stated that
DOT expresses no views as to the
precise index the Commission should
choose. DOT’s submittal simply was a
confirmation of certain points raised by
AOPL with respect to regulatory
obligations. DOT stated that it has
adopted safety regulations that have
imposed significant obligations and
considerable costs on pipelines as they
moved to compliance with such
regulations. Based on concerns about
the capacity of the underlying
infrastructure of the nation’s
transportation network, including oil
pipelines, to meet the growing demands
placed upon it, DOT urged the
Commission to consider the financial
commitment necessary for pipelines to
maintain and expand their system
capacity in light of these new
regulations.
63. Second, we disagree with
Shippers that the pipelines can expand
their systems and handle
environmental, safety and security
measures based on the present PPI
index, without any need to increase that
index. The ability of pipelines to
accomplish what Shippers claim they
have in terms of system expansion and
environmental, safety and security
measures is due in no small part to the
appropriateness of the current index
level. There is no guarantee that in the
future pipelines will retain that ability
unless the Commission once again
adopts an index that allows the
pipelines to recover their expected cost
increases.
64. DOT has suggested that the FERC
consider convening a workshop or
technical conference to explore
regulatory mechanisms that could
facilitate critical investment in
maintaining and expanding pipeline
system capacity. The Commission
acknowledges the potential need for
increased capacity of the nation’s oil
transportation system, and appreciates
the concerns expressed by DOT in this
matter. The current proceeding is
limited to consideration of the
appropriate index for oil pipeline
ratemaking. We will continue to
monitor oil pipeline performance, and if
appropriate, at some future date, may
convene such a technical conference or
workshop.
The Commission Orders
Consistent with our review and
verification of the sample pipeline Form
No. 6 data, and the application of the
previously approved Order No. 561
methodology to that data, the
Commission determines that the
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appropriate oil pricing index for the
next five years, July 1, 2006 through
June 30, 2011, should be PPI plus a 1.3
percent adjustment.
BILLING CODE 6717–01–P
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
Veterans’ Employment and Training
Service
20 CFR Part 1002
[Docket No. VETS–U–04]
RIN 1293–AA09
Uniformed Services Employment and
Reemployment Rights Act of 1994;
Correction
dsatterwhite on PROD1PC76 with RULES
AGENCY: Veterans’ Employment and
Training Service, Labor.
ACTION: Correcting Amendment.
SUMMARY: This document contains a
correction to the final regulations
implementing the Uniformed Services
Employment and Reemployment Act of
1994 (USERRA), which were published
in the Federal Register on December 19,
2005. Congress enacted USERRA to
protect the rights of persons who
voluntarily or involuntarily leave
employment positions to undertake
military service. USERRA authorizes the
Secretary of Labor to prescribe rules
implementing the law as it applies to
States, local governments, and private
employers. 38 U.S.C. 4331(a). The
Department, through the Veterans’
Employment and Training Service
(VETS), promulgated rules under this
statutory authority to provide guidance
to employers and employees concerning
their rights and obligations under
USERRA. The final rule contained an
incorrect citation to the Agency’s
statutory authority to promulgate
regulations under USERRA. This
document corrects the final regulations
by revising the statutory authority
citation.
DATES: Effective on March 28, 2006.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Robert Wilson, Chief, Investigations and
Compliance Division, Veterans’
Employment and Training Service, U.S.
Department of Labor, 200 Constitution
Avenue, NW., Room S–1312,
Washington, DC 20210,
Wilson.Robert@dol.gov, (202) 693–4719
(this is not a toll-free number).
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
VerDate Aug<31>2005
15:42 Mar 27, 2006
Jkt 208001
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
On September 20, 2004, VETS issued
proposed regulations to implement the
Uniformed Services Employment and
Reemployment Rights Act of 1994, as
amended (USERRA), 38 U.S.C. 4301–
4334. VETS invited written comments
on the proposed regulations from
interested parties, and invited comment
on specific issues. VETS considered all
timely comments received in response
to the proposed regulations, and
published final regulations in the
Federal Register on December 19, 2005.
Office of the Special Trustee for
American Indians
Need for Correction
By the Commission.
Magalie R. Salas,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 06–2964 Filed 3–27–06; 8:45 am]
Background
SUMMARY: The Office of the Special
Trustee for American Indians (OST) is
revising its regulations to update
references to agency names, addresses,
and position titles. This action is
editorial in nature and is intended to
improve the accuracy and clarity of the
OST’s regulations.
DATES: Effective Date: March 28, 2006.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Lorie Curtis, Office of Trust Regulations,
Policies and Procedures, Office of the
Special Trustee for American Indians,
4400 Masthead Street NE., Albuquerque,
New Mexico 87109; phone 505–816–
1086; facsimile 505–816–1377.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The
regulations promulgated by the
Department of the Interior in 25 CFR
part 1200 describe, among other things,
the processes by which Indian tribes can
manage tribal funds currently held in
trust by the United States under the
American Indian Trust Fund
Management Reform Act. The
regulations contain references to
organizations, positions, and addresses
that changed in 2003. We are updating
these regulations to correct the
references and to make other minor
editorial changes to improve clarity.
Section 4331 of USERRA authorizes
the Secretary of Labor to prescribe
regulations implementing the law as it
applies to States, local governments,
and private employers. 38 U.S.C.
4331(a). This statutory authority is
noted correctly in two places in the
preamble to the USERRA final rule. See
70 FR 75246 and 70 FR 75292. However,
an incorrect reference to the statutory
authority was inadvertently inserted in
the text of the regulations. See 70 FR
75295. To correct this error, this
document substitutes the correct
statutory authority for that listed in the
text of the final regulations.
List of Subjects in 20 CFR Part 1002
Labor, Veterans, Pensions.
Accordingly, 20 CFR part 1002 is
corrected by making the following
correcting amendment:
I
PART 1002—[AMENDED]
1. The authority citation is corrected
to read as follows:
I
Authority: Section 4331(a) of the
Uniformed Services Employment and
Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA),
38 U.S.C. 4331(a) (Pub. L. 103–353, 108 Stat.
3150).
U.S. Department of Labor.
Veterans’ Employment and Training Service.
Charles S. Ciccolella,
Assistant Secretary for Veterans’ Employment
and Training.
[FR Doc. 06–2966 Filed 3–27–06; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4510–79–P
PO 00000
25 CFR Part 1200
RIN 1035–AA05
American Indian Trust Fund
Management Reform Act; Technical
Amendments
Office of the Special Trustee for
American Indians, Interior.
ACTION: Final Rule.
AGENCY:
Determination To Issue a Final Rule
The Department has determined that
the public notice and comment
provisions of the Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 553(b), do not
apply because of the good cause
exception under 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(3)(B),
which allows the agency to suspend the
notice and public procedure when the
agency finds for good cause that those
requirements are impractical,
unnecessary and contrary to the public
interest. Because this amendment makes
only minor editorial changes, no public
comment is necessary.
Determination To Make Rule Effective
Immediately
Because this amendment makes only
minor editorial changes, the Department
Frm 00016
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E:\FR\FM\28MRR1.SGM
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Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 71, Number 59 (Tuesday, March 28, 2006)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 15329-15338]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 06-2964]
=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
18 CFR Part 342
[Docket No. RM05-22-000]
Five-Year Review of Oil Pipeline Pricing Index
Issued March 21, 2006.
AGENCY: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, DOE.
ACTION: Order establishing index for oil price change ceiling levels.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (Commission) is
issuing this final order concluding its second five-year review of the
oil pricing index, established in Order No. 561, Revisions to Oil
Pipeline Regulations Pursuant to the Energy Policy Act of 1992, FERC
Stats. & Regs. [Regs. Preambles, 1991-1996] ] 30,985 (1993). After
consideration of all the initial, reply and supplemental comments, the
Commission has concluded that the PPI+1.3 index should be established
for the five-year period commencing July 1, 2006. At the end of this
period, in July 2011, the Commission will once again review the index
to determine whether it continues to measure adequately the cost
changes in the oil pipeline industry.
DATES: March 28, 2006.
ADDRESSES: Secretary of the Commission, Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission, 888 First Street, NE., Washington, DC 20426.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Harris S. Wood (Legal Information), Office of the General Counsel, 888
First Street, NE., Washington, DC 20426, (202) 502-8224.
Robert W. Fulton (Technical Information), Office of Energy Markets and
Reliability, 888 First Street, NE., Washington, DC 20426, (202) 502-
8003.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Before Commissioners: Joseph T. Kelliher, Chairman; Nora Mead
Brownell, and Suedeen G. Kelly.
1. On July 6, 2005, the Commission issued a Notice of Inquiry
(NOI),\1\ in which it proposed to continue using the Producer Price
Index for Finished Goods (PPI or PPI-FG) for the next five-year period
beginning July 1, 2006, to track oil pipeline industry cost changes.
The Commission applies the index to oil pipeline transportation tariffs
to establish rate ceiling levels for pipeline rate changes. The NOI
invited interested persons to submit comments on the continued use of
PPI and to propose, justify, and fully support, as an alternative,
adjustments to PPI. Comments and reply comments were due September 13
and October 13, 2005, respectively.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Five-Year Review of Oil Pipeline Pricing Index, IV FERC
Stats. & Regs. [Notices] ] 35,552 (2005)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. Based on our review of the comments and reply comments received,
and for the reasons discussed below, the Commission determines that the
PPI plus one point three percent (PPI+1.3) should be established for
the five-year period commencing July 1, 2006, and concludes that this
index satisfies the mandates of the Energy Policy Act of 1992 (Energy
Policy Act).\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ 42 U.S.C.A. 7172 note (West Supp. 1993). The Energy Policy
Act's mandate of establishing a simplified and generally applicable
method of regulating oil transportation rates specifically excluded
the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System (TAPS), or any pipeline delivering
oil, directly or indirectly, into it.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Background
3. Congress, in the Energy Policy Act, required the Commission to
establish a ``simplified and generally applicable'' ratemaking
methodology for oil pipelines, consistent with the just and reasonable
standard of the Interstate Commerce Act (ICA).\3\ On October 22, 1993,
the Commission issued Order No. 561,\4\ promulgating regulations
pertaining to the Commission's jurisdiction over oil pipelines under
the ICA, and to fulfill the requirements of the Energy Policy Act. In
so doing, the Commission found that using an indexing methodology to
regulate oil pipeline rate changes, accompanied with certain
alternative rate-changing methodologies where either the pipeline or
the shipper could justify departure from the indexing methodology,
would satisfy both the mandate of Congress and comply with the
requirements of the ICA. The Commission found that the indexing
methodology adopted in the final rule would simplify, and thereby
expedite, the process of changing rates by allowing, as a general rule,
such changes to be made in accordance with a generally applicable
index, and that it would ensure compliance with the just and reasonable
standard of the ICA by subjecting the chosen index to periodic
monitoring and, if necessary,
[[Page 15330]]
adjustment. In determining which index to use, the Commission obtained
the views of interested parties, including industry participants,
shippers and others on its proposal to change its ratemaking
methodology for oil pipelines. Dr. Alfred E. Kahn (Dr. Kahn) supported
the establishment of an index of PPI-1 on behalf of a group of
shippers, as the index that best tracked pipeline cost changes over a
period of time. After extensive analysis of various suggested indices,
the Commission adopted the PPI-1 index for the purpose of allowing oil
pipelines to change rates without making cost-of-service filings. This
index was chosen over others because it came the closest to tracking
the historical changes in actual costs as reported in FERC Form No. 6
and was to be in effect for the five-year period July 1996 through June
2001. The Commission also committed to review every five years the
continued effectiveness of its index.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ 49 U.S.C. app. 1 (1988).
\4\ Revisions to Oil Pipeline Regulations Pursuant to the Energy
Policy Act, FERC Stats. & Regs. [Regs. Preambles, 1991-1996] ]
30,985 (1993), 58 FR 58753 (Nov. 4, 1993); order on reh'g, Order No.
561-A, FERC Stats. & Regs. [Regs Preambles, 1991-1996] ] 31,000
(1994), 59 FR 40243 (Aug. 8, 1994), aff'd., Association of Oil Pipe
Lines v. FERC, 83 F.3d 1424 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
4. In the course of establishing the appropriate index for the
first review period 2001-2006, the Commission initially deviated from
the methodology it had used in establishing the index as PPI-1 percent,
concluding that the index should be retained as PPI-1, based upon a
revision to the methodology established in Order No. 561. The
Commission's order was reviewed by the U.S. Court of Appeals and
remanded because the Commission departed from the Order No. 561
methodology. Specifically, the U.S. Court of Appeals found that the
Commission neither adequately addressed parties' concerns over using a
new methodology, nor in the alternative articulated reasons for
changing its averaging methodology applied in Order No. 561. Further,
the U.S. Court of Appeals found that the Commission failed to justify
its methodological shifts from Order No. 561 regarding outliers and the
use of net plant. Upon remand, the Commission concluded that the most
appropriate way to measure pipeline costs and rate ceilings, and to
assure that the nexus drawn between them continued, was to apply the
same methodology as it initially applied in Order No. 561. The
Commission thus returned to the method adopted in Order No. 561 in its
further analysis on remand. Utilizing the Kahn methodology which
resulted in an index of an unadjusted PPI, the Commission adopted PPI
as the appropriate index for the five-year period beginning July 2001.
This order on remand was upheld by the U.S. Court of Appeals.\5\ In the
current five-year review, we are applying that same methodology.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ 102 FERC ] 61,195 (2003), aff'd., Flying J Inc. v. FERC, 363
F.3rd 495 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Initial Comments and Initial Reply Comments
5. On September 13, 2005, the Association of Oil Pipelines (AOPL)
submitted its comments in response to the NOI. AOPL, as supported by a
study done by its consultant, Dr. Ramsey Shehadeh (Dr. Shehadeh),
contends that an index of PPI+1.3 percent rather than PPI is the
appropriate index for the next five years. AOPL avers that application
of the Commission's established, U.S. Court of Appeals-approved
methodology shows that pipeline costs over the past five years
increased at a rate of PPI+1.3 percent. AOPL maintains that the
increased pipeline costs result from imposition of new safety and
environmental regulatory obligations, voluntary security measures in
the wake of 9/11 and increased energy costs. AOPL states that an index
of PPI+1.3 percent will ensure that pipeline rates are ``just and
reasonable'' while allowing efficient pipeline carriers to recover
their increased costs over the next five years. These carriers, AOPL
argues, will also be able to expand capacity to eliminate existing
capacity constraints, and continue ongoing efforts to improve pipeline
safety, efficiency, and security.
6. Lion Oil Company, National Cooperative Refinery Association,
Sinclair Oil Corporation and Tesoro Refining and Marketing Company
(collectively the Refiners) filed a joint response on October 13, 2005,
to AOPL's September 13 initial comments. The Refiners and the Air
Transport Association of America (ATA), whose comments are discussed
below, are both supported by the same study prepared by their
consultant, Peter K. Ashton (Mr. Ashton), who urges the Commission to
keep PPI as the index. The Refiners contend that the correct analysis
of FERC Form No. 6 data indicates that the Commission should maintain
PPI to determine annual rate increases. The Refiners state that PPI was
determined appropriately by applying the methodology described by the
Commission and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit over the past 12 years. The Refiners claim that AOPL failed to
provide any sound support for its claim that PPI+1.3 percent is the
inflationary index that tracked oil pipeline cost increases the best
over the past five years. The Refiners contend that Mr. Ashton
demonstrated a sound analysis of the data whose results indicate the
Commission's initial view in its NOI was correct: The PPI without any
adjustment is the index that has best tracked oil pipeline cost
increases.
7. On October 13, 2005, the ATA also filed a response to AOPL's
comments. ATA contends that today's economic environment requires
careful scrutiny of any proposed pipeline rate increases. ATA states
the ability of pipelines to recover costs not generally encompassed by
indexing through the cost-of-service ``safety valve'' or through the
Commission sanctioned ``security surcharge'' ensures that pipelines can
recover normal cost changes through indexing without, at the same time,
having unjustified across-the-board burdens placed on the airline
industry by implementation of an unreasonably high indexing adjustment.
As mentioned above, ATA relied upon the same Ashton study as the
Refiners. ATA states that its position, and that of its member
airlines, is that the Commission should adopt a price index of PPI for
the next five-year period.
8. In his Sworn Declaration, Mr. Ashton claims that he employed the
same methodology in conducting his analysis of oil pipeline cost
increases in the 1999-2004 period as that used and adopted by the
Commission in its previous review of the pricing index, as well as by
Dr. Kahn. Based on his detailed analysis of historical oil pipeline
cost data from 1999-2004, employing this methodology, Mr. Ashton
concluded that the PPI, without any adjustment, closely tracked oil
pipeline cost increases for that period. He states that taking the
midpoint between the two composite averages (middle 50 percent and
middle 80 percent of the sample) yields an annual rate of increase that
is virtually identical to the increase in the PPI for the relevant time
period. Mr. Ashton concludes that there is no basis for modifying the
current PPI index since it already appropriately tracks normal industry
average costs.
9. In addition to conducting his own analysis, Mr. Ashton reviewed
the submission of AOPL and its expert, Dr. Shehadeh. Mr. Ashton
concluded that the data and analysis employed by Dr. Shehadeh are
deficient, cannot be replicated, and therefore cannot be relied on.
Specifically, Mr. Ashton cites the fact that much of the data
pertaining to the later years of the study were compiled and supplied
by AOPL, instead of Dr. Shehadeh obtaining his sample data from FERC
Form No. 6. Mr. Ashton questions the lack of information concerning the
source of Dr. Shehadeh's data, and the apparent lack of any attempt to
validate or verify the information. Mr. Ashton states that, more
significantly, in an attempt to
[[Page 15331]]
increase the sample size, Dr. Shehadeh made numerous additions and
adjustments to the Form No. 6 data for ``potential omissions and
potential errors,'' much of which was based on information supplied by
AOPL. Mr. Ashton claims that Dr. Shehadeh made such adjustments without
any clear indication as to exactly what those adjustments were, or how
such adjustments affected the results of the study. As a result, Mr.
Ashton concludes that any results of Dr. Shehadeh's study are deficient
and unreliable.
10. The U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) also filed comments
in response to AOPL on October 13, 2005. DOT expressed no views on the
precise index the Commission should choose. DOT submitted its comments
to confirm certain points raised by AOPL with respect to oil pipeline
regulatory obligations. DOT states that it has adopted safety
regulations that impose significant obligations and costs on pipeline
operators.\6\ DOT states that it is concerned about the capacity of the
underlying infrastructure of the nation's transportation networks,
including oil pipelines, to meet growing demands placed upon them. DOT
urges the Commission to consider seriously the financial commitment
necessary for operators to maintain and expand pipeline system
capacity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ The DOT integrity management regulations are found at 65
Federal Register 75378, December 1, 2000 and 67 Federal Register
2136 (January 16, 2002).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
11. DOT states that in the long run, its rules will prove
beneficial to the public and pipelines as well, but in the short run,
the ensuing costs will prove considerable, with the additional effect
of reducing or deferring operator revenues. DOT estimates that, over
the seven year period 2001 through 2007, initial baseline assessments
would cost operators more than $120 million; retesting, $14.5 million
annually; preparation of integrity plans, almost $18 million; and
related implementation costs, almost $10 million the first year and $5
million annually thereafter. DOT states it could not estimate the
repair costs incurred as a result of its required testing as it is
impossible to predict the number and kind of conditions that would be
disclosed, but given the fact that most repairs involve excavating
pipeline segments and replacing sections of pipe, along with the
requisite pressure reductions required to accommodate repairs, DOT
believes such repair costs would be considerable. DOT noted that in
2004 pipeline operators made more than 1,500 repairs posing immediate
threats to pipeline integrity, and noted that one operator reported a
single repair cost $8 million to make. DOT therefore contends that it
is imperative that the Commission factor these costs into its
deliberations in choosing the appropriate index for the next five-year
period. DOT believes that failure to do so could lead to various
outcomes inconsistent with the public interest, such as operators being
disinclined to invest in additional capacity, abandoning older or
marginally economic pipelines as a cost-cutting measure, or operators
being tempted to cut corners on safety as a way of bringing costs more
in line with revenues. DOT also cites evidence demonstrating a serious
underinvestment in petroleum pipeline infrastructure and underscoring
that several pipeline systems of national importance lack redundancy,
with consequences including higher prices and less competitive markets
for petroleum products in some regions, supply disruptions and price
spikes due to relatively minor service interruptions, and diversion of
petroleum products to other, less efficient and desirable
transportation modes.
12. DOT claims that the extent of capacity restrictions in the
nation's pipeline infrastructure is becoming more apparent, as is the
realization that the current regulatory mechanisms may not lead to
appropriate reinvestment in the industry. DOT suggests that the
Commission consider convening a workshop or technical conference to
explore regulatory mechanisms that could facilitate critical investment
in maintaining and expanding pipeline system capacity.
13. On October 14, 2005, the Pipeline Safety Trust (Trust), an
organization that promotes fuel transportation safety through education
and advocacy, filed to respond to AOPL's comments. The Trust agrees
with AOPL that safety requirements on the industry have significantly
increased since the last five-year review, including but not limited to
the new integrity management regulations. In addition, the Trust states
that it is persuaded by the 1999-2004 data contained in AOPL's draft
comments (which were analyzed by AOPL using a U.S. Court of Appeals-
approved methodology) that the costs on the industry have increased
enough to justify a PPI+1.3 percent as the pricing index for the next
five years. However, the Trust requests that prior to approving PPI+1.3
percent, the FERC perform its own technical review of the accuracy and
completeness of AOPL's cost data, and the reasonableness and
appropriateness of AOPL's analytical methodology.
Exchange of Supporting Data Between Parties and Filed With the
Commission
14. To expedite the index review process, AOPL and the ATA and
Refiners (hereinafter referred to as Shippers) agreed to exchange
source data, spreadsheets, and the detail of the methodology used to
support their respective positions of PPI+1.3 percent, and PPI. On
November 15, 2005, AOPL and the Shippers filed their supporting
workpapers with the Commission.
Subsequent Reply Comments and Responses
15. On January 10, 2006, AOPL filed comments in reply to the study
presented by the Shippers, contending that their study contains flawed
economic analysis and incomplete and erroneous sampling of pipeline
cost data. AOPL claims that, when corrected, the data presented by
Shippers support an adjustment of PPI+1.56 percent, which supports
AOPL's original position that the Commission should establish the index
at least at PPI+1.3 percent.
16. On January 23, 2006, the Shippers filed a joint response to
AOPL's January 10 comments. Shippers claim that AOPL's comments distort
the position advocated by Shippers and present non-public data upon
which AOPL based its incorrect conclusions. Shippers contend that the
facts they are presenting for Commission consideration are supported by
a study conducted by Dr. Paul J. Smith (Dr. Smith), a prominent
mathematician and statistician, as well as by a supplemental study
performed by their consultant, Mr. Ashton. Based on new data provided
by AOPL, Mr. Ashton added some pipelines to his study, and reconciled
much of the data supplied by AOPL with that culled from FERC Form No. 6
data. Mr. Ashton concludes that the Commission should be very cautious
about establishing an index higher than the present PPI.
17. Dr. Smith reviewed the dataset consisting of 62 firms that Mr.
Ashton originally proposed, as well as the 81firm dataset proposed by
Dr. Shehadeh in his January 10 rebuttal declaration on behalf of AOPL.
Dr. Smith recommends the use of the median or geometric mean to
estimate the five-year cost index, given the Form No. 6 data. In both
data sets analyzed, the median and geometric mean are very close
together. Dr. Smith argued that the use of the arithmetic mean is
clearly not appropriate for either of these data sets. Arithmetic means
are not representative of data from skewed distributions.
[[Page 15332]]
18. Shippers conclude that, given the validation of Mr. Ashton's
methodology, use of the geometric mean and choice of sample set, the
conclusions reached by Dr. Smith, and given the real possibility of
substantial errors in the FERC Form No. 6 data, the PPI should be used
as the inflationary index for the next five years, or, in the
alternative, the Commission should maintain the PPI and institute a
rulemaking to establish new criteria and reconsider the methodology
currently being used for determining such an index. Shippers contend
that the fact that a significant number of large oil pipelines are
substantially over-recovering their cost of service lends additional
support to this conclusion.
19. On February 9, 2006, AOPL submitted its supplemental reply
comments in response to comments made by Shippers on January 23, 2006.
AOPL claimed that Shippers, even after admitting to substantial
mistakes in their analysis of oil pipeline cost data, resulting in
flawed evidence and testimony, nevertheless urged the Commission to
adopt a new methodology for setting the price cap index or,
alternatively, to retain the PPI index pending a new rulemaking. AOPL
argued that the Commission should squarely reject the Shippers' new
position because, despite correcting errors in data and sample
selection, Shippers' position remains fundamentally flawed. AOPL argued
that Shippers' own cost evidence supports a substantial upward
adjustment to the current index. AOPL states that, in sum, it is clear
that Shippers' real complaint is not with the methodology and cost data
used by the Commission to set its price cap index, but rather with the
index level the faithful application of such methodology produces. The
Commission must, as required by law, apply its established, U.S. Court
of Appeals-approved index standard and set PPI+1.3 percent as its new
index for the next five years.
20. AOPL argued that, while Shippers purported to apply the
Commission-approved methodology for measuring pipeline cost changes,
Shippers in fact departed from that standard in several key respects.
Even after correcting the data from their original analysis, Shippers'
data sample omitted many eligible pipelines, failed to account for
mergers, used incorrect data fields and data not reflected on FERC Form
No. 6, improperly included cost data from TAPS assets that are not
governed by the index and reflect entirely different accounting
conventions, and most damaging, performed key calculations in the wrong
order, thereby systematically understating cost changes.
21. AOPL's comments addressed as well the report of Dr. Smith,
cited by Shippers as a source of validation of its calculations. AOPL
claimed that Dr. Smith's analysis is irrelevant to this proceeding, as
he does not purport to address Mr. Ashton's analysis and expresses no
opinion about the reasonableness of that analysis or its use of
composite measures of central tendency. Dr. Smith advocates use of an
entirely different standard, the median, does not approve of
calculating cost changes in the wrong sequence, and in fact does not
even analyze, much less endorse, use of the unweighted geometric mean
in combination with the weighted mean and median that Mr. Ashton used.
Nor, argues AOPL, did Dr. Smith analyze the middle 50 percent and
middle 80 percent data sets. As a result of all this, any reliance
Shippers placed on the report of Dr. Smith was misplaced.
22. AOPL addressed Shippers' claims that the Commission must
abandon its U.S. Court of Appeals-approved standard because of
``manifest errors'' and because its results are sensitive to ``extreme
data points'' by pointing out that the existence and reasonable
treatment of outlier data was extensively addressed by the Commission
in prior proceedings, and the Commission's methodology was specifically
designed to take such an issue into consideration, specifically by
employing the middle 50 percent and middle 80 percent samples. As to
Shippers' claim that the Commission's methodology is flawed and it
should set the index at PPI because a small minority of oil pipelines
is over-recovering their cost of service, AOPL replied that the
Commission recognized that, in adopting a uniform index for all
pipelines, inevitably some pipelines would over-earn while others will
under-earn. If Shippers truly believe that individual pipelines are
over-earning such that rates cannot satisfy the ``just and reasonable''
requirement, they can file a complaint against those pipelines. AOPL
contends that the indexing methodology is not intended to drive rates
to cost, but instead to make sure that any rate changes were based on
expected cost changes. AOPL further states that the Commission is not
subject to a statutory duty to examine whole rates when pipelines
propose index rates; rather, its inquiry is limited to a comparison of
changes in rates and costs from one year to another.
23. In his Supplemental Rebuttal Declaration on behalf of AOPL, Dr.
Shehadeh argues that Mr. Ashton departed from the very methodology he
purported to support, failed to implement accurately either the
methodology used by Dr. Kahn or by Dr. Smith, has no support in any of
the testimonies given in this proceeding for his findings, and for
these reasons, such findings are unreliable as a basis for selection of
an index for index-based regulation of oil pipeline tariffs. Dr.
Shehadeh states that the basis for the differences between his
conclusions and those of Mr. Ashton consist principally of errors in
Mr. Ashton's data and his flawed order of operations in implementing
the methods of Dr. Kahn. Specifically, Dr. Shehadeh cites the fact that
Mr. Ashton calculates his cost changes in incorrect order--he applied
the geometric mean over time prior to his application of the arithmetic
mean across pipelines. Dr. Kahn correctly determined annual average
change in costs by employing the geometric mean on the average
cumulative changes, as opposed to Mr. Ashton, who in contrast
determined the annual average change in costs by employing the average
of the geometric means of each pipeline's cumulative changes.
24. Rather than addressing the validity of Dr. Shehadeh's assertion
concerning the order of his calculations, Dr. Shehadeh claims that
instead, Mr. Ashton introduced an entirely new methodology based on
measures of central tendency and composite averages, purportedly based
on Dr. Smith's report. Dr. Shehadeh further states that Mr. Ashton's
new methodology, especially as it pertains to use of sensitive data, is
flawed and therefore unreliable.
25. In conclusion, Dr. Shehadeh continues his support of the use of
the methodology the Commission employed in its previous analysis, that
Dr. Kahn validated, and that the U.S. Court of Appeals approved.
According to Dr. Shehadah, Mr. Ashton's new methodology is completely
unsupported by factual evidence, lacks economic foundation, and is
unreliable and uninformative. Employing the same methodology used by
Dr. Kahn and the Commission and endorsed by the U.S. Court of Appeals
demonstrates that actual cost changes experienced by oil pipelines over
the last five years almost equaled PPI+1.5 percent, and consequently,
the Commission should choose as the index for the next five year period
PPI with an adjustment factor no less than 1.3 percent.
26. On February 21, 2006, the American Trucking Association filed
letter comments in response to the Commission's NOI. The American
[[Page 15333]]
Trucking Association adopted the positions espoused by the Shippers and
added no new arguments. On February 28, 2006, the International Air
Transport Association filed letter comments, similar to that of the
American Trucking Association, in support of the Shippers and again
adding no new arguments.
27. On February 24, 2006, Shippers filed additional comments,
styled ``supplemental rebuttal,'' and a ``Sworn Rebuttal Declaration''
of Mr. Ashton. The purpose of this filing is to rebut the Supplemental
Reply Comments of AOPL, which had been filed on February 9, 2006.
Shippers contend that AOPL has made two fundamental and related errors
in its Supplemental Reply Comments: AOPL incorrectly states that the
Shippers and Mr. Ashton have employed a new methodology; and, even if
Shippers have employed a different methodology, the Commission is
within its rights to rely on that methodology.
Discussion
Methodology To Calculate the Index Differential
28. Since Order Nos. 561 and 561-A, the Commission has primarily
relied upon Dr. Kahn's testimony \7\ to develop the methodology to set
the index differential \8\, which was subsequently approved by the U.S.
Court of Appeals.\9\ Within the Commission-established method, after
each firm's unit cost changes are calculated and weighted, two trimmed
data sets are extracted from the master data set. Both parties have
constructed the trimmed data sets of the middle 50 percent and middle
80 percent. Trimming is done to remove statistical outliers, or
spurious data points that could bias the mean of the sample in either
direction. Table 1 provides a description of the statistical values of
central tendency used by both parties to develop the index. The
industry-wide cost index is calculated by averaging both composites on
Line D and then comparing that value to the PPI-FG index data over the
same period.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Declaration of Alfred E. Kahn, August 31, 2000, in Review of
Pipeline Pricing Index, Docket No. RM00-11-000.
\8\ To calculate the index differential, the cost index is
compared to the PPI-FG average index for the same time period. The
remainder of this calculation [Cost Index-PPI-FG] is the index
differential.
\9\ Association of Oil Pipe Lines v. FERC, 83 F.3d at 1437.
Table 1
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Line Middle 80 percent Middle 50 percent
------------------------------------------------------------------------
A................. Median................... Median.
B................. Weighted Mean............ Weighted Mean.
C................. Un-weighted Mean......... Un-weighted Mean.
D................. Composite of 80% = Composite of 50% =
(A+B+C)/3. (A+B+C)/3.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
29. Both AOPL and Shippers used the same sample (with the exception
of SFPP, L.P.\10\) to describe the central tendency of the data, in
which the cost index calculation directly follows. However, the parties
have differed in the way in which they calculated the pipelines' cost
increases. The result has been that both parties calculate a different
pipeline industry cost index; AOPL arriving at an index of PPI+1.49
percent and the Shippers arriving at an index of PPI+0.675 percent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ SFPP, L.P. was excluded by the Shippers because its cost as
reflected in its Form No. 6 were being challenged in a current rate
proceeding. The Commission conducted a review of the pipeline
samples submitted by both Dr. Shehadeh and Mr. Ashton and determined
that, using the Court of Appeals-approved methodology, the exclusion
of SFPP, L.P. causes only a 0.02 percent decrease in the average
annual cost difference. Thus, the exclusion of SFPP, L.P. still
supports the use of PPI+1.3 percent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
30. In simple terms, AOPL and the Shippers state that they apply
the same methodology but they arrive at different results. Each party
calculates total industry costs \11\ for each pipeline in the time
period between 1999 and 2004, and then estimates the central tendency
of the results, sums these amounts, and divides the result by the
number of pipelines to arrive at the industry average cumulative change
in industry costs (known as the arithmetic mean of the sample). AOPL
then derives an annual percent change in industry costs for the 1999
through 2004 period by employing the geometric mean on this industry
average cumulative change in costs. AOPL's methodology tracks the
methodology previously used by the Commission and approved by the U.S.
Court of Appeals. The Shippers, however, depart from the prior approved
methodology, in that the Shippers derive the cumulative change in costs
(between 1999 and 2004) for each pipeline, by calculating each year's
cost change for each pipeline. The year to year cost changes are
multiplied together to arrive at the cumulative cost change for that
pipeline. The average cost change is determined by taking the geometric
mean of that cumulative cost change.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ Average total cost for an individual pipeline is the
average of the change in operating cost (weighted by the operating
ration) added to the average of the change in net plant (weighted by
the residual, one minus the operating ratio). References to
individual pipeline costs beyond this point are assumed to be
average total costs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
31. We base our analysis of the calculations in this proceeding
upon the U.S. Court of Appeals-approved model, and have found that the
methodology used by Dr. Shehadeh for AOPL in this proceeding conforms
to Dr. Kahn's U.S. Court of Appeals-approved methodology. Our analysis
shows that the Shippers' methodology, as represented by Mr. Ashton, is
fundamentally flawed.
32. In delineating the index differential, Mr. Ashton, in his first
declaration,\12\ claims to have accurately applied Dr. Kahn's
methodology in calculating average annual cost changes, but our review
found that he deviates from Dr. Kahn's methodology in certain respects.
In this first attempt, Mr. Ashton determines the average annual change
in unit costs for years 1999 through 2004 by calculating the arithmetic
average of the geometric mean of each pipeline's cumulative unit cost
change, as opposed to Dr. Kahn's method of calculating the geometric
mean of the arithmetic average of cumulative unit cost change (Ashton's
Decl. at p. 14). On the basis of determining the average cost change of
each pipeline, the use of Dr. Kahn's methodology would calculate the
cost increase between end years 1999 and 2004 by this formula: (final
cost - initial cost)/(initial cost)-1. Mr. Ashton erred in this step of
the calculations by taking the geometric mean of the product of the
individual company's yearly cost increase. Furthermore, Dr. Shehadeh
has shown that Mr. Ashton's method results in the underestimation of
costs.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ Sworn Declaration of Peter K. Ashton, October 13, 2005 (p.
3).
\13\ Rebuttal Declaration of Ramsey D. Shehadeh, PhD at 10-11,
January 10, 2006 by use of a theorem known as Jensen's Inequality.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
33. Mr. Ashton responds \14\ to Dr. Shehadeh's rebuttal, and claims
that the newly added testimony of Dr. Smith supports Mr. Ashton's new
methodology.\15\ However, in examining Dr. Smith's analysis, it seems
that he has followed Dr. Kahn's approach (but not Mr. Ashton's) by
calculating percentage cost changes for individual companies, where Dr.
Smith states that ``the five-year percent differences in costs as
reported'' for individual companies ``were computed as (final
[[Page 15334]]
cost - initial cost)/(initial cost)-1.'' Therefore, we cannot reconcile
Dr. Smith's evidence with Mr. Ashton's statement that ``Prof. Smith
clearly points out that given the underlying characteristics of the
data and its skewed distribution, the methodology that I employ relying
on the geometric mean is the proper methodology for computing the cost
increases of individual pipeline companies'' (Supplemental Decl. at p.
2) Dr. Smith's testimony regarding his recommendation of the use of the
geometric mean, was to describe with relative accuracy the central
tendency of the data, not the calculation of the individual cost
increases themselves. Further, Dr. Smith's testimony in regard to this
proceeding is incomplete because he only trimmed the cost data by 5
percent, and he never analyzed the ``middle 50 percent'' and ``middle
80 percent'' data sets, which excluded ``outliers,'' adopted by the
Commission and approved by the U.S. Court of Appeals. As the Court of
Appeals stated, ``[t]he object of excluding outliers is to prevent
extreme and spurious data from biasing an analysis, i.e., affecting its
result adversely.'' \16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ Supplemental Declaration of Peter K. Ashton, January 23,
2006.
\15\ Analysis of Pipeline Index Data, submitted by Paul J.
Smith, January 23, 2006.
\16\ Association of Oil Pipe Lines v. FERC, 281 F.3d 239, 246
(D.C. Cir. 2002).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
34. Also, in the same response, Mr. Ashton presents an ``update''
to his methodology, and supports it again with the analysis of Dr.
Smith (Supplemental Decl. at p. 7). Originally, Mr. Ashton measured the
central tendency of both of the trimmed data sets (80 percent and 50
percent) with the median, the weighted and the un-weighted arithmetic
mean (although he still wrongly calculates the cost changes for
individual companies by the geometric mean). In the update, Mr. Ashton
delineates the weighted and un-weighted means by now taking the
geometric mean \17\
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR28MR06.000
of the unit cost change. Mr. Ashton states that this update is
justified ``as Dr. Smith points out, in measuring the central tendency
it is also appropriate to take the geometric mean and the median--not
the arithmetic mean.'' The supporting evidence by Dr. Smith points out
that both data sets (untrimmed) are not normally distributed. Dr. Smith
states that, ``the data are more accurately described by a skewed
lognormal distribution than by a bell-shaped normal distribution, but
that neither distribution accurately described the data.'' Dr. Smith
then measured the arithmetic average applied to a 5 percent trimmed
sample in which he concluded in his analysis that, based on the
results, ``the trimmed mean is substantially less than the arithmetic
mean, illustrating how a few extremely large indices affect the overall
estimate'' (p.5).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ This geometric mean is a statistical treatment to the data
to find central tendency, as opposed to the geometric mean used
previously to calculate the index of costs over time. In this
application, the general formula (see formula above) was used, where
denotes the cost index of firm i.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
35. Shippers, in their Supplemental Rebuttal filing of February 24,
2006, contend that the use of the geometric mean was but a small change
and an improvement to the Commission's methodology to better suit the
underlying data.\18\ The Shippers' underlying belief in this order
seems to be that the data in the samples that are used in the
Commission's methodology are positively skewed, and therefore, Dr.
Smith never had to prove that our samples were skewed. However, Dr.
Smith never applied his alternative approach to our samples to
determine, based on his analysis, what the best measure of central
tendency would be. He contended that he proved that the geometric mean
approach would be more accurate on his 5 percent trimmed sample because
his result more closely matched the median, and therefore was ``more
robust.'' Dr. Smith, though, never proved that the geometric mean was
``more robust'' on the 50 and 80 percent samples.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ Supplemental Rebuttal Comments at 2; Ashton Supplemental
Rebuttal Decl. at 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
36. Based on the calculations presented by the Shippers through Mr.
Ashton's declarations, it is clear that the methodology the Shippers
use departs from the methodology presented by Dr. Kahn. Shippers have
not proven that their methodology is superior to that of Dr. Kahn.
Reconciling the Dataset of AOPL and Mr. Ashton
37. In Shippers' January 23, 2006 joint response to comments made
on January 10, 2006 by AOPL, Mr. Ashton added some pipelines to his
study, and reconciled much of the data supplied by AOPL and culled from
FERC Form No. 6 data. Aside from a few remaining pipelines in which
discrepancies appear between the data that Mr. Ashton used and the data
that Dr. Shehadeh used, Mr. Ashton is prepared to accept the
reconciliation and changes offered by Dr. Shehadeh in his Rebuttal
Declaration. Mr. Ashton's database is comprised of 79 pipelines that
account for 92 percent of all barrel-miles transported in 1999.
38. To investigate the data discrepancies, the Commission has
examined the hard copy FERC Form No. 6 data filed by individual
pipelines to determine whether complete data for these pipelines are
available and whether they match the data used by Mr. Ashton or Dr.
Shehadeh. We have compared, on a pipeline-by-pipeline basis, every
relevant data value in Mr. Ashton's sample with the corresponding
values in FERC Form No. 6. We then have applied to the reconciled data,
which account for the only remaining discrepancies identified by Mr.
Ashton, the methodology described by Dr. Kahn, adopted by the
Commission and approved by the U.S. Court of Appeals. We now discuss
those pipeline-by-pipeline comparisons.
39. Navajo Pipeline Co. L.P.--Holly Energy Partners--Operating
L.P.--Dr. Shehadeh correctly points out in Exhibit A15 of his original
declaration and Exhibit 16 of his rebuttal declaration that Navajo
Pipeline Co. L.P. (Navajo) was renamed Holly Energy Partners--Operating
L.P. (Holly) in 2004. As a result, both companies filed a FERC Form No.
6 in 2004. Mr. Ashton is correct in noting that the 2004 data reported
by Dr. Shehadeh comes from only one company, Navajo, and is only
partial year data. The Commission agrees that the 2004 data for Navajo
and Holly can be aggregated to provide data for the complete year.
However, the Commission takes issue with the values Mr. Ashton reports
for carrier property and total barrel-miles. A review of Navajo's 2004
FERC Form No. 6 reveals carrier property totaling $10,186,371 and
barrel-miles totaling 4,095,048,097. Holly's 2004 FERC Form No. 6
reports carrier property totaling $22,788,803 and total barrel-miles of
3,330,670,969. Thus, the Commission will use $32,975,174 for carrier
property and 7,425,719,066 for total barrel-miles.
40. Olympic Pipe Line Company --On March 31, 2003, Olympic Pipe
Line Company (Olympic) resubmitted its 2001 FERC Form No. 6 to report
changes to carrier property, accrued depreciation, and operating
revenue. Mr. Ashton is correct to use the data contained in the
resubmitted FERC Form No. 6. However, Mr. Ashton fails to reflect the
operating expenses provided in the updated FERC Form No. 6 and
continues to use the figure reported in Olympic's original 2001 FERC
Form No. 6. Thus, the Commission will use the updated $59,520,702 for
Olympic's 2001 operating expenses.
[[Page 15335]]
41. Premcor Port Arthur Pipeline Company--Mr. Ashton states that he
did not include Premcor Port Arthur Pipeline Company (Premcor) in the
dataset he used to calculate oil pipeline costs changes because Premcor
lacked complete FERC Form No. 6 data. Dr. Shehadeh agrees with Mr.
Ashton on this point. No data is reported for accrued depreciation for
the years 2001-2004 even though Premcor did report accrued depreciation
in 1999-2000. Without complete data for all six years, a company cannot
be included in the dataset. Therefore, the Commission agrees with Mr.
Ashton's recommendation that Premcor be excluded from the analysis.
42. Cypress Pipe Line Company, LLC--Mr. Ashton criticizes Dr.
Shehadeh's use of barrel-mile data for Cypress Pipe Line Company, LLC
(Cypress) in 1999 from page 700 of the FERC Form No. 6, rather than
data reported on page 600. Mr. Ashton states that the agreed-upon
source for barrel-mile data is page 600 of the FERC Form No. 6. Despite
this criticism, Mr. Ashton himself elects to use data from page 700,
not data from page 600 as he describes. Cypress, however, errs by
reporting the number of barrels received into the system, rather than
total barrel-miles. This is evident from comparing line 32 of page 600,
grand total of barrels received into system, with page 600 line 33a;
the numbers are identical. By contrast, line 4 of page 700 reports
total throughput in barrel-miles as 78,558,341.83. Thus, the Commission
will use 78,558,342 for Cypress's 1999 throughput in barrel-miles.
43. Mr. Ashton raises another substantive issue with respect to the
reconciled dataset contained in Dr. Shehadeh's rebuttal declaration.
Mr. Ashton notes that there are differences between the operating
revenues for five pipelines reported on the FERC Form No. 6, page 114,
and FERC Form No. 6, page 301. Specifically, these discrepancies occur
with respect to Mobil Pipe Line Company, Mustang Pipe Line Partners,
Osage Pipe Line Company, LLC, San Pedro Bay Pipeline Company, and
SouthTex 66 Pipeline Company, Ltd.
44. In order to rectify these differences, the Commission adjusted
its cost calculation to use the figures endorsed by Mr. Ashton.
However, the use of Mr. Ashton's figures proved immaterial as the
result still supports the use of PPI+1.3 percent as the new oil index.
When the Commission adopted the page 301 data for those pipelines for
which Mr. Ashton noted discrepancies, and applied the U.S. Court of
Appeals-approved methodology, the results changed by less than 0.01
percent.
Indexing Methodology
45. In the January 23, 2006, response of Shippers to AOPL's January
10 comments, Shippers assert for the first time that, as an alternative
to using the current methodology for determining adjustments to PPI
after conducting a five-year review, the Commission should continue to
use the current unadjusted PPI for the time being and institute a
rulemaking to establish a new methodology for determining what the oil
pipeline rate change index should be over the next five years. Shippers
contend this is appropriate because there are serious defects in the
Commission's current index review methodology. AOPL responded to this
assertion on February 9, 2006.
46. Notwithstanding Shippers' assertions to the contrary contained
in their Supplemental Rebuttal Comments of February 24, 2006, Shippers'
suggestion that the Commission should embark upon a new rulemaking
proceeding to establish a new method for calculating pipeline cost
changes to compare to changes in PPI is beyond the scope of our five-
year review as set forth in the NOI that instituted this proceeding. In
the NOI, the Commission asked for comments on whether and to what
extent the PPI should be adjusted to better reflect those cost changes,
not whether the method for determining pipeline costs should be
changed. The NOI specifically stated:
The Commission proposes to continue to utilize PPI for the next
five-year period as the index to track changes to the costs of the
oil pipeline industry and to apply to rate ceiling levels for oil
pipeline rate changes. The Commission invites interested persons to
submit comments on the continued use of PPI and to propose, justify,
and fully support, as an alternative, adjustments to PPI. (NOI, ] 4)
The parties have filed numerous comments reflecting their positions
on what adjustments should or should not be made to the PPI upon
review, and only as a last-minute item has anyone suggested that the
Commission embark on a course of discarding the Commission's current
five-year review methodology of determining pipeline cost changes to
compare to changes in the PPI-FG over the five-year review period. The
information provided by Shippers is insufficient to persuade us that
our method should be discarded. Beyond these issues, no one has
suggested that the Commission look to change to an index other than
PPI-FG as representative of oil pipeline industry-wide costs.
47. Shippers first contend the use of FERC Form No. 6 data make
application of the cost standard inaccurate. They claim that the data
contained in the FERC Form No. 6 is sporadic, incomplete, and contain
substantial errors. Shippers point out that out of 186 FERC regulated
pipelines, only 79 pipelines have provided sufficient Form No. 6 data
to warrant being included in the database for analysis. They believe
the 42 percent sample is too small to justify the continued use of Form
No. 6 data.
48. The FERC Form No. 6 data is the only systematic source of
information regarding the past costs and revenues of oil pipelines. As
previously mentioned, Mr. Ashton concedes his sample contains 79
pipelines that account for over 92 percent of the 1999 total barrel-
miles. In defending Order No. 561-A on appeal to the D.C. Circuit on
this very issue, the Commission stated that ``[t]here is * * * no
reason to believe that samples representing between 10% and 33% of the
industry, taken from the median range of the industry cost data, were
too small to produce reliable results.'' \19\ In addition, the Shippers
argued before the U.S. Court of Appeals that the, ``[d]ata submitted to
FERC have become increasingly accurate, thus eliminating the need for a
proxy.'' \20\ Further, the U.S. Court of Appeals agreed that it is
evidently uncontested that the reported data have become more accurate.
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\19\ See, Brief for Respondent Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission, Association of Oil Pipelines v. Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission, No. 94-1538, at 36 (July 24, 1995).
\20\ See, Flying J Inc. v. FERC, 363 F.3d 495 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
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49. Second, Shippers express concern that a significant number of
oil pipelines are not complying with FERC Form No. 6 filing
requirements. Specifically, Shippers were concerned that the Commission
has not consistently enforced these filing requirements nor has it
examined the Form No. 6 data and required corrections of the errors
noted by Mr. Ashton in his supplemental declaration.
50. The Commission disagrees with the Shippers' assertion that the
Commission has not consistently enforced the accurate and timely filing
of FERC Form No. 6 data. In 1994, the Commission addressed additional
revisions to the Form No. 6 in Order Nos. 571 and 571-A,\21\ including
adding
[[Page 15336]]
a new page 700. The information included in the Form No. 6 was
determined at the time to be the minimum necessary for Shippers to
assess filed rate changes under Order No. 561.
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\21\ Order No. 260, 47 FR 42327 (Sept. 27 1982); FERC Stats. &
Regs. [Regulations Preambles January 1991-June 1996] ] 31,006 (Oct.
28 1994). Order No. 571-A, 60 FR 356 (Jan. 4, 1995); FERC Stats. &
Regs. [Regulations Preambles January 1991-June 1996] ] 31,012 (Dec.
28, 1994).
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51. Prior to 2000, FERC Form No. 6 required that a pipeline include
its annual cost of service, operating revenues, throughput in barrels,
and throughput in barrel-miles. The Commission found that the Form No.
6 data was inadequate to monitor the reasonableness of a pipeline's
filed rates. Thus, the Commission proposed the addition of the
following reporting requirements: operating and maintenance expenses,
depreciation expense, AFUDC depreciation, amortization of deferred
earnings, rate base, rate of return, return on rate base, and income
tax allowance. Since the Form No. 6 is intended to be both a financial
and ratemaking document,\22\ these additional requirements ensured that
the Commission had the financial, operational, and ratemaking
information needed to carry out its regulatory responsibilities to
monitor the oil pipeline industry in a dynamically changing
environment.
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\22\ Cost of Service Reporting and Filing Requirements for Oil
Pipelines, FERC Stats. & Regs. [Regulations Preambles 1991-1996] ]
31,006 at 31,169 and FERC Form No. 6, p.i, I.
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52. In Order No. 620, the Commission required pipelines to maintain
workpapers that fully support the data reported on page 700 including
but not limited to the total cost-of-service calculations and all of
its associated components.\23\ In addition, Order No. 620 provides that
the Commission or its staff may request that a pipeline make its work
papers available for review.\24\
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\23\ FERC Stats. & Regs. [Regs. Preambles] ] 31,115 (Dec. 13,
2000); 65 FR 81335 (Dec. 26, 2000).
\24\ Staff examined each pipeline's compliance with the
requirements for reporting additional information on page 700 of the
FERC Form No. 6. After substantial follow-up contacts by staff, with
the 183 jurisdictional oil pipelines, only 12 pipelines were not in
compliance and expressed the need for additional accounting help in
executing a complete Form No. 6. Staff referred the pipelines to
either the Association of Oil Pipelines personnel or staff resources
for advice.
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53. Finally, Shippers submit that the U.S. Court of Appeals-
approved methodology is no longer reliable because the results are
sensitive to small changes in the sample size. Mr. Ashton argued in his
Supplemental Declaration that the results achieved by using the
Commission's methodology accords undue weight to extreme data points at
the high and low end of the spectrum, with high cost oil pipelines
exerting a disproportionately strong impact. Using Dr. Smith's
``trimmed percent sample,'' Mr. Ashton notes that by simply removing
the four highest and lowest pipelines from the data set, the cost index
fell from a range of PPI+0.66 percent and PPI+0.69 percent to PPI+0.58
percent and PPI+0.68 percent (middle 80 percent and 50 percent
respectively).\25\
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\25\ Supplemental Declaration of Peter K. Ashton at 22-24.
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54. The sensitivity analysis Mr. Ashton includes in his
Supplemental Declaration does not provide a reasoned basis for the
Commission to abandon its current methodology because the existence and
proper treatment of ``outlier'' data were extensively addressed in
prior Commission proceedings, and the current U.S. Court of Appeals-
approved methodology was specifically designed to take this matter into
account. To minimize the risk that extreme and/or erroneous
observations bias the result, the Commission uses only the middle 50
percent and 80 percent of the relevant cost data, thus ensuring that
the index is not driven by statistical outliers.
Possible Over-Recovery of Costs-of-Service by Large Pipelines
55. Shippers point to the fact that a significant number of large
oil pipelines are substantially over-recovering their cost-of-service
as further support for maintaining the PPI without adjustment as the
appropriate index for the subsequent five-year period. Shippers
maintain that the index methodology was designed to enable pipelines to
recover costs by permitting them to increase rates at the same pace as
they are predicted to experience cost increases. Shippers contend that
the role of the index is to accommodate normal cost changes, not to
guarantee recovery of all costs at any time and in full. Shippers state
that a concern of the Commission was that under an indexing system,
rates would diverge from actual costs and the resulting rates would
fail the just and reasonable test. According to Shippers, this concern
has proven to be well founded, as evidenced by data reported on FERC
Form No. 6 which indicate that a number of interstate pipelines have
been charging indexed rates that permit them to substantially over-
recover their cost-of-service of fourteen pipelines during the 2002-
2004 period that were subject to indexing regulation, the total
interstate operating revenues of these pipelines, and the amount by
which each of these pipelines have been over-recovering its self-
reported cost-of-service. Shippers conclude that clearly an increase in
the current index will further increase the amount of over-recoveries
by these pipelines.
56. AOPL responds that this argument is flawed as a matter of
regulatory policy and lacks any basis in evidence. The PPI index
reflects the year-to-year changes in industry costs in general and, as
such, reflects changes in the ``average'' oil pipeline's cost of
service. Under the indexing system, existing rates remain subject to
the Commission's complaint process. If Shippers believe that individual
pipelines are over-earning such that their rates cannot satisfy the
just and reasonable requirement for oil pipeline rates, their remedy
would be to file complaints against those pipelines. AOPL further
argues that another reason why over-earning pipelines do not represent
a flaw in the Commission's index methodology is that the index governs
rate changes based on ``grandfathered'' rates. AOPL claims that the
rates of most oil pipelines are deemed to be just and reasonable,
thereby establishing a ``baseline'' for future rates. Therefore, to the
extent a carrier was over-earning in 1992, the indexing methodology was
not intended to drive those rates to cost, but instead to make sure
that any rate changes were based on expected cost changes. As to
Shippers' comparison of the cost of service to revenues for their small
sample of pipelines, AOPL points out that five of those fourteen
pipelines have, in whole or in part, ``market-based'' rates and as such
are not fully subject to the index. In addition, AOPL claims that
another of the pipelines on their list has rates based on a rate
negotiated with Shippers in 2002. For all the above reasons, AOPL
disputes the position taken by Shippers.
57. The Commission is not subject to a statutory duty to examine
the whole rate when an oil pipeline proposes an indexed rate change.
Rather, our inquiry is limited to a comparison of the changes in the
rates and costs from year to year. We recognized in adopting a uniform
index for all pipelines that inevitably some pipelines would over-earn
while others will under-earn. It is a fact simply inherent in an
industry-wide pipeline index. Shippers' use of a sample of fourteen
pipelines culled from the entire data set of pipelines being analyzed
only serves to emphasize this point. Further, Shippers' own
calculations show that many of these pipelines actually experienced a
decrease in their over-recoveries over the short time period being
considered. In addition, even though Shippers' calculations may
accurately measure over-recovery for a few pipelines, AOPL shows that,
based on Page 700 information for 2003 and 2004, pipeline
[[Page 15337]]
revenues were 20 percent below booked costs of service. For the above
reasons, the Commission finds that the existence of such over-
recoveries does not mean that PPI is the most appropriate index.
Structural Changes in the Oil Industry
58. Shippers claim that structural changes in the oil industry
ensure that adequate capital will be available to pipelines if they
charge rates determined by the PPI index level. They point to the
emergence of publicly-traded partnerships such as master limited
partnerships (MLPs) and limited liability companies that have elected
to be taxed as partnerships. According to Shippers, MLPs have resulted
in increased concentration in the pipeline industry, and are the forms
through which many pipelines subject to indexing are owned. To evaluate
the impact of indexing, Shippers state that the environment of MLPs
must be reviewed as well. According to Shippers, MLPs continue to enjoy
good access to capital markets, and the number, size and total amount
of capital raised by MLPs continues to grow. Shippers argue that MLP's
success at capital raising is being accompanied by an active
acquisitions market as well as by partnerships' continued investment in
energy infrastructure (organized growth) projects, thus proving that
raising capital is not a problem for the oil industry. Shippers also
argue that another important consideration is the use of funds
generated from pipeline operations. Shippers state that MLPs generally
distribute all available cash flow to unit-holders in the form of
quarterly distributions (similar to dividends). Thus, Shippers contend,
one cannot assume that increases in rates resulting from an increase in
the Commission's index will be used to offset any increased costs for
safety, efficiency and security, or to fund capital expansion. Shippers
conclude that no basis exists for the proposition that extraordinary
rate increases must be approved across-the-board in order to provide
sufficient capital for oil pipelines to expand and operate their
systems in a safe and secure environment. On the contrary, Shippers
contend, the available evidence suggests that more than sufficient
capital is presently available at rates determined by the PPI to
achieve these objectives.
59. AOPL responds that the Shippers are attributing what is
occurring for only a small sample of the entire pipeline industry
(approximately 38 energy-related MLPs exist as of August 2005) to the
entire industry. AOPL states that what happens with MLPs means
absolutely nothing for the majority of oil pipelines that are not owned
and operated by MLPs. According to AOPL, the very purpose of the five-
year review of the cost index is to ensure that pipeline rates keep
pace with cost changes in the industry so that past levels of capital
investment can be maintained. AOPL argues that, to preserve adequate
capital investment, the Commission must adopt a price index consistent
with its cost standard of at least PPI+1.3 percent.
60. The fact that oil pipelines have been able to attract capital
in the past does not establish that they would be able to do so in the
future if the Commission fails to set an index that is adequate. We
believe the continuation of the methodology used in Order No. 561 to
arrive at the new index accurately captures costs in the interstate oil
pipeline transportation sector, and will produce an index sufficient
for pipelines to maintain their capital investment. We find adherence
to the Order No. 561 methodology supports an oil index of PPI+1.3 for
the next five years. Finally, we find that no party has made a
convincing showing that the Order No. 561 methodology is no longer
adequate for computing the oil index.
Continuation of the Current PPI and Impairment of Pipeline Expansion
61. Shippers claim that, contrary to the brief filed by DOT, the