Notice of Safety Advisory 2006-02, 11700-11701 [E6-3232]

Agencies

• Federal Railroad Administration
• DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

[Federal Register Volume 71, Number 45 (Wednesday, March 8, 2006)]
[Notices]
[Pages 11700-11701]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E6-3232]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Railroad Administration


Notice of Safety Advisory 2006-02

AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), Department of 
Transportation DOT).

ACTION: Notice of safety advisory.

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SUMMARY: This safety advisory provides recommended practices for the 
testing, classification, and reuse of second-hand rail.\1\ The purpose 
of this safety advisory is to reduce the number of rail defects that 
occur when second-hand rail is used.
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    \1\ Second-hand rail is sometimes also referred to as relay 
rail.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Christopher F. Schulte, Specialist, 
Track Division, FRA Office of Safety Assurance and Compliance, 1120 
Vermont Avenue, NW, Mail Stop 25, Washington, DC 20590 
(Christopher.Schulte@fra.dot.gov or (202) 493-6251); or Christina 
McDonald, Trial Attorney, FRA Office of Chief Counsel, 1120 Vermont 
Avenue, NW, Mail Stop 10, Washington, DC 20590, 
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(Christina.McDonald@fra.dot.gov or (202) 493-6032).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

Derailment in Nodaway, Iowa

    On March 17, 2001, Amtrak train No. 5-17, the California Zephyr, 
derailed near Nodaway, Iowa. Amtrak train No. 5-17 consisted of two 
locomotive units and 16 cars. All but the last five cars derailed. As a 
result of the derailment, 78 people were injured, including one fatal 
injury. At the time of the accident, Amtrak train No. 5-17 was 
operating over FRA Class 4 \2\ track belonging to the BNSF Railway 
(BNSF) Creston Subdivision.
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    \2\ Over Class 4 track, the maximum allowable operating speed 
for freight trains is 60 mph, and the maximum allowable operating 
speed for passenger trains is 80 mph. See 49 CFR 213.9.
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    Near MP 419.90, the locomotive engineer experienced a ``tugging'' 
sensation in connection with the train's progress and heard a 
``grinding, screeching, noise.'' He made an emergency brake 
application. When the locomotives came to a stop, the engineer realized 
that the train's cars had uncoupled from the locomotives, and most cars 
had derailed. The cars were about 1/8 mile behind the stopped 
locomotives.
    A broken rail was discovered at the point of derailment. The broken 
pieces of rail were reassembled at the scene, and it was determined 
that they came from a 15-foot, 6-inch section of rail (referred to as a 
``plug'') that had been installed as replacement rail at this location 
in February 2001. The

[[Page 11701]]

replacement plug had been installed because BNSF discovered internal 
defects near MP 419.92 during a routine scan of the existing rail on 
February 13, 2001. A short section of the continuous welded rail that 
contained the defects was removed, and a replacement rail was inserted. 
The plug did not receive an ultrasonic inspection immediately before or 
after installation. It would have been visually inspected for obvious 
surface damage, defects, and excessive wear before installation.
    Following the derailment, the National Transportation Board (NTSB) 
and FRA conducted an investigation. The NTSB issued a report, NTSB RAB-
02-1 (adopted
    March 5, 2002), which provides the underlying basis for FRA's 
recommendations in this safety advisory. The NTSB could not reliably 
determine the source of the plug and considered two different accounts. 
Based on either account, however, the replacement rail would have been 
removed from another track location for reuse. Analysis conducted by 
the NTSB indicated that the plug rail had multiple internal defects. 
Specifically, the NTSB laboratory found that the rail failed due to 
fatigue initiating from cracks associated with the precipitation of 
internal hydrogen. Cracks associated with the precipitation of internal 
hydrogen occur in steels due to excessive hydrogen content during 
processing. As a result of its investigation of this accident, the NTSB 
made the following recommendation to FRA: Require railroads to conduct 
ultrasonic or other appropriate inspections to ensure that rail used to 
replace defective segments of existing rail is free from internal 
defects. (R-02-5).

Existing Regulatory Requirements

    FRA's regulations set forth the requirements for the inspection of 
rail. They are found in 49 CFR Sec.  213.237 and include procedures for 
the inspection of internal rail defects.

Rail Inspection Procedures on the BNSF Creston Subdivision

    On the Creston Subdivision, BNSF's procedure for the inspection of 
internal rail flaws not only met, but also exceeded, the standard 
specified in Sec.  213.237. Paragraph (a) of Sec.  213.237 requires a 
continuous search for internal defects to be made of all rail in Class 
4 track at least once every 40 million gross tons (mgt) or once a year, 
whichever interval is shorter. However, BNSF scanned the rail for 
internal defects once every 30 days. Most railroads rely on the fact 
that all existing rail is ultrasonically scanned while in place in the 
track, in accordance with the requirements of Sec.  213.237. Therefore, 
if a piece of rail has been removed from a track location and stored 
for future use as a replacement rail, a railroad may assume that the 
replacement rail was scanned while in its previous location and that it 
passed its inspection. This was the process used for the plug rail that 
failed in the Nodaway accident. Despite the assumption that the rail 
had been scanned and passed its inspection, this rail was, in fact, 
defective. FRA notes that rail in main track that is subject to testing 
under Sec.  213.237, and is removed from track for future use can be 
relatively free of internal defects if the last test occurred shortly 
before the rail's removal. However, FRA notes that rail that is removed 
from track at the end of a testing cycle, or rail that is taken from 
track that is not subject to the requirements of Sec.  213.237, is more 
likely to have defects.

Recommendations

    The Federal Track Safety Standards prescribe minimum standards. 
Railroads are not precluded from prescribing additional or more 
stringent standards that are consistent with sound maintenance 
practices. In response to the accident in Nodaway, Iowa and the 
resulting NTSB recommendations, FRA makes the recommendations 
identified below.
    (1) FRA recommends that railroads retest for internal rail flaws 
the entire length of any rail that is removed from track and stored for 
reuse. The railroad should conduct this retest before that rail carries 
revenue traffic. This recommendation applies to rail being installed 
into track that is subject to the rail testing requirements specified 
in Sec.  213.237. After completing the retest and finding no internal 
rail flaws, the railroad should physically mark the rail with the words 
``fully re-tested'' or with other appropriate language. Such rail would 
then be suitable for reuse in track subject to testing under Sec.  
213.237.
    (2) FRA recognizes that some railroads do not have the equipment to 
test second-hand rail in accordance with the above recommendation. In 
such cases, FRA encourages railroads to develop a classification 
program. The classification program is intended to decrease the 
likelihood that a railroad will install second-hand rail with defects 
back into active track. FRA recommends that, at a minimum, the 
classification program for railroads that do not have out-of-track 
testing capabilities include the following rail identification 
procedures:
    (a) Classify rail as either reuseable or not reusable. Distinctly 
mark as reusable rail that is: taken from track subject to the testing 
requirements of Sec.  213.237, intended for use in track subject to the 
testing requirements of Sec.  213.237, and has accumulated less than 15 
million gross tons (mgt) since the last valid rail test;
    (b) Prohibit the reuse of the following second-hand rails in track 
that is subject to the testing requirements of Sec.  213.237: (i) rail 
removed from track that is not subject to the testing requirements of 
Sec.  213.237 and (ii) rail that does not have a classification marking 
pursuant to either recommendations (1) or (2)(a) of this safety 
advisory; and
    (c) Develop and use a highly visible permanent marking system to 
mark defective rails that railroads remove from track after identifying 
internal defects in those rails. The highly visible permanent marking 
system should include visible, etched markings (e.g., score lines from 
an abrasive rail saw or a cutting torch) on the rail head at the 
specific area(s) on the rail where the defects are detected. This 
marking is in addition to the highly visible marking of defective rails 
required by Sec.  213.237(c).

    Issued in Washington, DC, on March 2, 2006.
Grady C. Cothen, Jr.,
Deputy Associate Administrator for Safety Standards and Program 
Development.
 [FR Doc. E6-3232 Filed 3-7-06; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-06-P