HIPAA Administrative Simplification: Enforcement, 8390-8433 [06-1376]
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Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 32 / Thursday, February 16, 2006 / Rules and Regulations
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES
Office of the Secretary
45 CFR Parts 160 and 164
RIN 0991–AB29
HIPAA Administrative Simplification:
Enforcement
Office of the Secretary, HHS.
Final rule.
AGENCY:
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ACTION:
SUMMARY: The Secretary of Health and
Human Services is adopting rules for
the imposition of civil money penalties
on entities that violate rules adopted by
the Secretary to implement the
Administrative Simplification
provisions of the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of
1996, Public Law 104–191 (HIPAA). The
final rule amends the existing rules
relating to the investigation of
noncompliance to make them apply to
all of the HIPAA Administrative
Simplification rules, rather than
exclusively to the privacy standards. It
also amends the existing rules relating
to the process for imposition of civil
money penalties. Among other matters,
the final rule clarifies and elaborates
upon the investigation process, bases for
liability, determination of the penalty
amount, grounds for waiver, conduct of
the hearing, and the appeal process.
DATES: This final rule is effective on
March 16, 2006.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Carol C. Conrad, (202) 690–1840.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On April
18, 2005, the Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS) published a
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
(proposed rule) proposing to revise the
existing rules relating to compliance
with, and enforcement of, the
Administrative Simplification
regulations (HIPAA rules) adopted by
the Secretary of Health and Human
Services (Secretary) under subtitle F of
Title II of HIPAA (HIPAA provisions).
70 FR 20224. The proposed rule also
proposed the adoption of new
provisions relating to the imposition of
civil money penalties on covered
entities that violate a HIPAA provision
or HIPAA rule. The comment period on
the proposed rule closed on June 17,
2005. Forty-nine comments, principally
from health care organizations, were
received during the comment period.
In this final rule, HHS revises existing
rules that relate to compliance with, and
enforcement of, the HIPAA rules. These
rules are codified at 45 CFR part 160,
subparts C and E. In addition, this final
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rule adds a new subpart D to part 160.
The new subpart D contains additional
rules relating to the imposition by the
Secretary of civil money penalties on
covered entities that violate the HIPAA
rules. The full set of rules to be codified
at subparts C, D, and E of 45 CFR part
160 is collectively referred to in this
final rule as the ‘‘Enforcement Rule.’’
Finally, HHS makes minor and
conforming changes to subpart A of part
160 and subpart E of part 164.
The statutory and regulatory
background of the final rule is set out
below. A description of the provisions
of the proposed rule, the public
comments, and HHS’s responses to the
comments follows. The preamble
concludes with HHS’s analyses of
impact and other issues under
applicable law.
I. Background
A. Statutory Background
Subtitle F of Title II of HIPAA,
entitled ‘‘Administrative
Simplification,’’ requires the Secretary
to adopt national standards for certain
information-related activities of the
health care industry. Under section
1173 of the Social Security Act (Act), 42
U.S.C. 1320d–2, the Secretary is
required to adopt national standards for
certain financial and administrative
transactions, code sets, the security of
health information, and certain unique
health identifiers. In addition, section
264 of HIPAA, 42 U.S.C. 1320d–2 note,
requires the Secretary to promulgate
standards to protect the privacy of
certain health information. Under
section 1172(a) of the Act, 42 U.S.C.
1320d–1(a), the provisions of Subtitle F
apply only to—
The following persons:
(1) A health plan.
(2) A health care clearinghouse.
(3) A health care provider who transmits
any health information in electronic form in
connection with a transaction referred to in
section 1173(a)(1).
These entities are collectively known
as ‘‘covered entities.’’ 1
HIPAA requires certain consultations
with industry as a predicate to the
issuance of the HIPAA standards and
provides that most covered entities have
1 An additional category of covered entities was
added by the Medicare Prescription Drug,
Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 (Pub.
L. 108–173) (MMA). As added by MMA, section
1860D–31(h)(6)(A) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 1395w–
141(h)(6)(A), provides that a prescription drug card
sponsor is a covered entity for purposes of applying
part C of title XI and all regulatory provisions
promulgated thereunder, including regulations
(relating to privacy) adopted pursuant to the
authority of the Secretary under section 264(c) of
the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act of 1996 (42 U.S.C. 1320d–2 note).
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up to 2 years (small health plans have
up to 3 years) to come into compliance
with the standards, once adopted. Act,
sections 1172(c) (42 U.S.C. 1320d–1(c)),
1175(b) (42 U.S.C. 1320d–4(b)). The
statute establishes civil money penalties
and criminal penalties for violations.
Act, sections 1176 (42 U.S.C. 1320d–5),
1177 (42 U.S.C. 1320d–6). HHS enforces
the civil money penalties, while the
U.S. Department of Justice enforces the
criminal penalties.
HIPAA’s civil money penalty
provision, section 1176(a) of the Act, 42
U.S.C. 1320d–5(a), authorizes the
Secretary to impose a civil money
penalty, as follows:
(1) IN GENERAL. Except as provided in
subsection (b), the Secretary shall impose on
any person who violates a provision of this
part [42 U.S.C. 1320d, et seq.] a penalty of
not more than $100 for each such violation,
except that the total amount imposed on the
person for all violations of an identical
requirement or prohibition during a calendar
year may not exceed $25,000.
(2) PROCEDURES. The provisions of
section 1128A [42 U.S.C. 1320a–7a] (other
than subsections (a) and (b) and the second
sentence of subsection (f)) shall apply to the
imposition of a civil money penalty under
this subsection in the same manner as such
provisions apply to the imposition of a
penalty under such section 1128A.
For simplicity, we refer throughout this
preamble to this provision, the related
provisions at section 1128A of the Act,
and other related provisions of the Act,
by their Social Security Act citations,
rather than by their U.S. Code citations.
Subsection (b) of section 1176 sets out
limitations on the Secretary’s authority
to impose civil money penalties and
also provides authority for waiving such
penalties. Under section 1176(b)(1), a
civil money penalty may not be
imposed with respect to an act that
‘‘constitutes an offense punishable’’
under the related criminal penalty
provision, section 1177 of the Act.
Under section 1176(b)(2), a civil money
penalty may not be imposed ‘‘if it is
established to the satisfaction of the
Secretary that the person liable for the
penalty did not know, and by exercising
reasonable diligence would not have
known, that such person violated the
provision.’’ Under section 1176(b)(3), a
civil money penalty may not be
imposed if the failure to comply was
due ‘‘to reasonable cause and not to
willful neglect’’ and is corrected within
a certain time. Finally, under section
1176(b)(4), a civil money penalty may
be reduced or entirely waived ‘‘to the
extent that the payment of such penalty
would be excessive relative to the
compliance failure involved.’’
As noted above, section 1176(a)
incorporates by reference certain
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provisions of section 1128A of the Act.
Those provisions, as relevant here,
establish a number of requirements with
respect to the imposition of civil money
penalties. Under section 1128A(c)(1),
the Secretary may not initiate a civil
money penalty action ‘‘later than six
years after the date’’ of the occurrence
that forms the basis for the civil money
penalty. Under section 1128A(c)(2), a
person upon whom the Secretary seeks
to impose a civil money penalty must be
given written notice and an opportunity
for a determination to be made ‘‘on the
record after a hearing at which the
person is entitled to be represented by
counsel, to present witnesses, and to
cross-examine witnesses against the
person.’’ Section 1128A also provides,
at subsections (c), (e), and (j),
respectively, requirements for: Service
of the notice and authority for sanctions
which the hearing officer may impose
for misconduct in connection with the
civil money penalty proceeding; judicial
review of the Secretary’s determination
in the United States Court of Appeals
for the circuit in which the person
resides or maintains his/its principal
place of business; and the issuance and
enforcement of subpoenas by the
Secretary. In addition, section 1128A of
the Act contains provisions relating to
liability for civil money penalties and
what measures must be taken once they
are imposed. For example, section
1128A(d) provides that the Secretary
must take into account certain factors
‘‘in determining the amount * * * of
any penalty’’; section 1128A(h) requires
certain notifications once a civil money
penalty is imposed; and section
1128A(l) makes a principal liable for
penalties ‘‘for the actions of the
principal’s agent acting within the scope
of the agency.’’ These provisions are
discussed more fully below.
B. Regulatory Background
As noted above, section 1173 of the
Act and section 264 of HIPAA require
the Secretary to adopt a number of
national standards to facilitate the
exchange, and protect the privacy and
security, of certain health information.
The Secretary has already adopted many
of these HIPAA standards by regulation.
These regulations consist of the
following: Health Insurance Reform:
Standards for Electronic Transactions
(Transactions Rule); Standards for
Privacy of Individually Identifiable
Health Information (Privacy Rule);
Health Insurance Reform: Standard
Unique Employer Identifier (EIN Rule);
Health Insurance Reform: Security
Standards (Security Rule); and HIPAA
Administrative Simplification: Standard
Unique Health Identifier for Health Care
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Providers (NPI Rule). Proposed
standards for certain claims attachments
were published on September 23, 2005
(70 FR 55990) and proposed standards
for health plan identifiers are under
development. The history of these and
related rules is described in a proposed
rule published on April 18, 2005 at 70
FR 20225–20226.
An interim final rule promulgating
procedural requirements for imposition
of civil money penalties, Civil Money
Penalties: Procedures for Investigations,
Imposition of Penalties, and Hearings
(April 17, 2003 interim final rule), was
published on April 17, 2003 (68 FR
18895), and was effective on May 19,
2003, with a sunset date of September
16, 2004 (as corrected at 68 FR 22453,
April 28, 2003). The April 17, 2003
interim final rule adopted a new subpart
E of part 160. The sunset date of the
April 17, 2003 interim final rule was
extended to September 16, 2005 on
September 15, 2004 (69 FR 55515) and
was further extended to March 16, 2006
on September 14, 2005 (70 FR 54293).
The authority for administering and
enforcing compliance with the Privacy
Rule has been delegated to the HHS
Office for Civil Rights (OCR). 65 FR
82381 (December 28, 2000). The
authority for administering and
enforcing compliance with the nonprivacy HIPAA rules has been delegated
to the HHS Centers for Medicare &
Medicaid Services (CMS). 68 FR 60694
(October 23, 2003).
II. Overview of the Proposed and Final
Rules
A. The Proposed Rule
In the proposed rule, we proposed to
bring together and adopt rules governing
the implementation of the civil money
penalty authority of section 1176 of the
Act for all of the HIPAA rules. As
previously noted, parts of the
Enforcement Rule are already in place:
subpart C of part 160 establishes certain
investigative procedures for the Privacy
Rule, and subpart E establishes interim
procedures for investigations and for the
imposition, and challenges to the
imposition, of civil money penalties for
all of the HIPAA rules. The proposed
rule would complete the Enforcement
Rule by (1) making subpart C applicable
to all of the HIPAA rules; (2) adopting
on a permanent basis most of the
provisions of subpart E; and (3)
addressing, among other issues, our
policies for determining violations and
calculating civil money penalties, how
we will address the statutory limitations
on the imposition of civil money
penalties, and various procedural
issues, such as provisions for appellate
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review within HHS of a hearing
decision, burden of proof, and
notification of other agencies of the
imposition of a civil money penalty.
Several fundamental considerations
shaped the proposed rule. First, there is
one statutory provision for imposing
civil money penalties on covered
entities that violate the HIPAA rules;
thus, the proposed rule sought to
establish a uniform enforcement and
compliance policy for all of the HIPAA
rules to minimize the potential for
confusion and burden and maximize the
potential for fairness and consistency in
enforcement. Second, the proposed rule
sought to facilitate the movement from
noncompliance to compliance by
covered entities by extending to all of
the HIPAA rules the regulatory
commitment to promoting and
encouraging voluntary compliance with
the HIPAA rules that currently applies
to the Privacy Rule, subpart C of part
160. Third, the proposed rule sought to
minimize confusion with the
procedures for investigations and
hearings by building upon pre-existing
Departmental procedures for
investigations and hearings under
section 1128A of the Act—the civil
money penalty regulations of the Office
of the Inspector General, which are
codified at 42 CFR parts 1003, 1005, and
1006 (OIG regulations). Fourth, the
proposed rule was intended to be clear
and easy to understand. Finally, the
proposed rule sought to provide the
Secretary with reasonable discretion,
particularly in areas where the exercise
of judgment is called for by the statute
or rules, and to avoid being overly
prescriptive in areas where it would be
helpful to gain experience with the
practical impact of the HIPAA rules, to
avoid unintended adverse effects.
We proposed to amend subpart A of
part 160, which contains general
provisions, to include a definition of
‘‘person.’’ With respect to subpart C of
part 160, we proposed to incorporate
several provisions currently found in
subpart E and to make subpart C
applicable to the non-privacy HIPAA
rules. We also proposed to add to part
160 a new subpart D, which would
establish rules relating to the imposition
of civil money penalties, including
those which apply whether or not there
is a hearing. We also proposed to
incorporate into subpart D several
provisions currently found in subpart E.
Proposed subpart E addressed the prehearing and hearing phases of the
enforcement process. Many of the
provisions of proposed subpart E were
adopted by the April 17, 2003 interim
final rule; we did not propose to change
them substantively, although we
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proposed to renumber them. Finally, a
conforming change to the privacy
standards in subpart E of part 164 was
proposed.
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B. The Final Rule
While the final rule adopts most of
the provisions of the proposed rule
without change, several significant
changes to certain provisions of the
proposed rule have been made in
response to comments. We do not list
variables in the final rule, as was
proposed, to count the number of
violations of an identical requirement or
prohibition; rather, the final rule
clarifies that the method for determining
the number of such violations is
grounded in the substantive
requirement or prohibition violated. In
addition, the ALJ will be able to review
the number of violations determined as
part of his or her review of the proposed
civil money penalty. The provision for
joint and several liability of the
members of an affiliated covered entity
is retained, unless it is established that
another member of the affiliated covered
entity was responsible for the violation.
While we continue to treat section
1176(b)(1) as an affirmative defense, we
provide that it may be raised at any
time. We retain the provision for
statistical sampling, but we provide
that, where statistical sampling is used,
HHS must provide a copy of the study
on which its statistical findings are
based with the notice of proposed
determination. As a corollary, we
provide that a respondent who intends
to introduce evidence of its statistical
expert at the hearing must provide the
study prepared by its expert to HHS at
least 30 days prior to the scheduled
hearing. We also provide that a
respondent will have 90, rather than 60,
days in which to file its request for
hearing. Other changes made by the
final rule are described below.
The Enforcement Rule does not adopt
standards, as that term is defined and
interpreted under Subtitle F of Title II
of HIPAA. Thus, the requirement for
industry consultations in section
1172(c) of the Act does not apply. For
the same reason, the statute’s time
frames for compliance, set forth in
section 1175 of the Act, do not apply to
the Enforcement Rule. Accordingly, the
Enforcement Rule is effective on March
16, 2006.
III. Section-by-Section Description of
the Final Rule and Response to
Comments
We received 49 comments on the
proposed rule. Many of these comments
were from associations or interest
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groups involved in the health care
industry. We also received comments
from covered entities, a state agency, a
law school class, and a number of
individuals.
While the comments addressed most
of the provisions of the proposed rule,
the following 14 sections of the
proposed rule received no comment:
proposed §§ 160.400, 160.418, 160.500,
160.502, 160.506, 160.510, 160.514,
160.524, 160.526, 160.528, 160.530,
160.532, 160.544, and 160.550. We
have, accordingly, not changed these
sections in the final rule from what was
proposed, and we do not discuss them
below. The basis and purpose of
sections that are unchanged from the
proposed rule and are not discussed
below are set out in the proposed rule
published on April 18, 2005 at 70 FR
20240–20247 and, in certain cases, in
the interim final rule published on April
17, 2003 at 68 FR 18895–18901.
A number of comments also
expressed support for particular
provisions. In most cases, we do not
discuss these comments, with which we
generally agree, below. Finally, certain
comments raised issues concerning
other HIPAA rules, such as allegations
that a particular entity had violated the
Privacy Rule or that particular
provisions of a HIPAA rule create a
hardship. Such issues are outside the
scope of this rulemaking and,
accordingly, are not addressed here.
A. Subpart A
Subpart A of the final rule adopts a
new definition of the term ‘‘person.’’
This definition is placed in § 160.103,
which contains definitions that apply to
all of the HIPAA rules. Thus, the new
definition of ‘‘person’’ applies to all of
the HIPAA rules.
Proposed rule: We proposed to amend
§ 160.103 to add a definition of the term
‘‘person’’ to replace the definition of
that term adopted by the April 17, 2003
interim final rule. We proposed to
define the term ‘‘person’’ as ‘‘a natural
person, trust or estate, partnership,
corporation, professional association or
corporation, or other entity, public or
private.’’ As more fully explained at 70
FR 20227–20228, the proposed
definition clarified, consistent with the
HIPAA provisions, that the term
includes States and other public
entities.
Final rule: The final rule adopts the
provisions of the proposed rule.
Comment: We received one comment
on this section, endorsing its
application to all of the HIPAA rules.
Response: The definition of ‘‘person’’
in the final rule remains the same as
proposed.
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B. Subpart C—Compliance and
Investigations
We amend subpart C to make the
compliance and investigation provisions
of the subpart—which at present apply
only to the Privacy Rule—apply to all of
the HIPAA rules. In addition, we
include in subpart C the definitions that
apply to subparts C, D, and E. We move
to subpart C from subpart E the
provisions relating to investigational
subpoenas and inquiries. We also add to
subpart C provisions prohibiting
intimidation or retaliation that are
currently found in the Privacy Rule but
not in the other HIPAA rules. We
change the title of this subpart to reflect
the focus of this subpart within the
larger Enforcement Rule. Aside from a
change to § 160.306 and certain minor
and conforming changes to §§ 160.300,
160.312, 160.314, and 160.316, we do
not change the substance of the existing
provisions of subpart C.
1. Section 160.300—Applicability
Proposed rule: We proposed to amend
§ 160.300 (along with § 160.304—
Principles for achieving compliance;
§ 160.306—Complaints to the Secretary;
§ 160.308—Compliance reviews; and
§ 160.310—Responsibilities of covered
entities) to make the provisions of
subpart C applicable to all of the HIPAA
rules, instead of applicable only to the
Privacy Rule. The proposed rule would
accomplish this by changing the present
references in these sections from
‘‘subpart E of part 164’’ to the more
inclusive, defined term, ‘‘administrative
simplification provision’’ or
‘‘administrative simplification
provisions,’’ as appropriate. As
explained at 70 FR 20228, the purpose
of this proposed change was to simplify
and make uniform the compliance and
enforcement process for the HIPAA
rules.
Final rule: The final rule streamlines
the provisions of the proposed rule by
substituting the term ‘‘provisions’’ for
the references to standards,
requirements, and implementation
specifications in § 160.300.
Comment: A number of comments
endorsed the approach of having
uniform compliance and enforcement
provisions for the HIPAA rules, and no
comments disagreed with this approach.
Response: The final rule retains the
policy of the proposed rule, consistent
with the expression of support for this
approach in the public comment, but
streamlines the language of the section.
Comment: A couple of comments
asked whether ‘‘affiliated entities’’ were
the same as ‘‘hybrid entities,’’ in terms
of applying the rule.
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Response: As described at
§ 164.105(b)(2)(i)(A), an affiliated
covered entity consists of ‘‘[l]egally
separate covered entities [that] designate
themselves (including any health care
component of such covered entity) as a
single affiliated covered entity * * *
[where] all of the covered entities
designated are under common
ownership or control.’’ Thus, an
affiliated covered entity is comprised of
more than one covered entity. By
contrast, a hybrid entity is defined at
§ 164.103 as ‘‘a single legal entity: (1)
That is a covered entity; (2) Whose
business activities include both covered
and non-covered functions; and (3) That
designates health care components in
accordance with [the regulation].’’ The
Privacy and Security Rules apply to any
covered entity in either arrangement.
The issue of liability for a particular
violation with respect to covered
entities in an affiliated covered entity is
discussed in connection with
§ 160.402(b) below.
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2. Section 160.302—Definitions
Proposed rule: We proposed to move
to § 160.302 three definitions that were
adopted in the April 17, 2003 interim
final rule at § 160.502: ‘‘ALJ’’
(Administrative Law Judge), ‘‘civil
money penalty or penalty’’, and
‘‘respondent.’’ We also proposed to add
to § 160.302 two terms which are used
throughout subparts C, D, and E:
‘‘administrative simplification
provision’’ and ‘‘violation’’ or ‘‘to
violate.’’ We proposed to define the
term ‘‘administrative simplification
provision’’ in § 160.302 to mean any
requirement or prohibition established
by the HIPAA provisions or HIPAA
rules: ‘‘* * * any requirement or
prohibition established by: (1) 42 U.S.C.
1320d–1320d–4, 1320d–7, and 1320d–8;
(2) Section 264 of Public Law 104–191;
or (3) This subchapter.’’ We proposed to
define a ‘‘violation’’ (or ‘‘to violate’’) to
mean a ‘‘failure to comply with an
administrative simplification
provision.’’ As more fully explained at
70 FR 20228–20229, both definitions
derive directly from the statutory
language, and both definitions function
consistently and fairly across the
various HIPAA rules.
Final rule: The final rule adopts the
provisions of the proposed rule.
a. ‘‘Administrative Simplification
Provision’’
Comment: One comment expressed
general support for the definitions.
Another comment stated that the
definition of ‘‘administrative
simplification provision’’ should be
revised to include only standards. The
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comment argued that this approach
would be more consistent with the
statute, which provides that covered
entities must comply with standards,
not requirements, prohibitions, or other
restrictions set forth in the HIPAA rules.
Response: No change is made to the
definition of ‘‘administrative
simplification provision.’’ With respect
to the second comment above, we do
not agree that the definition of this term
should be limited to standards. As
discussed at 70 FR 20229, limiting the
elements of the HIPAA rules that could
be violated to those designated as
standards would have the effect of,
among other things, insulating from
enforcement explicit statutory
requirements and prohibitions (e.g., the
prohibitions at section 1175(a) of the
Act, which the statute terms
‘‘requirements’’ and which the
Transactions Rule treats as requirements
but not standards). We do not agree that
Congress intended such an effect. We
note, moreover, that the statute
explicitly provides for the adoption of
implementation specifications. See
section 1172(d) of the Act. Furthermore,
we disagree with the contention that the
statute does not contemplate that
violations may be tied to requirements
and prohibitions: section 1176(a)(1)
speaks of ‘‘violations of an identical
requirement or prohibition.’’
Comment: Several comments argued
that this definition could lead to
multiple violations from a single act and
lead to more liability than covered
entities could reasonably expect. It also
was argued that this definition would
render almost meaningless the statutory
$25,000 cap on liability for violations of
an identical provision in a calendar
year.
Response: No examples were supplied
to illustrate the concern as to how this
definition would increase the
anticipated liability of covered entities,
so we can only respond generally. The
prohibition in § 160.404(b)(2) on
counting overlapping requirements
twice should minimize any such effect.
As for violations that might be
implicated in a single act and not be
insulated by § 160.404(b)(2), we see no
reason why they should not be
considered as separate violations, since
covered entities must comply with all
applicable requirements and
prohibitions of the HIPAA provisions
and rules. Also, the definition does not
render the statutory cap meaningless;
rather, the ‘‘requirement or prohibition’’
language of the definition is taken
directly from the part of section 1176(a)
that establishes the $25,000 statutory
cap (‘‘the total amount imposed on the
person for all violations of an identical
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requirement or prohibition for a
calendar year may not exceed $25,000’’).
Furthermore, for the reasons explained
in the preamble to the proposed rule,
none of the other possible formulations
of what constitutes a ‘‘provision of this
part’’ works uniformly and fairly across
the HIPAA rules. Thus, we retain the
definition of ‘‘administrative
simplification provision’’ as proposed.
b. ‘‘Violation’’ or ‘‘Violate’’
Comment: One comment asked how
the definition of ‘‘violation’’ would
work with the addressable components
of the Security Rule.
Response: With respect to the issue of
how this term would apply to the
addressable implementation
specifications of the Security Rule, we
provide the following guidance. Under
§ 164.306(d)(3)(ii), a covered entity must
implement an addressable
implementation specification if doing so
is ‘‘reasonable and appropriate.’’ Where
that condition is met, the addressable
implementation specification is a
requirement, and failure to implement
the addressable implementation
specification would, accordingly,
constitute a violation. Where that
condition is not met, the covered entity
must document why it would not be
reasonable and appropriate to
implement the implementation
specification and implement ‘‘an
equivalent alternative measure if
reasonable and appropriate.’’ In this
latter situation, creating the
documentation referred to is a
requirement, and implementing an
alternative measure is also a
requirement, if doing so is reasonable
and appropriate in the covered entity’s
circumstances; failure to take either
required action would, accordingly,
constitute a violation.
3. Section 160.304—Principles for
Achieving Compliance
Proposed rule: We proposed to amend
§ 160.304 to make it applicable to all of
the HIPAA rules; otherwise, we
proposed to leave the rule substantively
unchanged. Section 160.304 provides
that the Secretary will, to the extent
practicable, seek the cooperation of
covered entities in obtaining
compliance. Section 160.304 also
provides that the Secretary may provide
technical assistance to help covered
entities voluntarily comply with the
HIPAA rules.
Final rule: The final rule adopts the
provisions of the proposed rule.
Comment: Many comments supported
HHS’s approach to voluntary
compliance and the use of a complaintbased process to identify and correct
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noncompliance, on the grounds that it is
the most efficient and effective way of
obtaining compliance and realizing the
benefits of the HIPAA rules. In addition,
some contended that, given the
confusion of many covered entities with
many of the rules’ requirements, it is an
appropriate approach. However, one
comment criticized HHS’s reliance on
voluntary compliance and informal
resolution of complaints on the ground
that the statute contemplates that
violations of the HIPAA rules should be
pursued in the same manner as fraud
and abuse cases, that is, through the
formal, adversarial process provided for
by section 1128A(c). Another comment
stated that HHS’s reliance on voluntary
compliance has led to lax enforcement
and that reliance on a complaint-based
system is a fundamentally flawed
approach, particularly with respect to
enforcement of the Privacy Rule,
because HHS has provided insufficient
education to consumers, and it is
impossible for consumers to complain
about a law about which they know very
little. Several comments urged that OCR
and CMS continue to provide
educational materials and guidance to
help covered entities comply with the
HIPAA rules and to educate consumers
about their rights under the Privacy
Rule.
Response: We agree that encouraging
voluntary compliance is the most
effective and quickest way of obtaining
compliance in most cases. We do not
agree that encouraging voluntary
compliance and seeking informal
resolution of complaints in individual
cases constitutes lax enforcement or that
such an approach is inconsistent with
our statutory obligations. Our
experience to date with privacy
complaints illustrates the effectiveness
of our enforcement approach. As of
October 31, 2005, OCR had received and
initiated reviews of over 16,000 privacy
complaints from health care consumers
and others across the country. These
complaints are widespread and diverse,
not only geographically, but also with
respect to the type of entity complained
against, as well as the Privacy Rule
issues raised by the complaints.
Complaints are filed against all sizes
and types of covered entities, from solo
practitioners to hospitals and pharmacy
chains, and from health insurance
issuers to group health plans, for
example. In addition, the complaints
implicate a full range of Privacy Rule
issues, from uses and disclosures of
protected health information to
individual rights to administrative
requirements. The variation and
expansiveness of the complaints
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provide HHS with a much broader
approach to compliance than would a
compliance review system, which likely
would need to be targeted to larger
institutions and/or a smaller set of
concerns. Further, our experience with
these cases—68 percent have been
resolved or otherwise closed to date—
indicates that generally we are receiving
good cooperation from covered entities
in quickly addressing compliance
problems. Such resolutions bring the
benefits of the HIPAA rules to
consumers far more quickly than would
a formalized, adversarial process, which
would also be time-consuming and
costly for both sides.
We also do not agree that the statute
contemplates only a formalized,
adversarial process; rather, it only
requires such a process where a
proposed civil money penalty is
contested. It is important to note,
moreover, that section 1176
contemplates that we would work with
covered entities to help them achieve
compliance, even when there is an
allegation that the covered entity is in
violation of the rules. Section 1176
provides that a civil money penalty may
not be imposed if the failure to comply
was due to reasonable cause and not
willful neglect and is corrected within
a certain period of time after the covered
entity knew or should have known of
the compliance failure, and that the
Secretary may, in some circumstances,
provide technical assistance to the
covered entity during that period.
Further, an approach that is primarily
complaint-based does not limit our
ability to perform compliance reviews
when appropriate, and this has, in fact,
occurred. We will continue to review
the effectiveness of our enforcement
approach and revise it, if needed.
Notwithstanding our above approach,
however, we will resort to civil money
penalties, as needed, for matters that
cannot be resolved by informal means.
Further, we disagree that persons
affected by the Privacy Rule and the
other HIPAA rules are unaware of their
rights, as evidenced by the large number
of complaints that HHS has received
from consumers and covered and other
entities. HHS has an ongoing program of
providing information to the public and
guidance to covered entities through the
Internet, public speaking and
educational events, and toll-free call-in
lines. The millions of hits to our Web
sites—https://www.hhs.gov/ocr/hipaa for
the Privacy Rule and https://
www.cms.gov/hipaa/hipaa2 for the
other HIPAA rules—suggest that
covered entities and the public are
increasingly aware of the application of
the HIPAA rules to their business
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activities and lives, respectively, and are
able to access the information we have
made available. In addition, the
American Health Information
Management Association issued the
results of their latest compliance survey
in a report entitled ‘‘The State of HIPAA
Privacy and Security Compliance, April
2005,’’ which indicated, with respect to
the Privacy Rule, that over two-thirds of
all hospital and health system patients
had some or a complete understanding
of their rights and the facility’s
responsibilities. Nonetheless, while
such evidence is encouraging, we
recognize that HHS must remain active
in providing outreach and public
education. We are committed to doing
so, and thus, continue to develop
educational material for consumers and
industry guidance for covered entities.
Comment: One comment suggested
that the Secretary commit to providing
technical assistance to covered entities.
Response: We do not agree that the
provision of technical assistance should
be mandated. The statute (at section
1176(b)(3)(B)(ii)) makes the provision of
technical assistance discretionary if the
Secretary determines that the
compliance failure was due to the
covered entity’s inability to comply.
While OCR and CMS provide technical
assistance in many cases, it is not
necessary in all instances to provide
such assistance in order to obtain
compliance. Thus, it is inappropriate to
mandate the provision of technical
assistance.
Comment: One comment suggested
amending § 160.304(b) to require
ongoing reporting of complaints and
resolutions to the healthcare industry.
The goal in requiring reporting would
be to educate covered entities regarding
complaints that are found to be actual
violations and encourage them to review
their compliance. The comment stated
that the current reports made by OCR to
the National Committee on Vital and
Health Statistics are not helpful since
they only report the volume of
complaints, not the nature of the
complaints or whether a violation
occurred.
Response: We do not believe
mandatory reporting of complaints and
resolutions is necessary. Both CMS and
OCR currently have the ability to report
to the public, including the healthcare
industry, about complaints and their
resolutions, and do so in summary form.
We continue to present summaries of
actions on complaints in various fora,
including in public presentations,
testimony, and in written documents.
Our enforcement experience also
informs our development of FAQs and
guidance documents to explain certain
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provisions and how to comply with
them. In any event, covered entities
should use their own internal complaint
processes and experience to assess and
improve their compliance and ability to
serve the needs of their customers.
Comment: One comment suggested
that the informal resolution process
should allow HHS to render opinions on
a covered entity’s interpretation of the
HIPAA rules. The comment expressed
concern that a covered entity would not
be able to resolve a compliance issue
during the informal resolution process if
it made a good faith, but incorrect,
interpretation of a HIPAA rule. The
comment suggested allowing HHS to
render an opinion on the entity’s
interpretation to facilitate the informal
resolution of compliance problems.
Response: As a general matter, we do
not issue advisory opinions, but the
informal resolution process will provide
covered entities with information about
HHS’s interpretation of the HIPAA
rules. Covered entities may also find
guidance as to the proper interpretation
of a HIPAA rule in the FAQs posted on
the HHS website and technical
assistance offered to the covered entities
by HHS. Covered entities may also
submit questions to HHS for
consideration with respect to future
FAQs and guidance.
4. Section 160.306—Complaints to the
Secretary
Proposed rule: Section 160.306
provides for investigations of covered
entities by the Secretary. It also outlines
the procedure and requirements for
filing a complaint against a covered
entity. For example, it provides that a
complaint must name the person that is
the subject of the complaint and
describe the acts or omissions believed
to be violations. It also requires that
complaints be filed within 180 days of
when the complainant knew or should
have known that the act or omission
occurred, unless this time limit is
waived for good cause. The proposed
rule would have amended this section
to apply it to all of the HIPAA rules,
rather than exclusively to the Privacy
Rule, but otherwise proposed no
substantive changes to the section.
Final rule: The final rule adopts the
provisions of the proposed rule, except
that proposed § 160.306(c) is revised to
require the Secretary to describe the
basis of the complaint in the first
written communication with the
covered entity about the complaint.
Comment: One comment asked for
clarification on when a complaint will
be considered to have been timely filed
in situations when a complainant
should have known of the violation,
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thus triggering the 180-day time period
for filing a complaint.
Response: Deciding whether or not a
complaint was properly filed within the
180-day period will need to be
determined in each case. For example,
an individual who is informed through
an accounting of disclosures that his or
her health information was
impermissibly disclosed would be
considered to know of the violation at
the time the individual receives the
accounting. In any event, however, the
180-day period can be waived for good
cause shown.
Comment: Two comments suggested
that HHS be required to inform a
covered entity of the specific basis for
an investigation or compliance review.
These comments suggested the best way
to accomplish this goal would be to
send a copy of the complaint to the
covered entity. The comments stated
that, without specific information as to
the basis of the complaint, a covered
entity will not be able to properly
respond to the agency’s request for
information.
Response: Both CMS and OCR
currently provide the basis for an
investigation in the first written
communication with a covered entity
about a complaint. This policy will
continue to be followed, and the final
rule is revised to require it. It should be
noted that provision of a description of
the basis for the complaint does not
circumscribe the investigation, if the
investigation subsequently uncovers
other compliance issues with respect to
the covered entity.
We disagree that sending a copy of the
complaint is necessary for a covered
entity to adequately respond to the
Secretary’s inquiries. As noted above,
covered entities receive a description of
the basis for the complaint. Other
information contained in the complaint,
such as the complainant’s identity, is
not always relevant to the investigation.
In some cases, in fact, it may be
necessary to withhold such information
to, for example, protect the
complainant’s privacy. In instances
where it is necessary to provide the
complainant’s identity in order for the
covered entity to properly respond to
the investigation, the complainant is so
informed before this information is
released to the covered entity.
Comment: One comment suggested
that the rule be revised to require that
a complaint include the name of the
covered entity that is the subject of the
complaint.
Response: The rule, both as proposed
and as adopted below, already requires
that a complaint ‘‘name the person that
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is the subject of the complaint.’’ See
§ 160.306(b)(2).
Comment: In one comment, a covered
entity complained that it had expended
a great deal of time and money
defending itself against what turned out
to be a false allegation and asked that
HHS put more effort into gathering
detailed information from complainants
and helping covered entities respond to
complaints. Another comment criticized
the rule for providing no way of
sanctioning a person bringing a
negligent or malicious complaint.
Response: We understand that it may
take time and effort to establish that an
allegation is unfounded. When
complaints are received, we make every
effort to determine if the complaint is
legitimate, so as not to place undue
burdens on covered entities. Further,
covered entities are encouraged
promptly to contact the OCR or CMS
investigators handling their complaints
to discuss the allegations once notice of
an investigation is received by the
covered entity. Doing so should help a
covered entity avoid the expenditure of
unnecessary time and funds on
defending itself against baseless
complaints. The statute provides no
basis for our penalizing a person for
bringing a negligent or malicious
complaint, although remedies may exist
at common law. However, as discussed
below in connection with § 160.316,
lack of good faith would typically be a
matter that is looked at in the course of
investigating a complaint.
Comment: One comment suggested
that only individuals or personal
representatives should have standing to
file a complaint. The comment takes the
position that one covered entity should
not be able to bring a complaint against
another.
Response: We disagree. The purpose
of the complaint process is to bring
violations to the attention of HHS, so
that any noncompliance with the
HIPAA rules may be corrected.
Particularly with respect to the
Transactions Rule, the persons or
entities that are likely to be
disadvantaged by the noncompliance of
a covered entity are other covered
entities. It would, accordingly, be
inconsistent with the purpose of the
complaint process to exclude such
entities from it.
Comment: Two comments suggested
that HHS be required to notify covered
entities of a complaint within a
specified time-frame.
Response: OCR and CMS make every
effort to notify covered entities of
complaints on a timely basis. However,
we do not include a specific deadline
for notifying covered entities of
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complaints in the rule. The time needed
to determine whether a complaint states
issues that should be investigated can
vary greatly, while fluctuations in the
volume of complaints and other
workload demands may also make
meeting a specific deadline problematic.
Comment: One comment suggested
that § 160.306(a)(2) should be amended
to require that ‘‘uses or disclosures’’ be
described in the complaint rather than
‘‘acts or omissions.’’
Response: The suggested change
would not be appropriate. The
provisions of this rule apply to all of the
HIPAA rules, not just the Privacy Rule;
the other HIPAA rules regulate actions
other than uses and disclosures of
protected health information. Moreover,
even under the Privacy Rule, a violation
may occur where no impermissible use
or disclosure of protected health
information has occurred. Failure to
comply with a notice requirement under
§ 164.520 is an example of a violation
that does not involve a use or disclosure
of protected health information.
Comment: One comment suggested
that the Secretary should be required to
investigate all complaints and that
failure to do so is inconsistent with
section 1176(a) of the Act, which
compels the Secretary to impose
penalties for violations unless a
statutory limitation applies. Imposing a
deadline for beginning investigations
was also suggested.
Response: The decision to investigate
a complaint is based on the facts
presented. Not all complaints need to be
investigated. For example, in our
experience, a substantial percentage of
privacy complaints allege facts that fall
outside of OCR’s jurisdiction under
HIPAA—e.g., an action prior to the
compliance date of the Privacy Rule or
an action by an entity not covered by
the Rule. Revising the rule to require the
Secretary to investigate all complaints
would be counterproductive and lead to
an inefficient allocation of enforcement
resources. Similarly, imposing a
deadline for beginning an investigation
is unrealistic: Some investigations may
turn out to be more time-consuming
than anticipated, delaying the start of
other investigations. It is necessary to
provide OCR and CMS with the
flexibility to deal with variations in
circumstances and resource constraints.
5. Section 160.308—Compliance
Reviews
Proposed rule: The proposed rule
provided that the Secretary may
conduct compliance reviews to
determine whether covered entities are
complying with the applicable
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administrative simplification
provisions.
Final rule: The final rule adopts the
provisions of the proposed rule.
Comment: Several comments asked
HHS to outline the circumstances under
which a compliance review would be
undertaken or asked that the
compliance review provision be
eliminated from the rule. One comment
suggested that compliance reviews be
limited to evidence-based reviews.
These comments expressed concern that
the rule does not specifically define
when a compliance review will be
undertaken.
Response: Compliance reviews are
conducted at the discretion of the
Secretary. Outlining specific instances
in which a compliance review will be
conducted could have the
counterproductive effect of skewing
compliance efforts toward those aspects
of compliance that had been identified
as likely to result in a compliance
review. It also does not seem advisable
to limit, by rule, the circumstances
under which such reviews may be
conducted at this early stage of the
enforcement program, when our
knowledge of the types of violations that
may arise is necessarily limited. We also
do not agree that the provision for
compliance reviews should be
eliminated. There are situations where
instances of potential noncompliance
come to HHS’s attention outside of the
complaint process (e.g., where media
reports suggest that a violation has
occurred), and HHS must have clear
authority to investigate such situations.
Comment: A number of comments
suggested that HHS detail the
compliance review process and rules for
notification of covered entities when
they are being reviewed.
Response: The rule already contains
procedures to be followed, and
requirements to be met, that apply to
compliance reviews. See §§ 160.304,
160.310, 160.312, 160.314, and 160.316.
It is unnecessary to establish procedures
comparable to the complaint filing
procedures of § 160.306 for compliance
reviews, since they are initiated by
HHS. The concerns expressed by most
of the comments on this topic—that
HHS would undertake a compliance
review without notice to the covered
entity and without specifying the basis
for, or the focus of, the review—are
misplaced. Section 160.312 requires
HHS to attempt to resolve violations
found in a compliance review by
informal means and to inform the
covered entity in writing if a
compliance review is or is not resolved
by informal means. Failing to notify the
covered entity of a compliance review
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or the basis for such a review is not
consistent with our practice generally
and would be unlikely to yield much
information of use, resulting in an
ineffective use of the covered entity’s
and the agency’s resources.
Comment: One comment suggests that
compliance reviews should be
mandatory and should be initiated
within a specified time period.
Response: The rule, as proposed and
adopted, does not preclude establishing
a compliance review program or
schedule, but it does not require it
either. One purpose of compliance
reviews is to permit investigation when
allegations or situations warranting
investigation come to our attention
outside of the complaint process. The
necessity for a compliance review in a
particular case or a program of
scheduled compliance reviews is
inherently unpredictable, and it is
important to retain the administrative
flexibility to address such situations.
Mandating compliance reviews on a
fixed basis or schedule would be an
inefficient allocation of limited
enforcement resources and would
hamper the agency’s ability to target
resources at actual noncompliance
problems as they arise.
Comment: One comment suggested
that the rule contain provisions
outlining the coordination and
cooperation between CMS and OCR
when a compliance review under more
than one rule occurs.
Response: As with complaint-based
investigations, CMS and OCR will
coordinate and allocate responsibility
for compliance reviews based upon the
HIPAA provisions involved and the
facts of the case. We do not consider it
advisable to specify detailed rules in
this regard, as the allocation of function
and responsibility will depend on the
facts of each case and the resources
available at the time.
6. Section 160.310—Responsibilities of
Covered Entities
Proposed rule: Section 160.310
addresses the responsibilities of a
covered entity, such as providing
records and compliance reports to the
Secretary and cooperating during a
compliance review or complaint
investigation. Section 160.310(c)
provides that a covered entity must
permit HHS to have access during
normal business hours to its facilities,
books, records, and other information
necessary to determine compliance, but
provides that if the Secretary determines
that ‘‘exigent circumstances exist, such
as when documents may be hidden or
destroyed,’’ the covered entity must
permit access at any time without
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notice. Section 160.310 also requires
that the Secretary may not disclose
protected health information obtained
by the Secretary in the course of an
investigation or compliance review
except when necessary to ascertaining
or enforcing compliance or as otherwise
required by law. The proposed rule
would amend this section to apply it to
all of the HIPAA rules, rather than
exclusively to the Privacy Rule, but
otherwise proposed no substantive
changes to the section.
Final rule: The final rule adopts the
provisions of the proposed rule.
Comment: A couple of comments
asked HHS either to further define
‘‘exigent circumstances,’’ such as by
limiting it to situations involving
national security or by inserting specific
examples of exigent circumstances in
§ 160.310(c)(1). One comment suggested
that the rule be revised to require that
the Secretary’s determination that
‘‘exigent circumstances’’ exist be a
‘‘reasonable’’ one.
Response: The determination of what
constitutes ‘‘exigent circumstances’’ will
inevitably be fact-dependent. Specific
language defining ‘‘exigent
circumstances’’ is unnecessary, as the
rule already provides a clarifying
example and the principle underlying
the provision is reasonably universal.
We note that limiting the provision to
situations where matters of national
security are involved would most likely
not cover the types of situations the
provision is intended to cover—
situations in which it is likely that the
covered entity will seek to conceal or
destroy evidence of noncompliance that
HHS needs to carry out its statutory
obligation to enforce the HIPAA rules.
Comment: Two comments asked for
further guidance and notice of record
retention requirements and another
comment expressed concerns with the
record retention requirements of the
Privacy Rule.
Response: Record retention
requirements applicable to the Privacy
and Security Rules are spelled out in
those rules; see, § 164.530(j) and
§ 164.316(b), respectively. We do not
address these record retention
requirements here, as this topic lies
outside the scope of this rule.
The other HIPAA rules do not contain
explicit record retention requirements,
as such. However, it is likely that the
documentation that would be relevant
to showing compliance with those
rules—such as health plan instructions
to providers, software documentation,
contracts, and systems processes—is
kept as part of normal business
practices. Covered entities should
consider any other applicable laws,
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such as state law, in making such
decisions.
7. Section 160.312—Secretarial Action
Regarding Complaints and Compliance
Reviews
Proposed rule: We proposed to revise
§ 160.312(a) to require that, where
noncompliance is indicated, the
Secretary would seek to reach by
informal means a resolution of the
matter that is satisfactory to the
Secretary. Informal means could include
demonstrated compliance, or a
completed corrective action plan or
other agreement. We proposed to revise
§ 160.312(a)(2) to require, where
noncompliance is indicated and the
matter is resolved by informal means,
that HHS notify the covered entity in
writing and, if the matter arose from a
complaint, the complainant. Where
noncompliance is indicated and the
matter is not resolved by informal
means, proposed § 160.312(a)(3)(i)
would require the Secretary to so inform
the covered entity and provide the
covered entity an opportunity to submit,
within 30 days of receipt of such
notification, written evidence of any
mitigating factors or affirmative
defenses. To avoid confusion with the
notice of proposed determination
process provided for at proposed
§ 160.420, proposed § 160.312(a)(3)(ii)
provided that, where the matter is not
resolved by informal means and the
Secretary finds that imposition of a civil
money penalty is warranted, the formal
finding would be contained in the
notice of proposed determination issued
under proposed § 160.420. We proposed
to leave § 160.312(b) substantively
unchanged.
Final rule: The final rule adopts the
provisions of the proposed rule.
Comment: One comment suggested
that covered entities should be able to
appeal the Secretary’s findings during
the informal resolution process and that
the Secretary’s decision to resolve a
matter informally should not preclude
the respondent from questioning the
Secretary’s interpretation or application
of the rule in question.
Response: The purpose of the
informal resolution process described in
§ 160.312 is to bring closure at an early
stage to a matter where compliance is in
issue and, thus, to obviate the need to
issue a notice of proposed
determination. Section 160.312
recognizes, however, that informal
resolutions will not always be achieved.
Where the agency and the covered
entity are not able to resolve the matter
informally, HHS (through OCR and/or
CMS) will make a finding of
noncompliance pursuant to § 160.420,
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which the covered entity may then
challenge through the applicable
procedures of subparts D and E. Nothing
in the rule compels the covered entity
to challenge the finding of
noncompliance under § 160.420, but if
the covered entity wishes to challenge
such a finding, including the agency’s
interpretation or application of a rule, it
must do so through the procedural
avenue provided by subparts D and E.
These procedures implement the
requirement of section 1128A(c) of the
Act that the Secretary may not make an
adverse determination against a person
until the person has been given written
notice and an opportunity for a hearing
on the record on the adverse
determination.
Comment: One comment asked how
informal resolution is possible, given
HHS’s position that, where a violation is
found, a CMP must be imposed.
Another comment expressed concern
that the informal resolution process
would allow covered entities to skirt
penalties and the consequences of
noncompliance with the HIPAA rules
and suggested that the Secretary should
not be compelled to reach a resolution
through informal processes.
Response: These comments
misunderstand our position as to the
mandatory nature of the statute. The
Secretary must impose a civil money
penalty where a formal determination of
a violation is made. However, many
opportunities exist prior to this
determination that allow the Secretary
to exercise his discretion to not impose
a penalty. This issue is discussed more
fully in connection with § 160.402
below.
The second comment above also
misconstrues § 160.312. Nothing in that
section compels OCR or CMS to resolve
matters informally. Indeed,
§ 160.312(a)(3) describes the actions to
be taken ‘‘[i]f the matter is not resolved
by informal means * * *’’.
Comment: One comment suggested
that HHS and the covered entity should
be required to put the informal
resolution in writing.
Response: Both § 160.312(a)(2) and
§ 160.312(b) require that the resolutions
contemplated in those sections be ‘‘in
writing.’’ CMS and OCR currently
document informal resolutions.
Comment: One comment suggested
that the 30-day time period for a
covered entity to submit to the Secretary
evidence of mitigating factors or
affirmative defenses should be
extended.
Response: Thirty days should be
sufficient for a covered entity to submit
such evidence. The opportunity to
provide additional evidence comes at
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the end of investigation, and the
covered entity should be gathering any
evidence of mitigating factors or
affirmative defenses during the
investigation. In addition, the covered
entity will have the opportunity to
present such evidence to the ALJ if it
chooses to appeal the Secretary’s
findings. Accordingly, we do not change
this provision.
Comment: One comment suggested
that a deadline should be imposed for
HHS to notify the covered entity of its
findings after an investigation.
Response: The time needed to finalize
the agency’s findings will depend on the
complexity of the case, its outcome, and
workload considerations. As these
factors are inherently variable and
unpredictable, we do not believe it
would be advisable to impose fixed
deadlines for taking the actions
described in § 160.312.
Comment: One comment requested
clarification of proposed
§ 160.312(a)(3)(ii), with respect to what
action is referred to and the associated
time frame.
Response: The action referred to is
HHS’s notification of the covered entity
of its finding of noncompliance when it
determines that the matter cannot be
resolved informally. Section
160.312(a)(3)(ii) provides that, if HHS
decides to impose a civil money
penalty, it will send a notice of
proposed determination to the covered
entity pursuant to § 160.420. Thus, the
intent of this provision is to clarify that,
once OCR and/or CMS, as applicable,
has determined that a violation has
occurred, the matter cannot be resolved
informally in a manner that is
satisfactory to OCR and/or CMS, and a
civil money penalty should be imposed,
the agency’s next step is to provide the
formal notice required by section
1128A(c)(1), which in this rule is the
notice of proposed determination under
§ 160.420. The rule imposes no specific
deadline on the agency for sending this
notice. However, it should be noted that
if the notice is not sent within six years
of the violation, pursuit of the civil
money penalty would be precluded by
section 1128A(c)(1), which is
implemented in this rule by § 160.414.
Comment: One comment requested
that § 160.312(a)(3) be revised to afford
complainants the opportunity to
express, in writing, the impact of the
violation.
Response: The suggested change is
unnecessary, since nothing in the rule
precludes a complainant from providing
such information to the agency at any
point in the process. Complainants
frequently describe, in their complaints
or in the course of OCR’s or CMS’s
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initial contacts with the complainants,
the impact of the alleged violation. HHS
also may request such information from
the complainant where, for example, it
bears on the amount of the penalty to be
imposed.
8. Section 160.314—Investigational
Subpoenas and Inquiries
Proposed rule: The text of proposed
§ 160.314 was adopted by the April 17,
2003 interim final rule as § 160.504. We
proposed to move this section to subpart
C, consistent with our overall approach
of organizing subparts C, D, and E to
reflect the stages of the enforcement
process. We proposed to include in the
introductory language of proposed
§ 160.314(a) a sentence which states
that, for the purposes of paragraph (a),
a person other than a natural person is
termed an ‘‘entity.’’ We proposed not to
modify § 160.314(b)(1), (2) and (8) from
the provisions of the April 17, 2003
interim final rule at paragraphs (b)(1)–
(3) of § 160.504. However, we proposed
to add new paragraphs (3) through (7)
and (9) to § 160.314(b) and also to add
a new paragraph (c). The proposed new
paragraphs at §§ 160.314(b)(3)–(b)(7)
would permit representatives of HHS to
attend and ask questions at the inquiry,
give a witness the opportunity to clarify
his answers on the record after being
questioned by HHS, require any
objections or claims of privilege to be
asserted on the record, and permit HHS
to seek enforcement of the subpoena
through the federal district court if a
witness refuses to answer nonprivileged questions or produce
requested documents or items. Further,
proposed § 160.314(c) provided that,
consistent with § 160.310, testimony
and other evidence obtained in an
investigational inquiry may be used by
HHS in any of its activities and may be
used or offered into evidence in any
administrative or judicial proceeding.
Together, these additions would clarify
the manner in which investigational
inquiries will be conducted, and how
testimony given, and evidence obtained,
during such an investigation may be
used.
Final rule: The final rule adopts the
provisions of the proposed rule, except
that paragraph (a) is revised to clarify
that investigational subpoenas may
issue when a compliance review is
conducted.
Comment: A few comments requested
that this section provide for the
protection of privileged documents
when subpoenaed by the Secretary.
Comments also suggested that covered
entities should have the ability to
challenge a subpoena issued by the
Secretary.
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Response: The rule, as proposed and
adopted, provides a process for a
subpoenaed witness to challenge the
subpoena and/or assert privilege. Under
section 205(e) of the Act, made
applicable by section 1128A(j)(1) of the
Act, the federal district court in which
a person charged with contumacy or
refusal to obey a subpoena resides or
transacts business has jurisdiction upon
application of HHS. As provided in
§ 160.314(a)(5), HHS may seek to
enforce the subpoena in such cases
through action in the relevant federal
district court, which would presumably
hear the basis for the witness’s refusal
to obey or claim of privilege in
connection with a motion to quash
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(c)(3). (28 U.S.C.
Appendix).
Comment: Several comments
requested that the scope of the
subpoenas issued by the Secretary be
limited to the investigation and that the
Secretary not be allowed to pursue
open-ended inquiries.
Response: Section 205(d) of the Act,
which is made applicable by section
1128A(j)(1), provides that a subpoena
may issue for ‘‘the production of any
evidence that relates to any matter
under investigation or in question
before [the Secretary].’’ Moreover, the
federal courts subject the exercise of an
agency’s administrative subpoena
authority to a reasonableness analysis.
In U.S. v. Powell, 397 U.S. 481 (1964),
the holding of which was extended to
all administrative subpoena authorities
in Securities and Exchange Commission
v. Jerry T. O’Brien, Inc., 467 U.S. 735,
741–42 (1984), the U.S. Supreme Court
articulated a standard for the judicial
review of administrative subpoenas that
requires that the investigation be
conducted pursuant to a legitimate
purpose and that the information
requested under the subpoena is
relevant to that purpose. HHS is
required to comply with this standard in
the exercise of the subpoena authority
under this section.
Comment: One comment asked that
covered entities be given notice of
investigational inquiries directed at
them.
Response: In general, we would
expect that an investigational subpoena
would be used where a covered entity
has failed to respond to HHS’s requests
for information in the course of an
investigation conducted under
§ 160.306. In such a case, the covered
entity will have been previously
notified of the investigation pursuant to
§ 160.306(c). Similarly, a subpoena
would typically be issued in connection
with a compliance review under
§ 160.308 where the covered entity had
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failed to respond to HHS’s prior
requests for information. Thus, we do
not expect the element of surprise to be
present, which appears to be the
concern underlying these comments.
We clarify in § 160.314(a) that this
section also applies to compliance
reviews.
Comment: One comment suggested
that § 160.314(a) be revised to state that
the admissibility of written statements
obtained by HHS during an
investigational inquiry is subject to 45
CFR 160.518 and 160.538.
Response: We do not consider the
suggested language necessary. Sections
160.518 and 160.538 apply to the
exchange and admission of written
statements. Should OCR or CMS seek to
have written statements obtained during
an investigation admitted into evidence,
those statements would be subject to the
requirements of §§ 160.518 and 160.538.
Comment: One comment asked for
clarification as to who may amend a
transcript and whether the Secretary has
the discretion to limit a witness’s
amendment of his or her testimony
transcript.
Response: Under § 160.314(b)(9), both
sides may propose corrections to the
transcript, and any proposed corrections
are attached to the transcript; the
transcript itself is not altered. Section
160.314(b)(9)(i) provides that, if a
witness is provided with a copy of the
transcript, the witness may submit
written proposed corrections to the
transcript, or, if the witness is afforded
only the opportunity to inspect the
transcript, the witness may propose
corrections to the transcript at the time
of inspection. In either case, the
witness’s proposed corrections are
attached to the transcript. Similarly,
under § 160.314(b)(9)(ii), the Secretary’s
proposed corrections are attached to the
transcript. The purpose of the proposed
corrections is to make the transcript
‘‘true and accurate.’’ See
§ 160.314(b)(9)(i). Under this process,
then, HHS would not be changing the
witness’s proposed corrections; HHS
would, at most, be proposing different
corrections.
Comment: One comment suggested
that § 160.314 be revised to require HHS
to provide for the same protection of
protected health information that is
required of covered entities when HHS
receives protected health information
during an investigation.
Response: Section 160.310(c)(3)
explicitly protects the confidentiality of
protected health information received
by HHS ‘‘in connection with an
investigation or compliance review
under this subpart.’’ Although these
protections are not the same as those
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required of covered entities with respect
to protected health information, in some
respects they are more stringent, given
the limited circumstances for which the
information may be disclosed under this
provision. Because § 160.314 is now
part of the subpart, the restriction of
§ 160.310(c)(3) applies to protected
health information received during an
investigational inquiry. See § 160.314(c),
which provides that testimony and
other evidence obtained in an
investigational inquiry may only be
used ‘‘[c]onsistent with § 160.310(c)(3)
* * *’’.
Comment: One comment asked for
clarification of the ‘‘good cause’’
limitation on a witness’s ability to
inspect the official transcript of their
testimony.
Response: This provision derives from
the Administrative Procedure Act,
which requires, at 5 U.S.C. 555(c), that
‘‘[a] person compelled to submit data or
evidence is entitled to retain or, on
payment of lawfully prescribed costs,
procure a copy or transcript thereof,
except that in a nonpublic investigatory
proceeding the witness may for good
cause be limited to inspection of the
official transcript of his testimony.’’ The
‘‘good cause’’ language of this provision
has been explained as follows:
The * * * grant[] to agencies of the right
to inhibit access to testimony in nonpublic
investigatory proceedings were in recognition
that such investigations, ‘‘like those of a
grand jury, might be thwarted in certain cases
if not kept secret, and that if witnesses were
given a copy of their transcript, suspected
violators would be in a better position to
tailor their own testimony to that of the
previous testimony, and to threaten witness
about to testify with economic or other
reprisals.’’
LaMorte v. Mansfield, 438 F.2d 448, 451
(2d Cir. 1971) (quoting Commercial
Capital Corp. v. S.E.C., 360 F.2d 856,
858 (7th Cir. 1966)).
Comment: Several comments
suggested that evidence obtained during
an investigation by HHS should be used
only within the scope of that
investigation, not for other matters, as
provided for by § 160.314(c).
Response: Section 160.314(c) mirrors
the OIG rule. The concept that HHS may
use evidence obtained in an
investigation for matters outside the
scope of the investigation is not novel.
While we would expect to be careful in
using such information for other
purposes, we are legally obligated to
take appropriate action if we obtain
clear evidence of wrongdoing.
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9. Section 160.316—Refraining From
Intimidation or Retaliation
Proposed rule: Proposed § 160.316,
which was taken from § 164.530(g)(2) of
the Privacy Rule, would prohibit
covered entities from threatening,
intimidating, coercing, discriminating
against, or taking any other retaliatory
action against individuals or other
persons (including other covered
entities) who complain to HHS or
otherwise assist or cooperate in the
enforcement processes created by this
rule. The intent of this addition to
subpart C was to make these nonretaliation provisions applicable to all of
the HIPAA rules, not just the Privacy
Rule. A conforming change to
§ 164.530(g) of the Privacy Rule was
proposed, to cross-reference proposed
§ 160.316.
Final rule: The final rule adopts the
provisions of the proposed rule, except
that the verb ‘‘harass’’ is inserted in the
introductory language of this section.
The related revision to § 164.530(g) is
adopted without change.
Comment: Two comments asked HHS
to strengthen the prohibition on
retaliation and intimidation. The
comments express concern that the
current provision is not a sufficient
deterrence to covered entities,
particularly payers. One comment
suggested that the language be revised to
read in pertinent part as follows: ‘‘A
covered entity may not threaten * * *
including not threaten to reduce or
eliminate payment, intimidate, coerce,
harass, discriminate against, or take any
other retaliatory action against any
individual or other person * * *
including suspending or terminating
participation in a Medicaid program
and/or in any other program or network
or reducing or eliminating payment for
* * *’’. Another comment suggested
that persons who engage in prohibited
retaliation or intimidation should be
considered to have ‘‘knowingly’’
violated the statute and be subject to
criminal penalties under section 1177 of
the Act.
Response: We agree with the
comment that the actions covered in the
suggested language would constitute
intimidation or retaliation under the
appropriate facts, but we think that such
claims may be made under the existing
language. However, while harassment is
encompassed by the phrase ‘‘other
retaliatory action’’ in this section, since
harassment is a form of pressure that is
sufficiently different from, and as
objectionable as, the other intimidating
or retaliatory acts that are specifically
mentioned, we clarify the section by
including it in the text of the regulation;
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the text of the final rule is revised
accordingly.
The statute does not make retaliation
or intimidation the subject of a criminal
penalty under section 1177, and we
cannot expand the scope of the criminal
provision by regulation. Accordingly,
we do not adopt this suggestion.
Comment: One comment suggested
amending the section to require that a
complaint be filed in good faith under
§ 160.306 and that the same change be
made to the remaining language in
proposed § 164.530(g). The comment
stated that covered entities should not
be prohibited from firing employees
who file false complaints and that
covered health care providers should
not be prohibited from terminating the
provider-patient relationship where the
patient files a false complaint.
Response: The good faith of a
complainant is currently evaluated by
OCR to the extent it bears upon
determining whether a compliance
failure appears to have occurred and the
extent to which the complaint should be
investigated. We do not read the rule as
prohibiting the firing of an employee or
the termination of a provider-patient
relationship where other legitimate
grounds for such action exist; whether
such grounds exist would be a matter to
be ascertained in the course of the
investigation.
Comment: Two comments asked HHS
to provide examples of retaliation and/
or outline procedures or criteria for how
the occurrence of retaliation will be
investigated and determined. One
comment asked that the rule stipulate
that an act be considered to be one of
retaliation or intimidation only if it
occurred after the filing of a complaint.
Response: Complaints regarding
retaliation or intimidation will be
handled in the same manner as
investigations regarding other possible
violations of the HIPAA rule, as
§ 160.316 is considered an
administrative simplification provision
for the purposes of imposing a civil
money penalty. Because such situations
are likely to be quite varied and
factually complex, we are reluctant to
preclude consideration of events prior
to the filing of a complaint that may be
relevant to a claim of retaliation or
intimidation. We, thus, retain the
language as proposed.
C. Subpart D—Imposition of Civil
Money Penalties
Subpart D of the final rule addresses
the issuance of a notice of proposed
determination to impose a civil money
penalty and other actions that are
relevant thereafter, whether or not a
hearing is requested following the
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issuance of the notice of proposed
determination. It also contains
provisions on identifying violations,
calculating civil money penalties for
such violations, and establishing
affirmative defenses to the imposition of
civil money penalties. It, thus,
implements the provisions of section
1176, as well as related provisions of
section 1128A. As noted above, many
provisions of subpart D are based in
large part upon the OIG regulations, but
we adapt the language of the OIG
regulations to reflect issues presented
by, or the authority underlying, the
HIPAA rules.
1. Section 160.402—Basis for a Civil
Money Penalty
Section 160.402 sets forth the rules
concerning the basis for liability for a
civil money penalty. It includes the
rules for determining liability if more
than one covered entity is responsible
for a violation and where an agent of a
covered entity is responsible for a
violation.
a. Section 160.402(a)—General Rule
Proposed rule: Proposed § 160.402(a)
would require the Secretary to impose a
civil money penalty on any covered
entity which the Secretary determines
has violated an administrative
simplification provision, unless the
covered entity establishes that an
affirmative defense, as provided for by
§ 160.410, exists. This provision is
based on the language in section 1176(a)
that ’’* * * the Secretary shall impose
on any person who violates a provision
of this part a penalty * * * ’’. A
‘‘provision of this part’’ is considered to
be a requirement or prohibition of the
HIPAA statute or rules. See the
discussion of ‘‘administrative
simplification provision’’ under
§ 160.302 above.
Final rule: The final rule adopts the
provisions of the proposed rule.
Comment: A number of comments
suggested that the words ‘‘the Secretary
will impose a civil money penalty
* * * ’’ are too strict. Some comments
expressed concern that this language
could jeopardize HHS’s ability to
resolve a matter informally; other
comments questioned how this language
was consistent with the provisions for
voluntary compliance (§ 160.304),
informal resolution (§ 160.312), and
settlement (§ 160.416). Most of these
comments suggested that the rule give
the Secretary discretion to impose a
civil money penalty instead of making
it mandatory.
Response: Section 160.402(a) states
the general rule of section 1176(a): If the
Secretary determines that a covered
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entity has violated an administrative
simplification provision, he will impose
a civil money penalty unless a basis for
not imposing a penalty under section
1176(b) exists. The use of the words
‘‘shall impose’’ in section 1176(a) is
more than the mere conveyance of
authority to the Secretary to exercise his
discretion where he has made a formal
determination that a covered entity has
violated an administrative
simplification provision. Under the
procedures set forth in this final rule,
the formal determination is proposed in
a notice of proposed determination
under § 160.420. A covered entity may
request administrative review by an
administrative law judge of this
determination. If the covered entity does
not so request, the proposed
determination becomes final.
Many opportunities will precede a
determination of a violation, however,
that will permit the Secretary to exercise
his discretion to not impose a penalty.
As set forth in § 160.304, the principle
for achieving compliance is to seek
voluntary compliance by covered
entities. To implement this principle in
complaints and compliance reviews,
§ 160.312 provides that the Secretary
will attempt to reach resolution by
informal means prior to proposing a
determination under § 160.420 that a
covered entity has violated an
administrative simplification provision.
If resolution satisfactory to the Secretary
is reached by informal means, the
Secretary may exercise his discretion to
close the matter without formally
proposing a determination under
§ 160.420. The Secretary is also
authorized by section 1128A(f) of the
Act, which is incorporated by reference
in section 1176, to exercise discretion to
settle any matter. Thus, under
§§ 160.416 and 160.514, settlements of
civil money penalties which have been
proposed or are being challenged
through the administrative hearing
process are possible. The Secretary also
has discretion to waive civil money
penalties, in whole or in part, in certain
cases under § 160.412.
The general rule stated in § 160.402(a)
that the Secretary will impose a civil
money penalty upon a covered entity if
the Secretary determines that the
covered entity has violated an
administrative simplification provision
is not at odds with the Secretary’s
authority to exercise his discretion
pursuant to §§ 160.304, 160.312,
160.412, 160.416, and 160.514.
However, these exercises of Secretarial
discretion require actions by covered
entities. When a covered entity acts, or
fails to act, in ways that do not allow the
exercise of Secretarial discretion not to
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impose a penalty, the Secretary will
impose a civil money penalty upon the
covered entity if the Secretary
determines that the covered entity has
violated an administrative
simplification provision.
Comment: One comment complained
that § 160.402(a) does not allow for early
termination of frivolous complaints. The
comment stated that covered entities are
locked into paying a civil money
penalty or initiating an expensive and
elaborate defense to the complaint.
Response: It is our expectation that
complaints that are frivolous will be
resolved at an early stage of the informal
resolution process under § 160.312. A
covered entity can facilitate this process
by cooperating with the OCR or CMS
investigators on a timely basis.
Comment: One comment suggested
that § 160.402(a) be revised to require
HHS to issue a finding that informal
resolution is not sufficient and that a
civil money penalty is necessary.
Response: The provision suggested
would be redundant. The notice of
proposed determination under § 160.420
essentially fulfills this function, in that
it must state the grounds upon which
the Secretary has decided to impose the
penalty.
b. Section 160.402(b)—Violations by
More Than One Covered Entity
Proposed rule: Proposed § 160.402(b)
provided that, except with respect to
covered entities that are members of an
affiliated covered entity, if the Secretary
determines that more than one covered
entity was responsible for violating an
administrative simplification provision,
the Secretary will impose a civil money
penalty against each such covered
entity. Based on the statutory language
in section 1176(a), which states that the
Secretary ‘‘* * * shall impose a penalty
* * *’’ when there is a determination
that an entity has violated a HIPAA
provision, this provision would apply to
any two or more covered entities (other
than members of an affiliated covered
entity, discussed below), including, but
not limited to, those that are part of a
joint arrangement, such as an organized
health care arrangement. The preamble
to the proposed rule noted that the
determination of whether or not an
entity is responsible for the violation
would be based on the facts and that,
while simply being part of a joint
arrangement would not, in and of itself,
make a covered entity responsible for a
violation by another entity in the joint
arrangement, it could be a factor
considered in the analysis. See 70 FR
20231.
Proposed § 160.402(b)(2) provided
that each covered entity that is a
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member of an affiliated covered entity
would be jointly and severally liable for
a civil money penalty for a violation by
the affiliated covered entity. An
affiliated covered entity is a group of
covered entities under common
ownership or control, which have
elected to be treated as if they were one
covered entity for purposes of
compliance with the Security and
Privacy Rules. See § 164.105(b).
Final rule: The final rule provides that
a member of an affiliated covered entity
is jointly and severally liable for a
violation by the affiliated covered
entity, unless it is established that
another member of the affiliated covered
entity was responsible for the violation.
Comment: Proposed § 160.402(b) was
opposed by many on the ground that it
was unfair to make one covered entity
liable for a violation committed by
another covered entity. A number of
comments stated that this provision was
particularly unfair, when coupled with
the requirement of proposed § 160.426
that the public be notified of civil
money penalties imposed, in that a
covered entity that was not responsible
for the violation in question could bear
the reputational injury associated with
such notification, due to the operation
of proposed § 160.402(b). One comment
pointed out that violations may not be
system-wide, but may be limited to one
member of the affiliated covered entity;
in such a situation, it would not be fair
to penalize the other members of the
affiliated covered entity.
Response: We agree with these
comments to a certain extent and have
changed the final rule accordingly. We
agree that, if responsibility for a
violation can be shown to lie with one
member of an affiliated covered entity,
that member should be held liable for
the violation. Thus, we have provided
that a covered entity member of an
affiliated covered entity may avoid
liability if it is established that another
member was responsible for the
violation. We suspect that in most cases,
which member was responsible for the
violation will be clear—for example, if
four of five members of a covered entity
distributed privacy notices but the fifth
member did not, the violations of the
notice distribution requirement of
§ 164.520 would be attributed to the
fifth member. In such cases, the
objections to publication described
above are beside the point, because
liability follows responsibility.
However, we do not agree that the
inability to assign specific responsibility
for a violation to one or more members
of an affiliated covered entity should
shield all of its members from liability.
We doubt that such situations will arise
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often, but they may arise where the
affiliated covered entity has failed to
take a required act—for example, where
the affiliated covered entity has failed to
appoint a privacy officer. In such a case,
all of the members of the affiliated
covered entity bear a share of the
responsibility for the failure to act, since
any of them could have presumably
taken action to bring the group, as a
whole, into compliance. It is, thus, not
unreasonable that all members of the
affiliated covered entity should be
jointly and severally liable for the
consequent penalty. Moreover, absent
joint and several liability, each member
of the affiliated covered entity would be
separately liable for the penalty for the
violation, e.g., the failure to appoint a
privacy officer. Thus, the removal of
joint and several liability may result in
greater liability for the members of an
affiliated covered entity in some cases.
Comment: Several comments argued
that there is no statutory authority for
holding the members of an affiliated
covered entity jointly and severally
liable, in that the statute requires that
the penalty ‘‘shall be imposed on any
person who violates a provision * * *’’
and, thus, does not authorize imposition
of a penalty on a person who has not
violated a provision of the statute or
rules. One comment argued that
proposed § 160.402(b) would violate the
due process clause by imposing liability
on entities not responsible for a
violation.
Response: These objections are
misplaced. Where, as will usually be the
case, responsibility for the violation is
evident and the responsible party is
charged with the violation, they are
obviously not relevant. In the case of
other violations, where the
responsibility for the violation is shared
by the members of the affiliated covered
entity, as in where the affiliated covered
entity fails to take required actions, they
are likewise not relevant. Since each
covered entity member of the affiliated
covered entity is responsible for
complying with the rule in question,
responsibility for the failure to act may
be properly imputed to each member.
Moreover, since an affiliated covered
entity is a type of joint undertaking, it
is reasonable to impute responsibility to
the members of the affiliated covered
entity, as is typically done with joint
ventures.
Comment: Several comments argued
that proposed § 160.402(b) uses a legal
fiction of the Privacy and Security Rules
to create liability where liability would
not otherwise exist and substitutes this
fiction for the corporate form and
structure that establish the basis for
enterprise liability under U.S. law.
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Another comment stated that this
section is inconsistent with the
provision of the HIPAA rules
(§ 160.105(b)) that defines an affiliated
covered entity as an entity comprised of
‘‘legally separate’’ entities.
Response: We disagree. The affiliated
covered entity concept is more than a
legal fiction. It is an operational
approach to discharging certain
compliance responsibilities. When
covered entities create an affiliated
covered entity, they mutually agree to
conduct their business in a certain
manner and hold themselves out to the
world as a joint undertaking. While the
Privacy and Security Rules do not
prescribe detailed requirements for how
an affiliated covered entity must be
organized, the level of cooperation such
an undertaking necessitates, the
requirement for designation, and the
requirement of common ownership or
control mean that the participating
members will have entered into an
agreement of some sort, whether formal
or informal. We, thus, think that it is
properly viewed as a joint venture.
The fact that an affiliated covered
entity is composed of ‘‘legally separate’’
entities is beside the point. Joint and
several liability, as a concept, is
imposed on legally separate entities.
See, e.g., Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed.
2004), liability.
Comment: A number of comments
argued that the provision for joint and
several liability would discourage
covered entities from setting up
affiliated covered entities. One comment
stated that proposed § 160.402(b)
represents a change in position by HHS,
in that the preamble to the Privacy Rule,
on which many covered entities relied,
stated that covered entities that formed
an affiliated covered entity are
‘‘separately subject to liability under
this rule.’’
Response: Section 160.402(b), as
adopted, should allay the concerns
expressed by these comments with
respect to the potential exposure to
liability for the members of affiliated
covered entities. We think that, in most
cases, which member of an affiliated
covered entity is responsible for a
violation will be obvious; where this is
the case, HHS would seek to impose the
civil money penalties on that member.
Even if it is not obvious from the
violation itself who the responsible
party is, a covered entity may adduce
evidence to establish that responsibility
for the violation lies elsewhere, and, if
this is shown, avoid liability. In any
event, the establishment of an affiliated
covered entity is not mandated by either
the Privacy Rule or the Security Rule.
Rather, establishing an affiliated
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covered entity is a business decision to
be made by the covered entities
involved. The affiliated covered entity
arrangement carries with it certain
benefits for the member entities; any
increased exposure to potential liability
under this rule, assuming there is one,
should be part of the business calculus.
In addition, we do not agree that
§ 160.402(b) is inconsistent with the
position taken in the preamble to the
Privacy Rule. Our prior statement was
intended to provide notice that liability
for violations by an affiliated covered
entity would devolve onto the member
covered entities of an affiliated covered
entity, rather than being attributed to
the affiliated covered entity itself, so
that member covered entities could not
avoid liability by arguing that the
affiliated covered entity had committed
the violation in question. It was not
intended to indicate the bases upon
which that liability would be
determined, which is the purpose of
§ 160.402(b).
Comment: A couple of comments
supported the policy of holding the
members of an affiliated covered entity
jointly and severally liable. One
comment supported holding all covered
entities in an affiliated covered entity
liable for the violations of one as an
efficient mechanism for highlighting the
seriousness of violations of the HIPAA
rules.
Response: For the reasons set forth
above, we have not adopted this policy
in the final rule, insofar as
responsibility for a violation can be
determined.
Comment: Two comments requested
clarification of the maximum amount of
the penalty that will be assessed against
an affiliated covered entity when one of
its members has been found
noncompliant.
Response: Where responsibility for a
violation is allocated to individual
covered entities, each covered entity
determined to be responsible for the
violation would be liable for violations
of an identical requirement or
prohibition in a calendar year up to the
statutory maximum of $25,000. If
responsibility for particular violations
cannot be determined, so that the
members of the affiliated covered entity
are jointly and severally liable for the
violation, the maximum that would be
imposed for violations of an identical
requirement or prohibition in a calendar
year would be $25,000.
Comment: Several comments
requested clarification of the statement
in the preamble to the proposed rule
that membership in an organized health
care arrangement ‘‘could be a factor
considered in the analysis’’ in
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determining the liability of a member of
such arrangement for a violation. Of
particular concern was the potential
liability of a hospital for the actions of
physicians with privileges; one
comment noted that the hospital
exercises little control over medical staff
in such situations. One comment
requested that the final rule clarify that
membership in an organized health care
arrangement would not increase a
covered entity’s exposure to liability.
Response: As we noted in the
preamble to the proposed rule, the
members of an organized health care
arrangement would be individually—
not jointly and severally—liable for any
violation of the HIPAA rules. What our
preamble statement intended to indicate
was that HHS might have to look
carefully at how the organized health
care arrangement operated in
determining which member(s) of the
organized health care arrangement was
responsible for a particular violation, if
that was not clear at the outset.
c. Section 160.402(c)—Violations
Attributed to a Covered Entity
Proposed rule: Proposed § 160.402(c)
provided that a covered entity can be
held liable for a civil money penalty
based on the actions of any agent,
including a workforce member, acting
within the scope of the agency. This
provision derives from section 1128A(l)
of the Act, which is made applicable to
HIPAA by section 1176(a)(2) of the Act.
Section 1128A(l) states that ‘‘a principal
is liable for penalties * * * under this
section for the actions of the principal’s
agents acting within the scope of the
agency.’’ Under the proposed rule, a
covered entity could be liable for a civil
money penalty for a violation by any
agent acting within the scope of the
agency, including a workforce member.
(‘‘Workforce’’ is defined at § 160.103 as
‘‘employees, volunteers, trainees, or
other persons whose conduct in the
performance of work for a covered
entity is under the direct control of such
entity, whether or not they are paid by
the covered entity.’’) The proposed rule
excepted covered entities from liability
for actions of a business associate agent
that violate the HIPAA rules, if the
covered entity was in compliance with
the HIPAA rules governing business
associates at §§ 164.308(b) and
164.502(e). Proposed § 160.402(c) also
provided that the Federal common law
of agency would apply to determine
agency issues under this provision.
Final rule: The final rule adopts the
provisions of the proposed rule.
Comment: A number of comments
supported the provision of proposed
§ 160.402(c) relating to business
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associates and requested that it be
retained in the final rule.
Response: We agree and have done so.
Comment: One comment requested
clarification of the liability of a covered
entity for a violation committed by a
non-covered entity who is not a
business associate or workforce
member, such as researchers, medical
device vendors, and non-covered
providers who have treatment privileges
and access to protected health
information at a covered entity’s facility.
The comment argued that, depending on
the circumstances, such persons may or
may not be considered agents.
Response: In general, a ‘‘violation’’
cannot occur, if the act in question is
not done by a covered entity or its agent,
because only covered entities are subject
to the HIPAA rules. For example, if a
permitted or required disclosure of
protected health information is made by
a covered entity to a person or entity
that is not a workforce member or
business associate, the covered entity
would not generally be responsible for
that person’s or entity’s subsequent use
or disclosure of the information. Thus,
if a hospital that is a covered entity
discloses protected health information
to a non-covered health care provider
with privileges for treatment of a
patient, the hospital would not be liable
for a subsequent use or disclosure by
that provider, as long as the hospital is
not also involved in that use or
disclosure. If the provider is an agent of
the hospital, however, the hospital’s
liability will be determined in
accordance with § 160.402(c).
Comment: We requested comment in
the proposed rule on whether there are
categories of workforce members whom
it would be inappropriate to treat as
agents under § 160.402(c). A number of
comments suggested that independent
contractors, volunteers, and students
under the supervision of an academic
institution be excluded from the
definition of an agent for whose acts the
covered entity could be liable, provided
that the covered entity has given the
requisite training to such persons. The
comments indicated that generally
covered entities have less control over
such persons than they have over
employees.
Response: Whether a person is
sufficiently under the control of a
covered entity and acting within the
scope of the agency has to be
determined on the facts of each
situation, but § 160.402(c) creates a
presumption that a workforce member is
an agent of the covered entity for the
member’s conduct under the HIPAA
rules, such as using and disclosing
protected health information. With
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regard to whether an independent
contractor is a member of the covered
entity’s workforce, the question would
be whether the covered entity had direct
control over the independent contractor
in the performance of its work for the
covered entity. See § 160.103 (definition
of ‘‘workforce’’). If the covered entity
does not have direct control over such
persons, they do not fall within the
definition of ‘‘workforce.’’ Where
persons, such as independent
contractors, who are not under the
direct control of the covered entity
perform a function or activity that
involves the use or disclosure of
individually identifiable health
information or a function or activity
regulated by this subchapter on behalf
of a covered entity, such persons would
fall within the definition of ‘‘business
associate,’’ and the covered entity
would be required to comply with the
business associate provisions of the
Privacy and Security Rules with regard
to such persons. Because of the direct
control requirement in the definition of
workforce, we think it is appropriate for
a covered entity to be liable for a
violative act of an independent
contractor who is a member of the
workforce, that is, who is under the
direct control of the covered entity.
With respect to volunteers and
trainees, we note that, while covered
entities may have less control over these
persons, they do control their
performance of activities that are
governed by the HIPAA rules, such as
access to protected health information.
In regard to privacy, a covered entity is
required to train these categories of
workforce members as necessary and
appropriate for these volunteers and
trainees to carry out their functions
within the covered entity. 45 CFR
164.530(b). This requirement allows a
covered entity to adapt its training to a
volunteer’s or trainee’s scope of duties.
For example, a volunteer who files
laboratory results in a medical record
will require training that is different and
more extensive than the training given
to a volunteer in the lobby gift shop of
a hospital. Section 160.402(c) is
consistent with these distinctions. The
acts of volunteers and trainees will be
examined on a case-by-case basis to
determine if they are acting as agents
within the scope of their agency. Thus,
we think that it is appropriate to treat
volunteers and trainees as persons for
whose acts a covered entity may be
liable, if they act as agents for the
covered entity and violate the HIPAA
rules within the scope of their agency.
Comment: One comment
recommended that the rule be revised to
make covered entities liable for
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violations committed by business
associates. The comment suggested that,
if a covered entity is not liable for the
actions of its business associates,
covered entities will outsource the
handling of protected health
information to avoid liability.
Response: We included the business
associate exception in proposed
§ 160.402(c)(1)–(3) to make this rule
consistent with the business associate
provisions in the Privacy and Security
Rules. Changing the business associate
provisions in the Privacy and Security
Rules is outside the scope of this
rulemaking. (See the extensive
discussion about business associates in
the Privacy Rule and Security Rule
preambles at 65 FR 82503–82507 and
82640–82645, 67 FR 53251–53253, and
68 FR 8358–8361). The satisfactory
assurances that are required in written
contracts or arrangements between
covered entities and their business
associates are intended to protect the
confidentiality of protected health
information handled by business
associates. If a covered entity fails to
comply with the business associate
provisions in the Privacy and Security
Rules, such as by not entering into the
requisite contracts or arrangements, or
by not taking reasonable steps to cure a
breach or end a violation that is known
to the covered entity, the covered entity
may be liable for the actions of a
business associate agent. We, therefore,
decline to follow the recommendation.
Comment: Two comments suggested
that HHS limit its use of the Federal
common law of agency because its
application may make a covered entity
liable for the actions of a person, such
as an independent contractor, for whom
the covered entity is not liable under
state law.
Response: As we stated above,
covered entities must comply with the
business associate provisions of the
Privacy and Security Rules for
independent contractors who are not
under the direct control of the covered
entity and who perform a function or
activity that involves the use or
disclosure of individually identifiable
health information or a function or
activity regulated by ‘‘this subchapter’’
(i.e., the HIPAA rules) on behalf of a
covered entity. If a covered entity
complies with the business associate
provisions, the exception from liability
in § 160.402(c) will be applicable. The
purpose of establishing the Federal
common law of agency to determine
when a covered entity is vicariously
liable for the acts of its agents is to
achieve nationwide uniformity in the
implementation of the HIPAA rules by
covered entities and nationwide
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consistency in the enforcement of these
rules by HHS. The comments reinforced
our conclusion that reliance on state law
could introduce inconsistency in the
implementation of the HIPAA rules by
covered entities in different states.
Thus, we retain the Federal common
law of agency as the standard by which
agency questions in specific cases will
be determined.
Comment: Two comments requested
clarification of how this section will
apply to insurance agents, brokers, and
consultants.
Response: Insurance agents, brokers,
and consultants who are not members of
the covered entity’s workforce but with
whom the covered entity shares
protected health information will
generally fall within the definition of
‘‘business associate’’ at § 160.103. A
covered entity that complies with the
business associate provisions of the
Privacy and Security Rules would not
be liable for a violation of those rules by
the business associate pursuant to the
liability exception in § 160.402(c). It is
also possible that the insurance agent,
broker, or consultant may be the
covered entity’s agent in some, but not
all, of his or her activities. An agent or
broker may be working on behalf of an
employer to arrange insurance coverage
for its employees and not on behalf of
the health insurance issuer that is a
covered entity. In cases where the
liability exception for business
associates is not available or not met,
the determination of whether an
insurance agent, broker, or consultant is
an agent of a covered entity and was
acting within the scope of the agency
will be made based on the facts of each
situation.
Comment: One comment argued that
covered entities should not be liable for
acts of employees outside the scope of
their employment. Another comment
suggested that covered entities should
not be liable for the actions of agents
who have been informed of the covered
entity’s HIPAA compliance policies, yet
act contrary to them. Another suggested
that a covered entity should not be
liable for the acts of agents who,
although authorized to disclose
protected health information, disclose it
for purposes of sale or with intent to do
harm.
Response: Section 160.402(c), as
proposed and adopted, provides that a
covered entity is liable for the acts of an
agent acting ‘‘within the scope of the
agency.’’ This provision necessarily
implies that a covered entity is not
liable for its agent’s acts outside the
scope of the agency (as determined
under the federal common law of
agency). With regard to the comments
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that suggest that unauthorized conduct
by an agent is outside the scope of the
agency, the Federal common law of
agency will be applied to the facts of
each case to determine whether the
covered entity is liable for the conduct,
even though it was unauthorized.
Comment: Two comments expressed
concern with the role of a Privacy
Officer and his or her liability under
this part and the covered entity’s
liability for the actions of a Privacy
Officer who is a business associate. One
comment suggested that the Privacy
Officer should not incur any additional
liability merely by being designated the
Privacy Officer. The other comment
requested clarification as to a covered
entity’s liability when the covered entity
directly controls a Privacy Officer, if the
Privacy Officer is a business associate.
Response: As stated above, the facts of
each case will determine the liability of
covered entities for wrongful conduct of
its agents under the HIPAA rules. As a
general matter, we think that a Privacy
Officer is an officer of a covered entity
for the purposes of the Privacy Rule
and, thus, will likely be the covered
entity’s agent. As stated in § 160.402, a
covered entity is liable for the acts of its
agent acting within the scope of its
agency and, thus, is liable for any
penalties that result from those acts.
However, if a Privacy Officer is a
business associate of the covered entity,
the liability exception in § 160.402(c)
may apply. A covered entity that is in
compliance with the business associate
provisions of the Privacy and Security
Rules will not be liable for a violation
of those rules by the business associate.
2. Section 160.404—Amount of a Civil
Money Penalty
Proposed rule: Under proposed
§ 160.404(a), the penalty amount would
be determined through the method
provided for in proposed § 160.406,
using the factors set forth in proposed
§ 160.408, and subject to the statutory
caps reflected in proposed § 160.404(b)
and any reduction under proposed
§ 160.412. The proposed regulation
would not establish minimum penalties.
Proposed § 160.404 would follow the
language of the statute and establish the
maximum penalties for a violation and
for violations of an identical
requirement or prohibition during a
calendar year, as set forth in the
statute—up to $100 per violation and up
to $25,000 for violations of an identical
requirement or prohibition in a calendar
year. Proposed § 160.404(b) provided
that the term ‘‘calendar year’’ means the
period from January 1 through the
following December 31.
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Under proposed § 160.404(b)(2), a
violation of a more specific requirement
or prohibition, such as one contained
within an implementation specification,
could not also be counted, for purposes
of determining civil money penalties, as
an automatic violation of a broader
requirement or prohibition that entirely
encompasses the more specific one.
That is, the Secretary could impose a
civil money penalty for violation of
either the general or the specific
requirement, but not both. Proposed
§ 160.404(b)(2) would not apply where a
covered entity’s action results in
violations of multiple, differing
requirements or prohibitions within the
same HIPAA rule or in violations of
more than one HIPAA rule. Proposed
§ 160.404(b)(2) also would not preclude
assessing civil money penalties for
multiple violations of an identical
requirement or prohibition, up to the
statutory cap.
Final rule: The final rule adopts the
provisions of the proposed rule.
Changes to the provisions referenced in
this section are discussed in connection
with those provisions.
Comment: While most comments that
addressed proposed § 160.404(b)(2)
supported it, several comments
suggested that a single set of facts or
single activity should not result in the
finding of more than one violation, even
of different subparts. According to the
comments, covered entities should not
be assessed penalties for violating more
than one provision if all violations arise
out of the same facts or incident. One
comment suggested that penalties
should not be doubly assessed for
overlapping provisions in other subparts
unless gross misconduct or willful
negligence was involved.
Response: We do not count an act that
violates overlapping provisions of a
subpart as more than one violation
because provisions that are duplicative
in a subpart were written that way as a
drafting convenience and were not
intended to establish separate legal
obligations. This rationale, however,
does not apply where the legal
obligations are found in different
subparts. Further, the different subparts
implement different statutory standards
and, thus, impose separate legal
obligations. For example, where a
covered entity re-sells its used
computers without scrubbing the hard
drives that contain protected health
information, this act may violate several
separate legal obligations under the
Security and Privacy Rules: (1) The
media re-use requirement of
§ 164.310(d)(2)(ii); (2) the safeguards
requirement of § 164.530(c); and (3) to
the extent that the protected health
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information on the drives is accessible
by persons to whom it could not
permissibly be disclosed,
§§ 164.308(a)(4)(i) and 164.502(a). In
such a situation, the act has violated
requirements or prohibitions of different
rules promulgated pursuant to different
provisions of the statute, and it is
appropriate that such violations be
treated separately. Thus, we decline to
extend § 160.404(b)(2) as suggested.
Further, the same facts may evidence
noncompliance with more than one
non-overlapping provision of a subpart
and, thus, may result in multiple
violations for which a penalty may be
assessed. For example, a covered entity
that makes an impermissible use of
protected health information may also,
by virtue of the impermissible use, have
violated the Privacy Rule’s minimum
necessary and/or reasonable safeguard
provisions.
We also note that, in some cases, a
violation of one requirement or
prohibition may produce consequential
violations, and such cases would not
come within § 160.404(b)(2). For
example, § 164.308(a) requires covered
entities to conduct security risk
analyses. The security risk analysis is
the foundation of the covered entity’s
security risk management plan and is
one of the bases which it must take into
account in deciding not to implement
addressable implementation
specifications under the Security Rule.
If a covered entity does not do a security
risk analysis, it has no basis for not
implementing the addressable
implementation specifications under the
Security Rule, and any failure to
implement such specifications could,
thus, be considered a violation. Thus,
while the failure to conduct the security
risk analysis would be a violation, albeit
a continuing one, of just one provision,
it would necessarily result in other
violations, to the extent the covered
entity failed to implement the
addressable implementation
specifications of the Security Rule.
Comment: One comment suggested
that the costs incurred by the covered
entity as a result of the violation should
be considered in calculating the amount
of the penalty.
Response: We do not adopt this
suggestion for several reasons. First, we
are not certain what costs the comment
is suggesting be considered—the costs
associated with committing the
violation, the costs associated with
correcting the violation, or both.
Second, the factors to be considered in
determining the amount of the penalty
for a violation are set out at section
1128A(d) and are implemented in this
rule by § 160.408. ‘‘Costs incurred by
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the covered entity as a result of the
violation’’ is not a concept that fits
squarely within any of the statutory
factors. Third, to the extent
consideration of such costs is
reasonable, it would seem to be relevant
only to the criterion for waiver under
§ 160.412 (‘‘the extent that payment of
the penalty would be excessive relative
to the violation’’); insofar as that
criterion weighs the seriousness of the
effect of the violation, costs associated
with correcting the violation might in
certain circumstances be a relevant
factor to be considered.
3. Section 160.406—Number of
Violations
Proposed rule: Proposed § 160.406
would establish the general rule that the
Secretary will determine the number of
violations of an identical requirement or
prohibition by a covered entity by
applying any of the variables of action,
person, or time, as follows: (1) The
number of times the covered entity
failed to engage in required conduct or
engaged in a prohibited act; (2) the
number of persons involved in, or
affected by, the violation; or (3) the
duration of the violation, counted in
days. Paragraph (a) of this section would
require the Secretary to determine the
appropriate variable or variables for
counting the number of violations based
on the specific facts and circumstances
related to the violation, and take into
consideration the underlying purpose of
the particular HIPAA rule that is
violated. More than one variable could
be used to determine the number of
violations (for example, the number of
people affected multiplied by the time
(number of days) over which the
violation occurred). The Secretary
would have discretion in determining
which variable or variables were
appropriate for determining the number
of violations. The preamble to the
proposed rule noted that, under this
proposal, the policy for determining
which variable(s) to use for which type
of violation would be developed in the
context of specific cases rather than
established by regulation and that
subsequent cases would be decided
consistently with prior similar cases.
Final rule: The final rule eliminates
the provision for variables and provides
that the number of violations of an
identical requirement or prohibition
(termed ‘‘identical violations’’) will be
determined based on the nature of the
covered entity’s obligation to act or not
act under the provision violated, such as
its obligation to act in a certain manner,
or within a certain time, or with respect
to certain persons. With respect to
continuing violations, a separate
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violation will be deemed to occur on
each day such a violation continues.
Comment: While two comments
supported the proposal, many
comments challenged the variable
approach of proposed § 160.406 to
determining the number of violations. In
particular, several comments expressed
concern over the broad discretion
provided to the Secretary to determine
the number of violations, particularly in
light of the fact that the proposed rule
would have prohibited the ALJ from
reviewing the Secretary’s choice of
variable(s). Further, some comments
were concerned that the Secretary could
use multiple variables to determine the
number of violations. It was argued that
the proposed approach was unfair in
that it (1) did not allow covered entities
to predict the amount of a civil money
penalty that would result from a
violation, and (2) could maximize the
penalty to the statutory cap in virtually
any case, which could result in very
harsh penalties for relatively minor
offenses. Other comments argued that
the variable approach was inconsistent
with the policy of proposed
§ 160.404(b)(2), prohibiting the double
counting of overlapping regulatory
requirements, or was inconsistent with
HHS’s general approach to voluntary
compliance. It was suggested, for
example, that HHS instead could
establish one particular calculation
method for each HIPAA rule or specify
the types of violations for which HHS
would use a particular method.
Comments also criticized the variable
approach as inconsistent with the
definition of ‘‘violation,’’ arguing that
the person and time variables have no
logical relationship to a failure to
comply, and thus, would not be
appropriate for counting violations.
Specifically, it was argued that since a
‘‘violation’’ is defined as a failure to
comply with a requirement or
prohibition, by definition a violation is
a failure to take a required action or a
failure to refrain from doing a
prohibited act, and, thus, is not defined
by the period of time during which such
action or inaction occurs or by the
number of people who may be affected
by it. Further, several comments argued
that the action/inaction variable was the
only one that was consistent with the
statute, so that penalizing covered
entities by using other variables would
be penalizing them for violations that,
by definition, do not exist, which would
be inconsistent with Congressional
intent, as expressed in section 1176(a),
and inappropriate as a matter of public
policy. It was also argued that the time
and person variables look at qualitative
issues and attempt to measure the
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importance of an act or omission; they
do not measure where an act is
quantitatively extensive—i.e., repeated
or prolonged. It was argued that
qualitative considerations are treated,
under the statute, as aggravating or
mitigating factors, not as questions of
the quantity of violations, as is done
under the variable approach.
Response: It was not our intent to
suggest that the variables we proposed
would be employed in a manner
unrelated to the nature of the
underlying violation, as assumed by
many of the comments. However, since
we agree that the manner in which the
number of identical violations should be
determined will depend on the nature of
the provision violated, and the
provision for variables was confusing
and susceptible to misinterpretation, we
have eliminated the explicit
requirement to use the person, time, and
action variables. The final rule instead
makes clear that the Secretary will
determine the number of identical
violations based on the nature of the
obligation of the covered entity to act (or
not act) under the provision violated.
While we agree, in principle, that the
definition of ‘‘violation’’ looks to an
action or a failure to act as the essence
of a violation, defining what particular
act or failure to act constitutes the
specific violation in question will
necessarily require looking at the
substantive provision involved and
determining what the covered entity
was legally obligated to do. We do not
agree, in this regard, that the elements
of ‘‘people’’ and ‘‘time’’ are always
irrelevant to a failure to comply or that
consideration of these elements would
result in double counting of violations.
Rather, the precise nature of the covered
entity’s obligation will, as discussed
below, in many cases be a function of
to whom the obligation is owed or the
manner in which it must be performed
or other elements. Thus, we include in
the regulation examples of elements that
should be considered, as appropriate, in
construing a provision to determine a
covered entity’s obligation thereunder.
We believe that this approach, under
which the number of violations is
grounded in the language of the
provision violated, is wholly consistent
with the statutory scheme.
In many cases, applying this principle
should not be difficult. For example, the
Privacy Rule requires that covered
entities have contracts or other
arrangements in place with its business
associates to assure the privacy of
protected health information, and
specifies what must (and may not) be
included in the contract or other
arrangement to do so. See § 164.504(e).
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Two such provisions are that the
contract may not authorize the business
associate to use or further disclose the
information in a manner that would
violate the Privacy Rule, if done by the
covered entity, and that the contract
must provide that the business associate
will use appropriate safeguards to
prevent use or disclosure of the
information other than as provided for
by the contract. See § 164.504(e)(2)(i)
and 164.504(e)(2)(ii)(B). If a covered
entity enters into five contracts with
business associates that authorize the
business associates to use protected
health information in a manner not
permitted by the Privacy Rule and that
do not require the business associates to
use appropriate safeguards to protect the
information, the covered entity will
have committed five violations of each
of the two separate requirements.
Similarly, the Transactions Rule
prohibits covered entities from entering
into trading partner agreements that
would change the use of a data element
in a standard or add data elements not
contained in the standard. See
§ 162.915(a), (b). If a health plan were,
by trading partner agreement, to require
200 providers to use a data element in
a given transaction in a manner that was
inconsistent with the standard, and also
required the use of another data element
that was not part of the standard, we
would view each inconsistent
requirement in the trading partner
agreement as a separate violation. The
regulation prohibits the adoption of
certain terms in trading partner
agreements, so each noncompliant term
in each agreement would constitute a
separate violation, resulting in 200
violations of each of these requirements.
With respect to the transactions
standards themselves, however, we
anticipate defining the requirement
violated to be the requirement to
conduct a standard transaction. While
one could view each required data
element in a transaction as a separate
requirement, because the
Implementation Guide for each
transaction is incorporated by reference
into the regulation, one could also view
the underlying Implementation Guides
as functioning simply to describe what
constitutes compliance in a particular
case, rather than establishing separate
compliance requirements. While we
believe that either interpretation of the
Transactions Rule is permissible, we
expect to take the latter view of the
Rule, to facilitate the predictability of
determining violations under that Rule.
Thus, we would count each
noncompliant transaction as a single
violation, regardless of the number of
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missing data elements. For example, if
a health plan is found to have
conducted 200 eligibility transactions
which are missing several required data
elements, the health plan would have
committed 200 violations of one
identical requirement (i.e., the
requirement at § 162.923(a) to conduct a
covered transaction as a standard (i.e.,
compliant) transaction).
In some cases, determining how many
times a provision has been violated will
be a function of the number of
individuals or other entities affected,
because the covered entity’s obligation
is to act in a certain manner with
respect to certain persons. We include
the term ‘‘persons’’ in the list of
examples in § 160.406 to make clear that
such consideration may be appropriate.
It may include not only individuals, but
also other covered entities, their
workforce members, or trading partners,
where the obligation in question relates
to such types of persons. For example,
assume that a covered entity
impermissibly allows a workforce
member to access the protected health
information of 20 patients whose
information is stored on a computer file.
The question is whether this set of facts
constitutes one violation or 20
violations of § 164.502(a), which
prohibits impermissible uses or
disclosures of protected health
information. Since the covered entity
has an obligation with respect to each
patient to protect his or her protected
health information, the sharing of the 20
patients’ protected health information
with the employee constitutes a separate
impermissible use, or violation, of
§ 164.502(a) with respect to each
patient.
Some provisions embody a
requirement or prohibition that is of an
ongoing nature or for which timeliness
is an element of compliance. We
characterize violations of such a
requirement or prohibition as
continuing violations. In such cases, the
covered entity’s obligation to act
continues over time, and, if it fails to
take the required action, that failure to
comply also continues over time. Thus,
there needs to be a way of determining
how such compliance failures are
measured. We have decided to count
such failures in days, as each day
represents a new opportunity to correct
the compliance failure. Accordingly, we
have included, in the second sentence
of § 160.406, language that establishes
that continuing violations will be
counted by days for purposes of
determining how many violations of an
identical requirement or prohibition
occurred.
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For example, the Security Rule
requires covered entities to implement
many types of policies and procedures.
Under § 164.308(a)(4)(i), for example, a
covered entity is required to implement
policies and procedures for authorizing
access to electronic protected health
information that are consistent with the
applicable requirements of the Privacy
Rule. The implementation of such
policies and procedures is an ongoing
obligation and, thus, any failure to
adopt them is a continuing violation. As
another example, a covered entity
generally is required by § 164.524 to act
on a request by an individual for access
to his or her protected health
information no later than 30 days after
the request is received. Thus, each day
beyond the 30-day period a covered
entity fails to provide such access
would be a separate violation.
In contrast, situations in which the
violation is a discrete act would not be
continuing violations. The transaction
example above illustrates violations that
are discrete acts. Similarly, where a
health plan violates § 162.925(a)(2) by
rejecting transactions because they are
standard transactions, each rejection
would constitute a discrete act. The
example above of the workforce member
who impermissibly accesses protected
health information likewise is an
example of violations that are discrete
acts.
As explained above, determining the
number of violations in a particular case
will depend, necessarily, on the precise
provision violated and a covered
entity’s obligations thereunder. The
examples above should assist covered
entities in understanding their potential
liability. These examples also illustrate
that determining the number of
violations may implicate a number of
elements depending on the underlying
provision violated, such as whether a
covered entity had an obligation with
respect to each person, or the amount of
time that had elapsed with respect to a
continuing violation, or a combination
of these or other elements. While the
final rule does not adopt the variable
approach of the proposed rule, it does
not preclude consideration of multiple
elements in determining what
constitutes the violation and, thus, the
number of violations.
Comment: Several comments
challenged the preamble statement that
future cases would be decided
consistently with prior similar cases.
One comment suggested that giving
HHS discretion to determine the
variables used in counting violations,
yet saying that future cases will be
consistent with past use of variable in
similar violations, creates conflict.
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Other comments asked whether and
how a covered entity would be able to
challenge the selection of variable(s)
based on the variables used in similar
cases, if the facts of prior cases were not
publicized, so that covered entities
could determine how prior violations
had been counted. Thus, comments
requested that tracking of decided cases
and the use of variables for each
provision be assigned to a central entity
within HHS, or that this information be
made available to covered entities via
the HHS Web sites.
Response: With respect to the
comments regarding the preamble
statement in the proposed rule that
future cases would be decided
consistently with prior similar cases, we
clarify that the number of violations of
a particular provision will be
determined in a similar manner each
time a case presents a violation of that
particular provision, with due regard to
the individual facts and circumstances
of the case. In addition, as discussed
below, the final rule eliminates the
prohibition on ALJ review of the
Secretary’s choice of variable. Thus,
under the final rule, the ALJ may review
the Secretary’s method of determining
the number of violations for consistency
or other purposes. With respect to a
covered entity’s ability to challenge the
Secretary’s method of determining the
number of violations, HHS will make
available for public inspection and
copying final decisions imposing civil
money penalties and may publish such
decisions on its HIPAA Web sites. (This
is discussed below in connection with
§ 160.426.) Thus, covered entities will
be able to ascertain the application of
the penalty provisions where penalties
are imposed.
Comment: One comment suggested
that there be a limit on the number of
violations determined based upon the
monetary impact the fine will have on
the covered entity.
Response: A change is not necessary,
as the statute and regulation already
provide two points at which the
financial impact of a civil money
penalty on a covered entity may be
considered—in connection with (1) the
statutory factors (section 1128A(d),
implemented in this rule by § 160.408)
and (2) waiver (section 1176(b)(4),
implemented in this rule by § 160.412).
Comment: Two comments suggested
that the Secretary should consider
whether or not the covered entity has
enacted and completed a corrective
action plan when determining the
number of violations.
Response: Completion of a corrective
action plan does not relate to
determining the number of occurrences
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8407
of a violation, so we do not include it
as part of § 160.406. However, HHS
would consider any such action prior to
imposition of a civil money penalty for
purposes of determining whether there
is a basis for informal resolution of the
complaint. In addition, this fact is taken
into account in determining whether the
penalty should be imposed at all,
insofar as it pertains to the ‘‘reasonable
cause’’ defense under section 1176(b)(3)
and § 160.410(b)(3), since an element of
that defense is whether the ‘‘failure to
comply’’ has been corrected.
4. Section 160.408—Factors Considered
in Determining the Amount of a Civil
Money Penalty
Proposed rule: Section 1176(a)(2)
states that, with some exceptions, the
provisions of section 1128A of the Act
shall apply to the imposition of a civil
money penalty under section 1176 ‘‘in
the same manner as’’ such provisions
apply to the imposition of a civil money
penalty under section 1128A. Section
1128A(d) requires that—
In determining the amount of * * * any
penalty, * * * the Secretary shall take into
account—
(1) The nature of the claims and the
circumstances under which they were
presented,
(2) The degree of culpability, history of
prior offenses and financial condition of the
person presenting the claims, and
(3) Such other matters as justice may
require.
While the factors listed in section
1128A(d) were drafted to apply to
violations involving claims for payment
under federally funded health programs,
HIPAA violations usually will not
concern claims. Thus, we proposed to
tailor the section 1128A(d) factors to the
HIPAA rules and break them into their
component elements for ease of
understanding and application, as
follows: (1) The nature of the violation;
(2) the circumstances under which the
violation occurred; (3) degree of
culpability; (4) history of prior offenses;
(5) financial condition of the covered
entity; and (6) such other matters as
justice may require. Proposed § 160.408
provided detailed factors, within the
categories stated above, to consider in
determining the amount of a civil
money penalty. However, the proposed
rule would not label any of these factors
as aggravating or mitigating. Rather,
proposed § 160.408 listed factors that
could be considered either as
aggravating or mitigating in determining
the amount of the civil money penalty.
The proposed approach would allow the
Secretary to choose whether to consider
a particular factor and how to consider
each factor as appropriate in each
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situation to avoid unfair or
inappropriate results. It also would
leave to the Secretary’s discretion the
decision regarding when aggravating
and mitigating factors will be taken into
account in determining the amount of
the civil money penalty.
Final rule: The final rule adopts the
provisions of the proposed rule, with a
minor clarification. Section 160.408(d)
is revised to clarify that the prior history
to be considered relates to prior
compliance with, and violations of, the
administrative simplification
provisions.
Comment: A number of comments
supported the provision for mitigating
factors and urged that it be retained in
the final rule.
Response: We agree and have done so.
See § 160.408 below.
Comment: A number of comments
raised concerns or recommendations
related to a covered entity’s history of
compliance. For example, several urged
that HHS consider as a factor whether
the covered entity has initiated
correction action, and whether such
action was performed independently
and prior to contact from HHS. Some
comments also requested that HHS
consider any evidence of a covered
entity’s good faith attempts to comply
with the administrative simplification
requirements or that HHS take into
consideration a history of prior controls.
One comment stated that the phrase
‘‘history of prior offenses’’ in proposed
§ 160.408(d) was vague and requested
that HHS revise the provision to clarify
that it refers only to prior violations by
a covered entity of the HIPAA rules, and
not to prior offenses unrelated to the
HIPAA rules. Another comment
expressed concern with the provision at
proposed § 160.408(d)(4), which would
allow HHS to consider as a factor in
determining the amount of a civil
money penalty how the covered entity
has responded to prior complaints, as
well as the preamble statement that
such factor could include complaints
raised by individuals directly to the
covered entity. The comment argued
that the manner in which a covered
entity responded to previous complaints
about matters unrelated to the violation
at issue, or to complaints raised by
individuals, may be irrelevant and
unfairly prejudicial.
Response: With respect to corrective
action by a covered entity, HHS would
consider any such action prior to
imposition of a civil money penalty for
purposes of determining whether there
is a basis for informal resolution of a
complaint. In addition, corrective
actions of the covered entity are taken
into account in determining whether the
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covered entity has established an
affirmative defense to the violation as
provided for under § 160.410(b)(3).
Nonetheless, where the corrective action
is taken in response to a complaint from
an individual, the final rule at
§ 160.408(d)(4) provides the Secretary
with authority to consider such
corrective action as a factor in
determining a civil money penalty.
With respect to a covered entity’s
good faith attempt to comply with the
HIPAA provisions and rules, we agree
that such actions could be mitigating
factors depending on the circumstances
and, thus, have revised the rule to
clarify that a covered entity’s history of
prior compliance generally may be
considered, which could include, as
appropriate, prior violations, as well as
prior compliance efforts. In addition, we
agree that § 160.408(d) should apply
only to violations of the HIPAA rules,
and not to offenses of other provisions
of law. Accordingly, we have revised
the language of § 160.408(d) to
substitute the term ‘‘violations’’—which
is defined at § 160.302 as a failure to
comply with an administrative
simplification provision—for the term
‘‘offenses’’ in the proposed rule.
Finally, we disagree that only those
prior violations that are relevant to the
issue at hand should be considered.
While greater attention may be given to
those violations that are similar in
nature to the violation at issue, a
covered entity’s history of HIPAA
compliance generally is relevant to
determining whether the amount of a
civil money penalty should be increased
or decreased.
Comment: One comment urged that
the size of the covered entity not be
used as a factor in determining the
amount of a civil money penalty,
arguing that larger covered entities
should not be subject to greater
penalties for violations identical to
those of smaller entities. The comment
stated that, depending on the way the
number of violations is calculated,
larger covered entities are already
subject to greater risk since more
patients potentially could be affected by
one act or omission. Another comment
asked what financial information would
be required of a respondent to make a
showing of its financial condition and
whether, given that section 1128A
provides that the Secretary shall take
into account financial condition, the
burden is on HHS to do so even if the
respondent does not. Another comment
asked how the financial condition of a
covered entity is to be assessed.
Response: With respect to the first
comment, no change is made in the final
rule. The size of the covered entity is
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relevant in considering, under
§ 160.408(e)(1), whether a covered entity
experienced financial difficulties
affecting its ability to comply, and
under § 160.408(e)(2), whether the
imposition of a civil money penalty
would jeopardize a covered entity’s
ability to provide or pay for health care.
In response to the second comment, the
showing that a covered entity must
make of its financial condition will vary
depending on the circumstances.
However, a respondent may provide
whatever information it believes
relevant to such a determination should
it desire that HHS consider the entity’s
financial condition as a mitigating
factor. Should a respondent fail to raise
financial condition as a mitigating factor
(or any other mitigating factor),
however, HHS is under no obligation to
raise the issue. See § 160.534(b)(1)(ii).
With respect to how financial
condition is assessed, the Departmental
Appeals Board (Board) has considered
this issue in other cases litigated under
section 1128A. The Board has said that
an inquiry into a provider’s financial
condition should be focused on whether
the provider can pay the civil money
penalty without being put out of
business. See Milpitas Care Center, DAB
No. 1864 (2003). In Capitol Hill
Community Rehabilitation and
Specialty Care Center, DAB CR 469
(1997), aff’d, DAB No. 1629 (1997), the
Board construed a regulation (42 CFR
488.438(f)(2)) that lists a facility’s
‘‘financial condition’’ as one of the
factors that must be considered in
deciding the amounts of civil money
penalties. The Board stated that, while
the term ‘‘financial condition’’ is not
defined in the regulations, the plain
meaning of the term is that a facility’s
‘‘financial condition’’ is its overall
financial health. Thus, the relevant
question to be considered in deciding
whether a facility’s financial condition
would permit it to pay civil money
penalties is whether the penalty
amounts would jeopardize the facility’s
ability to survive as a business entity.
Comment: One comment argued that
proposed § 160.408 should establish
that HHS can only consider mitigating
factors to determine the amount of the
civil money penalty and not as a basis
for waiving the penalty altogether. The
comment stated that proposed § 160.410
already establishes circumstances under
which HHS may not impose a fine, and
it would be unreasonable to extend
those circumstances.
Response: The final rule does not
expand the circumstances under which
the Secretary is prohibited from
imposing, or may waive, a civil money
penalty under §§ 160.410 and 160.412,
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respectively. The factors in § 160.408
may be applied to determine, as
appropriate, whether to increase or
decrease the amount of a civil money
penalty.
Comment: One comment expressed
concern that the overlap of certain
variables in proposed § 160.406 with
factors in proposed § 160.408 (e.g., the
variable for the duration of the violation
counted in days versus the factor for the
time period during which the violation
occurred) could result in compounding
the penalty.
Response: We disagree that providing
for both counting continuing violations
in days and taking time into account
under § 160.408 is inappropriate. The
provision for counting continuing
violations in days relates to determining
how many times violation of an
identical provision occurred; the
provision for considering the time
period of the violation is one element,
among others, that may constitute a
mitigating or aggravating factor in
determining the amount of a civil
money penalty. While it is true that
length of time will tend to operate in the
same direction (i.e., to reduce or enlarge
the penalty) with respect to each of
these elements of the penalty
calculation, these two elements are
different in nature, and time is relevant
to both.
Comment: One comment that
supported the list of factors in proposed
§ 160.408 nonetheless recommended
that we better describe the factors in the
preamble. Another comment requested
examples of what may be included in
the factor of ‘‘[s]uch other matters as
justice may require’’ proposed at
§ 160.408(f).
Response: With respect to the first
comment, the factors themselves are
particularized and, thus, are fairly selfexplanatory. However, where questions
about the factors were raised in the
public comments, we have provided
further guidance in our responses in this
preamble. With respect to the ‘‘such
matters as justice may require’’ factor,
many different circumstances have been
cited for consideration in prior cases in
other areas in which this factor applies.
For example, ALJs have been asked to
consider the following types of
circumstances under this factor: the
respondent’s trustworthiness, the
respondent’s lack of veracity and
remorse, measurable damages to the
government, indirect or intangible
damages to the government, the effect of
the penalty on respondent’s
rehabilitation, and unprompted
diligence in correcting violations.
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5. Section 160.410—Affirmative
Defenses to the Imposition of a Civil
Money Penalty
Section 160.410 implements sections
1176(b)(1)–(3) of the Act. These sections
specify certain limitations on when civil
money penalties may be imposed.
Paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) of section
1176(b) each state that, if the conditions
described in those paragraphs are met,
a penalty may not be imposed under
subsection (a) of section 1176. Under
section 1176(b)(1), a civil money
penalty may not be imposed with
respect to an act if the act constitutes a
criminal offense punishable under
section 1177 of the Act. Under section
1176(b)(2), a civil money penalty may
not be imposed if it is established to the
satisfaction of the Secretary that the
person who would be liable for the
penalty did not know, and by exercising
reasonable diligence would not have
known, that such person violated the
provision. Under section 1176(b)(3), a
civil money penalty may not be
imposed if the failure to comply was
due to reasonable cause and not to
willful neglect and is corrected within
a certain period. The period of time to
correct a failure to comply may be
extended as determined appropriate by
the Secretary based on the nature and
extent of the failure to comply.
Proposed rule: Proposed § 160.410
would characterize the limitations
under section 1176(b)(1), (2), and (3) as
‘‘affirmative defenses,’’ to make clear
that they must be raised in the first
instance by the respondent. In order not
to preclude the raising of affirmative
defenses that could legitimately be
raised, the introductory text of proposed
§ 160.410 would permit a respondent to
offer affirmative defenses other than
those provided in section 1176(b).
Under proposed § 160.410(a), several
terms relevant to the affirmative
defenses would be defined: ‘‘Reasonable
cause,’’ ‘‘reasonable diligence,’’ and
‘‘willful neglect.’’ ‘‘Reasonable cause’’
would be defined as ‘‘circumstances
that make it unreasonable for the
covered entity, despite the exercise of
ordinary business care and prudence, to
comply with the administrative
simplification provision violated.’’
‘‘Reasonable diligence’’ would be
defined as ‘‘the business care and
prudence expected from a person
seeking to satisfy a legal requirement
under similar circumstances.’’ ‘‘Willful
neglect’’ would be defined as
‘‘conscious, intentional failure or
reckless indifference to the obligation to
comply with the administrative
simplification provision violated.’’
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Proposed § 160.410(b)(1) simply
referred to section 1177.2 Proposed
§ 160.410(b)(2) generally tracked the
statutory language, but also provided
that whether or not a covered entity
possesses the requisite knowledge to
make this affirmative defense
inapplicable would be ‘‘determined by
the federal common law of agency.’’ The
text of proposed § 160.410(b)(3) used the
defined term ‘‘reasonable diligence’’
and, thus, would build on the analysis
conducted under proposed
§ 160.410(b)(2). Proposed
§ 160.410(b)(3)(ii)(B) would follow the
statutory language and would permit the
Secretary to use the full discretion
provided by the statute in extending the
statutory cure period.
Final rule: The final rule adopts the
provisions of the proposed rule. A
related change is made to § 160.504(c),
as discussed below.
a. Section 160.410(b)—General Rule
Comment: One comment asked
whether a covered entity could
challenge in a hearing the
reasonableness of the Secretary’s finding
that an affirmative defense has not been
sufficiently established.
Response: A respondent may
challenge in a hearing the finding in a
notice of proposed determination that
an affirmative defense has not been
established. See § 160.534(b)(1)(i),
which provides that the respondent
bears the burden of proof with respect
to affirmative defenses.
Comment: Two comments noted that
the preamble to the proposed rule (70
FR 20237) would allow a covered entity
to raise affirmative defenses in addition
to those listed under § 160.410(b), but
that the text of the proposed rule would
not allow for additional defenses. They
asked that the final rule be revised to
allow a covered entity to present
affirmative defenses not expressly listed
in § 160.410(b). One comment
contended, however, that § 160.410
would allow covered entities too many
opportunities to avoid a penalty.
Response: The introductory text of
§ 160.410(b) permits other affirmative
defenses to be raised by using the
phrase ‘‘including the following.’’ While
we do not delineate what additional
affirmative defenses might be raised, the
‘‘[e]xcept as provided in subsection (b)’’
2 Section 1177(a) provides that a person who
knowingly and in violation of this part uses or
causes to be used a unique health identifier, obtains
individually identifiable health information relating
to an individual, or discloses individually
identifiable health information relating to another
person shall be punished as provided in subsection
(b). Section 1177(b) sets out three levels of penalties
that vary depending on the circumstances under
which the offense was committed.
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language of section 1176(a)(1) suggests
that they are limited. Nonetheless, the
statute clearly contemplates at least one
defense other than the limitations set
out at section 1176(b)—the statute of
limitations provision at section
1128A(h). Statutes of limitations
defenses are typically treated as
affirmative defenses, see Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(c). (28 U.S.C. Appendix). Thus, we
believe that provision for other
affirmative defenses that may be fairly
implied from the HIPAA provisions or
section 1128A must be made and,
accordingly, have done so.
We do not eliminate the affirmative
defenses that may be raised and that are
provided for by § 160.410, as suggested
by the final comment above. We have no
authority to eliminate a limitation that
the statute imposes on our authority to
impose civil money penalties, whether
or not it has the effect complained of.
Comment: One comment suggested
that § 160.410(b) should be revised to
state that the Secretary ‘‘shall not’’
impose a civil money penalty. The
comment stated that if a covered entity
establishes an affirmative defense, the
Secretary should not have discretion to
impose a penalty as indicated by the
current wording ‘‘may not impose.’’
Response: We do not make the
suggested change, because the present
wording accomplishes what the
comment urges. The phrase ‘‘may not
impose’’ means, in this context, ‘‘is not
permitted to impose.’’ We do not change
the language here, as it is consistent
with the usage in the HIPAA rules
generally, and we do not wish to suggest
an inconsistency or a different meaning
for similar prohibitions in other HIPAA
rules.
b. Section 160.410(b)(1)—‘‘Criminal
Offense’’ Affirmative Defense
Comment: Several comments
expressed concern that covered entities
are being forced to incriminate
themselves if they raise the affirmative
defense under § 160.410(b)(1) in the
request for hearing under § 160.504.
These comments stated that covered
entities should be able to raise this
defense after a case has been referred to
the Department of Justice, on the theory
that section 1176(b)(1) operates as a
jurisdictional bar to the imposition of a
civil money penalty. One comment
cited the Memorandum for Alex M.
Azar II and Timothy J. Coleman from
Stephen G. Bradbury, Re: Scope of
Criminal Enforcement Under 42 U.S.C.
1320d–6 (June 1, 2005) (Justice
Memorandum). The Justice
Memorandum is available at https://
www.usdoj.gov/olc/hipaa_final.htm.
The comment cited the Justice
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Memorandum for the proposition that
this section of the statute operates as an
absolute bar to imposition of a civil
money penalty, rather than as an
affirmative defense. Several comments
argued that the burden of establishing
that the limitation of section 1176(b)(1)
applied should be on HHS, not on the
respondent, as a matter of fairness.
Response: We continue to be of the
view that the statute is structured to
make the limitation of section 1176(b)(1)
a defense that must be raised by the
respondent. The fact that meeting the
condition described in this subsection
operates to bar the imposition of a civil
money penalty does not distinguish it
from the limitations provided for by
sections 1176(b)(2) and 1176(b)(3), and
those sections of the statute clearly are
defenses which the respondent should
raise. Moreover, the burden of
establishing that section 1176(b)(1)
applied could never be on HHS, as that
would require HHS to carry the burden
of proving a fact that would defeat its
claim; it is the respondent, not HHS,
who, in the context of the hearing, will
be the proponent of the claim that the
act for which a civil money penalty is
sought is a criminal offense.
However, we recognize that section
1176(b)(1) could potentially present a
situation of some difficulty for a
respondent, where the Department of
Justice is considering a referral related
to the violations on which the civil
money penalty action has been brought.
While the requirement that civil money
penalties be authorized by the
Department of Justice before they are
brought should prevent such situations
from arising, we cannot assume that
they will never arise. Accordingly, we
provide that, unlike the other
affirmative defenses, which are waived
if not raised in the request for hearing,
this affirmative defense may be raised at
any time during the administrative
proceedings, to permit respondents to
better manage such legal risks, should
they ever arise. Provision for this is
made in § 160.504(c), and a conforming
change is made to § 160.548(e).
Comment: One comment stated that
the fact of referral to the Department of
Justice should constitute conclusive
evidence that the act is one
‘‘punishable’’ under section 1177, even
if the Department of Justice declines to
prosecute (so that the act is not
‘‘punished’’ under section 1177).
Response: We do not agree. Referral to
the Department of Justice constitutes, at
most, our preliminary assessment that
the act in question may be subject to
criminal prosecution. The Department
of Justice may not agree with our
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preliminary assessment and may return
the case to us for administrative action.
Comment: One comment requested
that knowledge under section 1177 be
defined.
Response: ‘‘Knowingly’’ is the term
used in section 1177 of the Act (‘‘A
person who knowingly and in violation
of this part * * * ’’). According to the
Office of Legal Counsel of the United
States Department of Justice, ‘‘ ‘the term
‘knowingly’ merely requires proof of
knowledge of the facts that constitute
the offense.’ ’’ Justice Memorandum, at
11, quoting U.S. v. Bryan, 524 U.S. 184,
193 (1998).
c. Section 160.410(b)(2)—‘‘Lack of
Knowledge’’ Affirmative Defense
Comment: One comment asks HHS to
clarify the definition of knowledge
required for a civil money penalty to be
imposed.
Response: Under section 1176(b)(2), a
civil money penalty may not be
imposed for a violation ‘‘if it is
established to the satisfaction of the
Secretary that the person liable for the
penalty did not know * * * that such
person violated the provision.’’ As we
observed at 70 FR 20237—
This language on its face suggests that the
knowledge involved must be knowledge that
a ‘‘violation’’ has occurred, not just
knowledge of the facts constituting the
violation. * * * We, thus, interpret this
knowledge requirement to mean that the
covered entity must have knowledge that a
violation has occurred, not just knowledge of
the facts underlying the violation.
Comment: One comment asked
whether, if a covered entity were found
not to be liable because the knowledge
of an agent could not be imputed to it,
the individual committing the violation
would be held liable for the penalty.
Response: The Enforcement Rule
provides that only a covered entity is
liable for a civil money penalty under
section 1176. See § 160.402(a) and the
definition of ‘‘respondent’’ at § 160.302.
Comment: One comment contended
that the phrase ‘‘to the satisfaction of the
Secretary’’ should be stricken from
proposed § 160.410(b)(2). The comment
stated that this phrase would preclude
the covered entity from raising an
argument before the ALJ that the
Secretary did not properly consider
their affirmative defenses before
imposing a penalty. Another comment
asked whether this phrase makes the
finding totally discretionary and, thus,
unreviewable by the ALJ.
Response: This language is statutory,
as may be seen at section 1176(b)(2), set
out above. Further, as discussed above,
a respondent may raise affirmative
defenses in a hearing. Where so raised,
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the ALJ’s decision as to whether the
covered entity lacked knowledge would
become the decision of the Secretary,
unless reversed on subsequent appeal.
Comment: One comment asked, with
respect to imputing knowledge to the
covered entity, who would be
considered to be a ‘‘responsible officer
or manager’’ and whether a Privacy
Officer is considered a ‘‘responsible
officer or manager.’’
Response: With respect to who would
be considered to be a responsible officer
or manager and whether a Privacy
Officer would be considered a
responsible officer or manager, see the
discussion above under § 160.402(c).
Comment: One comment asked
whether, if a Privacy Officer mitigates or
corrects a violation, that action would
satisfy the requirement that a
responsible officer or manager be made
aware of the violation.
Response: We are unsure what the
precise concern of this comment is, as
the issue of knowledge typically would
arise in the context of the ‘‘lack of
knowledge’’ affirmative defense. That
defense requires, for its application, that
the covered entity not have actual or
constructive knowledge of the violation.
If the violation has been corrected, as
the comment suggests, one would
normally presume that the covered
entity knew of the violation, making the
lack of knowledge defense unavailable.
Under the scenario posed by the
comment, as we understand it, the issue
would be whether the elements of the
‘‘reasonable cause’’ affirmative defense
were present.
d. Section 160.410(b)(3)—‘‘Reasonable
Cause’’ Affirmative Defense
Comment: One comment asked that
the word ‘‘corrected’’ in
§ 160.410(b)(3)(ii) be changed to
‘‘mitigated,’’ because not all violations
can be fully corrected.
Response: We agree with the
comment that not all violations of the
HIPAA rules can be fully corrected, in
the sense of being undone or fully
remediated. However, we do not agree
that the term ‘‘corrected,’’ which is the
term used by the statute, need be read
so narrowly. Rather, the statute speaks
of the ‘‘failure to comply’’ being
corrected. Thus, the term ‘‘corrected,’’
as used in the statute, could include
correction of a covered entity’s
noncompliant procedure by making the
procedure compliant. In any event,
since the term ‘‘corrected’’ is the term
used in the statute, we employ it in the
rule below.
Comment: One comment requested
clarification as to how a covered entity
could ask for an extension of time to
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cure a violation under
§ 160.410(b)(3)(ii)(B).
Response: The covered entity should
make this request in writing to, as
applicable, CMS or OCR. The request
should state when the violation will be
corrected and the reasons that support
the need for additional time.
Comment: One comment asked that
the 30-day cure period be extended by
an additional 30 days.
Response: The initial cure period is,
by statute, 30 days. However, section
1176(b)(3)(B)(i) permits the Secretary to
extend the initial cure period ‘‘as
determined appropriate by the Secretary
based on the nature and extent of the
failure to comply.’’ Section
160.410(b)(3)(ii)(B) adopts, and does not
expand upon, this statutory language.
Thus, HHS could extend the cure period
for an additional 30 days (or some
greater or lesser period), if it were
determined appropriate to do so.
6. Section 160.412—Waiver
Section 1176(b)(4) of the Act provides
for waiver of a civil money penalty in
certain circumstances. Section
1176(b)(4) provides that, if the failure to
comply is ‘‘due to reasonable cause and
not to willful neglect,’’ a penalty that
has not already been waived under
section 1176(b)(3) ‘‘may be waived to
the extent that the payment of such
penalty would be excessive relative to
the compliance failure involved.’’ If
there is reasonable cause and no willful
neglect and the violation has been
timely corrected, the imposition of the
civil money penalty would be precluded
by section 1176(b)(3). Therefore, waiver
under this section would be available
only where there was reasonable cause
for the violation and no willful neglect,
but the violation was not timely
corrected.
Proposed rule: Proposed § 160.412 did
not propose to elaborate on the statute
in any material way. This provision
would provide the Secretary with the
flexibility to utilize the discretion
provided by the statutory language as
necessary.
Final rule: The final rule adopts the
provisions of the proposed rule.
Comment: One comment suggested
that this section be removed entirely.
The comment stated that section
1176(b)(4) authorizes, but does not
compel, the Secretary to allow for
waiver of civil money penalties. The
comment argued that waiver is an
unnecessary avenue for covered entities
to avoid penalties, as the statute and the
proposed rule would provide so many
other avenues by which a covered entity
could avoid being penalized for
violations.
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Response: As was more fully
discussed at 70 FR 20239, the statute, in
our view, creates a statutory right for
covered entities to request a waiver,
where a violation is due to reasonable
cause and not willful neglect, but has
not been corrected within the statutory
cure period (including any extensions
thereof). While the grant of a waiver is
within the agency’s discretion, the
statute clearly contemplates that
covered entities may request a waiver in
such circumstances and that HHS must
consider the request. Accordingly, we
do not make the change suggested.
7. Section 160.414—Limitations
Proposed rule: Proposed § 160.414
was adopted by the April 17, 2003
interim final rule as § 160.522. We
proposed to move this section, which
sets forth the six-year limitation period
provided for in section 1128A(c)(1),
from subpart E to subpart D, because
this provision applies generally to the
imposition of civil money penalties and
is not dependent on whether a hearing
is requested. We also proposed to
change the language of this provision so
that the date of the occurrence of the
violation is the date from which the
limitation is determined.
Final rule: The final rule adopts the
provisions of the proposed rule.
Comment: One comment requested
clarification of record retention
requirements and their interaction with
the time limitation on bringing an
enforcement action.
Response: The issue raised by this
comment is discussed in connection
with § 160.310 above.
Comment: One comment suggested
shortening the time period to two years
in the interest of accomplishing
compliance faster and making recordkeeping less burdensome for covered
entities.
Response: The six-year limitations
period of § 160.414 is provided for by
statute (section 1128A(c)(1) of the Act),
and, thus, is not within our power to
change by regulation. Insofar as this
comment suggests changing the record
retention requirements of the Privacy
and Security Rules, the requested
change is outside the scope of this
rulemaking.
8. Section 160.416—Authority To Settle
Proposed rule: Proposed § 160.416
was adopted by the April 17, 2003
interim final rule as § 160.510. We
proposed to move this section, which
addresses the authority of the Secretary
to settle any issue or case or to
compromise any penalty imposed on a
covered entity, from subpart E to
subpart D, because this provision
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applies generally to the imposition of
civil money penalties, and is not
dependent on whether a hearing is
requested. No change was proposed to
the text of the provision.
Final rule: The final rule adopts the
provisions of the proposed rule.
Comment: One comment expressed
concern that this provision does not
provide for alternative dispute
resolution. The comment urged HHS to
remain committed to the informal
resolution process.
Response: We provide in the rule that
HHS will attempt to resolve compliance
issues informally, for the reasons
discussed above and in the preamble to
the proposed rule. Where this process is
insufficient to resolve the matter, the
statute requires provision of a formal
hearing process, if a hearing is
requested. We note that under their
current procedures, the ALJ and/or the
Departmental Appeals Board routinely
afford parties the opportunity to engage
in alternative dispute resolution.
Comment: Two comments suggested
removing § 160.416 from the final rule,
on the ground that it is inappropriate to
give the Secretary this authority without
oversight.
Response: We do not adopt this
suggestion. The statute explicitly gives
the Secretary the authority to
compromise penalties, which would
typically be done through settlement of
the case. See section 1128A(f).
9. Section 160.420—Notice of Proposed
Determination
Proposed rule: The text of proposed
§ 160.420 was adopted by the April 17,
2003 interim final rule as § 160.514. We
proposed to move this section from
subpart E, which sets out the procedures
and rights of the parties to a hearing, to
subpart D, because the notice provided
for in this section must be given
whenever a civil money penalty is
proposed, regardless of whether a
hearing is requested. No changes, other
than conforming changes, were
proposed to paragraphs (a)(1) and (a)(3),
(a)(4), or to paragraph (b). We proposed
to revise paragraph (a)(2) by adding that,
in the event the Secretary employs
statistical sampling techniques under
§ 160.536, the sample relied upon and
the methodology employed must be
generally described in the notice of
proposed determination. A new
paragraph (a)(5) would require the
notice to describe any circumstances
described in § 160.408 that were
considered in determining the amount
of the proposed penalty; this provision
would correspond to § 1003.109(a)(5) of
the OIG regulations. Paragraph (a)(5) of
§ 160.514 of the April 17, 2003 interim
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final rule would be renumbered as
§ 160.420(a)(6).
Final rule: We adopt the section as
proposed, except that, where HHS bases
the proposed penalty in part on
statistical sampling, a copy of the report
of the agency’s statistical expert, rather
than just a description of the study and
the sampling technique used, must be
provided with the notice of proposed
determination.
Comment: One comment requested
clarification as to whether the notice of
proposed determination serves as the
notice required by the statute.
Response: Yes, the notice provided for
by § 160.420—the notice of proposed
determination—implements the
requirement for notice of section
1128A(c)(1).
Comment: One comment
recommended that the final rule retain
§ 160.420(a)(5) to ensure that covered
entities have sufficient information as to
why the penalty was imposed.
Response: This has been done. See
§ 160.420(a)(5) below.
Comment: Several comments
requested that the rule specify that the
notice of proposed determination will
be sent to the covered entity’s Privacy
Officer or another designated officer.
Response: This issue is discussed
below in connection with § 160.504.
Comment: Several comments stated
that, if HHS bases its proposed penalty
on statistical sampling, the notice of
proposed determination should include
a copy of the study relied upon, so that
a covered entity has adequate notice and
time to prepare its defense.
Response: We agree and have made
the requested change.
10. Section 160.422—Failure To Request
a Hearing
Proposed rule: The text of proposed
§ 160.422 was adopted by the April 17,
2003 interim final rule as § 160.516. We
proposed to add language (‘‘and the
matter is not settled pursuant to
§ 160.416’’) to recognize that the
Secretary and the respondent may agree
to a settlement after the Secretary has
issued a notice of proposed
determination. We also proposed that
the penalty be final upon receipt of the
penalty notice, to make clear when
subsequent actions, such as collection,
may commence.
Final rule: The final rule adopts the
provisions of the proposed rule.
Comment: Several comments
suggested that a provision should be
added allowing the time frame to
request a hearing to be extended when
the notice of proposed determination is
not received by the appropriate person
within the covered entity.
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Response: This issue is discussed in
connection with § 160.504 below.
11. Section 160.424—Collection of
Penalty
Proposed rule: The text of § 160.424
was adopted by the April 17, 2003
interim final rule as § 160.518. We
proposed to move this section, which
addresses how a final penalty is
collected, from subpart E to subpart D,
because this provision applies generally
to the imposition of civil money
penalties and is not dependent upon
whether a hearing is requested. The rule
provides that once a proposed penalty
becomes final, it will be collected by the
Secretary, unless compromised. The
Secretary may bring a collection action
in the Federal district court for the
district in which the respondent resides,
is found, or is located. The penalty
amount, as finally determined, may be
collected by means of offset from
Federal funds or state funds owing to
the respondent. Matters that were, or
could have been, raised in a hearing or
in an appeal to the U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals may not be raised as a defense
to the collection action.
Final rule: The final rule adopts the
provisions of the proposed rule.
Comment: One comment asked what
interest rate will accrue, if a penalty is
not paid promptly by the covered entity.
Response: Under the Federal Claims
Collection rules, interest is calculated as
provided by 31 U.S.C. 3717. See 31 CFR
901.9.
Comment: One comment asked
whether, if a penalty is assessed against
a hybrid entity, the part of the entity
responsible for the violation would pay
the penalty or the entire hybrid entity
would pay the penalty.
Response: As noted above, a hybrid
entity is, by definition, a single legal
entity. Where a penalty is assessed
against a covered entity that has
designated itself as a hybrid entity, the
legal entity that is the covered entity is
responsible for payment of the penalty.
How the covered entity allocates the
penalty payment as a matter of internal
accounting is a business decision of the
covered entity.
Comment: One comment asked
whether, if an agency with the same
structure as a Medicaid agency is
assessed a penalty, federal dollars can
be withheld in lieu of payment of the
penalty.
Response: Yes. Section 1128A(f)
provides for setoff of penalty amounts
against Federal or state agency funds
then or later owing to the person
penalized.
Comment: One comment suggests that
the Secretary does not have the
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authority to preclude issues from being
raised in a civil action in federal court.
The comment suggests removing
§ 160.424(d) from the final rule.
Response: Section 160.424(d) merely
states the well-recognized principle
that, where an administrative remedy
exists, a plaintiff must exhaust that
remedy as a precondition to raising the
issue in question in court.
12. Section 160.426—Notification of the
Public and Other Agencies
Proposed rule: We proposed to
require notification of the public
generally whenever a proposed penalty
became final, in order to make the
information available to anyone who
must make decisions with respect to
covered entities. The regulatory
language would provide for notification
in such manner as the Secretary deems
appropriate, which would include
posting to an HHS Web site and/or the
periodic publication of a notice in the
Federal Register.
Final rule: The final rule adopts the
provisions of the proposed rule.
Comment: Several comments argued
that the provision for notification of the
public in proposed § 160.426 would
extend beyond the scope of the
Secretary’s statutory authority under
section 1128A(h), since section
1128A(h) specifies only that certain
types of organizations and agencies to
be notified. They urged that the
requirement be eliminated.
Response: We disagree that the
requirement for public notification is
unauthorized. It is true that § 160.426
establishes the means by which HHS
may carry out its obligation to notify
various agencies and organizations
under section 1128A(h). However, the
basis for the public notice portion of
§ 160.426 lies not in section 1128A(h),
as the comments assumed, but in the
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5
U.S.C. 552.
FOIA requires final opinions and
orders made in adjudication cases to be
made available for public inspection
and copying. See 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(2)(A).
The adjudicatory process 3 set forth in
the Enforcement Rule begins with the
service upon the respondent of a notice
of proposed determination under
§ 160.420. This proposed penalty
becomes final if the respondent fails to
contest it in the time and manner
provided in § 160.504(b). If the
respondent does contest the proposed
3 Under the Administrative Procedure Act,
‘‘adjudication means agency process for the
formulation of an order.’’ 5 U.S.C. 551(7). An ‘‘order
means the whole or part of a final disposition * * *
of an agency in a matter other than rule making
* * *’’. 5 U.S.C. 551(6).
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penalty, the final agency order is the
decision of the ALJ, or the Board, as the
case may be. While it is true that section
1128A(h) does not require that such
notice be given to the public, neither
does it prohibit such wider
dissemination of that information, and
nothing in section 1128A(h) suggests
that it modifies the Secretary’s
obligations under FOIA. FOIA requires
making final orders or opinions
available for public inspection and
copying by ‘‘computer
telecommunication * * * or other
electronic means,’’ which would
encompass putting them up on the
Department’s Web site, and further
provides that, absent actual and timely
notice, in order for the Department to
rely upon final opinions that affect a
member of the public or to cite them as
precedent against a party, the opinions
or orders must be indexed and made
available electronically. See 5 U.S.C.
552(a)(2).
Comment: Many comments objected
to the requirement for public notice.
Comments argued that since final
decisions of the Departmental Appeals
Board are available under FOIA, there is
no need for further notice to the public.
Further, it was stated that many HIPAA
violations, particularly of the
Transactions Rule, are very technical in
nature and the public may be unable to
understand the nature of such
violations. Accordingly, public
notification may injure the reputation of
covered entities and cause them to lose
business, while the reputational injury
attendant on public notification may be
wholly disproportionate to the
violations involved. Also, comments
argued that entities that are members of
an affiliated covered entity and that are
held liable for the actions of others
under § 160.402(b) may be unfairly
labeled as noncompliant. Finally,
comments stated that covered entities
may have to expend additional
resources to fight complaints, because
the public notification provision would
give competitors an incentive to use the
complaint process to gain an unfair
business advantage.
Response: Final decisions of the ALJs
and the Departmental Appeals Board are
made public via the Board’s Web site.
See https://www.hhs.gov/dab/
search.html. Such postings, however,
would not include penalties that
become final because a request for
hearing was not filed under § 160.422.
Notices of proposed determination
under § 160.420 that become final
because a hearing has not been timely
requested, would likewise be made
available for such public inspection and
copying as final orders. By making the
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entire final opinion or order available to
the public, the facts underlying the
penalty determination and the law
applied to those facts will be apparent.
Given that information, the public may
discern the nature and extent of the
violation as well as the basis for
imposition of the civil money penalty
on the covered entity. Finally, the
process established for the review and
investigation of complaints should
identify those without merit, or over
which HHS has no jurisdiction under
the HIPAA provisions, but, in any event,
we doubt that the notification
provisions of this section will increase
the likelihood that complaints will be
filed.
Comment: One comment suggested
that, rather than mandating the
provision of notice to the public, the
rule should give the Secretary discretion
to determine when public notification is
prudent, as doing so may not be
appropriate in all instances—for
example, where there is an ongoing
investigation or a technical failure is
involved. A number of comments urged
HHS to publish violations of HIPAA
without the name of the covered entity.
They argued that this approach would
enable covered entities to understand
how OCR and CMS apply the HIPAA
rules in particular circumstances and
would, thus, encourage voluntary
compliance.
Response: As noted, under FOIA, we
must make final orders and opinions
available for public inspection and
copying. FOIA permits the Secretary to
withhold information whose release
could, for instance, reasonably be
expected to interfere with prospective or
ongoing law enforcement proceedings,
but such exemption does not apply
where, as in the case of such final
opinions and orders, they are made after
the conclusion of such proceedings. See
5 U.S.C. 552(b)(7)(A). While FOIA
permits the deletion of identifying
details to prevent a clearly unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy, identifying
the name(s) of the covered entities
against whom penalties are imposed
would not be such an invasion of
personal privacy.
Comment: One comment suggested
that the rule be revised to require
covered entities to notify the Secretary
and potentially affected individuals
when there is a suspected breach of the
Privacy Rule. The comment also
suggested that HHS make available a list
of violations organized by entity,
including the number of persons
affected by each violation. One
comment asked that all final decisions
of the ALJ or the Board, including those
to not assess a penalty, be made public,
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so that covered entities could present a
better defense in the future based on
past decisions to not impose a penalty
in a similar situation. Another comment
supported the proposal to notify the
public of final penalties, on the ground
that the public should be aware of
violations, particularly of the Privacy
Rule. Another comment suggested that
complainants should be notified when a
penalty is imposed.
Response: As noted, final opinions or
orders imposing penalties will be made
available to the public for inspection
and copying. Given that this
information will be public, we do not
accept the other comments above.
Comment: One comment stated that
the public notification rule should not
apply to, or include, matters referred to
the Department of Justice. Another
comment asked that HHS confirm that
the public notification provision would
not apply to informal resolutions.
Response: In neither of the above
situations has a final order on a penalty
proposed under § 160.420 been entered.
Consequently, neither situation would
come within the public notification
requirement of § 160.426.
Comment: Several comments
expressed concern that publication of a
penalty could occur prematurely, before
all of the covered entity’s appeals had
been exhausted. They requested
clarification as to when a penalty is
considered final for purposes of
notification. A couple of comments
stated that the penalty should be
considered to be final, for purposes of
the public notification, when all court
appeals have been exhausted.
Response: A civil money penalty is
considered to be final, for purposes of
notification, when it is a final agency
action—i.e., the time for administrative
appeal has run or the adverse
administrative finding has otherwise
become final. The final opinion or order
that is subject to the notification
provisions of this section is the notice
of proposed determination, if a request
for hearing is not timely filed, the
decision of the ALJ, if that is not
appealed, or the final decision of the
Board.
D. Subpart E—Procedures for Hearings
As previously explained, the
provisions of section 1128A of the Act
apply to the imposition of a civil money
penalty under section 1176 ‘‘in the same
manner as’’ they apply to the imposition
of civil money penalties under section
1128A itself. The provisions of subpart
E are, as a consequence, based in large
part upon, and are in many respects the
same as, the OIG regulations
implementing section 1128A. We adapt,
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re-order, or combine the language of the
OIG regulations in a number of places
for clarity of presentation or to reflect
concepts unique to the HIPAA
provisions or rules. To avoid confusion,
we also employ certain language usages
in order to be consistent with the usages
in the other HIPAA rules (for example,
for mandatory duties, ‘‘must’’ or ‘‘will’’
instead of ‘‘shall’’ is used; for
discretionary duties, ‘‘may’’ instead of
‘‘has the authority to’’ is used).
Subpart E, as adopted by the April 17,
2003 interim final rule, adopted
provisions relating to investigational
inquiries and subpoenas and certain
definitions that have now been moved
to subpart C. It also adopted a number
of provisions that relate to all civil
money penalties that have now been
moved to subpart D. Subpart E, as
revised below, addresses only the
administrative hearing phase of the
enforcement process.
General comment: Several comments
argued that the proposed Enforcement
Rule, as a whole, would give the
government an unfair advantage and
seriously compromise the ability of
covered entities to defend themselves
before an ALJ and on an appeal to the
Board. It was argued that the following
provisions, in combination, would
‘‘stack the deck’’ in the government’s
favor:
(1) The severely restricted ability of
covered entities to rebut the statistical
sampling report; (2) the ‘‘extraordinary
circumstances’’ standard for failure to timely
exchange exhibits and witness statements; (3)
the inability to depose prior to the hearing or
question at the hearing the government’s
statistical sampling expert; (4) the ability of
the * * * ALJ * * * to admit prior evidence
of witnesses which were not subject to cross
examination by the covered entity; (5) the
requirements regarding hearing requests; (6)
the limited nature of discovery and the lack
of obligation to share exculpatory evidence;
(7) the ALJ’s discretion about applying the
Federal Rules of Evidence; (8) the very broad
harmless error rule which significantly
restricts a covered entity’s appeal rights; and
(9) the limited authority of the ALJ and
correspondingly broad discretion provided to
the Secretary.
Response: While we also discuss the
above provisions individually, we
provide the following general response.
We do not agree that the proposed rule
would have given HHS an unfair
advantage or compromised the ability of
covered entities to defend themselves.
Most of the provisions cited should
operate even-handedly, providing no
greater advantage to the government
than to the respondent. For example, the
limitation on depositions will also mean
that the governmental party cannot
depose any statistical expert of the
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respondent; similarly, the other
limitations on discovery should operate
similarly for both parties, as should the
ALJ’s discretion with respect to the
application of the Federal Rules of
Evidence and the application of the
harmless error rule.
In any event, we have changed several
of the provisions cited. We have
required the government’s statistical
study to be provided with the notice of
proposed determination, we have
clarified the conditions for the
admission of written statements, and we
have eliminated the restriction on the
ALJ’s authority to review the method by
which the number of violations is
determined. We believe that the final
rule strikes an appropriate balance and
should ensure that neither party has a
procedural advantage.
1. Section 160.504—Hearing Before an
ALJ
Proposed rule: The proposed rule
proposed few changes to this section,
which was § 160.526 of the April 17,
2003 interim final rule. Section
160.526(a)(2) of the April 17, 2003
interim final rule stated that the
Departmental party in a hearing is ‘‘the
Secretary.’’ The term ‘‘Secretary’’ is
defined at § 160.103 of the HIPAA rules
as ‘‘the Secretary of Health and Human
Services or any other officer or
employee of HHS to whom the authority
involved has been delegated.’’ However,
in light of the multiple roles of the
Secretary in the context of a hearing
(OCR and/or CMS would be a party,
while the ALJ or the Board would be the
adjudicator), we proposed to clarify in
§ 160.504(a)(2) which part of HHS acts
as the ‘‘party’’ in the hearing. Because
which component of HHS will be the
‘‘party’’ in a particular case will depend
on which rule is alleged to have been
violated, and because a particular case
could involve more than one HIPAA
rule, we proposed to define the
Secretarial party generically, by
reference to the component with the
delegated enforcement authority. Under
the proposed provision, the Secretarial
party could consist of more than one
officer or employee, so that it is possible
for both CMS and OCR to be the
Secretarial party in a particular case.
Proposed § 160.504(b) provided that
the request for a hearing must be mailed
within 60 days, via certified mail, return
receipt requested, to the address
specified in the notice of proposed
determination. The last sentence of
proposed § 160.504(b) provided that the
date of receipt of the notice of proposed
determination is presumed to be five
days after the date of the notice unless
the respondent makes a reasonable
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showing to the contrary. This showing
may be made even where the notice is
sent by mail and is not precluded by the
computation of time rule of proposed
§ 160.526(c), establishing a five-day
allowance for mailing.
Proposed § 160.504(c) would require
that the request for hearing clearly and
directly admit, deny, or explain each of
the findings of fact contained in the
notice of proposed determination with
respect to which the respondent has
knowledge and must also state the
circumstances or arguments that the
respondent alleges constitute the
grounds for any defense and the factual
and legal basis for opposing the penalty.
Proposed § 160.504(d)(1) would require
the ALJ to dismiss a hearing request
where ‘‘[t]he respondent’s hearing
request is not filed as required by
paragraphs (b) and (c) of this section.’’
Proposed §§ 160.504(d)(2)–(4) would
require dismissal where the hearing
request was, respectively, withdrawn,
abandoned, or raised no issue that could
properly be addressed in a hearing.
Final rule: Section 160.504 below
revises the proposed rule in several
respects. The proposed 60-day time
limit for filing a request for hearing is
extended to 90 days. See § 160.504(b).
Section 160.504(c) provides that an
affirmative defense under
§ 160.410(b)(1) may be raised at any
time. Section 160.504(d)(1) provides
that a dismissal on the grounds stated in
that paragraph may only be made on
motion of the Secretary, and the ground
for dismissal under paragraph (b) is
limited to the respondent’s failure to
comply with the timely filing
requirement of paragraph (b).
Comment: A number of comments
objected to the 60-day time limit of
proposed § 160.504(b) as unreasonably
short and unfair, given the detailed
showing the covered entity is required
to provide in its request for hearing and
the severe consequences, under
proposed § 160.504(d)(1), of failing to
meet this requirement. A couple of
comments also objected that this
provision is not necessary and does not
follow the OIG regulation in this
respect. Comments suggested several
changes: (1) That the required
specificity of the request for hearing be
eliminated, (2) that the time for
response be lengthened, and/or (3) that
there be a provision to excuse an
untimely request for hearing based on
good cause.
Response: We accommodate the
concerns raised in the public comment
by extending the period for filing a
request for hearing from 60 to 90 days.
We note that, as so revised, the rule
does not parallel the analogous
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provision of the OIG regulations (42
CFR 1005.2(c)) in two respects: (1) It
requires more specificity in the hearing
request; and (2) it provides the
respondent more time in which to file
the hearing request. We are of the view,
however, that the compromise in
§ 160.504(b), as revised, will promote
the conduct of the hearing in an
efficient manner by clarifying at an early
stage of the process the issues in dispute
and the basis for those disputes. We
retain the requirement of proposed
§ 160.504(c) that the request for hearing
clearly and directly admit, deny, or
explain each of the findings of fact and
state the circumstances or arguments
that the respondent alleges constitute
the grounds for any defense and the
factual and legal basis for opposing the
penalty. (However, the respondent need
not provide its statistical study,
assuming it has one, until 30 days
before the scheduled hearing. See
§ 160.518.) This requirement will
facilitate narrowing and refining the
issues in dispute, thereby expediting the
conduct of the hearing.
Comment: One comment suggested
that, if the 60-day time period for
response were retained, HHS be
required to send a reminder to the
covered entity on the 45th day.
Response: We do not adopt this
suggestion. The need for the suggested
change is obviated by our decision to
extend the 60-day period.
Comment: Several comments
suggested that the rule does not
properly take into account the
possibility of notices being delivered to
the wrong official in a covered entity or
getting lost in a covered entity’s internal
mail system. They recommended that
the rule specify the official(s) in the
covered entity to whom the notice of
proposed determination must be sent, so
that the covered entity does not lose
time needed to prepare its defense. A
few comments suggested that the notice
of proposed determination be sent to the
Privacy Officer. It was suggested that the
covered entity be able to show good
cause for failing to respond in a timely
manner in such cases, or that the 60-day
time period be tolled.
Response: We do not think it is
necessary or feasible to identify the
person(s) to whom the notice of
proposed determination should be
addressed. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 (28 U.S.C.
Appendix), which applies under section
1128A(c), establishes who may be
served and applies without need for
further regulatory action. Because the
size and other organizational
circumstances of covered entities vary
greatly, a rule that further limited or
defined who must be served would most
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likely be inappropriate for some covered
entities. Further, it is likely that a notice
of proposed determination would be
issued after significant prior contact
with the covered entity, so we anticipate
that our investigators would be able to
ascertain which officer would be the
appropriate recipient of the notice.
In any event, a respondent can raise
the issues of concern raised by the
comments—e.g., failure to reach the
appropriate official or the official to
whom the notice of proposed
determination was addressed due to
problems in the entity’s mail system—
under § 160.504(b). Under that section,
if the respondent makes ‘‘a reasonable
showing’’ to the ALJ that the mailed
notice of proposed determination was
not properly received by the covered
entity or by a proper official within the
covered entity, the ALJ can extend the
90-day period to the extent he or she
considers appropriate.
Comment: One comment asked
whether findings of fact that are not
contested or about which the claim is
made of insufficient knowledge to
respond in the hearing request are
deemed admitted.
Response: Section 160.504(c) provides
respondents with two choices with
respect to denying findings of fact: (1)
The respondent may deny them; or (2)
the respondent may claim a lack of
knowledge, in which case the finding in
question is ‘‘deemed denied.’’ Since the
regulation deems a finding of fact
denied only where lack of knowledge is
claimed, if the respondent has neither
denied nor asserted lack of knowledge
with respect to the finding, the finding
must be deemed admitted.
Comment: One comment stated that
dismissal of a hearing request on the
grounds described in proposed
§ 160.504(d)(1)–(3) should be made
permissive, not mandatory, and
§ 160.504(d)(4) (dismissal where the
respondent fails to state an issue that
may properly be addressed in a hearing)
should be eliminated, to ensure that
covered entities are provided a fair
opportunity to request a hearing and
develop an appropriate defense.
Response: We revise proposed
§ 160.504(d)(1) to require dismissal on
the ground of failure to comply with
paragraph (b) to be limited to failure to
comply with the requirement of the
paragraph for timely filing of the request
for hearing. We revise proposed
§ 160.504(d)(1) to provide that dismissal
on this ground may occur only if the
Secretary moves for dismissal on this
ground. If the Secretarial party—OCR,
CMS, or both—does not believe that the
hearing should be dismissed due to the
insufficiency of the respondent’s request
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for hearing, and so does not challenge
the timeliness or sufficiency of the
request for hearing under paragraph (b)
or (c), respectively, the hearing should
go forward. The revision to paragraph
(d)(1) would permit this to occur.
Like its counterparts in other rules
issued pursuant to section 1128A,
§ 160.504(d)(1)–(3) mandates dismissal
so that the limited resources of the
government and of respondents are not
expended on hearing requests that fail
to comply with the straightforward
requirements of this section or that have
been withdrawn or abandoned by the
respondent. We believe that
considerations of economy and
efficiency require the dismissal of cases
that fall within the descriptions of these
subsections. However, in response to
the comments, we have added a
requirement to § 160.504(d)(1) that the
Secretary must file a motion for
dismissal of a hearing request rather
than permit an automatic dismissal by
the ALJ. The filing of such a motion will
require the Secretary to enunciate the
reasons a hearing request is deficient
under paragraphs (b) and (c) of this
section and allow the respondent the
opportunity to answer those charges.
We do not add such a requirement to
§ 160.504(d)(2)–(3), because we think
that the ALJ should have authority to
dismiss such cases for reasons of
withdrawal or abandonment by the
respondent without being requested to
do so by the Secretary.
Section 160.504(d)(4) provides the
administrative review channel leading
to judicial review of claims that may not
be reviewed administratively, such as
constitutional claims. This subsection is
necessary so that there is no confusion
about how respondents can efficiently
exhaust the administrative process for
such claims. We, thus, decline to
eliminate this subsection.
2. Section 160.508—Authority of the
ALJ
Proposed rule: The text of proposed
§ 160.508 was adopted by the April 17,
2003 interim final rule as § 160.530. No
changes to paragraphs (a) and (b) were
proposed. We proposed to revise
paragraph (c) by adding paragraphs
(c)(1) and (c)(5) to the list of limitations
on the authority of the ALJ. Proposed
paragraph (c)(1) would require the ALJ
to follow Federal statutes, regulations,
and Secretarial delegations of authority,
and to give deference to published
guidance to the extent not inconsistent
with statute or regulation; the preamble
to the proposed rule indicated that by
‘‘published guidance’’ we meant
guidance that has been publicly
disseminated, including posting on the
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CMS or OCR Web site. Proposed
paragraph (c)(5) would clarify that ALJs
may not review the Secretary’s exercise
of discretion whether to grant an
extension or to provide technical
assistance under section 1176(b)(3)(B) of
the Act or the Secretary’s exercise of
discretion in the choice of variable(s)
under proposed § 160.406.
Final rule: The final rule adopts the
provisions of the proposed rule, except
for proposed § 160.508(c)(5)(ii), which is
eliminated. A conforming change is
made to § 160.508(c)(5).
a. Section 160.508(b)
Comment: One comment stated that
this provision should be amended to
add a provision requiring that a
requested hearing be conducted within
a time certain, not to exceed 90 days
from receipt of the request for a hearing.
Another comment suggested that the
ALJ should notify a respondent of the
date and time for the hearing no later
than 90 days after the request for
hearing is filed.
Response: It would not be reasonable
or appropriate to impose a fixed
deadline by which hearings must be
scheduled, and we decline to do so. In
a complicated case, the time for
discovery and pre-hearing motions may
take more than 90 days, and, thus,
imposing such a deadline may
circumscribe the parties’ ability to
prepare their cases. Moreover, the ALJs
have other cases on their dockets, and
we cannot assume that they will in all
cases be able to begin a hearing on a
civil money penalty within 90 days. The
scheduling of the hearing is best left to
the ALJs, in consultation with the
parties.
b. Section 160.508(c)
Comment: A number of comments
opposed proposed § 160.508(c), on the
ground that it would significantly limit
the ALJ’s authority to rule on pertinent
issues. They stated that it was
questionable under this section whether
the ALJ would have the authority to
review the determination of the number
of violations, or imposition of joint and
several liability, since they may be
addressed in published guidance to
which the ALJ must give deference. It
was suggested that this limitation would
be a problem under proposed
§ 160.424(d), since those are issues that
a respondent would be unable to raise
at the administrative level.
Response: We do not agree. We
believe that it is of importance to
covered entities that ALJ and Board
decisions, as components of HHS, be
consistent with one another and with
the published compliance guidance
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HHS provides to covered entities.
Accordingly, we require ALJs and the
Board to follow guidance which has
been publicly disseminated, unless the
ALJ or Board finds the guidance to be
inconsistent with statute or regulation.
In the examples cited, any published
guidance related to the determination of
the number of violations, or when joint
and several liability is appropriate must
be consistent with applicable statute
and regulation, matters upon which the
ALJ may rule. See section 1176 and
§§ 160.402(b)(2), 160.406, and 160.508.
While deference to such published
guidance is required of the ALJs and
DAB, as components of HHS, similar
deference is not necessarily afforded
such guidance in any judicial review of
an adverse final agency determination
sought by a respondent. Section
160.424(d) should not present a
problem, since challenges related to
published guidance may be raised
during administrative and judicial
reviews of the proposed penalty.
Comment: One comment stated that
ALJs should be allowed to consider
affirmative defenses during a hearing,
even if they relate to issues committed
to the Secretary’s discretion. The
comment argued that an inability to
raise affirmative defenses before the ALJ
might impact a covered entity’s ability
to subsequently pursue legal remedies
under § 160.424(d).
Response: We agree that the ALJ is
allowed to consider affirmative defenses
during a hearing. See the discussion of
§ 160.410 above.
Comment: A couple of comments
agreed that ALJs should have the
authority to evaluate whether there was
a violation in the first place and asked
that this provision be retained in the
final rule.
Response: We agree and have done so.
c. Section 160.508(c)(1)
Comment: One comment asked, if a
guidance in effect at the time a violation
occurred were changed before the date
of the hearing, which version of the
guidance the ALJ would have to follow.
Response: The guidance in effect at
the time the violation occurred would
govern.
Comment: One comment expressed
concern with § 160.508(c)(1), insofar as
it would include in ‘‘published
guidance’’ FAQs published on the CMS
and OCR Web sites. According to the
comment, FAQs have never been
designated in the HIPAA regulations as
having the force of regulations
themselves. According to the comment,
many covered entities are not aware of
these postings and the industry is
unaware that they will have the same
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force and effect as regulations. The
comment further stated that if FAQs are
to have the force of regulation, then the
questions and responses should be
organized for such use, and the HIPAA
regulation should specifically designate
that covered entities will be held
accountable for compliance with these
responses or ‘‘published guidance.’’
Another comment suggested that
proposed § 160.508(c)(1) should be
revised to require the ALJ to give
consideration to published guidance
and consider whether the covered entity
reasonably relied on such guidance, as
is done in the regulations relating to
hearings by the Provider
Reimbursement Review Board (PRRB),
citing to 42 CFR 405.1867.
Response: The ‘‘published
guidances’’, including FAQs, inform
covered entities of the approach HHS is
taking in the enforcement of the HIPAA
rules. The guidances do not have the
force and effect of a regulation, as the
comment suggests, and are not
controlling upon the courts, as would be
the case with a regulation. As
previously explained, HHS seeks to
provide consistent compliance guidance
to covered entities and, to the extent
possible, to render decisions in the
adjudicative process that are both
consistent with other adjudicated cases
and with the policy decisions of the
Secretary expressed in HHS rules and
guidances. The consistency sought
within HHS is achieved by requiring the
ALJ and the Board, which are
components of HHS, to defer to such
published guidances, if they are
consistent with statute and regulation.
This is consistent with, and recognizes
the effect of, the existing delegations of
authority by the Secretary, which
delegate to the programs the Secretary’s
authority to establish policy. Requiring
that only consideration be given to such
published guidances, as in PRRB
hearings, rather than deference, would
not achieve the desired result.
Comment: One comment argued that
proposed § 160.508(c)(1) should be
changed to add ‘‘and does not establish
requirements in addition to those
specified in the applicable statute or
regulation,’’ on the ground that covered
entities should not be penalized for not
complying with requirements that
exceed the plain language of the statute.
Response: It is not clear what the
comment is suggesting, but if the
comment is suggesting that guidance
merely parrot what is in the statute and
regulations, guidance would be both
unnecessary and unhelpful. If, however,
the comment is suggesting that guidance
not exceed any explicit limits imposed
by the statute or regulations, the
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language is likewise unnecessary, as the
current language would permit the ALJ
or the Board to disregard guidance that
was not consistent with statute or
regulations.
d. Section 160.508(c)(5)
Comment: Proposed § 160.508(c)(5)(ii)
would have made the Secretary’s
selection of the variable under § 160.406
unreviewable by the ALJ. It was
criticized by several commenters as
unfair and inconsistent with the statute
on the grounds that the whole purpose
of the hearing before an ALJ is to review
the Secretary’s assessment of a penalty.
It was argued that, if a covered entity
has a reasonable argument as to why the
use of variables or a particular variable
was not appropriate, it should be
allowed to present the argument during
the ALJ hearing to which it is entitled
by statute. It was also argued that, since
proposed § 160.406 would include a
factual determination of the number of
times a covered entity may have failed
to engage in required conduct, or may
have engaged in a prohibited act, each
of the parties should be authorized to
address, and the ALJ to consider at a
hearing, that factual determination. One
comment asked whether, even if the ALJ
lacks authority to directly question the
variable(s) selected, a challenge to the
variable could be made through a claim
that ‘‘justice required’’ selection of a
different variable.
Response: Section 1128A(c)(2)
establishes the right to a hearing on the
record for any person who has been
given an adverse determination by the
Secretary. In a proceeding under section
1176, the adverse determination by the
Secretary is the civil money penalty
proposed in the notice of proposed
determination under § 160.420. Upon
review of the comments regarding
proposed § 160.508(c)(5)(ii), we agree
that the count of violations is an integral
part of a civil money penalty and should
be reviewable by the ALJ. Thus, we have
deleted proposed subparagraph (ii) from
§ 160.508(c)(5) in the final rule. As a
conforming change, we have integrated
subparagraph (i) into the text of
§ 160.508(c)(5).
3. Section 160.512—Prehearing
Conferences
Proposed rule: Proposed § 160.512
would adopt § 160.534, as added by the
April 17, 2003 interim final rule, with
two changes. Proposed § 160.512 would
revise paragraph (a) to establish a
minimum amount of notice (not less
than 14 business days) that must be
provided to the parties in the
scheduling of prehearing conferences.
Proposed § 160.512 would also revise
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paragraph (b)(11) to include the issue of
the protection of individually
identifiable health information as a
matter that may be discussed at the
prehearing conference, if appropriate.
Final rule: The final rule adopts the
provisions of the proposed rule.
Comment: One comment
recommended that a provision be added
to § 160.512 to require the ALJ to
schedule a prehearing conference
within 30 days of a request for a
hearing, unless both parties agree to a
later date.
Response: The scheduling of a
prehearing conference will depend, in
part, on the scheduling of the hearing.
For the reasons discussed under
§ 160.508(b) above, we do not agree that
it is advisable to so circumscribe the
ALJ’s flexibility to set the hearing
calendar.
Comment: A couple of comments
objected that the time frame for notice
of a pre-hearing conference provided for
by proposed § 160.512 is inadequate to
permit all necessary parties involved to
prepare a response. One comment stated
that the rule should extend the time
frame to 25 business days, while the
other suggested that the rule should
require at least a 30-day notice of a prehearing conference.
Response: Section 160.512 does not
prescribe 14 days as the amount of
notice of a pre-hearing conference that
must be given; rather, it simply
establishes 14 days as the minimum
amount of notice that is ‘‘reasonable.’’ In
our experience, 14 days should in most
cases be sufficient for the parties to
prepare for the conference adequately;
however, nothing in the rule prohibits a
party from requesting a longer period of
time to prepare for a pre-hearing
conference or the ALJ from granting
such a request.
4. Section 160.516—Discovery
Proposed rule: Proposed § 160.516
would adopt § 160.538 of the April 17,
2003 interim final rule. As relevant
here, proposed § 160.516 would permit
requests for production of documents,
but would not permit other forms of
discovery, such as interrogatories,
requests for admission, and depositions.
Proposed paragraph (d) states that this
section ‘‘may not be construed to
require the disclosure of interview
reports or statements obtained by any
party, or on behalf of any party, of
persons who will not be called as
witnesses by that party, or analyses and
summaries prepared in conjunction
with the investigation or litigation of the
case, or any otherwise privileged
documents.’’
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Final rule: The final rule adopts the
provisions of the proposed rule.
Comment: Several comments
recommended that proposed § 160.516
should be revised to allow requests for
admissions, depositions, and written
interrogatories in the discovery process.
It was argued that permitting these
forms of discovery would ensure that
covered entities are able to mount a
proper defense. It also was asserted that
expert testimony will be necessary to
establish both the alleged violation(s)
and any affirmative defenses. Allowing
such discovery would, it was asserted,
help to produce a record, make appeals
less likely, and potentially decrease the
length of administrative hearings.
Response: We believe that the level of
detail provided to a covered entity in
the notice of proposed determination
(including, where applicable, a copy of
HHS’s statistical expert’s study),
coupled with a right to request the
production of documents for copying
and inspection, provides the covered
entity with the information reasonably
required to mount its challenge to the
proposed civil money penalty or to
determine whether an affirmative
defense applies. The additional
discovery mentioned in the comments
would result in delays and costs.
Experience with the OIG regulation at
42 CFR 1005.7, which likewise does not
authorize other types of discovery, has
demonstrated that the discovery
provided for is appropriate and
sufficient.
Comment: Several comments argued
that, at a minimum, depositions should
be permitted at least with regard to
expert witnesses, including the
government’s statistical expert. They
asserted that, because depositions
would not be permitted, covered entities
would lose another potential
opportunity to question the
government’s statistician in an effort to
understand and defend against the
conclusion and assumptions made in
establishing the proposed civil money
penalty, which would be prejudicial to
the covered entity.
Response: We do not agree that
depositions are necessary. Under
§ 160.420(a)(2), as adopted in this final
rule, the study of HHS’s statistical
expert must be provided to the
respondent with the notice of proposed
determination.
Comment: A couple of comments
criticized the proposed rule for not
requiring that OCR and/or CMS hand
over potentially exculpatory
information to the entity being
investigated. The obligation to provide
exculpatory evidence should include
handing over exculpatory interview
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reports or statements obtained by the
government of persons who will not be
called as witnesses by that party. It was
recommended that this obligation be
added to the final rule.
Response: The obligation to provide
exculpatory evidence to an accused,
which applies in criminal proceedings,
is inapplicable in a HIPAA
administrative simplification
enforcement case.
Comment: One comment contended
that § 160.516 should be revised to treat
personal health information as
privileged information not subject to
discovery, since hearings are open to the
public under proposed § 160.534.
Response: A covered entity concerned
with potential public access to protected
health information may raise the issue
before the ALJ and seek a protective
order under § 160.512(b)(11). Depending
on the circumstances, an ALJ may
require the information to be deidentified or direct identifiers to be
stripped to protect the privacy of
individuals or order other protections
routinely afforded to similarly
confidential information within the
litigation forum, such as protective
orders on the use of the information in
public portions of the proceedings. In
addition, the ALJ may, for good cause
shown, order appropriate redactions
made to the record after hearing. See
§ 160.542(d).
5. Section 160.518—Exchange of
Witness Lists, Witness Statements, and
Exhibits
Proposed rule: Proposed § 160.518
would carry forward § 160.540, as
adopted by the April 17, 2003 interim
final rule, with one substantive change.
It would revise paragraph (a) to provide
time limits within which the exchange
of witness lists, statements, and exhibits
must occur prior to a hearing. Under
proposed § 160.518(a), these items must
be exchanged not more than 60, but not
less than 15, days prior to the scheduled
hearing.
Final rule: The final rule revises this
provision to require that, where a
respondent retains a statistical expert
for the purpose of challenging the
Secretary’s statistical sampling, a report
by the respondent’s expert be provided
to the Secretarial party not less than 30
days prior to the hearing.
Comment: Several comments
criticized the time frames of proposed
§ 160.518 as problematic in light of the
anticipated use of statistical sampling.
They argued that, if HHS uses statistical
sampling to determine the number of
violations and to establish its prima
facie case against a covered entity, the
covered entity must have a fair
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opportunity to rebut this evidence. That
fair opportunity should permit the
addition of rebuttal witnesses,
statements and exhibits after the 15-day
period and/or requiring the government
to provide more detailed information to
the covered entity regarding its
statistical sampling calculations,
methodology and assumptions at a time
that is sufficiently prior to the 15-day
deadline. The comments requested that
the time frames listed in the regulation
be increased to allow a covered entity
adequate time to prepare for a hearing.
Specifically, the comments urged that
witness lists, statements, and exhibits
for a hearing be exchanged by the
parties not more than 60 days and not
less than 30 days before a scheduled
hearing date.
Response: We have accommodated
the concern that the details of HHS’s
statistical study will not be made
available early enough in the proceeding
to allow a fair opportunity for rebuttal
by requiring in § 160.420(a)(2) that a
copy of the study be given to the
respondent with the notice of proposed
determination. Accordingly, under such
circumstances, there should not be a
problem identifying who respondent
should call as a rebuttal witness within
the time frames set out in this section.
We revise § 160.518(a) to require the
respondent to provide to HHS a copy of
the report of its statistical expert not less
than 30 days before the scheduled
hearing. This will give the Secretarial
party adequate time to prepare the
statistical part of its case and is
reasonable in light of the fact that the
respondent is given HHS’s statistical
study at the commencement of the
proceeding.
Comment: With respect to proposed
§ 160.518(b)(2), one comment asked
what would constitute extraordinary
circumstances. The comment stated that
this standard seems unnecessarily high
and that ‘‘good cause’’ would be a more
reasonable and fairer standard, given the
need for covered entities to rebut the
evidence of a statistical expert whose
information they will not receive until
the exchange of witnesses and exhibits.
Response: The decision concerning
what is sufficient to convince the ALJ
that extraordinary circumstances exist
will be case-specific. The justification
for lowering the standard no longer
applies, given our change to § 160.420.
Accordingly, we retain the
‘‘extraordinary circumstances’’ standard
to emphasize the importance of
observing the time frame for the
exchange of such information.
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6. Section 160.520—Subpoenas for
Attendance at Hearing
Proposed rule: Proposed § 160.520
would carry forward § 160.542, as
adopted by the April 17, 2003 interim
final rule, mainly unchanged. Proposed
§ 160.520 would clarify that when a
subpoena is served on HHS, the
Secretary may comply with the
subpoena by designating any
knowledgeable representative to testify.
Proposed § 160.520(d) would require a
party seeking a subpoena to file a
written motion not less than 30 days
before the scheduled hearing, unless
otherwise allowed by the ALJ for good
cause shown; the paragraph specified
what such a motion must contain.
Final rule: The final rule adopts the
provisions of the proposed rule.
Comment: One comment asked that
the language in proposed § 160.520(c) be
modified to provide that, if a respondent
subpoenas a particular employee or
official with specific knowledge of the
case at hand, the identified employee or
official would be required to testify.
While acknowledging that it was
reasonable for HHS to be able to
substitute a witness if a respondent
subpoenas an employee or official with
no knowledge of the case (such as the
Secretary), the comment argued that
HHS should not have such discretion if
the employee or official who is
subpoenaed has specific knowledge of
the case.
Response: We retain the provision as
proposed, because it is necessary to
permit the smooth conduct of
government business. We do not agree
that the provision will damage a
respondent’s ability to litigate his case,
as the provision requires that, although
the Secretary may designate an HHS
representative, the person so designated
must be ‘‘knowledgeable.’’ That person
may be the employee or official upon
whom the subpoena was first served, if
the Secretary determines that such
person is the appropriate witness,
possessed of the requisite knowledge to
testify upon the issues which are the
subject of the subpoena.
Comment: One comment stated
concerns with the interplay of proposed
§ 160.538 with proposed § 160.520(d).
Under proposed § 160.538(b), if a party
seeks to admit the testimony of a
witness in the form of a written
statement, that statement must be
provided to the other party ‘‘in a
manner that allows sufficient time for
the other party to subpoena the witness
for cross-examination at the hearing.’’
Under proposed § 160.520(d), ‘‘a party
seeking a subpoena must file a written
motion not less than 30 days before the
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date fixed for the hearing, unless
otherwise allowed by the ALJ for good
cause shown.’’ The comment argued
that a party that wanted to subpoena a
person whose written statement was
being offered by the opposing party
should not have the burden of showing
good cause for moving for a subpoena
less than 30 days before the hearing
date. Instead, the party seeking to admit
the written statement should be
required to provide that statement to the
other party more than 30 days before the
hearing, so that the other party will have
an opportunity to subpoena that witness
under the procedures established by
these regulations.
Response: We believe that the rules
adequately provide for such a
contingency, and so do not revise
§ 160.520 as requested. The party that
seeks to introduce testimony, other than
expert testimony, in the form of a
written statement must provide the
other party with a copy of the statement
and the address of the witness in
sufficient time to allow that other party
to subpoena that witness for cross
examination. Since § 160.520(d)
requires that motions seeking a
subpoena be filed not less than 30 days
before the hearing, the witness
statement and address should be
provided in sufficient time to allow a
timely motion to be made. In the event
that such statement and/or address is
not provided in sufficient time to allow
for a timely motion, good cause for
permitting the motion for subpoena to
be made on fewer than 30 days notice
would exist.
7. Section 160.522—Fees
Proposed rule: The proposed rule
proposed in § 160.522 to carry forward
unchanged § 160.544 of the April 17,
2003 interim final rule. The provision
requires the party subpoenaing a
witness to pay the cost of fees and
mileage. Where the respondent is the
party subpoenaing the witness, the
check for such fees and mileage must
accompany the subpoena when served,
but the check is not required to
accompany the subpoena where the
party subpoenaing the witness is the
Secretary.
Final rule: The final rule adopts the
provisions of the proposed rule.
Comment: One comment requested
clarification of this provision. Observing
that proposed § 160.522 would require a
check for specific fees to accompany the
subpoena except when HHS issues such
a subpoena, the comment questioned
whether this meant that HHS would be
required to reimburse someone they
subpoenaed or whether the HHS
reimbursement would come at a later
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date. Further, if it was the case that HHS
was not required to reimburse such fees,
the comment asked why this is the case,
since any other party would be required
to reimburse those fees.
Response: HHS is required to, and
will, pay to a subpoenaed witness the
fees provided for in this section. The
payment, however, need not accompany
the subpoena. This policy is consistent
with the usual procedure when the
federal government is a party. See, e.g.,
Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(b)(1). (28 U.S.C.
Appendix).
8. Section 160.534—The Hearing
Proposed rule: The text of proposed
§ 160.534 was adopted by the April 17,
2003 interim final rule as § 160.554. No
changes to paragraphs (a) and (c) were
proposed. However, it was proposed to
add a new paragraph (b) allocating the
burden of proof at the hearing. Under
proposed § 160.534(b), the respondent
would bear the burden of proof with
respect to: (1) Any affirmative defense,
including those set out in section
1176(b) of the Act, as implemented by
proposed § 160.410; (2) any challenge to
the amount or scope of a proposed
penalty under section 1128A(d), as
implemented by proposed §§ 160.404–
160.408, including mitigating factors;
and (3) any contention that a proposed
penalty should be reduced or waived
under section 1176(b)(4), as
implemented by § 160.412. The
Secretary would have the burden of
proof with respect to all other issues,
including issues of liability and the
factors considered as aggravating factors
under proposed § 160.408 in
determining the amount of penalties to
be imposed. The burden of persuasion
would be judged by a preponderance of
the evidence (i.e., it is more likely than
not that the position advocated is true).
We also proposed a new § 160.534(d),
which would provide that any party
may present items or information,
during its case in chief, that were
discovered after the date of the notice of
proposed determination or request for a
hearing, as applicable. The admissibility
of such proffered evidence would be
governed generally by the provisions of
proposed § 160.540, and be subject to
the 15-day rule for the exchange of trial
exhibits, witness lists and statements set
out at proposed § 160.518(a). If any such
evidence is offered by the Secretary, it
would not be admissible, unless
relevant and material to the findings of
fact set forth in the notice of proposed
determination, including circumstances
that may increase such penalty. If any
such evidence is offered by the
respondent, it would not be admissible
unless relevant and material to a
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specific admission, denial, or
explanation of a finding of fact, or to a
specific circumstance or argument
expressly stated in the respondent’s
request for hearing that are alleged to
constitute grounds for any defense or
the factual and legal basis for opposing
or reducing the penalty.
Final rule: The final rule adopts the
provisions of the proposed rule.
Comment: One comment
recommended that proposed
§ 160.534(b)(1)(ii) (placing the burden of
proof on the respondent with respect to
any challenge to the amount of a
proposed penalty pursuant to
§ 160.404–160.408, including mitigating
factors) be deleted. It was argued that
due process requires that HHS sustain
the burden of going forward with
evidence proving the amount of a
proposed penalty and the burden of
persuasion. It was also noted that this
section would place on the respondent
the burden of proof with respect to an
issue that is unreviewable under
proposed § 160.508(c)(5)—the selection
of variables under § 160.406.
Response: We disagree that
§ 160.534(b)(1)(ii) violates the due
process clause. Rather, it is consistent
with the normal allocation of the burden
of proof, in which the proponent of a
fact or argument has the burden of
proving it. Our change to § 160.508(c)(5)
renders the remainder of the comment
moot.
Comment: One comment suggested
that § 160.534(c) be revised to require
the ALJ, upon the request of either
party, to close a public hearing that
could result in disclosure of privacy or
security information that should not be
made public and seal the records.
Response: We agree that protecting
protected health information is
important and is an issue about which
all parties and the ALJ should be
concerned. However, administrative
hearings are, in general, required to be
open to the public. See, e.g., Detroit Free
Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 700 (6th
Cir. 2002) (stating that INS deportation
hearings and similar administrative
proceedings are traditionally open to the
public). An ALJ has means by which he
can protect the privacy of protected
health information to be introduced into
evidence, if he determines that this
should be done, including requiring
redaction of identifying information and
closing part of the hearing. In our view,
the ALJ will be in the best position to
balance the competing interests of the
public’s right to information and the
privacy interests associated with any
protected health information.
Accordingly, we do not mandate closure
of the hearing on request.
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9. Section 160.536—Statistical Sampling
Proposed rule: Proposed § 160.536
would permit the Secretary to introduce
the results of a statistical sampling
study as evidence of the number of
violations under proposed § 160.406(b),
or, where appropriate, any factor
considered in determining the amount
of the civil money penalty under
proposed § 160.408. If the estimation is
based upon an appropriate sampling
and employs valid statistical methods, it
would constitute prima facie evidence
of the number of violations or amount
of the penalty sought that is a part of the
Secretary’s burden of proof. Such a
showing would cause the burden of
going forward to shift to the respondent,
although the burden of persuasion
would remain with the Secretary.
Final rule: The final rule adopts the
provisions of the proposed rule.
Comment: Several comments argued
that the proposed rule would
significantly limit a covered entity’s
ability to challenge HHS’s statistical
evidence. Although proposed
§ 160.420(a)(2) would require HHS, in
the notice of proposed determination, to
describe the sampling technique used
by the Secretary, it is unclear what
constitutes a ‘‘brief’’ description, and a
brief description will most likely be
insufficient to provide the covered
entity with enough information to
mount an adequate challenge. Because
the covered entity may not receive a
copy of the actual statistical study until
15 days before the hearing, it would
have a very short period of time in
which to review, investigate, critique,
and/or rebut the statistical study.
Because proposed § 160.516 would
prohibit the taking of depositions, there
would be no way to subject the HHS’s
statistical expert to adverse examination
until the hearing, if then. The comments
requested that proposed § 160.536 be
deleted or, alternatively, the rule be
revised to permit depositions of HHS’s
statistical expert and require HHS to
give covered entities more detail of the
technique utilized in sufficient time to
allow entities to provide a meaningful
defense and rebuttal.
Response: We recognize the concern
that to make an effective challenge to
the Secretary’s introduction of the
results of a statistical study, a covered
entity should be provided with the
details of that study early in the
proceeding. Accordingly, we have
revised proposed § 160.420(a)(2) to
require HHS to provide a copy of the
study relied upon to the respondent
with the notice of proposed
determination. Further, we have revised
proposed § 160.504(b) to enlarge the
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time within which a respondent seeking
a hearing before an ALJ must mail its
request for hearing from 60 to 90 days.
We do not agree that depositions, which
are expensive and time consuming, are
required; the statistical study relied
upon will be given to respondent with
the notice of proposed determination,
allowing an adequate amount of time to
prepare any opposition thereto.
Comment: Several comments
contended that permitting proof of
violations by statistical sampling
violates basic notions of due process
and fundamental fairness, in that either
a violation is provable or it is not. The
comments raised the following specific
objections on this ground. Statistical
sampling merely estimates the number
of violations that could have occurred
and should not be used as a ‘‘short cut’’
for appropriate investigation and
review. The determination of any
variable used to calculate the number of
violations should be based on an
objective standard. The proposed
approach would not treat all covered
entities the same. The following
example was provided to illustrate this
latter concern. Suppose that a dentist
had 3,000 patients of record, and that
seven percent of those patients, or 210,
did not receive a Notice of Privacy
Practices. Suppose that a sample of 100
of the 3,000 patients was examined by
HHS, and it was determined that 15 did
not receive a notice. A statistical
inference from this sample would
estimate that 600, or 15 percent of all
patients of record, did not receive a
notice, even though in fact only 210 had
not received a notice. Under § 160.536,
the provider could be charged for 600
violations. While, on average, the
sampling approach would yield the
correct estimate of all providers, it
would not necessarily be correct for any
specific provider, which would be
unfair to the individual providers
involved.
Response: The use of sampling and
statistical methods is recognized under
Fed. R. Evid. 702 and under 42 CFR
1003.133 of the OIG rules, upon which
the language of this section is based.
The respondent may challenge whether
the estimation offered by the Secretary
is based upon a valid sample and
employs valid statistical methods or
may otherwise rebut the statistical
evidence submitted. In the example
cited by the comment, the respondent
also could rebut the results with
evidence that the actual number of
violations is less than the estimate
derived from the statistical sample.
With respect to the concerns
regarding the fairness and
appropriateness of using statistical
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sampling to determine the number of
violations, HHS will use sampling
methods which follow recognized
scientific guidelines for statistical
validity and precision. These methods
would be applicable to all types of
covered entities and will objectively
measure the number of violations by a
covered entity or the number of
occurrences of a particular aggravating
circumstance. Because of the wide range
of possible violations, however, we
cannot at this time present specific
sampling designs or levels of acceptable
precision. However, the methodology
employed will be documented and
made available in the statistical
sampling study provided with the
notice of proposed determination.
Comment: Several comments argued
that the use of statistical sampling is
inappropriate to determine violations of
the HIPAA rules. A couple of comments
argued that, because of the many
variables and discretionary
considerations that can go into
determining that a violation has
occurred, and because many complaints
or investigations will relate to
individual circumstances, using
statistical sampling to determine the
number of violations is not appropriate.
Another comment gave as an example of
this problem Privacy Rule violations
involving disclosure of protected health
information beyond the ‘‘minimum
necessary;’’ it asserted that the number
of such violations cannot be adequately
assessed through a statistical sample.
Use of statistical sampling in such a
case could preclude a covered entity
from asserting its fact-based affirmative
defenses. It was argued that statistical
sampling is appropriate for use in
estimating averages, but is not
appropriate for determining the number
of violations by a specific covered
entity.
Response: As noted above, statistical
sampling is recognized under the
Federal Rules of Evidence and other
HHS regulations. See, e.g., 42 CFR
1003.133. The results, if based upon an
appropriate sampling and computed by
valid statistical methods, are only prima
facie evidence of the number of
violations or the existence of factors
material to the proposed civil money
penalty. The respondent may challenge
the adequacy or size of the sample or
the statistical methods employed, and
may offer other evidence to rebut the
results derived through the statistical
methodology.
We do not agree that statistical
methods are, per se, inappropriate for
determining the number of violations
that have occurred. For example,
suppose that a health plan with a large
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volume of electronic claims is found to
have required providers to include on
such claims a data element which is not
part of the standard. A sample of the
claims would be selected, and the
percentage of claims found to be in
violation of the standard would be
computed from the sample and
projected to the universe of claims for
the year to establish the total number of
violations of the standard in the
calendar year. Of course, HHS’s
statistical methods would have to pass
muster, and a respondent could
challenge the statistical results, on
normal statistical grounds, e.g., that the
sample size was insufficient, that the
sample was not representative, and so
on.
Comment: Several comments
contended that, by allowing statistical
sampling to be introduced at a hearing,
proposed § 160.536 directly contradicts
the language of § 160.508, which does
not allow an ALJ to review issues under
the Secretary’s discretion, which
includes calculating the number of
violations. Other comments stated that,
in the event that statistical sampling is
used by HHS to determine the number
of violations, it should be subject to ALJ
review and that insulating it from
review would increase the potential for
abuse exponentially.
Response: Proposed § 160.508(c) has
been revised to permit the ALJ to review
the Secretary’s calculation of the
number of violations of an identical
administrative simplification provision
under § 160.406. If statistical sampling
is employed to determine the number of
violations, the results are subject to
challenge before the ALJ.
Comment: The provision of proposed
§ 160.536 limiting statistical studies to
those ‘‘based upon an appropriate
sampling and computed by valid
statistical methods’’ was criticized. It
was noted that no criteria for validity
are given, even though the comments by
the agency specifically acknowledge the
danger of extrapolating from small
sample sizes. It also was argued that the
appropriateness and validity of such
sampling techniques are left to the
discretion of the Secretary, who will
employ criteria known only to the
Secretary. It was recommended that
statistical sampling not be permitted
without clearer guidelines or more
flexibility to challenge the study at an
early stage, before significant
investment of resources.
Response: By requiring that
appropriate sampling and valid
statistical methods be employed, HHS is
mirroring the standard by which the
reliability of such expert testimony is
assessed under Fed. R. Evid. 702. If
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statistical sampling is employed to
determine the number of violations of
an administrative simplification
provision in a calendar year, such
determination is subject to review by
the ALJ. With respect to a respondent’s
ability to challenge the study at an
earlier stage, under § 160.420(a)(2), a
copy of the study relied upon will be
provided to the respondent with the
notice of proposed determination.
10. Section 160.538—Witnesses
Proposed rule: Proposed § 160.538
would carry forward unchanged
§ 160.556, as adopted by the April 17,
2003 interim final rule. As relevant
here, paragraph (b) provides that, at the
discretion of the ALJ and subject to
certain conditions, testimony of
witnesses other than the testimony of
expert witnesses may be admitted in the
form of a written statement and the ALJ
may, at his discretion, admit prior
sworn testimony of experts that has
been subject to adverse examination.
Final rule: The final rule adopts the
provisions of the proposed rule, except
that the fourth sentence of proposed
§ 160.538(b) is placed before the second
sentence of proposed § 160.538(b).
Comment: One comment stated that it
was unclear whether the government’s
statistician could even be required to
testify; rather, it appeared that the
government could rely solely on the
expert’s prior testimony in other cases
and/or the expert’s report. Because
depositions are not allowed, this
provision must mean that testimony
from experts in other cases may be used.
It was argued that this would be
prejudicial, because the covered entity
will not have had an opportunity to
subject the testimony to adverse
examination and the facts of different
cases would likely not be identical.
Therefore, the expert testimony in one
case may not be appropriate for use in
a different case. It was recommended
that this section be revised to require, at
the covered entity’s request, the
testimony at the hearing of the
government’s statistical expert and
prohibit the use of prior sworn
testimony of experts unless from the
specific case at issue.
Response: HHS expects that its
statistical expert will testify at the
hearing. Moreover, the respondent may
move the ALJ to subpoena HHS’s
statistical expert to appear and testify at
the hearing. See § 160.520.
Comment: One comment stated that,
when §§ 160.538 and 160.516(b) are
read together, they would permit an
expert’s testimony, taken under oath in
a different case, to be admitted into
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evidence, leaving the respondent with
no chance to question the expert.
Response: We recognize the concern
raised, which we believe arises out of an
inadvertent transposition of a sentence
in the text of proposed § 160.538(b). We
intended that the subsection’s text
mirror that of the OIG regulation at 45
CFR 1005.16(b) by ending with the
following: ‘‘Any such written statement
must be provided to the other party,
along with the last known address of the
witness, in a manner that allows
sufficient time for the other party to
subpoena the witness for crossexamination at the hearing. Prior
written statements of witnesses
proposed to testify at the hearing must
be exchanged as provided in § 160.518.’’
We have corrected this error. As the rule
now reads, the prior sworn testimony of
an expert will be treated like any other
witness’s statement that a party
proposes to offer in lieu of testimony at
the hearing: a copy must be provided to
the other party along with the witness’s
address in sufficient time to permit such
other party to subpoena and question
that witness at the hearing.
11. Section 160.540—Evidence
Proposed rule: Proposed § 160.540
would carry forward unchanged
§ 160.558, which was adopted by the
April 17, 2003 interim final rule.
Paragraph (b) of this section provides
that the ALJ is not bound by the Federal
Rules of Evidence, except as provided in
the subpart.
Final rule: The final rule adopts the
provisions of the proposed rule.
Comment: One comment argued that
proposed § 160.540(b) should be
revised. The comment stated that the
optional use of the Federal Rules of
Evidence is insufficient and would not
allow entities to know what evidence
will be admissible at the hearing or
what rules of evidence will apply. At a
minimum, it was argued, the use of
hearsay should be prohibited except
pursuant to the hearsay exceptions of
the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Response: The Administrative
Procedure Act does not require HHS to
apply the Federal Rules of Evidence to
limit the discretion of ALJs to admit
evidence at hearings. See 5 U.S.C.
556(d). To be admissible, evidence need
only be relevant, material, reliable, and
probative. However, the ALJ may apply
the Federal Rules of Evidence, where
appropriate. Examples of situations
where use of the Federal Rules of
Evidence might be appropriate would
include to exclude unreliable evidence,
to weigh the probative value of evidence
against the risks attending its admission,
to determine whether a Federal
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privilege exists, or to determine whether
the evidence relates to an offered
compromise and settlement, which
would be inadmissible under Fed. R.
Evid. 408.
Comment: One comment argued that
proposed § 160.540(g) should be
deleted. It was argued that this
provision is inconsistent with the sixyear time limit in § 160.414, in that it
permits admission at the hearing of
‘‘crimes, wrongs or acts’’ without limit
as to when they may have occurred. The
comment stated that acts or other
behaviors that are not the subject of civil
money penalties are not relevant factors
in determining the penalties that should
be imposed, nor are they proof that the
prohibited activity occurred. The
Secretary is not required in a civil
administrative proceeding to prove
intent or mens rea.
Response: We believe that evidence of
prior bad acts, admitted for the purposes
listed (which are consistent with Fed. R.
Evid. 404(b)) may be relevant and
material in particular cases and, thus,
should not be categorically excluded, as
suggested. For instance, such evidence
may be relevant and material to proving
a covered entity’s knowledge of the
violation or aggravating circumstances
affecting the amount of the civil money
penalty imposed. In the latter case, for
example, the evidence would be
admitted to prove the aggravating
circumstances and not the actual
violations at issue; thus, the statute of
limitations would not apply with
respect to the bad acts. (We note,
however, that prior bad acts unrelated to
the covered entity’s compliance with
the HIPAA provisions or rules would
not be admissible to prove aggravating
circumstances under § 160.408(d).)
Comment: Another comment argued
that proposed § 160.540(g) should be
deleted, but if retained, such evidence
should be reviewable under the other
criteria for admissibility of proposed
§ 160.540, and HHS should be required
to provide advance notice of its intent
to present such evidence.
Response: Evidence of prior bad acts
would be subject to the same criteria for
admissibility as other evidence offered
at the hearing—for instance, whether
the probative value of such evidence is
substantially outweighed by its
potential for prejudice. Such evidence is
also subject to the rules regarding notice
that apply to other evidence; see, e.g.,
§§ 160.420(a)(5), 160.516, and 160.518.
12. Section 160.542—The Record
Proposed rule: This section would
carry forward unchanged § 160.560,
adopted by the April 17, 2003 interim
final rule. Since the section provides
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that the record of the proceedings be
transcribed, we proposed to add to
paragraph (a) of this section a
requirement that the cost of
transcription of the record be borne
equally by the parties, in the interest of
fairness.
Final rule: The final rule adopts the
provisions of the proposed rule, except
that paragraph (a) is revised to clarify
that if a party requests a copy of the
transcript of the hearing proceedings it
must pay the cost of such transcript,
unless such payment is waived by the
ALJ or the Board for good cause shown.
Comment: One comment
recommended that this fee be assessed
at the end of the investigation and
assumed by the responsible party based
on the outcome of the investigation.
Another comment requested that HHS
bear the cost of the court reporter’s
appearance (as opposed to the cost of
copies).
Response: We acknowledge that the
language of proposed paragraph (a)
suggested that there is a fee or cost for
a court reporter’s appearance, in
addition to the cost of obtaining a copy
of the transcript of the hearing
proceedings. As there is no such
additional cost, we have revised
paragraph (a) to state that a party that
requests a copy of the transcript of
hearing is required to pay the cost of
preparing such transcript. We have also
added a provision that will permit the
ALJ or the Board, for good cause shown,
to waive the cost of obtaining the
transcript.
13. Section 160.546—ALJ Decision
Proposed rule: The proposed rule
proposed that the ALJ decision would
be the initial decision of the Secretary,
rather than the final decision of the
Secretary as set forth in § 160.564(d) of
the April 17, 2003 interim final rule.
Thus, we proposed to revise paragraph
(d) to provide that the decision of the
ALJ will be final and binding on the
parties 60 days from the date of service
of the ALJ decision, unless it is timely
appealed by either party.
Final rule: The final rule adopts the
provisions of the proposed rule.
Comment: One comment requested
that the section be revised to provide
that the ALJ could not increase a
penalty beyond the statutory cap of
section 1176(a)(1).
Response: The ALJ is bound by both
the statute and the regulations, which
both explicitly address this issue.
Section 1176(a)(1) states that ‘‘the total
amount imposed on the person for all
violations of an identical requirement or
prohibition during a calendar year may
not exceed $25,000.’’ Section
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160.404(b)(1)(ii) states that the Secretary
may not impose a civil money penalty
in excess of $25,000 for identical
violations during a calendar year.
In light of these explicit provisions,
we do not agree that the suggested
change is necessary.
14. Section 160.548—Appeal of the ALJ
Decision
Proposed rule: Proposed § 160.548
would provide that any party may
appeal the initial decision of the ALJ to
the Board within 30 days of the date of
service of the ALJ initial decision,
unless extended for good cause. The
appealing party must file a written brief
specifying its exceptions to the initial
decision. The opposing party may file
an opposition brief, which is limited to
the exceptions raised in the brief
accompanying notice of appeal and any
relevant issues not addressed in said
exceptions and must be filed within 30
days of receiving the appealing party’s
notice of appeal and brief. The
appealing party may, if permitted by the
Board, file a reply brief. These briefs
may be the only means that the parties
will have to present their case to the
Board, since there is no right to appear
personally before the Board. The
proposed rule provided that if a party
demonstrates that additional evidence is
material and relevant and there are
reasonable grounds why such evidence
was not introduced at the ALJ hearing,
the Board may remand the case to the
ALJ for consideration of the additional
evidence. In an appeal to the Board, the
standard of review on a disputed issue
of fact would be whether the ALJ’s
initial decision is supported by
substantial evidence on the record as a
whole; on a disputed issue of law, the
standard of review is whether the ALJ’s
initial decision is erroneous. The Board
could decline review, affirm, increase,
reduce, or reverse any penalty, or
remand a penalty determination to the
ALJ.
Under proposed § 160.548(i), the
Board must serve its decision on the
parties within 60 days after final briefs
are filed. The decision of the Board
becomes the final decision of the
Secretary 60 days after service of the
decision, except where the decision is to
remand to the ALJ or a party requests
reconsideration before the decision
becomes final. Proposed § 160.548(j)
provides that a party may request
reconsideration of the Board’s decision,
provides a reconsideration process, and
provides that the Board’s
reconsideration decision becomes final
on service. The decision of the Board
constitutes the final decision of the
Secretary from which a petition for
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judicial review may be filed by a
respondent aggrieved by the Board’s
decision. Proposed § 160.548(k)
provides for a petition for judicial
review of a final decision of the
Secretary.
Final rule: The final rule adopts the
provisions of the proposed rule, except
that paragraph (e) is revised to make it
consistent with the revision to
§ 160.504(c). The revision would permit
the Board to consider an affirmative
defense under § 160.410(b)(1) that is
raised for the first time before the Board.
Thus, under paragraph (f) of this
section, the Board could, but would not
be required to, remand the case to the
ALJ for consideration of any evidence
adduced with respect to such defense.
Comment: One comment was received
on this section. It requested that the
section be revised to provide that the
Board could not increase a penalty
beyond the statutory cap of section
1176(a)(1).
Response: We do not agree that such
a provision is necessary, for the reasons
discussed in the preceding section.
15. Section 160.552—Harmless Error
Proposed rule: Proposed § 160.552
proposed to adopt the ‘‘harmless error’’
rule that applies to civil litigation in
Federal courts. The provision would
provide, in general, that the ALJ and the
Board at every stage of the proceeding
will disregard any error or defect in the
proceeding that does not affect the
substantial rights of the parties.
Final rule: The final rule adopts the
provisions of the proposed rule.
Comment: One comment asked for
further guidance on, and clarification of,
this provision. Another comment stated
that the provision was far too broad,
particularly given the limited discovery
available to covered entities. Concern
was expressed that the rule would
severely limit a covered entity’s ability
to appeal an adverse ruling.
Response: The proposed rule was
modeled after Fed. R. Civ. P. 61 and 42
CFR 1005.23 of the OIG regulations. It
is a common provision in procedural
rules that govern civil and
administrative adjudications and is
intended to promote efficiency in the
resolution of disputes. If a respondent
seeks an appeal because of an error that
affects the party’s substantive rights or
the case’s outcome, this section would
not be applicable. Thus, we do not agree
that it would severely limit a covered
entity’s ability to appeal an adverse
ruling, and we adopt the section as
proposed.
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8423
IV. Impact Statement and Other
Required Analyses
Comment: Only one comment was
received on the impact and other
required analyses of the proposed rule
(see 70 FR 20247–49). The comment
asserted that HHS was declaring itself
exempt from complying with the
Paperwork Reduction Act, the
Regulatory Flexibility Act, the
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of
1995, the Small Business Regulatory
Enforcement and Fairness Act, and
Executive Order 13132, and that an
effort to compute vigorously the range of
potential effects is needed to assure
agency accountability.
Response: The comment misstates the
position HHS took in the proposed rules
concerning these laws. HHS does not
consider itself, or the Enforcement Rule,
exempt from these laws. However, each
of these laws covers only certain types
of rules and agency actions. For the
reasons stated in the proposed rule and
summarized below, those laws do not
apply to the particular actions taken
with respect to this rule. The comment
provides no substantive grounds for
altering our prior conclusions with
respect to these laws.
A. Paperwork Reduction Act
We reviewed this final rule to
determine whether it raises issues that
would subject it to the Paperwork
Reduction Act (PRA). Since the final
rule comes within the exemption of 5
CFR 1320.4(a), as it deals entirely with
administrative investigations and
actions against specific individuals or
entities, it need not be reviewed by the
Office of Management and Budget under
the authority of the PRA.
B. Executive Order 12866; Regulatory
Flexibility Act; Unfunded Mandates
Reform Act of 1995; Small Business
Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of
1996; Executive Order 13132
We have examined the impacts of this
final rule as required by Executive
Order 12866 (September 1993,
Regulatory Planning and Review), the
Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA)
(September 16, 1980, Pub. L. 96–354),
the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of
1995 (Pub. L. 104–4), the Small
Business Regulatory Enforcement and
Fairness Act, 5 U.S.C. 801, et seq., and
Executive Order 13132.
1. Executive Order 12866
Executive Order 12866 (as amended
by Executive Order 13258, which
merely reassigns responsibility of
duties) directs agencies to assess all
costs and benefits of available regulatory
alternatives and, if regulation is
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necessary, to select regulatory
approaches that maximize net benefits
(including potential economic,
environmental, public health and safety
effects, distributive impacts, and
equity). Executive Order 12866 defines,
at section 3(f), several categories of
‘‘significant regulatory actions.’’ One
category is ‘‘economically significant’’
rules, which are defined in section
3(f)(1) of the Order as rules that may
‘‘have an annual effect on the economy
of $100 million or more, or adversely
affect in a material way the economy,
productivity, competition, jobs, the
environment, public health or safety, or
State, local, or tribal governments or
communities.’’ Another category, under
section 3(f)(4) of the Order, consists of
rules that are ‘‘significant regulatory
actions’’ because they ‘‘raise novel legal
or policy issues arising out of legal
mandates, the President’s priorities, or
the principles set forth in this Executive
Order.’’ Executive Order 12866 requires
a full economic impact analysis only for
‘‘economically significant’’ rules under
section 3(f)(1). For the reasons stated at
70 FR 20248–49, we have concluded
that this rule should be treated as a
‘‘significant regulatory action’’ within
the meaning of section 3(f)(4) of
Executive Order 12866, but that the
impact of this rule is not such that it
reaches the economically significant
threshold under section 3(f)(1) of the
Order.
We note, with regard to our prior
analysis, that our ongoing experiences
with HIPAA complaints bears out our
experience to July 2004, which was
discussed at 70 FR 20248. As of October
31, 2005, OCR had received and
initiated review of over 16,000
complaints and had closed 68 percent of
the complaints; at the same time, CMS
had received and initiated review of 413
complaints and closed 67 percent of the
complaints. Thus, we continue to be of
the view that the costs attributable to
the provisions of this rule will, in most
cases that are opened, be low. We
likewise continue to believe, for the
reasons stated at 70 FR 20249, that the
value of the benefits brought by the
HIPAA provisions are sufficient to
warrant appropriate enforcement efforts
and that the benefits of these protections
far outweigh the costs of this
enforcement regulation.
Thus, in most cases, if covered
entities comply with the various HIPAA
rules, they should not incur any
significant additional costs as a result of
the Enforcement Rule. This is based on
the fact the costs intrinsic to most of the
HIPAA rules and operating directions
against which compliance is evaluated
have been scored independently of this
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rule, and those requirements are not
changed by this rule. We recognize that
the specific requirements against which
compliance is evaluated are not yet well
known and may evolve with experience
under HIPAA, but we expect that
covered entities have both the ability
and expectation to maintain
compliance, especially given our
commitment to encouraging and
facilitating voluntary compliance. While
not straightforward to project, it seems
likely that the number of times in which
the full civil money penalty
enforcement process will be invoked
will be extremely small, based on the
evidence to date.
the national government and the States,
or on the distribution of power and
responsibilities among the various
levels of government,’’ nor, for the
reasons previously explained, will it
have substantial economic effects would
not be substantial, while any
preemption of State law that could
occur would be a function of the
underlying HIPAA rules, not this rule.
Therefore, the Enforcement Rule is not
subject to Executive Order 13132
(Federalism).
2. Other Analyses
We also examined the impact of this
rule as required by the Regulatory
Flexibility Act (RFA). The RFA requires
agencies to determine whether a rule
will have a significant economic impact
on a substantial number of small
entities. For purposes of the RFA, small
entities include small businesses,
nonprofit organizations, and
government jurisdictions; for health care
entities, the size standard for a ‘‘small’’
entity ranges from $6 million to $29
million in revenues in any one year. For
the reasons discussed at 70 FR 20249,
the Secretary certifies that this rule will
not have a significant economic impact
on a substantial number of small
entities.
Section 202 of the Unfunded
Mandates Reform Act of 1995, 2 U.S.C.
1531 et seq., also requires that agencies
assess anticipated costs and benefits
before issuing any rule that may result
in expenditure in any one year by State,
local, or tribal governments, in the
aggregate, or by the private sector, of
$100 million, adjusted for inflation. The
Small Business Regulatory Enforcement
Fairness Act of 1996 (SBREFA), 5 U.S.C.
801, et seq., requires that rules that will
have an impact on the economy of $100
million or more per annum be
submitted for Congressional review. For
the reasons discussed above and at 70
FR 20248–49, this rule will not impose
a burden large enough to require a
section 202 statement under the
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995
or Congressional review under SBREFA.
Executive Order 13132 establishes
certain requirements that an agency
must meet when it adopts a final rule
that imposes substantial direct
requirement costs on State and local
governments, preempts State law, or
otherwise has Federalism implications.
This final rule does not have
‘‘Federalism implications, ‘‘ as it will
not have ‘‘substantial direct effects on
the States, on the relationship between
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Dated: December 20, 2005.
Michael O. Leavitt,
Secretary.
45 CFR Part 160
Administrative practice and
procedure, Computer technology,
Electronic transactions, Employer
benefit plan, Health, Health care, Health
facilities, Health insurance, Health
records, Hospitals, Investigations,
Medicaid, Medical research, Medicare,
Penalties, Privacy, Reporting and record
keeping requirements, Security.
45 CFR Part 164
Administrative practice and
procedure, Electronic information
system, Electronic transactions,
Employer benefit plan, Health, Health
care, Health facilities, Health Insurance,
Health records, Hospitals, Medicaid,
Medical research, Medicare, Privacy,
Reporting and record keeping
requirements, Security.
I For the reasons set forth in the
preamble, the Department of Health and
Human Services amends 45 CFR subtitle
A, subchapter C, parts 160 and 164, as
set forth below.
PART 160—GENERAL
ADMINISTRATIVE REQUIREMENTS
1. The authority citation for part 160
is revised to read as follows:
I
Authority: 42 U.S.C. 1302(a), 42 U.S.C.
1320d—1320d–8, sec. 264 of Pub. L.104–191,
110 Stat. 2033–2034 (42 U.S.C. 1320d–2
(note)), and 5 U.S.C. 552.
2. Add to § 160.103 in alphabetical
order the definition of ‘‘Person’’ to read
as follows:
I
§ 160.103
Definitions.
*
*
*
*
*
‘‘Person’’ means a natural person,
trust or estate, partnership, corporation,
professional association or corporation,
or other entity, public or private.
*
*
*
*
*
I 3. Revise subpart C to read as follows:
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Subpart C—Compliance and
Investigations
Sec.
160.300 Applicability.
160.302 Definitions.
160.304 Principles for achieving
compliance.
160.306 Complaints to the Secretary.
160.308 Compliance reviews.
160.310 Responsibilities of covered entities.
160.312 Secretarial action regarding
complaints and compliance reviews.
160.314 Investigational subpoenas and
inquiries.
160.316 Refraining from intimidation or
retaliation.
§ 160.300
Applicability.
This subpart applies to actions by the
Secretary, covered entities, and others
with respect to ascertaining the
compliance by covered entities with,
and the enforcement of, the applicable
provisions of this part 160 and parts 162
and 164 of this subchapter.
§ 160.302
Definitions.
As used in this subpart and subparts
D and E of this part, the following terms
have the following meanings:
Administrative simplification
provision means any requirement or
prohibition established by:
(1) 42 U.S.C. 1320d—1320d–4,
1320d–7, and 1320d–8;
(2) Section 264 of Pub. L. 104–191; or
(3) This subchapter.
ALJ means Administrative Law Judge.
Civil money penalty or penalty means
the amount determined under § 160.404
of this part and includes the plural of
these terms.
Respondent means a covered entity
upon which the Secretary has imposed,
or proposes to impose, a civil money
penalty.
Violation or violate means, as the
context may require, failure to comply
with an administrative simplification
provision.
§ 160.304 Principles for achieving
compliance.
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(a) Cooperation. The Secretary will, to
the extent practicable, seek the
cooperation of covered entities in
obtaining compliance with the
applicable administrative simplification
provisions.
(b) Assistance. The Secretary may
provide technical assistance to covered
entities to help them comply voluntarily
with the applicable administrative
simplification provisions.
§ 160.306
Complaints to the Secretary.
(a) Right to file a complaint. A person
who believes a covered entity is not
complying with the administrative
simplification provisions may file a
complaint with the Secretary.
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(b) Requirements for filing
complaints. Complaints under this
section must meet the following
requirements:
(1) A complaint must be filed in
writing, either on paper or
electronically.
(2) A complaint must name the person
that is the subject of the complaint and
describe the acts or omissions believed
to be in violation of the applicable
administrative simplification
provision(s).
(3) A complaint must be filed within
180 days of when the complainant knew
or should have known that the act or
omission complained of occurred,
unless this time limit is waived by the
Secretary for good cause shown.
(4) The Secretary may prescribe
additional procedures for the filing of
complaints, as well as the place and
manner of filing, by notice in the
Federal Register.
(c) Investigation. The Secretary may
investigate complaints filed under this
section. Such investigation may include
a review of the pertinent policies,
procedures, or practices of the covered
entity and of the circumstances
regarding any alleged violation. At the
time of initial written communication
with the covered entity about the
complaint, the Secretary will describe
the act(s) and/or omission(s) that are the
basis of the complaint.
§ 160.308
Compliance reviews.
The Secretary may conduct
compliance reviews to determine
whether covered entities are complying
with the applicable administrative
simplification provisions.
§ 160.310
entities.
Responsibilities of covered
(a) Provide records and compliance
reports. A covered entity must keep
such records and submit such
compliance reports, in such time and
manner and containing such
information, as the Secretary may
determine to be necessary to enable the
Secretary to ascertain whether the
covered entity has complied or is
complying with the applicable
administrative simplification
provisions.
(b) Cooperate with complaint
investigations and compliance reviews.
A covered entity must cooperate with
the Secretary, if the Secretary
undertakes an investigation or
compliance review of the policies,
procedures, or practices of the covered
entity to determine whether it is
complying with the applicable
administrative simplification
provisions.
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8425
(c) Permit access to information. (1) A
covered entity must permit access by
the Secretary during normal business
hours to its facilities, books, records,
accounts, and other sources of
information, including protected health
information, that are pertinent to
ascertaining compliance with the
applicable administrative simplification
provisions. If the Secretary determines
that exigent circumstances exist, such as
when documents may be hidden or
destroyed, a covered entity must permit
access by the Secretary at any time and
without notice.
(2) If any information required of a
covered entity under this section is in
the exclusive possession of any other
agency, institution, or person and the
other agency, institution, or person fails
or refuses to furnish the information, the
covered entity must so certify and set
forth what efforts it has made to obtain
the information.
(3) Protected health information
obtained by the Secretary in connection
with an investigation or compliance
review under this subpart will not be
disclosed by the Secretary, except if
necessary for ascertaining or enforcing
compliance with the applicable
administrative simplification
provisions, or if otherwise required by
law.
§ 160.312 Secretarial action regarding
complaints and compliance reviews.
(a) Resolution when noncompliance is
indicated. (1) If an investigation of a
complaint pursuant to § 160.306 or a
compliance review pursuant to
§ 160.308 indicates noncompliance, the
Secretary will attempt to reach a
resolution of the matter satisfactory to
the Secretary by informal means.
Informal means may include
demonstrated compliance or a
completed corrective action plan or
other agreement.
(2) If the matter is resolved by
informal means, the Secretary will so
inform the covered entity and, if the
matter arose from a complaint, the
complainant, in writing.
(3) If the matter is not resolved by
informal means, the Secretary will—
(i) So inform the covered entity and
provide the covered entity an
opportunity to submit written evidence
of any mitigating factors or affirmative
defenses for consideration under
§§ 160.408 and 160.410 of this part. The
covered entity must submit any such
evidence to the Secretary within 30 days
(computed in the same manner as
prescribed under § 160.526 of this part)
of receipt of such notification; and
(ii) If, following action pursuant to
paragraph (a)(3)(i) of this section, the
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Secretary finds that a civil money
penalty should be imposed, inform the
covered entity of such finding in a
notice of proposed determination in
accordance with § 160.420 of this part.
(b) Resolution when no violation is
found. If, after an investigation pursuant
to § 160.306 or a compliance review
pursuant to § 160.308, the Secretary
determines that further action is not
warranted, the Secretary will so inform
the covered entity and, if the matter
arose from a complaint, the
complainant, in writing.
dsatterwhite on PROD1PC65 with RULES3
§ 160.314 Investigational subpoenas and
inquiries.
(a) The Secretary may issue
subpoenas in accordance with 42 U.S.C.
405(d) and (e), 1320a–7a(j), and 1320d–
5 to require the attendance and
testimony of witnesses and the
production of any other evidence during
an investigation or compliance review
pursuant to this part. For purposes of
this paragraph, a person other than a
natural person is termed an ‘‘entity.’’
(1) A subpoena issued under this
paragraph must—
(i) State the name of the person
(including the entity, if applicable) to
whom the subpoena is addressed;
(ii) State the statutory authority for
the subpoena;
(iii) Indicate the date, time, and place
that the testimony will take place;
(iv) Include a reasonably specific
description of any documents or items
required to be produced; and
(v) If the subpoena is addressed to an
entity, describe with reasonable
particularity the subject matter on
which testimony is required. In that
event, the entity must designate one or
more natural persons who will testify on
its behalf, and must state as to each such
person that person’s name and address
and the matters on which he or she will
testify. The designated person must
testify as to matters known or
reasonably available to the entity.
(2) A subpoena under this section
must be served by—
(i) Delivering a copy to the natural
person named in the subpoena or to the
entity named in the subpoena at its last
principal place of business; or
(ii) Registered or certified mail
addressed to the natural person at his or
her last known dwelling place or to the
entity at its last known principal place
of business.
(3) A verified return by the natural
person serving the subpoena setting
forth the manner of service or, in the
case of service by registered or certified
mail, the signed return post office
receipt, constitutes proof of service.
(4) Witnesses are entitled to the same
fees and mileage as witnesses in the
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district courts of the United States (28
U.S.C. 1821 and 1825). Fees need not be
paid at the time the subpoena is served.
(5) A subpoena under this section is
enforceable through the district court of
the United States for the district where
the subpoenaed natural person resides
or is found or where the entity transacts
business.
(b) Investigational inquiries are nonpublic investigational proceedings
conducted by the Secretary.
(1) Testimony at investigational
inquiries will be taken under oath or
affirmation.
(2) Attendance of non-witnesses is
discretionary with the Secretary, except
that a witness is entitled to be
accompanied, represented, and advised
by an attorney.
(3) Representatives of the Secretary
are entitled to attend and ask questions.
(4) A witness will have the
opportunity to clarify his or her answers
on the record following questioning by
the Secretary.
(5) Any claim of privilege must be
asserted by the witness on the record.
(6) Objections must be asserted on the
record. Errors of any kind that might be
corrected if promptly presented will be
deemed to be waived unless reasonable
objection is made at the investigational
inquiry. Except where the objection is
on the grounds of privilege, the question
will be answered on the record, subject
to objection.
(7) If a witness refuses to answer any
question not privileged or to produce
requested documents or items, or
engages in conduct likely to delay or
obstruct the investigational inquiry, the
Secretary may seek enforcement of the
subpoena under paragraph (a)(5) of this
section.
(8) The proceedings will be recorded
and transcribed. The witness is entitled
to a copy of the transcript, upon
payment of prescribed costs, except
that, for good cause, the witness may be
limited to inspection of the official
transcript of his or her testimony.
(9)(i) The transcript will be submitted
to the witness for signature.
(A) Where the witness will be
provided a copy of the transcript, the
transcript will be submitted to the
witness for signature. The witness may
submit to the Secretary written
proposed corrections to the transcript,
with such corrections attached to the
transcript. If the witness does not return
a signed copy of the transcript or
proposed corrections within 30 days
(computed in the same manner as
prescribed under § 160.526 of this part)
of its being submitted to him or her for
signature, the witness will be deemed to
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have agreed that the transcript is true
and accurate.
(B) Where, as provided in paragraph
(b)(8) of this section, the witness is
limited to inspecting the transcript, the
witness will have the opportunity at the
time of inspection to propose
corrections to the transcript, with
corrections attached to the transcript.
The witness will also have the
opportunity to sign the transcript. If the
witness does not sign the transcript or
offer corrections within 30 days
(computed in the same manner as
prescribed under § 160.526 of this part)
of receipt of notice of the opportunity to
inspect the transcript, the witness will
be deemed to have agreed that the
transcript is true and accurate.
(ii) The Secretary’s proposed
corrections to the record of transcript
will be attached to the transcript.
(c) Consistent with § 160.310(c)(3),
testimony and other evidence obtained
in an investigational inquiry may be
used by HHS in any of its activities and
may be used or offered into evidence in
any administrative or judicial
proceeding.
§ 160.316 Refraining from intimidation or
retaliation.
A covered entity may not threaten,
intimidate, coerce, harass, discriminate
against, or take any other retaliatory
action against any individual or other
person for—
(a) Filing of a complaint under
§ 160.306;
(b) Testifying, assisting, or
participating in an investigation,
compliance review, proceeding, or
hearing under this part; or
(c) Opposing any act or practice made
unlawful by this subchapter, provided
the individual or person has a good faith
belief that the practice opposed is
unlawful, and the manner of opposition
is reasonable and does not involve a
disclosure of protected health
information in violation of subpart E of
part 164 of this subchapter.
I 4. Add a new subpart D to read as
follows:
Subpart D—Imposition of Civil Money
Penalties
160.400 Applicability.
160.402 Basis for a civil money penalty.
160.404 Amount of a civil money penalty.
160.406 Violations of an identical
requirement or prohibition.
160.408 Factors considered in determining
the amount of a civil money penalty.
160.410 Affirmative defenses.
160.412 Waiver.
160.414 Limitations.
160.416 Authority to settle.
160.418 Penalty not exclusive.
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160.420 Notice of proposed determination.
160.422 Failure to request a hearing.
160.424 Collection of penalty.
160.426 Notification of the public and other
agencies.
§ 160.400
Applicability.
This subpart applies to the imposition
of a civil money penalty by the
Secretary under 42 U.S.C. 1320d–5.
§ 160.402
Basis for a civil money penalty.
(a) General rule. Subject to § 160.410,
the Secretary will impose a civil money
penalty upon a covered entity if the
Secretary determines that the covered
entity has violated an administrative
simplification provision.
(b) Violation by more than one
covered entity. (1) Except as provided in
paragraph (b)(2) of this section, if the
Secretary determines that more than one
covered entity was responsible for a
violation, the Secretary will impose a
civil money penalty against each such
covered entity.
(2) A covered entity that is a member
of an affiliated covered entity, in
accordance with § 164.105(b) of this
subchapter, is jointly and severally
liable for a civil money penalty for a
violation of part 164 of this subchapter
based on an act or omission of the
affiliated covered entity, unless it is
established that another member of the
affiliated covered entity was responsible
for the violation.
(c) Violation attributed to a covered
entity. A covered entity is liable, in
accordance with the federal common
law of agency, for a civil money penalty
for a violation based on the act or
omission of any agent of the covered
entity, including a workforce member,
acting within the scope of the agency,
unless—
(1) The agent is a business associate
of the covered entity;
(2) The covered entity has complied,
with respect to such business associate,
with the applicable requirements of
§§ 164.308(b) and 164.502(e) of this
subchapter; and
(3) The covered entity did not—
(i) Know of a pattern of activity or
practice of the business associate, and
(ii) Fail to act as required by
§§ 164.314(a)(1)(ii) and 164.504(e)(1)(ii)
of this subchapter, as applicable.
dsatterwhite on PROD1PC65 with RULES3
§ 160.404
Amount of a civil money penalty.
(a) The amount of a civil money
penalty will be determined in
accordance with paragraph (b) of this
section and §§ 160.406, 160.408, and
160.412.
(b) The amount of a civil money
penalty that may be imposed is subject
to the following limitations:
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(1) The Secretary may not impose a
civil money penalty—
(i) In the amount of more than $100
for each violation; or
(ii) In excess of $25,000 for identical
violations during a calendar year
(January 1 through the following
December 31).
(2) If a requirement or prohibition in
one administrative simplification
provision is repeated in a more general
form in another administrative
simplification provision in the same
subpart, a civil money penalty may be
imposed for a violation of only one of
these administrative simplification
provisions.
§ 160.406 Violations of an identical
requirement or prohibition.
The Secretary will determine the
number of violations of an
administrative simplification provision
based on the nature of the covered
entity’s obligation to act or not act under
the provision that is violated, such as its
obligation to act in a certain manner, or
within a certain time, or to act or not act
with respect to certain persons. In the
case of continuing violation of a
provision, a separate violation occurs
each day the covered entity is in
violation of the provision.
§ 160.408 Factors considered in
determining the amount of a civil money
penalty.
In determining the amount of any
civil money penalty, the Secretary may
consider as aggravating or mitigating
factors, as appropriate, any of the
following:
(a) The nature of the violation, in light
of the purpose of the rule violated.
(b) The circumstances, including the
consequences, of the violation,
including but not limited to:
(1) The time period during which the
violation(s) occurred;
(2) Whether the violation caused
physical harm;
(3) Whether the violation hindered or
facilitated an individual’s ability to
obtain health care; and
(4) Whether the violation resulted in
financial harm.
(c) The degree of culpability of the
covered entity, including but not
limited to:
(1) Whether the violation was
intentional; and
(2) Whether the violation was beyond
the direct control of the covered entity.
(d) Any history of prior compliance
with the administrative simplification
provisions, including violations, by the
covered entity, including but not
limited to:
(1) Whether the current violation is
the same or similar to prior violation(s);
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8427
(2) Whether and to what extent the
covered entity has attempted to correct
previous violations;
(3) How the covered entity has
responded to technical assistance from
the Secretary provided in the context of
a compliance effort; and
(4) How the covered entity has
responded to prior complaints.
(e) The financial condition of the
covered entity, including but not
limited to:
(1) Whether the covered entity had
financial difficulties that affected its
ability to comply;
(2) Whether the imposition of a civil
money penalty would jeopardize the
ability of the covered entity to continue
to provide, or to pay for, health care;
and
(3) The size of the covered entity.
(f) Such other matters as justice may
require.
§ 160.410
Affirmative defenses.
(a) As used in this section, the
following terms have the following
meanings:
Reasonable cause means
circumstances that would make it
unreasonable for the covered entity,
despite the exercise of ordinary business
care and prudence, to comply with the
administrative simplification provision
violated.
Reasonable diligence means the
business care and prudence expected
from a person seeking to satisfy a legal
requirement under similar
circumstances.
Willful neglect means conscious,
intentional failure or reckless
indifference to the obligation to comply
with the administrative simplification
provision violated.
(b) The Secretary may not impose a
civil money penalty on a covered entity
for a violation if the covered entity
establishes that an affirmative defense
exists with respect to the violation,
including the following:
(1) The violation is an act punishable
under 42 U.S.C. 1320d–6;
(2) The covered entity establishes, to
the satisfaction of the Secretary, that it
did not have knowledge of the violation,
determined in accordance with the
federal common law of agency, and, by
exercising reasonable diligence, would
not have known that the violation
occurred; or
(3) The violation is—
(i) Due to reasonable cause and not
willful neglect; and
(ii) Corrected during either:
(A) The 30-day period beginning on
the date the covered entity liable for the
penalty knew, or by exercising
reasonable diligence would have
known, that the violation occurred; or
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(B) Such additional period as the
Secretary determines to be appropriate
based on the nature and extent of the
failure to comply.
§ 160.412
Waiver.
For violations described in
§ 160.410(b)(3)(i) that are not corrected
within the period described in
§ 160.410(b)(3)(ii), the Secretary may
waive the civil money penalty, in whole
or in part, to the extent that payment of
the penalty would be excessive relative
to the violation.
§ 160.414
Limitations.
No action under this subpart may be
entertained unless commenced by the
Secretary, in accordance with § 160.420,
within 6 years from the date of the
occurrence of the violation.
§ 160.416
Authority to settle.
Nothing in this subpart limits the
authority of the Secretary to settle any
issue or case or to compromise any
penalty.
§ 160.418
Penalty not exclusive.
Except as otherwise provided by 42
U.S.C. 1320d-5(b)(1), a penalty imposed
under this part is in addition to any
other penalty prescribed by law.
dsatterwhite on PROD1PC65 with RULES3
§ 160.420 Notice of proposed
determination.
(a) If a penalty is proposed in
accordance with this part, the Secretary
must deliver, or send by certified mail
with return receipt requested, to the
respondent, written notice of the
Secretary’s intent to impose a penalty.
This notice of proposed determination
must include—
(1) Reference to the statutory basis for
the penalty;
(2) A description of the findings of
fact regarding the violations with
respect to which the penalty is proposed
(except that, in any case where the
Secretary is relying upon a statistical
sampling study in accordance with
§ 160.536 of this part, the notice must
provide a copy of the study relied upon
by the Secretary);
(3) The reason(s) why the violation(s)
subject(s) the respondent to a penalty;
(4) The amount of the proposed
penalty;
(5) Any circumstances described in
§ 160.408 that were considered in
determining the amount of the proposed
penalty; and
(6) Instructions for responding to the
notice, including a statement of the
respondent’s right to a hearing, a
statement that failure to request a
hearing within 90 days permits the
imposition of the proposed penalty
without the right to a hearing under
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§ 160.504 or a right of appeal under
§ 160.548 of this part, and the address
to which the hearing request must be
sent.
(b) The respondent may request a
hearing before an ALJ on the proposed
penalty by filing a request in accordance
with § 160.504 of this part.
organization, and the appropriate State
or local licensing agency or organization
(including the agency specified in 42
U.S.C. 1395aa(a), 1396a(a)(33)).
I 5. Revise subpart E of this part to read
as follows:
§ 160.422
Sec.
160.500 Applicability.
160.502 Definitions.
160.504 Hearing before an ALJ.
160.506 Rights of the parties.
160.508 Authority of the ALJ.
160.510 Ex parte contacts.
160.512 Prehearing conferences.
160.514 Authority to settle.
160.516 Discovery.
160.518 Exchange of witness lists, witness
statements, and exhibits.
160.520 Subpoenas for attendance at
hearing.
160.522 Fees.
160.524 Form, filing, and service of papers.
160.526 Computation of time.
160.528 Motions.
160.530 Sanctions.
160.532 Collateral estoppel.
160.534 The hearing.
160.536 Statistical sampling.
160.538 Witnesses.
160.540 Evidence.
160.542 The record.
160.544 Post hearing briefs.
160.546 ALJ’s decision.
160.548 Appeal of the ALJ’s decision.
160.550 Stay of the Secretary’s decision.
160.552 Harmless error.
Failure to request a hearing.
If the respondent does not request a
hearing within the time prescribed by
§ 160.504 of this part and the matter is
not settled pursuant to § 160.416, the
Secretary will impose the proposed
penalty or any lesser penalty permitted
by 42 U.S.C. 1320d–5. The Secretary
will notify the respondent by certified
mail, return receipt requested, of any
penalty that has been imposed and of
the means by which the respondent may
satisfy the penalty, and the penalty is
final on receipt of the notice. The
respondent has no right to appeal a
penalty under § 160.548 of this part
with respect to which the respondent
has not timely requested a hearing.
§ 160.424
Collection of penalty.
(a) Once a determination of the
Secretary to impose a penalty has
become final, the penalty will be
collected by the Secretary, subject to the
first sentence of 42 U.S.C. 1320a–7a(f).
(b) The penalty may be recovered in
a civil action brought in the United
States district court for the district
where the respondent resides, is found,
or is located.
(c) The amount of a penalty, when
finally determined, or the amount
agreed upon in compromise, may be
deducted from any sum then or later
owing by the United States, or by a State
agency, to the respondent.
(d) Matters that were raised or that
could have been raised in a hearing
before an ALJ, or in an appeal under 42
U.S.C. 1320a–7a(e), may not be raised as
a defense in a civil action by the United
States to collect a penalty under this
part.
§ 160.426 Notification of the public and
other agencies.
Whenever a proposed penalty
becomes final, the Secretary will notify,
in such manner as the Secretary deems
appropriate, the public and the
following organizations and entities
thereof and the reason it was imposed:
the appropriate State or local medical or
professional organization, the
appropriate State agency or agencies
administering or supervising the
administration of State health care
programs (as defined in 42 U.S.C.
1320a–7(h)), the appropriate utilization
and quality control peer review
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Subpart E—Procedures for Hearings
§ 160.500
Applicability.
This subpart applies to hearings
conducted relating to the imposition of
a civil money penalty by the Secretary
under 42 U.S.C. 1320d–5.
§ 160.502
Definitions.
As used in this subpart, the following
term has the following meaning:
Board means the members of the HHS
Departmental Appeals Board, in the
Office of the Secretary, who issue
decisions in panels of three.
§ 160.504
Hearing before an ALJ.
(a) A respondent may request a
hearing before an ALJ. The parties to the
hearing proceeding consist of—
(1) The respondent; and
(2) The officer(s) or employee(s) of
HHS to whom the enforcement
authority involved has been delegated.
(b) The request for a hearing must be
made in writing signed by the
respondent or by the respondent’s
attorney and sent by certified mail,
return receipt requested, to the address
specified in the notice of proposed
determination. The request for a hearing
must be mailed within 90 days after
notice of the proposed determination is
received by the respondent. For
purposes of this section, the
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respondent’s date of receipt of the
notice of proposed determination is
presumed to be 5 days after the date of
the notice unless the respondent makes
a reasonable showing to the contrary to
the ALJ.
(c) The request for a hearing must
clearly and directly admit, deny, or
explain each of the findings of fact
contained in the notice of proposed
determination with regard to which the
respondent has any knowledge. If the
respondent has no knowledge of a
particular finding of fact and so states,
the finding shall be deemed denied. The
request for a hearing must also state the
circumstances or arguments that the
respondent alleges constitute the
grounds for any defense and the factual
and legal basis for opposing the penalty,
except that a respondent may raise an
affirmative defense under
§ 160.410(b)(1) at any time.
(d) The ALJ must dismiss a hearing
request where—
(1) On motion of the Secretary, the
ALJ determines that the respondent’s
hearing request is not timely filed as
required by paragraphs (b) or does not
meet the requirements of paragraph (c)
of this section;
(2) The respondent withdraws the
request for a hearing;
(3) The respondent abandons the
request for a hearing; or
(4) The respondent’s hearing request
fails to raise any issue that may properly
be addressed in a hearing.
dsatterwhite on PROD1PC65 with RULES3
§ 160.506
Rights of the parties.
(a) Except as otherwise limited by this
subpart, each party may—
(1) Be accompanied, represented, and
advised by an attorney;
(2) Participate in any conference held
by the ALJ;
(3) Conduct discovery of documents
as permitted by this subpart;
(4) Agree to stipulations of fact or law
that will be made part of the record;
(5) Present evidence relevant to the
issues at the hearing;
(6) Present and cross-examine
witnesses;
(7) Present oral arguments at the
hearing as permitted by the ALJ; and
(8) Submit written briefs and
proposed findings of fact and
conclusions of law after the hearing.
(b) A party may appear in person or
by a representative. Natural persons
who appear as an attorney or other
representative must conform to the
standards of conduct and ethics
required of practitioners before the
courts of the United States.
(c) Fees for any services performed on
behalf of a party by an attorney are not
subject to the provisions of 42 U.S.C.
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406, which authorizes the Secretary to
specify or limit their fees.
§ 160.508
Authority of the ALJ.
(a) The ALJ must conduct a fair and
impartial hearing, avoid delay, maintain
order, and ensure that a record of the
proceeding is made.
(b) The ALJ may—
(1) Set and change the date, time and
place of the hearing upon reasonable
notice to the parties;
(2) Continue or recess the hearing in
whole or in part for a reasonable period
of time;
(3) Hold conferences to identify or
simplify the issues, or to consider other
matters that may aid in the expeditious
disposition of the proceeding;
(4) Administer oaths and affirmations;
(5) Issue subpoenas requiring the
attendance of witnesses at hearings and
the production of documents at or in
relation to hearings;
(6) Rule on motions and other
procedural matters;
(7) Regulate the scope and timing of
documentary discovery as permitted by
this subpart;
(8) Regulate the course of the hearing
and the conduct of representatives,
parties, and witnesses;
(9) Examine witnesses;
(10) Receive, rule on, exclude, or limit
evidence;
(11) Upon motion of a party, take
official notice of facts;
(12) Conduct any conference,
argument or hearing in person or, upon
agreement of the parties, by telephone;
and
(13) Upon motion of a party, decide
cases, in whole or in part, by summary
judgment where there is no disputed
issue of material fact. A summary
judgment decision constitutes a hearing
on the record for the purposes of this
subpart.
(c) The ALJ—
(1) May not find invalid or refuse to
follow Federal statutes, regulations, or
Secretarial delegations of authority and
must give deference to published
guidance to the extent not inconsistent
with statute or regulation;
(2) May not enter an order in the
nature of a directed verdict;
(3) May not compel settlement
negotiations;
(4) May not enjoin any act of the
Secretary; or
(5) May not review the exercise of
discretion by the Secretary with respect
to whether to grant an extension under
§ 160.410(b)(3)(ii)(B) of this part or to
provide technical assistance under 42
U.S.C. 1320d–5(b)(3)(B).
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§ 160.510
8429
Ex parte contacts.
No party or person (except employees
of the ALJ’s office) may communicate in
any way with the ALJ on any matter at
issue in a case, unless on notice and
opportunity for both parties to
participate. This provision does not
prohibit a party or person from
inquiring about the status of a case or
asking routine questions concerning
administrative functions or procedures.
§ 160.512
Prehearing conferences.
(a) The ALJ must schedule at least one
prehearing conference, and may
schedule additional prehearing
conferences as appropriate, upon
reasonable notice, which may not be
less than 14 business days, to the
parties.
(b) The ALJ may use prehearing
conferences to discuss the following—
(1) Simplification of the issues;
(2) The necessity or desirability of
amendments to the pleadings, including
the need for a more definite statement;
(3) Stipulations and admissions of fact
or as to the contents and authenticity of
documents;
(4) Whether the parties can agree to
submission of the case on a stipulated
record;
(5) Whether a party chooses to waive
appearance at an oral hearing and to
submit only documentary evidence
(subject to the objection of the other
party) and written argument;
(6) Limitation of the number of
witnesses;
(7) Scheduling dates for the exchange
of witness lists and of proposed
exhibits;
(8) Discovery of documents as
permitted by this subpart;
(9) The time and place for the hearing;
(10) The potential for the settlement
of the case by the parties; and
(11) Other matters as may tend to
encourage the fair, just and expeditious
disposition of the proceedings,
including the protection of privacy of
individually identifiable health
information that may be submitted into
evidence or otherwise used in the
proceeding, if appropriate.
(c) The ALJ must issue an order
containing the matters agreed upon by
the parties or ordered by the ALJ at a
prehearing conference.
§ 160.514
Authority to settle.
The Secretary has exclusive authority
to settle any issue or case without the
consent of the ALJ.
§ 160.516
Discovery.
(a) A party may make a request to
another party for production of
documents for inspection and copying
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that are relevant and material to the
issues before the ALJ.
(b) For the purpose of this section, the
term ‘‘documents’’ includes
information, reports, answers, records,
accounts, papers and other data and
documentary evidence. Nothing
contained in this section may be
interpreted to require the creation of a
document, except that requested data
stored in an electronic data storage
system must be produced in a form
accessible to the requesting party.
(c) Requests for documents, requests
for admissions, written interrogatories,
depositions and any forms of discovery,
other than those permitted under
paragraph (a) of this section, are not
authorized.
(d) This section may not be construed
to require the disclosure of interview
reports or statements obtained by any
party, or on behalf of any party, of
persons who will not be called as
witnesses by that party, or analyses and
summaries prepared in conjunction
with the investigation or litigation of the
case, or any otherwise privileged
documents.
(e)(1) When a request for production
of documents has been received, within
30 days the party receiving that request
must either fully respond to the request,
or state that the request is being objected
to and the reasons for that objection. If
objection is made to part of an item or
category, the part must be specified.
Upon receiving any objections, the party
seeking production may then, within 30
days or any other time frame set by the
ALJ, file a motion for an order
compelling discovery. The party
receiving a request for production may
also file a motion for protective order
any time before the date the production
is due.
(2) The ALJ may grant a motion for
protective order or deny a motion for an
order compelling discovery if the ALJ
finds that the discovery sought—
(i) Is irrelevant;
(ii) Is unduly costly or burdensome;
(iii) Will unduly delay the
proceeding; or
(iv) Seeks privileged information.
(3) The ALJ may extend any of the
time frames set forth in paragraph (e)(1)
of this section.
(4) The burden of showing that
discovery should be allowed is on the
party seeking discovery.
§ 160.518 Exchange of witness lists,
witness statements, and exhibits.
(a) The parties must exchange witness
lists, copies of prior written statements
of proposed witnesses, and copies of
proposed hearing exhibits, including
copies of any written statements that the
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party intends to offer in lieu of live
testimony in accordance with § 160.538,
not more than 60, and not less than 15,
days before the scheduled hearing,
except that if a respondent intends to
introduce the evidence of a statistical
expert, the respondent must provide the
Secretarial party with a copy of the
statistical expert’s report not less than
30 days before the scheduled hearing.
(b)(1) If, at any time, a party objects
to the proposed admission of evidence
not exchanged in accordance with
paragraph (a) of this section, the ALJ
must determine whether the failure to
comply with paragraph (a) of this
section should result in the exclusion of
that evidence.
(2) Unless the ALJ finds that
extraordinary circumstances justified
the failure timely to exchange the
information listed under paragraph (a)
of this section, the ALJ must exclude
from the party’s case-in-chief—
(i) The testimony of any witness
whose name does not appear on the
witness list; and
(ii) Any exhibit not provided to the
opposing party as specified in paragraph
(a) of this section.
(3) If the ALJ finds that extraordinary
circumstances existed, the ALJ must
then determine whether the admission
of that evidence would cause substantial
prejudice to the objecting party.
(i) If the ALJ finds that there is no
substantial prejudice, the evidence may
be admitted.
(ii) If the ALJ finds that there is
substantial prejudice, the ALJ may
exclude the evidence, or, if he or she
does not exclude the evidence, must
postpone the hearing for such time as is
necessary for the objecting party to
prepare and respond to the evidence,
unless the objecting party waives
postponement.
(c) Unless the other party objects
within a reasonable period of time
before the hearing, documents
exchanged in accordance with
paragraph (a) of this section will be
deemed to be authentic for the purpose
of admissibility at the hearing.
§ 160.520
hearing.
Subpoenas for attendance at
(a) A party wishing to procure the
appearance and testimony of any person
at the hearing may make a motion
requesting the ALJ to issue a subpoena
if the appearance and testimony are
reasonably necessary for the
presentation of a party’s case.
(b) A subpoena requiring the
attendance of a person in accordance
with paragraph (a) of this section may
also require the person (whether or not
the person is a party) to produce
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relevant and material evidence at or
before the hearing.
(c) When a subpoena is served by a
respondent on a particular employee or
official or particular office of HHS, the
Secretary may comply by designating
any knowledgeable HHS representative
to appear and testify.
(d) A party seeking a subpoena must
file a written motion not less than 30
days before the date fixed for the
hearing, unless otherwise allowed by
the ALJ for good cause shown. That
motion must—
(1) Specify any evidence to be
produced;
(2) Designate the witnesses; and
(3) Describe the address and location
with sufficient particularity to permit
those witnesses to be found.
(e) The subpoena must specify the
time and place at which the witness is
to appear and any evidence the witness
is to produce.
(f) Within 15 days after the written
motion requesting issuance of a
subpoena is served, any party may file
an opposition or other response.
(g) If the motion requesting issuance
of a subpoena is granted, the party
seeking the subpoena must serve it by
delivery to the person named, or by
certified mail addressed to that person
at the person’s last dwelling place or
principal place of business.
(h) The person to whom the subpoena
is directed may file with the ALJ a
motion to quash the subpoena within 10
days after service.
(i) The exclusive remedy for
contumacy by, or refusal to obey a
subpoena duly served upon, any person
is specified in 42 U.S.C. 405(e).
§ 160.522
Fees.
The party requesting a subpoena must
pay the cost of the fees and mileage of
any witness subpoenaed in the amounts
that would be payable to a witness in a
proceeding in United States District
Court. A check for witness fees and
mileage must accompany the subpoena
when served, except that, when a
subpoena is issued on behalf of the
Secretary, a check for witness fees and
mileage need not accompany the
subpoena.
§ 160.524
papers.
Form, filing, and service of
(a) Forms. (1) Unless the ALJ directs
the parties to do otherwise, documents
filed with the ALJ must include an
original and two copies.
(2) Every pleading and paper filed in
the proceeding must contain a caption
setting forth the title of the action, the
case number, and a designation of the
paper, such as motion to quash
subpoena.
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(3) Every pleading and paper must be
signed by and must contain the address
and telephone number of the party or
the person on whose behalf the paper
was filed, or his or her representative.
(4) Papers are considered filed when
they are mailed.
(b) Service. A party filing a document
with the ALJ or the Board must, at the
time of filing, serve a copy of the
document on the other party. Service
upon any party of any document must
be made by delivering a copy, or placing
a copy of the document in the United
States mail, postage prepaid and
addressed, or with a private delivery
service, to the party’s last known
address. When a party is represented by
an attorney, service must be made upon
the attorney in lieu of the party.
(c) Proof of service. A certificate of the
natural person serving the document by
personal delivery or by mail, setting
forth the manner of service, constitutes
proof of service.
§ 160.526
Computation of time.
(a) In computing any period of time
under this subpart or in an order issued
thereunder, the time begins with the day
following the act, event or default, and
includes the last day of the period
unless it is a Saturday, Sunday, or legal
holiday observed by the Federal
Government, in which event it includes
the next business day.
(b) When the period of time allowed
is less than 7 days, intermediate
Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays
observed by the Federal Government
must be excluded from the computation.
(c) Where a document has been served
or issued by placing it in the mail, an
additional 5 days must be added to the
time permitted for any response. This
paragraph does not apply to requests for
hearing under § 160.504.
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§ 160.528
Motions.
(a) An application to the ALJ for an
order or ruling must be by motion.
Motions must state the relief sought, the
authority relied upon and the facts
alleged, and must be filed with the ALJ
and served on all other parties.
(b) Except for motions made during a
prehearing conference or at the hearing,
all motions must be in writing. The ALJ
may require that oral motions be
reduced to writing.
(c) Within 10 days after a written
motion is served, or such other time as
may be fixed by the ALJ, any party may
file a response to the motion.
(d) The ALJ may not grant a written
motion before the time for filing
responses has expired, except upon
consent of the parties or following a
hearing on the motion, but may overrule
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or deny the motion without awaiting a
response.
(e) The ALJ must make a reasonable
effort to dispose of all outstanding
motions before the beginning of the
hearing.
§ 160.530
Sanctions.
The ALJ may sanction a person,
including any party or attorney, for
failing to comply with an order or
procedure, for failing to defend an
action or for other misconduct that
interferes with the speedy, orderly or
fair conduct of the hearing. The
sanctions must reasonably relate to the
severity and nature of the failure or
misconduct. The sanctions may
include—
(a) In the case of refusal to provide or
permit discovery under the terms of this
part, drawing negative factual inferences
or treating the refusal as an admission
by deeming the matter, or certain facts,
to be established;
(b) Prohibiting a party from
introducing certain evidence or
otherwise supporting a particular claim
or defense;
(c) Striking pleadings, in whole or in
part;
(d) Staying the proceedings;
(e) Dismissal of the action;
(f) Entering a decision by default;
(g) Ordering the party or attorney to
pay the attorney’s fees and other costs
caused by the failure or misconduct;
and
(h) Refusing to consider any motion or
other action that is not filed in a timely
manner.
§ 160.532
Collateral estoppel.
When a final determination that the
respondent violated an administrative
simplification provision has been
rendered in any proceeding in which
the respondent was a party and had an
opportunity to be heard, the respondent
is bound by that determination in any
proceeding under this part.
§ 160.534
The hearing.
(a) The ALJ must conduct a hearing
on the record in order to determine
whether the respondent should be
found liable under this part.
(b) (1) The respondent has the burden
of going forward and the burden of
persuasion with respect to any:
(i) Affirmative defense pursuant to
§ 160.410 of this part;
(ii) Challenge to the amount of a
proposed penalty pursuant to
§§ 160.404–160.408 of this part,
including any factors raised as
mitigating factors; or
(iii) Claim that a proposed penalty
should be reduced or waived pursuant
to § 160.412 of this part.
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8431
(2) The Secretary has the burden of
going forward and the burden of
persuasion with respect to all other
issues, including issues of liability and
the existence of any factors considered
as aggravating factors in determining the
amount of the proposed penalty.
(3) The burden of persuasion will be
judged by a preponderance of the
evidence.
(c) The hearing must be open to the
public unless otherwise ordered by the
ALJ for good cause shown.
(d)(1) Subject to the 15-day rule under
§ 160.518(a) and the admissibility of
evidence under § 160.540, either party
may introduce, during its case in chief,
items or information that arose or
became known after the date of the
issuance of the notice of proposed
determination or the request for hearing,
as applicable. Such items and
information may not be admitted into
evidence, if introduced—
(i) By the Secretary, unless they are
material and relevant to the acts or
omissions with respect to which the
penalty is proposed in the notice of
proposed determination pursuant to
§ 160.420 of this part, including
circumstances that may increase
penalties; or
(ii) By the respondent, unless they are
material and relevant to an admission,
denial or explanation of a finding of fact
in the notice of proposed determination
under § 160.420 of this part, or to a
specific circumstance or argument
expressly stated in the request for
hearing under § 160.504, including
circumstances that may reduce
penalties.
(2) After both parties have presented
their cases, evidence may be admitted in
rebuttal even if not previously
exchanged in accordance with
§ 160.518.
§ 160.536
Statistical sampling.
(a) In meeting the burden of proof set
forth in § 160.534, the Secretary may
introduce the results of a statistical
sampling study as evidence of the
number of violations under § 160.406 of
this part, or the factors considered in
determining the amount of the civil
money penalty under § 160.408 of this
part. Such statistical sampling study, if
based upon an appropriate sampling
and computed by valid statistical
methods, constitutes prima facie
evidence of the number of violations
and the existence of factors material to
the proposed civil money penalty as
described in §§ 160.406 and 160.408.
(b) Once the Secretary has made a
prima facie case, as described in
paragraph (a) of this section, the burden
of going forward shifts to the respondent
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to produce evidence reasonably
calculated to rebut the findings of the
statistical sampling study. The Secretary
will then be given the opportunity to
rebut this evidence.
§ 160.538
Witnesses.
(a) Except as provided in paragraph
(b) of this section, testimony at the
hearing must be given orally by
witnesses under oath or affirmation.
(b) At the discretion of the ALJ,
testimony of witnesses other than the
testimony of expert witnesses may be
admitted in the form of a written
statement. The ALJ may, at his or her
discretion, admit prior sworn testimony
of experts that has been subject to
adverse examination, such as a
deposition or trial testimony. Any such
written statement must be provided to
the other party, along with the last
known address of the witness, in a
manner that allows sufficient time for
the other party to subpoena the witness
for cross-examination at the hearing.
Prior written statements of witnesses
proposed to testify at the hearing must
be exchanged as provided in § 160.518.
(c) The ALJ must exercise reasonable
control over the mode and order of
interrogating witnesses and presenting
evidence so as to:
(1) Make the interrogation and
presentation effective for the
ascertainment of the truth;
(2) Avoid repetition or needless
consumption of time; and
(3) Protect witnesses from harassment
or undue embarrassment.
(d) The ALJ must permit the parties to
conduct cross-examination of witnesses
as may be required for a full and true
disclosure of the facts.
(e) The ALJ may order witnesses
excluded so that they cannot hear the
testimony of other witnesses, except
that the ALJ may not order to be
excluded—
(1) A party who is a natural person;
(2) In the case of a party that is not
a natural person, the officer or employee
of the party appearing for the entity pro
se or designated as the party’s
representative; or
(3) A natural person whose presence
is shown by a party to be essential to the
presentation of its case, including a
person engaged in assisting the attorney
for the Secretary.
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§ 160.540
Evidence.
(a) The ALJ must determine the
admissibility of evidence.
(b) Except as provided in this subpart,
the ALJ is not bound by the Federal
Rules of Evidence. However, the ALJ
may apply the Federal Rules of
Evidence where appropriate, for
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example, to exclude unreliable
evidence.
(c) The ALJ must exclude irrelevant or
immaterial evidence.
(d) Although relevant, evidence may
be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger
of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or by considerations of undue
delay or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence.
(e) Although relevant, evidence must
be excluded if it is privileged under
Federal law.
(f) Evidence concerning offers of
compromise or settlement are
inadmissible to the extent provided in
Rule 408 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence.
(g) Evidence of crimes, wrongs, or acts
other than those at issue in the instant
case is admissible in order to show
motive, opportunity, intent, knowledge,
preparation, identity, lack of mistake, or
existence of a scheme. This evidence is
admissible regardless of whether the
crimes, wrongs, or acts occurred during
the statute of limitations period
applicable to the acts or omissions that
constitute the basis for liability in the
case and regardless of whether they
were referenced in the Secretary’s notice
of proposed determination under
§ 160.420 of this part.
(h) The ALJ must permit the parties to
introduce rebuttal witnesses and
evidence.
(i) All documents and other evidence
offered or taken for the record must be
open to examination by both parties,
unless otherwise ordered by the ALJ for
good cause shown.
§ 160.542
The record.
(a) The hearing must be recorded and
transcribed. Transcripts may be
obtained following the hearing from the
ALJ. A party that requests a transcript of
hearing proceedings must pay the cost
of preparing the transcript unless, for
good cause shown by the party, the
payment is waived by the ALJ or the
Board, as appropriate.
(b) The transcript of the testimony,
exhibits, and other evidence admitted at
the hearing, and all papers and requests
filed in the proceeding constitute the
record for decision by the ALJ and the
Secretary.
(c) The record may be inspected and
copied (upon payment of a reasonable
fee) by any person, unless otherwise
ordered by the ALJ for good cause
shown.
(d) For good cause, the ALJ may order
appropriate redactions made to the
record.
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§ 160.544
Post hearing briefs.
The ALJ may require the parties to file
post-hearing briefs. In any event, any
party may file a post-hearing brief. The
ALJ must fix the time for filing the
briefs. The time for filing may not
exceed 60 days from the date the parties
receive the transcript of the hearing or,
if applicable, the stipulated record. The
briefs may be accompanied by proposed
findings of fact and conclusions of law.
The ALJ may permit the parties to file
reply briefs.
§ 160.546
ALJ’s decision.
(a) The ALJ must issue a decision,
based only on the record, which must
contain findings of fact and conclusions
of law.
(b) The ALJ may affirm, increase, or
reduce the penalties imposed by the
Secretary.
(c) The ALJ must issue the decision to
both parties within 60 days after the
time for submission of post-hearing
briefs and reply briefs, if permitted, has
expired. If the ALJ fails to meet the
deadline contained in this paragraph, he
or she must notify the parties of the
reason for the delay and set a new
deadline.
(d) Unless the decision of the ALJ is
timely appealed as provided for in
§ 160.548, the decision of the ALJ will
be final and binding on the parties 60
days from the date of service of the
ALJ’s decision.
§ 160.548
Appeal of the ALJ’s decision.
(a) Any party may appeal the decision
of the ALJ to the Board by filing a notice
of appeal with the Board within 30 days
of the date of service of the ALJ
decision. The Board may extend the
initial 30 day period for a period of time
not to exceed 30 days if a party files
with the Board a request for an
extension within the initial 30 day
period and shows good cause.
(b) If a party files a timely notice of
appeal with the Board, the ALJ must
forward the record of the proceeding to
the Board.
(c) A notice of appeal must be
accompanied by a written brief
specifying exceptions to the initial
decision and reasons supporting the
exceptions. Any party may file a brief in
opposition to the exceptions, which
may raise any relevant issue not
addressed in the exceptions, within 30
days of receiving the notice of appeal
and the accompanying brief. The Board
may permit the parties to file reply
briefs.
(d) There is no right to appear
personally before the Board or to appeal
to the Board any interlocutory ruling by
the ALJ.
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(e) Except for an affirmative defense
under § 160.410(b)(1) of this part, the
Board may not consider any issue not
raised in the parties’ briefs, nor any
issue in the briefs that could have been
raised before the ALJ but was not.
(f) If any party demonstrates to the
satisfaction of the Board that additional
evidence not presented at such hearing
is relevant and material and that there
were reasonable grounds for the failure
to adduce such evidence at the hearing,
the Board may remand the matter to the
ALJ for consideration of such additional
evidence.
(g) The Board may decline to review
the case, or may affirm, increase,
reduce, reverse or remand any penalty
determined by the ALJ.
(h) The standard of review on a
disputed issue of fact is whether the
initial decision of the ALJ is supported
by substantial evidence on the whole
record. The standard of review on a
disputed issue of law is whether the
decision is erroneous.
(i) Within 60 days after the time for
submission of briefs and reply briefs, if
permitted, has expired, the Board must
serve on each party to the appeal a copy
of the Board’s decision and a statement
describing the right of any respondent
who is penalized to seek judicial
review.
(j)(1) The Board’s decision under
paragraph (i) of this section, including
a decision to decline review of the
initial decision, becomes the final
decision of the Secretary 60 days after
the date of service of the Board’s
decision, except with respect to a
decision to remand to the ALJ or if
reconsideration is requested under this
paragraph.
(2) The Board will reconsider its
decision only if it determines that the
decision contains a clear error of fact or
error of law. New evidence will not be
a basis for reconsideration unless the
party demonstrates that the evidence is
newly discovered and was not
previously available.
(3) A party may file a motion for
reconsideration with the Board before
the date the decision becomes final
under paragraph (j)(1) of this section. A
motion for reconsideration must be
accompanied by a written brief
specifying any alleged error of fact or
law and, if the party is relying on
additional evidence, explaining why the
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evidence was not previously available.
Any party may file a brief in opposition
within 15 days of receiving the motion
for reconsideration and the
accompanying brief unless this time
limit is extended by the Board for good
cause shown. Reply briefs are not
permitted.
(4) The Board must rule on the motion
for reconsideration not later than 30
days from the date the opposition brief
is due. If the Board denies the motion,
the decision issued under paragraph (i)
of this section becomes the final
decision of the Secretary on the date of
service of the ruling. If the Board grants
the motion, the Board will issue a
reconsidered decision, after such
procedures as the Board determines
necessary to address the effect of any
error. The Board’s decision on
reconsideration becomes the final
decision of the Secretary on the date of
service of the decision, except with
respect to a decision to remand to the
ALJ.
(5) If service of a ruling or decision
issued under this section is by mail, the
date of service will be deemed to be 5
days from the date of mailing.
(k)(1) A respondent’s petition for
judicial review must be filed within 60
days of the date on which the decision
of the Board becomes the final decision
of the Secretary under paragraph (j) of
this section.
(2) In compliance with 28 U.S.C.
2112(a), a copy of any petition for
judicial review filed in any U.S. Court
of Appeals challenging the final
decision of the Secretary must be sent
by certified mail, return receipt
requested, to the General Counsel of
HHS. The petition copy must be a copy
showing that it has been time-stamped
by the clerk of the court when the
original was filed with the court.
(3) If the General Counsel of HHS
received two or more petitions within
10 days after the final decision of the
Secretary, the General Counsel will
notify the U.S. Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation of any petitions
that were received within the 10 day
period.
§ 160.550
Stay of the Secretary’s decision.
(a) Pending judicial review, the
respondent may file a request for stay of
the effective date of any penalty with
the ALJ. The request must be
accompanied by a copy of the notice of
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8433
appeal filed with the Federal court. The
filing of the request automatically stays
the effective date of the penalty until
such time as the ALJ rules upon the
request.
(b) The ALJ may not grant a
respondent’s request for stay of any
penalty unless the respondent posts a
bond or provides other adequate
security.
(c) The ALJ must rule upon a
respondent’s request for stay within 10
days of receipt.
§ 160.552
Harmless error.
No error in either the admission or the
exclusion of evidence, and no error or
defect in any ruling or order or in any
act done or omitted by the ALJ or by any
of the parties is ground for vacating,
modifying or otherwise disturbing an
otherwise appropriate ruling or order or
act, unless refusal to take such action
appears to the ALJ or the Board
inconsistent with substantial justice.
The ALJ and the Board at every stage of
the proceeding must disregard any error
or defect in the proceeding that does not
affect the substantial rights of the
parties.
PART 164—SECURITY AND PRIVACY
1. The authority citation for part 164
is revised to read as follows:
I
Authority: 42 U.S.C. 1320d–1320d–8 and
sec. 264, Pub. L. No. 104–191, 110 Stat.
2033–2034 (42 U.S.C. 1320d–2 (note)).
2. In § 164.530, revise paragraph (g) to
read as follows:
I
§ 164.530
Administrative requirements.
*
*
*
*
*
(g) Standard: refraining from
intimidating or retaliatory acts. A
covered entity—
(1) May not intimidate, threaten,
coerce, discriminate against, or take
other retaliatory action against any
individual for the exercise by the
individual of any right established, or
for participation in any process
provided for by this subpart, including
the filing of a complaint under this
section; and
(2) Must refrain from intimidation and
retaliation as provided in § 160.316 of
this subchapter.
*
*
*
*
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[FR Doc. 06–1376 Filed 2–10–06; 2:59 pm]
BILLING CODE 4153–01–P
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Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 71, Number 32 (Thursday, February 16, 2006)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 8390-8433]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 06-1376]
[[Page 8389]]
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Part III
Department of Health and Human Services
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Office of the Secretary
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45 CFR Parts 160 and 164
HIPAA Administrative Simplification: Enforcement; Final Rule
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 32 / Thursday, February 16, 2006 /
Rules and Regulations
[[Page 8390]]
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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
Office of the Secretary
45 CFR Parts 160 and 164
RIN 0991-AB29
HIPAA Administrative Simplification: Enforcement
AGENCY: Office of the Secretary, HHS.
ACTION: Final rule.
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SUMMARY: The Secretary of Health and Human Services is adopting rules
for the imposition of civil money penalties on entities that violate
rules adopted by the Secretary to implement the Administrative
Simplification provisions of the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996, Public Law 104-191 (HIPAA). The final rule
amends the existing rules relating to the investigation of
noncompliance to make them apply to all of the HIPAA Administrative
Simplification rules, rather than exclusively to the privacy standards.
It also amends the existing rules relating to the process for
imposition of civil money penalties. Among other matters, the final
rule clarifies and elaborates upon the investigation process, bases for
liability, determination of the penalty amount, grounds for waiver,
conduct of the hearing, and the appeal process.
DATES: This final rule is effective on March 16, 2006.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Carol C. Conrad, (202) 690-1840.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On April 18, 2005, the Department of Health
and Human Services (HHS) published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
(proposed rule) proposing to revise the existing rules relating to
compliance with, and enforcement of, the Administrative Simplification
regulations (HIPAA rules) adopted by the Secretary of Health and Human
Services (Secretary) under subtitle F of Title II of HIPAA (HIPAA
provisions). 70 FR 20224. The proposed rule also proposed the adoption
of new provisions relating to the imposition of civil money penalties
on covered entities that violate a HIPAA provision or HIPAA rule. The
comment period on the proposed rule closed on June 17, 2005. Forty-nine
comments, principally from health care organizations, were received
during the comment period.
In this final rule, HHS revises existing rules that relate to
compliance with, and enforcement of, the HIPAA rules. These rules are
codified at 45 CFR part 160, subparts C and E. In addition, this final
rule adds a new subpart D to part 160. The new subpart D contains
additional rules relating to the imposition by the Secretary of civil
money penalties on covered entities that violate the HIPAA rules. The
full set of rules to be codified at subparts C, D, and E of 45 CFR part
160 is collectively referred to in this final rule as the ``Enforcement
Rule.'' Finally, HHS makes minor and conforming changes to subpart A of
part 160 and subpart E of part 164.
The statutory and regulatory background of the final rule is set
out below. A description of the provisions of the proposed rule, the
public comments, and HHS's responses to the comments follows. The
preamble concludes with HHS's analyses of impact and other issues under
applicable law.
I. Background
A. Statutory Background
Subtitle F of Title II of HIPAA, entitled ``Administrative
Simplification,'' requires the Secretary to adopt national standards
for certain information-related activities of the health care industry.
Under section 1173 of the Social Security Act (Act), 42 U.S.C. 1320d-2,
the Secretary is required to adopt national standards for certain
financial and administrative transactions, code sets, the security of
health information, and certain unique health identifiers. In addition,
section 264 of HIPAA, 42 U.S.C. 1320d-2 note, requires the Secretary to
promulgate standards to protect the privacy of certain health
information. Under section 1172(a) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 1320d-1(a),
the provisions of Subtitle F apply only to--
The following persons:
(1) A health plan.
(2) A health care clearinghouse.
(3) A health care provider who transmits any health information
in electronic form in connection with a transaction referred to in
section 1173(a)(1).
These entities are collectively known as ``covered entities.'' \1\
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\1\ An additional category of covered entities was added by the
Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of
2003 (Pub. L. 108-173) (MMA). As added by MMA, section 1860D-
31(h)(6)(A) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 1395w-141(h)(6)(A), provides that
a prescription drug card sponsor is a covered entity for purposes of
applying part C of title XI and all regulatory provisions
promulgated thereunder, including regulations (relating to privacy)
adopted pursuant to the authority of the Secretary under section
264(c) of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of
1996 (42 U.S.C. 1320d-2 note).
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HIPAA requires certain consultations with industry as a predicate
to the issuance of the HIPAA standards and provides that most covered
entities have up to 2 years (small health plans have up to 3 years) to
come into compliance with the standards, once adopted. Act, sections
1172(c) (42 U.S.C. 1320d-1(c)), 1175(b) (42 U.S.C. 1320d-4(b)). The
statute establishes civil money penalties and criminal penalties for
violations. Act, sections 1176 (42 U.S.C. 1320d-5), 1177 (42 U.S.C.
1320d-6). HHS enforces the civil money penalties, while the U.S.
Department of Justice enforces the criminal penalties.
HIPAA's civil money penalty provision, section 1176(a) of the Act,
42 U.S.C. 1320d-5(a), authorizes the Secretary to impose a civil money
penalty, as follows:
(1) IN GENERAL. Except as provided in subsection (b), the
Secretary shall impose on any person who violates a provision of
this part [42 U.S.C. 1320d, et seq.] a penalty of not more than $100
for each such violation, except that the total amount imposed on the
person for all violations of an identical requirement or prohibition
during a calendar year may not exceed $25,000.
(2) PROCEDURES. The provisions of section 1128A [42 U.S.C.
1320a-7a] (other than subsections (a) and (b) and the second
sentence of subsection (f)) shall apply to the imposition of a civil
money penalty under this subsection in the same manner as such
provisions apply to the imposition of a penalty under such section
1128A.
For simplicity, we refer throughout this preamble to this provision,
the related provisions at section 1128A of the Act, and other related
provisions of the Act, by their Social Security Act citations, rather
than by their U.S. Code citations.
Subsection (b) of section 1176 sets out limitations on the
Secretary's authority to impose civil money penalties and also provides
authority for waiving such penalties. Under section 1176(b)(1), a civil
money penalty may not be imposed with respect to an act that
``constitutes an offense punishable'' under the related criminal
penalty provision, section 1177 of the Act. Under section 1176(b)(2), a
civil money penalty may not be imposed ``if it is established to the
satisfaction of the Secretary that the person liable for the penalty
did not know, and by exercising reasonable diligence would not have
known, that such person violated the provision.'' Under section
1176(b)(3), a civil money penalty may not be imposed if the failure to
comply was due ``to reasonable cause and not to willful neglect'' and
is corrected within a certain time. Finally, under section 1176(b)(4),
a civil money penalty may be reduced or entirely waived ``to the extent
that the payment of such penalty would be excessive relative to the
compliance failure involved.''
As noted above, section 1176(a) incorporates by reference certain
[[Page 8391]]
provisions of section 1128A of the Act. Those provisions, as relevant
here, establish a number of requirements with respect to the imposition
of civil money penalties. Under section 1128A(c)(1), the Secretary may
not initiate a civil money penalty action ``later than six years after
the date'' of the occurrence that forms the basis for the civil money
penalty. Under section 1128A(c)(2), a person upon whom the Secretary
seeks to impose a civil money penalty must be given written notice and
an opportunity for a determination to be made ``on the record after a
hearing at which the person is entitled to be represented by counsel,
to present witnesses, and to cross-examine witnesses against the
person.'' Section 1128A also provides, at subsections (c), (e), and
(j), respectively, requirements for: Service of the notice and
authority for sanctions which the hearing officer may impose for
misconduct in connection with the civil money penalty proceeding;
judicial review of the Secretary's determination in the United States
Court of Appeals for the circuit in which the person resides or
maintains his/its principal place of business; and the issuance and
enforcement of subpoenas by the Secretary. In addition, section 1128A
of the Act contains provisions relating to liability for civil money
penalties and what measures must be taken once they are imposed. For
example, section 1128A(d) provides that the Secretary must take into
account certain factors ``in determining the amount * * * of any
penalty''; section 1128A(h) requires certain notifications once a civil
money penalty is imposed; and section 1128A(l) makes a principal liable
for penalties ``for the actions of the principal's agent acting within
the scope of the agency.'' These provisions are discussed more fully
below.
B. Regulatory Background
As noted above, section 1173 of the Act and section 264 of HIPAA
require the Secretary to adopt a number of national standards to
facilitate the exchange, and protect the privacy and security, of
certain health information. The Secretary has already adopted many of
these HIPAA standards by regulation. These regulations consist of the
following: Health Insurance Reform: Standards for Electronic
Transactions (Transactions Rule); Standards for Privacy of Individually
Identifiable Health Information (Privacy Rule); Health Insurance
Reform: Standard Unique Employer Identifier (EIN Rule); Health
Insurance Reform: Security Standards (Security Rule); and HIPAA
Administrative Simplification: Standard Unique Health Identifier for
Health Care Providers (NPI Rule). Proposed standards for certain claims
attachments were published on September 23, 2005 (70 FR 55990) and
proposed standards for health plan identifiers are under development.
The history of these and related rules is described in a proposed rule
published on April 18, 2005 at 70 FR 20225-20226.
An interim final rule promulgating procedural requirements for
imposition of civil money penalties, Civil Money Penalties: Procedures
for Investigations, Imposition of Penalties, and Hearings (April 17,
2003 interim final rule), was published on April 17, 2003 (68 FR
18895), and was effective on May 19, 2003, with a sunset date of
September 16, 2004 (as corrected at 68 FR 22453, April 28, 2003). The
April 17, 2003 interim final rule adopted a new subpart E of part 160.
The sunset date of the April 17, 2003 interim final rule was extended
to September 16, 2005 on September 15, 2004 (69 FR 55515) and was
further extended to March 16, 2006 on September 14, 2005 (70 FR 54293).
The authority for administering and enforcing compliance with the
Privacy Rule has been delegated to the HHS Office for Civil Rights
(OCR). 65 FR 82381 (December 28, 2000). The authority for administering
and enforcing compliance with the non-privacy HIPAA rules has been
delegated to the HHS Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS). 68
FR 60694 (October 23, 2003).
II. Overview of the Proposed and Final Rules
A. The Proposed Rule
In the proposed rule, we proposed to bring together and adopt rules
governing the implementation of the civil money penalty authority of
section 1176 of the Act for all of the HIPAA rules. As previously
noted, parts of the Enforcement Rule are already in place: subpart C of
part 160 establishes certain investigative procedures for the Privacy
Rule, and subpart E establishes interim procedures for investigations
and for the imposition, and challenges to the imposition, of civil
money penalties for all of the HIPAA rules. The proposed rule would
complete the Enforcement Rule by (1) making subpart C applicable to all
of the HIPAA rules; (2) adopting on a permanent basis most of the
provisions of subpart E; and (3) addressing, among other issues, our
policies for determining violations and calculating civil money
penalties, how we will address the statutory limitations on the
imposition of civil money penalties, and various procedural issues,
such as provisions for appellate review within HHS of a hearing
decision, burden of proof, and notification of other agencies of the
imposition of a civil money penalty.
Several fundamental considerations shaped the proposed rule. First,
there is one statutory provision for imposing civil money penalties on
covered entities that violate the HIPAA rules; thus, the proposed rule
sought to establish a uniform enforcement and compliance policy for all
of the HIPAA rules to minimize the potential for confusion and burden
and maximize the potential for fairness and consistency in enforcement.
Second, the proposed rule sought to facilitate the movement from
noncompliance to compliance by covered entities by extending to all of
the HIPAA rules the regulatory commitment to promoting and encouraging
voluntary compliance with the HIPAA rules that currently applies to the
Privacy Rule, subpart C of part 160. Third, the proposed rule sought to
minimize confusion with the procedures for investigations and hearings
by building upon pre-existing Departmental procedures for
investigations and hearings under section 1128A of the Act--the civil
money penalty regulations of the Office of the Inspector General, which
are codified at 42 CFR parts 1003, 1005, and 1006 (OIG regulations).
Fourth, the proposed rule was intended to be clear and easy to
understand. Finally, the proposed rule sought to provide the Secretary
with reasonable discretion, particularly in areas where the exercise of
judgment is called for by the statute or rules, and to avoid being
overly prescriptive in areas where it would be helpful to gain
experience with the practical impact of the HIPAA rules, to avoid
unintended adverse effects.
We proposed to amend subpart A of part 160, which contains general
provisions, to include a definition of ``person.'' With respect to
subpart C of part 160, we proposed to incorporate several provisions
currently found in subpart E and to make subpart C applicable to the
non-privacy HIPAA rules. We also proposed to add to part 160 a new
subpart D, which would establish rules relating to the imposition of
civil money penalties, including those which apply whether or not there
is a hearing. We also proposed to incorporate into subpart D several
provisions currently found in subpart E. Proposed subpart E addressed
the pre-hearing and hearing phases of the enforcement process. Many of
the provisions of proposed subpart E were adopted by the April 17, 2003
interim final rule; we did not propose to change them substantively,
although we
[[Page 8392]]
proposed to renumber them. Finally, a conforming change to the privacy
standards in subpart E of part 164 was proposed.
B. The Final Rule
While the final rule adopts most of the provisions of the proposed
rule without change, several significant changes to certain provisions
of the proposed rule have been made in response to comments. We do not
list variables in the final rule, as was proposed, to count the number
of violations of an identical requirement or prohibition; rather, the
final rule clarifies that the method for determining the number of such
violations is grounded in the substantive requirement or prohibition
violated. In addition, the ALJ will be able to review the number of
violations determined as part of his or her review of the proposed
civil money penalty. The provision for joint and several liability of
the members of an affiliated covered entity is retained, unless it is
established that another member of the affiliated covered entity was
responsible for the violation. While we continue to treat section
1176(b)(1) as an affirmative defense, we provide that it may be raised
at any time. We retain the provision for statistical sampling, but we
provide that, where statistical sampling is used, HHS must provide a
copy of the study on which its statistical findings are based with the
notice of proposed determination. As a corollary, we provide that a
respondent who intends to introduce evidence of its statistical expert
at the hearing must provide the study prepared by its expert to HHS at
least 30 days prior to the scheduled hearing. We also provide that a
respondent will have 90, rather than 60, days in which to file its
request for hearing. Other changes made by the final rule are described
below.
The Enforcement Rule does not adopt standards, as that term is
defined and interpreted under Subtitle F of Title II of HIPAA. Thus,
the requirement for industry consultations in section 1172(c) of the
Act does not apply. For the same reason, the statute's time frames for
compliance, set forth in section 1175 of the Act, do not apply to the
Enforcement Rule. Accordingly, the Enforcement Rule is effective on
March 16, 2006.
III. Section-by-Section Description of the Final Rule and Response to
Comments
We received 49 comments on the proposed rule. Many of these
comments were from associations or interest groups involved in the
health care industry. We also received comments from covered entities,
a state agency, a law school class, and a number of individuals.
While the comments addressed most of the provisions of the proposed
rule, the following 14 sections of the proposed rule received no
comment: proposed Sec. Sec. 160.400, 160.418, 160.500, 160.502,
160.506, 160.510, 160.514, 160.524, 160.526, 160.528, 160.530, 160.532,
160.544, and 160.550. We have, accordingly, not changed these sections
in the final rule from what was proposed, and we do not discuss them
below. The basis and purpose of sections that are unchanged from the
proposed rule and are not discussed below are set out in the proposed
rule published on April 18, 2005 at 70 FR 20240-20247 and, in certain
cases, in the interim final rule published on April 17, 2003 at 68 FR
18895-18901.
A number of comments also expressed support for particular
provisions. In most cases, we do not discuss these comments, with which
we generally agree, below. Finally, certain comments raised issues
concerning other HIPAA rules, such as allegations that a particular
entity had violated the Privacy Rule or that particular provisions of a
HIPAA rule create a hardship. Such issues are outside the scope of this
rulemaking and, accordingly, are not addressed here.
A. Subpart A
Subpart A of the final rule adopts a new definition of the term
``person.'' This definition is placed in Sec. 160.103, which contains
definitions that apply to all of the HIPAA rules. Thus, the new
definition of ``person'' applies to all of the HIPAA rules.
Proposed rule: We proposed to amend Sec. 160.103 to add a
definition of the term ``person'' to replace the definition of that
term adopted by the April 17, 2003 interim final rule. We proposed to
define the term ``person'' as ``a natural person, trust or estate,
partnership, corporation, professional association or corporation, or
other entity, public or private.'' As more fully explained at 70 FR
20227-20228, the proposed definition clarified, consistent with the
HIPAA provisions, that the term includes States and other public
entities.
Final rule: The final rule adopts the provisions of the proposed
rule.
Comment: We received one comment on this section, endorsing its
application to all of the HIPAA rules.
Response: The definition of ``person'' in the final rule remains
the same as proposed.
B. Subpart C--Compliance and Investigations
We amend subpart C to make the compliance and investigation
provisions of the subpart--which at present apply only to the Privacy
Rule--apply to all of the HIPAA rules. In addition, we include in
subpart C the definitions that apply to subparts C, D, and E. We move
to subpart C from subpart E the provisions relating to investigational
subpoenas and inquiries. We also add to subpart C provisions
prohibiting intimidation or retaliation that are currently found in the
Privacy Rule but not in the other HIPAA rules. We change the title of
this subpart to reflect the focus of this subpart within the larger
Enforcement Rule. Aside from a change to Sec. 160.306 and certain
minor and conforming changes to Sec. Sec. 160.300, 160.312, 160.314,
and 160.316, we do not change the substance of the existing provisions
of subpart C.
1. Section 160.300--Applicability
Proposed rule: We proposed to amend Sec. 160.300 (along with Sec.
160.304--Principles for achieving compliance; Sec. 160.306--Complaints
to the Secretary; Sec. 160.308--Compliance reviews; and Sec.
160.310--Responsibilities of covered entities) to make the provisions
of subpart C applicable to all of the HIPAA rules, instead of
applicable only to the Privacy Rule. The proposed rule would accomplish
this by changing the present references in these sections from
``subpart E of part 164'' to the more inclusive, defined term,
``administrative simplification provision'' or ``administrative
simplification provisions,'' as appropriate. As explained at 70 FR
20228, the purpose of this proposed change was to simplify and make
uniform the compliance and enforcement process for the HIPAA rules.
Final rule: The final rule streamlines the provisions of the
proposed rule by substituting the term ``provisions'' for the
references to standards, requirements, and implementation
specifications in Sec. 160.300.
Comment: A number of comments endorsed the approach of having
uniform compliance and enforcement provisions for the HIPAA rules, and
no comments disagreed with this approach.
Response: The final rule retains the policy of the proposed rule,
consistent with the expression of support for this approach in the
public comment, but streamlines the language of the section.
Comment: A couple of comments asked whether ``affiliated entities''
were the same as ``hybrid entities,'' in terms of applying the rule.
[[Page 8393]]
Response: As described at Sec. 164.105(b)(2)(i)(A), an affiliated
covered entity consists of ``[l]egally separate covered entities [that]
designate themselves (including any health care component of such
covered entity) as a single affiliated covered entity * * * [where] all
of the covered entities designated are under common ownership or
control.'' Thus, an affiliated covered entity is comprised of more than
one covered entity. By contrast, a hybrid entity is defined at Sec.
164.103 as ``a single legal entity: (1) That is a covered entity; (2)
Whose business activities include both covered and non-covered
functions; and (3) That designates health care components in accordance
with [the regulation].'' The Privacy and Security Rules apply to any
covered entity in either arrangement. The issue of liability for a
particular violation with respect to covered entities in an affiliated
covered entity is discussed in connection with Sec. 160.402(b) below.
2. Section 160.302--Definitions
Proposed rule: We proposed to move to Sec. 160.302 three
definitions that were adopted in the April 17, 2003 interim final rule
at Sec. 160.502: ``ALJ'' (Administrative Law Judge), ``civil money
penalty or penalty'', and ``respondent.'' We also proposed to add to
Sec. 160.302 two terms which are used throughout subparts C, D, and E:
``administrative simplification provision'' and ``violation'' or ``to
violate.'' We proposed to define the term ``administrative
simplification provision'' in Sec. 160.302 to mean any requirement or
prohibition established by the HIPAA provisions or HIPAA rules: ``* * *
any requirement or prohibition established by: (1) 42 U.S.C. 1320d-
1320d-4, 1320d-7, and 1320d-8; (2) Section 264 of Public Law 104-191;
or (3) This subchapter.'' We proposed to define a ``violation'' (or
``to violate'') to mean a ``failure to comply with an administrative
simplification provision.'' As more fully explained at 70 FR 20228-
20229, both definitions derive directly from the statutory language,
and both definitions function consistently and fairly across the
various HIPAA rules.
Final rule: The final rule adopts the provisions of the proposed
rule.
a. ``Administrative Simplification Provision''
Comment: One comment expressed general support for the definitions.
Another comment stated that the definition of ``administrative
simplification provision'' should be revised to include only standards.
The comment argued that this approach would be more consistent with the
statute, which provides that covered entities must comply with
standards, not requirements, prohibitions, or other restrictions set
forth in the HIPAA rules.
Response: No change is made to the definition of ``administrative
simplification provision.'' With respect to the second comment above,
we do not agree that the definition of this term should be limited to
standards. As discussed at 70 FR 20229, limiting the elements of the
HIPAA rules that could be violated to those designated as standards
would have the effect of, among other things, insulating from
enforcement explicit statutory requirements and prohibitions (e.g., the
prohibitions at section 1175(a) of the Act, which the statute terms
``requirements'' and which the Transactions Rule treats as requirements
but not standards). We do not agree that Congress intended such an
effect. We note, moreover, that the statute explicitly provides for the
adoption of implementation specifications. See section 1172(d) of the
Act. Furthermore, we disagree with the contention that the statute does
not contemplate that violations may be tied to requirements and
prohibitions: section 1176(a)(1) speaks of ``violations of an identical
requirement or prohibition.''
Comment: Several comments argued that this definition could lead to
multiple violations from a single act and lead to more liability than
covered entities could reasonably expect. It also was argued that this
definition would render almost meaningless the statutory $25,000 cap on
liability for violations of an identical provision in a calendar year.
Response: No examples were supplied to illustrate the concern as to
how this definition would increase the anticipated liability of covered
entities, so we can only respond generally. The prohibition in Sec.
160.404(b)(2) on counting overlapping requirements twice should
minimize any such effect. As for violations that might be implicated in
a single act and not be insulated by Sec. 160.404(b)(2), we see no
reason why they should not be considered as separate violations, since
covered entities must comply with all applicable requirements and
prohibitions of the HIPAA provisions and rules. Also, the definition
does not render the statutory cap meaningless; rather, the
``requirement or prohibition'' language of the definition is taken
directly from the part of section 1176(a) that establishes the $25,000
statutory cap (``the total amount imposed on the person for all
violations of an identical requirement or prohibition for a calendar
year may not exceed $25,000''). Furthermore, for the reasons explained
in the preamble to the proposed rule, none of the other possible
formulations of what constitutes a ``provision of this part'' works
uniformly and fairly across the HIPAA rules. Thus, we retain the
definition of ``administrative simplification provision'' as proposed.
b. ``Violation'' or ``Violate''
Comment: One comment asked how the definition of ``violation''
would work with the addressable components of the Security Rule.
Response: With respect to the issue of how this term would apply to
the addressable implementation specifications of the Security Rule, we
provide the following guidance. Under Sec. 164.306(d)(3)(ii), a
covered entity must implement an addressable implementation
specification if doing so is ``reasonable and appropriate.'' Where that
condition is met, the addressable implementation specification is a
requirement, and failure to implement the addressable implementation
specification would, accordingly, constitute a violation. Where that
condition is not met, the covered entity must document why it would not
be reasonable and appropriate to implement the implementation
specification and implement ``an equivalent alternative measure if
reasonable and appropriate.'' In this latter situation, creating the
documentation referred to is a requirement, and implementing an
alternative measure is also a requirement, if doing so is reasonable
and appropriate in the covered entity's circumstances; failure to take
either required action would, accordingly, constitute a violation.
3. Section 160.304--Principles for Achieving Compliance
Proposed rule: We proposed to amend Sec. 160.304 to make it
applicable to all of the HIPAA rules; otherwise, we proposed to leave
the rule substantively unchanged. Section 160.304 provides that the
Secretary will, to the extent practicable, seek the cooperation of
covered entities in obtaining compliance. Section 160.304 also provides
that the Secretary may provide technical assistance to help covered
entities voluntarily comply with the HIPAA rules.
Final rule: The final rule adopts the provisions of the proposed
rule.
Comment: Many comments supported HHS's approach to voluntary
compliance and the use of a complaint-based process to identify and
correct
[[Page 8394]]
noncompliance, on the grounds that it is the most efficient and
effective way of obtaining compliance and realizing the benefits of the
HIPAA rules. In addition, some contended that, given the confusion of
many covered entities with many of the rules' requirements, it is an
appropriate approach. However, one comment criticized HHS's reliance on
voluntary compliance and informal resolution of complaints on the
ground that the statute contemplates that violations of the HIPAA rules
should be pursued in the same manner as fraud and abuse cases, that is,
through the formal, adversarial process provided for by section
1128A(c). Another comment stated that HHS's reliance on voluntary
compliance has led to lax enforcement and that reliance on a complaint-
based system is a fundamentally flawed approach, particularly with
respect to enforcement of the Privacy Rule, because HHS has provided
insufficient education to consumers, and it is impossible for consumers
to complain about a law about which they know very little. Several
comments urged that OCR and CMS continue to provide educational
materials and guidance to help covered entities comply with the HIPAA
rules and to educate consumers about their rights under the Privacy
Rule.
Response: We agree that encouraging voluntary compliance is the
most effective and quickest way of obtaining compliance in most cases.
We do not agree that encouraging voluntary compliance and seeking
informal resolution of complaints in individual cases constitutes lax
enforcement or that such an approach is inconsistent with our statutory
obligations. Our experience to date with privacy complaints illustrates
the effectiveness of our enforcement approach. As of October 31, 2005,
OCR had received and initiated reviews of over 16,000 privacy
complaints from health care consumers and others across the country.
These complaints are widespread and diverse, not only geographically,
but also with respect to the type of entity complained against, as well
as the Privacy Rule issues raised by the complaints. Complaints are
filed against all sizes and types of covered entities, from solo
practitioners to hospitals and pharmacy chains, and from health
insurance issuers to group health plans, for example. In addition, the
complaints implicate a full range of Privacy Rule issues, from uses and
disclosures of protected health information to individual rights to
administrative requirements. The variation and expansiveness of the
complaints provide HHS with a much broader approach to compliance than
would a compliance review system, which likely would need to be
targeted to larger institutions and/or a smaller set of concerns.
Further, our experience with these cases--68 percent have been resolved
or otherwise closed to date--indicates that generally we are receiving
good cooperation from covered entities in quickly addressing compliance
problems. Such resolutions bring the benefits of the HIPAA rules to
consumers far more quickly than would a formalized, adversarial
process, which would also be time-consuming and costly for both sides.
We also do not agree that the statute contemplates only a
formalized, adversarial process; rather, it only requires such a
process where a proposed civil money penalty is contested. It is
important to note, moreover, that section 1176 contemplates that we
would work with covered entities to help them achieve compliance, even
when there is an allegation that the covered entity is in violation of
the rules. Section 1176 provides that a civil money penalty may not be
imposed if the failure to comply was due to reasonable cause and not
willful neglect and is corrected within a certain period of time after
the covered entity knew or should have known of the compliance failure,
and that the Secretary may, in some circumstances, provide technical
assistance to the covered entity during that period. Further, an
approach that is primarily complaint-based does not limit our ability
to perform compliance reviews when appropriate, and this has, in fact,
occurred. We will continue to review the effectiveness of our
enforcement approach and revise it, if needed. Notwithstanding our
above approach, however, we will resort to civil money penalties, as
needed, for matters that cannot be resolved by informal means.
Further, we disagree that persons affected by the Privacy Rule and
the other HIPAA rules are unaware of their rights, as evidenced by the
large number of complaints that HHS has received from consumers and
covered and other entities. HHS has an ongoing program of providing
information to the public and guidance to covered entities through the
Internet, public speaking and educational events, and toll-free call-in
lines. The millions of hits to our Web sites--https://www.hhs.gov/ocr/
hipaa for the Privacy Rule and https://www.cms.gov/hipaa/hipaa2 for the
other HIPAA rules--suggest that covered entities and the public are
increasingly aware of the application of the HIPAA rules to their
business activities and lives, respectively, and are able to access the
information we have made available. In addition, the American Health
Information Management Association issued the results of their latest
compliance survey in a report entitled ``The State of HIPAA Privacy and
Security Compliance, April 2005,'' which indicated, with respect to the
Privacy Rule, that over two-thirds of all hospital and health system
patients had some or a complete understanding of their rights and the
facility's responsibilities. Nonetheless, while such evidence is
encouraging, we recognize that HHS must remain active in providing
outreach and public education. We are committed to doing so, and thus,
continue to develop educational material for consumers and industry
guidance for covered entities.
Comment: One comment suggested that the Secretary commit to
providing technical assistance to covered entities.
Response: We do not agree that the provision of technical
assistance should be mandated. The statute (at section
1176(b)(3)(B)(ii)) makes the provision of technical assistance
discretionary if the Secretary determines that the compliance failure
was due to the covered entity's inability to comply. While OCR and CMS
provide technical assistance in many cases, it is not necessary in all
instances to provide such assistance in order to obtain compliance.
Thus, it is inappropriate to mandate the provision of technical
assistance.
Comment: One comment suggested amending Sec. 160.304(b) to require
ongoing reporting of complaints and resolutions to the healthcare
industry. The goal in requiring reporting would be to educate covered
entities regarding complaints that are found to be actual violations
and encourage them to review their compliance. The comment stated that
the current reports made by OCR to the National Committee on Vital and
Health Statistics are not helpful since they only report the volume of
complaints, not the nature of the complaints or whether a violation
occurred.
Response: We do not believe mandatory reporting of complaints and
resolutions is necessary. Both CMS and OCR currently have the ability
to report to the public, including the healthcare industry, about
complaints and their resolutions, and do so in summary form. We
continue to present summaries of actions on complaints in various fora,
including in public presentations, testimony, and in written documents.
Our enforcement experience also informs our development of FAQs and
guidance documents to explain certain
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provisions and how to comply with them. In any event, covered entities
should use their own internal complaint processes and experience to
assess and improve their compliance and ability to serve the needs of
their customers.
Comment: One comment suggested that the informal resolution process
should allow HHS to render opinions on a covered entity's
interpretation of the HIPAA rules. The comment expressed concern that a
covered entity would not be able to resolve a compliance issue during
the informal resolution process if it made a good faith, but incorrect,
interpretation of a HIPAA rule. The comment suggested allowing HHS to
render an opinion on the entity's interpretation to facilitate the
informal resolution of compliance problems.
Response: As a general matter, we do not issue advisory opinions,
but the informal resolution process will provide covered entities with
information about HHS's interpretation of the HIPAA rules. Covered
entities may also find guidance as to the proper interpretation of a
HIPAA rule in the FAQs posted on the HHS website and technical
assistance offered to the covered entities by HHS. Covered entities may
also submit questions to HHS for consideration with respect to future
FAQs and guidance.
4. Section 160.306--Complaints to the Secretary
Proposed rule: Section 160.306 provides for investigations of
covered entities by the Secretary. It also outlines the procedure and
requirements for filing a complaint against a covered entity. For
example, it provides that a complaint must name the person that is the
subject of the complaint and describe the acts or omissions believed to
be violations. It also requires that complaints be filed within 180
days of when the complainant knew or should have known that the act or
omission occurred, unless this time limit is waived for good cause. The
proposed rule would have amended this section to apply it to all of the
HIPAA rules, rather than exclusively to the Privacy Rule, but otherwise
proposed no substantive changes to the section.
Final rule: The final rule adopts the provisions of the proposed
rule, except that proposed Sec. 160.306(c) is revised to require the
Secretary to describe the basis of the complaint in the first written
communication with the covered entity about the complaint.
Comment: One comment asked for clarification on when a complaint
will be considered to have been timely filed in situations when a
complainant should have known of the violation, thus triggering the
180-day time period for filing a complaint.
Response: Deciding whether or not a complaint was properly filed
within the 180-day period will need to be determined in each case. For
example, an individual who is informed through an accounting of
disclosures that his or her health information was impermissibly
disclosed would be considered to know of the violation at the time the
individual receives the accounting. In any event, however, the 180-day
period can be waived for good cause shown.
Comment: Two comments suggested that HHS be required to inform a
covered entity of the specific basis for an investigation or compliance
review. These comments suggested the best way to accomplish this goal
would be to send a copy of the complaint to the covered entity. The
comments stated that, without specific information as to the basis of
the complaint, a covered entity will not be able to properly respond to
the agency's request for information.
Response: Both CMS and OCR currently provide the basis for an
investigation in the first written communication with a covered entity
about a complaint. This policy will continue to be followed, and the
final rule is revised to require it. It should be noted that provision
of a description of the basis for the complaint does not circumscribe
the investigation, if the investigation subsequently uncovers other
compliance issues with respect to the covered entity.
We disagree that sending a copy of the complaint is necessary for a
covered entity to adequately respond to the Secretary's inquiries. As
noted above, covered entities receive a description of the basis for
the complaint. Other information contained in the complaint, such as
the complainant's identity, is not always relevant to the
investigation. In some cases, in fact, it may be necessary to withhold
such information to, for example, protect the complainant's privacy. In
instances where it is necessary to provide the complainant's identity
in order for the covered entity to properly respond to the
investigation, the complainant is so informed before this information
is released to the covered entity.
Comment: One comment suggested that the rule be revised to require
that a complaint include the name of the covered entity that is the
subject of the complaint.
Response: The rule, both as proposed and as adopted below, already
requires that a complaint ``name the person that is the subject of the
complaint.'' See Sec. 160.306(b)(2).
Comment: In one comment, a covered entity complained that it had
expended a great deal of time and money defending itself against what
turned out to be a false allegation and asked that HHS put more effort
into gathering detailed information from complainants and helping
covered entities respond to complaints. Another comment criticized the
rule for providing no way of sanctioning a person bringing a negligent
or malicious complaint.
Response: We understand that it may take time and effort to
establish that an allegation is unfounded. When complaints are
received, we make every effort to determine if the complaint is
legitimate, so as not to place undue burdens on covered entities.
Further, covered entities are encouraged promptly to contact the OCR or
CMS investigators handling their complaints to discuss the allegations
once notice of an investigation is received by the covered entity.
Doing so should help a covered entity avoid the expenditure of
unnecessary time and funds on defending itself against baseless
complaints. The statute provides no basis for our penalizing a person
for bringing a negligent or malicious complaint, although remedies may
exist at common law. However, as discussed below in connection with
Sec. 160.316, lack of good faith would typically be a matter that is
looked at in the course of investigating a complaint.
Comment: One comment suggested that only individuals or personal
representatives should have standing to file a complaint. The comment
takes the position that one covered entity should not be able to bring
a complaint against another.
Response: We disagree. The purpose of the complaint process is to
bring violations to the attention of HHS, so that any noncompliance
with the HIPAA rules may be corrected. Particularly with respect to the
Transactions Rule, the persons or entities that are likely to be
disadvantaged by the noncompliance of a covered entity are other
covered entities. It would, accordingly, be inconsistent with the
purpose of the complaint process to exclude such entities from it.
Comment: Two comments suggested that HHS be required to notify
covered entities of a complaint within a specified time-frame.
Response: OCR and CMS make every effort to notify covered entities
of complaints on a timely basis. However, we do not include a specific
deadline for notifying covered entities of
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complaints in the rule. The time needed to determine whether a
complaint states issues that should be investigated can vary greatly,
while fluctuations in the volume of complaints and other workload
demands may also make meeting a specific deadline problematic.
Comment: One comment suggested that Sec. 160.306(a)(2) should be
amended to require that ``uses or disclosures'' be described in the
complaint rather than ``acts or omissions.''
Response: The suggested change would not be appropriate. The
provisions of this rule apply to all of the HIPAA rules, not just the
Privacy Rule; the other HIPAA rules regulate actions other than uses
and disclosures of protected health information. Moreover, even under
the Privacy Rule, a violation may occur where no impermissible use or
disclosure of protected health information has occurred. Failure to
comply with a notice requirement under Sec. 164.520 is an example of a
violation that does not involve a use or disclosure of protected health
information.
Comment: One comment suggested that the Secretary should be
required to investigate all complaints and that failure to do so is
inconsistent with section 1176(a) of the Act, which compels the
Secretary to impose penalties for violations unless a statutory
limitation applies. Imposing a deadline for beginning investigations
was also suggested.
Response: The decision to investigate a complaint is based on the
facts presented. Not all complaints need to be investigated. For
example, in our experience, a substantial percentage of privacy
complaints allege facts that fall outside of OCR's jurisdiction under
HIPAA--e.g., an action prior to the compliance date of the Privacy Rule
or an action by an entity not covered by the Rule. Revising the rule to
require the Secretary to investigate all complaints would be
counterproductive and lead to an inefficient allocation of enforcement
resources. Similarly, imposing a deadline for beginning an
investigation is unrealistic: Some investigations may turn out to be
more time-consuming than anticipated, delaying the start of other
investigations. It is necessary to provide OCR and CMS with the
flexibility to deal with variations in circumstances and resource
constraints.
5. Section 160.308--Compliance Reviews
Proposed rule: The proposed rule provided that the Secretary may
conduct compliance reviews to determine whether covered entities are
complying with the applicable administrative simplification provisions.
Final rule: The final rule adopts the provisions of the proposed
rule.
Comment: Several comments asked HHS to outline the circumstances
under which a compliance review would be undertaken or asked that the
compliance review provision be eliminated from the rule. One comment
suggested that compliance reviews be limited to evidence-based reviews.
These comments expressed concern that the rule does not specifically
define when a compliance review will be undertaken.
Response: Compliance reviews are conducted at the discretion of the
Secretary. Outlining specific instances in which a compliance review
will be conducted could have the counterproductive effect of skewing
compliance efforts toward those aspects of compliance that had been
identified as likely to result in a compliance review. It also does not
seem advisable to limit, by rule, the circumstances under which such
reviews may be conducted at this early stage of the enforcement
program, when our knowledge of the types of violations that may arise
is necessarily limited. We also do not agree that the provision for
compliance reviews should be eliminated. There are situations where
instances of potential noncompliance come to HHS's attention outside of
the complaint process (e.g., where media reports suggest that a
violation has occurred), and HHS must have clear authority to
investigate such situations.
Comment: A number of comments suggested that HHS detail the
compliance review process and rules for notification of covered
entities when they are being reviewed.
Response: The rule already contains procedures to be followed, and
requirements to be met, that apply to compliance reviews. See
Sec. Sec. 160.304, 160.310, 160.312, 160.314, and 160.316. It is
unnecessary to establish procedures comparable to the complaint filing
procedures of Sec. 160.306 for compliance reviews, since they are
initiated by HHS. The concerns expressed by most of the comments on
this topic--that HHS would undertake a compliance review without notice
to the covered entity and without specifying the basis for, or the
focus of, the review--are misplaced. Section 160.312 requires HHS to
attempt to resolve violations found in a compliance review by informal
means and to inform the covered entity in writing if a compliance
review is or is not resolved by informal means. Failing to notify the
covered entity of a compliance review or the basis for such a review is
not consistent with our practice generally and would be unlikely to
yield much information of use, resulting in an ineffective use of the
covered entity's and the agency's resources.
Comment: One comment suggests that compliance reviews should be
mandatory and should be initiated within a specified time period.
Response: The rule, as proposed and adopted, does not preclude
establishing a compliance review program or schedule, but it does not
require it either. One purpose of compliance reviews is to permit
investigation when allegations or situations warranting investigation
come to our attention outside of the complaint process. The necessity
for a compliance review in a particular case or a program of scheduled
compliance reviews is inherently unpredictable, and it is important to
retain the administrative flexibility to address such situations.
Mandating compliance reviews on a fixed basis or schedule would be an
inefficient allocation of limited enforcement resources and would
hamper the agency's ability to target resources at actual noncompliance
problems as they arise.
Comment: One comment suggested that the rule contain provisions
outlining the coordination and cooperation between CMS and OCR when a
compliance review under more than one rule occurs.
Response: As with complaint-based investigations, CMS and OCR will
coordinate and allocate responsibility for compliance reviews based
upon the HIPAA provisions involved and the facts of the case. We do not
consider it advisable to specify detailed rules in this regard, as the
allocation of function and responsibility will depend on the facts of
each case and the resources available at the time.
6. Section 160.310--Responsibilities of Covered Entities
Proposed rule: Section 160.310 addresses the responsibilities of a
covered entity, such as providing records and compliance reports to the
Secretary and cooperating during a compliance review or complaint
investigation. Section 160.310(c) provides that a covered entity must
permit HHS to have access during normal business hours to its
facilities, books, records, and other information necessary to
determine compliance, but provides that if the Secretary determines
that ``exigent circumstances exist, such as when documents may be
hidden or destroyed,'' the covered entity must permit access at any
time without
[[Page 8397]]
notice. Section 160.310 also requires that the Secretary may not
disclose protected health information obtained by the Secretary in the
course of an investigation or compliance review except when necessary
to ascertaining or enforcing compliance or as otherwise required by
law. The proposed rule would amend this section to apply it to all of
the HIPAA rules, rather than exclusively to the Privacy Rule, but
otherwise proposed no substantive changes to the section.
Final rule: The final rule adopts the provisions of the proposed
rule.
Comment: A couple of comments asked HHS either to further define
``exigent circumstances,'' such as by limiting it to situations
involving national security or by inserting specific examples of
exigent circumstances in Sec. 160.310(c)(1). One comment suggested
that the rule be revised to require that the Secretary's determination
that ``exigent circumstances'' exist be a ``reasonable'' one.
Response: The determination of what constitutes ``exigent
circumstances'' will inevitably be fact-dependent. Specific language
defining ``exigent circumstances'' is unnecessary, as the rule already
provides a clarifying example and the principle underlying the
provision is reasonably universal. We note that limiting the provision
to situations where matters of national security are involved would
most likely not cover the types of situations the provision is intended
to cover--situations in which it is likely that the covered entity will
seek to conceal or destroy evidence of noncompliance that HHS needs to
carry out its statutory obligation to enforce the HIPAA rules.
Comment: Two comments asked for further guidance and notice of
record retention requirements and another comment expressed concerns
with the record retention requirements of the Privacy Rule.
Response: Record retention requirements applicable to the Privacy
and Security Rules are spelled out in those rules; see, Sec.
164.530(j) and Sec. 164.316(b), respectively. We do not address these
record retention requirements here, as this topic lies outside the
scope of this rule.
The other HIPAA rules do not contain explicit record retention
requirements, as such. However, it is likely that the documentation
that would be relevant to showing compliance with those rules--such as
health plan instructions to providers, software documentation,
contracts, and systems processes--is kept as part of normal business
practices. Covered entities should consider any other applicable laws,
such as state law, in making such decisions.
7. Section 160.312--Secretarial Action Regarding Complaints and
Compliance Reviews
Proposed rule: We proposed to revise Sec. 160.312(a) to require
that, where noncompliance is indicated, the Secretary would seek to
reach by informal means a resolution of the matter that is satisfactory
to the Secretary. Informal means could include demonstrated compliance,
or a completed corrective action plan or other agreement. We proposed
to revise Sec. 160.312(a)(2) to require, where noncompliance is
indicated and the matter is resolved by informal means, that HHS notify
the covered entity in writing and, if the matter arose from a
complaint, the complainant. Where noncompliance is indicated and the
matter is not resolved by informal means, proposed Sec.
160.312(a)(3)(i) would require the Secretary to so inform the covered
entity and provide the covered entity an opportunity to submit, within
30 days of receipt of such notification, written evidence of any
mitigating factors or affirmative defenses. To avoid confusion with the
notice of proposed determination process provided for at proposed Sec.
160.420, proposed Sec. 160.312(a)(3)(ii) provided that, where the
matter is not resolved by informal means and the Secretary finds that
imposition of a civil money penalty is warranted, the formal finding
would be contained in the notice of proposed determination issued under
proposed Sec. 160.420. We proposed to leave Sec. 160.312(b)
substantively unchanged.
Final rule: The final rule adopts the provisions of the proposed
rule.
Comment: One comment suggested that covered entities should be able
to appeal the Secretary's findings during the informal resolution
process and that the Secretary's decision to resolve a matter
informally should not preclude the respondent from questioning the
Secretary's interpretation or application of the rule in question.
Response: The purpose of the informal resolution process described
in Sec. 160.312 is to bring closure at an early stage to a matter
where compliance is in issue and, thus, to obviate the need to issue a
notice of proposed determination. Section 160.312 recognizes, however,
that informal resolutions will not always be achieved. Where the agency
and the covered entity are not able to resolve the matter informally,
HHS (through OCR and/or CMS) will make a finding of noncompliance
pursuant to Sec. 160.420, which the covered entity may then challenge
through the applicable procedures of subparts D and E. Nothing in the
rule compels the covered entity to challenge the finding of
noncompliance under Sec. 160.420, but if the covered entity wishes to
challenge such a finding, including the agency's interpretation or
application of a rule, it must do so through the procedural avenue
provided by subparts D and E. These procedures implement the
requirement of section 1128A(c) of the Act that the Secretary may not
make an adverse determination against a person until the person has
been given written notice and an opportunity for a hearing on the
record on the adverse determination.
Comment: One comment asked how informal resolution is possible,
given HHS's position that, where a violation is found, a CMP must be
imposed. Another comment expressed concern that the informal resolution
process would allow covered entities to skirt penalties and the
consequences of noncompliance with the HIPAA rules and suggested that
the Secretary should not be compelled to reach a resolution through
informal processes.
Response: These comments misunderstand our position as to the
mandatory nature of the statute. The Secretary must impose a civil
money penalty where a formal determination of a violation is made.
However, many opportunities exist prior to this determination that
allow the Secretary to exercise his discretion to not impose a penalty.
This issue is discussed more fully in connection with Sec. 160.402
below.
The second comment above also misconstrues Sec. 160.312. Nothing
in that section compels OCR or CMS to resolve matters informally.
Indeed, Sec. 160.312(a)(3) describes the actions to be taken ``[i]f
the matter is not resolved by informal means * * *''.
Comment: One comment suggested that HHS and the covered entity
should be required to put the informal resolution in writing.
Response: Both Sec. 160.312(a)(2) and Sec. 160.312(b) require
that the resolutions contemplated in those sections be ``in writing.''
CMS and OCR currently document informal resolutions.
Comment: One comment suggested that the 30-day time period for a
covered entity to submit to the Secretary evidence of mitigating
factors or affirmative defenses should be extended.
Response: Thirty days should be sufficient for a covered entity to
submit such evidence. The opportunity to provide additional evidence
comes at
[[Page 8398]]
the end of investigation, and the covered entity should be gathering
any evidence of mitigating factors or affirmative defenses during the
investigation. In addition, the covered entity will have the
opportunity to present such evidence to the ALJ if it chooses to appeal
the Secretary's findings. Accordingly, we do not change this provision.
Comment: One comment suggested that a deadline should be imposed
for HHS to notify the covered entity of its findings after an
investigation.
Response: The time needed to finalize the agency's findings will
depend on the complexity of the case, its outcome, and workload
considerations. As these factors are inherently variable and
unpredictable, we do not believe it would be advisable to impose fixed
deadlines for taking the actions described in Sec. 160.312.
Comment: One comment requested clarification of proposed Sec.
160.312(a)(3)(ii), with respect to what action is referred to and the
associated time frame.
Response: The action referred to is HHS's notification of the
covered entity of its finding of noncompliance when it determines that
the matter cannot be resolved informally. Section 160.312(a)(3)(ii)
provides that, if HHS decides to impose a civil money penalty, it will
send a notice of proposed determination to the covered entity pursuant
to Sec. 160.420. Thus, the intent of this provision is to clarify
that, once OCR and/or CMS, as applicable, has determined that a
violation has occurred, the matter cannot be resolved informally in a
manner that is satisfactory to OCR and/or CMS, and a civil money
penalty should be imposed, the agency's next step is to provide the
formal notice required by section 1128A(c)(1), which in this rule is
the notice of proposed determination under Sec. 160.420. The rule
imposes no specific deadline on the agency for sending this notice.
However, it should be noted that if the notice is not sent within six
years of the violation, pursuit of the civil money penalty would be
precluded by section 1128A(c)(1), which is implemented in this rule by
Sec. 160.414.
Comment: One comment requested that Sec. 160.312(a)(3) be revised
to afford complainants the opportunity to express, in writing, the
impact of the violation.
Response: The suggested change is unnecessary, since nothing in the
rule precludes a complainant from providing such information to the
agency at any point in the process. Complainants frequently describe,
in their complaints or in the course of OCR's or CMS's initial contacts
with the complainants, the impact of the alleged violation. HHS also
may request such information from the complainant where, for example,
it bears on the amount of the penalty to be imposed.
8. Section 160.314--Investigational Subpoenas and Inquiries
Proposed rule: The text of proposed Sec. 160.314 was adopted by
the April 17, 2003 interim final rule as Sec. 160.504. We proposed to
move this section to subpart C, consistent with our overall approach of
organizing subparts C, D, and E to reflect the stages of the
enforcement process. We proposed to include in the introductory
language of proposed Sec. 160.314(a) a sentence which states that, for
the purposes of paragraph (a), a person other than a natural person is
termed an ``entity.'' We proposed not to modify Sec. 160.314(b)(1),
(2) and (8) from the provisions of the April 17, 2003 interim final
rule at paragraphs (b)(1)-(3) of Sec. 160.504. However, we proposed to
add new paragraphs (3) through (7) and (9) to Sec. 160.314(b) and also
to add a new paragraph (c). The proposed new paragraphs at Sec. Sec.
160.314(b)(3)-(b)(7) would permit representatives of HHS to attend and
ask questions at the inquiry, give a witness the opportunity to clarify
his answers on the record after being questioned by HHS, require any
objections or claims of privilege to be asserted on the record, and
permit HHS to seek enforcement of the subp