Before Commissioners: Joseph T. Kelliher, Chairman; Nora Mead Brownell, and Suedeen G. Kelly; California Independent System Operator; Order Accepting and Modifying Tariff Filing and Instituting a Section 206 Proceeding, 6063-6068 [06-1090]
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Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 24 / Monday, February 6, 2006 / Notices
will allow for more streamlined
processing of the data and more
effective use of resources, including
providing more focus on information
about profits, profitability, investment,
and operating costs in these lines of
business. Reducing the scope of the
survey will also reduce the reporting
burden on the survey respondents.
The proposed modifications include
elimination of Schedule 5341,
‘‘Domestic Coal Operations, Reserves
and Production Statistics,’’ Schedule
5750, ‘‘Eliminations in Consolidation’’
for Downstream Natural Gas, and
Schedule 5850, ‘‘Eliminations in
Consolidation’’ for Electric Power. The
following schedules for the downstream
natural gas and electric power lines of
business will be reduced in scope:
• Schedule 5711, Downstream
Natural Gas Operating Expenses,
• Schedule 5712, Purchases and Sales
of Natural Gas and Natural Gas Liquids,
• Schedule 5741, Downstream
Natural Gas Capacity Measures, and
Downstream Natural Gas Output
Measures, and all of the Electric Power
schedules, including:
• Schedule 5810, Consolidating
Statement of Income,
• Schedule 5811, Electric Power
Operating Expenses,
• Schedule 5812, Purchases and Sales
of Fuel and Electric Power.
• Schedule 5841, Electric Power
Capacity and Output Statistics.
Copies of the proposed new schedules
and the instructions are available from
Mr. Filas.
III. Request for Comments
Prospective respondents and other
interested persons are invited to
comment on the actions discussed in
item II. The following guidelines are
provided to assist in the preparation of
comments.
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General Issues
A. Is the proposed collection of
information necessary for the proper
performance of the functions of the
agency and does the information have
practical utility? Practical utility is
defined as the actual usefulness of
information to or for an agency, taking
into account its accuracy, adequacy,
reliability, timeliness, and the agency’s
ability to process the information it
collects.
B. What enhancements can be made
to the quality, utility, and clarity of the
information to be collected?
As a Potential Respondent to the
Request for Information
A. What actions could be taken to
help ensure and maximize the quality,
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objectivity, utility, and integrity of the
information to be collected?
B. Are the Form EIA–28 instructions
and definitions clear and sufficient? If
not, which instructions require
clarification?
C. Can information be submitted by
the due date?
D. Public reporting burden for the
Form EIA–28 collection, including
proposed changes, is estimated to
average 450 hours per response. The
estimated burden includes the total
time, effort, or financial resources
expended to generate, maintain, retain,
disclose and provide the information. In
your opinion, how accurate is this
estimate?
E. The agency estimates that the only
cost to a respondent is for the time it
will take to complete the collection.
Will a respondent incur any start-up
costs for reporting, or any recurring
costs for operation maintenance, and
purchases of services associated with
the information collection?
F. What additional actions could be
taken to minimize the burden of this
collection of information? Such actions
may involve the use of automated,
electronic, mechanical, or other
technological collection techniques or
other forms of information technology.
G. Does any other Federal, State, or
local agency collect similar information?
If so, specify the agency, the data
element(s), and the method(s) of
collection.
As a Potential User of the Information
to be Collected
A. What actions could be taken to
help ensure and maximize the quality,
objectivity, utility, and integrity of the
information disseminated?
B. Is the information useful at the
levels of detail to be collected?
C. For what purpose(s) would the
information be used? Be specific.
D. Are there alternate sources for the
information and are they useful? If so,
what are their weaknesses and/or
strengths?
Comments submitted in response to
this notice will be summarized and/or
included in the request for OMB
approval of the form. They also will
become a matter of public record.
Statutory Authority: Section 3507(h)(1) of
the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (Pub.
L. No. 104–13, 44 U.S.C. Chapter 35).
Issued in Washington, DC, January 31,
2006.
Jay H. Casselberry,
Agency Clearance Officer, Energy Information
Administration.
[FR Doc. E6–1564 Filed 2–3–06; 8:45 am]
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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission
[Docket No. ER06–354–000; EL06–44–000]
Before Commissioners: Joseph T.
Kelliher, Chairman; Nora Mead
Brownell, and Suedeen G. Kelly;
California Independent System
Operator; Order Accepting and
Modifying Tariff Filing and Instituting a
Section 206 Proceeding
Issued January 13, 2006.
1. On December 21, 2005, the
California Independent System Operator
Corporation (CAISO) filed a tariff
amendment (Amendment No. 73)
proposing to change its current ‘‘soft’’
$250/MWh bid cap for real-time energy
bids and adjustment bids to a ‘‘hard’’
$400/MWh bid cap, effective January 1,
2006 or as soon thereafter as possible.
The CAISO asked the Commission to
review its application on an expedited
basis with a shortened comment period.
In this order, the Commission accepts
with modification, as described below,
the CAISO’s proposed tariff amendment,
effective upon issuance of this order.
2. To remove any opportunity for
market distortions created by the
Commission’s approval of an increase in
the CAISO bid cap, we will institute,
under section 206 of the Federal Power
Act (FPA),1 an investigation into the
price cap in the WECC outside the
CAISO. We also institute a section 206
investigation into the CAISO ancillary
service capacity bid cap, in order to
consider whether any incentives that
distort a supplier’s choice between
offering energy or ancillary services will
result from the rise in gas prices and the
increase in the CAISO energy bid cap.
We hereby establish a refund effective
date pursuant to the provisions of
section 206.
Background
The CAISO’s Filing
3. The CAISO filed Amendment No.
73 requesting that the Commission
accept its tariff revision altering the
CAISO’s current bid cap. Section 28 of
the CAISO tariff establishes a bid cap
that sets a limit on the level of bids
submitted for the CAISO’s energy and
ancillary service capacity markets.
According to the CAISO, this bid cap
also applies to adjustment bids used in
the day-ahead and hour-ahead
congestion management markets.
Amendment No. 73 proposes to modify
section 28.1.2 to replace the current
1 16
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‘‘soft’’ bid cap 2 of $250/MWh for realtime energy bids and adjustment bids
with a ‘‘hard’’ bid cap of $400/MWh.3
The CAISO states that its proposal to
change its bid cap from ‘‘soft’’ to ‘‘hard’’
is consistent with the Commission’s
directive that it change its bid cap to a
‘‘hard’’ cap when it implements the
Market Redesign and Technology
Upgrade (MRTU).4 It does not propose
to change the bid cap for ancillary
services markets from the current ‘‘soft’’
$250/MWh cap.
4. The CAISO states that on November
9, 2005, in response to a request from
its Department of Market Monitoring
(DMM), the CAISO’s Market
Surveillance Committee (MSC) 5
recommended that the bid cap on the
real-time energy market be increased
prior to this winter, because ‘‘the
likelihood of substantially higher
natural gas prices during the winter of
[2006] is sufficiently high to justify
raising the bid cap at this time’’ in order
to avoid ‘‘the risk of generation unitlevel variable costs approaching or
rising above the [current $250/MWh]
cap level.’’ The MSC recommended a
new level of $400/MWh, based on its
analysis of average values of Henry Hub
futures prices for the upcoming winter.6
The CAISO further notes that the DMM
prepared a memorandum supporting the
MSC’s recommendation, citing changed
market conditions and the significant
benefits to the California energy markets
that would result from raising the realtime energy bid cap under current
market conditions.7 The CAISO asserts
2 Section 28.1.1 of the CAISO’s tariff currently
permits market participants to submit bids above
the cap, but any accepted bids above the cap are
not eligible to set the market clearing price and are
subject to cost justification and refund. A ‘‘soft’’ cap
is one where market participants may submit bids
above the bid cap with adequate justification, but
without setting the market clearing price.
3 A ‘‘hard’’ cap is one where market participants’
bids are not permitted to exceed the cap, regardless
of the seller’s costs.
4 California Independent System Operator Corp.,
112 FERC ¶ 61,013 at P 104 (2005) (July 2005
Order), reh’g pending.
5 The CAISO’s Web site notes that the MSC is an
independent advisory group of industry experts
who can suggest changes in rules and protocols to
the CAISO Governing Board, MSC Description,
available at https://www.caiso.com/docs/2005/10/
04/200510041051301081.html (last visited Jan. 9,
2006).
6 See Raising the Level of the Bid Cap on the RealTime Energy Market in California, Market
Surveillance Committee, Nov. 9, 2005 (MSC
Recommendation Paper). According to the CAISO,
the MSC also notes that gaining some experience
with the current market design and a higher bid cap
would be a preferred strategy for transitioning in
the future to a $500/MWh bid cap. MSC
Recommendation Paper at 5–6.
7 See Memorandum of Keith Casey, Department of
Market Monitoring, Dec. 9, 2005 (DMM
Memorandum). According to the CAISO, the DMM
Memorandum enumerates a number of reasons for
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that the DMM further recommended
that the bid cap for adjustment bids
used in day-ahead and hour-ahead
congestion management markets be
increased to $400/MWh, with the bid
cap for ancillary services remaining at
$250/MWh.8
5. The CAISO requested that,
pursuant to section 35.11 of the
Commission’s regulations,9 the
Commission waive its notice
requirements for Amendment No. 73.
The CAISO states that good cause exists
for this waiver because acceptance of a
January 1, 2006 effective date will
permit the California energy markets to
realize the benefits described above as
quickly as possible to address the
substantial increase in natural gas prices
that may potentially occur in the winter
2006. It also states that the January 1
date will assist in implementation of the
bid-cap change in the CAISO
settlements process and will permit
interested stakeholders time to comment
on this proposal on an expedited basis.
6. The CAISO requested expedited
tariff revision procedures under the
Commission’s Expedited Tariff
Revisions Guidance Order.10 It asserts
that Amendment No. 73 satisfies the
requirements of the Expedited Tariff
Revisions Guidance Order because the
amendment is intended to remedy the
risk that the CAISO real-time energy
market may not be able to attract
sufficient supply bids to maintain
system reliability, particularly from
resources outside of the CAISO Control
Area due to significant increases in
variable operation costs. The CAISO
states that it has posted the filing on its
website and sent an email notification to
each market participant as is required
raising the bid cap, including: (1) Promoting
reliability by providing greater fixed-cost recovery
for generating units during high demand periods
when supply margins are tight and prices are at or
near the bid cap; (2) providing greater incentives for
load-servicing entities (LSEs) to continue to
minimize their spot market exposure for signing
additional long-term power contracts; (3) providing
greater incentives for generation owners to maintain
their units at a high level of availability; (4)
providing greater incentives for further
development of demand response programs such as
real-time pricing; (5) if gas prices escalate over the
winter months, a higher bid cap will not discourage
suppliers from selling into the California real-time
energy markets since such suppliers would be
assured of bid cost recovery for accepted bids above
$250/WMh; and (6) providing a measured transition
to the $500/MWh energy bid cap scheduled to be
implemented with the CAISO’s new market design
in 2007.
8 The CAISO Amendment No. 73 Filing, Dec. 21,
2005 (citing DMM Memorandum at 5) (The CAISO
Amendment No. 73 Filing).
9 18 CFR 35.11 (2005).
10 Guidance Order on Expedited Tariff Revisions
for Regional Transmission Organizations and
Independent System Operators, 111 FERC ¶ 61,009
(2005).
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by the Expedited Tariff Revisions
Guidance Order.
7. Finally, the CAISO requested a
shortened comment period of December
28, 2005 for Amendment No. 73. It
states that this shorter comment period
will allow the Commission to issue an
order prior to the requested January 1,
2006 effective date.
Bid Cap Background
8. In a July 2002 Order,11 the
Commission established a bid cap of
$250/MWh for the California real-time
energy and ancillary services markets, to
become effective on October 1, 2002, as
recommended by the CAISO’s MSC. The
Commission also applied this bid cap to
day-ahead markets when implemented
by the CAISO. The July 2002 Order also
imposed a price cap of $250/MWh for
all spot market sales in the Western
Electricity Coordinating Council
(WECC), beginning October 1, 2002.12
9. On October 11, 2002, the
Commission issued an order on
rehearing and compliance filing.13 The
October 2002 Order clarified that sellers
may continue to submit bids above the
bid cap with the understanding that
such bids cannot set the market clearing
price and that these bids above the cap
will be subject to justification and
refund.14
10. On July 1, 2005, the Commission
issued an order finding that the bid cap
for California market energy bids should
be increased to a hard $500/MWh cap
on day one of MRTU implementation.15
The July 2005 Order reaffirmed that the
bid cap for ancillary services and
Residual Unit Commitment (RUC)
availability should remain at $250/
MWh.16
Notice of Filing and Responsive
Pleadings
11. Notice of the CAISO’s December
21, 2005 filing was published in the
Federal Register, 71 Fed. Reg. 98 (2006),
with interventions and protests due on
11 California Independent System Operator Corp.,
100 FERC ¶ 61,060 (July 2002 Order), order on
reh’g, 101 FERC ¶ 61,061 (2002).
12 Id. The Commission extended the October 1,
2002 deadline to October 30, 2002 in a subsequent
order. California Independent System Operator
Corp., 100 FERC ¶ 61,351 (2002).
13 California Independent System Operator Corp.,
101 FERC ¶ 61,061 (2002) (October 2002 Order).
14 Id. at P 17.
15 July 2005 Order, 112 FERC ¶ 61,013 at P 104.
16 Id. at 111 (reaffirming the Commission’s
October 2003 and June 2004 orders which
determined that the bid caps for ancillary services
and RUC availability should be $250/MWh. See
California Independent System Operator Corp., 105
FERC ¶ 61,140, reh’g denied, 105 FERC ¶ 61,278
(2003); California Independent System Operator
Corp., 107 FERC ¶ 61,274, order on reh’g, 108 FERC
¶ 61,254 (2004)).
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or before January 3, 2006. Southern
California Edison Company (SCE),
Sacramento Municipal Utility District
(SMUD), the Northern California Power
Agency (NCPA), Modesto Irrigation
District (MID), the Mirant Parties,17 and
the California Department of Water
Resources State Water Project filed
motions to intervene. Williams Power
Company, Inc. (Williams), Powerex
Corp. (Powerex), Portland General
Electric Company (Portland), Pacific Gas
and Electric Company (PG&E), the
Indicated Parties,18 and Alliance for
Retail Energy Markets (AReM) filed
motions to intervene and comments.
California Electricity Oversight Board
(CEOB) filed a motion to intervene with
comments supporting the CAISO’s filing
but made no other comments.
Independent Energy Producers
Association (IEP) filed a motion to
intervene out-of-time and comments.
City of Santa Clara, California (SVP) and
Public Service Company of New Mexico
(PSNM) filed motions to intervene and
protests. The CAISO filed an answer on
January 5, 2006.
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Raising CAISO Bid Cap
12. PG&E, AReM, and Powerex
generally support the CAISO’s proposal.
AReM states that the CAISO’s proposal
is rational and reasonable and has been
sufficiently justified by the CAISO.
AReM notes that the risk of electricity
supply shortfalls in California remains
high, particularly during the summer of
2006, and that given the dramatic
increases in natural gas costs that have
occurred over the past year, the current
$250/MWh bid cap raises the risk of
generator bid costs exceeding the
current bid cap level. AReM cautions
that this interim increase in the cap by
the CAISO, however, should not be
perceived to mitigate the necessity for
the further ‘‘hard’’ bid cap increases
mandated by the Commission.19
Powerex cautions that it is important for
the CAISO and the Commission to
continue to give careful consideration in
determining the bid cap levels
associated with the various markets so
that (1) there is a demonstrated need for
the mitigation, and (2) the mitigation
levels do not negatively impact the
efficient operation of the market or the
reliable operation of the grid both in
California and West-wide. PSNM, SVP,
Portland, and Williams support or do
17 The Mirant Parties consist of Mirant Americas
Energy Marketing, LP, Mirant California, LLC,
Mirant Delta, LLC, and Mirant Potrero, LLC.
18 The Indicated Parties consist of Avista Energy,
Inc., Puget Sound Energy, Inc., Coral Power, L.L.C.,
and Sempra Energy.
19 See July 2005 Order, 112 FERC ¶ 61,013 at P
104.
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not oppose 20 the CAISO’s proposal to
raise the bid cap to $400/MWh. No
intervenor opposed the CAISO’s
proposal to raise the bid cap level.
‘‘Hard’’ vs. ‘‘Soft’’ Bid Cap
13. PSNM, SVP, Portland, and
Williams oppose changing the CAISO’s
bid cap from a ‘‘soft’’ to a ‘‘hard’’ cap.
14. PSNM argues that although the
Commission has directed the CAISO to
replace the existing ‘‘soft’’ cap with an
escalating ‘‘hard’’ cap starting in 2007,
concurrent with implementation of the
CAISO’s MRTU, it would be unjust and
unreasonable to implement a ‘‘hard’’
cap, particularly on such short notice,
while still retaining the current market
design structure. PSNM notes that, in
our July 2005 Order, the Commission
did not authorize adoption of a ‘‘hard’’
cap as part of the current market
structure or otherwise suggest that the
CAISO needs to or should adopt a
‘‘hard’’ bid cap prior to adoption of the
MRTU in 2007. PSNM contends that
implementing a ‘‘hard’’ cap now, at the
proposed $400/MWh level, would limit
suppliers’ ability to recover their
substantiated costs if congestion costs
and natural gas prices cause the
competitive market price to exceed
$400/MWh, thereby creating a risk of
supply curtailments. PSNM points out
that if, as the CAISO claims, the $400/
MWh price it has selected is unlikely to
be exceeded during the one year period
prior to adoption of the MRTU, then
retention of the ‘‘soft’’ cap should be of
little concern. By contrast, PSNM
argues, if the CAISO’s estimation of the
market price produced by higher natural
gas prices is incorrect, and actual prices
exceed the $400/MWh level, the effect
on California markets could be severe.
15. SVP argues that the CAISO’s
proposal to change from a ‘‘soft’’ cap to
a ‘‘hard’’ cap is not supportable. They
assert that the three CAISO
departmental reports attached to the
filing in support of the proposal
recommended an increase to a $400/
MWh ‘‘soft’’ cap, not a ‘‘hard’’ cap. SVP
argues that the CAISO’s studies
conclude that, with current gas prices
projected between $10 and $12 per Mcf,
a ‘‘soft’’ cap of $400/MWh is roughly
equivalent to the $250/MWh ‘‘soft’’ cap
implemented when gas costs were
20 PSNM states it takes no explicit position
regarding whether the $400/MWh bid cap selected
by the CAISO is optimal or constitutes a sufficiently
high price to eliminate risks of supply shortfalls,
but agrees in principle with the CAISO’s conclusion
that higher natural gas prices necessitate an
increase in the existing $250/MWh bid cap.
Williams cautions that its comments in support of
the CAISO’s proposal should not be construed as
an endorsement of price caps as it remains opposed
to price caps for a number of reasons.
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approximately three to four dollars per
Mcf. SVP contends that the CAISO
studies do not provide any rationale to
support a change from a ‘‘soft’’ cap to
a ‘‘hard’’ cap, and in fact, assert that a
$400/MWh ‘‘soft’’ cap is necessary to
maintain the status quo. According to
SVP, the CAISO’s Board of Governors’
resolution changed the CAISO’s
departmental recommendations to a
‘‘hard’’ cap without explanation or
analysis. SVP points out that the
CAISO’s only comment on the change is
that the Commission required the
CAISO to change to a ‘‘hard’’ cap once
MRTU is implemented, and that
implementing a ‘‘hard’’ cap now will
ease the transition to a $500/MWh
‘‘hard’’ cap when MRTU is
implemented in 2007. According to
SVP, without the structural changes
MRTU is expected to bring about, there
is no justification for the change to a
‘‘hard’’ cap, and the CAISO fails to
justify any present need for a ‘‘hard’’
cap versus a ‘‘soft’’ cap and does not
address the potential consequences of
the change. SVP further argues that the
escalation in natural gas prices and the
recent bankruptcy filing of Calpine
Corporation further strain the market
and risk contributing to a shortfall of
energy in California.
16. Portland argues that the ‘‘hard’’
nature of the new bid cap proposal does
not adequately promote a transparent
and workable market with the
appropriate application of constraints
and oversight. Specifically, Portland
argues that a hard cap would force the
CAISO to resort to out-of-market (OOM)
purchases to acquire capacity resources
when market prices within the CAISO
market exceed the cap. By definition,
according to Portland, such OOM
purchases would involve capacity and
associated pricing that would not be
offered to all market participants in real
time, and thus do not promote an
efficient, transparent, and workable
market. In contrast, Portland argues that
a ‘‘soft’’ cap would achieve that goal
because the current ‘‘soft’’ cap
methodology provides a ceiling that
market participants may not exceed
without: (1) Demonstrating that their
costs justify a higher bid; and (2) being
subject to refund.
17. Williams similarly requests that
the Commission reject the proposal to
change the bid cap from a ‘‘soft’’ to a
‘‘hard’’ cap. Williams submits that the
same concerns that resulted in the
current ‘‘soft’’ cap continue to exist.
Specifically, Williams expresses the
concern that should fuel prices continue
to rise, its operating costs may exceed
$400/MWh, and with the must-offer
obligation still in place, it may be
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required to operate at a loss. Williams
states that the CAISO seems to base its
proposal for a ‘‘hard’’ cap on the
Commission’s directive in a separate
proceeding to replace the current ‘‘soft’’
bid cap with a ‘‘hard’’ bid cap when the
CAISO’s MRTU market design is
implemented.21 However, Williams
argues, the environment under which a
generator will operate when MRTU is
implemented will be significantly
different than today’s environment,22
and accordingly the CAISO’s attempt to
justify the imposition of a ‘‘hard’’ cap at
this time, by comparing the proposed
cap with the initial MRTU ‘‘hard’’ cap
of $500/MWh, is misplaced.
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Price Cap in the WECC Outside the
CAISO
18. Powerex and Indicated Parties
contend that the CAISO-proposed bid
cap increase should be applied
throughout the West in order to prevent
artificial distortions in the electricity
markets that could result from different
price caps between regions. They note
that the expected increases in natural
gas prices in the winter of 2006 will
affect not only the CAISO markets, but
all electricity markets in the West. As
Indicated Parties further state, the Westwide market power mitigation program
was established to meet the same goals
as the CAISO market power mitigation,
namely to address market power
concerns without undermining
incentives for new entry and long-term
adequacy. Therefore, according to
Indicated Parties, until the Commission
releases the western markets from the
temporary mitigation program, the
West-wide price cap should be no less
than the bid cap for the CAISO market.
Indicated Parties request that the
Commission take action under FPA
section 206 to ensure that any elevation
in the bid cap applicable to the CAISO
markets is matched by an identical
elevation in the price cap applicable to
the remainder of the WECC. Powerex
and Indicated Parties support the
increase of the West-wide price cap to
$400/MWh.
19. The Indicated Parties further
assert that the Commission should hold
21 See The CAISO Amendment No. 73 Filing at
5 (citing July 2005 Order, 112 FERC ¶ 61,013 at P
104 (2005)).
22 Williams notes that the ‘‘hard’’ cap directed by
the Commission under MRTU is initially set at
$500/MWh and ultimately increases to $1,000/
MWh (a structure that Williams points out was
approved by the Commission prior to the recent
run-up in fuel prices), the must-offer obligation will
not exist under MRTU as it does today, and the
California Public Utility Commission’s (CPUC)
resource adequacy requirement should be in place
when MRTU is implemented, resulting in less
reliance by load on the CAISO’s real-time market.
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that the bid cap in the non-California
portion of the WECC will be a ‘‘soft’’ cap
that permits cost justifications for sales
above the level of the cap, and not a
‘‘hard’’ cap as the CAISO has proposed
for its markets. They argue that if
natural gas prices move even higher
than their current levels, a ‘‘hard’’ cap
of $400/MWh may not be sufficient to
ensure full cost recovery for some
generators. They assert that a ‘‘soft’’ cap
at least permits generators to sell at
prices above the cap as long as they can
justify their elevated prices. Indicated
Parties also request that the Commission
clarify the type of documentation that
sellers need to supply to justify prices
above the applicable bid cap. According
to Indicated Parties, this clarification
will reduce the possibility of artificial
constraints by making it easier for
sellers with incremental costs above the
level of the cap to decide whether to
contribute their output into the market.
Ancillary Services
20. Powerex states that the cap on
ancillary service capacity bids should be
increased to $400/MWh. It asserts that
neither the CAISO nor MSC has offered
any reason for the failure to raise this
bid cap. According to Powerex, different
bid caps for energy and ancillary
services could potentially distort
electricity markets since not all possible
markets scenarios can be foreseen.
Effective Date
21. SVP asserts that the CAISO
violated the FPA by making an
unauthorized tariff change. SVP states
that the CAISO filed its proposed
Amendment 73 on December 21, 2005,
and requested expedited consideration
in order to implement the proposal on
January 1, 2006.23 SVP notes that on
December 22, 2005, the Commission
established a comment date of January
3, 2006, for protests and interventions,
and did not authorize a January 1, 2006
effective date.24 According to SVP,
despite the Commission’s absence of
approval, the CAISO announced its
intention to make the proposed ‘‘hard’’
cap effective on January 1, 2006.25 SVP
states that the CAISO has no authority
to unilaterally implement tariff changes
before the Commission approves the
changes. It states that the Commission
should not tolerate such actions which
violate the filed rate doctrine.26 SVP
23 See
CAISO Amendment No. 73 Filing.
Independent System Operator Corp.,
Notice of Filing, Docket No. ER06–354–000, Dec.
22, 2005.
25 See CAISO Market Notice, Dec. 27, 2005.
26 See FPA sections 205(c), 16 U.S.C. 824d(c)
(2000), and 206(a), 16 U.S.C. 824e(a) (2000); see also
Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Hall, 453 U.S. 571,
24 California
PO 00000
Frm 00034
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
states that the CAISO’s unauthorized
change in the tariff could cause bids to
be rejected or could cause sellers to
choose not to bid.
Discussion
Procedural Matters
22. Pursuant to Rule 214 of the
Commission’s Rules of Practice and
Procedure, 18 CFR 385.214 (2005), the
notices of intervention and timely,
unopposed motions to intervene serve
to make the entities that filed them
parties to these proceedings. We will
accept IEP’s motion to intervene
because it will not be prejudicial at this
early stage in the proceeding.
23. Rule 213(a)(2) of the
Commission’s Rules of Practice and
Procedure, 18 CFR 385.213(a)(2) (2005),
prohibits an answer to a protest unless
otherwise ordered by the decisional
authority. We will accept the CAISO’s
answer because it has provided
information that assisted us in our
decision-making process.
24. IEP failed to file a timely
Statement of Issues as required by Order
No. 663.27 Order No. 663 applies to all
pleadings, including protests and
comments,28 and requires that any
issues that a movant wishes the
Commission to address must be
specifically identified in a section
entitled ‘‘Statement of Issues’’ that must
list each issue presented to the
Commission in a separately enumerated
paragraph that includes representative
Commission and court precedent on
which the party is relying. Any issues
not so listed in a separate section will
be deemed to have been waived. Order
No. 663 became effective September 23,
2005. IEP’s late motion to intervene and
comments, filed on January 4, 2006,
omitted the Statement of Issues. For this
reason, we deem IEP to have waived the
issues in its comments. While Indicated
Parties did include a ‘‘Statement of
581 (1981) (explaining that ‘‘under the filed rate
doctrine, the Commission alone is empowered to
[accept proposed rate filings], and until it has done
so, no rate other than the one on file may be
charged.’’); Williams Power Co. v. California
Independent System Operator Corp., 110 FERC
¶ 61,231 at P 18, clarification denied, 111 FERC
¶ 61,348 (2005) (explaining that ‘‘[i]f the CAISO
believes that additional tariff provisions are
necessary to maintain operational control of its
system and to minimize operating costs, it must
request prior Commission authorization of the
proposed tariff changes.’’).
27 Revision of Rules of Practice and Procedure
Regarding Issue Identification, Order No. 663, 70
FR 55,723 (Sept. 23, 2005), FERC Stats. & Regs.
¶31,193 (2005).
28 Order No. 663 does not apply to comments on
rulemakings or comments on offers of settlement.
However, that exception does not apply here
because IEP is commenting on a tariff filing. See
Order No. 663.
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Issues,’’ any issue not specifically
identified by Indicated Parties in their
‘‘Statement of Issues’’ is deemed
waived.
Commission Determination
rmajette on PROD1PC67 with NOTICES1
CAISO Bid Cap
25. The current $250/MWh ‘‘soft’’ bid
cap in the CAISO’s energy market was
established in October 2002 when
natural gas prices were between $3 and
$4/MMBtu. As the CAISO noted in its
filing, in recent months, concerns over
tight natural gas supplies have resulted
in high and volatile natural gas prices
throughout the country. Natural gas spot
prices in California recently reached as
high as $14/MMBtu.29 Since natural gas
is the fuel source for a significant
portion of generation used to meet
California load, this price rise and
volatility led the CAISO to have
concerns that the current level of the bid
cap may constrain the CAISO’s ability to
acquire sufficient power in real time.
Given the current market design, which
includes a must-offer obligation and a
$250/MWh cap on energy, the
Commission is concerned that
generators may not have the opportunity
to adequately recover their costs. We
note that no intervenor has opposed the
increase, and find that raising the bid
cap is justified by the well-documented
rise in gas prices. Accordingly, the
Commission accepts the CAISO’s
proposal to raise the current bid cap
from $250/MWh to $400/MWh.
26. The Commission rejects, however,
the CAISO’s proposal to change the
current ‘‘soft’’ nature of the cap to a
‘‘hard’’ cap during this interim period
prior to the implementation of MRTU
and a resource adequacy mechanism.
Neither the MSC nor DMM
recommended changing the cap from a
‘‘soft’’ to a ‘‘hard’’ cap, and the CAISO
has not adequately supported such a
change. A ‘‘hard’’ cap, in combination
with the CAISO’s current must-offer
obligation,30 could result in confiscatory
rates because it would raise the
possibility that sellers could be forced to
operate at a loss. Based on the current
circumstances of rising and volatile gas
prices, we will retain the cap as a ‘‘soft’’
cap during this interim period. The
CAISO has filed an emergency request
in response to an unusual situation of
29 See Daily price survey ($/MMBtu), Platts Gas
Daily, Dec. 14, 2005, at p. 2 (listing the midpoint
for ‘‘PG&E city-gate’’ at $14.325).
30 We note that the current must-offer obligation
in California (and the WECC), which lacks a
separate capacity payment, is different from a mustoffer obligation where sellers, as part of a resource
adequacy program, voluntarily accept a must-offer
obligation in exchange for receiving a capacity
payment.
VerDate Aug<31>2005
14:55 Feb 03, 2006
Jkt 208001
rapidly rising natural gas prices, and the
Commission believes the importance of
ensuring a market design that is both
reliable and non-confiscatory outweighs
the CAISO’s desire to transition towards
a ‘‘hard’’ cap directed by the
Commission to begin at the
implementation of MRTU in 2007.
Price Cap in the WECC Outside the
CAISO
27. Our preliminary judgment is that
the maximum price for spot market
sales in the WECC outside the CAISO,
as established by the Commission in our
July 2002 Order, should also be raised
to a $400/MWh ‘‘soft’’ cap. As we stated
in that order, ‘‘California is an integral
part of a trade and reliability region in
the West. Because of this
interdependency of market and
infrastructure, conditions in and
changes to the California market affect
the entire region.’’ 31 Accordingly,
pursuant to our authority under section
206 of the FPA, we propose to increase
the cap to a $400/MWh ‘‘soft’’ cap for
all spot market sales in the WECC
outside the CAISO, defined in our June
19, 2001 Order as sales in the WECC
that are 24 hours or less and are entered
into the day of or day prior to
delivery.32
28. In light of issues raised by entities
in this proceeding and the
Commission’s above proposal, we
hereby institute, under section 206 of
the FPA, 16 U.S.C. 824e (2000), an
investigation into the price cap on spot
market sales in the WECC outside the
CAISO. We recognize the interest of
entities regarding this investigation and,
therefore, the Commission invites
interested persons to submit comments
on this issue within 10 days from the
date of issuance of this order. We note
that implementing a $400/MWh bid cap
in the CAISO while the remainder of the
WECC retains a $250/MWh cap could
cause the non-CAISO WECC to have
difficulties in attracting imbalance
energy if gas prices were to rise
substantially prior to Commission
action. Because gas prices have leveled
off since the CAISO’s filing, we believe
the potential for this to occur in the near
term is small, however, the Commission
intends to act expeditiously to address
this WECC cap upon the expiration of
the comment period.
29. In cases where the Commission
institutes an investigation on its own
motion, section 206(b) of the FPA, as
31 July
2002 Order at P 2.
San Diego Gas & Electric Company v.
Sellers of Energy and Ancillary Services Into
Markets Operated by the California Independent
System Operator and the California Power
Exchange, 95 FERC ¶61,418 at n. 3 (2001).
32 See
PO 00000
Frm 00035
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
6067
amended by section 1285 of the Energy
Policy Act of 2005,33 requires that the
Commission establish a refund effective
date and that date must be no earlier
than the publication date of the
Commission’s notice that it intends to
initiate such proceeding but no later
than five months after the publication
date. Therefore, we find that the refund
effective date, pursuant to section 206(b)
of the FPA, as amended by section 1285
of the Energy Policy Act of 2005, is the
date on which this order is published in
the Federal Register.
Ancillary Services
30. Powerex argues that the bid caps
should be the same for both the CAISO
energy and ancillary services markets.
Powerex asserts that neither the CAISO
nor MSC has offered a rationale for not
raising the ancillary services bid cap
from its current $250/MWh level, and
cites potential market distortions
without giving details of how they
might occur. In its answer, the CAISO
dismisses this concern, pointing out that
PJM has a $1,000/MWh energy bid cap
and a $100/MWh regulation bid cap,
and asserting that ancillary service
capacity is a fixed cost and that gas
prices do not affect the cost of ancillary
services. The CAISO argues that to the
extent the CAISO accepts an ancillary
services capacity bid from a supplier,
and then calls on the unit to provide
energy, the supplier will be able to
reflect any increased gas costs in its
energy bid. Finally, the CAISO argues
that the ancillary service capacity bid
cap will continue to be a ‘‘soft’’ cap,
thus allowing suppliers to submit bids
in excess of $250/MWh, provided they
can provide cost justification for such
bids.
31. The Commission recognizes that
until the implementation of MRTU in
2007, the current CAISO market design
does not have a day-ahead market that
co-optimizes energy and ancillary
services. The CAISO relies on ancillary
service capacity being offered by sellers
directly to the CAISO for various
categories of reserves. Sellers must make
the decision to sell either energy or
ancillary services. To the extent a seller
chooses to make its capacity available
for selling an ancillary service like
spinning reserves, it could incur an
opportunity cost by not selling energy.
Thus, under the current market design,
the price of energy could have an
impact on the price of ancillary services
and suppliers may thus choose to
provide energy instead of ancillary
33 Pub. L. No. 109–58, § 1285, 119 Stat. 594, 980–
81 (2005).
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Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 24 / Monday, February 6, 2006 / Notices
services if the ancillary service capacity
bid cap is below this opportunity cost.
32. Given these concerns, we will
address the issue of the appropriate
level of the CAISO ancillary service
capacity bid cap in the section 206
investigation instituted in this
proceeding. We recognize the interest of
entities regarding this issue, therefore,
the Commission invites interested
persons to submit comments on the
appropriate level of the CAISO’s
ancillary service capacity bid cap within
10 days from the date of issuance of this
order. As discussed above, we find that
the refund effective date, pursuant to
section 206(b) of the FPA, as amended
by section 1285 of the Energy Policy Act
of 2005, is the date on which this order
is published in the Federal Register.
Effective Date
33. We note that in its answer, the
CAISO states that it has not
implemented Amendment No. 73 and it
does not intend to make the $400/MWh
bid cap effective until approved by the
Commission. In fact, the CAISO asserts
that it made repeated statements in its
transmittal letter and market notice that
it requested the amendment be made
effective on January 1, 2006 or as soon
thereafter as possible. As noted above,
the Commission accepts the CAISO’s
proposal, as modified, effective as of the
date of this order.
rmajette on PROD1PC67 with NOTICES1
The Commission Orders
(A) The Commission accepts and
modifies the CAISO’s proposal to adjust
its bid cap for real-time energy bids and
adjustment bids to $400/MWh, as
discussed within the body of the order,
effective upon issuance of this order.
(B) Pursuant to the authority
conferred upon the Commission by the
FPA, particularly section 206 thereof,
the Commission institutes an
investigation into the price cap in the
WECC outside the CAISO and the
ancillary service capacity bid cap in the
CAISO, as discussed in the body of this
order. Entities may submit comments
regarding these issues within 10 days
from the date of issuance of this order.
(C) The refund effective date
established pursuant to section 206(b) of
the FPA, as amended by section 1285 of
the Energy Policy Act of 2005, as
discussed in the body of this order, is
the date upon which this order is
published in the Federal Register.
By the Commission.
Magalie R. Salas,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 06–1090 Filed 2–3–06; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717–01–P
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14:55 Feb 03, 2006
Jkt 208001
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission
[Docket Nos. EC06–68–000, et al.]
Morgan Stanley, et al. Electric Rate and
Corporate Filings
January 30, 2006.
The following filings have been made
with the Commission. The filings are
listed in ascending order within each
docket classification.
1. Morgan Stanley
[Docket No. EC06–68–000]
Take notice that on January 24, 2006,
Morgan Stanley tendered for filing with
the Commission an application
pursuant to section 203 of the Federal
power Act seeking blanket authorization
for the acquisition, directly or
indirectly, of securities of electric utility
companies, transmitting utilities or of
any holding company over any electric
utility company or transmitting utility,
subject to certain proposed limitations.
Comment Date: 5 p.m. eastern time on
February 6, 2006.
2. Elkem Metals Company—Alloy, L.P.,
et al. and Alloy Power Inc., et al.
[Docket No. EC06–69–000]
Take notice that on January 25, 2006,
Elkem Metals Company—Alloy, L.P.
(Elkem) and Alloy Power Inc. (Alloy
Power) (collectively, Parties) and D.E.
Shaw & Co., L.L.C., D.E. Shaw & Co. II,
Inc., D.E. Shaw & Co., L.P. and D.E.
Shaw & Co., Inc. (collectively, the ShawRelated Entities and, together with
Parties, Applicants), submitted an
application pursuant to section 203 of
the Federal Power Act for authorization
of a disposition of a jurisdictional
facilities whereby one-third of the
limited partnership interests in Elkem
would be transferred to Alloy Power. In
addition, Applicants seek authorization
for the Shaw-Related Entities to
indirectly acquire securities in Elkem.
Comment Date: 5 p.m. eastern time on
February 15, 2006.
3. BBPOP Wind Equity LLC, et al.
[Docket No. EC06–70–000]
Take notice that on January 25, 2006,
BBPOP Wind Equity LLC (BBPOP Wind
Equity), Kumeyaay Wind, LLC
(Kumeyaay), Wind Park Bear Creek, LLC
(Bear Creek), and Jersey-Atlantic Wind,
LLC (Jersey-Atlantic) (for the last three
entities, collectively, the Project
Companies), and Babcock & Brown
Wind Partners—U.S. LLC (BBWPUS)
(collectively, Applicants) filed with the
Commission an application pursuant to
PO 00000
Frm 00036
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
section 203 of the Federal Power Act for
an order authorizing the indirect
disposition of jurisdictional facilities in
connection with the transfer and sale of
upstream ownership interests in the
jurisdictional facilities of the Project
Companies. BBPOP Wind Equity and
BBWPUS state that they are subsidiaries
or affiliates of Babcock & Brown
International Pty. Ltd. (BBIPL). The
Project Companies which currently are
owned indirectly in part by BBPOP
Wind Equity, further state that they own
wind energy generating facilities in
operation in California, Pennsylvania
and New Jersey and the proposed
transactions are the transfer of upstream
ownership interests in the Project
Companies from BBPOP Wind Equity to
BBWP and the potential temporary
transfer of the membership interests in
one or more of the Project Companies
from BBPOP 3 to another wholly-owned
BBPOP Wind Equity subsidiary.
Comment Date: 5 p.m. eastern time on
February 15, 2006.
4. FPL Energy Duane Arnold, LLC
[Docket No. EG06–31–000]
Take notice that on January 26, 2006,
FPL Energy Duane Arnold, LLC
(Applicant), tendered for filing with the
Commission an application for
determination of exempt wholesale
generator status pursuant to part 365 of
the Commission’s regulations.
Applicant states that it is a nuclearpowered facility with a nameplate
capacity rating of 645 MW and is
located in Palo, Iowa.
Comment Date: 5 p.m. eastern time on
February 16, 2006.
5. City of Anaheim, California
[Docket No. EL06–24–000]
Take notice that on January 26, 2006,
the City of Anaheim, California filed
revisions of Appendix I to the OATT.
Comment Date: 5 p.m. eastern time on
February 9, 2006.
6. Braintree Electric Light Department
[Docket No. EL06–48–000]
Take notice that on January 19, 2006,
Braintree Electric Light Department
(Braintree) submitted a petition
pursuant to Rule 207(a)(2) of the
Commission’s Rules of Practice and
Procedure (18 CFR 385.207(a)(2)) for a
declaratory order determining that rates
and charges associated with the costs of
a reliability must-run (RMR) agreement
between Braintree and ISO New
England, Inc. as to Braintree’s Potter 2
generating unit will satisfy the ‘‘just and
reasonable’’ criteria of section 205 of the
Federal Power Act.
Comment Date: 5 p.m. eastern time on
February 21, 2006.
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]]>Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 71, Number 24 (Monday, February 6, 2006)]
[Notices]
[Pages 6063-6068]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 06-1090]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
[Docket No. ER06-354-000; EL06-44-000]
Before Commissioners: Joseph T. Kelliher, Chairman; Nora Mead
Brownell, and Suedeen G. Kelly; California Independent System Operator;
Order Accepting and Modifying Tariff Filing and Instituting a Section
206 Proceeding
Issued January 13, 2006.
1. On December 21, 2005, the California Independent System Operator
Corporation (CAISO) filed a tariff amendment (Amendment No. 73)
proposing to change its current ``soft'' $250/MWh bid cap for real-time
energy bids and adjustment bids to a ``hard'' $400/MWh bid cap,
effective January 1, 2006 or as soon thereafter as possible. The CAISO
asked the Commission to review its application on an expedited basis
with a shortened comment period. In this order, the Commission accepts
with modification, as described below, the CAISO's proposed tariff
amendment, effective upon issuance of this order.
2. To remove any opportunity for market distortions created by the
Commission's approval of an increase in the CAISO bid cap, we will
institute, under section 206 of the Federal Power Act (FPA),\1\ an
investigation into the price cap in the WECC outside the CAISO. We also
institute a section 206 investigation into the CAISO ancillary service
capacity bid cap, in order to consider whether any incentives that
distort a supplier's choice between offering energy or ancillary
services will result from the rise in gas prices and the increase in
the CAISO energy bid cap. We hereby establish a refund effective date
pursuant to the provisions of section 206.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 16 U.S.C. 824e (2000).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Background
The CAISO's Filing
3. The CAISO filed Amendment No. 73 requesting that the Commission
accept its tariff revision altering the CAISO's current bid cap.
Section 28 of the CAISO tariff establishes a bid cap that sets a limit
on the level of bids submitted for the CAISO's energy and ancillary
service capacity markets. According to the CAISO, this bid cap also
applies to adjustment bids used in the day-ahead and hour-ahead
congestion management markets. Amendment No. 73 proposes to modify
section 28.1.2 to replace the current
[[Page 6064]]
``soft'' bid cap \2\ of $250/MWh for real-time energy bids and
adjustment bids with a ``hard'' bid cap of $400/MWh.\3\ The CAISO
states that its proposal to change its bid cap from ``soft'' to
``hard'' is consistent with the Commission's directive that it change
its bid cap to a ``hard'' cap when it implements the Market Redesign
and Technology Upgrade (MRTU).\4\ It does not propose to change the bid
cap for ancillary services markets from the current ``soft'' $250/MWh
cap.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Section 28.1.1 of the CAISO's tariff currently permits
market participants to submit bids above the cap, but any accepted
bids above the cap are not eligible to set the market clearing price
and are subject to cost justification and refund. A ``soft'' cap is
one where market participants may submit bids above the bid cap with
adequate justification, but without setting the market clearing
price.
\3\ A ``hard'' cap is one where market participants' bids are
not permitted to exceed the cap, regardless of the seller's costs.
\4\ California Independent System Operator Corp., 112 FERC ]
61,013 at P 104 (2005) (July 2005 Order), reh'g pending.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
4. The CAISO states that on November 9, 2005, in response to a
request from its Department of Market Monitoring (DMM), the CAISO's
Market Surveillance Committee (MSC) \5\ recommended that the bid cap on
the real-time energy market be increased prior to this winter, because
``the likelihood of substantially higher natural gas prices during the
winter of [2006] is sufficiently high to justify raising the bid cap at
this time'' in order to avoid ``the risk of generation unit-level
variable costs approaching or rising above the [current $250/MWh] cap
level.'' The MSC recommended a new level of $400/MWh, based on its
analysis of average values of Henry Hub futures prices for the upcoming
winter.\6\ The CAISO further notes that the DMM prepared a memorandum
supporting the MSC's recommendation, citing changed market conditions
and the significant benefits to the California energy markets that
would result from raising the real-time energy bid cap under current
market conditions.\7\ The CAISO asserts that the DMM further
recommended that the bid cap for adjustment bids used in day-ahead and
hour-ahead congestion management markets be increased to $400/MWh, with
the bid cap for ancillary services remaining at $250/MWh.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ The CAISO's Web site notes that the MSC is an independent
advisory group of industry experts who can suggest changes in rules
and protocols to the CAISO Governing Board, MSC Description,
available at https://www.caiso.com/docs/2005/10/04/
200510041051301081.html (last visited Jan. 9, 2006).
\6\ See Raising the Level of the Bid Cap on the Real-Time Energy
Market in California, Market Surveillance Committee, Nov. 9, 2005
(MSC Recommendation Paper). According to the CAISO, the MSC also
notes that gaining some experience with the current market design
and a higher bid cap would be a preferred strategy for transitioning
in the future to a $500/MWh bid cap. MSC Recommendation Paper at 5-
6.
\7\ See Memorandum of Keith Casey, Department of Market
Monitoring, Dec. 9, 2005 (DMM Memorandum). According to the CAISO,
the DMM Memorandum enumerates a number of reasons for raising the
bid cap, including: (1) Promoting reliability by providing greater
fixed-cost recovery for generating units during high demand periods
when supply margins are tight and prices are at or near the bid cap;
(2) providing greater incentives for load-servicing entities (LSEs)
to continue to minimize their spot market exposure for signing
additional long-term power contracts; (3) providing greater
incentives for generation owners to maintain their units at a high
level of availability; (4) providing greater incentives for further
development of demand response programs such as real-time pricing;
(5) if gas prices escalate over the winter months, a higher bid cap
will not discourage suppliers from selling into the California real-
time energy markets since such suppliers would be assured of bid
cost recovery for accepted bids above $250/WMh; and (6) providing a
measured transition to the $500/MWh energy bid cap scheduled to be
implemented with the CAISO's new market design in 2007.
\8\ The CAISO Amendment No. 73 Filing, Dec. 21, 2005 (citing DMM
Memorandum at 5) (The CAISO Amendment No. 73 Filing).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
5. The CAISO requested that, pursuant to section 35.11 of the
Commission's regulations,\9\ the Commission waive its notice
requirements for Amendment No. 73. The CAISO states that good cause
exists for this waiver because acceptance of a January 1, 2006
effective date will permit the California energy markets to realize the
benefits described above as quickly as possible to address the
substantial increase in natural gas prices that may potentially occur
in the winter 2006. It also states that the January 1 date will assist
in implementation of the bid-cap change in the CAISO settlements
process and will permit interested stakeholders time to comment on this
proposal on an expedited basis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ 18 CFR 35.11 (2005).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
6. The CAISO requested expedited tariff revision procedures under
the Commission's Expedited Tariff Revisions Guidance Order.\10\ It
asserts that Amendment No. 73 satisfies the requirements of the
Expedited Tariff Revisions Guidance Order because the amendment is
intended to remedy the risk that the CAISO real-time energy market may
not be able to attract sufficient supply bids to maintain system
reliability, particularly from resources outside of the CAISO Control
Area due to significant increases in variable operation costs. The
CAISO states that it has posted the filing on its website and sent an
email notification to each market participant as is required by the
Expedited Tariff Revisions Guidance Order.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ Guidance Order on Expedited Tariff Revisions for Regional
Transmission Organizations and Independent System Operators, 111
FERC ] 61,009 (2005).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
7. Finally, the CAISO requested a shortened comment period of
December 28, 2005 for Amendment No. 73. It states that this shorter
comment period will allow the Commission to issue an order prior to the
requested January 1, 2006 effective date.
Bid Cap Background
8. In a July 2002 Order,\11\ the Commission established a bid cap
of $250/MWh for the California real-time energy and ancillary services
markets, to become effective on October 1, 2002, as recommended by the
CAISO's MSC. The Commission also applied this bid cap to day-ahead
markets when implemented by the CAISO. The July 2002 Order also imposed
a price cap of $250/MWh for all spot market sales in the Western
Electricity Coordinating Council (WECC), beginning October 1, 2002.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ California Independent System Operator Corp., 100 FERC ]
61,060 (July 2002 Order), order on reh'g, 101 FERC ] 61,061 (2002).
\12\ Id. The Commission extended the October 1, 2002 deadline to
October 30, 2002 in a subsequent order. California Independent
System Operator Corp., 100 FERC ] 61,351 (2002).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
9. On October 11, 2002, the Commission issued an order on rehearing
and compliance filing.\13\ The October 2002 Order clarified that
sellers may continue to submit bids above the bid cap with the
understanding that such bids cannot set the market clearing price and
that these bids above the cap will be subject to justification and
refund.\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ California Independent System Operator Corp., 101 FERC ]
61,061 (2002) (October 2002 Order).
\14\ Id. at P 17.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
10. On July 1, 2005, the Commission issued an order finding that
the bid cap for California market energy bids should be increased to a
hard $500/MWh cap on day one of MRTU implementation.\15\ The July 2005
Order reaffirmed that the bid cap for ancillary services and Residual
Unit Commitment (RUC) availability should remain at $250/MWh.\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ July 2005 Order, 112 FERC ] 61,013 at P 104.
\16\ Id. at 111 (reaffirming the Commission's October 2003 and
June 2004 orders which determined that the bid caps for ancillary
services and RUC availability should be $250/MWh. See California
Independent System Operator Corp., 105 FERC ] 61,140, reh'g denied,
105 FERC ] 61,278 (2003); California Independent System Operator
Corp., 107 FERC ] 61,274, order on reh'g, 108 FERC ] 61,254 (2004)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notice of Filing and Responsive Pleadings
11. Notice of the CAISO's December 21, 2005 filing was published in
the Federal Register, 71 Fed. Reg. 98 (2006), with interventions and
protests due on
[[Page 6065]]
or before January 3, 2006. Southern California Edison Company (SCE),
Sacramento Municipal Utility District (SMUD), the Northern California
Power Agency (NCPA), Modesto Irrigation District (MID), the Mirant
Parties,\17\ and the California Department of Water Resources State
Water Project filed motions to intervene. Williams Power Company, Inc.
(Williams), Powerex Corp. (Powerex), Portland General Electric Company
(Portland), Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E), the Indicated
Parties,\18\ and Alliance for Retail Energy Markets (AReM) filed
motions to intervene and comments. California Electricity Oversight
Board (CEOB) filed a motion to intervene with comments supporting the
CAISO's filing but made no other comments. Independent Energy Producers
Association (IEP) filed a motion to intervene out-of-time and comments.
City of Santa Clara, California (SVP) and Public Service Company of New
Mexico (PSNM) filed motions to intervene and protests. The CAISO filed
an answer on January 5, 2006.
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\17\ The Mirant Parties consist of Mirant Americas Energy
Marketing, LP, Mirant California, LLC, Mirant Delta, LLC, and Mirant
Potrero, LLC.
\18\ The Indicated Parties consist of Avista Energy, Inc., Puget
Sound Energy, Inc., Coral Power, L.L.C., and Sempra Energy.
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Raising CAISO Bid Cap
12. PG&E, AReM, and Powerex generally support the CAISO's proposal.
AReM states that the CAISO's proposal is rational and reasonable and
has been sufficiently justified by the CAISO. AReM notes that the risk
of electricity supply shortfalls in California remains high,
particularly during the summer of 2006, and that given the dramatic
increases in natural gas costs that have occurred over the past year,
the current $250/MWh bid cap raises the risk of generator bid costs
exceeding the current bid cap level. AReM cautions that this interim
increase in the cap by the CAISO, however, should not be perceived to
mitigate the necessity for the further ``hard'' bid cap increases
mandated by the Commission.\19\ Powerex cautions that it is important
for the CAISO and the Commission to continue to give careful
consideration in determining the bid cap levels associated with the
various markets so that (1) there is a demonstrated need for the
mitigation, and (2) the mitigation levels do not negatively impact the
efficient operation of the market or the reliable operation of the grid
both in California and West-wide. PSNM, SVP, Portland, and Williams
support or do not oppose \20\ the CAISO's proposal to raise the bid cap
to $400/MWh. No intervenor opposed the CAISO's proposal to raise the
bid cap level.
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\19\ See July 2005 Order, 112 FERC ] 61,013 at P 104.
\20\ PSNM states it takes no explicit position regarding whether
the $400/MWh bid cap selected by the CAISO is optimal or constitutes
a sufficiently high price to eliminate risks of supply shortfalls,
but agrees in principle with the CAISO's conclusion that higher
natural gas prices necessitate an increase in the existing $250/MWh
bid cap. Williams cautions that its comments in support of the
CAISO's proposal should not be construed as an endorsement of price
caps as it remains opposed to price caps for a number of reasons.
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``Hard'' vs. ``Soft'' Bid Cap
13. PSNM, SVP, Portland, and Williams oppose changing the CAISO's
bid cap from a ``soft'' to a ``hard'' cap.
14. PSNM argues that although the Commission has directed the CAISO
to replace the existing ``soft'' cap with an escalating ``hard'' cap
starting in 2007, concurrent with implementation of the CAISO's MRTU,
it would be unjust and unreasonable to implement a ``hard'' cap,
particularly on such short notice, while still retaining the current
market design structure. PSNM notes that, in our July 2005 Order, the
Commission did not authorize adoption of a ``hard'' cap as part of the
current market structure or otherwise suggest that the CAISO needs to
or should adopt a ``hard'' bid cap prior to adoption of the MRTU in
2007. PSNM contends that implementing a ``hard'' cap now, at the
proposed $400/MWh level, would limit suppliers' ability to recover
their substantiated costs if congestion costs and natural gas prices
cause the competitive market price to exceed $400/MWh, thereby creating
a risk of supply curtailments. PSNM points out that if, as the CAISO
claims, the $400/MWh price it has selected is unlikely to be exceeded
during the one year period prior to adoption of the MRTU, then
retention of the ``soft'' cap should be of little concern. By contrast,
PSNM argues, if the CAISO's estimation of the market price produced by
higher natural gas prices is incorrect, and actual prices exceed the
$400/MWh level, the effect on California markets could be severe.
15. SVP argues that the CAISO's proposal to change from a ``soft''
cap to a ``hard'' cap is not supportable. They assert that the three
CAISO departmental reports attached to the filing in support of the
proposal recommended an increase to a $400/MWh ``soft'' cap, not a
``hard'' cap. SVP argues that the CAISO's studies conclude that, with
current gas prices projected between $10 and $12 per Mcf, a ``soft''
cap of $400/MWh is roughly equivalent to the $250/MWh ``soft'' cap
implemented when gas costs were approximately three to four dollars per
Mcf. SVP contends that the CAISO studies do not provide any rationale
to support a change from a ``soft'' cap to a ``hard'' cap, and in fact,
assert that a $400/MWh ``soft'' cap is necessary to maintain the status
quo. According to SVP, the CAISO's Board of Governors' resolution
changed the CAISO's departmental recommendations to a ``hard'' cap
without explanation or analysis. SVP points out that the CAISO's only
comment on the change is that the Commission required the CAISO to
change to a ``hard'' cap once MRTU is implemented, and that
implementing a ``hard'' cap now will ease the transition to a $500/MWh
``hard'' cap when MRTU is implemented in 2007. According to SVP,
without the structural changes MRTU is expected to bring about, there
is no justification for the change to a ``hard'' cap, and the CAISO
fails to justify any present need for a ``hard'' cap versus a ``soft''
cap and does not address the potential consequences of the change. SVP
further argues that the escalation in natural gas prices and the recent
bankruptcy filing of Calpine Corporation further strain the market and
risk contributing to a shortfall of energy in California.
16. Portland argues that the ``hard'' nature of the new bid cap
proposal does not adequately promote a transparent and workable market
with the appropriate application of constraints and oversight.
Specifically, Portland argues that a hard cap would force the CAISO to
resort to out-of-market (OOM) purchases to acquire capacity resources
when market prices within the CAISO market exceed the cap. By
definition, according to Portland, such OOM purchases would involve
capacity and associated pricing that would not be offered to all market
participants in real time, and thus do not promote an efficient,
transparent, and workable market. In contrast, Portland argues that a
``soft'' cap would achieve that goal because the current ``soft'' cap
methodology provides a ceiling that market participants may not exceed
without: (1) Demonstrating that their costs justify a higher bid; and
(2) being subject to refund.
17. Williams similarly requests that the Commission reject the
proposal to change the bid cap from a ``soft'' to a ``hard'' cap.
Williams submits that the same concerns that resulted in the current
``soft'' cap continue to exist. Specifically, Williams expresses the
concern that should fuel prices continue to rise, its operating costs
may exceed $400/MWh, and with the must-offer obligation still in place,
it may be
[[Page 6066]]
required to operate at a loss. Williams states that the CAISO seems to
base its proposal for a ``hard'' cap on the Commission's directive in a
separate proceeding to replace the current ``soft'' bid cap with a
``hard'' bid cap when the CAISO's MRTU market design is
implemented.\21\ However, Williams argues, the environment under which
a generator will operate when MRTU is implemented will be significantly
different than today's environment,\22\ and accordingly the CAISO's
attempt to justify the imposition of a ``hard'' cap at this time, by
comparing the proposed cap with the initial MRTU ``hard'' cap of $500/
MWh, is misplaced.
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\21\ See The CAISO Amendment No. 73 Filing at 5 (citing July
2005 Order, 112 FERC ] 61,013 at P 104 (2005)).
\22\ Williams notes that the ``hard'' cap directed by the
Commission under MRTU is initially set at $500/MWh and ultimately
increases to $1,000/MWh (a structure that Williams points out was
approved by the Commission prior to the recent run-up in fuel
prices), the must-offer obligation will not exist under MRTU as it
does today, and the California Public Utility Commission's (CPUC)
resource adequacy requirement should be in place when MRTU is
implemented, resulting in less reliance by load on the CAISO's real-
time market.
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Price Cap in the WECC Outside the CAISO
18. Powerex and Indicated Parties contend that the CAISO-proposed
bid cap increase should be applied throughout the West in order to
prevent artificial distortions in the electricity markets that could
result from different price caps between regions. They note that the
expected increases in natural gas prices in the winter of 2006 will
affect not only the CAISO markets, but all electricity markets in the
West. As Indicated Parties further state, the West-wide market power
mitigation program was established to meet the same goals as the CAISO
market power mitigation, namely to address market power concerns
without undermining incentives for new entry and long-term adequacy.
Therefore, according to Indicated Parties, until the Commission
releases the western markets from the temporary mitigation program, the
West-wide price cap should be no less than the bid cap for the CAISO
market. Indicated Parties request that the Commission take action under
FPA section 206 to ensure that any elevation in the bid cap applicable
to the CAISO markets is matched by an identical elevation in the price
cap applicable to the remainder of the WECC. Powerex and Indicated
Parties support the increase of the West-wide price cap to $400/MWh.
19. The Indicated Parties further assert that the Commission should
hold that the bid cap in the non-California portion of the WECC will be
a ``soft'' cap that permits cost justifications for sales above the
level of the cap, and not a ``hard'' cap as the CAISO has proposed for
its markets. They argue that if natural gas prices move even higher
than their current levels, a ``hard'' cap of $400/MWh may not be
sufficient to ensure full cost recovery for some generators. They
assert that a ``soft'' cap at least permits generators to sell at
prices above the cap as long as they can justify their elevated prices.
Indicated Parties also request that the Commission clarify the type of
documentation that sellers need to supply to justify prices above the
applicable bid cap. According to Indicated Parties, this clarification
will reduce the possibility of artificial constraints by making it
easier for sellers with incremental costs above the level of the cap to
decide whether to contribute their output into the market.
Ancillary Services
20. Powerex states that the cap on ancillary service capacity bids
should be increased to $400/MWh. It asserts that neither the CAISO nor
MSC has offered any reason for the failure to raise this bid cap.
According to Powerex, different bid caps for energy and ancillary
services could potentially distort electricity markets since not all
possible markets scenarios can be foreseen.
Effective Date
21. SVP asserts that the CAISO violated the FPA by making an
unauthorized tariff change. SVP states that the CAISO filed its
proposed Amendment 73 on December 21, 2005, and requested expedited
consideration in order to implement the proposal on January 1,
2006.\23\ SVP notes that on December 22, 2005, the Commission
established a comment date of January 3, 2006, for protests and
interventions, and did not authorize a January 1, 2006 effective
date.\24\ According to SVP, despite the Commission's absence of
approval, the CAISO announced its intention to make the proposed
``hard'' cap effective on January 1, 2006.\25\ SVP states that the
CAISO has no authority to unilaterally implement tariff changes before
the Commission approves the changes. It states that the Commission
should not tolerate such actions which violate the filed rate
doctrine.\26\ SVP states that the CAISO's unauthorized change in the
tariff could cause bids to be rejected or could cause sellers to choose
not to bid.
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\23\ See CAISO Amendment No. 73 Filing.
\24\ California Independent System Operator Corp., Notice of
Filing, Docket No. ER06-354-000, Dec. 22, 2005.
\25\ See CAISO Market Notice, Dec. 27, 2005.
\26\ See FPA sections 205(c), 16 U.S.C. 824d(c) (2000), and
206(a), 16 U.S.C. 824e(a) (2000); see also Arkansas Louisiana Gas
Co. v. Hall, 453 U.S. 571, 581 (1981) (explaining that ``under the
filed rate doctrine, the Commission alone is empowered to [accept
proposed rate filings], and until it has done so, no rate other than
the one on file may be charged.''); Williams Power Co. v. California
Independent System Operator Corp., 110 FERC ] 61,231 at P 18,
clarification denied, 111 FERC ] 61,348 (2005) (explaining that
``[i]f the CAISO believes that additional tariff provisions are
necessary to maintain operational control of its system and to
minimize operating costs, it must request prior Commission
authorization of the proposed tariff changes.'').
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Discussion
Procedural Matters
22. Pursuant to Rule 214 of the Commission's Rules of Practice and
Procedure, 18 CFR 385.214 (2005), the notices of intervention and
timely, unopposed motions to intervene serve to make the entities that
filed them parties to these proceedings. We will accept IEP's motion to
intervene because it will not be prejudicial at this early stage in the
proceeding.
23. Rule 213(a)(2) of the Commission's Rules of Practice and
Procedure, 18 CFR 385.213(a)(2) (2005), prohibits an answer to a
protest unless otherwise ordered by the decisional authority. We will
accept the CAISO's answer because it has provided information that
assisted us in our decision-making process.
24. IEP failed to file a timely Statement of Issues as required by
Order No. 663.\27\ Order No. 663 applies to all pleadings, including
protests and comments,\28\ and requires that any issues that a movant
wishes the Commission to address must be specifically identified in a
section entitled ``Statement of Issues'' that must list each issue
presented to the Commission in a separately enumerated paragraph that
includes representative Commission and court precedent on which the
party is relying. Any issues not so listed in a separate section will
be deemed to have been waived. Order No. 663 became effective September
23, 2005. IEP's late motion to intervene and comments, filed on January
4, 2006, omitted the Statement of Issues. For this reason, we deem IEP
to have waived the issues in its comments. While Indicated Parties did
include a ``Statement of
[[Page 6067]]
Issues,'' any issue not specifically identified by Indicated Parties in
their ``Statement of Issues'' is deemed waived.
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\27\ Revision of Rules of Practice and Procedure Regarding Issue
Identification, Order No. 663, 70 FR 55,723 (Sept. 23, 2005), FERC
Stats. & Regs. ]31,193 (2005).
\28\ Order No. 663 does not apply to comments on rulemakings or
comments on offers of settlement. However, that exception does not
apply here because IEP is commenting on a tariff filing. See Order
No. 663.
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Commission Determination
CAISO Bid Cap
25. The current $250/MWh ``soft'' bid cap in the CAISO's energy
market was established in October 2002 when natural gas prices were
between $3 and $4/MMBtu. As the CAISO noted in its filing, in recent
months, concerns over tight natural gas supplies have resulted in high
and volatile natural gas prices throughout the country. Natural gas
spot prices in California recently reached as high as $14/MMBtu.\29\
Since natural gas is the fuel source for a significant portion of
generation used to meet California load, this price rise and volatility
led the CAISO to have concerns that the current level of the bid cap
may constrain the CAISO's ability to acquire sufficient power in real
time. Given the current market design, which includes a must-offer
obligation and a $250/MWh cap on energy, the Commission is concerned
that generators may not have the opportunity to adequately recover
their costs. We note that no intervenor has opposed the increase, and
find that raising the bid cap is justified by the well-documented rise
in gas prices. Accordingly, the Commission accepts the CAISO's proposal
to raise the current bid cap from $250/MWh to $400/MWh.
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\29\ See Daily price survey ($/MMBtu), Platts Gas Daily, Dec.
14, 2005, at p. 2 (listing the midpoint for ``PG&E city-gate'' at
$14.325).
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26. The Commission rejects, however, the CAISO's proposal to change
the current ``soft'' nature of the cap to a ``hard'' cap during this
interim period prior to the implementation of MRTU and a resource
adequacy mechanism. Neither the MSC nor DMM recommended changing the
cap from a ``soft'' to a ``hard'' cap, and the CAISO has not adequately
supported such a change. A ``hard'' cap, in combination with the
CAISO's current must-offer obligation,\30\ could result in confiscatory
rates because it would raise the possibility that sellers could be
forced to operate at a loss. Based on the current circumstances of
rising and volatile gas prices, we will retain the cap as a ``soft''
cap during this interim period. The CAISO has filed an emergency
request in response to an unusual situation of rapidly rising natural
gas prices, and the Commission believes the importance of ensuring a
market design that is both reliable and non-confiscatory outweighs the
CAISO's desire to transition towards a ``hard'' cap directed by the
Commission to begin at the implementation of MRTU in 2007.
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\30\ We note that the current must-offer obligation in
California (and the WECC), which lacks a separate capacity payment,
is different from a must-offer obligation where sellers, as part of
a resource adequacy program, voluntarily accept a must-offer
obligation in exchange for receiving a capacity payment.
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Price Cap in the WECC Outside the CAISO
27. Our preliminary judgment is that the maximum price for spot
market sales in the WECC outside the CAISO, as established by the
Commission in our July 2002 Order, should also be raised to a $400/MWh
``soft'' cap. As we stated in that order, ``California is an integral
part of a trade and reliability region in the West. Because of this
interdependency of market and infrastructure, conditions in and changes
to the California market affect the entire region.'' \31\ Accordingly,
pursuant to our authority under section 206 of the FPA, we propose to
increase the cap to a $400/MWh ``soft'' cap for all spot market sales
in the WECC outside the CAISO, defined in our June 19, 2001 Order as
sales in the WECC that are 24 hours or less and are entered into the
day of or day prior to delivery.\32\
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\31\ July 2002 Order at P 2.
\32\ See San Diego Gas & Electric Company v. Sellers of Energy
and Ancillary Services Into Markets Operated by the California
Independent System Operator and the California Power Exchange, 95
FERC ]61,418 at n. 3 (2001).
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28. In light of issues raised by entities in this proceeding and
the Commission's above proposal, we hereby institute, under section 206
of the FPA, 16 U.S.C. 824e (2000), an investigation into the price cap
on spot market sales in the WECC outside the CAISO. We recognize the
interest of entities regarding this investigation and, therefore, the
Commission invites interested persons to submit comments on this issue
within 10 days from the date of issuance of this order. We note that
implementing a $400/MWh bid cap in the CAISO while the remainder of the
WECC retains a $250/MWh cap could cause the non-CAISO WECC to have
difficulties in attracting imbalance energy if gas prices were to rise
substantially prior to Commission action. Because gas prices have
leveled off since the CAISO's filing, we believe the potential for this
to occur in the near term is small, however, the Commission intends to
act expeditiously to address this WECC cap upon the expiration of the
comment period.
29. In cases where the Commission institutes an investigation on
its own motion, section 206(b) of the FPA, as amended by section 1285
of the Energy Policy Act of 2005,\33\ requires that the Commission
establish a refund effective date and that date must be no earlier than
the publication date of the Commission's notice that it intends to
initiate such proceeding but no later than five months after the
publication date. Therefore, we find that the refund effective date,
pursuant to section 206(b) of the FPA, as amended by section 1285 of
the Energy Policy Act of 2005, is the date on which this order is
published in the Federal Register.
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\33\ Pub. L. No. 109-58, Sec. 1285, 119 Stat. 594, 980-81
(2005).
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Ancillary Services
30. Powerex argues that the bid caps should be the same for both
the CAISO energy and ancillary services markets. Powerex asserts that
neither the CAISO nor MSC has offered a rationale for not raising the
ancillary services bid cap from its current $250/MWh level, and cites
potential market distortions without giving details of how they might
occur. In its answer, the CAISO dismisses this concern, pointing out
that PJM has a $1,000/MWh energy bid cap and a $100/MWh regulation bid
cap, and asserting that ancillary service capacity is a fixed cost and
that gas prices do not affect the cost of ancillary services. The CAISO
argues that to the extent the CAISO accepts an ancillary services
capacity bid from a supplier, and then calls on the unit to provide
energy, the supplier will be able to reflect any increased gas costs in
its energy bid. Finally, the CAISO argues that the ancillary service
capacity bid cap will continue to be a ``soft'' cap, thus allowing
suppliers to submit bids in excess of $250/MWh, provided they can
provide cost justification for such bids.
31. The Commission recognizes that until the implementation of MRTU
in 2007, the current CAISO market design does not have a day-ahead
market that co-optimizes energy and ancillary services. The CAISO
relies on ancillary service capacity being offered by sellers directly
to the CAISO for various categories of reserves. Sellers must make the
decision to sell either energy or ancillary services. To the extent a
seller chooses to make its capacity available for selling an ancillary
service like spinning reserves, it could incur an opportunity cost by
not selling energy. Thus, under the current market design, the price of
energy could have an impact on the price of ancillary services and
suppliers may thus choose to provide energy instead of ancillary
[[Page 6068]]
services if the ancillary service capacity bid cap is below this
opportunity cost.
32. Given these concerns, we will address the issue of the
appropriate level of the CAISO ancillary service capacity bid cap in
the section 206 investigation instituted in this proceeding. We
recognize the interest of entities regarding this issue, therefore, the
Commission invites interested persons to submit comments on the
appropriate level of the CAISO's ancillary service capacity bid cap
within 10 days from the date of issuance of this order. As discussed
above, we find that the refund effective date, pursuant to section
206(b) of the FPA, as amended by section 1285 of the Energy Policy Act
of 2005, is the date on which this order is published in the Federal
Register.
Effective Date
33. We note that in its answer, the CAISO states that it has not
implemented Amendment No. 73 and it does not intend to make the $400/
MWh bid cap effective until approved by the Commission. In fact, the
CAISO asserts that it made repeated statements in its transmittal
letter and market notice that it requested the amendment be made
effective on January 1, 2006 or as soon thereafter as possible. As
noted above, the Commission accepts the CAISO's proposal, as modified,
effective as of the date of this order.
The Commission Orders
(A) The Commission accepts and modifies the CAISO's proposal to
adjust its bid cap for real-time energy bids and adjustment bids to
$400/MWh, as discussed within the body of the order, effective upon
issuance of this order.
(B) Pursuant to the authority conferred upon the Commission by the
FPA, particularly section 206 thereof, the Commission institutes an
investigation into the price cap in the WECC outside the CAISO and the
ancillary service capacity bid cap in the CAISO, as discussed in the
body of this order. Entities may submit comments regarding these issues
within 10 days from the date of issuance of this order.
(C) The refund effective date established pursuant to section
206(b) of the FPA, as amended by section 1285 of the Energy Policy Act
of 2005, as discussed in the body of this order, is the date upon which
this order is published in the Federal Register.
By the Commission.
Magalie R. Salas,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 06-1090 Filed 2-3-06; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-P
