Auction of 800 MHz Air-Ground Radiotelephone Service Licenses, 3513-3518 [06-664]

Agencies

• FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

[Federal Register Volume 71, Number 14 (Monday, January 23, 2006)]
[Notices]
[Pages 3513-3518]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 06-664]


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FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

[Report No. AUC-06-65-A (Auction No. 65); DA 06-3]


Auction of 800 MHz Air-Ground Radiotelephone Service Licenses

AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission.

ACTION: Notice.

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SUMMARY: This document announces the auction of new nationwide 
commercial Air-Ground Radiotelephone Service licenses in the 800 MHz 
band (Auction No. 65), scheduled to commence on May 10, 2006. This 
document also seeks comments on reserve prices or minimum opening bids 
and other procedures for Auction No. 65.

DATES: Comments are due on or before January 31, 2006 and reply 
comments are due on or before February 7, 2006.

ADDRESSES: Comments and reply comments must be sent by electronic mail 
to the following address: auctions65@fcc.gov.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For legal questions: Brian Carter at 
(202) 418-0660. For general auction questions: Jeff Crooks at (202) 
418-0660. For service rules questions: Erin McGrath or Richard 
Arsenault (legal); or Jay Jackson or Moslem Sawez (technical) at (202) 
418-0620.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a summary of the Auction No. 65 
Comment Public Notice released on January 10, 2006. The complete text 
of the Auction No. 65 Comment Public Notice, including attachments and 
related Commission documents is available for public inspection and 
copying from 8 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. Monday through Thursday or from 8 a.m. 
to 11:30 p.m. on Friday at the FCC Reference Information Center, 
Portals II, 445 12th Street, SW., Room CY-A257, Washington, DC 20554. 
The Auction No. 65 Comment Public Notice and related Commission 
documents may also be purchased from the Commission's duplicating 
contractor, Best Copy and Printing, Inc. (BCPI), Portals II, 445 12th 
Street, SW., Room CY-B402, Washington, DC 20554, telephone 202-488-
5300, facsimile 202-488-5563, or you may contact BCPI at its Web site: 
https://www.BCPIWEB.com. When ordering documents from BCPI please 
provide the appropriate FCC document number for example, DA 06-3. The 
Auction No. 65 Comment Public Notice and related documents are also 
available on the Internet at the Commission's Web site: https://
wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/65/.

[[Page 3514]]

I. Licenses To Be Offered in Auction No. 65

    1. Alternative Band Configurations. The Commission will auction 
licenses in three alternative band configurations: (1) Band Plan 1, 
comprised of two overlapping, shared, cross-polarized 3 MHz licenses 
(Licenses A and B, respectively), (2) Band Plan 2, comprised of an 
exclusive 3 MHz license and an exclusive 1 MHz license (Licenses C and 
D, respectively), and (3) Band Plan 3, comprised of an exclusive 1 MHz 
license and an exclusive 3 MHz license (Licenses E and F, 
respectively), with the blocks at opposite ends of the band from Band 
Plan 2. Licenses in only one of these mutually incompatible band 
configurations will be awarded. The band plan that receives the highest 
aggregate bids in the auction will be implemented, and licenses 
composing that configuration will be awarded to winning bidders subject 
to review of the long-form license applications. Because the three band 
configurations are mutually incompatible, applications for licenses in 
different band plans will be mutually exclusive. The descriptions and 
licenses available in Auction No. 65 are listed in Attachment A of the 
Auction No. 65 Comment Public Notice.
    2. Permissible Services. A new licensee may provide any type of 
air-ground service (i.e., voice telephony, broadband Internet, data, 
etc.) to aircraft of any type, and serve any or all aviation markets 
(commercial, government, and general). A licensee must provide service 
to aircraft. A new licensee may not provide ancillary land mobile or 
fixed services in the 800 MHz air-ground spectrum.
    3. Eligibility Restriction. In order to promote competition in the 
800 MHz air-ground band, the Commission has prohibited any party from 
obtaining a controlling interest, either at auction or by a post-
auction transaction, in new licenses for more than three megahertz of 
spectrum (either shared or exclusive) in the band. No single party, 
therefore, may hold more than one license in any of the available band 
configurations.
    4. International Coordination. To promote interoperable 
communications and to manage interference, some of the ground station 
locations in North America and channel block assignments of the 800 MHz 
air-ground band have been predetermined consistent with bilateral 
agreements with Mexico and with Canada. These agreements, which provide 
for coordinated use of the 800 MHz air-ground frequencies over North 
American airspace, are based on a narrow bandwidth channel scheme, and 
therefore may need to be renegotiated to provide for more flexible use 
of this spectrum based on the band plan configuration that is 
implemented as a result of the auction.
    5. Spectrum Sharing Plan. If Band Plan 1, which is comprised of two 
overlapping 3 MHz licenses, is implemented, the new licensees will be 
required to jointly file a spectrum sharing and site selection plan 
with the Wireless Telecommunications Bureau (Bureau) within six months 
of the initial grant of their spectrum licenses, and they will be 
required to notify the Bureau of any changes to the plan. The Bureau 
will issue a public notice prior to the commencement of Auction No. 65 
in which it will specify the filing requirements for such a plan. This 
approach will provide parties with overlapping spectrum licenses 
flexibility to configure their systems without having to adhere to 
minimum spacing requirements or site locations predetermined by the 
Commission.
    6. Incumbent Licensee. In the Air-Ground Order, the Commission 
granted Verizon Airfone--the only incumbent service provider in the 800 
MHz air-ground band--a nonrenewable license to operate in the band for 
five years. This license will expire in May 2010. Verizon Airfone must 
transition its incumbent narrowband operations from four to one 
megahertz of spectrum in the band within two years of the initial grant 
date of a new license in the band. The Commission has directed the 
Bureau to adopt reporting requirements so that Airfone's transition of 
its base stations and its subscribers' aircraft to operations in one 
megahertz of the 800 MHz air-ground band may be monitored. The Bureau 
will issue a public notice enumerating such requirements by February 6, 
2006. Airfone must file its initial transition status report with the 
Commission six months from the date of the grant of any new license in 
the band and at each of the three six-month intervals thereafter.
    7. In addition, if Airfone, or an affiliate of Airfone, wins an 
exclusive 3 MHz license at auction, the Bureau will issue a public 
notice within 60 days of the grant of such a license, which requires 
the company to include in each status report information regarding the 
transition of its existing subscribers from its narrowband system to a 
broadband system and to file additional status reports at six-month 
intervals from the conclusion of the two-year transition period until 
the expiration of its five-year nonrenewable license.

II. Auction Procedures

    8. Section 309(j)(3) of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 
requires the Commission to ``ensure that, in the scheduling of any 
competitive bidding under this subsection, an adequate period is 
allowed * * * before issuance of bidding rules, to permit notice and 
comment on proposed auction procedures * * *.'' Consistent with the 
provisions of section 309(j)(3) and to ensure that potential bidders 
have adequate time to familiarize themselves with the specific rules 
that will govern the day-to-day conduct of an auction, the Commission 
directed the Bureau, under its existing delegated authority, to seek 
comment on a variety of auction-specific procedures prior to the start 
of each auction. The Bureau therefore seeks comment on the following 
issues relating to Auction No. 65.

A. Auction Structure

i. Simultaneous Multiple-Round Auction Design
    9. The Bureau proposes to conduct Auction No. 65 as a simultaneous 
multiple-round auction. As indicated above, licenses will be offered in 
three mutually incompatible band configurations, and the band plan that 
receives the highest aggregate bids in the auction will be implemented. 
The Bureau believes the simultaneous multiple-round auction design is 
an appropriate auction design given these circumstances. This type of 
auction offers every license for bid at the same time and consists of 
successive bidding rounds in which eligible bidders may place bids on 
individual licenses. Bidding remains open on all licenses until bidding 
stops on every license. The Bureau seeks comment on this proposal.
ii. Round Structure
    10. The Commission will conduct Auction No. 65 over the Internet. 
Alternatively, telephonic bidding will also be available. The toll-free 
telephone number for telephonic bidding will be provided to qualified 
bidders.
    11. The simultaneous multiple-round format will consist of 
sequential bidding rounds, each followed by the release of round 
results. The initial bidding schedule will be announced in a public 
notice to be released at least one week before the start of the 
auction. Details on viewing round results, including the location and 
format of downloadable round results files, will be included in the 
same public notice.
    12. The Bureau retains the discretion to change the bidding 
schedule in order to foster an auction pace that reasonably balances 
speed with the bidders' need to study round results and adjust their

[[Page 3515]]

bidding strategies. The Bureau may increase or decrease the amount of 
time for the bidding rounds and review periods, or the number of rounds 
per day, depending upon the bidding activity level and other factors.
iii. Stopping Rule
    13. The Bureau has discretion to establish stopping rules before or 
during multiple round auctions in order to terminate the auction within 
a reasonable time. For Auction No. 65, the Bureau proposes to employ a 
simultaneous stopping rule approach. A simultaneous stopping rule means 
that all licenses remain available for bidding until bidding closes 
simultaneously on all licenses.
    14. Bidding will close simultaneously on all licenses after the 
first round in which no bidder submits any new bids or applies a 
proactive waiver. Thus, unless circumstances dictate otherwise, bidding 
will remain open on all licenses until bidding stops on every license.
    15. However, the Bureau proposes to retain the discretion to 
exercise any of the following options during Auction No. 65: (a) Use a 
modified version of the simultaneous stopping rule. The modified 
stopping rule would close the auction for all licenses after the first 
round in which no bidder applies a waiver or submits any new bids on 
any license for which it is not the provisionally winning bidder. Thus, 
absent any other bidding activity, a bidder placing a new bid on a 
license for which it is the provisionally winning bidder would not keep 
the auction open under this modified stopping rule; (b) keep the 
auction open even if no bidder submits any new bids or applies a 
waiver. In this event, the effect will be the same as if a bidder had 
applied a waiver. The activity rule, therefore, will apply as usual and 
a bidder with insufficient activity will either lose bidding 
eligibility or use a remaining activity rule waiver; (c) declare that 
the auction will end after a specified number of additional rounds 
(special stopping rule). If the Bureau invokes this special stopping 
rule, it will accept bids in the specified final round(s) after which 
the auction will close.
    16. The Bureau proposes to exercise these options only in certain 
circumstances, for example, where the auction is proceeding very 
slowly, there is minimal overall bidding activity, or it appears likely 
that the auction will not close within a reasonable period of time. 
Before exercising these options, the Bureau is likely to attempt to 
increase the pace of the auction by, for example, increasing the number 
of bidding rounds per day and/or changing the minimum acceptable bid 
percentage. The Bureau seeks comment on these proposals.
iv. Information Relating to Auction Delay, Suspension, or Cancellation
    17. For Auction No. 65, the Bureau proposes that, by public notice 
or by announcement during the auction, the Bureau may delay, suspend, 
or cancel the auction in the event of natural disaster, technical 
obstacle, evidence of an auction security breach, unlawful bidding 
activity, administrative or weather necessity, or for any other reason 
that affects the fair and efficient conduct of competitive bidding. In 
such cases, the Bureau, in its sole discretion, may elect to resume the 
auction starting from the beginning of the current round, resume the 
auction starting from some previous round, or cancel the auction in its 
entirety. Network interruption may cause the Bureau to delay or suspend 
the auction. The Bureau emphasizes that exercise of this authority is 
solely within the discretion of the Bureau, and its use is not intended 
to be a substitute for situations in which bidders may wish to apply 
their activity rule waivers. The Bureau seeks comment on this proposal.

B. Bidding Procedures

i. Upfront Payments and Bidding Eligibility
    18. The Bureau has delegated authority and discretion to determine 
an appropriate upfront payment for each license being auctioned. A 
bidder's upfront payment is a refundable deposit to establish 
eligibility to bid on licenses. Upfront payments related to licenses 
for the specific spectrum subject to auction protect against frivolous 
or insincere bidding and provide the Commission with a source of funds 
from which to collect payments owed at the close of the auction. With 
these factors in mind for Auction No. 65, we propose upfront payments 
of $100,000 per license.
    19. Consistent with the Bureau's usual practice, we further propose 
that the amount of the upfront payment submitted by a bidder will 
determine the bidder's bidding eligibility in bidding units. For 
Auction No. 65, the Bureau proposes to assign 100,000 bidding units per 
license. The number of bidding units for a given license is fixed and 
does not change during the auction as prices change.
    20. However, because the mutually incompatible band configurations 
and the three megahertz eligibility restriction limit a bidder to 
winning only a single license, the Bureau proposes to permit a bidder 
with 100,000 bidding units of eligibility to bid or be active 
simultaneously on any or all of the licenses it selected on its FCC 
Form 175, rather than being limited to activity on a single license 
with 100,000 bidding units as our usual activity and eligibility rules 
would require. That is, under the Bureau's proposal, an upfront payment 
of $100,000 would give a bidder 100,000 bidding units of eligibility, 
which in turn would permit the bidder to be active on any or all of the 
licenses it selected on its FCC Form 175, making it unnecessary to 
acquire more than 100,000 bidding units of bidding eligibility in order 
to bid or be active simultaneously on more than one license.
    21. The proposed upfront payment and number of bidding units for 
each license available in Auction No. 65 is also set forth in 
Attachment A of the Auction No. 65 Comment Public Notice. The Bureau 
seeks comment on this proposal.
ii. Activity Rule
    22. In order to ensure that an auction closes within a reasonable 
period of time, an activity rule requires bidders to bid actively 
throughout the auction, rather than wait until late in the auction 
before participating. Bidders are required to be active during each 
round of the auction. If a bidder fails to maintain the required 
activity level in a round, it must use one of the limited number of 
activity rule waivers allotted to it in order to maintain its current 
level of eligibility. In a typical FCC auction, if the bidder has no 
activity rule waivers remaining, its eligibility will be reduced.
    23. For Auction No. 65, the Bureau proposes the following activity 
requirement: in each round of the auction, a bidder desiring to 
maintain its eligibility to participate in the auction is required to 
be active (place a bid or hold the provisionally winning bid) on at 
least one license. Under the Bureau's proposal for upfront payments and 
bidding eligibility, a bidder must have 100,000 bidding units of 
eligibility to participate in the auction--i.e., to bid on at least one 
license--and may hold a maximum of 100,000 bidding units of 
eligibility. Therefore, under the Bureau's proposal for this auction, 
any reduction in a bidder's eligibility will effectively preclude the 
bidder from further bidding in the auction. In other words, failure to 
maintain the required activity level will have the effect of 
eliminating the bidder from further bidding in the auction unless an 
activity rule waiver is used.

[[Page 3516]]

    24. The Bureau seeks comment on these proposals. Commenters that 
believe this activity rule should be modified should explain their 
reasoning and comment on the desirability of an alternative approach. 
Commenters are advised to support their claims with analyses and 
suggested alternative activity rules.
iii. Activity Rule Waivers
    25. Use of an activity rule waiver preserves the bidder's 
eligibility despite the bidder's activity in the current round being 
below the required minimum level. An activity rule waiver applies to an 
entire round of bidding and not to a particular license. Activity rule 
waivers can be either proactive or automatic and are principally a 
mechanism for auction participants to avoid the loss of bidding 
eligibility in the event that exigent circumstances prevent them from 
placing a bid in a particular round.
    26. The FCC Auction System assumes that a bidder that does not meet 
the activity requirement would prefer to apply an activity rule waiver 
(if available) rather than lose bidding eligibility, which in this 
auction would have the effect of precluding the bidder from further 
bidding in the auction. Therefore, the system will automatically apply 
a waiver at the end of any bidding round in which a bidder fails to be 
active (place a bid or hold the provisionally winning bid) on at least 
one license unless the bidder has no activity rule waivers available. 
If a bidder has no waivers remaining and does not satisfy the required 
activity requirement, it will no longer be permitted to place bids in 
the auction.
    27. A bidder may apply an activity rule waiver proactively as a 
means to keep the auction open without placing a bid. If a bidder 
proactively applies an activity rule waiver (using the ``apply waiver'' 
function in the FCC Auction System) during a bidding round in which no 
bids are submitted, the auction will remain open and the bidder's 
eligibility will be preserved. An automatic waiver applied by the FCC 
Auction System in a round in which there are no new bids will not keep 
the auction open. A bidder cannot submit a proactive waiver after 
submitting a bid in a round, and submitting a proactive waiver will 
preclude a bidder from placing any bids in that round. Applying a 
waiver is irreversible; once a proactive waiver is submitted, that 
waiver cannot be unsubmitted, even if the round has not yet closed.
    28. The Bureau proposes that each bidder in Auction No. 65 be 
provided with three activity rule waivers that may be used at the 
bidder's discretion during the course of the auction as set forth 
above. The Bureau seeks comment on this proposal.
iv. Reserve Price or Minimum Opening Bid
    29. Section 309(j) calls upon the Commission to prescribe methods 
for establishing a reasonable reserve price or a minimum opening bid 
amount when FCC licenses are subject to auction, unless the Commission 
determines that a reserve price or minimum opening bid amount is not in 
the public interest. Consistent with this mandate, the Commission has 
directed the Bureau to seek comment on the use of a minimum opening bid 
amount and/or reserve price prior to the start of each auction.
    30. Normally, a reserve price is an absolute minimum price below 
which an item will not be sold in a given auction. Reserve prices can 
be either published or unpublished. A minimum opening bid amount, on 
the other hand, is the minimum bid price set at the beginning of the 
auction below which no bids are accepted. It is generally used to 
accelerate the competitive bidding process. The auctioneer, however, 
often has the discretion to lower the minimum opening bid amount during 
the course of the auction. It is also possible for the minimum opening 
bid amount and the reserve price to be the same amount.
    31. In light of the distinctive features of the Air-Ground 
Radiotelephone Service and Section 309(j)'s requirements for 
competitive bidding, the Bureau proposes to set minimum opening bids 
for each license and to establish a published aggregate reserve price 
for the entire band. The Bureau believes a minimum opening bid amount, 
which has been used in other auctions, is an effective tool for 
accelerating the competitive bidding process. At the same time, given 
uncertainty regarding the relative values of the 800 MHz Air-Ground 
Radiotelephone Service licenses, the Bureau believes that it can best 
comply with the Commission's statutory mandate to recover for the 
public a portion of the value of the public spectrum resource by 
establishing a published reserve price for the entire band. Under this 
proposal, if the sum of the provisionally winning bids at the close of 
bidding does not meet or exceed the aggregate reserve price, the 
Commission will cancel the auction and no licenses will be awarded on 
the basis of the bidding.
    32. More specifically, for Auction No. 65, the Bureau proposed to 
set minimum opening bids on a license-by-license basis as follows:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                               Minimum
              Licenses                     Bandwidth         opening bid
------------------------------------------------------------------------
A and B............................  3 MHz (2 MHz shared).    $1,500,000
C and F............................  3 MHz................     2,800,000
D and E............................  1 MHz................       200,000
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    33. The Bureau also proposes to establish a published reserve price 
of $5,000,000 for the entire band. Attachment A of the Auction No. 65 
Comment Public Notice also sets forth the proposed minimum opening bids 
and reserve price. The Bureau seeks comment on this proposal.
    34. If commenters believe that these minimum opening bid amounts 
will result in unsold licenses, or are not reasonable amounts, or 
should instead operate as reserve prices, they should explain why this 
is so, and comment on the desirability of an alternative approach. 
Commenters are advised to support their claims with valuation analyses 
and suggested reserve prices or minimum opening bid amount levels or 
formulas. In establishing the minimum opening bid amounts and the 
reserve price, the Bureau particularly seeks comment on such factors as 
the amount of spectrum being auctioned, levels of incumbency, the 
availability of technology to provide service, issues of interference 
with other spectrum bands and any other relevant factors that could 
reasonably have an impact on valuation of the 800 MHz Air-Ground 
Radiotelephone Service licenses. Commenters proposing to reduce or 
eliminate the reserve price should address the extent to which minimum 
opening bids should be changed as a result. The Bureau also seeks 
comment on whether, consistent with section 309(j), the public interest 
would be served by having no minimum opening bid amounts or reserve 
price.
v. Bid Amounts
    35. In each round, eligible bidders will be able to place bids on a 
given license in any of nine different amounts. The FCC Auction System 
interface will list the nine acceptable bid amounts for each license.
    36. The minimum acceptable bid amount for a license will be equal 
to its minimum opening bid amount until the bids placed enable the FCC 
Auction System to calculate a higher price for the license. If such a 
price can be calculated, the minimum acceptable bid amount for the 
license will be determined in a two-step process: (a) The FCC Auction 
System designates a

[[Page 3517]]

price for each license. For licenses with provisionally winning bids, 
this price will be equal to the amount of the provisionally winning 
bid. For all other licenses, the price will be equal to the amount of 
the highest bid placed on the license by any non-provisionally winning 
bidder; (b) the price is increased by the minimum acceptable bid 
percentage.
    37. The minimum acceptable bid amount will be calculated by 
multiplying the license price times the sum of one plus the minimum 
acceptable bid percentage--e.g., if the minimum acceptable bid 
percentage is five percent, the minimum acceptable bid amount will 
equal (license price) * (1.05), rounded. The Bureau will round the 
result using our standard rounding procedures.
    38. The nine acceptable bid amounts for each license consist of the 
minimum acceptable bid amount and additional amounts calculated using 
the minimum acceptable bid amount and the bid increment percentage. The 
Bureau will round the results using our standard rounding procedures. 
The first additional acceptable bid amount equals the minimum 
acceptable bid amount times the sum of one plus the bid increment 
percentage, rounded--e.g., if the bid increment percentage is five 
percent, the calculation is (minimum acceptable bid amount) * (1 + 
0.05), rounded, or (minimum acceptable bid amount) * 1.05, rounded; the 
second additional acceptable bid amount equals the minimum acceptable 
bid amount times the sum of one plus two times the bid increment 
percentage, rounded, or (minimum acceptable bid amount) * 1.10, 
rounded; the third additional acceptable bid amount equals the minimum 
acceptable bid amount times the sum of one plus three times the bid 
increment percentage, rounded, or (minimum acceptable bid amount) * 
1.15, rounded; etc. Note that the bid increment percentage need not be 
the same as the minimum acceptable bid percentage.
    39. For Auction No. 65, the Bureau proposes to use a minimum 
acceptable bid percentage of five percent. This means that the minimum 
acceptable bid amount for a license will be approximately five percent 
greater than the provisionally winning bid amount for the license. The 
Bureau proposes to use a bid increment percentage of five percent.
    40. The Bureau retains the discretion to change the minimum 
acceptable bid amounts, the minimum acceptable bid percentage, the bid 
increment percentage, and the number of acceptable bid amounts if it 
determines that circumstances so dictate. The Bureau will do so by 
announcement in the FCC Auction System during the auction. The Bureau 
seeks comment on these proposals.
vi. Provisionally Winning Bids
    41. At the end of each bidding round, the FCC Auction System will 
determine the provisionally winning bids by considering all of the bids 
that have been placed in the auction and determining which band plan 
option has the highest aggregate bid while not allowing a bidder to 
have more than one provisionally winning bid. The only licenses that 
can have provisionally winning bids are those of the band plan option 
with the highest aggregate bid; the licenses of the other band plan 
options will not have provisionally winning bids.
    42. If a provisionally winning bid must be selected from among 
identical bid amounts submitted on a license (i.e., tied bids), we will 
use a random number generator to select a single bid from among the 
tied bids. (Each bid is assigned a random number, and the tied bid with 
the highest random number wins the tiebreaker.) The remaining bidders, 
as well as the provisionally winning bidder, can submit higher bids in 
subsequent rounds. However, if the auction were to end with no other 
bids being placed, the winning bidder would be the one that placed the 
selected provisionally winning bid.
    43. Similarly, in the event of identical aggregate high bid amounts 
on more than one band plan (i.e., tied band plans), the tie between 
band plans will be broken based on the random numbers of the 
corresponding bids. The tied band plan with the highest sum of the 
random numbers will become the band plan for which there are 
provisionally winning bids.
    44. A consequence of the mutually incompatible band configurations 
and the three megahertz eligibility restriction is that a bid that does 
not become a provisionally winning bid at the conclusion of the round 
in which it was placed may become a provisionally winning bid at the 
conclusion of a subsequent round.
    45. Bidders are reminded that provisionally winning bids count 
toward activity for purposes of the activity rule.
vii. Bid Removal and Bid Withdrawal
    46. For Auction No. 65, the Bureau proposes the following bid 
removal and bid withdrawal procedures. Before the close of a bidding 
round, a bidder has the option of removing any bid placed in that 
round. By removing selected bids in the FCC Auction System, a bidder 
may effectively unsubmit any bid placed within that round. A bidder 
removing a bid placed in the same round is not subject to a withdrawal 
payment. Once a round closes, a bidder may no longer remove a bid.
    47. The Bureau proposes for Auction No. 65 that bidders not be 
permitted, in any round, to withdraw bids made in previous rounds. The 
Commission has recognized that bid withdrawals may be an important tool 
to help bidders avoid incomplete aggregations of licenses and pursue 
efficient backup strategies as information becomes available during the 
course of an auction. In Auction No. 65, however, bidders may win only 
one license and therefore will not face risks of being unable to secure 
desired aggregations of licenses. In addition, the Bureau believes that 
given the small number of licenses in the auction and the nature of the 
licenses being offered, bidders will not need to use bid withdrawals to 
pursue backup strategies in the same way bidders may need to do so in 
some auctions. Moreover, in previous auctions, the Bureau has observed 
instances in which bid withdrawals arguably may have been used for 
strategic, anticompetitive purposes. While the Bureau continues to 
recognize that bid withdrawals may play an important role in an 
auction, the Bureau notes that bid withdrawals have not been available 
in several previous auctions. The Bureau seeks comment on these 
proposed bid removal and bid withdrawal procedures.

III. Conclusion

    48. Comments are due on or before January 31, 2006, and reply 
comments are due on or before February 7, 2006. All filings must be 
addressed to the Commission's Secretary Attn: WTB/ASAD, Office of the 
Secretary, Federal Communications Commission. Parties who file comments 
by paper must file an original and four copies of each filing. U.S. 
Postal Service first-class, Express, and Priority mail should be 
addressed to 445 12th Street, SW., Washington, DC 20554. Filings can be 
sent by hand or messenger delivery, by commercial overnight courier, or 
by first-class or overnight U.S. Postal Service mail. The Bureau also 
requires that all comments and reply comments be filed electronically 
to the following address: auction65@fcc.gov. The electronic mail 
containing the comments or reply comments must include a subject or 
caption referring to ``Auction No. 65 Comments'' and the name of the 
commenting party. The Bureau requests that parties format any 
attachments to electronic mail as

[[Page 3518]]

Adobe[reg] Acrobat[reg] (pdf) or Microsoft[reg] Word documents. Copies 
of comments and reply comments will be available for public inspection 
between 8 a.m. and 4:30 p.m. Eastern Time (ET) Monday through Thursday 
or 8 a.m. to 11:30 a.m. ET on Fridays in the FCC Reference Information 
Center, Room CY-A257, 445 12th Street, SW., Washington, DC 20554, and 
will also be posted on the Web page for Auction No. 65 at https://
wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/65/.
    49. This proceeding has been designated as a ``permit-but-
disclose'' proceeding in accordance with the Commission's ex parte 
rules. Persons making oral ex parte presentations are reminded that 
memoranda summarizing the presentations must contain summaries of the 
substance of the presentations and not merely a listing of the subjects 
discussed. More than a one- or two-sentence description of the views 
and arguments presented is generally required. Other rules pertaining 
to oral and written ex parte presentations in permit-but-disclose 
proceedings are set forth in 47 CFR 1.1206(b) of the Commission's 
rules.

Federal Communications Commission.
Gary D. Michaels,
Deputy Chief, Auctions and Spectrum Access Division, WTB.
[FR Doc. 06-664 Filed 1-19-06; 1:22 pm]
BILLING CODE 6712-01-P