United States, State of Illinois, State of New York, and Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Marquee Holdings, Inc. and LCE Holdings, Inc.; Complaint, Proposed Final Judgment, and Competitive Impact Statement, 3327-3340 [06-454]
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either the public or BPI service list), and
a certificate of service must be timely
filed. The Secretary will not accept a
document for filing without a certificate
of service.
Authority: This review is being conducted
under authority of title VII of the Tariff Act
of 1930; this notice is published pursuant to
section 207.62 of the Commission’s rules.
Issued: January 17, 2006.
By order of the Commission.
Marilyn R. Abbott,
Secretary to the Commission.
[FR Doc. E6–641 Filed 1–19–06; 8:45 am]
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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
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Notice of Lodging of Consent Decree
Under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act
Notice is hereby given that on
December 30, 2005, a proposed Consent
Decree in the lead case Lyondell
Chemical Co., et al. v. Albemarle Corp.
et al., Civil Action No. 01CV890,
consolidated with United States v. EPEC
Polymers, Inc., 02CV003, and El Paso
Tennessee Pipeline Co., et al. v. Chevron
USA, Inc., et al., 03CV0225, was lodged
with the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Texas.
This settlement relates to the PetroChemical Systems, Inc. Superfunded
Site located in Liberty County, Texas
(‘‘the Site’’). On December 6, 2001,
ARCO and Lyondell Chemical Company
(successor to ACC) (hereinafter ‘‘ARCO/
Lyondell’’) sued a number of parties,
including the Settling Defendants
(Celanese, Ltd. and CNA Holdings f/k/
a Hoechst Celanese Corporation; Cook
Composites and Polymers Co.; E.R.
Carpenter, L.P., Successor in Interest to
Carpenter Chemical Company; Hercules
Incorporated; Texaco, Inc., as
predecessor to Huntsman Petrochemical
Corporation; NL Industries, f/k/a
National Lead Company; Rexene
Corporation, n/k/a Huntsman Polymers
Corporation; and Vacuum Tanks, Inc.)
to this Consent Decree, for cost recovery
and contribution under CERCLA
Sections 107 and 113, 42 U.S.C. 9607
and 9613, on the grounds that these
parties were liable under CERCLA for
the remediation of the Site. On January
3, 2002, the United States filed a
complaint against EPEC Polymers, Inc.
pursuant to CERCLA Section 107, 42
U.S.C. 9607, seeking, inter alia: (1)
Reimbursement of response costs and
(2) a declaratory judgment of liability for
any future response costs incurred by
the United States at the Site. EPEC
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Polymers, Inc., as well as other El Paso
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in the ARCO/Lyondell matter and
ultimately brought contribution claims
against various parties including the
Settling Defendants to this Consent
Decree.
Under the proposed Consent Decree,
the United States provides covenants
not to sue settling defendants under
CERCLA Sections 106 and 107, 42
U.S.C. 9606 and 9607, in connection
with the site. The proposed Consent
Decree resolves the contribution claims
brought by ARCO/Lyondell and El Paso
against Settling Defendants and Settling
Defendants shall pay the United States
$37,000 for response costs incurred by
the Environment Protection Agency at
the Site and $369,000 to the
contribution plaintiffs.
The Department of Justice will receive
for a period of third (30) days from the
date of this publication comments
relating to the Consent Decree.
comments should be addressed to the
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Division, P.O. Box 7611, U.S.
Department of Justice, Washington, DC
20044–7611, and should refer to United
States v. EPEC Polymers, Inc., D.J. Ref.
90–11–3–709/1.
The Consent Decree may be examined
at the Office of the United States
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During the public comment period, the
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open.html. A copy of the Consent
Decree may also be obtained by mail
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Thomas A. Mariana, Jr.,
Assistant Chief, Environmental, Enforcement
Section, Environment and Natural Resources
Division.
[FR Doc. 06–509 Filed 1–19–06; 8:45 am]
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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Antitrust Division
United States, State of Illinois, State of
New York, and Commonwealth of
Massachusetts v. Marquee Holdings,
Inc. and LCE Holdings, Inc.; Complaint,
Proposed Final Judgment, and
Competitive Impact Statement
Notice is hereby given pursuant to the
Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act,
15 U.S.C. section 16(b) through (h), that
a Complaint, proposed Final Judgment,
Stipulation and Competitive Impact
Statement have been filed with the
United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York in United
States of America, State of Illinois, State
of New York, and Commonwealth of
Massachusetts v. Marquee Holdings,
Inc. and LCE Holdings, Inc., Civil
Action No. 05–10722. On December 22,
2005, the United States filed a
Complaint alleging that the proposed
merger of Marquee Holdings, Inc. and
LCE Holdings, Inc. would violate
Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.
18 by lessening competition for
theatrical exhibition of first-run films in
five cities: Boston, MA, New York, NY,
Chicago, IL, Dallas, TX, and Seattle,
WA. The proposed Final Judgment, filed
at the same time as the Complaint,
requires the defendants to divest firstrun, commercial theatres, along with
certain tangible and intangible assets, in
those five cities in order to proceed with
the proposed $4 billion transaction. A
Competitive Impact Statement filed by
the United States on December 22, 2005
describes the Complaint, the proposed
Final Judgment, the industry, and the
remedies available to private litigants
who may have been injured by the
alleged violation.
Copies of the Complaint, proposed
Final Judgment and Competitive Impact
Statement are available for inspection at
the Department of Justice in
Washington, DC in Room 200, 325
Seventh Street, NW., and at the Office
of the Clerk of the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New
York, New York, New York. Copies of
these materials may be obtained from
the Antitrust Division upon request and
payment of the copying fee set by
Department of Justice regulations.
Public comment is invited within 60
days of the date of this notice. Such
comments, and responses thereto, will
be published in the Federal Register
and filed with the Court. Comments
should be directed to John R. Read,
Chief, Litigation III Section, Antitrust
Division, United States Department of
Justice, 325 7th Street, NW., Suite 300,
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Washington, DC 20530 (telephone: 202–
307–0468). At the conclusion of the
sixty (60) day comment period, the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District
of New York may enter the proposed
consent decree upon finding that it
serves the public interest.
3. Venue in this District is proper
under 15 U.S.C. 22 and 28 U.S.C.
§ 1391(c).
I. Jurisdiction and Venue
II. Defendants and the Proposed Merger
4. Defendant Marquee Holdings, Inc.
(‘‘Marquee’’) is a Delaware corporation
with its headquarters in Kansas City,
Missouri. It is the holding company of
AMC Entertainment Inc. (‘‘AMC’’). AMC
owns or operates 216 theatres
containing 3,300 screens at locations
throughout the United States.
5. Defendant LCE Holdings, Inc.
(‘‘LCE’’) is a Delaware corporation with
its headquarters in New York City, New
York. It is the holding company of
Loews Cineplex Entertainment
Corporation (‘‘Loews’’). Loews owns or
operates 128 theatres containing 1,424
screens at locations throughout the
United States. Loews operates theatres
under the Loews Theatres, Cineplex
Odeon, Star Theatres, and Magic
Johnson Theatres brands.
6. On June 30, 2005, Marquee and
LCE entered into a merger agreement.
Under the merger agreement, LCE
would merge into Marquee and Loews
will merge into AMC. The current
shareholders of LCE would control 40%
of the combined company’s outstanding
common stock while the current
shareholders of Marquee would control
60% of the combined company’s
outstanding common stock.
1. This action is filed by the United
States pursuant to section 15 of the
Clayton Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 25,
to obtain equitable relief to prevent a
violation of section 7 of the Clayton Act,
as amended, 15 U.S.C. 18. The States of
Illinois and New York, and the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts bring
this action under section 16 of the
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 26, to prevent the
defendants from violating section 7 of
the Clayton Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C.
18.
2. Both defendants operate theatres in
this District. The distribution and
exhibition of commercial, first-run films
is a commercial activity that
substantially affects, and is in the flow
of, interstate trade and commerce. The
defendants purchase substantial
quantities of equipment, services, and
supplies from sources located outside of
New York. In particular, most of the
distributors from whom the defendants
license films are located outside of New
York. The defendants also acquire
funding for their New York operations
from outside of New York. The Court
has jurisdiction over the subject matter
of this action and jurisdiction over the
parties pursuant to 15 U.S.C. 22, 25, and
26, and 28 U.S.C. 1331 and 1337.
III. Background of the Movie Industry
7. Theatrical exhibition of feature
length motion picture films (‘‘movies’’)
provides a major source of out-of-home
entertainment in the United States.
Although they vary, ticket prices for
movies tend to be significantly less
expensive than many other forms of outof-home entertainment, particularly live
entertainment such as sporting events
and live theatre. Movies have retained
their appeal as mass entertainment:
Over 1.5 billion movie tickets were sold
in the United States in 2004. Total box
office revenue for 2004 exceeded $9.5
billion.
8. ‘‘Exhibitors’’ are companies that
operate movie theatres. Some exhibitors
own a single theatre, whereas others
own a circuit of theatres within one or
more regions of the United States. AMC
and Loews are exhibitors and each
operates one of the largest theatre
circuits in the United States.
9. ‘‘Distributors’’ are companies that
engage in the business of renting and
licensing movies to exhibitors.
Distributors arrange for the promotion
and marketing of films and contract
with exhibitors to exhibit films at
theatres throughout the country.
Established distributors include Sony,
J. Robert Kramer II,
Director of Operations, Antitrust Division.
Complaint
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The United States of America, acting
under the direction of the Attorney
General of the United States, and the
States of Illinois and New York, and the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, acting
through their Attorneys General, bring
this civil antitrust action to prevent the
proposed merger of Marquee Holdings,
Inc. and LCE Holdings, Inc. If the
merger is permitted to proceed, it would
combine the two leading, and in some
cases only, operators of first-run,
commercial movie theatres in Chicago
North, Midtown Manhattan, downtown
Seattle, downtown Boston, and north
Dallas. The merger would substantially
lessen competition and tend to create a
monopoly in the theatrical exhibition of
commercial, first-run movies in the
above listed markets in violation of
section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.
18.
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Paramount, Twentieth Century Fox,
Universal, Disney, Warner Bros.,
Dreamworks, Metro-Goldwyn-Meyer,
and Buena Vista.
10. Distributors negotiate with
exhibitors to exhibit films. Exhibitors
compete to obtain films to show at their
theatres that they believe will result in
high ticket sales, and distributors
choose theatres to exhibit their films
based on the quality, location, and
grossing potential of the theatres and the
particular terms offered by the
exhibitors.
11. Distributors license movies by
‘‘zones’’ that reflect specific local areas.
Typically, only one theatre within a
zone will play a particular movie. There
are two types of zones: ‘‘free zones’’ (or
‘‘non-competitive zones’’) and
‘‘competitive zones.’’ Free zones contain
only a single theatre. Competitive zones
contain two or sometimes more theatres
competing for the exclusive license to
exhibit a movie within the zone.
12. The terms of the agreement
pursuant to which distributors license
films to exhibitors vary and are
individually negotiated. Each
agreement, however, typically specifies
a formula pursuant to which box office
revenues are divided between the
exhibitor and the distributor. The
agreements often provide that the
exhibitor will keep a certain dollar
amount from the box office revenues to
compensate for ‘‘overhead,’’ as well as
a specified percentage of what remains
after the overhead is deducted.
13. Exhibitors set ticket prices for
each theatre based on a number of
factors, including the competitive
situation facing each theatre, the prices
of nearby, comparable theatres, the
number and type of amenities each
theatre offers, such as stadium seating,
and the age of the theatre.
IV. Relevant Market
A. Product Market
14. Movies are a unique form of
entertainment. The experience of
viewing a movie in a theatre is an
inherently different experience from a
live show, a sporting event, or viewing
a DVD or videotape of a movie in the
home. Typically, viewing a DVD or
videotape in the home lacks several
characteristics of viewing movies in
theatres, including the size of screen,
the sophistication of sound systems, and
the social experience of viewing a movie
with other patrons. Ticket prices for
movies are generally very different than
prices for other forms of entertainment:
Live entertainment is typically
significantly more expensive than a
movie ticket, whereas renting a DVD or
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videotape is usually significantly
cheaper than viewing a first-run movie
in a theatre. Because going to the movies
is a different experience from other
forms of entertainment and because
movie prices are significantly different
from other forms of entertainment, small
but significant price increases for movie
tickets generally do not cause a
sufficient number of movie-goers to shift
to other forms of entertainment to make
the increase unprofitable.
15. A movie is considered to be in its
‘‘first-run’’ during the initial weeks
following its release in a given locality.
If successful, a movie may be exhibited
at other theatres after the first-run as
part of a second or subsequent run
(often called a sub-run). Tickets at
theatres exhibiting sub-run movies
usually cost significantly less than
tickets at first-run theatres. Because the
films exhibited at sub-run theatres are
no longer new releases, most moviegoers do not regard sub-run films as an
adequate substitute for first-run films
and would not switch to sub-run films
if the price of first-run films was
increased by a small but significant
amount.
16. Commercial movies typically
appeal to different patrons than other
types of movies, such as art movies or
foreign language movies. For example,
art films tend to appeal more
universally to mature audiences and art
film patrons tend to purchase fewer
concessions. Theatres that primarily
exhibit art films often contain
auditoriums with fewer seats than
theatres that primarily play commercial
films. Typically, art films are released
less widely than commercial films.
Also, exhibitors consider art theatre
operations as distinct from the
operations of theatres that exhibit
commercial films. Because art movies
appeal to different patrons and are often
exhibited in different types of theatres
than commercial theatres, most moviegoers do not regard art films as an
adequate substitute for commercial
films and would not switch to them if
the price of commercial films was
increased by a small, but significant
amount.
17. Similarly, foreign language films
do not widely appeal to U.S. audiences.
As a result, movie-goers do not regard
foreign language films as adequate
substitutes for commercial films and
would not switch to them if the price of
commercial films was increased by a
small, but significant amount.
18. Movie-goers prefer stadium
seating theatres, in which each row of
seats is set on a tier that is higher than
the tier on which the row in front of it
is set. Movie-goers will often bypass
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older, slope floor theatres to view a
movie at a stadium seating theatre and
are willing to pay more to view movies
in stadium seating theatres. Exhibitors
also view stadium seating theatres as
superior to slope floor theatres.
Exhibitors will often look to build new
stadium seating theatres in areas where
only slope floor theatres, but no stadium
seating theatres, exist. Almost all new
theatres are stadium seating theatres.
19. From the perspective of
distributors selecting locations at which
to exhibit their movies, there is no
adequate substitute for theatres that
exhibit first-run, commercial films.
Distributors seek to have their newly
released movies exhibited widely in
high-quality theatres. A small but
significant reduction in the rental fees
paid to distributors by exhibitors would
not cause the distributors to exhibit
their films in anything other than firstrun, commercial theatres.
20. The relevant product market
within which to assess the competitive
effects of this merger is the exhibition of
first-run, commercial films: From the
movie-goer’s perspective, the market is
first-run, commercial films and from the
distributors’ perspective, the market is
first-run, commercial theatres in which
to exhibit first-run, commercial films.
B. Geographic Markets
21. Movie-goers typically do not want
to travel very far from their homes to
attend a movie, particularly in urban
areas. Accordingly, geographic markets
for the exhibition of first-run,
commercial movies are predominantly
local.
22. Most movie-goers in Chicago
North typically are reluctant to travel
significant distances out of that area to
attend a movie. A small but significant
price increase for movie tickets in
Chicago North would not cause a
sufficient number of movie-goers to
travel out of Chicago North to make the
increase unprofitable. Chicago North
constitutes a relevant geographic market
in which to assess some of the
competitive effects of this merger. AMC
and Loews are the two largest exhibitors
in Chicago North.
23. Most movie-goers attending
movies in Midtown Manhattan are
reluctant to travel to other parts of
Manhattan or off the island of
Manhattan to view a movie. A small but
significant price increase for movie
tickets in Midtown Manhattan would
not cause a sufficient number of moviegoers to travel to other areas of
Manhattan or out of the borough to
make the increase unprofitable.
Midtown Manhattan constitutes a
relevant geographic market in which to
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assess some of the competitive effects of
this merger. AMC and Loews are the
two largest exhibitors in Midtown
Manhattan.
24. Like movie-goers in Chicago North
and Midtown Manhattan, most moviegoers in downtown Seattle typically are
reluctant to travel significant distances
out of downtown to attend a movie. A
small but significant price increase for
movie tickets in downtown Seattle
would not cause a sufficient number of
movie-goers to travel out of downtown
to make the increase unprofitable.
Downtown Seattle constitutes a relevant
geographic market in which to assess
some of the competitive effects of this
merger. AMC and Loews are the two
largest exhibitors in downtown Seattle.
25. Most movie-goers in downtown
Boston typically are reluctant to travel
significant distances out of downtown
to attend a movie. A small but
significant price increase for movie
tickets in downtown Boston would not
cause a sufficient number of moviegoers to travel out of the city to make
the increase unprofitable. Downtown
Boston constitutes a relevant geographic
market in which to assess some of the
competitive effects of this merger. AMC
and Loews are the only two exhibitors
in downtown Boston.
26. Similarly, in north Dallas, most
movie-goers typically are reluctant to
travel significant distances out of the
city to attend a movie. A small but
significant price increase for movie
tickets in north Dallas would not cause
a sufficient number of movie-goers to
travel out of the city to make the
increase unprofitable. North Dallas
constitutes a relevant geographic market
in which to assess some of the
competitive effects of this merger. AMC
and Loews are the two largest exhibitors
in north Dallas.
27. The exhibition of first-run films in
Chicago North, Midtown Manhattan,
downtown Seattle, downtown Boston,
and north Dallas each constitutes a
relevant market (i.e., a line of commerce
and a section of the country) within the
meaning of section 7 of the Clayton Act,
15 U.S.C. 18.
V. Competitive Effects
A. Chicago North
28. In Chicago North, the proposed
merger would give the newly merged
entity control of all four major first-run,
commercial theatres with 55 screens
and a 2004 box office revenue of
approximately $24 million. AMC and
Loews each operate theatres in two
different zones in Chicago North. The
combined entity will control nearly
100% of the revenues from the two
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zones in Chicago North and overall
would have a market share of
approximately 100%. Using a measure
of market concentration called the
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (‘‘HHI’’),
explained in Appendix A, the merger
would yield a post-merger HHI of
approximately 10,000, representing an
increase of roughly 4,814.
control five of seven first-run,
commercial theatres with 78 screens
and 2004 box office revenues of
approximately $22 million. The
combined entity would have a market
share of approximately 78%. The
merger would yield a post-merger HHI
of roughly 6,393, representing an
increase of around 2,976.
B. Midtown Manhattan
29. In Midtown Manhattan, the
proposed merger would give the newly
merged entity control of the only firstrun, commercial stadium seating
theatres along with 71 total screens and
2004 box office revenue of
approximately $54.6 million. The
combined entity would have a market
share of approximately 88%. The
merger would yield a post-merger HHI
of roughly 7,779, representing an
increase of around 3,633. In the Times
Square zone, a zone in Midtown
Manhattan, AMC and Loews operate
theatres in the same zone. The
combined entity would control 100% of
the revenue from that film zone, the
highest grossing zone in the United
States.
F. Consumer Effects
33. The proposed merger would likely
lessen competition significantly in the
relevant markets by further enhancing
the ability of the remaining theatre
circuits, particularly the AMC-Loews
circuit, to increase prices.
(a) AMC and Loews directly compete
in all the relevant geographic markets.
The prices their theatres charge are
constrained by the prices charged by the
other; in particular, they are constrained
by the risk that the other will not follow
an attempted price increase. If AMC or
Loews were to increase prices and the
other were not to follow, the firm that
increased price might suffer financially
if a substantial number of its patrons
decided that the increased price was
unreasonable and opted to patronize the
other circuit.
(b) The proposed merger would
eliminate this pricing constraint and is
therefore likely to lead to higher prices
for ticket buyers.
(c) These higher prices could take the
form of a higher adult evening ticket
price or reduced discounting, e.g., for
matinees, children, seniors, and
students.
34. The proposed merger would also
eliminate non-price competition
between AMC and Loews and is
therefore likely to lead to lower quality
theatres for movie-goers.
(a) In order to persuade distributors to
exhibit top films in their respective
theatres that share the same zones and,
more importantly, to attract moviegoers, AMC and Loews strive to
maintain high quality theatres.
(b) The loss of each other’s theatres as
competitors would reduce the incentive
of AMC and Loews to maintain,
upgrade, and renovate theatres and to
improve amenities and services at
theatres in the relevant markets, thus
reducing the quality of the viewing
experience for a movie-goer.
C. Downtown Seattle
30. In downtown Seattle, the
proposed merger would give the newly
merged entity control of all three firstrun, commercial theatres with 31
screens and a 2004 box office revenue
of approximately $14.1 million. The
combined entity would control nearly
100% of the revenues from the zone in
downtown Seattle and a market share of
100%. The merger would yield a postmerger HHI of 10,000, representing an
increase of around 4,921.
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D. Downtown Boston
31. In downtown Boston, the
proposed merger would give the newly
merged entity control of the only firstrun, commercial theatres with 32
screens and a 2004 box office revenue
of approximately $20.8 million. The
combined entity would have a market
share of 100%. The merger would yield
a post-merger HHI of 10,000,
representing an increase of
approximately 4,635.
E. North Dallas
32. In north Dallas, the proposed
merger would give the newly merged
entity control of three of the first-run,
commercial theatres with stadium
seating, including the only two in north
central Dallas. It would control all three
commercial, first-run stadium seating
theatres in north central Dallas once the
new AMC theatre opens in Spring 2006.
Overall, the combined entity would
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VI. Entry
35. Entry by first-run, commercial
theatres is difficult in the relevant
markets. Exhibitors are often reluctant
to locate new theatres near existing
stadium theatres. Those who typically
build new theatres, exhibitors and real
estate developers, often seek to avoid
building new theatres in the same zones
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with existing theatres. Also, exhibitors
and real estate developers often seek to
build new stadium theatres in
conjunction with projects that contain
other retail establishments, such as
shops and restaurants that will be
another draw for customers. As a result,
real estate developers often look at the
customer demand for other retail in
areas in which they consider locating a
theatre, along with the customer
demand for a new theatre.
36. Entry by first-run, commercial
theatres in Chicago North is timeconsuming and difficult and is not
likely to reduce significantly the market
strength of the combined entity in the
near future. Suitable, available sites are
scarce, real estate and construction costs
are among the highest in the nation, and
acquiring the necessary permits and
approvals can be difficult and timeconsuming. Identifying a site, planning
the development, and constructing a
theatre in Chicago North takes several
years. No new first-run, commercial
theatres with the capability to reduce
significantly the newly merged entity’s
market power are likely to open within
the next two years.
37. In Manhattan, entry by first-run,
commercial theatres, particularly in
Midtown, is time-consuming and
difficult and is not likely to reduce
significantly the market strength of the
combined entity in the near future.
Suitable, available sites are scarce, and
real estate and construction costs are
among the highest in the nation.
Identifying a site, planning the
development, and constructing a theatre
in Midtown Manhattan takes several
years. No new first-run, commercial
theatres with the capability to reduce
significantly the newly merged entity’s
market power are likely to open within
the next two years.
38. Entry by first-run, commercial
theatres in downtown Seattle is timeconsuming and difficult and is not
likely to reduce significantly the market
strength of the combined entity in the
near future. Suitable, available sites are
scarce and acquiring the necessary
permits and approvals for the
construction of new theatres can be
difficult and time-consuming. No new
first-run, commercial theatres with the
capability to reduce significantly the
newly merged entity’s market power are
likely to open within the next two years.
39. Entry by first-run, commercial
theatres in downtown Boston is timeconsuming and difficult and is not
likely to reduce significantly the market
strength of the combined entity in the
near future. Suitable, available sites are
scarce and necessary permits and
approvals for the construction of new
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theatres can be difficult and timeconsuming. No new first-run,
commercial theatres with the capability
to reduce significantly the newly
merged entity’s market power are likely
to open within the next two years.
40. Entry by first-run, commercial
theatres in north Dallas is difficult and
is not likely to reduce significantly the
market strength of the combined entity
in the near future. Suitable, available
sites are scarce in north central Dallas,
where the combined entity’s market
strength would be the strongest, and no
new first-run, commercial theatres with
the capability to reduce significantly the
newly merged entity’s market power are
likely to open within the next two years.
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VII. Violation Alleged
41. The United States and plaintiff
states hereby reincorporate 1 through
40.
42. On June 30, 2005, Marquee and
LCE entered into a merger agreement.
Under the merger agreement, LCE
intends to merge into Marquee and
Loews intends to merge into AMC.
43. The effect of the proposed merger
would be to lessen competition
substantially in interstate trade and
commerce for first-run, commercial
theatres in which to exhibit first-run,
commercial films in Chicago North,
Midtown Manhattan, downtown Seattle,
downtown Boston, and north Dallas in
violation of section 7 of the Clayton Act,
15 U.S.C. 18.
44. The transaction would likely have
the following effects, among others:
(a) Competition for first-run,
commercial theatres in which to exhibit
first-run, commercial films in numerous
geographic markets would be eliminated
or substantially lessened; and
(b) Prices for first-run, commercial
film tickets would likely increase to
levels above those that would prevail
absent the merger.
VIII. Requested Relief
45. The plaintiffs request: (a)
Adjudication that the proposed merger
would violate section 7 of the Clayton
Act; (b) permanent injunctive relief to
prevent the consummation of the
proposed merger and to prevent the
defendants from entering into or
carrying out any agreement,
understanding or plan, the effect of
which would be to combine the
businesses or assets of defendants; (c) an
award of each plaintiff of its costs in
this action; and (d) such other relief as
is proper.
For Plaintiff United States of America
Dated: December 20, 2005.
Thomas O. Barnett (TB 1317),
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Jkt 208001
Acting Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust
Division.
J. Robert Kramer II (RK 3921),
Director of Operations.
John R. Read (JR 8964),
Chief, Litigation III.
Nina B. Hale (NH 7828),
Assistant Chief, Litigation III.
William H. Jones II (WJ 2563),
Allen P. Grunes (AG 4775),
Gregg I. Malawer (GM 6467),
Avery W. Gardiner (AG 2011),
Joan Hogan (JH 5666),
Attorneys for the United States, United States
Department of Justice, Antitrust Division,
Litigation III, 325 7th Street, NW., Suite 300,
Washington, DC 20530.
Bernard M. Hollander (BH 0818),
Senior Trial Attorney.
For Plaintiff State of New York
Eliot Spitzer,
Attorney General.
By: Jay L. Himes (JH 7714),
Chief, Antitrust Bureau.
Richard E. Grimm (RG 6891),
Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Bureau,
Office of the Attorney General, 120
Broadway, Room 26C62, New York, New
York 10271–0332. Tel: (212) 416–8282, (212)
416–8280. Fax: (212) 416–6015.
For Plaintiff State of Illinois
Lisa Madigan,
Attorney General.
By: Robert W. Pratt (RP 7924),
Chief, Antitrust Bureau, Office of the
Attorney General, State of Illinois, 100 West
Randolph Street, 13th Floor, Chicago, Illinois
60601. (312) 814–3722.
Kavita Puri,
Assistant Attorney General, of Counsel.
For Plaintiff State of Massachusetts
Thomas F. Reilly,
Attorney General.
By: Mary Freely (MF 1359),
Jeffrey Shapiro (JS 5521),
Assistant Attorney General, Office of the
Attorney General of Massachusetts, One
Ashburton Place, 19th Floor, Boston, MA
02108. (617) 727–2200 ext. 2985.
Exhibit A; Definition of HHI and
Calculations for Market
‘‘HHI’’ means the HerfindahlHirschman Index, a commonly accepted
measure of market concentration. It is
calculated by squaring the market share
of each firm competing in the market
and then summing the resulting
numbers. For example, for a market
consisting of four firms with shares of
thirty, thirty, twenty and twenty
percent, the HHI is 2600 (302 + 302 + 202
+ 202 = 2600). The HHI takes into
account the relative size and
distribution of the firms in a market and
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3331
approaches zero when a market consists
of a large number of firms of relatively
equal size. The HHI increases both as
the number of firms in the market
decreases and as the disparity in size
between those firms increases.
Markets in which the HHI is between
1000 and 1800 points are considered to
be moderately concentrated, and those
in which the HHI is in excess of 1800
points are considered to be
concentrated. Transactions that increase
the HHI by more than 100 points in
concentrated markets presumptively
raise antitrust concerns under the
Merger Guidelines. See Merger
Guidelines § 1.51.
Final Judgment
Whereas, plaintiffs, United States of
America, the State of Illinois, the State
of New York, and the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts filed their Complaint on
December 22, 2005, plaintiffs and
defendants, Marquee Holdings, Inc.
(‘‘AMC’’) and LCE Holdings, Inc.
(‘‘Loews’’), by their respective attorneys,
have consented to the entry of this Final
Judgment without trial or adjudication
of any issue of fact or law, and without
this Final Judgment constituting any
evidence against or admission by any
party regarding any issue of fact or law;
And Whereas, defendants agree to be
bound by the provisions of this Final
Judgment pending its approval by the
Court;
And Whereas, the essence of this
Final Judgment is the prompt and
certain divestiture[s] of certain rights or
assets by the defendants to assure that
competition is not substantially
lessened;
And Whereas, plaintiffs require
defendants to make certain
divestiture[s] for the purpose of
remedying the loss of competition
alleged in the Complaint;
And Whereas, defendants have
represented to the United States that the
divestiture[s] required below can and
will be made and that defendants will
later raise no claim of hardship or
difficulty as grounds for asking the
Court to modify any of the divestiture
provisions contained below;
Now Therefore, before any testimony
is taken, without trial or adjudication of
any issue of fact or law, and upon
consent of the parties, it is Ordered,
Adjudged and Decreed:
I. Jurisdiction
This Court has jurisdiction over the
subject matter of and each of the parties
to this action. The Complaint states a
claim upon which relief may be granted
against defendants under section 7 of
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the Clayton Act, as amended (15 U.S.C.
18).
II. Definitions
As used in this Final Judgment:
A. ‘‘Acquirer’’ or ‘‘Acquirers’’ means
the entity or entities to whom
defendants divest the Theatre Assets.
B. ‘‘AMC’’ means defendant Marquee
Holdings, Inc., a Delaware corporation
with its headquarters in Kansas City,
Missouri, its successors and assigns, and
its subsidiaries, divisions, groups,
affiliates, partnerships and joint
ventures, and their directors, officers,
managers, agents, and employees.
C. ‘‘Loews’’ means defendant LCE
Holdings, Inc., a Delaware corporation
with its headquarters in New York City,
New York, its successors and assigns,
and its subsidiaries, divisions, groups,
affiliates, partnerships and joint
ventures, and their directors, officers,
managers, agents, and employees.
D. ‘‘Landlord Consent’’ means any
contractual approval or consent that the
landlord or owner of one or more of the
Theatre Assets, or the property on
which one or more of the Theatre Assets
is situated, must grant prior to the
transfer of one of the Theatre Assets to
an Acquirer.
E. ‘‘Theatre Assets’’ means the firstrun, commercial motion picture theatre
businesses operated by AMC or Loews,
under the following names and at the
following locations:
Theatre name
Theatre address
i. City North 14 ..........
2600 N. Western
Ave. Chicago, IL.
1471 W. Webster Avenue Chicago, IL.
247 W. 42nd St. New
York, NY.
1501 7th Ave. Seattle, WA.
201 Brookline Ave.
Boston, MA.
13933 N. Central Expressway Dallas,
TX.
ii. Webster Place 11 ..
iii. E-Walk 13 .............
iv. Meridian 16 ..........
v. Fenway 13 ............
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vi. Keystone Park 16
The term ‘‘Theatre Assets’’ includes:
1. All tangible assets that comprise
the first-run, commercial motion picture
theatre business including all
equipment, fixed assets and fixtures,
personal property, inventory, office
furniture, materials, supplies, and other
tangible property and all assets used in
connection with the Theatre Assets; all
licenses, permits and authorizations
issued by any governmental
organization relating to the Theatre
Assets; all contracts, agreements, leases,
commitments, certifications, and
understandings, relating to the Theatre
Assets, including supply agreements; all
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customer lists, contracts, accounts, and
credit records; all repair and
performance records and all other
records relating to the Theater Assets;
2. All intangible assets used in the
development, production, servicing and
sale of Theatre Assets, including, but
not limited to all licenses and
sublicenses, intellectual property,
technical information, computer
software (except defendants’ proprietary
software) and related documentation,
know-how, drawings, blueprints,
designs, specifications for materials,
specifications for parts and devices,
quality assurance and control
procedures, all technical manuals and
information defendants provide to their
own employees, customers, suppliers,
agents or licensees, and all research data
relating to the Theatre Assets. Provided
however, that this term does not include
(a) any right to use or interest in
defendants’ copyrights, trademarks,
trade names, service marks or service
names, or (b) assets that the defendants
do not own and are not legally able to
transfer.
III. Applicability
A. This Final Judgment applies to
AMC and Loews, as defined above, and
all other persons in active concert or
participation with any of them who
receive actual notice of this Final
Judgment by personal service or
otherwise.
B. Defendants shall require, as a
condition of the sale or other
disposition of all or substantially all of
their assets or of lesser business units
that include the Theatre Assets, that the
purchaser agrees to be bound by the
provisions of this Final Judgment,
provided, however, that defendants
need not obtain such an agreement from
the Acquirer[s].
IV. Divestitures
A. Defendants are ordered and
directed, within 120 calendar days after
the filing of the Complaint in this
matter, of five (5) days after notice of the
entry of this Final Judgment by the
Court, whichever is later, to divest the
Theatre Assets in a manner consistent
with this Final Judgment to an Acquirer
acceptable to the United States in its
sole discretion after consultation with
the State of Illinois, State of New York,
and Commonwealth of Massachusetts,
as appropriate. The United States, in its
sole discretion, may agree to one or
more extensions of this time period not
to exceed 60 days in total, and shall
notify the Court in such circumstances,
Defendants agree to use their best efforts
to divest the Theatre Assets as
expeditiously as possible.
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B. In accomplishing the divestiture[s]
ordered by this Final Judgment,
defendants promptly shall make known,
by usual and customary means, the
availability of the Theatre Assets.
Defendants shall inform any person
making inquiry regarding a possible
purchase of the Theatre Assets that they
are being divested pursuant to this Final
Judgment and provide that person with
a copy of this Final Judgment.
Defendants shall offer to furnish to all
prospective Acquirers, subject to
customary confidentiality assurances,
all information and documents relating
to the Theater Assets customarily
provided in a due diligence process
except such information or documents
subject to the attorney-client or workproduct privileges. Defendants shall
make available such information to the
United States at the same time that such
information is made available to any
other person.
C. Defendants shall provide the
Acquirer[s] and the United States
information relating to the personnel
involved in the operation of the Theatre
Assets to enable the Acquirer[s] to make
offers of employment. Defendants will
not interfere with any negotiations by
the Acquirer[s] to employ any defendant
employee whose primary responsibility
is the operation of the Theater Assets.
D. Defendants shall permit
prospective Acquirers of the Theatre
Assets to have reasonable access to
personnel and to make inspections of
the physical facilities of the Theater
Assets; access to any and all
environmental, zoning, and other permit
documents and information; and access
to any and all financial, operational, or
other documents and information
customarily provided as part of a due
diligence process.
E. Defendants shall warrant to all
Acquirers of the Theatre Assets that
each asset will be operated on the date
of sale.
F. Defendants shall not take any
action that will impede in any way the
permitting, operation, or divestiture[s]
of the Theatre Assets.
G. At the option of the Acquirer[s],
defendants shall enter into an agreement
for products and services, such as
computer support services, that are
reasonably necessary for the Acquirer[s]
to effectively operate the Theatre Assets
during a transition period. The terms
and conditions of any contractual
arrangements meant to satisfy this
provision must be commercially
reasonable for those products and
services for which the agreement is
entered and shall remain in effect for no
more than three months, absent
approval of the United States, in its sole
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discretion, after consultation with the
State of Illinois, State of New York, and
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, as
appropriate.
H. Defendants shall warrant to the
Acquirer[s] of the Theatre Assets that
there are no material defects in the
environmental, zoning or other permits
pertaining to the operation of each asset,
and that following the sale of the
Theatre Assets, defendants will not
undertake, directly or indirectly, any
challenges to the environmental, zoning,
or other permits relating to the
operation of the Theatre Assets.
I. Unless the United States otherwise
consents in writing, the divestiture[s]
pursuant to section IV, or by trustee
appointed pursuant to section V, of this
Final Judgment, shall include the entire
Theatre Assets, and shall be
accomplished in such a way as to satisfy
the United States, in its sole discretion
(after consultation with the State of
Illinois, State of New York, and
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, as
appropriate) that the Theatre Assets can
and will be used by the Acquirer[s] as
part of a viable, ongoing business of
first-run, commercial motion picture
theatres. Divestiture[s] of the Theatre
Assets may be made to one or more
Acquirers, provided that in each
instance it is demonstrated to the sole
satisfaction of the United States that the
Theatre Assets will remain viable and
the divestiture[s] of such assets will
remedy the competitive harm alleged in
the Complaint. The divestiture[s],
whether pursuant to section IV or
section V of this Final Judgment,
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(1) shall be made to an Acquirer (or
Acquirers) that, in the United State’s sole
judgment (after consultation with the State of
Illinois, State of New York, and
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, as
appropriate), has the intent and capability
(including the necessary managerial,
operational, technical and financial
capability) of competing effectively in the
business of first-run, commercial motion
picture theatres; and
(2) shall be accomplished so as to satisfy
the United States, in its sole discretion (after
consultation with the State of Illinois, State
of New York, and Commonwealth of
Massachusetts, as appropriate), that none of
the terms of any agreement between an
Acquirer (or Acquirers) and defendants give
defendants the ability unreasonably to raise
the Acquirer’s costs, to lower the Acquirer’s
efficiency, or otherwise to interfere in the
ability of the Acquirer to compete effectively.
V. Appointment of Trustee
A. If defendants have not divested the
Theatre Assets within the time period
specified in section IV(A), defendants
shall notify the United States of that fact
in writing. Upon application of the
United States, the Court shall appoint a
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trustee selected by the United States and
approved by the Court to effect the
divestiture[s] of the Theatre Assets.
B. After the appointment of a trustee
becomes effective, only the trustee shall
have the right to sell the Theatre Assets.
The trustee shall have the power and
authority to accomplish the
divestiture[s] to an Acquirer[s]
acceptable to the United States (after
consultation with the State of Illinois,
State of New York, and Commonwealth
of Massachusetts, as appropriate) at
such price and on such terms as are
then obtainable upon reasonable effort
by the trustee, subject to the provision
of section, IV, V, VI, and VII of this Final
Judgment, and shall have such other
powers as this Court deems appropriate.
Subject to section V(D) of this Final
Judgment, the trustee may hire at the
cost and expense of defendants any
investment bankers, attorneys, or other
agents, who shall be solely accountable
to the trustee, reasonably necessary in
the trustee’s judgment to assist in the
divestiture[s].
C. Defendants shall not object to a sale
by the trustee on any ground other than
the trustee’s malfeasance. Any such
objections by defendants must be
conveyed in writing to the United States
and the trustee within ten (10) calendar
days after the trustee has provided the
notice required under section VII.
D. The trustee shall serve at the cost
and expense of defendants, on such
terms and conditions as the Court
approves, and shall account for all
monies derived from the sale of the
assets sold by the trustee and all costs
and expenses so incurred. After
approval by the Court of the trustee’s
accounting, including fees for its
services and those of any professionals
and agents retained by the trustee, all
remaining money shall be paid to
defendants and the trust shall then be
terminated. The compensation of the
trustee and any professionals and agents
retained by the trustee shall be
reasonable in light of the value of the
Theatre Assets and based on a fee
arrangement providing the trustee with
an incentive based on the price and
terms of the divestiture[s] and the speed
with which it is accomplished, but
timeliness is paramount.
E. Defendants shall use their best
efforts to assist the trustee in
accomplishing the required
divestiture[s]. The trustee and any
consultants, accountants, attorneys, and
other persons retained by the trustee
shall have full and complete access to
the personnel, books, records, and
facilities of the business to be divested,
and defendants shall develop financial
and other information relevant to such
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3333
business as the trustee may reasonably
request, subject to reasonable protection
for trade secret or other confidential
research, development, or commercial
information. Defendants shall take no
action to interfere with or to impede the
trustee’s accomplishment of the
divestiture[s].
F. After its appointment, the trustee
shall file monthly reports with the
parties and the Court setting forth the
trustee’s efforts to accomplish the
divestiture[s] ordered under this Final
Judgment. To the extent such reports
contain information that the trustee
deems confidential, such reports shall
not be filed in the public docket of the
Court. Such reports shall include the
name, address, and telephone number of
each person who, during the preceding
month, made an offer to acquire,
expressed an interest in acquiring,
entered into negotiations to acquire, or
was contacted or made an inquiry about
acquiring, any interest in the Theatre
Assets, and shall describe in detail each
contact with any such person. The
trustee shall maintain full records of all
efforts made to divest the Theatre
Assets.
G. If the trustee has not accomplished
such divestiture[s] within six months
after its appointment, the trustee shall
promptly file with the Court a report
setting forth (1) the trustee’s efforts to
accomplish the required divestiture[s],
(2) the reasons, in the trustee’s
judgment, why the required
divestiture[s] has not been
accomplished, and (3) the trustee’s
recommendations. To the extent such
reports contain information that the
trustee deems confidential, such reports
shall not be filed in the public docket
of the Court. The trustee shall at the
same time furnish such report to the
United States and, as appropriate, the
State of Illinois, State of New York, and
Commonwealth of Massachusetts who
shall have the right to make additional
recommendations consistent with the
purpose of the trust. The Court
thereafter shall enter such orders as it
shall deem appropriate to carry out the
purposes of the Final Judgment, which
may, if necessary, include extending the
trust and the term of the trustee’s
appointment by a period requested by
the United States.
VI. Landlord Consent
A. If defendants are unable to effect
the divestiture[s] required herein due to
the inability to obtain the Landlord
Consent for any of the Theatre Assets,
defendants shall divest alternative
Theatre Assets that complete effectively
with the theatre for which Landlord
Consent was not obtained. The United
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Theatre Assets, together with full details
of the same.
B. Within fifteen (15) calendar days of
receipt by the United States of such
notice, the United States may request
from defendants, the proposed Acquirer
or Acquirers, any other third party, or
the trustee if applicable additional
information concerning the proposed
divestiture[s], the proposed Acquirer or
Acquirers, and any other potential
Acquirer. Defendants and the trustee
shall furnish any additional information
requested within fifteen (15) calendar
days of the receipt of the request, unless
the parties shall otherwise agree.
C. Within thirty (30) calendar days
after receipt of the notice or within
twenty (20) calendar days after the
United States has been provided the
additional information requested from
defendants, the proposed Acquirer or
Acquirers, any third party, and the
trustee, whichever is later, the United
States shall provide written notice to
defendants and the trustee, if there is
one, stating whether or not it objects to
the proposed divestiture[s]. If the
United States provides written notice
that it does not object, the divestiture[s]
may be consummated, subject only to
defendants’ limited right to object to the
sale under section V(C) of this Final
Judgment. Absent written notice that the
United States does not object to the
proposed Acquirer[s] or upon objection
by the United States, the divestiture[s]
proposed under section IV or section V
shall not be consummated. Upon
objection by defendants under section
V(C), the divestiture[s] proposed under
section V shall not be consummated
unless approved by the Court.
VII. Notice of Proposed Divestitures
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States shall in its sole discretion (after
consultation with the State of Illinois,
State of New York, and Commonwealth
of Massachusetts, as appropriate),
determine whether such theatre
competes effectively with the theatre for
which landlord consent was not
obtained.
B. Within five (5) business days
following a determination that Landlord
Consent cannot be obtained for one of
the Theatre Assets, defendants shall
notify the United States and propose an
alternative divestiture pursuant to
section VI(A). The United States shall
have then ten (10) business days in
which to determine whether such
theatre is a suitable alternative pursuant
to section VI(A). If the defendants’
selection is deemed not to be a suitable
alternative, the United States shall in its
sole discretion select the theatre to be
divested (after consultation with the
State of Illinois, State of New York, and
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, as
appropriate).
C. If the trustee is responsible for
effecting the divestiture[s], it shall
notify both the United States and the
defendants within five (5) business days
following a determination that Landlord
Consent can not be obtained for one of
the Theatre Assets. Defendants shall
thereafter have five (5) business days to
propose an alternative divestiture
pursuant to section VI(a). The United
States shall have then ten (10) business
days in which to determine whether
such theatre is suitable alternative
pursuant to section VI(a). If the
defendants’ selection is deemed not to
be a suitable competitive alternative, the
United States shall in its sole discretion
select the theatre to be divested (after
consultation with the State of Illinois,
State of New York, and Commonwealth
of Massachusetts, as appropriate).
IX. Hold Separate
Until the divestiture[s] required by
this Final Judgment has been
accomplished defendants shall take all
steps necessary to comply with the Hold
Separate Stipulation and Order entered
by this Court. Defendants shall take no
action that would jeopardize the
divestiture[s] ordered by this Court.
A. Within two (2) business days
following execution of a definitive
divestiture agreement, defendants or the
trustee, whichever is then responsible
for effecting the divestiture[s] required
herein, shall notify the United States
and, as appropriate, the State of Illinois,
State of New York, and Commonwealth
of Massachusetts of any proposed
divestiture[s] required by sections IV or
V of this Final Judgment. If the trustee
is responsible, it shall similarly notify
defendants. The notice shall set forth
the details of the proposed divestiture[s]
and list the name, address, and
telephone number of each person not
previously identified who offered or
expressed an interest in or desire to
acquire any ownership interest in the
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VIII. Financing
Defendants shall not finance all or
any part of any purchase to section IV
or V of this Final Judgment.
X. Affidavits
A. Within twenty (20) calendar days
of the filing of the Complaint in this
matter, and every thirty (30) calendar
days thereafter until the divestiture[s]
has/have been completed under section
IV or V, defendants shall deliver to the
United States an affidavit as to the fact
and manner of its compliance with
section IV or V of this Final Judgment.
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Each such affidavit shall include the
name, address, and telephone number of
each person who, during the preceding
thirty days, made an offer to acquire,
expressed an interest in acquiring,
entered into negotiations to acquire, or
was contacted or made an inquiry about
acquiring, any interest in the Theatre
Assets, and shall describe in detail each
contact with any such person during
that period. Each such affidavit shall
also include a description of the efforts
defendants have taken to solicit buyers
for the Theatre Assets, and to provide
required information to prospective
purchasers, including the limitations, if
any, on such information. Assuming the
information set forth in the affidavit is
true and complete, any objection by the
United States to information provided
by defendants, including limitation on
information, shall be made within
fourteen (14) days of receipt of such
affidavit.
B. Within twenty (20) calendar days
of the filing of the Complaint in this
matter, defendants shall deliver to the
United States an affidavit that describes
in reasonable detail all actions
defendants have taken and all steps
defendants have implemented on an
ongoing basis to comply with section IX
of this Final Judgment. Defendants shall
deliver to the United States an affidavit
describing any changes to the efforts
and actions outlined in defendants’
earlier affidavits filed pursuant to this
section within fifteen (15) days after the
change is implemented.
C. Defendants shall keep all records of
all efforts made to preserve and divest
the Theatre Assets until one year after
such divestiture[s] has/have been
completed.
XI. Compliance Inspection
A. For the purposes of determining or
securing compliance with this Final
Judgment, or of determining whether
the Final Judgment should be modified
or vacated, and subject to any legally
recognized privilege, from time to time
duly authorized representatives of the
United States Department of Justice, the
State of Illinois, State of New York, or
Commonwealth of Massachusetts,
including consultants and other persons
retained by either of them, shall, upon
written request of a duly authorized
representative of the Assistant Attorney
General in charge of Antitrust Division,
the Attorney General for Illinois,
Attorney General for New York, or
Attorney General for Massachusetts, and
on reasonable notice to defendants, be
permitted.
(1) Access during defendants’ office hours
to inspect and copy, or at plantiff’s option,
to require defendants provide copies of, all
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books, ledgers, accounts, records and
documents in the possession, custody, or
control of defendants, relating to any matters
contained in this Final Judgment; and
(2) To interview, either informally or on
the record, defendants’ officers, employees,
or agents, who may have their individual
counsel present, regarding such matters. The
interviews shall be subject to the reasonable
convenience of the interviewee and without
restraint or interference by defendants.
B. Upon the written request of a duly
authorized representative of the
Assistant Attorney General in charge of
the Antitrust Division, the Attorney
General of Illinois, Attorney General for
New York, or Attorney General for
Massachusetts, defendants shall submit
written reports, under oath if requested,
relating to any of the matters contained
in this Final Judgment as may be
requested.
C. No information or documents
obtained by the means provided in this
section shall be divulged by the United
States, the State of Illinois, State of New
York, or Commonwealth of
Massachusetts, to any person other than
an authorized representative of the
executive branch of the United States, or
of each state government, except in the
course of legal proceedings to which at
least one of the plaintiffs is a party
(including grand jury proceedings), or
for the purpose of securing compliance
with this Final Judgment, or as
otherwise required by law.
D. If at the time information or
documents are furnished by defendants
to the plaintiffs, defendants represent
and identify in writing the material in
any such information or documents to
which a claim of protection may be
asserted under Rule 26(c)(7) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and
defendants mark each pertinent page of
such material, ‘‘Subject to claim of
protection under Rule 26(c)(7) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,’’ then
the plaintiffs shall give defendants ten
(10) calendar days notice prior to
divulging such material in any legal
proceeding (other than a grand jury
proceeding).
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XII. Notification
Unless such transaction is otherwise
subject to the reporting and waiting
period requirements of the Hart-ScottRodino Antitrust Improvements Act of
1976, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 18a (the
‘‘HSR Act’’), defendants, without
providing advance notification to the
United States, shall not directly or
indirectly acquire any assets of or any
interest, including any financial,
security, loan, equity or management
interest, in the business of first-run,
commercial theatres in Cook County,
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Illinois; New York County, New York
(Manhattan); King County, Washington;
Suffolk County, Massachusetts; and
Dallas County, Texas during a 10-year
period. This notification requirement
shall apply only to the acquisition of
any assets or any interest in the business
of first-run, commercial motion picture
theatres at the time of the acquisition
and shall not be construed to require
notification of acquisition of interest in
new theatre developments or of assets
not being operated as first-run
commercial motion picture theatre
businesses, provided, that this
notification requirement shall apply to
first-run, commercial theatres under
construction at the time of the entering
of this Final Judgment.
Such notification shall be provided to
the United States in the same format as,
and per the instructions relating to the
Notification and Report Form set forth
in the Appendix to part 803 of Title 16
of the Code of Federal Regulations as
amended, except that the information
requested in Items 5 through 9 of the
instructions must be provided only
about first-run, commercial theatres.
Notification shall be provided at least
thirty (30) days prior to acquiring any
such interest, and shall include, beyond
what may be required by the applicable
instructions, the names of the principal
representatives of the parties to the
agreement who negotiated the
agreement, and any management or
strategic plans discussing the proposed
transaction. If within the 30-day period
after notification, representatives of
require make a written request for
additional information, defendants shall
not consummate the proposed
transaction or agreement until twenty
(20) days after submitting all such
additional information. Early
termination of the waiting periods in
this paragraph may be requested and,
where appropriate, granted in the same
manner as is applicable under the
requirements and provisions of the HSR
Act and rules promulgated thereunder.
This section shall be broadly construed
and any ambiguity or uncertainly
regarding the filing of notice under this
Section shall be resolved in favor of
filing notice.
XIII. No Reacquisition
Defendants may not reacquire any
part of the Theatre Assets during the
term of this Final Judgment.
XIV. Retention of Jurisdiction
This Court retains jurisdiction to
enable any party to this Final Judgment
to apply to this Court at any time for
further orders and directions as may be
necessary or appropriate to carry out or
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construe this Final Judgment, to modify
any of its provisions, to enforce
compliance, and to punish violations of
its provisions.
XV. Expiration of Final Judgment
Unless this Court grants an extension,
this Final Judgment shall expire ten
years from the date of its entry.
XVI. Public Interest Determination
Entry of this Final Judgment is in the
public interest.
Date: lllll
Court approval subject to procedures of
Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act,
15 U.S.C. 16.
Respectfully submitted,
llllllllllllllllll
l
United States District Judge.
For Plaintiff United States of America
Dated: December 20, 2005.
William H. Jones II (WJ 2563),
Allen P. Grunes (AG 475),
Gregg I. Malawer (GM 6467),
Avery W. Gardiner (AG 2011),
Joan Hogan (JH 5666),
Attorneys.
Bernard M. Hollander (BH 0818),
Senior Trial Attorney, U.S. Department of
Justice, Antitrust Division, Litigation III
Section, 325 Seventh Street, NW., Suite 300,
Washington, DC 20530. Tel: (202) 514–0230.
Fax: (202) 307–9952.
For Plaintiff State of New York
Eliot Spitzer,
Attorney General.
By: Jay L. Himes (JH 7714),
Chief, Antitrust Bureau.
Richard E. Grimm (RG 6891),
Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Bureau,
Office of the Attorney General, 120
Broadway, room 26C62, New York, New York
10271–0332. Tel: (212) 416–8282, (212) 416–
8280. Fax: (212) 416–6015.
For Plaintiff State of Illinois
Lisa Madigan,
Attorney General.
By: Robert W. Pratt (RP 7924),
Chief, Antitrust Bureau, Office of the
Attorney General, State of Illinois, 100 West
Randolph Street, 13th Floor, Chicago, Illinois
60601. (312) 814–3722.
Kavita Puri,
Assistant Attorney General, of Counsel.
For Plaintiff Comonwealth of Massachusetts
Thomas F. Reilly,
Attorney General.
By: Jeffrey S. Shapiro (JS 5521),
Mary B. Freeley (MF 1359),
Assistant Attorney General, Office of the
Attorney General, Commonwealth of
Massachusetts, One Ashburton Place, Boston,
MA 02108. (617) 727–2200.
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For Defendant AMC
Ilene K. Gotts,
Damian Didden,
Wachell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz,
51 West 52nd Street, New York, NY 10019,
Tel: (212) 403–1113. Fax: (212) 403–2113.
For Defendant Loews
Deborah L. Feinstein,
Arnold & Porter,
555 Twelfth Street, NW., Washington, DC
20004. Tel: (202) 942–5015. Fax: (202) 942–
5999.
William H. Jones II (WJ 2563),
United States Department of Justice,
Antitrust Division, 325 7th Street, NW., Suite
300, Washington, DC 20530. (202) 514–0230.
Attorney for Plaintiff United States of
America.
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Competitive Impact Statement
Plaintiff, the United States of
America, pursuant to section 2(b) of the
Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act
(‘‘APPA’’), 15 U.S.C. 16(b)–(h), files this
Competitive Impact Statement relating
to the proposed Final Judgment
submitted for entry in this civil antitrust
proceeding.
I. Nature and Purpose of the Proceeding
Plaintiffs the United States, the State
of Illinois, the State of New York, and
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts
filed a civil antitrust Complaint on
December l, 2005, alleging that a
proposed merger of Marquee Holdings,
Inc. (‘‘AMC’’) and LCE Holdings, Inc.
(‘‘Loews’’) would violate section 7 of the
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C 18. The
Complaint alleges that AMC and Loews
both operate motion picture theatres
throughout the United States, and that
they each operate first-run, commercial
motion picture theatres in Chicago
North, Midtown Manhattan, downtown
Seattle, downtown Boston, and north
Dallas. The merger would combine the
two leading theatre circuits in the above
listed markets and give the newly
merged firm a dominant position in
those localities: In Chicago North the
newly merged firm would have a 100%
market share (by revenue); in Midtown
Manhattan, the newly merged firm
would have a 88% market share (by
revenue); in downtown Seattle the
newly merged firm would have a 100%
market share (by revenue); in downtown
Boston, the newly merged firm would
have a 100% market share (by revenue);
and in north Dallas the newly merged
firm would have a 78% market share (by
revenue). As a result, the combination
would substantially lessen competition
and tend to create a monopoly in the
markets for theatrical exhibition of firstrun, commercial films in the above
listed local markets.
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The prayer for relief seeks: (a) An
adjudication that the proposed merger
described in the Complaint would
violate section 7 of the Clayton Act; (b)
permanent injunctive relief preventing
the consummation of the transaction; (c)
an award to each plaintiff of the costs
of this action; and (d) such other relief
as is proper.
Shortly before this suit was filed, a
proposed settlement was reached that
permits AMC to complete its merger
with Loews, yet preserves competition
in the markets in which the transactions
would raise significant competitive
concerns. A Stipulation and proposed
Final Judgment embodying the
settlement were filed at the same time
the Complaint was filed.
The proposed Final Judgment, which
is explained more fully below, requires
AMC and Loews to divest one theatre to
acquirers acceptable to the United States
in each of the listed markets, except
Chicago, where it orders AMC and
Loews to divest two theatres. Unless the
United States grants a time extension,
the divestitures must be completed
within sixty (60) calendar days after the
filing of the Complaint in this matter or
five (5) days after notice of the entry of
this Final Judgment by the Court,
whichever is later.
If the divestitures are not completed
within the divestiture period, the Court,
upon application of the United States, is
to appoint a trustee selected by the
United States to sell the assets. The
proposed Final Judgment also requires
that, until the divestitures mandated by
the Final Judgment have been
accomplished, the defendants must
maintain and operate the six theatres to
be divested as active competitors,
maintain the management, staffing,
sales, and marketing of the theatres, and
maintain the theatres in operable
condition at current capacity
configurations. Further, the proposed
Final Judgment requires defendants to
give the United States prior notice
regarding future motion picture theatre
acquisitions in Cook County, Illinois;
New York County, New York
(Manhattan); King County, Washington;
Suffolk County, Massachusetts; and
Dallas County, Texas.
The plaintiffs and the defendants
have stipulated that the proposed Final
Judgment may be entered after
compliance with the APPA. Entry of the
proposed Final Judgment would
terminate this action, except that the
Court would retain jurisdiction to
construe, modify, or enforce the
provisions of the proposed Final
Judgment and to punish violations
thereof.
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II. The Alleged Violations
A. The Defendants
Marquee Holdings, Inc. is a Delaware
corporation with its headquarters in
Kansas City, Missouri. It is the holding
company of AMC Entertainment Inc.
AMC owns or operates 216 theatres
containing 3,300 screens at locations
throughout the United States. AMC had
revenues of approximately $1.8 billion
during 2004. JP Morgan Partners and
Apollo Management LP are the
controlling shareholders of AMC.
LCE Holdings, Inc. is a Delaware
corporation with its headquarters in
New York City, New York. It is the
holding company of Loews Cineplex
Entertainment Corporation. Loews owns
or operates 128 theatres containing
1,424 screens at locations throughout
the United States. Loews operates
theatres under the Loews Theatres,
Cineplex Odeon, Star Theatres, and
Magic Johnson Theatres brands. Loews
had revenues of approximately $1
billion during 2004. Bain Capital
Partners, Carlyle Group, and Spectrum
Equity Investors are the controlling
shareholders of Loews.
B. Description of the Events Giving Rise
to the Alleged Violations
On June 30, 2005, Marquee and LCE
entered into a merger agreement. Under
the merger agreement, LCE would merge
into Marquee and Loews would merge
into AMC. The current shareholders of
LCE would control 40% of the
combined company’s outstanding
common stock while the current
shareholders of Marquee would control
60% of the combined company’s
outstanding common stock. The merger
is a $4.1 billion transaction.
AMC and Loews compete in the
theatrical exhibition of first-run,
commercial films in Chicago North,
Midtown Manhattan, downtown Seattle,
downtown Boston, and north Dallas;
they compete to attract movie-goers to
their theatres and the exclusive right to
show films in Chicago North, Midtown
Manhattan, and downtown Seattle. The
proposed merger, and the threatened
loss of competition that would be
caused by it, precipitated the
government’s suit.
C. Anticompetitive Consequences of the
Proposed Transaction
The Complaint alleges that the
theatrical exhibition of first-run,
commercial films in Chicago North,
Midtown Manhattan, downtown Seattle,
downtown Boston, and north Dallas
each constitutes a line of commerce and
section of the country, or relevant
market, for antitrust purposes. First-run,
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commercial films differ significantly
from other forms of entertainment. The
experience of viewing a film in a theatre
is an inherently different experience
from a live show, a sporting event, or
viewing a DVD or videotape in the
home. Ticket prices for first-run,
commercial films are also generally very
different than for other forms of
entertainment. A small but significant
increase in the price of tickets for firstrun films would not cause a sufficient
shift to other forms of entertainment so
as to make the increase unprofitable.
Movie-goers typically do not want to
travel very far from their homes to
attend a movie. From a moviegoer’s
standpoint, theatres outside Chicago
North, Midtown Manhattan, downtown
Seattle, downtown Boston, and north
Dallas are not acceptable substitutes for
theatres within those areas. A small but
significant increase in the price of
tickets for first-run films in those areas
would not cause a sufficient shift to
theatres outside those areas to make the
increase unprofitable.
From a distributor’s standpoint, there
is no alternative to screening its firstrun, commercial films in first-run,
commercial theatres. From the
distributor standpoint as well, a small
but significant decrease in prices (i.e., a
decrease in film rental fees) would not
cause a sufficient shift by distributors to
other locations outside of these markets
to make the decrease unprofitable to
exhibitors.
The Complaint alleges that the merger
of AMC and Loews would lessen
competition substantially and tend to
create a monopoly in the markets for
exhibition of first-run, commercial films
in the relevant markets. The proposed
transaction would create further market
concentration in already concentrated
markets, and the merged firm would
control a majority of box office revenues
and the majority of first-run,
commercial theatres in those markets. In
Chicago North, the merged firm would
control all four first-run, commercial
theatres with a market share position of
100%, as measured by box office
revenues. Prior to the merger, AMC had
the highest market share in Chicago
North, with 60% of box office revenues.
In Midtown Manhattan, the merged firm
would control the only first-run theatres
with stadium seating,1 with a market
1 Stadium seating theatres are theatres in which
each row of seats is set on a tier that is higher than
the tier on which the row in front of it is set.
Moviegoers prefer stadium seating theatres over
sloped floor theatres and are willing to pay more
to view movies in stadium seating theatres.
Exhibitors also view stadium seating theatres as
superior to, and more competitively significant
than, sloped floor theatres. For example, exhibitors
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share position of approximately 88% of
box office revenues. Prior to the merger,
Loews had the highest market share in
Midtown Manhattan, with 54% of box
office revenues. In downtown Seattle,
the merged firm would control all three
first-run, commercial theatres and with
a market share position of 100% of box
office revenues. Prior to the merger,
AMC had the highest market share in
downtown Seattle, with approximately
56% of box office revenues. In
downtown Boston, the merged firm
would control both first-run,
commercial theatres, with a market
share position of 100%. Prior to the
merger, Loews had the highest market
share in downtown Boston, with
approximately 64% of box office
revenues. In north Dallas, the merged
firm would control three of four stadium
seating theatres, including the only two
in north central Dallas, and five of the
seven first-run, commercial theatres.
The merged firm would enjoy a market
share position of approximately 78%.
Prior to the merger, AMC had the
highest market share in north Dallas,
with approximately 43% of box office
revenues.
According to the HerfindahlHirschman Index (‘‘HHI’’), a widelyused measure of market concentration
defined and explained in Exhibit A, the
merged firm’s post-transaction HHI in
Chicago North would be 10,000,
representing an increase of 4,814 points.
In Midtown Manhattan the merged
firm’s post-transaction HHI would be
7,779, representing an increase of 3,633
points. In downtown Seattle, the merged
firm’s post-transaction share would be
10,000, representing an increase of
4,921 points. In downtown Boston, the
merged firm’s HHI would be 10,000, an
increase of 4,635. In north Dallas, the
merged firm’s HHI would be 6,393, an
increase of 2,976. These substantial
increases in concentration would likely
lead the merged firm to raise ticket
prices.
Distributors license movies by film
‘‘zones’’ that reflect specific local areas.
Generally, only one theatre within a
zone will play a particular movie. There
are two types of zones: ‘‘free zones’’ (or
‘‘non-competitive zones’’) and
‘‘competitive zones.’’ Free zones contain
only a single theatre. Competitive zones
contain two or sometimes more theatres
competing for the exclusive license to
exhibit a movie within the zone. The
merger would convert four film zones in
which AMC and Loews compete with
are more likely to build new theatres in areas where
the existing theatres are sloped floor than in areas
where the existing theatres are stadium seating.
Almost all newly constructed theatres are stadium
theatres.
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each other for exclusive licenses to
exhibit movies into zones in which
there would be little or no such
competition. In the Times Square zone
in Midtown Manhattan, the merged firm
would control all of the first-run,
commercial theatres. Similarly, the
merged firm would control all three
first-run, commercial theatres in the
film zone in downtown Seattle. In
Chicago, the merged firm would control
two adjacent film zones as a result of the
transaction.
The proposed Final Judgment would
leave the merged firm in control of only
one film zone in Chicago North.
Moviegoers will not be harmed by the
merged firm’s control of a film zone in
Chicago North, as Chicago movie-goers
tend to view theatres in an adjoining
film zone as good substitutes, and the
theatres tend to draw customers from
overlapping areas. The proposed Final
Judgment will preserve the premerger
competitive situation in which moviegoers have two competitive exhibitors
from which to choose, with each
exhibitor operating both a stadium
seating theatre and a slope floor theatre.
By reducing non-price competition,
the merger would also likely lead to
lower quality theatres by reducing the
incentive to maintain, upgrade and
renovate theatres in Chicago North,
Midtown Manhattan, downtown Seattle,
downtown Boston, and north Dallas.
Theatres compete on quality and other
non-price factors such as sound
systems, maintenance and cleanliness,
and seat quality. Theatres also compete
on quality through the number and
range of showtimes. The merger would
lessen the incentives that AMC and
Loews have to maintain the quality, or
potentially upgrade, their theatres in
Chicago North, Midtown Manhattan,
downtown Seattle, downtown Boston,
and north Dallas. As a result, the merger
will have the likely effect of reducing
the quality of the viewing experience for
movie-goers in these markets. It also
may allow the merged entity to reduce
the number of shows as there no longer
would be competitive pressure to
continue early and late shows.
New entry into the Chicago North,
Midtown Manhattan, downtown Seattle,
downtown Boston and north Dallas
markets for exhibition of first-run,
commercial films would be highly
unlikely to eliminate the
anticompetitive effects of this
transaction. Entry is difficult in these
markets because available, suitable land
is scarce and new entrants are often
reluctant to enter in areas where
existing stadium theatres are located.
With the exception of the theatre in
north Dallas, all of the theatre assets to
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be divested are located in densely-built
downtown or central city areas that are
characterized by significant regulatory
barriers to entry. In north Dallas, the
theatre to be divested is located in an
area north of downtown in north central
Dallas. That area of Dallas has been
substantially built out and generally
lacks the amount of land that a large
scale retail development that contains a
theatre would require.2 No new firstrun, commercial theatres with the
capability to reduce significantly the
newly merged entity’s market power are
likely to open within the next two years
in any of the markets.
For all of these reasons, plaintiff has
concluded that the proposed transaction
would lessen competition substantially
in the exhibition of first-run,
commercial films in Chicago North,
Midtown Manhattan, downtown Seattle,
downtown Boston, and north Dallas,
eliminate actual and potential
competition between AMC and Loews,
and likely result in increased ticket
prices and lower quality theatres in
those markets. The proposed merger
therefore violates section 7 of the
Clayton Act.
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III. Explanation of the Proposed Final
Judgment
The proposed Final Judgment would
preserve existing competition in the
theatrical exhibition of first-run films in
Chicago North, Midtown Manhattan,
downtown Seattle, downtown Boston,
and north Dallas. It requires the
divestiture of a total of six theatres in
the five markets: Webster Place 11
(Chicago North); City North 14 (Chicago
North); E-Walk 13 (Midtown
Manhattan); Meridian 16 (downtown
Seattle; Fenway 13 (downtown Boston);
and Keystone Park 16 (north Dallas).
The divestitures will preserve choices
for movie-goers and distributors. The
divestitures will make it less likely that
ticket prices will increase, theatre
quality will decline, the number of
theatres to which movie studios
distribute their movies will decline, or
movies will be distributed to lower
quality theatres in the listed markets as
a result of the transaction.
Unless the United States grants an
extension of time, the divestitures must
be completed within 120 calendar days
after the filing of the Complaint in this
matter or five (5) days after notice of the
2 In recent years, most new theatres are built as
part of broader commercial developments that
include other retail establishments. The new
commercial developments that include theatres are
often malls, shopping centers, or so-called lifestyle
centers. As a result, the land required for a new
theatre would also need to contain space for other
elements of the commercial development as well.
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entry of this Final Judgment by the
Court, whichever is later. Until the
divestitures take place, AMC and Loews
must maintain and operate the six
theatres to be divested as active
competitors, maintain the management,
staffing, sales, and marketing of the
theatres, and maintain the theatres in
operable condition at current capacity
configurations.
The divestitures must be to a
purchaser or purchasers acceptable to
the United States in its sole discretion,
after consultation with the States of
Illinois and New York, and the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts as
appropriate. Unless the United States
otherwise consents in writing, the
divestitures shall include all the assets
of the theatres to be divested, and shall
be accomplished in such a way as to
satisfy the United States that such assets
can and will be used as viable, ongoing
first-run theatres.
If defendants fail to divest these
theatres within the time periods
specified in the Final Judgment, the
Court, upon application of the United
States, is to appoint a trustee nominated
by the United States to effect the
divestitures. If a trustee is appointed,
the proposed Final Judgment provides
that AMC and Loews will pay all costs
and expenses of the trustee and any
professionals and agents retained by the
trustee. Under section V(d) of the
proposed Final Judgment, the
compensation paid to the trustee and
any persons retained by the trustee shall
be both reasonable in light of the value
of the theatres remaining to be divested,
and based on a fee arrangement
providing the trustee with an incentive
based on the price and terms of the
divestitures and the speed with which
they are accomplished. Timeliness is
paramount. After appointment, the
trustee will file monthly reports with
the parties and the Court, setting forth
the trustee’s efforts to accomplish the
divestitures ordered under the proposed
Final Judgment. Section V(g) of the
proposed Final Judgment provides that
if the trustee has not accomplished the
divestitures within six (6) months after
its appointment, the trustee shall
promptly file with the Court a report
setting forth (1) the trustee’s efforts to
accomplish the required divestitures, (2)
the reasons, in the trustee’s judgment,
why the required divestitures have not
been accomplished and (3) the trustee’s
recommendations. At the same time the
trustee will furnish such report to the
plaintiffs and defendants, who will each
have the right to be heard and to make
additional recommendations.
If the defendants or trustee are not
able to obtain a landlord’s consent to
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sell one of the theatres to be divested,
section VI of the proposed Final
Judgment permits the defendants to
select an alternative theatre that
competes effectively with the theatre for
which landlord consent was not
obtained to divest. The United States, in
its sole discretion, after consultation
with the States of Illinois and New York
and Commonwealth of Massachusetts as
appropriate, shall determine whether
the theatres offered are actually
competing with those that could not be
divested due to a failure to obtain
landlord consent. This provision will
ensure that any failure by the
defendants to obtain landlord consent
by the defendants does not thwart the
relief obtained in the proposed Final
Judgment.
The proposed Final Judgment also
prohibits the defendants from acquiring
any other theatres in Cook County,
Illinois; New York County, New York
(Manhattan); King County, Washington;
Suffolk County, Massachusetts; and
Dallas County, Texas without providing
at least thirty (30) days’ notice to the
U.S. Department of Justice. Such
acquisitions could raise competitive
concerns but might be too small to be
reported otherwise under the Hart-ScottRodino (‘‘HSR’’) premerger notification
statute.
IV. Remedies Available to Potential
Private Litigants
Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15
U.S.C. 15, provides that any person who
has been injured as a result of conduct
prohibited by the antitrust laws may
bring suit in federal court to recover
three times the damages the person has
suffered, as well as costs and reasonable
attorneys’ fees. Entry of the proposed
Final Judgment will neither impair nor
assist the bringing of any private
antitrust damage action. Under the
provisions of section 5(a) of the Clayton
Act, 15 U.S.C. 16 (a), the proposed Final
Judgment has no prima facie effect in
any subsequent private lawsuit that may
be brought against defendants.
V. Procedures Available for
Modification of the Proposed Final
Judgment
Plaintiffs and defendants have
stipulated that the proposed Final
Judgment may be entered by the Court
after compliance with the provisions of
the APPA, provided that plaintiff has
not withdrawn its consent. The APPA
conditions entry upon the Court’s
determination that the proposed Final
Judgment is in the public interest.
The APPA provides a period of at
least sixty (60) days preceding the
effective date of the proposed Final
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Judgment within which any person may
submit to plaintiff written comments
regarding the proposed Final Judgment.
Any person who wishes to comment
should do so within sixty (60) days of
the date of publication of this
Competitive Impact Statement in the
Federal Register. All comments
received during this period will be
considered by the Department of Justice,
which remains free to withdraw its
consent to the proposed Final Judgment
at any time prior to the Court’s entry
judgment. The comments and the
response of plaintiff will be filed with
the Court and published in the Federal
Register.
Written comments should be
submitted to: John R. Read, Chief,
Litigation III, Antitrust Division, United
States Department of Justice, 325 7th
Street, NW., Suite 300, Washington, DC
20530.
The proposed Final Judgment
provides that the Court retains
jurisdiction over this action, and the
parties may apply to the Court for any
order necessary or appropriate for the
modification, interpretation, or
enforcement of the Final Judgment.
VI. Alternatives to the Proposed Final
Judgment
Plaintiff considered, as an alternative
to the proposed Final Judgment, a full
trial on the merits against defendants.
Plaintiff could have continued the
litigation and sought preliminary and
permanent injunctions against AMC’s
merger with Loews. Plaintiff is satisfied,
however, that the divestiture of assets
and other relief described in the
proposed Final Judgment will preserve
competition for the exhibition of firstrun, commercial films in the relevant
markets identified in the Complaint.
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VII. Standard of Review Under the
APPA for Proposed Final Judgment
The APPA requires that proposed
consent judgments in antitrust cases
brought by the United States be subject
to a sixty (60) day comment period, after
which the Court shall determine
whether entry of the proposed Final
Judgment ‘‘is in the public interest.’’ In
making that determination, the Court
shall consider:
(A) The competitive impact of such
judgment, including termination of alleged
violations, provisions for enforcement and
modification, duration or relief sought,
anticipated effects of alternative remedies
actually considered and any other
considerations bearing upon the adequacy of
such judgment;
(B) The impact of entry of such judgment
upon the public generally and individuals
alleging specific injury from the violations
set forth in the complaint including
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consideration of the public benefit, if any, to
be derived from a determination of the issues
at trial.
15 U.S.C. 16(e)(1)(A) & (B). As the
United States Court of Appeals for the
DC Circuit held, this statute permits a
court to consider, among other things,
the relationship between the remedy
secured and the specific allegations set
forth in the government’s complaint,
whether the decree is sufficiently clear,
whether enforcement mechanisms are
sufficient and whether the decree may
positively harm third parties. See
United States v. Microsoft, 56 F.3d 1448,
1461–62 (DC Cir. 1995).
‘‘Nothing in this section shall be
construed to require the court to
conduct an evidentiary hearing or to
require the court to permit anyone to
intervene.’’ 15 U.S.C. 16(e)(2). Thus, in
conducting this inquiry, ‘‘[t]he Court is
nowhere compelled to go to trial or to
engage in extended proceedings which
might have the effect of vitiating the
benefits of prompt and less costly
settlement through the consent decree
process.’’ 3 Rather,
[a]bsent a showing of corrupt failure of the
government to discharge its duty, the Court,
in making its public interest finding, should
* * * carefully consider the explanations of
the government in the competitive impact
statement and its responses to comments in
order to determine whether those
explanations are reasonable under the
circumstances.
United States v. Mid-America
Diarymen, Inc., 1977–1 Trade Cas.
¶61,508 at 71,980 (W.D. Mo. 1977).
Accordingly, with respect to the
adequacy of the relief secured by the
decree, a court may not ‘‘engage in an
unrestricted evaluation of what relief
would best serve the public.’’ United
States v. BNS, Inc., 858 F.2d 456, 462
(9th Cir. 1988), citing United States v.
Bechtel Corp., 648 F.2d 660, 666 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1083 (1981);
see also Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1460–62.
Precedent requires that:
The balancing of competing social and
political interests affected by a proposed
antitrust consent decree must be left, in the
first instance, to the discretion of the
Attorney General. The court’s role in
protecting the public interest is one of
3 119 Cong. Rec. 24598 (1973) (statement of
Senator Tunney). See United States v. Gillette Co.,
406 F. Supp. 713, 715 (D. Mass. 1975). A ‘‘public
interest’’ determination can be made properly on
the basis of the Competitive Impact Statement and
Response to Comments filed pursuant to the APPA.
Although the APPA authorizes the use of additional
procedures, 15 U.S.C. 16(f), those procedures are
discretionary. A court need not invoke any of them
unless it believes that the comments have raised
significant issues and that further proceedings
would aid the court in resolving those issues. See
H.R. Rep. 93–1463, 93rd Cong. 2d Sess. 8–9 (1974),
reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 6535, 6538.
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3339
insuring that the government has not
breached its duty to the public in consenting
to the decree. The court is required to
determine not whether a particular decree is
the one that will best serve society, but
whether the settlement is ‘‘within the reaches
of the public interest.’’ More elaborate
requirements might undermine the
effectiveness of antitrust enforcement by
consent decree.4
Bechtel, 648 F.2d at 666 (citations
omitted) (emphasis added).
The proposed Final Judgment,
therefore, should not be reviewed under
a standard of whether it is certain to
eliminate every anticompetitive effect of
a particular practice or whether it
mandates certainty of free competition
in the future. Court approval of a final
judgment requires a standard more
flexible and less strict than the standard
required for a finding of liability. ‘‘[A]
proposed decree must be approved even
if it falls short of the remedy the court
would impose on its own, as long as it
falls within the range of acceptability or
is ‘within the reaches of public
interest.’ ’’ United States v. American
Tel. and Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 151
(D.D.C. 1982), aff’d. sub nom. Maryland
v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983);
quoting Gillette Co., 406 F. Supp. at 716
(citations omitted); United States v.
Alcan Aluminum, Ltd., 605 F. Supp.
619, 622 (W.D. Ky. 1985).
Moreover, the Court’s role under the
APPA is limited to reviewing the
remedy in relationship to the violations
that the United States has alleged in its
Complaint, and does not authorize the
court to ‘‘construct [its] own
hypothetical case and then evaluate the
decree against that case.’’ Microsoft, 56
F.3d at 1459. Because the ‘‘court’s
authority to review the decree depends
entirely on the government’s exercising
its prosecutorial discretion by bringing
a case in the first place,’’ it follows that
‘‘the court is only authorized to review
the decree itself,’’ and not to ‘‘effectively
redraft the complaint’’ to inquire into
other matters that the United States did
not pursue. Id. at 1459–60.
VIII. Determinative Documents
There are no determinative materials
or documents within the meaning of the
APPA that were considered by the
4 Cf. BNS, 858 F.2d at 464; 858 F.2d at 464
(holding that the court’s ‘‘ultimate authority under
the [APPA] is limited to approving or disapproving
the consent decree’’); Gillette, 406 F. Supp. at 716
(noting that, in this way, the court is constrained
to ‘‘look at the overall picture not hypercritically,
nor with a microscope, but with an artist’s reducing
glass’’); see generally Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1461
(discussing whether ‘‘the remedies [obtained in the
decree are] so inconsonant with the allegations
charged as to fall outside of the ‘reaches of the
public interest’ ’’).
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Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 13 / Friday, January 20, 2006 / Notices
plaintiff in formulating the proposed
Final Judgment.
Dated: December 20, 2005.
Respectfully submitted,
William H. Jones II (WJ 2563),
Allen P. Grunes (AG 4775),
Gregg I. Malawer (GM 6467),
Avery W. Gardiner (AG 2011),
Joan Hogan (JH 5666),
U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust
Division, 325 7th Street, NW., Suite 300,
Washington, DC 20530. (202) 514–0230.
Attorneys for Plaintiff the United States.
Bernard Hollander (BH 0818),
Senior Trial Attorney, U.S. Department of
Justice, Antitrust Division, 325 7th Street,
NW., Suite 300, Washington, DC 20530.
Attorney for Plaintiff the United States.
Exhibit A Definition of HHI and
Calculations for Market
‘‘HHI’’ means the HerfindahlHirschman Index, a commonly accepted
measure of market concentration. It is
calculated by squaring the market share
of each firm competing in the market
and then summing the resulting
numbers. For example, for a market
consisting of four firms with shares of
thirty, thirty, twenty and twenty
percent, the HHI is 2600 (302 + 302 +
202 + 202 = 2600). The HHI takes into
account the relative size and
distribution of the firms in a market and
approaches zero when a market consists
of a large number of firms of relatively
equal size. The HHI increases both as
the number of firms in the market
decreases and as the disparity in size
between those firms increases.
Markets in which the HHI is between
1000 and 1800 points are considered to
be moderately concentrated, and those
in which the HHI is in excess of 1800
points are considered to be
concentrated. Transactions that increase
the HHI by more than 100 points in
concentrated markets presumptively
raise antitrust concerns under the
Merger Guidelines. See Merger
Guidelines § 1.51.
[FR Doc. 06–454 Filed 1–19–06; 8:45 am]
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
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Employment and Training
Administration
Proposed Information Collection
Request Submitted for Public
Comment and Recommendations;
National Rapid Response Information
Network
Notice.
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I. Background
As part of its responsibility for the
administration and oversight of
activities carried out under the
Workforce Investment Act of 2000
(WIA), ETA has designed a Rapid
Response Information Network (RRIN).
This electronic reporting system will
allow users to easily input data
regarding layoffs and layoff related
information through a secure Web site.
II. Review Focus
BILLING CODE 4410–11–M
ACTION:
SUMMARY: The Department of Labor, as
part of its continuing effort to reduce
paperwork and respondent burden,
conducts a preclearance consultation
program to provide the general public
and Federal agencies with an
opportunity to comment on proposed
and/or continuing collections of
information in accordance with the
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995
(PRA95) [44 U.S.C. 3506(c)(A)]. This
program helps to ensure that requested
data can be provided in the desired
format, reporting burden (time and
financial resources) is minimized,
collection instruments are clearly
understood, and the impact of collection
requirements on respondents can be
properly assessed. Currently, the
Employment and Training
Administration, Office of National
Response is soliciting comments
concerning the proposed information
collection request (ICR) for the National
Rapid Response Network. A copy of the
proposed ICR is available at this site:
https://www.doleta.gov/Performance/
guidance/OMBControlNumber.cfm.
DATES: Written comments must be
submitted to the office listed in the
addressee’s section below on or before
March 21, 2006.
ADDRESSES: Jeff Ryan, U.S. Department
of Labor, Employment and Training
Administration, Room C–5325, 200
Constitution Avenue, NW., Washington,
DC 20210, Phone: (202) 693–3546 (this
is not a toll-free number), Fax: (202)
693–3149, e-mail: ryan.jeff@dol.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
The Department of Labor is
particularly interested in comments
which:
• Evaluate whether the proposed
collection of information is necessary
for the proper performance of the
functions of the agency, including
whether the information will have
practical utility;
• Evaluate the accuracy of the
agency’s estimate of the burden of the
proposed collection of information,
including the validity of the
methodology and assumptions used;
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• Enhance the quality, utility, and
clarity of the information to be
collected; and
• Minimize the burden of the
collection of information on those who
are to respond, including through the
use of appropriate automated,
electronic, mechanical, or other
technological collection techniques or
other forms of information technology,
e.g., permitting electronic submissions
of responses.
III. Current Actions
Type of Review: Regular.
Agency: Office of National Response.
Title: National Rapid Response
Information Network.
OMB Number: 1205–XXX.
Agency Form Numbers: ETA 9119A,
B, C.
Recordkeeping: 0.
Affected Public: State, local, or tribal
government.
Total Respondents: 53.
Estimated Total Burden Hours: 3274
hours.
Total Burden Cost (capital/startup):
$0.
Total Burden Cost (operating/
maintaining): $0.
Comments submitted in response to
this comment request will be
summarized and/or included in the
request for Office of Management and
Budget approval of the information
collection request; they will also
become a matter of public record.
Dated: January 11, 2006.
Emily Stover DeRocco,
Assistant Secretary for Employment and
Training.
[FR Doc. E6–645 Filed 1–19–06; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4510–30–P
LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION
Sunshine Act Meetings of the Board of
Directors and Four of the Board’s
Committees
The Legal Services
Corporation Board of Directors will
meet on January 28, 2006, and four of
its Committees will meet on January 27,
2006 in the order set forth in the
following schedule, with each
subsequent meeting commencing
shortly after adjournment of the prior
meeting.
TIMES AND DATES:
Meeting Schedule
Friday, January 27, 2006—9 a.m.
1. Performance Reviews Committee.
2. Finance Committee.
3. Provision for the Delivery of Legal
Services Committee (‘‘Provisions
Committee’’).
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Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 71, Number 13 (Friday, January 20, 2006)]
[Notices]
[Pages 3327-3340]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 06-454]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Antitrust Division
United States, State of Illinois, State of New York, and
Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Marquee Holdings, Inc. and LCE
Holdings, Inc.; Complaint, Proposed Final Judgment, and Competitive
Impact Statement
Notice is hereby given pursuant to the Antitrust Procedures and
Penalties Act, 15 U.S.C. section 16(b) through (h), that a Complaint,
proposed Final Judgment, Stipulation and Competitive Impact Statement
have been filed with the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York in United States of America, State of Illinois,
State of New York, and Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Marquee
Holdings, Inc. and LCE Holdings, Inc., Civil Action No. 05-10722. On
December 22, 2005, the United States filed a Complaint alleging that
the proposed merger of Marquee Holdings, Inc. and LCE Holdings, Inc.
would violate Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 18 by lessening
competition for theatrical exhibition of first-run films in five
cities: Boston, MA, New York, NY, Chicago, IL, Dallas, TX, and Seattle,
WA. The proposed Final Judgment, filed at the same time as the
Complaint, requires the defendants to divest first-run, commercial
theatres, along with certain tangible and intangible assets, in those
five cities in order to proceed with the proposed $4 billion
transaction. A Competitive Impact Statement filed by the United States
on December 22, 2005 describes the Complaint, the proposed Final
Judgment, the industry, and the remedies available to private litigants
who may have been injured by the alleged violation.
Copies of the Complaint, proposed Final Judgment and Competitive
Impact Statement are available for inspection at the Department of
Justice in Washington, DC in Room 200, 325 Seventh Street, NW., and at
the Office of the Clerk of the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York, New York, New York. Copies of these
materials may be obtained from the Antitrust Division upon request and
payment of the copying fee set by Department of Justice regulations.
Public comment is invited within 60 days of the date of this
notice. Such comments, and responses thereto, will be published in the
Federal Register and filed with the Court. Comments should be directed
to John R. Read, Chief, Litigation III Section, Antitrust Division,
United States Department of Justice, 325 7th Street, NW., Suite 300,
[[Page 3328]]
Washington, DC 20530 (telephone: 202-307-0468). At the conclusion of
the sixty (60) day comment period, the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York may enter the proposed consent decree
upon finding that it serves the public interest.
J. Robert Kramer II,
Director of Operations, Antitrust Division.
Complaint
The United States of America, acting under the direction of the
Attorney General of the United States, and the States of Illinois and
New York, and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, acting through their
Attorneys General, bring this civil antitrust action to prevent the
proposed merger of Marquee Holdings, Inc. and LCE Holdings, Inc. If the
merger is permitted to proceed, it would combine the two leading, and
in some cases only, operators of first-run, commercial movie theatres
in Chicago North, Midtown Manhattan, downtown Seattle, downtown Boston,
and north Dallas. The merger would substantially lessen competition and
tend to create a monopoly in the theatrical exhibition of commercial,
first-run movies in the above listed markets in violation of section 7
of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 18.
I. Jurisdiction and Venue
1. This action is filed by the United States pursuant to section 15
of the Clayton Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 25, to obtain equitable
relief to prevent a violation of section 7 of the Clayton Act, as
amended, 15 U.S.C. 18. The States of Illinois and New York, and the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts bring this action under section 16 of the
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 26, to prevent the defendants from violating
section 7 of the Clayton Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 18.
2. Both defendants operate theatres in this District. The
distribution and exhibition of commercial, first-run films is a
commercial activity that substantially affects, and is in the flow of,
interstate trade and commerce. The defendants purchase substantial
quantities of equipment, services, and supplies from sources located
outside of New York. In particular, most of the distributors from whom
the defendants license films are located outside of New York. The
defendants also acquire funding for their New York operations from
outside of New York. The Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter
of this action and jurisdiction over the parties pursuant to 15 U.S.C.
22, 25, and 26, and 28 U.S.C. 1331 and 1337.
3. Venue in this District is proper under 15 U.S.C. 22 and 28
U.S.C. Sec. 1391(c).
II. Defendants and the Proposed Merger
4. Defendant Marquee Holdings, Inc. (``Marquee'') is a Delaware
corporation with its headquarters in Kansas City, Missouri. It is the
holding company of AMC Entertainment Inc. (``AMC''). AMC owns or
operates 216 theatres containing 3,300 screens at locations throughout
the United States.
5. Defendant LCE Holdings, Inc. (``LCE'') is a Delaware corporation
with its headquarters in New York City, New York. It is the holding
company of Loews Cineplex Entertainment Corporation (``Loews''). Loews
owns or operates 128 theatres containing 1,424 screens at locations
throughout the United States. Loews operates theatres under the Loews
Theatres, Cineplex Odeon, Star Theatres, and Magic Johnson Theatres
brands.
6. On June 30, 2005, Marquee and LCE entered into a merger
agreement. Under the merger agreement, LCE would merge into Marquee and
Loews will merge into AMC. The current shareholders of LCE would
control 40% of the combined company's outstanding common stock while
the current shareholders of Marquee would control 60% of the combined
company's outstanding common stock.
III. Background of the Movie Industry
7. Theatrical exhibition of feature length motion picture films
(``movies'') provides a major source of out-of-home entertainment in
the United States. Although they vary, ticket prices for movies tend to
be significantly less expensive than many other forms of out-of-home
entertainment, particularly live entertainment such as sporting events
and live theatre. Movies have retained their appeal as mass
entertainment: Over 1.5 billion movie tickets were sold in the United
States in 2004. Total box office revenue for 2004 exceeded $9.5
billion.
8. ``Exhibitors'' are companies that operate movie theatres. Some
exhibitors own a single theatre, whereas others own a circuit of
theatres within one or more regions of the United States. AMC and Loews
are exhibitors and each operates one of the largest theatre circuits in
the United States.
9. ``Distributors'' are companies that engage in the business of
renting and licensing movies to exhibitors. Distributors arrange for
the promotion and marketing of films and contract with exhibitors to
exhibit films at theatres throughout the country. Established
distributors include Sony, Paramount, Twentieth Century Fox, Universal,
Disney, Warner Bros., Dreamworks, Metro-Goldwyn-Meyer, and Buena Vista.
10. Distributors negotiate with exhibitors to exhibit films.
Exhibitors compete to obtain films to show at their theatres that they
believe will result in high ticket sales, and distributors choose
theatres to exhibit their films based on the quality, location, and
grossing potential of the theatres and the particular terms offered by
the exhibitors.
11. Distributors license movies by ``zones'' that reflect specific
local areas. Typically, only one theatre within a zone will play a
particular movie. There are two types of zones: ``free zones'' (or
``non-competitive zones'') and ``competitive zones.'' Free zones
contain only a single theatre. Competitive zones contain two or
sometimes more theatres competing for the exclusive license to exhibit
a movie within the zone.
12. The terms of the agreement pursuant to which distributors
license films to exhibitors vary and are individually negotiated. Each
agreement, however, typically specifies a formula pursuant to which box
office revenues are divided between the exhibitor and the distributor.
The agreements often provide that the exhibitor will keep a certain
dollar amount from the box office revenues to compensate for
``overhead,'' as well as a specified percentage of what remains after
the overhead is deducted.
13. Exhibitors set ticket prices for each theatre based on a number
of factors, including the competitive situation facing each theatre,
the prices of nearby, comparable theatres, the number and type of
amenities each theatre offers, such as stadium seating, and the age of
the theatre.
IV. Relevant Market
A. Product Market
14. Movies are a unique form of entertainment. The experience of
viewing a movie in a theatre is an inherently different experience from
a live show, a sporting event, or viewing a DVD or videotape of a movie
in the home. Typically, viewing a DVD or videotape in the home lacks
several characteristics of viewing movies in theatres, including the
size of screen, the sophistication of sound systems, and the social
experience of viewing a movie with other patrons. Ticket prices for
movies are generally very different than prices for other forms of
entertainment: Live entertainment is typically significantly more
expensive than a movie ticket, whereas renting a DVD or
[[Page 3329]]
videotape is usually significantly cheaper than viewing a first-run
movie in a theatre. Because going to the movies is a different
experience from other forms of entertainment and because movie prices
are significantly different from other forms of entertainment, small
but significant price increases for movie tickets generally do not
cause a sufficient number of movie-goers to shift to other forms of
entertainment to make the increase unprofitable.
15. A movie is considered to be in its ``first-run'' during the
initial weeks following its release in a given locality. If successful,
a movie may be exhibited at other theatres after the first-run as part
of a second or subsequent run (often called a sub-run). Tickets at
theatres exhibiting sub-run movies usually cost significantly less than
tickets at first-run theatres. Because the films exhibited at sub-run
theatres are no longer new releases, most movie-goers do not regard
sub-run films as an adequate substitute for first-run films and would
not switch to sub-run films if the price of first-run films was
increased by a small but significant amount.
16. Commercial movies typically appeal to different patrons than
other types of movies, such as art movies or foreign language movies.
For example, art films tend to appeal more universally to mature
audiences and art film patrons tend to purchase fewer concessions.
Theatres that primarily exhibit art films often contain auditoriums
with fewer seats than theatres that primarily play commercial films.
Typically, art films are released less widely than commercial films.
Also, exhibitors consider art theatre operations as distinct from the
operations of theatres that exhibit commercial films. Because art
movies appeal to different patrons and are often exhibited in different
types of theatres than commercial theatres, most movie-goers do not
regard art films as an adequate substitute for commercial films and
would not switch to them if the price of commercial films was increased
by a small, but significant amount.
17. Similarly, foreign language films do not widely appeal to U.S.
audiences. As a result, movie-goers do not regard foreign language
films as adequate substitutes for commercial films and would not switch
to them if the price of commercial films was increased by a small, but
significant amount.
18. Movie-goers prefer stadium seating theatres, in which each row
of seats is set on a tier that is higher than the tier on which the row
in front of it is set. Movie-goers will often bypass older, slope floor
theatres to view a movie at a stadium seating theatre and are willing
to pay more to view movies in stadium seating theatres. Exhibitors also
view stadium seating theatres as superior to slope floor theatres.
Exhibitors will often look to build new stadium seating theatres in
areas where only slope floor theatres, but no stadium seating theatres,
exist. Almost all new theatres are stadium seating theatres.
19. From the perspective of distributors selecting locations at
which to exhibit their movies, there is no adequate substitute for
theatres that exhibit first-run, commercial films. Distributors seek to
have their newly released movies exhibited widely in high-quality
theatres. A small but significant reduction in the rental fees paid to
distributors by exhibitors would not cause the distributors to exhibit
their films in anything other than first-run, commercial theatres.
20. The relevant product market within which to assess the
competitive effects of this merger is the exhibition of first-run,
commercial films: From the movie-goer's perspective, the market is
first-run, commercial films and from the distributors' perspective, the
market is first-run, commercial theatres in which to exhibit first-run,
commercial films.
B. Geographic Markets
21. Movie-goers typically do not want to travel very far from their
homes to attend a movie, particularly in urban areas. Accordingly,
geographic markets for the exhibition of first-run, commercial movies
are predominantly local.
22. Most movie-goers in Chicago North typically are reluctant to
travel significant distances out of that area to attend a movie. A
small but significant price increase for movie tickets in Chicago North
would not cause a sufficient number of movie-goers to travel out of
Chicago North to make the increase unprofitable. Chicago North
constitutes a relevant geographic market in which to assess some of the
competitive effects of this merger. AMC and Loews are the two largest
exhibitors in Chicago North.
23. Most movie-goers attending movies in Midtown Manhattan are
reluctant to travel to other parts of Manhattan or off the island of
Manhattan to view a movie. A small but significant price increase for
movie tickets in Midtown Manhattan would not cause a sufficient number
of movie-goers to travel to other areas of Manhattan or out of the
borough to make the increase unprofitable. Midtown Manhattan
constitutes a relevant geographic market in which to assess some of the
competitive effects of this merger. AMC and Loews are the two largest
exhibitors in Midtown Manhattan.
24. Like movie-goers in Chicago North and Midtown Manhattan, most
movie-goers in downtown Seattle typically are reluctant to travel
significant distances out of downtown to attend a movie. A small but
significant price increase for movie tickets in downtown Seattle would
not cause a sufficient number of movie-goers to travel out of downtown
to make the increase unprofitable. Downtown Seattle constitutes a
relevant geographic market in which to assess some of the competitive
effects of this merger. AMC and Loews are the two largest exhibitors in
downtown Seattle.
25. Most movie-goers in downtown Boston typically are reluctant to
travel significant distances out of downtown to attend a movie. A small
but significant price increase for movie tickets in downtown Boston
would not cause a sufficient number of movie-goers to travel out of the
city to make the increase unprofitable. Downtown Boston constitutes a
relevant geographic market in which to assess some of the competitive
effects of this merger. AMC and Loews are the only two exhibitors in
downtown Boston.
26. Similarly, in north Dallas, most movie-goers typically are
reluctant to travel significant distances out of the city to attend a
movie. A small but significant price increase for movie tickets in
north Dallas would not cause a sufficient number of movie-goers to
travel out of the city to make the increase unprofitable. North Dallas
constitutes a relevant geographic market in which to assess some of the
competitive effects of this merger. AMC and Loews are the two largest
exhibitors in north Dallas.
27. The exhibition of first-run films in Chicago North, Midtown
Manhattan, downtown Seattle, downtown Boston, and north Dallas each
constitutes a relevant market (i.e., a line of commerce and a section
of the country) within the meaning of section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15
U.S.C. 18.
V. Competitive Effects
A. Chicago North
28. In Chicago North, the proposed merger would give the newly
merged entity control of all four major first-run, commercial theatres
with 55 screens and a 2004 box office revenue of approximately $24
million. AMC and Loews each operate theatres in two different zones in
Chicago North. The combined entity will control nearly 100% of the
revenues from the two
[[Page 3330]]
zones in Chicago North and overall would have a market share of
approximately 100%. Using a measure of market concentration called the
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (``HHI''), explained in Appendix A, the
merger would yield a post-merger HHI of approximately 10,000,
representing an increase of roughly 4,814.
B. Midtown Manhattan
29. In Midtown Manhattan, the proposed merger would give the newly
merged entity control of the only first-run, commercial stadium seating
theatres along with 71 total screens and 2004 box office revenue of
approximately $54.6 million. The combined entity would have a market
share of approximately 88%. The merger would yield a post-merger HHI of
roughly 7,779, representing an increase of around 3,633. In the Times
Square zone, a zone in Midtown Manhattan, AMC and Loews operate
theatres in the same zone. The combined entity would control 100% of
the revenue from that film zone, the highest grossing zone in the
United States.
C. Downtown Seattle
30. In downtown Seattle, the proposed merger would give the newly
merged entity control of all three first-run, commercial theatres with
31 screens and a 2004 box office revenue of approximately $14.1
million. The combined entity would control nearly 100% of the revenues
from the zone in downtown Seattle and a market share of 100%. The
merger would yield a post-merger HHI of 10,000, representing an
increase of around 4,921.
D. Downtown Boston
31. In downtown Boston, the proposed merger would give the newly
merged entity control of the only first-run, commercial theatres with
32 screens and a 2004 box office revenue of approximately $20.8
million. The combined entity would have a market share of 100%. The
merger would yield a post-merger HHI of 10,000, representing an
increase of approximately 4,635.
E. North Dallas
32. In north Dallas, the proposed merger would give the newly
merged entity control of three of the first-run, commercial theatres
with stadium seating, including the only two in north central Dallas.
It would control all three commercial, first-run stadium seating
theatres in north central Dallas once the new AMC theatre opens in
Spring 2006. Overall, the combined entity would control five of seven
first-run, commercial theatres with 78 screens and 2004 box office
revenues of approximately $22 million. The combined entity would have a
market share of approximately 78%. The merger would yield a post-merger
HHI of roughly 6,393, representing an increase of around 2,976.
F. Consumer Effects
33. The proposed merger would likely lessen competition
significantly in the relevant markets by further enhancing the ability
of the remaining theatre circuits, particularly the AMC-Loews circuit,
to increase prices.
(a) AMC and Loews directly compete in all the relevant geographic
markets. The prices their theatres charge are constrained by the prices
charged by the other; in particular, they are constrained by the risk
that the other will not follow an attempted price increase. If AMC or
Loews were to increase prices and the other were not to follow, the
firm that increased price might suffer financially if a substantial
number of its patrons decided that the increased price was unreasonable
and opted to patronize the other circuit.
(b) The proposed merger would eliminate this pricing constraint and
is therefore likely to lead to higher prices for ticket buyers.
(c) These higher prices could take the form of a higher adult
evening ticket price or reduced discounting, e.g., for matinees,
children, seniors, and students.
34. The proposed merger would also eliminate non-price competition
between AMC and Loews and is therefore likely to lead to lower quality
theatres for movie-goers.
(a) In order to persuade distributors to exhibit top films in their
respective theatres that share the same zones and, more importantly, to
attract movie-goers, AMC and Loews strive to maintain high quality
theatres.
(b) The loss of each other's theatres as competitors would reduce
the incentive of AMC and Loews to maintain, upgrade, and renovate
theatres and to improve amenities and services at theatres in the
relevant markets, thus reducing the quality of the viewing experience
for a movie-goer.
VI. Entry
35. Entry by first-run, commercial theatres is difficult in the
relevant markets. Exhibitors are often reluctant to locate new theatres
near existing stadium theatres. Those who typically build new theatres,
exhibitors and real estate developers, often seek to avoid building new
theatres in the same zones with existing theatres. Also, exhibitors and
real estate developers often seek to build new stadium theatres in
conjunction with projects that contain other retail establishments,
such as shops and restaurants that will be another draw for customers.
As a result, real estate developers often look at the customer demand
for other retail in areas in which they consider locating a theatre,
along with the customer demand for a new theatre.
36. Entry by first-run, commercial theatres in Chicago North is
time-consuming and difficult and is not likely to reduce significantly
the market strength of the combined entity in the near future.
Suitable, available sites are scarce, real estate and construction
costs are among the highest in the nation, and acquiring the necessary
permits and approvals can be difficult and time-consuming. Identifying
a site, planning the development, and constructing a theatre in Chicago
North takes several years. No new first-run, commercial theatres with
the capability to reduce significantly the newly merged entity's market
power are likely to open within the next two years.
37. In Manhattan, entry by first-run, commercial theatres,
particularly in Midtown, is time-consuming and difficult and is not
likely to reduce significantly the market strength of the combined
entity in the near future. Suitable, available sites are scarce, and
real estate and construction costs are among the highest in the nation.
Identifying a site, planning the development, and constructing a
theatre in Midtown Manhattan takes several years. No new first-run,
commercial theatres with the capability to reduce significantly the
newly merged entity's market power are likely to open within the next
two years.
38. Entry by first-run, commercial theatres in downtown Seattle is
time-consuming and difficult and is not likely to reduce significantly
the market strength of the combined entity in the near future.
Suitable, available sites are scarce and acquiring the necessary
permits and approvals for the construction of new theatres can be
difficult and time-consuming. No new first-run, commercial theatres
with the capability to reduce significantly the newly merged entity's
market power are likely to open within the next two years.
39. Entry by first-run, commercial theatres in downtown Boston is
time-consuming and difficult and is not likely to reduce significantly
the market strength of the combined entity in the near future.
Suitable, available sites are scarce and necessary permits and
approvals for the construction of new
[[Page 3331]]
theatres can be difficult and time-consuming. No new first-run,
commercial theatres with the capability to reduce significantly the
newly merged entity's market power are likely to open within the next
two years.
40. Entry by first-run, commercial theatres in north Dallas is
difficult and is not likely to reduce significantly the market strength
of the combined entity in the near future. Suitable, available sites
are scarce in north central Dallas, where the combined entity's market
strength would be the strongest, and no new first-run, commercial
theatres with the capability to reduce significantly the newly merged
entity's market power are likely to open within the next two years.
VII. Violation Alleged
41. The United States and plaintiff states hereby reincorporate 1
through 40.
42. On June 30, 2005, Marquee and LCE entered into a merger
agreement. Under the merger agreement, LCE intends to merge into
Marquee and Loews intends to merge into AMC.
43. The effect of the proposed merger would be to lessen
competition substantially in interstate trade and commerce for first-
run, commercial theatres in which to exhibit first-run, commercial
films in Chicago North, Midtown Manhattan, downtown Seattle, downtown
Boston, and north Dallas in violation of section 7 of the Clayton Act,
15 U.S.C. 18.
44. The transaction would likely have the following effects, among
others:
(a) Competition for first-run, commercial theatres in which to
exhibit first-run, commercial films in numerous geographic markets
would be eliminated or substantially lessened; and
(b) Prices for first-run, commercial film tickets would likely
increase to levels above those that would prevail absent the merger.
VIII. Requested Relief
45. The plaintiffs request: (a) Adjudication that the proposed
merger would violate section 7 of the Clayton Act; (b) permanent
injunctive relief to prevent the consummation of the proposed merger
and to prevent the defendants from entering into or carrying out any
agreement, understanding or plan, the effect of which would be to
combine the businesses or assets of defendants; (c) an award of each
plaintiff of its costs in this action; and (d) such other relief as is
proper.
For Plaintiff United States of America
Dated: December 20, 2005.
Thomas O. Barnett (TB 1317),
Acting Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division.
J. Robert Kramer II (RK 3921),
Director of Operations.
John R. Read (JR 8964),
Chief, Litigation III.
Nina B. Hale (NH 7828),
Assistant Chief, Litigation III.
William H. Jones II (WJ 2563),
Allen P. Grunes (AG 4775),
Gregg I. Malawer (GM 6467),
Avery W. Gardiner (AG 2011),
Joan Hogan (JH 5666),
Attorneys for the United States, United States Department of
Justice, Antitrust Division, Litigation III, 325 7th Street, NW.,
Suite 300, Washington, DC 20530.
Bernard M. Hollander (BH 0818),
Senior Trial Attorney.
For Plaintiff State of New York
Eliot Spitzer,
Attorney General.
By: Jay L. Himes (JH 7714),
Chief, Antitrust Bureau.
Richard E. Grimm (RG 6891),
Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Bureau, Office of the Attorney
General, 120 Broadway, Room 26C62, New York, New York 10271-0332.
Tel: (212) 416-8282, (212) 416-8280. Fax: (212) 416-6015.
For Plaintiff State of Illinois
Lisa Madigan,
Attorney General.
By: Robert W. Pratt (RP 7924),
Chief, Antitrust Bureau, Office of the Attorney General, State of
Illinois, 100 West Randolph Street, 13th Floor, Chicago, Illinois
60601. (312) 814-3722.
Kavita Puri,
Assistant Attorney General, of Counsel.
For Plaintiff State of Massachusetts
Thomas F. Reilly,
Attorney General.
By: Mary Freely (MF 1359),
Jeffrey Shapiro (JS 5521),
Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General of
Massachusetts, One Ashburton Place, 19th Floor, Boston, MA 02108.
(617) 727-2200 ext. 2985.
Exhibit A; Definition of HHI and Calculations for Market
``HHI'' means the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, a commonly accepted
measure of market concentration. It is calculated by squaring the
market share of each firm competing in the market and then summing the
resulting numbers. For example, for a market consisting of four firms
with shares of thirty, thirty, twenty and twenty percent, the HHI is
2600 (302 + 302 + 202 + 202
= 2600). The HHI takes into account the relative size and distribution
of the firms in a market and approaches zero when a market consists of
a large number of firms of relatively equal size. The HHI increases
both as the number of firms in the market decreases and as the
disparity in size between those firms increases.
Markets in which the HHI is between 1000 and 1800 points are
considered to be moderately concentrated, and those in which the HHI is
in excess of 1800 points are considered to be concentrated.
Transactions that increase the HHI by more than 100 points in
concentrated markets presumptively raise antitrust concerns under the
Merger Guidelines. See Merger Guidelines Sec. 1.51.
Final Judgment
Whereas, plaintiffs, United States of America, the State of
Illinois, the State of New York, and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts
filed their Complaint on December 22, 2005, plaintiffs and defendants,
Marquee Holdings, Inc. (``AMC'') and LCE Holdings, Inc. (``Loews''), by
their respective attorneys, have consented to the entry of this Final
Judgment without trial or adjudication of any issue of fact or law, and
without this Final Judgment constituting any evidence against or
admission by any party regarding any issue of fact or law;
And Whereas, defendants agree to be bound by the provisions of this
Final Judgment pending its approval by the Court;
And Whereas, the essence of this Final Judgment is the prompt and
certain divestiture[s] of certain rights or assets by the defendants to
assure that competition is not substantially lessened;
And Whereas, plaintiffs require defendants to make certain
divestiture[s] for the purpose of remedying the loss of competition
alleged in the Complaint;
And Whereas, defendants have represented to the United States that
the divestiture[s] required below can and will be made and that
defendants will later raise no claim of hardship or difficulty as
grounds for asking the Court to modify any of the divestiture
provisions contained below;
Now Therefore, before any testimony is taken, without trial or
adjudication of any issue of fact or law, and upon consent of the
parties, it is Ordered, Adjudged and Decreed:
I. Jurisdiction
This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of and each of
the parties to this action. The Complaint states a claim upon which
relief may be granted against defendants under section 7 of
[[Page 3332]]
the Clayton Act, as amended (15 U.S.C. 18).
II. Definitions
As used in this Final Judgment:
A. ``Acquirer'' or ``Acquirers'' means the entity or entities to
whom defendants divest the Theatre Assets.
B. ``AMC'' means defendant Marquee Holdings, Inc., a Delaware
corporation with its headquarters in Kansas City, Missouri, its
successors and assigns, and its subsidiaries, divisions, groups,
affiliates, partnerships and joint ventures, and their directors,
officers, managers, agents, and employees.
C. ``Loews'' means defendant LCE Holdings, Inc., a Delaware
corporation with its headquarters in New York City, New York, its
successors and assigns, and its subsidiaries, divisions, groups,
affiliates, partnerships and joint ventures, and their directors,
officers, managers, agents, and employees.
D. ``Landlord Consent'' means any contractual approval or consent
that the landlord or owner of one or more of the Theatre Assets, or the
property on which one or more of the Theatre Assets is situated, must
grant prior to the transfer of one of the Theatre Assets to an
Acquirer.
E. ``Theatre Assets'' means the first-run, commercial motion
picture theatre businesses operated by AMC or Loews, under the
following names and at the following locations:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Theatre name Theatre address
------------------------------------------------------------------------
i. City North 14.......................... 2600 N. Western Ave.
Chicago, IL.
ii. Webster Place 11...................... 1471 W. Webster Avenue
Chicago, IL.
iii. E-Walk 13............................ 247 W. 42nd St. New York,
NY.
iv. Meridian 16........................... 1501 7th Ave. Seattle, WA.
v. Fenway 13.............................. 201 Brookline Ave. Boston,
MA.
vi. Keystone Park 16...................... 13933 N. Central Expressway
Dallas, TX.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The term ``Theatre Assets'' includes:
1. All tangible assets that comprise the first-run, commercial
motion picture theatre business including all equipment, fixed assets
and fixtures, personal property, inventory, office furniture,
materials, supplies, and other tangible property and all assets used in
connection with the Theatre Assets; all licenses, permits and
authorizations issued by any governmental organization relating to the
Theatre Assets; all contracts, agreements, leases, commitments,
certifications, and understandings, relating to the Theatre Assets,
including supply agreements; all customer lists, contracts, accounts,
and credit records; all repair and performance records and all other
records relating to the Theater Assets;
2. All intangible assets used in the development, production,
servicing and sale of Theatre Assets, including, but not limited to all
licenses and sublicenses, intellectual property, technical information,
computer software (except defendants' proprietary software) and related
documentation, know-how, drawings, blueprints, designs, specifications
for materials, specifications for parts and devices, quality assurance
and control procedures, all technical manuals and information
defendants provide to their own employees, customers, suppliers, agents
or licensees, and all research data relating to the Theatre Assets.
Provided however, that this term does not include (a) any right to use
or interest in defendants' copyrights, trademarks, trade names, service
marks or service names, or (b) assets that the defendants do not own
and are not legally able to transfer.
III. Applicability
A. This Final Judgment applies to AMC and Loews, as defined above,
and all other persons in active concert or participation with any of
them who receive actual notice of this Final Judgment by personal
service or otherwise.
B. Defendants shall require, as a condition of the sale or other
disposition of all or substantially all of their assets or of lesser
business units that include the Theatre Assets, that the purchaser
agrees to be bound by the provisions of this Final Judgment, provided,
however, that defendants need not obtain such an agreement from the
Acquirer[s].
IV. Divestitures
A. Defendants are ordered and directed, within 120 calendar days
after the filing of the Complaint in this matter, of five (5) days
after notice of the entry of this Final Judgment by the Court,
whichever is later, to divest the Theatre Assets in a manner consistent
with this Final Judgment to an Acquirer acceptable to the United States
in its sole discretion after consultation with the State of Illinois,
State of New York, and Commonwealth of Massachusetts, as appropriate.
The United States, in its sole discretion, may agree to one or more
extensions of this time period not to exceed 60 days in total, and
shall notify the Court in such circumstances, Defendants agree to use
their best efforts to divest the Theatre Assets as expeditiously as
possible.
B. In accomplishing the divestiture[s] ordered by this Final
Judgment, defendants promptly shall make known, by usual and customary
means, the availability of the Theatre Assets. Defendants shall inform
any person making inquiry regarding a possible purchase of the Theatre
Assets that they are being divested pursuant to this Final Judgment and
provide that person with a copy of this Final Judgment. Defendants
shall offer to furnish to all prospective Acquirers, subject to
customary confidentiality assurances, all information and documents
relating to the Theater Assets customarily provided in a due diligence
process except such information or documents subject to the attorney-
client or work-product privileges. Defendants shall make available such
information to the United States at the same time that such information
is made available to any other person.
C. Defendants shall provide the Acquirer[s] and the United States
information relating to the personnel involved in the operation of the
Theatre Assets to enable the Acquirer[s] to make offers of employment.
Defendants will not interfere with any negotiations by the Acquirer[s]
to employ any defendant employee whose primary responsibility is the
operation of the Theater Assets.
D. Defendants shall permit prospective Acquirers of the Theatre
Assets to have reasonable access to personnel and to make inspections
of the physical facilities of the Theater Assets; access to any and all
environmental, zoning, and other permit documents and information; and
access to any and all financial, operational, or other documents and
information customarily provided as part of a due diligence process.
E. Defendants shall warrant to all Acquirers of the Theatre Assets
that each asset will be operated on the date of sale.
F. Defendants shall not take any action that will impede in any way
the permitting, operation, or divestiture[s] of the Theatre Assets.
G. At the option of the Acquirer[s], defendants shall enter into an
agreement for products and services, such as computer support services,
that are reasonably necessary for the Acquirer[s] to effectively
operate the Theatre Assets during a transition period. The terms and
conditions of any contractual arrangements meant to satisfy this
provision must be commercially reasonable for those products and
services for which the agreement is entered and shall remain in effect
for no more than three months, absent approval of the United States, in
its sole
[[Page 3333]]
discretion, after consultation with the State of Illinois, State of New
York, and Commonwealth of Massachusetts, as appropriate.
H. Defendants shall warrant to the Acquirer[s] of the Theatre
Assets that there are no material defects in the environmental, zoning
or other permits pertaining to the operation of each asset, and that
following the sale of the Theatre Assets, defendants will not
undertake, directly or indirectly, any challenges to the environmental,
zoning, or other permits relating to the operation of the Theatre
Assets.
I. Unless the United States otherwise consents in writing, the
divestiture[s] pursuant to section IV, or by trustee appointed pursuant
to section V, of this Final Judgment, shall include the entire Theatre
Assets, and shall be accomplished in such a way as to satisfy the
United States, in its sole discretion (after consultation with the
State of Illinois, State of New York, and Commonwealth of
Massachusetts, as appropriate) that the Theatre Assets can and will be
used by the Acquirer[s] as part of a viable, ongoing business of first-
run, commercial motion picture theatres. Divestiture[s] of the Theatre
Assets may be made to one or more Acquirers, provided that in each
instance it is demonstrated to the sole satisfaction of the United
States that the Theatre Assets will remain viable and the
divestiture[s] of such assets will remedy the competitive harm alleged
in the Complaint. The divestiture[s], whether pursuant to section IV or
section V of this Final Judgment,
(1) shall be made to an Acquirer (or Acquirers) that, in the
United State's sole judgment (after consultation with the State of
Illinois, State of New York, and Commonwealth of Massachusetts, as
appropriate), has the intent and capability (including the necessary
managerial, operational, technical and financial capability) of
competing effectively in the business of first-run, commercial
motion picture theatres; and
(2) shall be accomplished so as to satisfy the United States, in
its sole discretion (after consultation with the State of Illinois,
State of New York, and Commonwealth of Massachusetts, as
appropriate), that none of the terms of any agreement between an
Acquirer (or Acquirers) and defendants give defendants the ability
unreasonably to raise the Acquirer's costs, to lower the Acquirer's
efficiency, or otherwise to interfere in the ability of the Acquirer
to compete effectively.
V. Appointment of Trustee
A. If defendants have not divested the Theatre Assets within the
time period specified in section IV(A), defendants shall notify the
United States of that fact in writing. Upon application of the United
States, the Court shall appoint a trustee selected by the United States
and approved by the Court to effect the divestiture[s] of the Theatre
Assets.
B. After the appointment of a trustee becomes effective, only the
trustee shall have the right to sell the Theatre Assets. The trustee
shall have the power and authority to accomplish the divestiture[s] to
an Acquirer[s] acceptable to the United States (after consultation with
the State of Illinois, State of New York, and Commonwealth of
Massachusetts, as appropriate) at such price and on such terms as are
then obtainable upon reasonable effort by the trustee, subject to the
provision of section, IV, V, VI, and VII of this Final Judgment, and
shall have such other powers as this Court deems appropriate. Subject
to section V(D) of this Final Judgment, the trustee may hire at the
cost and expense of defendants any investment bankers, attorneys, or
other agents, who shall be solely accountable to the trustee,
reasonably necessary in the trustee's judgment to assist in the
divestiture[s].
C. Defendants shall not object to a sale by the trustee on any
ground other than the trustee's malfeasance. Any such objections by
defendants must be conveyed in writing to the United States and the
trustee within ten (10) calendar days after the trustee has provided
the notice required under section VII.
D. The trustee shall serve at the cost and expense of defendants,
on such terms and conditions as the Court approves, and shall account
for all monies derived from the sale of the assets sold by the trustee
and all costs and expenses so incurred. After approval by the Court of
the trustee's accounting, including fees for its services and those of
any professionals and agents retained by the trustee, all remaining
money shall be paid to defendants and the trust shall then be
terminated. The compensation of the trustee and any professionals and
agents retained by the trustee shall be reasonable in light of the
value of the Theatre Assets and based on a fee arrangement providing
the trustee with an incentive based on the price and terms of the
divestiture[s] and the speed with which it is accomplished, but
timeliness is paramount.
E. Defendants shall use their best efforts to assist the trustee in
accomplishing the required divestiture[s]. The trustee and any
consultants, accountants, attorneys, and other persons retained by the
trustee shall have full and complete access to the personnel, books,
records, and facilities of the business to be divested, and defendants
shall develop financial and other information relevant to such business
as the trustee may reasonably request, subject to reasonable protection
for trade secret or other confidential research, development, or
commercial information. Defendants shall take no action to interfere
with or to impede the trustee's accomplishment of the divestiture[s].
F. After its appointment, the trustee shall file monthly reports
with the parties and the Court setting forth the trustee's efforts to
accomplish the divestiture[s] ordered under this Final Judgment. To the
extent such reports contain information that the trustee deems
confidential, such reports shall not be filed in the public docket of
the Court. Such reports shall include the name, address, and telephone
number of each person who, during the preceding month, made an offer to
acquire, expressed an interest in acquiring, entered into negotiations
to acquire, or was contacted or made an inquiry about acquiring, any
interest in the Theatre Assets, and shall describe in detail each
contact with any such person. The trustee shall maintain full records
of all efforts made to divest the Theatre Assets.
G. If the trustee has not accomplished such divestiture[s] within
six months after its appointment, the trustee shall promptly file with
the Court a report setting forth (1) the trustee's efforts to
accomplish the required divestiture[s], (2) the reasons, in the
trustee's judgment, why the required divestiture[s] has not been
accomplished, and (3) the trustee's recommendations. To the extent such
reports contain information that the trustee deems confidential, such
reports shall not be filed in the public docket of the Court. The
trustee shall at the same time furnish such report to the United States
and, as appropriate, the State of Illinois, State of New York, and
Commonwealth of Massachusetts who shall have the right to make
additional recommendations consistent with the purpose of the trust.
The Court thereafter shall enter such orders as it shall deem
appropriate to carry out the purposes of the Final Judgment, which may,
if necessary, include extending the trust and the term of the trustee's
appointment by a period requested by the United States.
VI. Landlord Consent
A. If defendants are unable to effect the divestiture[s] required
herein due to the inability to obtain the Landlord Consent for any of
the Theatre Assets, defendants shall divest alternative Theatre Assets
that complete effectively with the theatre for which Landlord Consent
was not obtained. The United
[[Page 3334]]
States shall in its sole discretion (after consultation with the State
of Illinois, State of New York, and Commonwealth of Massachusetts, as
appropriate), determine whether such theatre competes effectively with
the theatre for which landlord consent was not obtained.
B. Within five (5) business days following a determination that
Landlord Consent cannot be obtained for one of the Theatre Assets,
defendants shall notify the United States and propose an alternative
divestiture pursuant to section VI(A). The United States shall have
then ten (10) business days in which to determine whether such theatre
is a suitable alternative pursuant to section VI(A). If the defendants'
selection is deemed not to be a suitable alternative, the United States
shall in its sole discretion select the theatre to be divested (after
consultation with the State of Illinois, State of New York, and
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, as appropriate).
C. If the trustee is responsible for effecting the divestiture[s],
it shall notify both the United States and the defendants within five
(5) business days following a determination that Landlord Consent can
not be obtained for one of the Theatre Assets. Defendants shall
thereafter have five (5) business days to propose an alternative
divestiture pursuant to section VI(a). The United States shall have
then ten (10) business days in which to determine whether such theatre
is suitable alternative pursuant to section VI(a). If the defendants'
selection is deemed not to be a suitable competitive alternative, the
United States shall in its sole discretion select the theatre to be
divested (after consultation with the State of Illinois, State of New
York, and Commonwealth of Massachusetts, as appropriate).
VII. Notice of Proposed Divestitures
A. Within two (2) business days following execution of a definitive
divestiture agreement, defendants or the trustee, whichever is then
responsible for effecting the divestiture[s] required herein, shall
notify the United States and, as appropriate, the State of Illinois,
State of New York, and Commonwealth of Massachusetts of any proposed
divestiture[s] required by sections IV or V of this Final Judgment. If
the trustee is responsible, it shall similarly notify defendants. The
notice shall set forth the details of the proposed divestiture[s] and
list the name, address, and telephone number of each person not
previously identified who offered or expressed an interest in or desire
to acquire any ownership interest in the Theatre Assets, together with
full details of the same.
B. Within fifteen (15) calendar days of receipt by the United
States of such notice, the United States may request from defendants,
the proposed Acquirer or Acquirers, any other third party, or the
trustee if applicable additional information concerning the proposed
divestiture[s], the proposed Acquirer or Acquirers, and any other
potential Acquirer. Defendants and the trustee shall furnish any
additional information requested within fifteen (15) calendar days of
the receipt of the request, unless the parties shall otherwise agree.
C. Within thirty (30) calendar days after receipt of the notice or
within twenty (20) calendar days after the United States has been
provided the additional information requested from defendants, the
proposed Acquirer or Acquirers, any third party, and the trustee,
whichever is later, the United States shall provide written notice to
defendants and the trustee, if there is one, stating whether or not it
objects to the proposed divestiture[s]. If the United States provides
written notice that it does not object, the divestiture[s] may be
consummated, subject only to defendants' limited right to object to the
sale under section V(C) of this Final Judgment. Absent written notice
that the United States does not object to the proposed Acquirer[s] or
upon objection by the United States, the divestiture[s] proposed under
section IV or section V shall not be consummated. Upon objection by
defendants under section V(C), the divestiture[s] proposed under
section V shall not be consummated unless approved by the Court.
VIII. Financing
Defendants shall not finance all or any part of any purchase to
section IV or V of this Final Judgment.
IX. Hold Separate
Until the divestiture[s] required by this Final Judgment has been
accomplished defendants shall take all steps necessary to comply with
the Hold Separate Stipulation and Order entered by this Court.
Defendants shall take no action that would jeopardize the
divestiture[s] ordered by this Court.
X. Affidavits
A. Within twenty (20) calendar days of the filing of the Complaint
in this matter, and every thirty (30) calendar days thereafter until
the divestiture[s] has/have been completed under section IV or V,
defendants shall deliver to the United States an affidavit as to the
fact and manner of its compliance with section IV or V of this Final
Judgment. Each such affidavit shall include the name, address, and
telephone number of each person who, during the preceding thirty days,
made an offer to acquire, expressed an interest in acquiring, entered
into negotiations to acquire, or was contacted or made an inquiry about
acquiring, any interest in the Theatre Assets, and shall describe in
detail each contact with any such person during that period. Each such
affidavit shall also include a description of the efforts defendants
have taken to solicit buyers for the Theatre Assets, and to provide
required information to prospective purchasers, including the
limitations, if any, on such information. Assuming the information set
forth in the affidavit is true and complete, any objection by the
United States to information provided by defendants, including
limitation on information, shall be made within fourteen (14) days of
receipt of such affidavit.
B. Within twenty (20) calendar days of the filing of the Complaint
in this matter, defendants shall deliver to the United States an
affidavit that describes in reasonable detail all actions defendants
have taken and all steps defendants have implemented on an ongoing
basis to comply with section IX of this Final Judgment. Defendants
shall deliver to the United States an affidavit describing any changes
to the efforts and actions outlined in defendants' earlier affidavits
filed pursuant to this section within fifteen (15) days after the
change is implemented.
C. Defendants shall keep all records of all efforts made to
preserve and divest the Theatre Assets until one year after such
divestiture[s] has/have been completed.
XI. Compliance Inspection
A. For the purposes of determining or securing compliance with this
Final Judgment, or of determining whether the Final Judgment should be
modified or vacated, and subject to any legally recognized privilege,
from time to time duly authorized representatives of the United States
Department of Justice, the State of Illinois, State of New York, or
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, including consultants and other persons
retained by either of them, shall, upon written request of a duly
authorized representative of the Assistant Attorney General in charge
of Antitrust Division, the Attorney General for Illinois, Attorney
General for New York, or Attorney General for Massachusetts, and on
reasonable notice to defendants, be permitted.
(1) Access during defendants' office hours to inspect and copy,
or at plantiff's option, to require defendants provide copies of,
all
[[Page 3335]]
books, ledgers, accounts, records and documents in the possession,
custody, or control of defendants, relating to any matters contained
in this Final Judgment; and
(2) To interview, either informally or on the record,
defendants' officers, employees, or agents, who may have their
individual counsel present, regarding such matters. The interviews
shall be subject to the reasonable convenience of the interviewee
and without restraint or interference by defendants.
B. Upon the written request of a duly authorized representative of
the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division, the
Attorney General of Illinois, Attorney General for New York, or
Attorney General for Massachusetts, defendants shall submit written
reports, under oath if requested, relating to any of the matters
contained in this Final Judgment as may be requested.
C. No information or documents obtained by the means provided in
this section shall be divulged by the United States, the State of
Illinois, State of New York, or Commonwealth of Massachusetts, to any
person other than an authorized representative of the executive branch
of the United States, or of each state government, except in the course
of legal proceedings to which at least one of the plaintiffs is a party
(including grand jury proceedings), or for the purpose of securing
compliance with this Final Judgment, or as otherwise required by law.
D. If at the time information or documents are furnished by
defendants to the plaintiffs, defendants represent and identify in
writing the material in any such information or documents to which a
claim of protection may be asserted under Rule 26(c)(7) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, and defendants mark each pertinent page of
such material, ``Subject to claim of protection under Rule 26(c)(7) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,'' then the plaintiffs shall give
defendants ten (10) calendar days notice prior to divulging such
material in any legal proceeding (other than a grand jury proceeding).
XII. Notification
Unless such transaction is otherwise subject to the reporting and
waiting period requirements of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust
Improvements Act of 1976, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 18a (the ``HSR Act''),
defendants, without providing advance notification to the United
States, shall not directly or indirectly acquire any assets of or any
interest, including any financial, security, loan, equity or management
interest, in the business of first-run, commercial theatres in Cook
County, Illinois; New York County, New York (Manhattan); King County,
Washington; Suffolk County, Massachusetts; and Dallas County, Texas
during a 10-year period. This notification requirement shall apply only
to the acquisition of any assets or any interest in the business of
first-run, commercial motion picture theatres at the time of the
acquisition and shall not be construed to require notification of
acquisition of interest in new theatre developments or of assets not
being operated as first-run commercial motion picture theatre
businesses, provided, that this notification requirement shall apply to
first-run, commercial theatres under construction at the time of the
entering of this Final Judgment.
Such notification shall be provided to the United States in the
same format as, and per the instructions relating to the Notification
and Report Form set forth in the Appendix to part 803 of Title 16 of
the Code of Federal Regulations as amended, except that the information
requested in Items 5 through 9 of the instructions must be provided
only about first-run, commercial theatres. Notification shall be
provided at least thirty (30) days prior to acquiring any such
interest, and shall include, beyond what may be required by the
applicable instructions, the names of the principal representatives of
the parties to the agreement who negotiated the agreement, and any
management or strategic plans discussing the proposed transaction. If
within the 30-day period after notification, representatives of require
make a written request for additional information, defendants shall not
consummate the proposed transaction or agreement until twenty (20) days
after submitting all such additional information. Early termination of
the waiting periods in this paragraph may be requested and, where
appropriate, granted in the same manner as is applicable under the
requirements and provisions of the HSR Act and rules promulgated
thereunder. This section shall be broadly construed and any ambiguity
or uncertainly regarding the filing of notice under this Section shall
be resolved in favor of filing notice.
XIII. No Reacquisition
Defendants may not reacquire any part of the Theatre Assets during
the term of this Final Judgment.
XIV. Retention of Jurisdiction
This Court retains jurisdiction to enable any party to this Final
Judgment to apply to this Court at any time for further orders and
directions as may be necessary or appropriate to carry out or construe
this Final Judgment, to modify any of its provisions, to enforce
compliance, and to punish violations of its provisions.
XV. Expiration of Final Judgment
Unless this Court grants an extension, this Final Judgment shall
expire ten years from the date of its entry.
XVI. Public Interest Determination
Entry of this Final Judgment is in the public interest.
Date: ----------
Court approval subject to procedures of Antitrust Procedures and
Penalties Act, 15 U.S.C. 16.
Respectfully submitted,
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
United States District Judge.
For Plaintiff United States of America
Dated: December 20, 2005.
William H. Jones II (WJ 2563),
Allen P. Grunes (AG 475),
Gregg I. Malawer (GM 6467),
Avery W. Gardiner (AG 2011),
Joan Hogan (JH 5666),
Attorneys.
Bernard M. Hollander (BH 0818),
Senior Trial Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust
Division, Litigation III Section, 325 Seventh Street, NW., Suite
300, Washington, DC 20530. Tel: (202) 514-0230. Fax: (202) 307-9952.
For Plaintiff State of New York
Eliot Spitzer,
Attorney General.
By: Jay L. Himes (JH 7714),
Chief, Antitrust Bureau.
Richard E. Grimm (RG 6891),
Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Bureau, Office of the Attorney
General, 120 Broadway, room 26C62, New York, New York 10271-0332.
Tel: (212) 416-8282, (212) 416-8280. Fax: (212) 416-6015.
For Plaintiff State of Illinois
Lisa Madigan,
Attorney General.
By: Robert W. Pratt (RP 7924),
Chief, Antitrust Bureau, Office of the Attorney General, State of
Illinois, 100 West Randolph Street, 13th Floor, Chicago, Illinois
60601. (312) 814-3722.
Kavita Puri,
Assistant Attorney General, of Counsel.
For Plaintiff Comonwealth of Massachusetts
Thomas F. Reilly,
Attorney General.
By: Jeffrey S. Shapiro (JS 5521),
Mary B. Freeley (MF 1359),
Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General,
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, One Ashburton Place, Boston, MA
02108. (617) 727-2200.
[[Page 3336]]
For Defendant AMC
Ilene K. Gotts,
Damian Didden,
Wachell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz,
51 West 52nd Street, New York, NY 10019, Tel: (212) 403-1113. Fax:
(212) 403-2113.
For Defendant Loews
Deborah L. Feinstein,
Arnold & Porter,
555 Twelfth Street, NW., Washington, DC 20004. Tel: (202) 942-5015.
Fax: (202) 942-5999.
William H. Jones II (WJ 2563),
United States Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, 325 7th
Street, NW., Suite 300, Washington, DC 20530. (202) 514-0230.
Attorney for Plaintiff United States of America.
Competitive Impact Statement
Plaintiff, the United States of America, pursuant to section 2(b)
of the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act (``APPA''), 15 U.S.C.
16(b)-(h), files this Competitive Impact Statement relating to the
proposed Final Judgment submitted for entry in this civil antitrust
proceeding.
I. Nature and Purpose of the Proceeding
Plaintiffs the United States, the State of Illinois, the State of
New York, and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts filed a civil antitrust
Complaint on December --, 2005, alleging that a proposed merger of
Marquee Holdings, Inc. (``AMC'') and LCE Holdings, Inc. (``Loews'')
would violate section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C 18. The Complaint
alleges that AMC and Loews both operate motion picture theatres
throughout the United States, and that they each operate first-run,
commercial motion picture theatres in Chicago North, Midtown Manhattan,
downtown Seattle, downtown Boston, and north Dallas. The merger would
combine the two leading theatre circuits in the above listed markets
and give the newly merged firm a dominant position in those localities:
In Chicago North the newly merged firm would have a 100% market share
(by revenue); in Midtown Manhattan, the newly merged firm would have a
88% market share (by revenue); in downtown Seattle the newly merged
firm would have a 100% market share (by revenue); in downtown Boston,
the newly merged firm would have a 100% market share (by revenue); and
in north Dallas the newly merged firm would have a 78% market share (by
revenue). As a result, the combination would substantially lessen
competition and tend to create a monopoly in the markets for theatrical
exhibition of first-run, commercial films in the above listed local
markets.
The prayer for relief seeks: (a) An adjudication that the proposed
merger described in the Complaint would violate section 7 of the
Clayton Act; (b) permanent injunctive relief preventing the
consummation of the transaction; (c) an award to each plaintiff of the
costs of this action; and (d) such other relief as is proper.
Shortly before this suit was filed, a proposed settlement was
reached that permits AMC to complete its merger with Loews, yet
preserves competition in the markets in which the transactions would
raise significant competitive concerns. A Stipulation and proposed
Final Judgment embodying the settlement were filed at the same time the
Complaint was filed.
The proposed Final Judgment, which is explained more fully be