David Geisen; Order Prohibiting Involvement in NRC-Licensed Activities (Effective Immediately), 2571-2576 [E6-437]

Agencies

• NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Federal Register Volume 71, Number 10 (Tuesday, January 17, 2006)]
[Notices]
[Pages 2571-2576]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E6-437]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[IA-05-052]


David Geisen; Order Prohibiting Involvement in NRC-Licensed 
Activities (Effective Immediately)

I

    Mr. David Geisen was previously employed, at times relevant to this 
Order, as the Manager of Design Engineering at the Davis-Besse Nuclear 
Power Station (Davis-Besse) operated by FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating 
Company (FENOC or licensee). The licensee holds License No. NPF-3 which 
was issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or Commission) 
pursuant to 10 CFR part 50 on April 22, 1977. The license authorizes 
the operation of Davis-Besse in accordance with the conditions 
specified therein. The facility is located on the licensee's site near 
Oak Harbor, Ohio.

II

    On August 3, 2001, the NRC issued Bulletin 2001-001, 
``Circumferential Cracking of Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Penetration 
Nozzles,'' (Bulletin). In the Bulletin, the NRC requested that all 
holders of operating licenses for pressurized water nuclear power 
reactors (PWR), including FENOC for the Davis-Besse facility, provide 
information to the NRC relating to the structural integrity of the 
reactor pressure vessel (RPV) head penetration nozzles at their 
respective facilities. The information requested from the licensees 
included the extent of RPV head penetration nozzle leakage and cracking 
that had been found to date, a description of the inspections and 
repairs undertaken to satisfy applicable regulatory requirements, and 
the basis for concluding that a licensee's plans for future inspections 
would ensure compliance with applicable regulatory requirements. The 
NRC also required that all Bulletin addressees, including FENOC, submit 
a written response to the NRC in accordance with the provisions of 10 
CFR 50.54(f). That

[[Page 2572]]

regulation provides, in part, that upon request of the NRC, an NRC-
licensee must submit written statements, signed under oath or 
affirmation, to enable the NRC to determine whether the license should 
be modified, suspended, or revoked.
    On September 4, October 17, and October 30, 2001, the licensee 
provided written responses to the Bulletin. Additionally, the licensee 
met with the NRC staff on numerous occasions during October and 
November of 2001 to provide clarifying information. Based, in part, on 
the information provided by FENOC in its written responses to the 
Bulletin and during meetings with the NRC staff, the NRC staff allowed 
the licensee to continue operation of the Davis-Besse facility until 
February 2002, rather than requiring FENOC to shut the unit down to 
perform inspections by December 31, 2001, as provided in the Bulletin.
    On February 16, 2002, FENOC shut down Davis-Besse for refueling and 
inspection of control rod drive mechanism (CRDM) RPV head penetration 
nozzles. Using ultrasonic testing, the licensee found cracks in three 
CRDM RPV head penetration nozzles and on March 6, 2002, the licensee 
discovered a cavity in the RPV head in the vicinity of CRDM Penetration 
Nozzle No. 3. The cavity measured approximately 5 to 7 inches long, 4 
to 5 inches wide, and penetrated through the 6.63 inch-thick low-alloy 
steel portion of the RPV head, leaving the stainless steel cladding 
material (measuring 0.202 to 0.314 inches-thick) as the sole reactor 
coolant system (RCS) pressure boundary. A smaller cavity was also found 
near CRDM Penetration Nozzle No. 2.
    The licensee conducted a root cause evaluation and determined that, 
contrary to the earlier information provided to the NRC, the cavities 
were caused by boric acid from the RCS released through cracks in the 
CRDM RPV head penetration nozzles. The root cause evaluation found that 
the licensee conducted limited cleaning and inspections of the RPV head 
during the Twelfth Refueling Outage (12RFO) that ended on May 18, 2000. 
However, neither the limited RPV head cleaning nor the resultant 
inspections during 12RFO were sufficient to ensure that the significant 
boric acid deposits on the RPV head were only a result of CRDM flange 
leakage, as supposed, and were not a result of RCS pressure boundary 
leakage.
    On March 6 and March 10, 2002, the licensee provided information to 
the NRC concerning the identification of a large cavity in the RPV head 
adjacent to CRDM Penetration Nozzle No. 3. The NRC conducted an 
Augmented Inspection Team (AIT) inspection at Davis-Besse from March 12 
to April 5, 2002, to determine the facts and circumstances related to 
the significant degradation of the RPV head. The results of the AIT 
inspection were documented in NRC Inspection Report No. 50-346/2002-03, 
issued on May 3, 2002. A follow-up Special Inspection was conducted 
from May 15 to August 9, 2002, and on October 2, 2002, the NRC issued 
the AIT Follow-up Special Inspection Report No. 50-346/2002-08 
documenting ten apparent violations associated with the RPV head 
degradation.
    On April 22, 2002, the NRC Office of Investigations (OI) initiated 
an investigation at Davis-Besse to determine, among other matters, 
whether FENOC and individual employees at the Davis-Besse facility 
failed to provide complete and accurate information to the NRC in its 
September 4, October 17, and October 30, 2001, responses to the 
Bulletin and during numerous conference calls and meetings in violation 
of 10 CFR 50.9 and 10 CFR 50.5(a)(2). The OI report (No. 3-2002-006) 
was issued on August 22, 2003. A copy of the OI report was provided to 
the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), Office of the United States 
Attorney, Northern District of Ohio for review. The matter remains 
under continued Federal investigation. Mr. Geisen, through the 
performance of his engineering duties, and through oral and written 
communications with other FENOC employees, was aware of the results of 
previous RPV head inspections. For example:
     On April 27, 2000, Mr. Geisen signed and closed out 
Condition Report (CR) 2000-1037 which included the following problem 
statement associated with the identification of five leaking control 
rod drives:

    ``Identified at locations: F10, D10, C11, F8, and G9 * * * There 
are no boron deposits on the vertical faces of the flange of G9 
drive. The bottom of the flange of G9 drive is inaccessible for 
inspection due to the boron buildup on the reactor head insulation, 
not allowing full camera insertion. Since the boron is evident only 
under the flange and not on the vertical surfaces, there is a high 
probability that G9 is a leaking CRD.''

     On June 27, 2001, Mr. Giesen approved and signed an intra-
company memorandum that indicated that ``large boron leakage from a 
control rod drive mechanism (CRDM) flange was observed during 12RFO 
inspection'' and ``This leakage did not permit the detailed inspection 
of CRDM nozzles.''
     On August 11, 2001, Mr. Geisen received an E-mail that 
stated, in part: ``it was pointed out that we cannot clean our head 
thru the mouse holes and a system engineer is requesting that three 
large holes be cut in the Service Structure for viewing [inspection] 
and cleaning.''
     Mr. Geisen reviewed a Piedmont Management and Technical 
Services, Inc., report, dated September 14, 2001, that indicated, in 
part, that at the completion of 12RFO the RPV head had boric acid 
deposits of considerable depth left at the center top area of the head.
     A Senior Staff Nuclear Advisor (former inservice 
inspector), FENOC, at the request of a system engineer from Davis-Besse 
plant engineering, reviewed a CD ROM video that the system engineer had 
made from videos of the reactor vessel head. The purpose of the review 
was to assist in locating or determining the location of some nozzles. 
Shortly after completing the review, Mr. Geisen asked the Senior Staff 
Nuclear Advisor what he thought, from a visual standpoint, of the data 
he had seen on the video. The Senior Staff Nuclear Advisor replied, in 
part, that, based on an Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) head 
examination document being developed, boron on the Davis-Besse head 
would preclude an examination of that nature [EPRI] from being 
performed.
     In March 2002, a consultant from Martin Sigmund Consulting 
Services, Inc., conducted an assessment of reactor head management 
issues at Davis-Besse. The consultant provided his assessment to the 
Davis-Besse Site Vice President via a memorandum dated March 28, 2002. 
The assessment, in part, consisted of interviews with many of the 
personnel involved with the reactor head corrosion issues. Mr. Geisen 
was interviewed for this assessment on March 27, 2002, and stated, in 
part, that some boric acid was left on the head in 2000 and that the 
condition report was not very thoroughly evaluated. Mr. Geisen also 
stated that he became aware that the reactor vessel head had not been 
cleaned completely when reviewing the videos of the inspections in 
preparation for interacting with the NRC in August, 2001.
     On June 18, 2002, the licensee interviewed Mr. Geisen 
regarding the Davis-Besse responses to Bulletin 2001-001. When asked 
whether the reactor vessel head was inspected in accordance with plant 
procedure, Mr. Geisen stated, in part, that we did the inspection but 
clearly not with [in accordance with] the procedure. Mr. Geisen further 
stated that Davis-Besse

[[Page 2573]]

was taking credit for a general inspection which clearly did not meet 
the requirements in Bulletin 2001-001.
    The above information demonstrates that Mr. Geisen had sufficient 
knowledge of the results of previous inspections of the RPV head and 
that he knew that the licensee's written and oral responses to NRC 
Bulletin 2001-001 were incomplete and inaccurate.
    Several FENOC employees, including Mr. David Geisen, were 
responsible for the information provided to the NRC by FENOC in 
response to the Bulletin.

III

    David Geisen was employed by FENOC as the Manager of Design 
Engineering at Davis-Besse at the time the licensee developed and 
transmitted to the NRC its written responses to the Bulletin and at the 
time the licensee met with the NRC to provide clarifying information 
regarding its written responses.
    On August 28, October 17, and October 30, 2001, respectively, Mr. 
Geisen concurred in the issuance of the licensee's September 4, October 
17, and October 30, 2001, responses to the Bulletin. On the concurrence 
sheets, Mr. Geisen was listed as the FENOC manager responsible for 
ensuring the completeness and accuracy of the responses. Mr. Geisen 
participated in the development and presentation of information to the 
NRC during information briefings held on October 3, October 11, and 
November 9, 2001.
    Item 1.d of the Bulletin requested each pressurized water reactor 
(PWR) licensee, including FENOC for Davis-Besse, to provide a 
description of the RPV head penetration nozzles and RPV head inspection 
(including type, scope, qualification requirements, and acceptance 
criteria) that were performed at PWRs in the 4 years preceding the date 
of the Bulletin, and the findings resulting from the inspections. The 
licensees were requested to include a description of any limitations 
(insulation or other impediments) to accessibility of the bare metal of 
the RPV head for visual examinations.
    On September 4, 2001, FENOC submitted its written response to the 
Bulletin for Davis-Besse. Item 1.d of the licensee's September 4, 2001, 
response to the Bulletin stated, in part, that:

    ``The DBNPS [Davis-Besse] has performed two inspections within 
the past four years, during the 11th Refueling Outage (RFO) in April 
1998 and during the 12th RFO in April 2000. The scope of the visual 
inspection was to inspect the bare metal RPV head area that was 
accessible through the weep holes to identify any boric acid leaks/
deposits. The DBNPS also inspected 100% of Control Rod Drive 
Mechanism (CRDM) flanges for leaks in response to Generic Letter 88-
05, `Boric Acid Corrosion of Carbon Steel Reactor pressure Boundary 
Components in PWR Plants.' The results of these two recent 
inspections are described below.
    Inspections of the RPV head are performed with the RPV head 
insulation installed in accordance with DBNPS procedure NG-EN-0324, 
`Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program,' which was developed in 
response to Generic Letter 88-05. As stated previously, a gap exists 
between the RPV head and the insulation, the minimum gap being at 
the dome center of the RPV head where it is approximately 2 inches, 
and does not impede visual inspection. The service structure 
envelopes the DBNPS RPV head and has 18 openings (weep holes) at the 
bottom through which inspections are performed. There are 69 CRDM 
nozzles that penetrate the RPV head. The metal reflective insulation 
is located above the head and does not interfere with the visual 
inspection. The visual inspection is performed by the use of a small 
camera. This camera is inserted through the weep holes.''

    Item 1.d of the licensee's September 4, 2001, response, under the 
section entitled, ``April 2000 Inspection Results (12RFO),'' stated:

    ``The boric acid deposits were located beneath the leaking 
flanges with clear evidence of downward flow. No visible evidence of 
nozzle leakage was detected.''

    Item 1.d of the licensee's September 4, 2001, response, under the 
section entitled, ``Subsequent Review of 1998 and 2000 Inspection 
Videotapes Results,'' stated:

    ``Since May 2001, a review of the 1998 and 2000 inspection 
videotapes of the RPV head has been performed. This review was 
conducted to re-confirm the indications of boron leakage experienced 
at the DBNPS were not similar to the indications seen at ONS and 
ANO-1; i.e., was not indicative of RPV nozzle leakage. This review 
determined that indications such as those that would result from RPV 
head penetration leakage were not evident.''

    The licensee's September 4, 2001, response was materially 
incomplete and inaccurate in that the response: (1) Mischaracterized 
the accumulation of boric acid on the RVP head as a result of the 12RFO 
RPV head inspection; (2) failed to include information that during the 
Eleventh Refueling Outage (11RFO) and 12RFO, the licensee's access to 
the RPV head bare metal was impeded by the presence of significant 
accumulations of boric acid deposits; (3) failed to indicate that the 
presence of boric acid deposits was not limited to the area beneath 
control rod drive mechanism flanges; and (4) failed to indicate that 
the build-up of boric acid deposits was so significant that the 
licensee could not inspect all of the RPV head penetration nozzles. Mr. 
Geisen was aware that the licensee's September 4, 2001, response to the 
Bulletin was materially incomplete and inaccurate, but nevertheless 
concurred on the response, thereby allowing it to be submitted to the 
NRC.
    The NRC staff determined that the September 4, 2001 response did 
not include sufficient information to justify the NRC permitting FENOC 
to operate Davis-Besse beyond December 31, 2001. As a result, FENOC met 
with the NRC staff, Commissioners' Technical Assistants, the Advisory 
Committee on Reactor Safeguards, and Congressional staff members, and 
developed supplemental responses in an effort to better communicate its 
justification for continued operations beyond December 31, 2001.
    On October 3, 2001, Mr. Geisen participated in a conference call 
with the NRC staff. Mr. Geisen was also involved in preparatory 
meetings for the October 3rd conference call. The agenda for the 
conference call stated ``Video Inspection Review from RFO10, RFO11, and 
RFO12: Further Confirmation of no indication of leakage attributable to 
CRDM nozzle leakage; clearly CRDM flange leakage.'' During the 
conference call, Mr. Geisen informed the NRC that 100% of the reactor 
pressure vessel head had been inspected during the last outage (RFO12) 
but some areas were precluded from inspection and that videotapes of 
the 10RFO, 11RFO, and 12RFO reactor pressure vessel head inspections 
had been reviewed. The information communicated by the Mr. Geisen 
during the conference call was materially incomplete and inaccurate in 
that the licensee did not conduct a 100% inspection of the RPV head 
during 12RFO due to the presence of significant amount of boric acid on 
the reactor pressure vessel head which obscured a significant number of 
RPV head nozzles.
    On October 10, 2001, Mr. Geisen attended a meeting with other FENOC 
management officials for the purposes of finalizing presentation slides 
for an October 11, 2001, meeting with the NRC Commissioner's Technical 
Assistants. Draft Presentation Slide 20 stated: ``Reviewed video 
inspections of Reactor Vessel head taken during 11RFO (April 1998) and 
12RFO (April 2000) and confirmed that Davis-Besse has not experienced 
boron leakage as seen at Oconee or Arkansas Nuclear.'' Presentation 
Draft Slide 21 stated: ``Reviewed past 3 outages of Reactor Vessel Head 
inspection video tapes which were taken to satisfy Generic Letter 97-
01: No telltale ``popcorn'' type boron deposits; During 12RFO (Spring 
2000), Davis-Besse identified sources of

[[Page 2574]]

boron that precluded the visual inspection of some CRDM penetrations, 
as five leaking flanges above the mirror insulation; Viewed past 3 
outages of inspection video tapes of area masked by boron in 12 RFO did 
not have previous leakage.''
    On October 11, 2001, Mr. Geisen and other licensee staff briefed 
the NRC Commissioners' Technical Assistants as to FENOC's basis for 
determining that Davis-Besse was safe to operate until the next 
refueling outage (March 2002). During the briefing, FENOC and Mr. 
Geisen, as a presenter, discussed the presentation slides that were 
finalized the previous day. Presentation Slide 6, as presented by FENOC 
stated, in part: ``Conducted and recorded video inspections of the head 
during 11RFO (April 1998) and 12RFO (April 2000)--No head penetration 
leakage was identified.'' Presentation Slide 7, as presented by Mr. 
Geisen stated, in part: ``All CRDM [control rod drive mechanism] 
penetrations were verified to be free from ``popcorn'' type boron 
deposits using video recordings from 11RFO or 12RFO.''
    The licensee's October 11, 2001, presentation to the NRC 
Commissioners' Technical Assistants was materially incomplete and 
inaccurate in that the presentation slides did not state that the 
build-up of boric acid on the RPV head was so significant that the 
licensee could not inspect all of the RPV head penetration nozzles. Due 
to the significant amount of boric acid present on the RPV head, of 
which he was aware, Mr. Geisen did not have a basis for stating that no 
visible evidence of RPV penetration nozzle leakage was detected.
    On October 17, 2001, the licensee provided a supplemental response 
to the Bulletin. The second paragraph under the section entitled, 
``Previous Inspection Results,'' on Page 2 of Attachment 1 of the 
licensee's October 17, 2001, supplemental response stated, in part:

    ``The inspections performed during the 10th, 11th, and 12th 
Refueling Outage (10RFO, conducted April 8 to June 2, 1996; 11RFO, 
conducted April 10 to May 23, 1998; and, 12RFO, conducted April 1 to 
May 18, 2000) consisted of a whole head visual inspection of the RPV 
head in accordance with the DBNPS Boric Acid Control Program 
pursuant to Generic Letter 88-05 `Boric Acid Corrosion of Carbon 
Steel Reactor Pressure Boundary Components in PWR Plants.' The 
visual inspections were conducted by remote camera and included 
below insulation inspections of the RPV bare head such that the 
Control Rod Drive Mechanism (CRDM) nozzle penetrations were viewed. 
During 10RFO, 65 of 69 nozzles were viewed, during 11RFO, 50 of 69 
nozzles were viewed, and during 12RFO, 45 of 69 nozzles were viewed. 
It should be noted that 19 of the obscured nozzles in 12RFO were 
also those obscured in 11RFO.''

    Information included under Column 6 of Attachment 2 of the 
licensee's October 17, 2001, supplemental response stated, in part, 
that 24 nozzles have a ``flange leak evident.'' Note 1 on the same 
table stated, in part:

    ``In 1996 during 10 RFO, the entire RPV head was inspected. 
Since the video was void of head orientation narration, each 
specific nozzle view could not be correlated.''

    The licensee's October 17, 2001, supplemental response was 
materially incomplete and inaccurate, in that the licensee did not view 
the stated number of RPV head penetration nozzles during the referenced 
outages, and the licensee believed that only five RPV head control rod 
drive mechanism flanges were leaking instead of the 24 RPV head control 
rod drive mechanism flanges noted in the response. Mr. Geisen was aware 
that the licensee's October 17, 2001, supplemental response was 
materially incomplete and inaccurate but, nevertheless, concurred on 
the response, thereby allowing it to be submitted to the NRC.
    On October 30, 2001, the licensee provided a supplemental response 
to the Bulletin. In an enclosure to the supplemental response, the 
licensee provided a summary table and photographic images of areas of 
accumulated boric acid crystal deposits on the RPV head. The 
photographic images were labeled to indicate the time the images were 
captured, the specific RPV nozzle locations associated with the images, 
except for those associated with 10 RFO (1996), and narrative comments. 
The labels also represented that the images were generally indicative 
of the condition of the RPV head for 10RFO and 11RFO.
    The licensee's October 30, 2001, supplemental response was 
materially incomplete and inaccurate, in that the photographic images 
of the RPV head nozzles and the accompanying labels were not consistent 
with the actual RPV head conditions and with the actual RPV head nozzle 
pictured. Specifically, the RPV head images omitted images of the 
significant boric acid accumulations present on the RPV head, and many 
of the RPV head nozzle images were mislabeled to indicate that the 
images were of different RPV head nozzles than actually presented in 
the image. In addition, several of the images were mere copies of other 
images with the labels changed. Mr. Geisen labeled the images based on 
his understanding of the head inspections and his discussions with a 
former Davis-Besse system engineer. Mr. Geisen was aware that the 
information contained in the licensee's October 30, 2001, supplemental 
response was materially incomplete and inaccurate but, nevertheless, 
concurred on the response, thereby allowing it to be submitted to the 
NRC.
    On November 9, 2001, in a transcribed presentation to the Advisory 
Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS), Mr. Geisen stated that the 
11RFO (1998) and 12RFO (2000) inspections were focused on inspecting 
the RPV for indications of the impact of boric acid leakage from 
leaking flanges. Mr. Geisen stated that the 1998 and 2000 inspections 
(video tapes) did not give a good view of the control rod drives 
because the camera angle was looking upwards at the structural material 
of the service structure on top of the head. Mr. Geisen stated that the 
video tape of the 10RFO (1996) inspection was a better video because 
the camera was following around a vacuum and probe that were 
specifically looking for head wastage as a result of boron deposits on 
the head. The information provided by the licensee and Mr. Geisen to 
the ACRS was materially incomplete and inaccurate in that each of the 
video tapes was helpful in understanding the significant boron 
accumulations present at the start of each outage, the clear 
impediments to 100% inspection of the RPV head nozzles, and difficulty 
the licensee encountered in its attempts to fully clean the RPV head of 
boron or to complete a comprehensive inspection of the RPV head 
nozzles.
    Following the 1996 RPV head inspection, the licensee generated 
Potential Condition Adverse to Quality Report 96-0551, which stated, in 
part, on Continuation Sheet Page 9, Part C, Item 1:

    ``The extent of the inspection was limited to approximately 50 
to 60% of the head area because of the restrictions imposed by the 
location and size of mouseholes. The inspection showed varying sizes 
of boric acid mounds scattered in various areas of the head. It is 
extremely difficult to develop an estimate of the amount of boric 
acid deposit because of the deposit scatter and limited 
inspection.''

    Based on the above information, the NRC concludes that Mr. Geisen 
had knowledge of the RPV head conditions and the limitations 
experienced during RPV head inspections, and that, notwithstanding that 
knowledge, he deliberately provided materially incomplete and 
inaccurate information when he: (1) Concurred, on August 28,

[[Page 2575]]

October 17, and October 30, 2001, respectively, in the licensee's 
September 4, October 17, and October 30, 2001, responses to the 
Bulletin; and (2) assisted in the preparation and presentation of 
incomplete or inaccurate information during internal meetings on 
October 2 and 10, 2001, and during meetings or teleconferences held 
with the NRC on October 3, 11, and November 9, 2001.
    The information provided by the licensee under oath in the Bulletin 
responses based, in part on the concurrence of Mr. Geisen, was material 
to the NRC because the NRC used the information, in part, to allow 
FENOC to operate Davis-Besse until February 2002 rather than requiring 
the plant to shut down by December 31, 2001, to conduct inspections of 
the head as discussed in Item 3.v.1. of the Bulletin. The information 
provided to the NRC during teleconferences and meetings was material to 
the NRC because the information gave the impression to the NRC staff 
that the Davis-Besse RPV head had been completely inspected and that 
the licensee had not identified any indications of RPV head penetration 
nozzle cracks when this was not the case at the time the response was 
submitted.
    Based on the above information, Mr. David Geisen, while employed by 
the licensee, engaged in deliberate misconduct by deliberately 
providing FENOC and the NRC information that he knew was not complete 
or accurate in all material respects to the NRC, a violation of 10 CFR 
50.5(a)(2). Mr. Geisen's actions also placed FENOC in violation of 10 
CFR 50.9. The NRC determined that these violations were of very high 
safety and regulatory significance because they demonstrated a pattern 
of deliberate inaccurate or incomplete documentation of information 
that was required to be submitted to the NRC. Had the NRC been aware of 
this incomplete and inaccurate information, the NRC would likely have 
taken immediate regulatory action to shut down the plant and require 
the licensee to implement appropriate corrective actions.
    The NRC must be able to rely on the licensee and its employees to 
comply with NRC requirements, including the requirement to provide 
information that is complete and accurate in all material respects. Mr. 
Geisen's action violated 10 CFR 50.5(a)(2) and caused the licensee to 
violate 10 CFR 50.9, and raise serious doubt as to whether he can be 
relied upon to comply with NRC requirements and to provide complete and 
accurate information to the NRC.
    Consequently, I lack the requisite reasonable assurance that 
licensed activities can be conducted in compliance with the 
Commission's requirements and that the health and safety of the public 
will be protected if Mr. Geisen is permitted to be involved in NRC-
licensed activities. Therefore, the public health, safety and interest 
require that Mr. Geisen be prohibited from any involvement in NRC-
licensed activities for a period of five years from the effective date 
of this Order. Additionally, Mr. Geisen is required to notify the NRC 
of his first employment in NRC-licensed activities for a period of five 
years following the prohibition period.

V

    Accordingly, pursuant to sections 103, 104, 161b, 161i, 161o, 182 
and 186 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and the 
Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 2.202, 10 CFR 50.5, and 10 CFR 
150.20, It is hereby ordered that effective immediately:
    1. Mr. David Geisen is prohibited for five years from the date of 
this Order from engaging in NRC-licensed activities. The NRC considers 
NRC-licensed activities to be those activities that are conducted 
pursuant to a specific or general license issued by the NRC, including 
those activities of Agreement State licensees conducted pursuant to the 
authority granted by 10 CFR 150.20.
    2. If Mr. Geisen is currently involved with another licensee in 
NRC-licensed activities, he must immediately cease those activities, 
and inform the NRC of the name, address and telephone number of the 
employer, and provide a copy of this Order to the employer.
    3. For a period of five years after the five-year period of 
prohibition has expired, Mr. Geisen shall, within 20 days of acceptance 
of his first employment offer involving NRC-licensed activities or his 
becoming involved in NRC-licensed activities, as defined in Paragraph 
IV.1 above, provide notice to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, of the name, 
address, and telephone number of the employer or the entity where he 
is, or will be, involved in NRC-licensed activities. In the 
notification, Mr. Geisen shall include a statement of his commitment to 
compliance with regulatory requirements and the basis why the 
Commission should have confidence that he will now comply with 
applicable NRC requirements.
    The Director, Office of Enforcement, may, in writing, relax or 
rescind any of the above conditions upon demonstration by Mr. Geisen of 
good cause.

VI

    In accordance with 10 CFR 2.202, David Geisen must, and any other 
person adversely affected by this Order may, submit an answer to this 
Order, and may request a hearing on this Order within 20 days of the 
date of this Order. However, since this enforcement action is being 
proposed prior to the U.S. Department of Justice completing its review 
of the OI investigation results, consideration may be given to 
extending the response time for submitting an answer as well as the 
time for requesting a hearing, for good cause shown. A request for 
extension of time must be made in writing to the Director, Office of 
Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, 
and include a statement of good cause for the extension. The answer may 
consent to this Order. Unless the answer consents to this Order, the 
answer shall, in writing and under oath or affirmation, specifically 
admit or deny each allegation or charge made in this Order and shall 
set forth the matters of fact and law on which Mr. Geisen or other 
person adversely affected relies and the reasons as to why the Order 
should not have been issued. Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.202(c)(2)(i), Mr. 
Giesen, may, in addition to demanding a hearing, at the time the answer 
is filed or sooner, move the presiding officer to set aside the 
immediate effectiveness of the Order on the ground that the Order, 
including the need for immediate effectiveness, is not based on 
adequate evidence but on mere suspicion, unfounded allegations, or 
error. Any answer or request for a hearing shall be submitted to the 
Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Attn: Rulemakings and 
Adjudications Staff, Washington, DC 20555. Copies also shall be sent to 
the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, Washington, DC 20555, to the Assistant General Counsel for 
Materials Litigation and Enforcement at the same address, to the 
Regional Administrator, NRC Region III, 2443 Warrenville Road, Lisle, 
IL 60532-4352, and to Mr. Geisen if the answer or hearing request is by 
a person other than Mr. Geisen. Because of continuing disruptions in 
delivery of mail to United States Government offices, it is requested 
that answers and requests for hearing be transmitted to the Secretary 
of the Commission either by means of facsimile transmission to 301-415-
1101 or by e-mail to hearingdocket@nrc.gov and also to the Office of 
the General

[[Page 2576]]

Counsel either by means of facsimile transmission to 301-415-3725 or by 
e-mail to OGCMailCenter@nrc.gov. If a person other than Mr. Geisen 
requests a hearing, that person shall set forth with particularity the 
manner in which his interest is adversely affected by this Order and 
shall address the criteria set forth in 10 CFR 2.309.
    If a hearing is requested by Mr. Geisen or a person whose interest 
is adversely affected, the Commission will issue an Order designating 
the time and place of any hearing. If a hearing is held, the issue to 
be considered at such hearing shall be whether this Order should be 
sustained.
    Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.202(c)(2)(i), Mr. Goyal, may, in addition to 
demanding a hearing, at the time the answer is filed or sooner, move 
the presiding officer to set aside the immediate effectiveness of the 
Order on the ground that the Order, including the need for immediate 
effectiveness, is not based on adequate evidence but on mere suspicion, 
unfounded allegations, or error.
    In the absence of any request for hearing, or written approval of 
an extension of time in which to request a hearing, the provisions 
specified in Section V above shall be effective immediately and shall 
be final 20 days from the date of this Order without further order or 
proceedings. If an extension of time for requesting a hearing has been 
approved, the provisions specified in Section V shall be final when the 
extension expires if a hearing request has not been received.

    Dated this 4th day of January 2006.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Martin J. Virgilio,
Deputy Executive Director for Materials, Research, State and Compliance 
Programs, Office of the Executive Director for Operations.
[FR Doc. E6-437 Filed 1-13-06; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P