Prasoon Goyal; Order Prohibiting Involvement in NRC-Licensed Activities (Effective Immediately), 2576-2578 [E6-418]

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• NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Federal Register Volume 71, Number 10 (Tuesday, January 17, 2006)]
[Notices]
[Pages 2576-2578]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E6-418]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[ IA-05-055]


Prasoon Goyal; Order Prohibiting Involvement in NRC-Licensed 
Activities (Effective Immediately)

I

    Mr. Prasoon Goyal was previously employed, at times relevant to 
this Order, as a Senior Engineer at the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power 
Station (Davis-Besse) operated by FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company 
(FENOC or licensee). The licensee holds License No. NPF-3 which was 
issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or Commission) 
pursuant to 10 CFR part 50 on April 22, 1977. The license authorizes 
the operation of Davis-Besse in accordance with the conditions 
specified therein. The facility is located on the licensee's site near 
Oak Harbor, Ohio.

II

    On August 3, 2001, the NRC issued Bulletin 2001-001, 
``Circumferential Cracking of Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Penetration 
Nozzles,'' (Bulletin). In the Bulletin, the NRC requested that all 
holders of operating licenses for pressurized water nuclear power 
reactors (PWR), including FENOC for the Davis-Besse facility, provide 
information to the NRC relating to the structural integrity of the 
reactor pressure vessel (RPV) head penetration nozzles at their 
respective facilities. The information requested from the licensees 
included the extent of RPV head penetration nozzle leakage and cracking 
that had been found to date, a description of the inspections and 
repairs undertaken to satisfy applicable regulatory requirements, and 
the basis for concluding that a licensee's plans for future inspections 
would ensure compliance with applicable regulatory requirements. The 
NRC also required that all Bulletin addressees, including FENOC, submit 
a written response to the NRC in accordance with the provisions of 10 
CFR 50.54(f). That regulation provides, in part, that upon request of 
the NRC, an NRC-licensee must submit written statements, signed under 
oath or affirmation, to enable the NRC to determine whether the license 
should be modified, suspended, or revoked.
    On September 4, October 17, and October 30, 2001, the licensee 
provided written responses to the Bulletin. Additionally, the licensee 
met with the NRC staff on numerous occasions during October and 
November of 2001 to provide clarifying information. Based, in part, on 
the information provided by FENOC in its written responses to the 
Bulletin and during meetings with the NRC staff, the NRC staff allowed 
the licensee to continue operation of the Davis-Besse facility until 
February 2002, rather than requiring FENOC to shut the unit down to 
perform inspections by December 31, 2001, as provided in the Bulletin.
    On February 16, 2002, FENOC shut down Davis-Besse for refueling and 
inspection of control rod drive mechanism (CRDM) RPV head penetration 
nozzles. Using ultrasonic testing, the licensee found cracks in three 
CRDM RPV head penetration nozzles and on March 6, 2002, the licensee 
discovered a cavity in the RPV head in the vicinity of CRDM Penetration 
Nozzle No. 3. The cavity measured approximately 5 to 7 inches long, 4 
to 5 inches wide, and penetrated through the 6.63 inch-thick low-alloy 
steel portion of the RPV head, leaving the stainless steel cladding 
material (measuring 0.202 to 0.314 inches-thick) as the sole reactor 
coolant system (RCS) pressure boundary. A smaller cavity was also found 
near CRDM Penetration Nozzle No. 2.
    The licensee conducted a root cause evaluation and determined, 
contrary to the earlier information provided to the NRC, that the 
cavities were caused by boric acid from the RCS released through cracks 
in the CRDM RPV head penetration nozzles. The root cause evaluation 
found that the licensee conducted limited cleaning and inspections of 
the RPV head during the Twelfth Refueling Outage (12RFO) that ended on 
May 18, 2000. However, neither the limited RPV head cleaning nor the 
resultant inspections during 12RFO were sufficient to ensure that the 
significant boric acid deposits on the RPV head were only a result of 
CRDM flange leakage, as supposed, and were not a result of RCS pressure 
boundary leakage.
    On March 6 and March 10, 2002, the licensee provided information to 
the NRC concerning the identification of a large cavity in the RPV head 
adjacent to CRDM Penetration Nozzle No. 3. The NRC conducted an 
Augmented Inspection Team (AIT) inspection at Davis-Besse from March 12 
to April 5, 2002, to determine the facts and circumstances related to 
the significant degradation of the RPV head. The results of the AIT 
inspection were documented in NRC Inspection Report No. 50-346/2002-03, 
issued on May 3, 2002. A follow-up Special Inspection was conducted 
from May 15 to August 9, 2002, and on October 2, 2002, the NRC issued 
the AIT Follow-up Special Inspection Report No. 50-346/2002-08 
documenting ten apparent violations associated with the RPV head 
degradation.
    On April 22, 2002, the NRC Office of Investigations (OI) initiated 
an investigation at Davis-Besse to determine, among other matters, 
whether FENOC and individual employees at the Davis-Besse facility 
failed to provide complete and accurate information to the NRC in its 
September 4, October 17, and October 30, 2001, responses to the 
Bulletin and during numerous conference calls and meetings in violation 
of 10 CFR 50.9 and 10 CFR 50.5(a)(2). The OI report (No. 3-2002-

[[Page 2577]]

006) was issued on August 22, 2003. A copy of the OI report was 
provided to the U. S. Department of Justice (DOJ), Office of the United 
States Attorney, Northern District of Ohio for review. The matter 
remains under continued Federal investigation.
    Mr. Goyal, through the performance of his engineering duties, 
through his direct involvement in the licensee's 1996 RPV head 
inspection and cleaning activities, and through oral and written 
communications with other FENOC employees was aware of the results of 
previous RPV head inspections.
     Mr. Goyal was the engineer responsible for performing the 
1996 reactor head inspection during the Tenth Refueling Outage (10RFO). 
During a sworn, transcribed interview with OI, Mr. Goyal stated that he 
could not see the top of the RPV head during 10RFO due to the limited 
access through the mouseholes and the accumulation of boric acid on the 
RPV head.
     Mr. Goyal wrote Potential Condition Adverse to Quality 
Report (PCAQR) 96-0551 documenting that the accumulation of boric acid 
on the head and the size of the mouseholes limited the extent of the 
inspection. Mr. Goyal documented in PCAQR 96-0551, in part:

    ``Since the boric acid deposits are not cleaned it is difficult 
to distinguish whether the deposits occurred because of the leaking 
flanges or the leaking CRDM.''
    ``This PCAQR is the quality document which recorded the boric 
acid deposit on the RV head. The deposits were discovered during the 
visual inspection of the RV head performed through the mouseholes 
utilizing a video camera. The extent of the inspection was limited 
to approximately 50 to 60% of the head areas because of the 
restrictions imposed by the location and sized of mouseholes. The 
inspection showed varying sizes of boric acid mounds scattered in 
various areas of head. It is extremely difficult to develop an 
estimate of the amount of boric acid deposit because of the deposit 
scatter and limited inspection.''

     Mr. Goyal authored a ``White'' paper, distributed to other 
Davis-Besse staff on May 8, 1996, that discussed control rod drive 
nozzle cracking within the nuclear power industry. Mr. Goyal documented 
in the ``White'' paper, in part:

    ``All plants, except Davis-Besse and Arkansas Nuclear 1, have 
large access holes in the skirt area of the service structure to 
view/clean the entire head. Davis-Besse's access is limited to about 
50 percent of the head area.''

    Several FENOC employees, including Mr. Prasoon Goyal, were 
responsible for the information provided to the NRC by FENOC in 
response to the Bulletin.

III

    Prasoon Goyal was employed by FENOC as a senior engineer in the 
Design Basis Engineering organization at Davis-Besse at the time the 
responses to the Bulletin were developed and transmitted to the NRC. 
Mr. Goyal was a design engineer and the individual who reviewed the 
licensee's 1996 inspection of the CRDM flanges, and conducted the 
licensee's inspection of the RPV head and CRDM nozzles during 10RFO.
    Mr. Goyal reviewed the October 17, 2001 supplemental response to 
the bulletin. On October 17, 2001, Mr. Goyal concurred as ``Design 
Basis Engrg--Mech'' [Design Basis Engineering--Mechanical] in the 
issuance of the licensee's October 17, 2001 supplemental response to 
the Bulletin.
    Item 1.d of the Bulletin requested each pressurized water reactor 
(PWR) licensee, including FENOC for Davis-Besse, to provide a 
description of the RPV head penetration nozzles and RPV head inspection 
(including type, scope, qualification requirements, and acceptance 
criteria) that were performed at PWRs in the 4 years preceding the date 
of the Bulletin, and the findings resulting from the inspections. The 
licensees were requested to include a description of any limitations 
(insulation or other impediments) to accessibility of the bare metal of 
the RPV head for visual examinations.
    On September 4, 2001, FENOC submitted its written response to the 
Bulletin for Davis-Besse. On October 17, 2001, FENOC submitted a 
supplemental response to the Bulletin for Davis-Besse and included 
information not provided in the September 4, 2001, response with regard 
to RPV inspections and cleaning conducted during 10RFO. Attachment 1 to 
the licensee's October 17, 2001, supplemental response to the Bulletin 
stated under the section entitled, ``Summary,'' in part:

    ``In May 1996, during a refueling outage, the RPV head was 
inspected. No leakage was identified, and these results have been 
recently verified by a re-review of the video tapes obtained from 
that inspection.''

    The October 17, 2001, supplemental response to the Bulletin also 
stated under the section entitled, ``Previous Inspection Results,'' in 
part:

    ``The inspections performed during the 10th, 11th, and 12th 
Refueling Outage (10RFO, conducted April 8 to June 2, 1996; 11RFO, 
conducted April 10, to May 23, 1998; and, 12RFO, conducted April 1 
to May 28, 2000) consisted of a whole head visual inspection of the 
RPV head in accordance with the DBNPS Boric Acid Control Program 
pursuant to Generic Letter 88-05, `Boric Acid Corrosion of Carbon 
Steel Reactor Pressure Boundary Components in PWR Plants.' The 
visual inspections were conducted by remote camera and included 
below insulation inspections of the RPV bare head such that the 
Control Rod Drive Mechanism (CRDM) nozzle penetrations were viewed. 
During 10RFO, 65 of 69 nozzles were viewed, during 11RFO, 50 of 69 
nozzles were viewed, and during 12 RFO, 45 of 69 nozzles were 
viewed.''

    Information included under Column 6 of Attachment 2 of the 
licensee's October 17, 2001, supplemental response stated, in part, 
that 24 nozzles have a ``flange leak evident.'' Note 1 on the same 
table stated, in part:

    ``In 1996 during 10 RFO, the entire RPV head was inspected. 
Since the video was void of head orientation narration, each 
specific nozzle view could not be correlated.''

    The licensee's October 17, 2001, supplemental response was 
materially incomplete and inaccurate in that the licensee did not view 
the stated number of RPV head penetration nozzles during the referenced 
outages, and the licensee believed that only five RPV head control rod 
drive mechanism flanges were leaking instead of the 24 RPV head control 
rod drive mechanism flanges noted in the response. Mr. Goyal was aware 
that the licensee's October 17, 2001, supplemental response was 
materially incomplete and inaccurate and concurred on the response, 
thereby allowing it to be submitted to the NRC.
    Based on the above information, the NRC concludes that Mr. Goyal 
had sufficient knowledge of the condition of the RPV head and the 
limitations experienced during the RPV head inspections conducted 
during 10RFO, and notwithstanding that knowledge, he deliberately 
provided materially incomplete and inaccurate information, when on 
October 17, 2001, he concurred on the licensee's October 17, 2001, 
supplemental response to the NRC.
    The information provided by the licensee under oath in the Bulletin 
supplemental response was material to the NRC because the NRC used the 
information, in part, to allow FENOC to operate Davis-Besse until 
February 2002 rather than requiring the plant to shut down by December 
31, 2001, to conduct inspections of the head as discussed in Item 
3.v.1. of the Bulletin.
    Based on the above information, Mr. Prasoon Goyal, while employed 
by the licensee, engaged in deliberate misconduct by deliberately 
providing incomplete or inaccurate information that he knew was not 
complete and accurate in all material respects to the NRC, a violation 
of 10 CFR 50.5(a)(2).

[[Page 2578]]

Mr. Goyal's actions also placed FENOC in violation of 10 CFR 50.9. The 
NRC determined that these violations were of very high safety and 
regulatory significance because they involved a pattern of deliberate 
documentation of inaccurate or incomplete information that was required 
to be submitted to the NRC. Had the NRC been aware of this incomplete 
and inaccurate information, the NRC would likely have taken immediate 
regulatory action to shut down the plant and require the licensee to 
implement appropriate corrective actions.

IV

    The NRC must be able to rely on the licensee and its employees to 
comply with NRC requirements, including the requirement to provide 
information and maintain records that are complete and accurate in all 
material respects. Mr. Goyal's deliberate actions raise serious doubt 
as to whether he can be relied upon to comply with NRC requirements and 
to provide complete and accurate information to the NRC.
    Consequently, I lack the requisite reasonable assurance that 
licensed activities can be conducted in compliance with the 
Commission's requirements and that the health and safety of the public 
will be protected if Mr. Goyal is permitted to be involved in NRC-
licensed activities. Therefore, the public health, safety and interest 
require that Mr. Goyal be prohibited from any involvement in NRC-
licensed activities for a period of one year effective immediately. 
Additionally, Mr. Goyal is required to notify the NRC of his first 
employment in NRC-licensed activities for a period of one year 
following the prohibition period.

V

    Accordingly, pursuant to sections 103, 104, 161b, 161i, 161o, 182 
and 186 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and the 
Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 2.202, 10 CFR 50.5, and 10 CFR 
150.20, It is hereby ordered that effective immediately:
    1. Mr. Prasoon Goyal is prohibited for one year from the date of 
this Order from engaging in NRC-licensed activities. The NRC considers 
NRC-licensed activities to be those activities that are conducted 
pursuant to a specific or general license issued by the NRC, including 
those activities of Agreement State licensees conducted pursuant to the 
authority granted by 10 CFR 150.20.
    2. If Mr. Goyal is currently involved with another licensee in NRC-
licensed activities, he must immediately cease those activities, and 
inform the NRC of the name, address and telephone number of the 
employer, and provide a copy of this Order to the employer.
    3. For a period of one year after the one-year period of 
prohibition has expired, Mr. Goyal shall, within 20 days of acceptance 
of his first employment offer involving NRC-licensed activities or his 
becoming involved in NRC-licensed activities, as defined in Paragraph 
IV.1 above, provide notice to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, of the name, 
address, and telephone number of the employer or the entity where he 
is, or will be, involved in NRC-licensed activities. In the 
notification, Mr. Goyal shall include a statement of his commitment to 
compliance with regulatory requirements and the basis why the 
Commission should have confidence that he will now comply with 
applicable NRC requirements.
    The Director, Office of Enforcement, may, in writing, relax or 
rescind any of the above conditions upon demonstration by Mr. Goyal of 
good cause.

VI

    In accordance with 10 CFR 2.202, Prasoon Goyal must, and any other 
person adversely affected by this Order may, submit an answer to this 
Order, and may request a hearing on this Order within 20 days of the 
date of this Order, consideration may be given to extending the 
response time for submitting an answer as well as the time for 
requesting a hearing, for good cause shown. A request for extension of 
time must be made in writing to the Director, Office of Enforcement, 
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, and include a 
statement of good cause for the extension. The answer may consent to 
this Order. Unless the answer consents to this Order, the answer shall, 
in writing and under oath or affirmation, specifically admit or deny 
each allegation or charge made in this Order and shall set forth the 
matters of fact and law on which Mr. Goyal or other person adversely 
affected relies and the reasons as to why the Order should not have 
been issued. Any answer or request for a hearing shall be submitted to 
the Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Attn: Rulemakings 
and Adjudications Staff, Washington, DC 20555. Copies also shall be 
sent to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, Washington, DC 20555, to the Assistant General Counsel for 
Materials Litigation and Enforcement at the same address, to the 
Regional Administrator, NRC Region III, 2443 Warrenville Road, Lisle, 
IL 60532-4352, and to Mr. Goyal if the answer or hearing request is by 
a person other than Mr. Goyal. Because of continuing disruptions in 
delivery of mail to United States Government offices, it is requested 
that answers and requests for hearing be transmitted to the Secretary 
of the Commission either by means of facsimile transmission to 301-415-
1101 or by e-mail to hearingdocket@nrc.gov and also to the Office of 
the General Counsel either by means of facsimile transmission to 301-
415-3725 or by e-mail to OGCMailCenter@nrc.gov. If a person other than 
the Mr. Goyal requests a hearing, that person shall set forth with 
particularity the manner in which his interest is adversely affected by 
this Order and shall address the criteria set forth in 10 CFR 2.309.
    If a hearing is requested by Mr. Goyal or a person whose interest 
is adversely affected, the Commission will issue an Order designating 
the time and place of any hearing. If a hearing is held, the issue to 
be considered at such hearing shall be whether this Order should be 
sustained.
    Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.202(c)(2)(i), Mr. Goyal, may, in addition to 
demanding a hearing, at the time the answer is filed or sooner, move 
the presiding officer to set aside the immediate effectiveness of the 
Order on the ground that the Order, including the need for immediate 
effectiveness, is not based on adequate evidence but on mere suspicion, 
unfounded allegations, or error.
    In the absence of any request for hearing, or written approval of 
an extension of time in which to request a hearing, the provisions 
specified in Section V above shall be effective immediately and final 
20 days from the date of this Order without further order or 
proceedings. If an extension of time for requesting a hearing has been 
approved, the provisions specified in Section V shall be final when the 
extension expires if a hearing request has not been received.


     Dated this 4th day of January 2006.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Martin J. Virgilio,
Deputy Executive Director for Materials, Research, State, and 
Compliance Programs, Office of the Executive Director for Operations.
 [FR Doc. E6-418 Filed 1-13-06; 8:45 am]
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