Steven Moffitt; Order Prohibiting Involvement in NRC-Licensed Activities (Effective Immediately), 2581-2585 [E6-416]

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• NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Federal Register Volume 71, Number 10 (Tuesday, January 17, 2006)]
[Notices]
[Pages 2581-2585]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E6-416]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[IA-05-054]


Steven Moffitt; Order Prohibiting Involvement in NRC-Licensed 
Activities (Effective Immediately)

I

    Mr. Steven Moffitt was previously employed, at times relevant to 
this Order, as the Technical Services Director at the Davis-Besse 
Nuclear Power Station (Davis-Besse) operated by FirstEnergy Nuclear 
Operating Company (FENOC or licensee). The licensee holds License No. 
NPF-3 which was issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or 
Commission) pursuant to 10 CFR Part 50 on April 22, 1977. The license 
authorizes the operation of Davis-Besse in accordance with the 
conditions specified therein. The facility is located on the Licensee's 
site near Oak Harbor, Ohio.

II

    On August 3, 2001, the NRC issued Bulletin 2001-001, 
``Circumferential Cracking of Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Penetration 
Nozzles,'' (Bulletin).

[[Page 2582]]

In the Bulletin, the NRC requested that all holders of operating 
licenses for pressurized water nuclear power reactors (PWR), including 
FENOC for the Davis-Besse facility, provide information to the NRC 
relating to the structural integrity of the reactor pressure vessel 
(RPV) head penetration nozzles at their respective facilities. The 
information requested from the licensees included the extent of RPV 
head penetration nozzle leakage and cracking that had been found to 
date, a description of the inspections and repairs undertaken to 
satisfy applicable regulatory requirements, and the basis for 
concluding that a licensee's plans for future inspections would ensure 
compliance with applicable regulatory requirements. The NRC also 
required that all the Bulletin addressees, including FENOC, submit a 
written response to the NRC in accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 
50.54(f). That regulation provides, in part, that upon request of the 
NRC, an NRC-licensee must submit written statements, signed under oath 
or affirmation, to enable the NRC to determine whether the license 
should be modified, suspended, or revoked.
    On September 4, October 17, and October 30, 2001, the licensee 
provided written responses to the Bulletin. Additionally, the licensee 
met with the NRC staff on numerous occasions during October and 
November of 2001 to provide clarifying information. Based, in part, on 
the information provided by FENOC in its written responses to the 
Bulletin and during meetings with the NRC staff, the NRC staff allowed 
the licensee to continue operation of the Davis-Besse facility until 
February 2002, rather than requiring FENOC to shut the unit down to 
perform inspections by December 31, 2001, as provided in the Bulletin.
    On February 16, 2002, FENOC shut down Davis-Besse for refueling and 
inspection of control rod drive mechanism (CRDM) RPV head penetration 
nozzles. Using ultrasonic testing, the licensee found cracks in three 
CRDM RPV head penetration nozzles and on March 6, 2002, the licensee 
discovered a cavity in the RPV head in the vicinity of CRDM Penetration 
Nozzle No. 3. The cavity measured approximately 5 to 7 inches long, 4 
to 5 inches wide, and penetrated through the 6.63 inch-thick low-alloy 
steel portion of the RPV head, leaving the stainless steel cladding 
material (measuring 0.202 to 0.314 inches-thick) as the sole reactor 
coolant system (RCS) pressure boundary. A smaller cavity was also found 
near CRDM Penetration Nozzle No. 2.
    The licensee conducted a root cause evaluation and determined that, 
contrary to the earlier information provided to the NRC, the cavities 
were caused by boric acid from the RCS released through cracks in the 
CRDM RPV head penetration nozzles. The root cause evaluation found that 
the licensee had previously conducted limited cleaning and inspections 
of the RPV head during the Twelfth Refueling Outage (12RFO) that ended 
on May 18, 2000. However, neither the limited RPV head cleaning nor the 
resultant inspections during 12RFO were sufficient to ensure that the 
significant boric acid deposits on the RPV head were only a result of 
CRDM flange leakage and were not a result of RCS pressure boundary 
leakage.
    On March 6 and March 10, 2002, the licensee provided information to 
the NRC concerning the identification of a large cavity in the RPV head 
adjacent to CRDM Penetration Nozzle No. 3. The NRC conducted an 
Augmented Inspection Team (AIT) inspection at Davis-Besse from March 12 
to April 5, 2002, to determine the facts and circumstances related to 
the significant degradation of the RPV head. The results of the AIT 
inspection were documented in NRC Inspection Report No. 50-346/2002-03, 
issued on May 3, 2002. A follow-up Special Inspection was conducted 
from May 15 to August 9, 2002, and on October 2, 2002, the NRC issued 
the AIT Follow-up Special Inspection Report No. 50-346/2002-08 
documenting ten apparent violations associated with the RPV head 
degradation.
    On April 22, 2002, the NRC Office of Investigations (OI) initiated 
an investigation at Davis-Besse to determine, among other matters, 
whether FENOC and individual employees at the Davis-Besse facility 
failed to provide complete and accurate information to the NRC in its 
September 4, October 17, and October 30, 2001, responses to the 
Bulletin and during numerous conference calls and meetings in violation 
of 10 CFR 50.9 and 10 CFR 50.5(a)(2). The OI report (No. 3-2002-006) 
was issued on August 22, 2003. A copy of the OI report was provided to 
the U. S. Department of Justice (DOJ), Office of the United States 
Attorney, Northern District of Ohio for review. The matter remains 
under continued Federal investigation.
    Mr. Moffitt was aware of the scope of the previous reactor vessel 
head inspections and the condition of the reactor vessel head due to 
his official duties and written and oral communications he received 
from other FENOC employees. For example;
     During a sworn, transcribed interview with OI, Mr. Moffitt 
stated that it was common knowledge that the reactor head was not 
totally cleaned during 12RFO.
     On June 27, 2001, Mr. Moffitt was sent a memorandum that 
provided an engineering evaluation of the question, ``Should Davis-
Besse Perform a Visual Head Inspection if The Plant Shut Down to Mode 5 
Conditions?'' Page 2 of the memorandum stated:

    ``During 12th RFO at Davis-Besse (DB) the Reactor Vessel head 
inspection was performed in accordance with boron inspection 
walkdown as required by GL-88-05 and GL 97-01. Large boron leakage 
from a CRDM flange was observed. This leakage did not permit the 
detailed inspection of CRDM nozzles.''

     On August 11, 2001, FENOC held a meeting to discuss its 
pending response to the Bulletin. Mr. Moffitt was listed as an attendee 
at the meeting, as documented in an E-mail from a design engineer that 
same day. As stated in the E-mail, ``it was pointed out that we can not 
clean our head thru the mouse holes and a system engineer is requesting 
that three large holes be cut in the Service Structure for viewing 
[inspection] and cleaning.''
     During a sworn, transcribed interview with OI, Mr. Moffitt 
stated that around the August 11, 2001, time frame he remembered 
talking to the engineer who had cleaned the RPV head regarding how much 
of the head was cleaned. Mr. Moffitt further stated that the engineer 
told him about 80 percent of the head was cleaned.
     During September 2001, Mr. Moffitt hired a contractor 
employed by Piedmont Management and Technical Services, Inc. to review 
Davis-Besse's preparation for 13RFO with implementing the requirements 
of Bulletin 2001-001. On September 14, 2001, the contractor provided 
Mr. Moffitt a copy of the letter [report] containing his 
recommendations and approximately one week later verbally briefed Mr. 
Moffitt on the contents of the report. The report stated, in part: ``It 
is noted that on completion of 12RFO, the Reactor Vessel head did have 
boric acid crystal deposits of considerable depth left in the center 
top area of the head, since cleaning of this area at that time was not 
successful in removing all the deposits (partly due to limited 
access).''
     During a licensee interview of Mr. Moffitt on July 1, 
2002, Mr. Moffitt indicated that he knew in the July to August 2001 
time-frame that boric acid was left on the head in 12RFO and that the 
boric acid impeded a complete inspection of the head.

[[Page 2583]]

    The above information demonstrates that Mr. Moffitt had sufficient 
knowledge of the results of previous inspections of the RPV head and 
that he knew the licensee's written and oral responses to NRC Bulletin 
2001-001 were incomplete and inaccurate.
    Several FENOC employees, including Mr. Steven Moffitt, were 
responsible for the information provided to the NRC by FENOC in 
response to the Bulletin.

III

    Steven Moffitt was employed by FENOC as the Technical Services 
Director at Davis-Besse at the time the responses to the Bulletin were 
developed and transmitted to the NRC. Mr. Moffitt participated in an 
October 3, 2001, teleconference with the NRC staff and a presentation 
on October 11, 2001, to the NRC Commissioners' Technical Assistants. On 
October 17, 2001, Mr. Moffitt concurred in the issuance of the 
supplemental licensee response, dated October 17, 2001.
    On October 3, 2001, Mr. Moffitt was a senior Davis-Besse management 
official on a conference call with the NRC staff. Mr. Moffitt was also 
involved in preparatory meetings for the October 3rd conference call. 
The agenda for the conference call stated: ``Video Inspection Review 
from RFO10, RFO11, and RFO12: Further Confirmation of no indication of 
leakage attributable to CRDM Nozzle leakage; clearly CRDM flange 
leakage.'' During the conference call, Mr. Moffitt's direct subordinate 
informed the NRC that 100% of the RPV head had been inspected during 
the last outage (12RFO) but that some areas were precluded from 
inspection and that videotapes of the inspections conducted during 
10RFO, 11RFO, and 12RFO had been reviewed. Mr. Moffitt was aware at the 
time of the October 3, 2001, meeting that the licensee did not conduct 
a 100% inspection of the RPV head during 12RFO due to the presence of 
boric acid on the head which obscured a significant number of the RPV 
head nozzles yet approved the misleading statements thereby causing the 
incomplete and inaccurate information to be submitted to the NRC.
    On October 10, 2001, Mr. Moffitt participated in a meeting with 
other FENOC officials for the purpose of finalizing presentation slides 
to be used during an October 11, 2001, meeting with the NRC 
Commissioner's Technical Assistants. Draft Presentation Slide 20 
stated: ``Reviewed video inspections of Reactor Vessel head taken 
during 11RFO (April 1998) and 12RFO (April 2000) and confirmed that 
Davis-Besse has not experienced boron leakage as seen at Oconee or 
Arkansas Nuclear.'' Presentation Draft Slide 21 for the briefing 
stated: ``Reviewed past 3 outages of Reactor Vessel Head inspection 
video tapes which were taken to satisfy Generic Letter 97-01: No 
telltale ``popcorn'' type boron deposits; During 12RFO (Spring 2000), 
Davis-Besse identified sources of boron that precluded the visual 
inspection of some CRDM penetrations, as five leaking flanges above the 
mirror insulation; Viewed past 3 outages of inspection video tapes of 
area masked by boron in 12 RFO did not have previous leakage.''
    On October 11, 2001, Mr. Moffitt and other licensee staff briefed 
the NRC Commissioners' Technical Assistants on FENOC's basis for 
concluding that Davis-Besse was safe to operate until the next 
refueling outage (March 2002). During the briefing, FENOC utilized the 
presentation slides that were finalized the previous day. Presentation 
Slide 6 stated, in part: ``Conducted and recorded video inspections of 
the head during 11RFO (April 1998) and 12RFO (April 2000)--No head 
penetration leakage was identified.'' Presentation Slide 7 stated, in 
part: ``All CRDM [control rod drive mechanism] penetrations were 
verified to be free from ``popcorn'' type boron deposits using video 
recordings from 11RFO or 12RFO.''
    The licensee's October 11, 2001, presentation to the NRC 
Commissioners' Technical Assistants was materially incomplete and 
inaccurate in that the presentation slides did not state that the 
build-up of boric acid on the RPV head was so significant that the 
licensee could not inspect all of the RPV head penetration nozzles. Due 
to the significant amount of boric acid present on the RPV head, of 
which Mr. Moffitt was aware, the licensee also did not have a basis for 
stating that no visible evidence of RPV penetration nozzle leakage was 
detected. Mr. Moffitt knew the information was incomplete and 
inaccurate and allowed it to be submitted to the NRC.
    On October 17, 2001, the licensee provided a supplemental response 
to the Bulletin. The second paragraph under the section entitled, 
``Previous Inspection Results,'' on Page 2 of Attachment 1 of the 
licensee's October 17, 2001, supplemental response stated, in part:

    ``The inspections performed during the 10th, 11th, and 12th 
Refueling Outage (10RFO, conducted April 8 to June 2, 1996; 11RFO, 
conducted April 10 to May 23, 1998; and, 12RFO, conducted April 1 to 
May 18, 2000) consisted of a whole head visual inspection of the RPV 
head in accordance with the DBNPS Boric Acid Control Program 
pursuant to Generic Letter 88-05 ``Boric Acid Corrosion of Carbon 
Steel Reactor Pressure Boundary Components in PWR Plants.'' The 
visual inspections were conducted by remote camera and included 
below insulation inspections of the RPV bare head such that the 
Control Rod Drive Mechanism (CRDM) nozzle penetrations were viewed. 
During 10RFO, 65 of 69 nozzles were viewed, during 11RFO, 50 of 69 
nozzles were viewed, and during 12RFO, 45 of 69 nozzles were viewed. 
It should be noted that 19 of the obscured nozzles in 12RFO were 
also those obscured in 11RFO.''

    Information included under Column 6 of Attachment 2 of the 
licensee's October 17, 2001, response stated, in part, that 24 nozzles 
have a ``flange leak evident.'' Note 1 on the same table stated, in 
part:

    ``In 1996 during 10 RFO, the entire RPV head was inspected. 
Since the video was void of head orientation narration, each 
specific nozzle view could not be correlated.''

    The licensee's October 17, 2001, supplemental response was 
materially incomplete and inaccurate, in that the licensee did not view 
the stated number of RPV head penetration nozzles during the referenced 
outages, and the licensee believed that only five RPV head control rod 
drive mechanism flanges were leaking instead of the 24 RPV head control 
rod drive mechanism flanges noted in the response. Specifically, during 
12RFO the licensee did not clean all of the RPV head; therefore, the 
licensee could not have viewed each of the RPV head penetration nozzles 
and determined that the observed boric acid accumulation was not a 
result of RPV nozzle leakage. Mr. Moffitt knew the information was 
incomplete and inaccurate but nonetheless, concurred on the response, 
thereby allowing the information to be submitted to the NRC.
    Based on the above information, the NRC concludes that Mr. Moffitt 
had knowledge of the condition of the RPV head and the limitations 
experienced during RPV head inspections, and he deliberately failed to 
ensure that information that was developed for and presented during an 
October 3, 2001, teleconference with the NRC; was developed during an 
October 10, 2001, meeting and presented during an October 11, 2001, 
meeting with the NRC; and was included in the licensee's October 17, 
2001, supplemental response to the NRC Bulletin 2001-001 was materially 
complete and accurate.
    The information presented to the NRC and provided in the licensee's 
October 17, 2001, supplemental response was material to the NRC because 
the information gave the impression to the NRC staff that the Davis-
Besse RPV head had been completely inspected for

[[Page 2584]]

evidence of nozzle cracks, when this was not the case at the time the 
information was provided or the supplemental response was submitted. In 
addition, information provided during the October 3 and October 11, 
2001, meetings and in the licensee's October 17, 2001, supplemental 
response to the NRC was material to the NRC because the NRC used the 
information, in part, to allow FENOC to operate Davis-Besse until 
February 2002 rather than requiring the plant to shut down by December 
31, 2001, to conduct inspections of the RPV head as discussed in Item 
3.v.1 of the Bulletin.
    Based on the above, Mr. Steven Moffitt, while employed by the 
licensee, engaged in deliberate misconduct by providing FENOC and the 
NRC information that he knew was not complete and accurate in all 
material respects to the NRC, a violation of 10 CFR 50.5(a)(2). Mr. 
Moffitt's actions also placed FENOC in violation of 10 CFR 50.9. The 
NRC determined that these violations were of very high safety and 
regulatory significance because they demonstrated a pattern of 
deliberate inaccurate or incomplete documentation of information that 
was required to be submitted to the NRC. Had the NRC been aware of this 
incomplete and inaccurate information, the NRC would likely have taken 
immediate regulatory action to shut down the plant and require the 
licensee to implement appropriate corrective actions.

IV

    The NRC must be able to rely on the licensee and its employees to 
comply with NRC requirements, including the requirement to provide 
information and maintain records that are complete and accurate in all 
material respects. Mr. Moffitt's deliberate actions raise serious doubt 
as to whether he can be relied upon to comply with NRC requirements and 
to provide complete and accurate information to the NRC.
    Consequently, I lack the requisite reasonable assurance that 
licensed activities can be conducted in compliance with the 
Commission's requirements and that the health and safety of the public 
will be protected if Mr. Moffitt is permitted to be involved in NRC-
licensed activities. Therefore, the public health, safety and interest 
require that Mr. Moffitt be prohibited from any involvement in NRC-
licensed activities for a period of five years from the date of this 
Order.
    Additionally, Mr. Moffitt is required to notify the NRC of his 
first employment in NRC-licensed activities for a period of five years 
following the prohibition period.

V

    Accordingly, pursuant to sections 103, 104, 161b, 161i, 161o, 182 
and 186 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and the 
Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 2.202, 10 CFR 50.5, and 10 CFR 
150.20, It is hereby ordered that effective immediately:
    1. Mr. Steven Moffitt is prohibited for five years from the date of 
this Order from engaging in NRC-licensed activities. The NRC considers 
NRC-licensed activities to be those activities that are conducted 
pursuant to a specific or general license issued by the NRC, including 
those activities of Agreement State licensees conducted pursuant to the 
authority granted by 10 CFR 150.20.
    2. If Mr. Moffitt is currently involved with another licensee in 
NRC-licensed activities, he must immediately cease those activities, 
and inform the NRC of the name, address and telephone number of the 
employer, and provide a copy of this Order to the employer.
    3. For a period of five years after the five-year period of 
prohibition has expired, Mr. Moffitt shall, within 20 days of 
acceptance of his first employment offer involving NRC-licensed 
activities or his becoming involved in NRC-licensed activities, as 
defined in Paragraph IV.1 above, provide notice to the Director, Office 
of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 
20555, of the name, address, and telephone number of the employer or 
the entity where he is, or will be, involved in NRC-licensed 
activities. In the notification, Mr. Moffitt shall include a statement 
of his commitment to compliance with regulatory requirements and the 
basis why the Commission should have confidence that he will now comply 
with applicable NRC requirements.
    The Director, Office of Enforcement, may, in writing, relax or 
rescind any of the above conditions upon demonstration by Mr. Moffitt 
of good cause.

VI

    In accordance with 10 CFR 2.202, Steven Moffitt must, and any other 
person adversely affected by this Order may, submit an answer to this 
Order, and may request a hearing on this Order within 20 days of the 
date of this Order. However, since this enforcement action is being 
proposed prior to the U.S. Department of Justice completing its review 
of the OI investigation results, consideration may be given to 
extending the response time for submitting an answer as well as the 
time for requesting a hearing, for good cause shown. A request for 
extension of time must be made in writing to the Director, Office of 
Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, 
and include a statement of good cause for the extension. The answer may 
consent to this Order. Unless the answer consents to this Order, the 
answer shall, in writing and under oath or affirmation, specifically 
admit or deny each allegation or charge made in this Order and shall 
set forth the matters of fact and law on which Mr. Moffitt or other 
person adversely affected relies and the reasons as to why the Order 
should not have been issued. Any answer or request for a hearing shall 
be submitted to the Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
Attn: Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff, Washington, DC 20555. Copies 
also shall be sent to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, to the Assistant General 
Counsel for Materials Litigation and Enforcement at the same address, 
to the Regional Administrator, NRC Region III, 2443 Warrenville Road, 
Lisle, IL 60532-4352, and to Mr. Moffitt if the answer or hearing 
request is by a person other than Mr. Moffitt. Because of continuing 
disruptions in delivery of mail to United States Government offices, it 
is requested that answers and requests for hearing be transmitted to 
the Secretary of the Commission either by means of facsimile 
transmission to 301-415-1101 or by e-mail to hearingdocket@nrc.gov and 
also to the Office of the General Counsel either by means of facsimile 
transmission to 301-415-3725 or by e-mail to OGCMailCenter@nrc.gov. If 
a person other than Mr. Moffitt requests a hearing, that person shall 
set forth with particularity the manner in which his interest is 
adversely affected by this Order and shall address the criteria set 
forth in 10 CFR 2.309.
    If a hearing is requested by Mr. Moffitt or a person whose interest 
is adversely affected, the Commission will issue an Order designating 
the time and place of any hearing. If a hearing is held, the issue to 
be considered at such hearing shall be whether this Order should be 
sustained.
    Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.202(c)(2)(I), Mr. Moffitt, may, in addition to 
demanding a hearing, at the time the answer is filed or sooner, move 
the presiding officer to set aside the immediate effectiveness of the 
Order on the ground that the Order, including the need for immediate 
effectiveness, is not based on adequate evidence but on mere suspicion, 
unfounded allegations, or error.

[[Page 2585]]

    In the absence of any request for hearing, or written approval of 
an extension of time in which to request a hearing, the provisions 
specified in Section V above shall be effective immediately and final 
20 days from the date of this Order without further order or 
proceedings. If an extension of time for requesting a hearing has been 
approved, the provisions specified in Section V shall be final when the 
extension expires if a hearing request has not been received.

    Dated this 4th day of January 2006.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Martin J. Virgilio,
Deputy Executive Director for Materials, Research, State, and 
Compliance Programs, Office of the Executive Director for Operations.
[FR Doc. E6-416 Filed 1-13-06; 8:45 am]
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