Preparedness Directorate; Protective Action Guides for Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) and Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) Incidents, 174-196 [05-24521]

Agencies

• DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

[Federal Register Volume 71, Number 1 (Tuesday, January 3, 2006)]
[Notices]
[Pages 174-196]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 05-24521]



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Part II





Department of Homeland Security





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Preparedness Directorate; Protective Action Guides for Radiological 
Dispersal Device (RDD) and Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) Incidents; 
Notice

Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 1 / Tuesday, January 3, 2006 / 
Notices

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DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Z-RIN 1660-ZA02


Preparedness Directorate; Protective Action Guides for 
Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) and Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) 
Incidents

AGENCY: Preparedness Directorate, Department of Homeland Security.

ACTION: Notice of draft guidance for interim use with request for 
comment.

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SUMMARY: The Preparedness Directorate of the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) is issuing guidance entitled, ``Application of 
Protective Action Guides for Radiological Dispersal Devices (RDD) and 
Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) Incidents'' for Federal agencies, and 
as appropriate, State and local governments, emergency responders, and 
the general public who may find it useful in planning and responding to 
an RDD or IND incident. The guidance recommends ``protective action 
guides'' (PAGs) to support decisions about actions that may need to be 
taken to protect the public when responding to or recovering from an 
RDD or IND incident. It also outlines a process to implement the 
recommendations and discusses operational guidelines that may be useful 
in the implementation of the PAGs. The full text of the document is 
included in this Notice. This guidance is provided for interim use and 
will be revised based on comments received. The Preparedness 
Directorate is seeking input on the appropriateness, implementability 
and completeness of the guidance.

DATES: The draft guidance contained in this notice is released for 
interim use effective January 3, 2006. Comments on this draft guidance 
should be received on or before March 6, 2006.

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments, identified by Docket Number DHS-
2004-0029 and Z-RIN 1660-ZA02, by one of the following methods:
     Federal eRulemaking Portal: https://www.regulations.gov. 
Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
     E-mail: FEMA-RULES@dhs.gov. Include Docket Number DHS-
2004-0029 and Z-RIN 1660-ZA02 in the subject line of the message.
     Fax: 202-646-4536.
     Mail/Hand Delivery/Courier: Rules Docket Clerk, Office of 
the General Counsel, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Room 840, 500 
C Street, SW., Washington, DC 20472.
    Instructions: All submissions received must include the agency name 
and docket number (if available) or Regulatory Information Number (RIN) 
for this rulemaking. All comments received will be posted without 
change to https://www.regulations.gov, including any personal 
information provided.
    Docket: For access to the docket to read background documents or 
comments received, go to https://www.regulations.gov. Submitted comments 
may also be inspected at 500 C Street, SW., Room 840, Washington, DC 
20472.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Craig Conklin, Chief, Nuclear and 
Chemical Hazards Branch, Preparedness Division, Department of Homeland 
Security, NAC, Washington, DC 20528, 703-605-1228 (phone), 703-605-1198 
(facsimile), or craig.conklin@dhs.gov (e-mail.)

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

(a) Introduction

(1) Background on the Guidance

    Since the terrorist events in the United States on September 11, 
2001, there has been increased worldwide effort to avert and respond to 
terrorist attacks. In addition, based on intelligence information, the 
potential for terrorist attacks in the United States involving 
radiological materials or a nuclear device has grown. The Federal 
Government has responded with an aggressive approach to planning and 
preparedness, utilizing the resources and expertise found in 
departments and agencies across the government. Prior to September 11, 
radiological emergencies were considered bounded by potential nuclear 
power plant accidents. However, new terrorist scenarios have emerged 
that offer new and different response challenges.
    In order to prepare for potential attacks, DHS held a Federal 
interagency ``dirty bomb'' exercise as part of the Top Officials-2 
Exercise (TOPOFF-2) in Seattle, Washington, May 12-16, 2003. The 
exercise brought to light a number of issues in Federal radiological 
emergency response and recovery. One of the most important issues 
raised was how long-term site restoration and cleanup would be 
accomplished following an act of radiological terrorism. This question 
was part of a larger discussion of Federal Government protective action 
recommendations following acts of radiological or nuclear terror. The 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) published PAGs in the ``Manual of 
Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents'' 
(EPA 400-R-92-001, May 1992), in coordination with the Federal 
Radiological Preparedness Coordinating Committee (FRPCC). However, the 
EPA Manual, often called the PAG Manual, was not developed to address 
response actions following radiological or nuclear terrorist incidents. 
Also, the PAG Manual does not address long-term cleanup.
    In 2003, DHS tasked an interagency working group to address these 
issues. The working group consisted of senior subject matter experts in 
radiological/nuclear emergency preparedness, response, and consequence 
management. The following Federal departments and agencies were 
represented on the working group: DHS, EPA, Department of Commerce 
(DOC), Department of Energy (DOE), Department of Defense (DOD), 
Department of Labor (DOL), Department of Health and Human Services 
(HHS), and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).
    The result of the interagency working group process is the 
following Federal consensus guidance entitled, ``Application of 
Protective Action Guides for Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) and 
Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) Incidents.'' (June 1, 2004). In it, the 
Federal agencies support the use of existing early and intermediate 
phase PAGs, as found in the EPA PAG Manual, for acts of radiological 
and nuclear terrorism. The working group also developed late phase 
guidance, also contained in the consensus guidance, for the cleanup and 
restoration of a site following an act of radiological or nuclear 
terrorism that is based on the principle of site-specific optimization.
    In developing this draft guidance, DHS convened a focus group of 
representatives from 13 State agencies with expertise in radiological 
emergency response and consequence management. The State 
representatives were asked to review the draft guidance and provide 
detailed comments on its content, structure, and presentation. DHS was 
particularly interested in how States would make use of the guidance 
and how well the guidance would serve to facilitate Federal and State 
(or local) government interactions during a radiological terrorism 
response. Overall, the State representatives responded very positively 
to the guidance. A number of improvements suggested by the States were 
incorporated into the draft guidance being published today.
    The purpose of this guidance is to aid Federal decision makers in 
protecting the public and emergency responders from the effects of 
radiation during an emergency and to provide guidelines and a process 
for site cleanup and recovery following an RDD or IND incident. This 
guidance is designed to

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be compatible with the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and 
the National Response Plan (NRP).
    This guidance presents levels of radiation exposure at which the 
Federal Government recommends that actions be considered to avoid or 
reduce radiation dose to the public from an RDD or IND incident. The 
intended audience for this document is principally Federal Government 
emergency response planners and officials; however, this document 
should also be useful to State and local governments for response 
planning. The protective action guides incorporate guidance and 
regulations published by the EPA, the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA), and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), 
and address key health protection questions faced in the various phases 
(early, intermediate, and late) of response to an incident.
    These PAGs are not absolute standards and are not intended to 
define ``safe'' or ``unsafe'' levels of exposure or contamination. 
Rather, they represent the approximate levels at which the associated 
protective actions are recommended. This guidance may also be used by 
State and local decision makers, and provides flexibility to be more or 
less restrictive as deemed appropriate based on the unique 
characteristics of the incident and local considerations.
    This guidance is not intended for use at site cleanups occurring 
under other statutory authorities such as EPA's Superfund program, the 
NRC's decommissioning program, or other Federal or State cleanup 
programs. In addition, the scope of this guidance does not include 
situations involving United States nuclear weapons accidents.

(2) Characteristics of RDD and IND Incidents

    An RDD is any device that causes the purposeful dissemination of 
radioactive material across an area without a nuclear detonation. The 
mode of dispersal typically described as an RDD is an explosive device 
coupled with radioactive material. An RDD poses a threat to public 
health and safety and the environment through the spread of radioactive 
materials, and any explosive device presents an added immediate threat 
to human life and property. Other means of dispersal, both passive and 
active, may be employed. Dissemination of radioactive material not 
carried out via a device would still be treated like an RDD by 
responders and decision makers.
    There is a wide range of possible consequences that may result from 
an RDD depending upon the type and size of the device, the type and 
quantity of radioactive material, and how dispersion is achieved. The 
consequences of an RDD may range from a small, localized area (e.g., a 
street, single building or city block) to large areas, conceivably 
several square miles. However, most experts agree that the likelihood 
of a large impacted area is low. In most plausible scenarios, the 
radioactive material would not result in acutely harmful radiation 
doses and the public health concern from the radioactive materials 
would likely focus on the chronic risk of developing cancer among 
exposed individuals. Hazards from fire, smoke, shock, shrapnel (from an 
explosion), industrial chemicals and other chemical or biological 
agents may also be present.
    An IND is an illicit nuclear weapon bought, stolen, or otherwise 
originating from a nuclear State, or a weapon fabricated by a terrorist 
group from illegally obtained fissile nuclear weapons material that 
produces a nuclear explosion. The guidance does not apply to acts of 
war between nation-states involving nuclear weapons. The nuclear yield 
achieved by an IND produces extreme heat, powerful shockwaves, and 
prompt radiation that would be acutely lethal for a significant 
distance. It also produces potentially lethal radioactive fallout, 
which may spread far downwind and deposit over very large areas. An IND 
would result in catastrophic loss of life, destruction of 
infrastructure and contamination of a very large area. If nuclear yield 
is not achieved, the result would likely resemble an RDD in which 
fissile weapons material was dispersed locally.

(3) RDD and IND Incidents v. Accidents

    Acts of radiological and nuclear terrorism differ from radiological 
and nuclear accidents in several key ways. Accidents occur almost 
exclusively at well-characterized fixed facilities, or along prescribed 
transit routes. Facility operators have a good understanding of the 
kinds of radiological incidents that may occur, and have developed 
safeguards, plans, and procedures to deal with them. Exercises are 
regularly held to practice emergency plans and procedures, and 
improvements are made where necessary. Local communities, such as those 
around nuclear power plants (NPPs) or weapons production facilities, 
are informed and involved in emergency planning, including development 
of public communication strategies, practicing shelter-in-place, and 
orderly evacuation along prescribed routes. Accidents may also occur 
along transit routes, but these are relatively rare and substantial 
contingency planning and exercising occurs for transportation accidents 
as well.
    Acts of radiological and nuclear terrorism, on the other hand, may 
occur virtually anywhere. Major cities are potential targets of such 
incidents. The number of potential targets and the diverse 
circumstances of potential attacks make focused response planning 
almost impossible. Even a rural setting could fall victim, if for 
example, a device were to go off prematurely. Most nuclear facilities 
are located in semi-rural settings around which the number of people 
affected would be less and the amount of critical infrastructure 
impacted is likely to be less.
    The scope of potential accidents is limited and fairly well 
understood. Facilities tend to have fixed quantities of licensed 
radioisotopes or well characterized types of radionuclides on site that 
may be released in an accident. The number of ways accidents can occur 
(within reason) is limited, making possible effective contingency 
planning and improved safety. Accidents of any magnitude are limited to 
a relatively small number of facilities, and these tend to have highly 
trained personnel, advanced security, advanced process designs with the 
most rigorous safeguards and back-up systems, and the most aggressive 
contingency planning. The design of commercial nuclear power reactors 
in the United States, for example, precludes a Chernobyl-type of 
nuclear accident. Smaller facilities, such as radiopharmaceutical or 
radiation source manufacturers, generally possess much less radioactive 
material (or only short half-life materials) that may be involved in an 
accidental release.
    Finally, an RDD or IND incident may be initiated without any 
advance warning and the release would likely have a relatively short 
duration. With a major NPP accident, the most severe type of incident 
previously considered, there is likely to be several hours or days of 
warning before the release starts and the release may be drawn out over 
many hours. The benefit of time is critical. Advance notice affords 
time to make appropriate decisions, communicate to the public, and 
execute orderly evacuation, if necessary, or other protective actions. 
This difference means that most early and some intermediate phase 
protective actions must be made more quickly and with less information 
in an RDD or IND incident if they are to be effective.

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(4) Phases of Response

    Typically, the response to an emergency can be divided into three 
time phases. Although these phases cannot be represented by precise 
time periods and may overlap, they provide a useful framework for the 
considerations involved in emergency response planning. The early phase 
(or emergency phase) is the period at the beginning of the incident 
when the source (e.g., fire or contaminated plume) at the incident is 
active, field measurement data are limited or not available, and 
immediate protective action decisions are required. Exposure to the 
radioactive plume, short-term exposure to deposited materials and 
inhalation of radioactive material are generally included when 
considering protective actions for the early phase of a radiological 
emergency. The response during the early phase includes the initial 
emergency response actions to retrieve and care for victims, stabilize 
the scene, and public health protective actions (such as sheltering-in-
place or evacuation) in the short term. Life-saving and first aid 
actions should be given priority.
    In general, early phase protective actions need to be made very 
quickly, and the protective action decisions can be modified later as 
more information becomes available. If an explosive RDD is deployed 
without warning, there may be no time to take protective actions to 
reduce plume exposure. In the event of a covert dispersal, discovery or 
detection may not occur for days or weeks, allowing contamination to be 
dispersed broadly by foot, vehicular traffic, wind, rain or other 
forces. If an IND explodes, there would only be time to make early 
phase protective action recommendations to protect against exposure 
from fallout in areas miles downwind from the explosion.
    The intermediate phase of the response may follow the early phase 
response within as little as a few hours, up to several days. The 
intermediate phase of the response is usually assumed to begin after 
the incident source and releases have been brought under control and 
protective action decisions can be made based on some field 
measurements of exposure and radioactive materials. Activities in this 
phase typically overlap with early and late phase activities, and may 
continue for weeks to many months until protective actions are 
terminated. During the intermediate phase, decisions must be made on 
the initial actions needed to begin recovery from the incident, reopen 
transportation systems and critical infrastructure, and return to some 
state of normal activities.
    The late phase is the period when recovery and cleanup actions 
designed to reduce radiation levels in the environment to acceptable 
levels commence and ends when all the recovery actions have been 
completed. In the late phase, decision makers will have more time and 
information to allow for better data collection and options analyses. 
In this respect, the late phase is no longer a response to an 
``emergency situation,'' as in the early and intermediate phases, and 
is better viewed in terms of the long-term objectives of cleanup and 
restoration of the site to meet the needs and desires of the community 
and region. With the additional time and increased understanding of the 
situation, there will be opportunities to involve key stakeholders in 
providing sound, cost-effective recommendations.

(5) Protective Action Guides

    A PAG is the projected dose to a reference individual from an 
accidental or deliberate release of radioactive material at which a 
specific protective action to reduce or avoid that dose is recommended. 
Thus, protective actions, such as evacuation or sheltering-in-place, 
should normally be taken before the anticipated dose is realized. The 
PAG Manual, published by EPA in coordination with the FRPCC, provides 
the basis for this proposed guidance and may be referred to for 
additional details. The EPA PAGs achieve the following criteria and 
goals: (1) Prevent acute effects, (2) reduce risk of chronic effects 
and, (3) require optimization to balance protection with other 
important factors and ensure that actions taken cause more benefit than 
harm.
    The PAG Manual was written to address the kinds of nuclear or 
radiological incidents deemed likely to occur. While intended to be 
applicable to any radiological release, the PAGs were designed 
principally to meet the needs of commercial nuclear power plant 
accidents, the worst type of incident under consideration in the PAGs. 
This is important for two reasons: commercial nuclear power plant 
accidents are almost always signaled by preceding events, giving plant 
managers time (hours or days) to make decisions, and local emergency 
managers time to communicate with the public and initiate evacuations 
if necessary; and, the suite of radionuclides is well-known, and is 
dominated by relatively short-lived isotopes. As a result of September 
11, the Federal Government has reevaluated the PAGs for their 
applicability to RDD and IND incidents.
    The PAGs are non-regulatory, and are meant to provide a flexible 
basis for decisions under varying emergency circumstances. Many factors 
should be considered when deciding whether or not to order an action 
based on the projected dose to a population. For example, evacuation of 
a population is much more difficult and costly as the size of the 
subject population increases. Further, there is a statistical increase 
in casualties directly related to the size of the population evacuated 
that must be taken into consideration. Thus, considering incident-
specific factors like these, actual projected doses at which action is 
recommended may vary up or down.

(b) Developing the Proposed Guidance

(1) Use of Existing PAGs

    In deriving the recommendations contained in this guidance, new 
types of incidents and scenarios that could lead to environmental 
radiological contamination were considered. The working group 
determined that the existing PAGs for the early and intermediate 
phases, including worker protection guides, published in the EPA PAG 
Manual, are also appropriate for use in RDD and IND incidents. The 
proposed recommendations are provided in Table 1 in Section D.3 of the 
following guidance. Appendix 1 of the following guidance provides 
additional details regarding worker protection recommendations and 
includes additional Response Worker Guidelines in Table 1B.

(2) Guidance for Late Phase Site Cleanup and Restoration

    The working group evaluated existing Federal dose and risk-based 
standards, guidance and benchmarks for site cleanup and restoration as 
possible guidance for use after an RDD or IND. Standards considered 
included those of the EPA under the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), and DOE and NRC 
standards under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. In addition, 
cleanup guidance and benchmarks issued by national and international 
radiation advisory bodies (such as the International Commission on 
Radiological Protection and the International Atomic Energy Agency) 
were considered.
    The working group also examined variations of these standards, 
guidance and benchmarks by explicitly considering the possibility of 
achieving more or less stringent risk or dose levels, and by using 
target ranges.

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    The working group determined that the nature of potential impacts 
from radiological and nuclear terror incidents was extremely broad. 
Because of the broad range of potential impacts that may occur from 
RDDs and INDs ranging, for example, from light contamination of a 
street or building, to widespread destruction of a major metropolitan 
area, a pre-established numeric guideline was not recommended as best 
serving the needs of decision makers in the late phase. Rather, a site-
specific process is recommended for determining the societal objectives 
for expected land uses and the options and approaches available to 
address RDD or IND contamination. For example, if the incident is an 
RDD of limited size, such that the impacted area is small, then it 
might reasonably be expected that a complete return to normal 
conditions can be achieved within a short period of time. However, if 
the impacted area is very large, then achieving even very low criteria 
for remediation of the entire area and/or maintaining existing land 
uses may not be practicable.
    The process recommended in the guidance was based on the risk 
management framework discussed in Appendix 2. This process may be 
implemented through engaging knowledgeable technical experts and key 
stakeholders to provide decision makers with advice on the options, 
costs and implications of various courses of action. The guidance 
recommends that the level of effort and resources invested be scaled to 
the significance of the incident, scope of contamination, potential 
severity of economic impact, technical feasibility, and resource 
constraints. This process should result in the selection of the most 
appropriate solution that is sensitive to the range of involved 
stakeholders. Such a process where multiple factors are considered in 
developing options and deciding on action is often referred to as 
optimization.
    Optimization is a concept that is common to many State, Federal and 
international risk management programs that address radionuclides and 
chemicals, although it is not always referred to as such. Broadly 
speaking, optimization is a flexible, multi-attribute decision process 
that seeks to consider and balance many factors. Optimization analyses 
are quantitative and qualitative assessments applied at each stage of 
site restoration decisionmaking, from evaluation of remedial options, 
to implementation of the chosen alternative. The evaluation of cleanup 
alternatives, for example, should factor all relevant variables, 
including; areas impacted (e.g., size, location relative to 
population), types of contamination (chemical, biological, and 
radioactive), human health, public welfare, technical feasibility, 
costs and available resources to implement and maintain remedial 
options, long-term effectiveness, timeliness, public acceptability, and 
economic effects (e.g., on residents, tourism, business, and industry).
    The optimization process is an approach that may accommodate a 
variety of dose and/or risk benchmarks identified from State, Federal 
or other sources (e.g., national and international advisory 
organizations) as goals or starting points in the analysis of 
remediation options. These benchmarks may be useful for analysis of 
remediation options and levels may move up or down depending on the 
site-specific circumstances and balancing of other relevant factors.

(3) Implementation of Site Cleanup and Restoration

    The guidance presents an implementation plan for long-term site 
cleanup and restoration analysis and decisionmaking that is described 
in detail in Appendix 3 of the guidance. The implementation plan was 
designed principally to describe Federal interactions with State and 
local governments and public stakeholder representatives. For purposes 
of this guidance, it is assumed that the RDD or IND incident is 
significant in size and scope of contamination and that the Federal 
Government will be the primary source of funding for site cleanup and 
restoration. This plan is compatible with NIMS and the NRP, and should 
be seen as a framework for assessing a site, evaluating technologies 
and remediation options, assessing costs and timeframes, and 
incorporating local input on current and future land uses so that site 
cleanup and restoration may be approached in a fair and open manner.
    The plan describes a collaborative and iterative approach in which 
two work groups, one of stakeholders and one of technical subject 
matter experts, interact to develop cleanup options for the site under 
the supervision and oversight of a team of senior local, State and 
Federal management officials. The stakeholder workgroup would represent 
local interests, and relate local land use preferences and public 
health and welfare concerns. The technical work group would perform 
analyses, evaluate technologies and options, assess cost-effectiveness, 
and estimate timelines for completion. Ongoing discussions between the 
groups should result in a remediation solution and cleanup criteria for 
site restoration that are generally acceptable to involved 
stakeholders. The options and recommended decision would be forwarded 
up to decisionmakers for final approval so that cleanup can commence.
    The constitution of the groups and the interactions among them may 
be shaped to meet specific local needs and concerns. For example, 
larger, more complex incidents may require a number of technical 
experts with specific skills and knowledge, and the location may 
warrant varying stakeholder group composition. The implementation plan 
is scalable to the situation.
    The goal of the whole process is to reach an agreed upon approach 
to site cleanup and restoration within a reasonable timeframe that is 
effective, achievable, and meets the needs of local stakeholders. The 
final decision must be approved by local, State and Federal decision 
makers.

(c) Tools and Guidelines To Support Application of the PAGs

    The need for protective action will be based on a determination of 
whether PAGs will be exceeded. To facilitate first responder activities 
and the use of PAGs in the field, operational guidelines are needed 
which can be readily used by local decision makers and by responders. 
Radiation doses are not directly measurable and must be calculated 
based on measurable quantities such as exposure rates, radiation count 
rates or decays per unit surface area, or radioactivity per unit 
volume. Operational guidelines are levels of radioactivity or 
concentrations of radionuclides that can be accurately measured by 
radiation detection and monitoring equipment and related or compared to 
the dose-based PAGs to quickly determine if protective actions need to 
be implemented. Appendix 4 of the guidance provides examples of 
existing operational guidelines, and those being developed.
    Federal Government agencies are continuing development of the 
operational guidelines to support the application of the protective 
action guides in this document, as well as tools that will help in the 
development of incident-specific operational guidelines when they are 
needed. As the Federal agencies develop these guidelines and tools, 
they will be made available for review on the internet at the DOE's Web 
site at https://www.ogcms.energy.gov. This webpage will provide the 
status of operation guideline development and contain or provide a link 
to downloadable documents and tools related to the guidelines.

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(d) Specific Questions for Reviewers

    The Preparedness Directorate/DHS welcomes any comments and 
suggestions regarding the subject document. However, we would 
appreciate if reviewers specifically address the following issues:
     Is the presentation and format of the document useful and 
appropriate for its intended purpose? If not, why not and how should it 
be changed?
     Is the implementation process in Appendix 3 of the 
proposed guidance clear and appropriate for its intended purpose? Are 
roles and responsibilities sufficiently defined in the document?
     Does the guidance provide the appropriate balance between 
(a) public health and environmental protection goals; and (b) the 
flexibility needed for the decision makers to conduct emergency 
response actions and address public welfare needs, costs and benefits, 
technical feasibility and societal interests during response to and 
recovery from an incident? If not, how should the guidance be changed 
to provide the appropriate balance?
     Are the proposed PAGs for the early and intermediate 
phases implementable? Are they appropriate? If not, why not and what 
alternatives do you recommend?
     Is the discussion on worker protection and response worker 
protection helpful? Does Appendix 1 of the proposed guidance provide an 
adequate discussion of expectations and the use of the alternate 
response worker guidelines for life and property saving situations? If 
not, what additional information is needed to make the discussion 
adequate?
     Are the operational guidelines being developed and 
discussed in Appendix 4 of the proposed guidance useful? Are the 
groupings clear and appropriate? Are there additional operational 
guides that should be developed?
     Is the optimization process proposed for late phase site 
restoration and cleanup reasonable and sufficiently flexible to address 
RDD and IND situations? If not, what changes need to be made to improve 
the process?
     Is a flexible process without pre-established limits an 
appropriate method for site recovery? Would a flexible process with 
goals, ranges or limits be more appropriate?
     What other guidance or tools are needed to assist in the 
implementation of the recommendations?

(e) References

    ``National Response Plan'' (NRP), January 2005.
    ``National Incident Management Plan'' (NIMS), March 1, 2004
    ``Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for 
Nuclear Incidents'' (EPA PAG) EPA 400-R-92-001, May 1992.

Complete Text of the Guidance

Application of Protective Action Guides for Radiological Dispersal 
Device (RDD) and Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) Incidents

    Prepared by the Department of Homeland Security in coordination 
with the Department of Commerce, Department of Defense, Department of 
Energy, Department of Labor, Department of Health and Human Services, 
Environmental Protection Agency, Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Table of Contents

(a) Introduction
(b) Characteristics of RDD and IND Incidents
    (1) Radiological Dispersal Device
    (2) Improvised Nuclear Device
    (3) Differences Between Acts of Terror and Accidents
(c) Phases of Response
    (1) Early Phase
    (2) Intermediate Phase
    (3) Late Phase
(d) Protective Actions and Protective Action Guides for RDD and IND 
Incidents
    (1) Protective Actions
    (2) Protective Action Guides
    (3) Protective Action Guides for RDD and IND Incidents
    (i) Early Phase PAGs
    (ii) Intermediate Phase PAGs
    (iii) Late Phase PAGs
(e) Federal Implementation
(f) Operational Guidelines
    Appendix 1. Radiation Protection for the Responder and Planning 
for Implementation of the Protective Action Guides
    Appendix 2. Risk Management Framework for RDD and IND Incident 
Planning
    Appendix 3. Federal Implementation
    Appendix 4. Operational Guidelines for Implementation of the 
PAGs During RDD or IND Events
    Appendix 5. Acronyms/Glossary

Preface

    Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD-5), Management of 
Domestic Incidents, states, ``to prevent, prepare for, respond to and 
recover from terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies, 
the United States Government shall establish a single, comprehensive 
approach to domestic incident management.'' It also assigns the 
Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) the role of 
Principal Federal Official for domestic incident management.
    DHS coordinated the development of this document in order to 
address the critical issues of protective actions and protective action 
guides (PAGs) to mitigate the effects caused by terrorist use of a 
Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) or Improvised Nuclear Device (IND). 
This document was developed to provide guidance for site cleanup and 
recovery following an RDD or IND incident and affirms the applicability 
of existing PAGs for radiological emergencies. The intended audience of 
this document is Federal radiological emergency response and 
consequence management officials. In addition, State and local 
governments may find this document useful in response and consequence 
management planning. These guides are not intended for use at site 
cleanups occurring under other statutory authorities such as the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Superfund program, the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission's decommissioning program, or other Federal and 
State cleanup programs. In addition, the scope of this document does 
not include situations involving United States nuclear weapons 
accidents.
    Underlying the development and implementation of the 
recommendations in the report is a risk management framework for making 
decisions to provide for public safety and welfare. Appendix 2 provides 
a summary of the framework based upon the report, ``Framework for 
Environmental Health Risk Management,'' published in 1997 by the 
Commission on Risk Assessment and Risk Management. The stages in this 
framework--(1) Defining the problem and putting it into context, (2) 
analyzing the risks, (3) examining the options, (4) making decisions 
about which options to implement, (5) taking action, and (6) conducting 
an evaluation of the results--are applicable to each of the stages of 
response to an RDD or IND incident. However, the recommended guidelines 
for early and intermediate phase actions already incorporate 
consideration of the first four stages, so that action can be taken 
immediately to respond to the incident. All of the stages of the risk 
management framework will be applicable in the process of establishing 
the criteria for the late phase of the response, as described later in 
this report, because each situation will have its own unique problems, 
risks, options, and decisions.
    The Consequence Management, Site Restoration/Cleanup and 
Decontamination (CMS) Subgroup of the DHS RDD/IND Working Group 
accomplished this effort. The CMS Subgroup consists of subject matter 
experts in radiological/nuclear

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emergency preparedness and response. In addition to DHS, the following 
departments and agencies contributed to this effort: Department of 
Commerce (DOC), Department of Defense (DoD), Department of Energy 
(DOE), Department of Labor (DOL), Department of Health and Human 
Services (HHS), Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC).

(a) Introduction

    For the early and intermediate phases of response, this document 
presents levels of radiation exposure at which the Federal Government 
recommends that actions be considered to avoid or reduce adverse public 
health consequences from an RDD or IND incident. These PAGs incorporate 
guidance and regulations published by the EPA, Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA), and the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (OSHA). For the late phase of the response, this 
document presents a process to establish appropriate levels based on 
site-specific circumstances. This document addresses the key questions 
at each stage of an incident (early, intermediate, and late) and 
constitutes advice by DHS to Federal, State, and local decision makers.
    The objectives of the guides are to aid decision makers in 
protecting the public, first responders, and other workers from the 
effects of radiation, while balancing the adverse social and economic 
impacts following an RDD or IND incident. Restoring the normal 
operation of critical infrastructure, services, industries, business, 
and public activities as soon as possible can minimize adverse social 
and economic impacts.
    These guides for RDD and IND incidents are not absolute standards. 
The guides are not intended to define ``safe'' or ``unsafe'' levels of 
exposure or contamination, but rather they represent the approximate 
levels at which the associated protective actions are justified. The 
guides give State and local decision makers the flexibility to be more 
or less restrictive as deemed appropriate based on the unique 
characteristics of the incident and local considerations.
    The PAGs can be used to select actions to prepare for, respond to, 
and recover from the adverse effects that may exist during any phase of 
a terrorist incident--the early (emergency) phase, the intermediate 
phase, or the late phase. There may be an urgent need to evacuate 
people; there may also be an urgent need to restore the services of 
critical infrastructure (e.g., roads, rail lines, airports, electric 
power, water, sewage, medical facilities, and businesses) in the hours 
and days following the incident--thus, some response decisions must be 
made quickly. If the decisions on the recovery of critical 
infrastructure are not made quickly, the disruption and harm caused by 
the incident could be inadvertently and unnecessarily increased. 
Failure to restore important services rapidly could result in 
additional adverse public health and welfare impacts that could be more 
significant than the direct radiological impacts.

(b) Characteristics of RDD and IND Incidents

    A radiological incident is defined as an event or series of events, 
deliberate or accidental, leading to the release, or potential release, 
into the environment of radioactive material in sufficient quantity to 
warrant consideration of protective actions. Use of an RDD or IND is an 
act of terror that produces a radiological incident.

(1) Radiological Dispersal Device

    An RDD poses a threat to public health and safety through the 
spread of radioactive materials by some means of dispersion. The mode 
of dispersal typically conceived as an RDD is an explosive device 
coupled with radioactive material. The explosion adds an immediate 
threat to human life and property. Other means of dispersal, both 
passive and active, may be employed.
    There is a wide range of possible consequences that may result from 
an RDD, depending on the type and size of the device, and how dispersal 
is achieved. The consequences of an RDD may range from a small, 
localized area, such as a single building or city block, to large 
areas, conceivably many square miles. However, most experts agree that 
the likelihood of impacting a large area is low. In most plausible 
scenarios, the radioactive material would not cause acutely harmful 
radiation doses, and the primary public health concern from those 
materials would be chronic risk of cancer to exposed individuals. 
Hazards from fire, smoke, shock (physical, electrical or thermal), 
shrapnel (from an explosion), industrial chemicals, and other chemical 
or biological agents may also be present.

(2) Improvised Nuclear Device

    An IND is a nuclear weapon originating from an adversary State or 
fabricated by a terrorist group from illicit special nuclear material 
that produces a nuclear explosion. The nuclear yield achieved by an IND 
produces extreme heat, powerful shockwaves, and prompt radiation that 
would be acutely lethal for a significant distance. It also produces 
radioactive fallout, which may spread far downwind and deposit over 
very large areas. If nuclear yield is not achieved, the result would 
likely resemble an RDD in which fissile weapons material was utilized.

(3) Differences Between Acts of Terror and Accidents

    Most radiological emergency planning has been conducted to respond 
to potential nuclear power plant accidents. RDD and IND incidents may 
differ from a nuclear power plant accident in several ways, and 
response planning should take these differences into account. First, 
the severity of an IND incident would be dramatically greater than any 
nuclear power plant accident (although an RDD would likely be on the 
same order of magnitude as a nuclear power plant accident). An IND 
would have vastly greater radiation levels and would create a large 
radius of severe damage from blast and heat, which could not occur in a 
nuclear power plant accident.
    Second, the release from an RDD or IND may start without any 
advance warning and would likely have a relatively short release 
duration. With a major nuclear power plant accident there is likely to 
be several hours of warning before the release starts, and the release 
is likely to be drawn out over many hours. This difference means that 
most early, and some intermediate phase, protective action decisions 
must be made more quickly (and with less information) in an RDD or IND 
incident if they are to be effective.
    Third, an RDD or IND incident is more likely to occur in a major 
city with a large population. Because of the rural setting in which 
many nuclear facilities are located, the number of people affected by a 
nuclear power plant incident may be less and the amount of critical 
infrastructure impacted is also likely to be smaller.
    Fourth, large nuclear facilities have detailed emergency plans that 
are periodically exercised, including specified protective action 
sectors, evacuation routes, and methods to quickly warn the public on 
the protective actions to take. This would not be the case in an RDD or 
IND incident. This level of radiological emergency planning typically 
does not exist for most cities and towns without nuclear facilities.
    Fifth, the type of radioactive material involved could and probably 
will be different from what is potentially

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released for a nuclear power plant incident.

(c) Phases of Response

    Typically, the response to an RDD or IND incident can be divided 
into three time phases--the early phase, the intermediate phase, and 
the late phase--that are generally accepted as being common to all 
nuclear incidents. Although these phases cannot be represented by 
precise time periods and may overlap, they provide a useful framework 
for the considerations involved in emergency response planning.

(1) Early Phase

    The early phase (or emergency phase) is the period at the beginning 
of the incident when immediate decisions for effective use of 
protective actions are required and actual field measurement data is 
generally not available. Exposure to the radioactive plume, short-term 
exposure to deposited materials, and inhalation of radioactive material 
are generally included when considering protective actions for the 
early phase. The response during the early phase includes initial 
emergency response actions to protect public health and welfare in the 
short term. Priority should be given to lifesaving and first-aid 
actions.
    In general, early phase protective actions should be taken very 
quickly, and the protective action decisions can be modified later as 
more information becomes available. If an explosive RDD is deployed 
without warning, there may be no time to take protective actions to 
reduce plume exposure. In the event of a covert dispersal, discovery or 
detection may not occur for days or weeks, allowing contamination to be 
dispersed broadly by foot, vehicular traffic, wind, rain, or other 
forces. If an IND explodes, there would only be time to make early 
phase, protective action recommendations to protect against exposure 
from fallout in areas many miles downwind from the explosion.

(2) Intermediate Phase

    The intermediate phase of the response may follow the early phase 
response within as little as a few hours. The intermediate phase of the 
response is usually assumed to begin after the source and releases have 
been brought under control and protective action decisions can be made 
based on measurements of exposure and radioactive materials that have 
been deposited as a result of the incident. Activities in this phase 
typically overlap with early and late phase activities, and may 
continue for weeks to many months, until protective actions are 
terminated.
    During the intermediate phase, decisions must be made on the 
initial actions needed to recover from the incident, reopen critical 
infrastructures, and return to a general state of normal activity. In 
general, intermediate phase decisions should consider late phase 
response objectives. However, some intermediate phase decisions will 
need to be made quickly (i.e., within hours) and should not be delayed 
by discussions on what the more desirable permanent decisions will be. 
All of these decisions must take into account the health, welfare, 
economic, and other factors that must be balanced by local officials. 
For example, it can be expected that hospitals and their access roads 
will need to remain open or be reopened quickly. These interim 
decisions can often be made with the acknowledgement that further work 
may be needed as time progresses.

(3) Late Phase

    The late phase is the period when recovery and cleanup actions 
designed to reduce radiation levels in the environment to acceptable 
levels are commenced, and it ends when all the recovery actions have 
been completed. With the additional time and increased understanding of 
the situation, there will be opportunities to involve key stakeholders 
in providing sound, cost-effective recommendations. Generally, early 
(or emergency) phase decisions will be made directly by elected public 
officials, or their designees, with limited stakeholder involvement due 
to the need to act within a short timeframe. Long-term decisions should 
be made with stakeholder involvement, and can also include incident-
specific technical working groups to provide expert advice to decision 
makers on impacts, costs, and alternatives.
    The relationship between typical protective actions and the phases 
of the incident response are outlined in Figure 1. Plainly, there is 
overlap between the phases, and this framework should be used to 
support a timely decision making process, irrespective of the 
perception of which incident phase might be applicable.
BILLING CODE 9110-21-P

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[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TN03JA06.000

BILLING CODE 9110-21-C

(d) Protective Actions and Protective Action Guides for RDD and IND 
Incidents

(1) Protective Actions

    Protective actions are activities that may be conducted in response 
to an RDD or IND incident in order to reduce or eliminate exposure to 
members of the public to radiation or other hazards. These actions are 
generic and are applicable to RDDs and INDs. The principal protective 
action decisions for consideration in the early and intermediate phases 
of an emergency are whether to shelter-in-place, evacuate, or relocate 
affected or potentially affected populations. Secondary actions include 
administration of prophylactic drugs, decontamination, use of access 
restrictions, and use of restrictions on food and water. In some 
situations, only one protective action needs to be implemented, while 
in others, numerous protective actions should be implemented.

(2) Protective Action Guides

    PAGs are the projected dose to a reference individual, from an 
accidental or deliberate release of radioactive material at which a 
specific protective action to reduce or avoid that dose is recommended. 
Thus, protective actions are designed to be taken before the 
anticipated dose is realized. The ``Manual of Protective Action Guides 
and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents'' \1\ published by the EPA 
(also known as the EPA PAG Manual) provides a significant part of the 
basis

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of this document and may be referred to for additional details.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ ``Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions 
for Nuclear Incidents,'' U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, May 
1992, EPA-400-R-92-001.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The existing PAGs meet the following principle criteria and goals: 
(1) Prevent acute effects, (2) reduce risk of chronic effects, and (3) 
require optimization to balance protection with other important factors 
and ensure that actions taken cause more benefit than harm.
    In this document, PAGs are generic criteria based on balancing 
public health and welfare with the risk of alternatives applied in each 
of the phases of an RDD or IND incident. The PAGs are specific for 
radiation and radioactive materials, and must be considered in the 
context of other chemical or biological hazards that may also be 
present. Though the PAGs are values of dose avoided, published dose 
conversion factors and derived response levels may be utilized in 
estimating doses, and for choosing and implementing protective actions. 
Other quantitative measures and derived concentration values may be 
useful in emergency situations; for example, for the release of goods 
and property from contaminated zones, and to control access in and out 
of contaminated areas.
    Because of the short time frames required for emergency response 
decisions, it is likely there will not be opportunities for local 
decision makers to consult with a variety of stakeholders before taking 
actions. Therefore, the early and intermediate phase EPA PAGs have been 
based on the significant body of work done in the general context of 
radiological emergency response planning, and represent the results of 
public comment, drills, exercises, and a consensus at the Federal level 
for appropriate emergency action.
    In order to use the PAGs to make decisions about appropriate 
protective actions, decision makers will need information on suspected 
radionuclides; projected plume movement and depositions; and/or actual 
measurement data or, during the period initially following the release, 
expert advice in the absence of good information. Sources of such 
information include: on-scene responders as well as monitoring, 
assessment, and modeling centers.

(3) Protective Action Guides for RDD and IND Incidents

    The PAGs for RDD and IND incidents are generally based on the 
following sources: the PAGs developed by EPA in coordination with other 
Federal agencies through the Protective Action Guide Subcommittee of 
the Federal Radiological Preparedness Coordinating Committee; guidance 
developed by the FDA for food and food products and the distribution of 
potassium iodide; and OSHA regulations.
    In order to use this guide, there may be a need to compare the PAG 
to the results of a risk assessment or dose projection. It should be 
emphasized that, in general, when making radiation dose projections, 
realistic assumptions should be used so the final results are 
representative of actual conditions.
    Table 1 provides a summary of the key actions and suggested PAGs 
for an RDD or IND incident.

                           Table 1.--Protective Action Guides for RDD or IND Incidents
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
               Phase                    Protective action      Protective action guide           Reference
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Early..............................  Limit Emergency Worker  5 rem (or greater under      EPA PAG Manual.
                                      Exposure.               exceptional
                                                              circumstances\1\.
                                     Sheltering of Public..  1 to 5 rems projected        EPA PAG Manual.
                                                              dose\2\.
                                     Evacuation of Public..  1 to 5 rems projected        EPA PAG Manual.
                                                              dose\3\.
                                     Administration of       For potassium iodide, FDA    FDA Guidance \6\.
                                      Prophylactic Drugs.     Guidance dose values\4\
                                                              \5\.
Intermediate.......................  Limit Worker Exposure.  5 rem/yr...................  See Appendix 1.
                                     Relocation of General   2 rems, projected dose       EPA PAG Manual.
                                      Public.                 first year Subsequent
                                                              years: 500 mrem/yr
                                                              projected dose.
                                     Food Interdiction.....  500 mrem/yr projected dose.  FDA Guidance \7\.
                                     Drinking Water          500 mrem/yr dose...........  EPA guidance in
                                      Interdiction.                                        development.
Late...............................  Final Cleanup Actions.  Late phase PAG based on
                                                              optimization .
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ In cases when radiation control options are not available or, due to the magnitude of the incident, are not
  sufficient, doses above 5 rems may be unavoidable. For further discussion see Appendix 1.
\2\ Should normally begin at 1 rem; however, sheltering may begin at lower levels if advantageous.
\3\ Should normally begin at 1 rem.
\4\ Provides protection from radioactive iodine only.
\5\ For other information on medical prophylactics and treatment please refer to https://www.fda.gov/cder/drugprepare/default.htm or https://www.bt.cdc.gov/radiation/index/asp or https://www.orau.gov/reacts.
\6\ ``Potassium Iodide as a Thyroid Blocking Agent in Radiation Emergencies,'' December 2001, Center Drug
  Evaluation and Research, FDA, HHS (https://www.fda.gov/cder/guidance/5386fnl.htm).
\7\ ``Accidental Radioactive Contamination of Human Food and Animal Feeds: Recommendations for State and Local
  Agencies,'' August 13, 1998, Office of Health and Industry Programs, Center for Devices and Radiological
  Health, FDA, HHS (https://www.fda.gov/cdhr/dmqrp/84.html).

(i) Early Phase PAGs
    For the early phase, the existing PAGs for evacuation, sheltering, 
relocation, and protection of emergency workers are appropriate for RDD 
and IND incidents. FDA guidance on the administration of stable iodine 
is also considered appropriate (only useful for an IND or NPP incident 
involving radioiodine release). The administration of other 
prophylactic drugs should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis and 
depend on the nature of the event and radioisotopes involved. It can be 
expected that an initial zone will be established and controlled around 
the site of the incident, as is the case for other crime scenes and 
hazards. These guides allow for the refinement of that area if the 
presence of radiation or radioactive material warrants such action.
    The response during the early phase includes initial emergency 
response actions to protect public health and welfare in the short 
term. Priority should be given to lifesaving and first-aid actions. 
Incident commanders should define and enforce an allowable emergency 
dose limit in accordance with the immediate risk situation. Following 
IND detonation, the highest priority missions will include suppression 
of ignited fires to prevent further loss of life. High radiation doses 
to emergency personnel in IND situations, substantially exceeding the 
nominal occupational level of 5 rem may be unavoidable. While every 
effort to employ as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) principles 
after an

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IND event will be made, medically significant exposures may also be 
unavoidable (see Appendix 1, Section E). Medical evaluation of 
emergency response personnel after such exposure is recommended.
(ii) Intermediate Phase PAGs
    The decisions in the intermediate phase will focus on the return of 
key infrastructure and services, and the rapid restoration of normal 
activities. This will include decisions on allowing use of roads, 
ports, waterways, transportation systems (including subways, trains, 
and airports), hospitals, businesses, and residences. It will also 
include responses to questions about acceptable use and release of real 
and personal property such as cars, clothes, or equipment that may have 
been impacted by the RDD or IND incident. Many of the activities will 
be concerned with materials and areas that were not affected but for 
which members of the public may have a concern. Thus, the PAGs serve to 
guide decisions on returning to impacted areas, leaving impacted areas, 
and providing assurance that an area or material was not impacted. See 
Appendix 1 for a discussion of occupational safety and health 
standards.
    For the intermediate phase, relocation of the population is a 
protective action that can be used to reduce dose. Relocation is the 
removal or continued exclusion of people (households) from contaminated 
areas in order to avoid chronic radiation exposure, and it is meant to 
protect the general public. For the intermediate phase, the existing 
relocation PAGs of 2 rems in the first year and 500 mrems in any year 
after the first are considered appropriate for RDD and IND incidents. 
However, for some IND incidents, the area impacted and the number of 
people that might be subject to relocation could potentially be very 
large and could exceed the resources and infrastructure available. For 
example, in making the relocation decision, the availability of 
adequate accommodations for relocated people should be considered. 
Decision makers may need to consider limiting action to those most 
severely affected, and phasing relocation implementation based on the 
resources available.
    The relocation PAG applies principally to personal residences but 
may impact other facilities as well. For example, it could impact work 
locations, hospitals, and park lands as well as the use of highways and 
other transportation facilities. For each type of facility, the 
occupancy time of individuals should be taken into account to determine 
the criteria for using a facility or area. It might be necessary to 
avoid continuous use of homes in an area because radiation levels are 
too high. However, a factory or office building in the same area could 
be used because occupancy times are shorter. Similarly, a highway could 
be used at higher contamination levels because the exposure time of 
highway users would be considerably less than the time spent at home.
    The intermediate phase PAGs for the interdiction of food and water 
are set at 500 mrem/yr each for RDD and IND incidents. These values are 
consistent with those now used or being considered as PAGs for other 
types of nuclear incidents.
    The use of simple dose reduction techniques is recommended for 
personal property and all potentially contaminated areas that continue 
to be occupied. This use is also consistent with the PAGs developed for 
other types of nuclear incidents. Examples of simple dose reduction 
techniques would be washing of all transportation vehicles (e.g., 
automobiles, trains, ships, and airplanes), personal clothing before 
reuse, eating utensils, food preparation surfaces before next use, and 
other personal property, as practicable and appropriate.
(iii) Late Phase PAGs
    The late phase involves the final cleanup of areas and property 
with radioactive material present. Unlike the early and intermediate 
phases of an RDD or IND incident, decision makers will have more time 
and information during the late phase to allow for better data 
collection, stakeholder involvement, and options analysis. In this 
respect, the late phase is no longer a response to an ``emergency 
situation,'' and is better viewed in terms of the objectives of site 
restoration and cleanup.
    Because of the extremely broad range of potential impacts that may 
occur from RDDs and INDs (e.g., ranging from light contamination of one 
building to widespread destruction of a major metropolitan area), a 
pre-established numeric guideline is not recommended as best serving 
the needs of decision makers in the late phase. Rather, a process 
should be used to determine the societal objectives for expected land 
uses and the options and approaches available, in order to select the 
most acceptable criteria. For example, if the incident is an RDD of 
limited size, such that the impacted area is small, then it might 
reasonably be expected that a complete return to normal conditions can 
be achieved within a short period of time. However, if the impacted 
area is large, then achieving even low cleanup levels for remediation 
of the entire area and/or maintaining existing land uses may not be 
practicable.
    The Risk Management Framework described in Appendix 2 provides such 
a process and helps assure the protection of public health and welfare. 
Decisions should take health, safety, technical, economic, and public 
policy factors into account. Appendix 3 utilizes the framework to 
manage Federal RDD and IND site cleanup and restoration.
    Optimization (broadly defined) is a concept that is common to many 
State, Federal, and international risk management programs that address 
radionuclides and chemicals, although it is not always identified as 
such. Optimization is a flexible approach where a variety of dose and/
or risk benchmarks may be identified from State, Federal,