Third-Party Servicing of Indirect Vehicle Loans, 75753-75759 [E5-7584]
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The petitioner also objects to the
patient release criteria rule on policy
grounds, stating that it creates
unwarranted hazards with regard to the
radioactive iodine treatment of thyroid
patients. The petitioner’s concern is that
there is no ‘‘hard and fast limit on the
amount of I–131’’ administered to an
outpatient, and that a licensee must
only perform a calculation showing that
no one will receive a dose that exceeds
a prescribed limit. However, the patient
release criteria rule means that patients
who are sick, stressed, hypothyroid,
potentially nauseous, and highly
radioactive are being ‘‘sent out the
door,’’ where they may come into close
contact with family members and
members of the public, and although
they are supposed to receive
instructions on minimizing exposure,
may have trouble comprehending and
remembering the guidance they are
given. The petitioner expresses
particular concern regarding how
children of released patients will be
adequately protected from radiological
exposure, stating that children are more
radiation-sensitive than adults and
deserve more protection. The petitioner
also expresses concern that there is a
likelihood of vomiting and that, unlike
hospital staff who wear protective
clothing to protect against radiological
contamination encountered while
cleaning up, family members caring for
patients at home will be unlikely to take
such precautions.
The petitioner also claims that during
the 1997 rulemaking, when the NRC
gave notice of the receipt of the petition
for rulemaking, it received numerous
adverse comments from the ACMUI,
Agreement States, and other
commenters. However, according to the
petitioner, the NRC proceeded to issue
the proposed rule and largely ignored
comments that ran counter to the NRC
staff’s preferred approach. In fact, the
petitioner asserts that the notice of the
final rule misrepresented critical
comments on the release of patients
with I–131 in their systems.
The petitioner states that the NRC
acknowledged in promulgating the 1997
final rule that family members of
patients would receive higher doses of
radiation, but justified this in part by
arguing that members of the clergy who
visit hospitals frequently would receive
lower doses of radiation as a result of
patients having been sent out of the
hospital, and by referring to the
emotional benefit of releasing these
patients. Specifically, the petitioner
asserts that the NRC claimed in the final
rule (see, 62 FR 4129) that although
individuals exposed to the patient could
receive higher doses than if the patient
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had been hospitalized longer, ‘‘these
higher doses are balanced by shorter
hospital stays and thus lower health
care costs. In addition, shorter hospital
stays may provide emotional benefits to
patients and their families. Allowing
earlier reunion of families can improve
the patient’s state of mind, which in
itself may improve the outcome of the
treatment and lead to the delivery of
more effective health care.’’
The petitioner argues, however, that
the NRC’s reasoning ignored his and
other thyroid patients’ comments that
some ‘‘patients may experience greater
‘emotional benefit’ from knowing that
by receiving their treatment as inpatients, they are protecting their
families from unnecessary radiation
exposure.’’ Moreover, the petitioner is
skeptical of the NRC’s rationale that
releasing patients with treatment doses
of radioactivity in their bodies will
reduce exposure to clergy who regularly
visit hospitals, or hospital orderlies.
Finally, the petitioner takes issue with
other aspects that he notes constituted
part of the NRC staff’s rationale for the
patient release criteria rule. Specifically,
he contests the NRC’s assertion that I–
131 treatment for thyroid cancer occurs
‘‘probably no more than once in a
lifetime,’’ the NRC’s implication that no
harm is done by exposing family
members to the exposure from just one
treatment, and the implication that it is
not ‘‘reasonably achievable’’ to keep
radiation exposure to family members
low by treating patients in radioactive
isolation.
The Petitioner’s Conclusion
The petitioner concludes that the
patient release criteria rule is
irredeemably flawed, as was the
rulemaking that produced that rule. The
petitioner therefore requests that the
NRC institute rulemaking to rescind that
portion of 10 CFR 35.75 that allows
patients to be released from radiological
isolation with I–131 in their systems in
amounts greater than 30 millicuries. The
petitioner requests that this rulemaking
be undertaken expeditiously.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 15th day
of December, 2005.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Annette Vietti-Cook,
Secretary of the Commission.
[FR Doc. E5–7641 Filed 12–20–05; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590–01–P
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75753
NATIONAL CREDIT UNION
ADMINISTRATION
12 CFR Parts 701 and 741
Third-Party Servicing of Indirect
Vehicle Loans
National Credit Union
Administration (NCUA).
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking
(NPR).
AGENCY:
SUMMARY: The NCUA is issuing a
proposed rule to regulate purchases by
federally insured credit unions of
indirect vehicle loans serviced by thirdparties. NCUA proposes to limit the
aggregate amount of these loans serviced
by any single third-party to a percentage
of the credit union’s net worth. The
effect of the proposed rule would be to
ensure that federally insured credit
unions do not undertake undue risk
with these purchases.
DATES: Comments must be received on
or before February 21, 2006.
ADDRESSES: You may submit comments
by any of the following methods (Please
send comments by one method only):
• NCUA Web Site:
https://www.ncua.gov/news/
proposed_regs/proposed_regs.html.
Follow the instructions for submitting
comments.
• E-mail: Address to
regcomments@ncua.gov. Include ‘‘[Your
name] Comments on Advance Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking (Specialized
Lending Activities)’’ in the e-mail
subject line.
• Fax: (703) 518–6319. Use the
subject line described above for e-mail.
• Mail: Address to Mary Rupp,
Secretary of the Board, National Credit
Union Administration, 1775 Duke
Street, Alexandria, Virginia 22314–
3428.
• Hand Delivery/Courier: Same as
mail address.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Paul
Peterson, Staff Attorney, Office of
General Counsel, at the above address or
telephone (703) 518–6540, Matt
Biliouris, Program Officer, Office of
Examination and Insurance, at the above
address or telephone (703) 518–6360, or
Steve Sherrod, Division of Capital
Markets Director, Office of Capital
Markets and Planning, at the above
address or telephone (703) 518–6620.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
A. Background
Indirect lending involves credit union
financing for the purchase of goods at
the point-of-sale. The merchant,
typically an automobile dealer, brings a
potential member-borrower to the credit
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union and also assists with
underwriting. When done properly,
indirect lending has certain advantages
for credit unions, including possible
growth in membership and lending
volume. Still, because the dealer’s
primary interest is in facilitating a
vehicle sale and not in careful
underwriting, indirect lending poses
particular risks to credit unions.
Some vendors offer indirect lending
programs in which the vendor manages
the credit union’s relationship with the
automobile dealer and, through loan
servicing conducted by the vendor or a
related business entity, the credit
union’s relationship with the member.
These vehicle lending programs,
referred to in this preamble as ‘‘indirect,
outsourced programs,’’ carry all the
risks of indirect lending programs as
well as additional risks.
NCUA is concerned some credit
unions may increase risk exposures in
indirect, outsourced programs without
first conducting adequate due diligence,
implementing appropriate controls, and
gaining experience with servicer
performance. Some credit unions have
realized weaker than expected earnings
because of participation in these
programs. Therefore, the Board has
determined that regulatory
concentration limits on indirect,
outsourced programs are appropriate.
The types of risk associated with
these indirect, outsourced loan
programs include: (1) Credit risk, (2)
liquidity risk, (3) transaction risk, (4)
compliance risk, and (5) reputation risk.
A credit union should exercise caution
and gain experience before significantly
growing a portfolio of loans
underwritten and serviced by a third
party. A credit union’s due diligence
should include an initial review of each
of these risks, as well as ongoing
reviews.
Credit risk. Both underwriting and
post-underwriting factors generate
potential credit risk. Credit loss
experience may be worse if the indirect,
outsourced loan program uses more
permissive underwriting criteria than
the credit union uses for its direct
lending. Post-underwriting, credit loss
experience may be worse if the quality
of a third-party’s servicing is not as good
as that of the credit union’s own
servicing. Credit unions should adopt
appropriate metrics (e.g., performance
standards) in their servicing agreements
to ensure timely servicing and
collection performance by the thirdparty servicer.
Liquidity risk. A credit union’s
liquidity position may suffer if the
credit union experiences a sudden
increase in indirect, outsourced loans.
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Liquidity may also be impaired if an
indirect, outsourced arrangement
restricts the ability to transfer servicing
by imposing a material cost for the
transfer, including the loss of a material
economic benefit, such as cancellation
of an insurance policy. Additionally,
loans contractually bound to a thirdparty servicer may have a more limited
market than the market for loans sold
with servicing released.
Transaction risk. Transaction risk
(also referred to as operating or fraud
risk) may arise in indirect, outsourced
programs because the credit union is
relying to a significant extent on the
third-party servicer’s internal controls,
information systems, employee
integrity, and operating processes. A
credit union’s due diligence should
include continuing review of each of
these areas, as well as the financial
condition of the servicer.
Compliance risk. Compliance risk in
lending programs may arise from
violations of, or nonconformance with,
consumer protection laws, such as the
Truth-in-Lending Act and Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act. To the extent
a credit union has reduced control and
supervision of a third-party servicer’s
collection activities, a credit union’s
compliance risk in an indirect,
outsourced program may be greater than
that of an in-house servicing program.
Reputation risk. Reputation risk may
result from a third-party servicer’s
compliance failures or transaction
losses. Poor quality servicing, improper
collection processes, and questionable
or excessive fees assessed against the
borrower by the servicer may also
alienate members from the credit union
and affect the ability of the credit union
to maintain existing relationships or
establish new ones.
NCUA has discussed sound business
practices related to this form of lending
in a series of letters to credit unions
going back several years. In November
2001, for example, NCUA published
NCUA Letter to Credit Unions (LTCU)
No. 01–CU–20, Due Diligence over
Third Party Service Providers, providing
minimum due diligence practices over
third-party service providers In
September 2004, the Board expressed its
concern with specialized lending
activities and the associated risks in
NCUA LTCU No. 04–CU–13,
Specialized Lending Activities. That
letter discussed three, higher risk
lending activities: subprime lending,
indirect lending, and outsourced
lending relationships, and included
three examiner questionnaires so credit
unions could see how examiners
evaluate the risks in these activities.
These two letters are available on
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NCUA’s Web site at
https://www.ncua.gov/letters/2001/01CU-20.pdf and
https://www.ncua.gov/letters/2004/04CU-13.pdf, respectively. Members of the
public without access to the internet
may request copies of letters to credit
unions and other NCUA publications by
calling NCUA’s publication line at (703)
518–6340.
Since the summer of 2004, NCUA has
also observed a significant increase in
specialized lending activities, including
the use of third parties to service
indirect vehicle loans. NCUA began
collecting indirect loan data from all
credit unions beginning with the June
30, 2004, Call Report. The portfolios of
credit unions reporting indirect loans
increased to $58 billion (at June 30,
2005) from $45 billion (at June 30,
2004), a 29 percent increase in one
year.1 Based on supervision and
insurance information, the growth in
indirect, outsourced vehicle loan
programs was even more rapid, and
NCUA also detected increasing
concentration levels at particular credit
unions in these loans. Currently, NCUA
estimates there are approximately
twenty or more credit unions with more
than 100 percent of their net worth
invested in indirect, outsourced vehicle
loans.
In June 2005, the NCUA Board issued
Risk Alert 05–RISK–01 (the Risk Alert),
Subject: Specialized Lending
Activities—Third-Party Subprime
Indirect Lending and Participations,
available on NCUA’s website at
https://www.ncua.gov/letters/RiskAlert/
2005/05-RISK-01.pdf. The Risk Alert
discussed concerns related to subprime,
indirect automobile loans underwritten
or serviced by third parties. The Risk
Alert further discussed due diligence
practices and on-going control
mechanisms appropriate for such
programs.
Despite these NCUA supervision and
insurance initiatives, the Board remains
concerned that some credit unions
engaging in these programs still do not
undertake the requisite due diligence to
understand and protect themselves from
the risks inherent in these programs. In
fact, some credit unions with significant
concentrations in indirect, outsourced
loans have indicated to NCUA their
desire to fund new loans even though
they have not yet completed the due
diligence described in NCUA issuances.
1 Based on anecdotal information, NCUA believes
that the vast majority of these indirect loans are
vehicle loans.
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B. Proposed Rule
1. General
NCUA proposes a two-step, regulatory
concentration limit for indirect,
outsourced programs with a waiver
provision for higher limits in
appropriate cases. The Board believes
the proposed rule is necessary to protect
the National Credit Union Share
Insurance Fund (NCUSIF) from the risks
associated with this activity.
For the first 30 months of a new
relationship, § 701.21(h)(1) limits a
credit union’s interest in indirect
vehicle loans serviced by any single
third party to 50 percent of the credit
union’s net worth. This permits a credit
union to enter and gain experience with
a new indirect, outsourced vendor
program. After 30 months of experience
with that third party’s program, the
proposed rule permits a credit union to
increase its interests in that program to
100 percent of the credit union’s net
worth.
The Board believes that limits of 50
percent and 100 percent are appropriate,
assuming credit unions maintain an
adequate due diligence program. As
explained below, however, a credit
union that can demonstrate appropriate
initial and ongoing due diligence may
apply for a waiver to obtain higher
limits.
In determining these concentration
limits, the Board noted that indirect,
outsourced programs typically require a
credit union to give a third party
servicer significant control over the loan
assets. For example, the third-party
generally makes all contacts with the
member-borrowers; determines when
the loans are in default; determines the
pace of and resource allocation to loan
collection, vehicle repossession, and
vehicle remarketing; and also controls
all the cash flows.
The indirect lending aspect of these
programs creates additional loss of
control for the credit union, as memberborrower information does not come
directly to the credit union but instead
is filtered through both the dealer and
the vendor. In some of these programs,
the third-party also controls the quality
of the loan receivables because it
dictates the underwriting criteria and
processes the loan applications. In
addition, some third-party vendors
control the insurance coverage
associated with these loans. The thirdparty may even assume some of the
credit risk through reinsurance
arrangements or stop-loss agreements.
All these factors increase a credit
union’s reliance on the third-party to
produce a positive return for the credit
union. Some vendors have advertised
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these programs in the past by promoting
them as ‘‘turn-key’’ and suggesting that
credit unions need do very little in the
way of due diligence.
The control exercised by the thirdparty in indirect, outsourced programs
is similar to the control exercised by an
issuer of an asset backed security (ABS)
collateralized by loan receivables. The
originator of a pool of loan receivables
(e.g., auto loans) sells the receivables
into a bankruptcy-remote grantor trust
or owner trust (i.e., the ABS issuer). The
ABS issuer contracts with a servicer,
usually affiliated with the seller (e.g.,
seller/servicer), to service the
receivables, and determines what sort of
credit enhancements or insurance will
be necessary to support issuance of
ABS. The ABS issuer also controls the
cash flows. The Board believes the risks
to a credit union from indirect,
outsourced programs are similar to
those posed by the purchase of an ABS
investment. Accordingly, in
determining appropriate concentration
limits for indirect, outsourced vendor
loan programs the Board examined
established concentration limits for
investment in ABS.
Natural person federal credit unions
are not authorized to invest in ABS,
even highly rated ABS.2 12 U.S.C. 1757.
National banks may invest in ABS, but
the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency (OCC) limits a bank’s
aggregate investments in ABS issued by
any one issuer to 25 percent of capital
and surplus.3 12 CFR 1.3(f). For
purposes of this limit, the OCC requires
aggregation of ABS issued by obligors
that are related directly or indirectly
through common control. 12 CFR
1.4(d)(i).
The OCC established this 25 percent
limit in 1996. Originally, the OCC
proposed an even more restrictive 15
percent limit, but ultimately chose a 25
percent limit with the following
explanation:
The OCC believes the 25 percent of capital
limit is a prudential limit that provides
sufficient protection against undue risk
concentrations. This limit parallels the 25
percent credit concentration benchmark in
the Comptroller’s Handbook for National
Bank Examiners. The Handbook identifies
credit concentrations in excess of 25 percent
2 NCUA’s corporate credit union rule, however,
does permit corporate credit unions to invest in
ABS. 12 CFR 704.5(c)(5). The corporate rule
generally limits the aggregate of all investments,
including ABS, issued by any single obligor to 50
percent of the corporate credit union’s capital or $5
million, whichever is greater. 12 CFR 704.6(c).
3 The capital and surplus of a national bank is
roughly equivalent to the net worth of a natural
person credit union. Compare 12 CFR 1.2(a) with
12 CFR 702.2(f) and the definition of the ‘‘net
worth’’ in proposed § 701.21(h)(3)(iv).
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of a bank’s capital as raising potential safety
and soundness concerns. For this purpose,
the Handbook guidance aggregates direct and
indirect obligations of an obligor or issuer
and also specifically contemplates
application of the 25 percent benchmark to
concentrations that may result from an
acquisition of a volume of loans from a single
source, regardless of the diversity of the
individual borrowers.
61 FR 63972, 63977 (Dec. 2,
1996)(emphasis in original).
In comparing indirect, outsourced
programs and ABS, the Board notes
there are certain protections for the ABS
investor that do not exist in the indirect,
outsourced loan programs. The creation
and sale of ABS securities are regulated
by the Securities and Exchange
Commission, while the various vendors
that currently market indirect,
outsourced loan programs to credit
unions have no specific regulatory
oversight. Further, the only ABS that
corporate credit unions and national
banks may invest in are reviewed and
rated by nationally recognized statistical
rating organizations (NRSROs) while the
vendors currently offering indirect,
outsourced programs to credit unions
are often privately held companies with
no NRSRO rating.
The proposed rule, with limits of 50
and 100 percent, is less restrictive than
the 25 percent that the OCC permits for
national bank investment in ABS. While
investing is a secondary activity for
credit unions, lending is a primary
purpose. Credit unions should have
maximum flexibility to make loans to
members within the bounds of safety
and soundness.
The Board is generally not inclined to
allow a credit union to place over 100
percent of its net worth at risk. A credit
union is not likely to experience a 100
percent devaluation of any particular
indirect, outsourced vehicle loan
portfolio but substantial devaluations
are possible, particularly in portfolios of
poor credit quality or in the event of
fraud. In addition, inadequate oversight
in one credit union program, such as a
lending program, may indicate poor due
diligence and potential losses in other
programs at that credit union.
Accordingly, the Board has determined
that a credit union should be held to a
maximum concentration of 100 percent
of net worth unless it can demonstrate
a high level of due diligence and
controls.
In determining when a credit union
may move from the 50 percent limit to
the 100 percent limit, the Board
examined the average life of the loans
that make up an indirect, outsourced
program portfolio. Average vehicle loan
life depends on various factors. For
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example, it can be as little as 20 to 24
months for subprime vehicle loans, and
as much as 36 months or more for
prime, new vehicle loans. After about 30
months of experience, then, a credit
union that is properly monitoring loan
performance on vehicle loans should
have a sufficient understanding of the
historical performance of that portfolio.
At the 30-month point, the Board
believes that an increase in
concentration limits from 50 percent of
net worth to 100 percent is appropriate.
Regardless of whether a credit union
is at or below its concentration limit, all
credit unions should conduct due
diligence, both before entering into
indirect, outsourced lending programs
and on an on-going basis. Even at lesser
concentration levels, these programs
entail significant risk that can negatively
affect net worth. All credit unions
involved in these programs must be
familiar with relevant regulatory
limitations and guidance, including
those documents referenced earlier in
this preamble.
The proposed rule is limited in scope,
in that it is limited to loans made to
finance vehicle purchases and the
concentration limits do not apply to
servicers that are federally-insured
depository institutions or wholly-owned
subsidiaries of federally-insured
depository institutions. The risks to
credit unions associated with these
servicers are mitigated because federal
regulators have access to and oversight
of these entities. Of course, credit
unions must still conduct appropriate
due diligence even when using these
servicers.
The proposed concentration limits are
not, however, limited to loans of any
particular credit quality, such as prime,
nonprime, or subprime loans. Still, loan
portfolios of lesser credit quality require
greater due diligence, as described in
the Risk Alert.4 Also, the due diligence
required for a waiver of the
concentration limits may increase for
portfolios of lesser credit quality.
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2. Waiver Provision
Section 701.21(h)(2) of the proposed
rule establishes a waiver process to
permit credit unions with high levels of
4 The Board would like to clarify that, potentially,
there could be vendor programs affected by this
rulemaking that are not affected by the Risk Alert,
and vice versa. For example, an indirect,
outsourced program that only involves vehicle
loans of prime credit quality would be affected by
the limits in this proposed rule but not by the Risk
Alert. On the other hand, any vendor program that
requires the credit union adopt vendor-generated
subprime underwriting criteria but does not involve
any third-party servicing would be subject to
portions of the Risk Alert but not subject to the
limits imposed by this proposed rule.
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due diligence and tight controls to have
greater concentration limits. A credit
union requesting a waiver of the
concentration limits may apply to the
regional director who will consider
various criteria in determining whether
to grant a waiver, including:
• The credit union’s understanding of
the third party servicer’s business
model, organization, financial health,
and the program risks;
• The credit union’s due diligence in
monitoring and protecting against
program risks;
• The credit union’s ability to control
the servicer’s actions and replace an
inadequate servicer as provided by
contract;
• Other relevant factors related to
safety and soundness considerations.
If a regional director determines that
a waiver is appropriate, the regional
director will include appropriate
limitations on the waiver such as a
substitute concentration limit and a
waiver expiration date.
3. Waiver Criteria
Credit unions that desire greater
concentration limits must have high
levels of due diligence and tight
controls. A discussion of the criteria a
regional director will use when
reviewing an application for waiver
follows.
a. The Credit Union’s Understanding of
the Third Party Servicer’s Organization,
Business Model, Financial Health, and
Program Risks
Often, an indirect, outsourced vendor
is a privately held company that
processes significant cash flows for the
credit union and also controls important
credit union records, such as the vehicle
title documents and current member
contact information. A credit union
requesting a concentration limit waiver
must demonstrate a comprehensive
understanding of the third party’s
organization, business model, financial
health, and the risks associated with the
vendor’s program. The credit union
must also demonstrate that the servicer
is adequately capitalized to meet its
financial obligations.
A credit union requesting a waiver
should provide detailed information
about the following in its waiver request
to the regional director:
• The vendor’s organization,
including identification of subsidiaries
and affiliates involved in the program
and the purpose of each;
• The various sources of income to
the vendor and the credit union in the
program and any potential vendor
conflicts with the interests of the credit
union;
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• The experience, character, and
fitness of the vendor’s owners and key
employees;
• The vendor’s ability to fulfill
commitments, as evidenced by aggregate
financial commitments, capital strength,
liquidity, reputation, and operating
results; 5
• How loan-related cash flows,
including borrower payments, borrower
payoffs, and insurance payments, are
tracked and identified in the program;
• The vendor’s internal controls to
protect against fraud and abuse, as
documented by, for example, a current
SAS 70 type II report prepared by an
independent and well-qualified
accounting firm;
• Insurance offered by the vendor,
including interrelated insurance
products, premiums, conditions for
coverage beyond the control of the
credit union (e.g., a prohibition on
extension of the insured loans past
maturity), and limitations such as
aggregate loss limits;
• The underwriting criteria provided
by the vendor, including an analysis of
the expected yield based on historical
loan data, and a sensitivity analysis
considering the potential effects of a
deteriorating economic environment,
failure of associated insurance, the
possibility of fraud at the servicer, a
decline in average portfolio credit
quality, and, if applicable, movement in
the program back toward industry-wide
performance statistics; 6
• Vendor involvement in the
underwriting and processing of loan
applications, including use of
proprietary scoring or screening models
not included in the credit union
approved underwriting criteria; and
• The program risks, including (1)
credit risk, (2) liquidity risk, (3)
transaction risk, (4) compliance risk, (5)
strategic risk, (6) interest rate risk, and
(7) reputation risk.
Some indirect, outsourced programs
have complex business models that
include vendor management of the
dealer relationship and also insurance
provided by the vendor. These business
models can produce situations where
the vendor’s financial interests are not
aligned with the credit union’s interests.
The credit union needs to be aware of
5 NRSRO ratings, multi-year audited and
segmented financials, and explanations of related
party transactions and changes to the net worth of
the vendor, if any, are also relevant.
6 If the program loans have historically
outperformed industry averages, perhaps because of
lower prepayment rates or lower default
proportions, the credit union should calculate
expected yield should the prepayment rates or
default proportions move upwards toward the
industry averages.
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these situations and, if appropriate, take
protective action.
For example, the dealer’s interest in
an indirect lending situation is to obtain
financing so that the dealer can sell a
vehicle. The credit union’s interest is to
ensure that loan applications are
properly underwritten, and that only
members who are qualified for loans
receive loans. With an indirect,
outsourced program, the third-party
vendor controls information on the
quality of all of a particular dealer’s
originations. A vendor could present
loans to a credit union from a changing
list of dealers, making it difficult for the
credit union to identify and screen out
such substandard dealers. This creates a
potential for the vendor to permit
dealers with substandard underwriting
performance to remain active in the
program.
Unlike typical indirect lending where
the dealer receives an origination fee, in
some vendor programs the vendor
processes the loan application for the
credit union and the vendor also
receives significant income from dealer
fees. The credit union needs to fully
understand the relationship between the
vendor and the dealers. Credit unions
seeking a concentration limit waiver
should review agreements between the
vendor and associated dealers.
Some vendors provide third-party
default insurance to credit unions, and
this presents a potential conflict. This
insurance pays most of the loan
deficiency balance to the credit union if
a loan defaults and a vehicle is
repossessed and sold at auction. In the
event of high loan default rates, the
interests of the credit union and
insurance company may conflict. The
credit union would like the vehicles
repossessed and sold and the insurance
paid, while the insurance company
would rather not pay the claims if they
can be legally avoided. Some vendors
align their interests with the insurance
company, not the credit union, through
guaranty or reinsurance agreements.
That is, if the vehicle is repossessed and
sold, the insurance company passes
some or all of its costs for paying the
claim through to the vendor. This
creates a potential conflict of interest
and an incentive for the vendor, as
servicer, not to repossess vehicles. For
example, a delay in repossession
increases the odds that a vehicle will
disappear (i.e., go skip) or a borrower
will declare and complete a bankruptcy
under chapter 13, and in neither
situation will the default insurance pay.
In addition, a delay in repossession on
a default near loan maturity may also
cause the insurance coverage to lapse
whether or not the vehicle is ultimately
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14:51 Dec 20, 2005
Jkt 208001
repossessed. Accordingly, a credit union
needs to understand the relationship
between the vendor and the insurance
company and the associated risks to the
credit union. To understand this
relationship fully, a credit union
desiring a concentration limit waiver
should review all agreements between
the vendor, affiliates of the vendor, and
the associated insurance companies.
Another potential conflict exists
where the vendor controls the dealer
relationship and can route a potential
loan to multiple funding sources. For
example, some vendors track statistics
on loan performance by dealership. A
credit union should be aware if a vendor
then routes loan applications from the
preferred dealerships to the preferred
funding sources. A credit union desiring
a waiver should understand the various
funding sources available to the vendor
and document how the vendor tracks
vendor performance and makes funding
decisions.
b. The Credit Union’s Due Diligence in
Monitoring and Protecting Against
Program Risks
Credit unions must design a due
diligence program that identifies and
assesses all material risks. The nature
and extent of the due diligence required
for a waiver depends on the nature and
extent of the identified risks. Higher
concentration levels entail more risk to
the net worth of the credit union, and
so the requisite due diligence also
depends on the substitute concentration
limit that the credit union requests.
c. Whether Contracts Between the Credit
Union and the Third-Party Servicer
Grant the Credit Union Sufficient
Control Over the Servicer’s Actions and
Provide for Replacing an Inadequate
Servicer
After a loan is funded, the most
important activity affecting loan
performance is the quality of the
servicing. As NCUA stated in LTCU No.
04–CU–13, and, again, in the Risk Alert,
safety and soundness requires a credit
union to limit the power of a third-party
servicer to alter loan terms. Also, the
servicing contract must contain a
mechanism, or exit clause, to replace an
unsatisfactory servicer.
To qualify for a waiver of these
regulatory concentration limits, the
servicing agreement should include
more than minimal protections for the
credit union. Servicer performance
standards should be objective and clear,
and the waiver request should clearly
articulate how the performance
standards protect the interests of the
credit union. The exit clause, including
any cure period, should be exercisable
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75757
in a reasonable period of time. The more
intensive the requisite servicing, such as
for nonprime or subprime loans, the
shorter that period of time should be. A
credit union’s right to exit the servicing
agreement should be exercisable at a
reasonable cost to the credit union. If
the credit union must pay a punitive fee
to replace a poor servicer, or give up
valuable insurance protection or legal
rights without adequate compensation,
the servicing agreement will not satisfy
this waiver criterion.
The regional director may also
consider any legal reviews obtained by
the credit union on these contracts. The
regional director should consider the
scope and depth of the review and the
qualifications of the reviewer.
d. Other Factors Related to Safety and
Soundness
Regional directors may consider other
relevant factors when determining
whether to grant a waiver of the
concentration limits as well as the size
of any substitute limit. Other factors
include, but are not limited to, the
demonstrated strength of the credit
union’s management and the credit
union’s previous history in exercising
due diligence over similar programs.
4. Grandfathering
Several credit unions that currently
participate in indirect, outsourced
programs have concentration levels that
exceed the proposed concentration
limits. For those credit unions that
exceed the concentration limits on the
effective date of any final rule, the rule
will not require any divestiture. The
rule will prohibit these credit unions
from purchasing any additional loans,
or interests in loans, from the affected
vendor program until such time as the
credit union either reduces its holdings
below the appropriate concentration
limit or the credit union obtains a
waiver to permit a greater concentration
limit.
The Board is concerned that some
credit unions may consider making
large purchases of loans that would be
subject to the rule before the effective
date of a final rule. NCUA will review
any large purchases closely and credit
unions should be advised that NCUA
may consider appropriate supervisory
action, including divestiture, to ensure
that the credit union’s actions were safe
and sound.
Regulatory Procedures
Regulatory Flexibility Act
The Regulatory Flexibility Act
requires NCUA to prepare an analysis to
describe any significant economic
E:\FR\FM\21DEP1.SGM
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Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 244 / Wednesday, December 21, 2005 / Proposed Rules
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impact a proposed rule may have on a
substantial number of small credit
unions (those under $10 million in
assets). This proposed rule establishes
for federally-insured credit unions a
concentration limit on indirect vehicle
loans serviced by third parties. As of
May 31, 2005, NCUA estimates no more
than five small credit unions were
involved in purchasing vehicle loans, or
interests in loans, from an indirect,
outsourced vendor program. The
proposed rule, therefore, will not have
a significant economic impact on a
substantial number of small credit
unions and a regulatory flexibility
analysis is not required.
Paperwork Reduction Act
The waiver provision of section
701.21(h)(2) contains information
collection requirements. As required by
the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995
(44 U.S.C. 3507(d)), NCUA has
submitted a copy of this proposed rule
as part of an information collection
package to the Office of Management
and Budget (OMB) for its review and
approval of a new Collection of
Information, Third-Party Servicing of
Indirect Vehicle Loans.
The proposed § 701.21(h)(2) requires
that credit unions requesting a waiver
provide sufficient information to NCUA
to determine if a waiver is appropriate.
NCUA is not certain how many credit
unions may request a waiver. Currently,
there are approximately twenty credit
unions that have in excess of 100
percent of net worth invested in
indirect, outsourced vehicle loan
programs. NCUA believes that no more
than ten of these credit unions will
request a waiver during the first year.
Also, during the first year, NCUA
estimates that no more than five
additional credit unions will approach
their concentration limits and also
request a waiver. It will take a credit
union approximately fifty hours to
prepare the waiver request, including
preparing a description of current and
planned due diligence efforts and
making copies of all supporting
documentation. Fifteen respondents
times fifty hours each is a total annual
burden of seven hundred and fifty
hours.
Organizations and individuals
desiring to submit comments on the
information collection requirements
should direct them to the Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs,
OMB, Attn: Mark Menchik, Room
10226, New Executive Office Building,
Washington, DC 20503.
The NCUA considers comments by
the public on this proposed collection of
information in—
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14:51 Dec 20, 2005
Jkt 208001
—Evaluating whether the proposed
collection of information is necessary
for the proper performance of the
functions of the NCUA, including
whether the information will have a
practical use;
—Evaluating the accuracy of the
NCUA’s estimate of the burden of the
proposed collection of information,
including the validity of the
methodology and assumptions used;
—Enhancing the quality, usefulness,
and clarity of the information to be
collected; and
—Minimizing the burden of collection
of information on those who are to
respond, including through the use of
appropriate automated electronic,
mechanical, or other technological
collection techniques or other forms
of information technology; e.g.,
permitting electronic submission of
responses.
List of Subjects
12 CFR part 701
Credit unions, Loans.
12 CFR part 741
Credit unions, Requirements for
insurance.
By the National Credit Union
Administration Board on December 15, 2005.
Mary Rupp,
Secretary of the Board.
For the reasons stated in the
preamble, the National Credit Union
Administration proposes to amend 12
CFR parts 701 and 741 as set forth
below:
PART 701—ORGANIZATION AND
OPERATIONS OF FEDERAL CREDIT
UNIONS
1. The authority citation for part 701
continues to read as follows:
The Paperwork Reduction Act
requires OMB to make a decision
concerning the collection of information
contained in these proposed regulations
between 30 and 60 days after
publication of this document in the
Federal Register. Therefore, a comment
to OMB is best assured of having its full
effect if OMB receives it within 30 days
of publication. This does not affect the
deadline for the public to comment to
the NCUA on the proposed regulations.
Authority: 12 U.S.C. 1752(5), 1755, 1756,
1757, 1759, 1761a, 1761b, 1766, 1767, 1782,
1784, 1787, and 1789. Section 701.6 is also
authorized by 31 U.S.C. 3717. Section 701.31
is also authorized by 15 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.;
42 U.S.C. 1981 and 3601–3619. Section
701.35 is also authorized by 42 U.S.C. 4311–
4312.
Executive Order 13132
*
Executive Order 13132 encourages
independent regulatory agencies to
consider the impact of their actions on
state and local interests. In adherence to
fundamental federalism principles,
NCUA, an independent regulatory
agency as defined in 44 U.S.C. 3502(5),
voluntarily complies with the executive
order. The proposed rule would not
have substantial direct effects on the
states, on the connection between the
national government and the states, or
on the distribution of power and
responsibilities among the various
levels of government. NCUA has
determined that this proposed rule does
not constitute a policy that has
federalism implications for purposes of
the executive order.
The Treasury and General Government
Appropriations Act, 1999—Assessment
of Federal Regulations and Policies on
Families
NCUA has determined that this
proposed rule would not affect family
well-being within the meaning of
section 654 of the Treasury and General
Government Appropriations Act, 1999,
Public Law 105–277, 112 Stat. 2681
(1998).
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2. In part 701, add a new paragraph
(h) to § 701.21 to read as follows:
§ 701.21 Loans to Members and Lines of
Credit to Members.
*
*
*
*
(h) Third-Party Servicing of Indirect
Vehicle Loans.
(1) A federally-insured credit union
must not acquire any vehicle loan, or
any interest in a vehicle loan, serviced
by a third-party servicer if the aggregate
amount of vehicle loans and interests in
vehicle loans serviced by that thirdparty servicer and its affiliates would
exceed:
(i) 50 percent of the credit union’s net
worth during the initial thirty months of
that third-party servicing relationship;
or
(ii) 100 percent of the credit union’s
net worth after the initial thirty months
of that third-party servicing
relationship.
(2) Regional directors may grant a
waiver of the limits in paragraph (h)(1)
of this section to permit greater limits
upon written application by a credit
union. In determining whether to grant
or deny a waiver, a regional director
will consider:
(i) The credit union’s understanding
of the third party servicer’s
organization, business model, financial
health, and the related program risks;
(ii) The credit union’s due diligence
in monitoring and protecting against
program risks;
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Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 244 / Wednesday, December 21, 2005 / Proposed Rules
(iii) Whether contracts between the
credit union and the third-party servicer
grant the credit union sufficient control
over the servicer’s actions and provide
for replacing an inadequate servicer;
and
(iv) Other factors relevant to safety
and soundness.
(3) For purposes of paragraph (h) of
this section:
(i) The term ‘‘third-party servicer’’
means any entity, other than a federallyinsured depository institution or a
wholly-owned subsidiary of a federallyinsured depository institution, that
receives any scheduled periodic
payments from a borrower pursuant to
the terms of a loan and distributes the
payments of principal and interest and
such other payments with respect to the
amounts received from the borrower as
may be required pursuant to the terms
of the loan.
(ii) The term ‘‘its affiliates,’’ as it
relates to the third-party servicer, means
any entities that:
(A) Control, are controlled by, or are
under common control with, that thirdparty servicer; or
(B) Are under contract with that thirdparty servicer or other entity described
in paragraph (h)(3)(ii)(A) of this section.
(iii) The term ‘‘vehicle loan’’ means
any installment vehicle sales contract or
its equivalent that the credit union must
report as an asset under generally
accepted accounting principles. The
term does not include loans made
directly by the credit union to a
member.
(iv) The term ‘‘net worth’’ means the
retained earnings balance of the credit
union at quarter end as determined
under generally accepted accounting
principles. For low income-designated
credit unions, net worth also includes
secondary capital accounts that are
uninsured and subordinate to all other
claims, including claims of creditors,
shareholders, and the National Credit
Union Share Insurance Fund.
*
*
*
*
*
PART 741—REQUIREMENTS FOR
INSURANCE
3. The authority citation for part 741
continues to read as follows:
rmajette on PROD1PC67 with PROPOSALS
Authority: 12 U.S.C. 1757, 1766, 1781–
1790, and 1790d. Section 741.4 is also
authorized by 31 U.S.C. 3717.
4. Add a new paragraph (c) to
§ 741.203 to read as follows:
§ 741.203 Minimum loan policy
requirements.
*
*
*
*
*
(c) Adhere to the requirements stated
in § 701.21(h) of this chapter concerning
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14:51 Dec 20, 2005
Jkt 208001
third-party servicing of indirect vehicle
loans. Before a state-chartered credit
union applies to a regional director for
a waiver under § 701.21(h)(2) it must
first notify its state supervisory
authority. The regional director will not
grant a waiver unless the appropriate
state official concurs in the waiver.
75759
2. On page 51116, column 3, in the
preamble, under the paragraph heading
‘‘Background’’, tenth line from the
bottom of the last paragraph, the
language ‘‘for this type of external
contributions is’’ is corrected to read
‘‘for this type of external contribution
is’’.
3. On page 51117, column 1, in the
[FR Doc. E5–7584 Filed 12–20–05; 8:45 am]
preamble, under the paragraph heading
BILLING CODE 7535–01–P
‘‘A. Overview’’, fourth line from the
bottom of the first paragraph, the
language ‘‘the commensurate income
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
standard’’ is corrected to read ‘‘the
commensurate with income standard’’.
Internal Revenue Service
4. On page 51117, column 2, in the
preamble, under the paragraph heading
26 CFR Part 1
‘‘A. Overview’’, the second line from the
bottom of the column, the language
[REG–144615–02]
‘‘appropriate return would be provided
RIN 1545–BB26
to such’’ is corrected to read
‘‘appropriate return would be required
Section 482: Methods To Determine
to such’’.
Taxable Income in Connection With a
5. On page 51118, column 2, in the
Cost Sharing Arrangement; Correction preamble, under the paragraph heading
‘‘1. General Rule—Proposed § 1.482–
AGENCY: Internal Revenue Service (IRS),
7(a)’’, the last line of the second
Treasury.
paragraph, the language ‘‘exploiting cost
ACTION: Correction to notice of proposed
shared intangibles.’’ is corrected to read
rulemaking.
‘‘exploiting the cost shared
SUMMARY: This document corrects notice intangibles.’’.
6. On page 51118, column 3, in the
of proposed rulemaking (REG–144615–
preamble, under the paragraph heading
02) that was published in the Federal
‘‘1. General Rule Proposed § 1.482–
Register on Monday, August 29, 2005
7(a)’’, the second line from the bottom
(70 FR 51116). The document contains
of the first full paragraph of the column,
proposed regulations that provide
the language ‘‘the rules of §§ 1.482–1
guidance regarding methods under
section 482 to determine taxable income and 1.482–5’’ is corrected to read ‘‘the
rules of §§ 1.482–1 and 1.482–4’’.
in connection with a cost sharing
7. On page 51118, column 3, in the
arrangement.
preamble, under the paragraph heading
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
‘‘a. CSA Transactions in General’’, the
Jeffrey L. Parry or Christopher J. Bello,
eighth line of the first paragraph, the
(202) 435–5265 (not a toll-free number). language ‘‘circumstances. ‘‘(Emphasis
added.)’’ is corrected to read
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
‘‘circumstances * * * ‘‘(Emphasis
Background
added.)’’.
8. On page 51119, column 1, in the
The notice of proposed rulemaking
preamble, under the paragraph heading
(REG–144615–02) that is the subject of
‘‘a. CSA Transactions in General’’, the
this correction is under section 482 of
fifteenth line of the first paragraph of
the Internal Revenue Code.
the column, the language ‘‘expected in
Need for Correction
a cost sharing agreement’’ is corrected to
As published, REG–144615–02
read ‘‘expected in a cost sharing
contains errors that may prove to be
arrangement.’’.
9. On page 51119, column 1, in the
misleading and are in need of
preamble, under the paragraph heading
clarification.
‘‘a. CSA Transactions in General’’, the
Correction of Publication
second line from bottom of the second
Accordingly, the notice of proposed
full paragraph, the language ‘‘be
rulemaking (REG–144615–02), that was
provided to such party to reflect its’’ is
the subject of FR Doc. 05–16626, is
corrected to read ‘‘be required to such
corrected as follows:
party to reflect its’’.
10. On page 51124, column 3, in the
1. On page 51116, column 2, in the
preamble, under the paragraph heading
preamble, under the paragraph heading
‘‘h. Valuation Consistent With the
‘‘Paperwork Reduction Act’’, eighth
Investor Model—Proposed § 1.482–
paragraph, third line, the language ‘‘of
information (see below);’’ is corrected to 7(g)(2)(viii)’’, the third line from the
bottom of the column, the language
read ‘‘of information (see above);’’.
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Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 70, Number 244 (Wednesday, December 21, 2005)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 75753-75759]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E5-7584]
=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
NATIONAL CREDIT UNION ADMINISTRATION
12 CFR Parts 701 and 741
Third-Party Servicing of Indirect Vehicle Loans
AGENCY: National Credit Union Administration (NCUA).
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPR).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: The NCUA is issuing a proposed rule to regulate purchases by
federally insured credit unions of indirect vehicle loans serviced by
third-parties. NCUA proposes to limit the aggregate amount of these
loans serviced by any single third-party to a percentage of the credit
union's net worth. The effect of the proposed rule would be to ensure
that federally insured credit unions do not undertake undue risk with
these purchases.
DATES: Comments must be received on or before February 21, 2006.
ADDRESSES: You may submit comments by any of the following methods
(Please send comments by one method only):
NCUA Web Site: https://www.ncua.gov/news/proposed_regs/
proposed_regs.html. Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
E-mail: Address to regcomments@ncua.gov. Include ``[Your
name] Comments on Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (Specialized
Lending Activities)'' in the e-mail subject line.
Fax: (703) 518-6319. Use the subject line described above
for e-mail.
Mail: Address to Mary Rupp, Secretary of the Board,
National Credit Union Administration, 1775 Duke Street, Alexandria,
Virginia 22314-3428.
Hand Delivery/Courier: Same as mail address.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Paul Peterson, Staff Attorney, Office
of General Counsel, at the above address or telephone (703) 518-6540,
Matt Biliouris, Program Officer, Office of Examination and Insurance,
at the above address or telephone (703) 518-6360, or Steve Sherrod,
Division of Capital Markets Director, Office of Capital Markets and
Planning, at the above address or telephone (703) 518-6620.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
A. Background
Indirect lending involves credit union financing for the purchase
of goods at the point-of-sale. The merchant, typically an automobile
dealer, brings a potential member-borrower to the credit
[[Page 75754]]
union and also assists with underwriting. When done properly, indirect
lending has certain advantages for credit unions, including possible
growth in membership and lending volume. Still, because the dealer's
primary interest is in facilitating a vehicle sale and not in careful
underwriting, indirect lending poses particular risks to credit unions.
Some vendors offer indirect lending programs in which the vendor
manages the credit union's relationship with the automobile dealer and,
through loan servicing conducted by the vendor or a related business
entity, the credit union's relationship with the member. These vehicle
lending programs, referred to in this preamble as ``indirect,
outsourced programs,'' carry all the risks of indirect lending programs
as well as additional risks.
NCUA is concerned some credit unions may increase risk exposures in
indirect, outsourced programs without first conducting adequate due
diligence, implementing appropriate controls, and gaining experience
with servicer performance. Some credit unions have realized weaker than
expected earnings because of participation in these programs.
Therefore, the Board has determined that regulatory concentration
limits on indirect, outsourced programs are appropriate.
The types of risk associated with these indirect, outsourced loan
programs include: (1) Credit risk, (2) liquidity risk, (3) transaction
risk, (4) compliance risk, and (5) reputation risk. A credit union
should exercise caution and gain experience before significantly
growing a portfolio of loans underwritten and serviced by a third
party. A credit union's due diligence should include an initial review
of each of these risks, as well as ongoing reviews.
Credit risk. Both underwriting and post-underwriting factors
generate potential credit risk. Credit loss experience may be worse if
the indirect, outsourced loan program uses more permissive underwriting
criteria than the credit union uses for its direct lending. Post-
underwriting, credit loss experience may be worse if the quality of a
third-party's servicing is not as good as that of the credit union's
own servicing. Credit unions should adopt appropriate metrics (e.g.,
performance standards) in their servicing agreements to ensure timely
servicing and collection performance by the third-party servicer.
Liquidity risk. A credit union's liquidity position may suffer if
the credit union experiences a sudden increase in indirect, outsourced
loans. Liquidity may also be impaired if an indirect, outsourced
arrangement restricts the ability to transfer servicing by imposing a
material cost for the transfer, including the loss of a material
economic benefit, such as cancellation of an insurance policy.
Additionally, loans contractually bound to a third-party servicer may
have a more limited market than the market for loans sold with
servicing released.
Transaction risk. Transaction risk (also referred to as operating
or fraud risk) may arise in indirect, outsourced programs because the
credit union is relying to a significant extent on the third-party
servicer's internal controls, information systems, employee integrity,
and operating processes. A credit union's due diligence should include
continuing review of each of these areas, as well as the financial
condition of the servicer.
Compliance risk. Compliance risk in lending programs may arise from
violations of, or nonconformance with, consumer protection laws, such
as the Truth-in-Lending Act and Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. To
the extent a credit union has reduced control and supervision of a
third-party servicer's collection activities, a credit union's
compliance risk in an indirect, outsourced program may be greater than
that of an in-house servicing program.
Reputation risk. Reputation risk may result from a third-party
servicer's compliance failures or transaction losses. Poor quality
servicing, improper collection processes, and questionable or excessive
fees assessed against the borrower by the servicer may also alienate
members from the credit union and affect the ability of the credit
union to maintain existing relationships or establish new ones.
NCUA has discussed sound business practices related to this form of
lending in a series of letters to credit unions going back several
years. In November 2001, for example, NCUA published NCUA Letter to
Credit Unions (LTCU) No. 01-CU-20, Due Diligence over Third Party
Service Providers, providing minimum due diligence practices over
third-party service providers In September 2004, the Board expressed
its concern with specialized lending activities and the associated
risks in NCUA LTCU No. 04-CU-13, Specialized Lending Activities. That
letter discussed three, higher risk lending activities: subprime
lending, indirect lending, and outsourced lending relationships, and
included three examiner questionnaires so credit unions could see how
examiners evaluate the risks in these activities. These two letters are
available on NCUA's Web site at https://www.ncua.gov/letters/2001/01-CU-
20.pdf and https://www.ncua.gov/letters/2004/04-CU-13.pdf, respectively.
Members of the public without access to the internet may request copies
of letters to credit unions and other NCUA publications by calling
NCUA's publication line at (703) 518-6340.
Since the summer of 2004, NCUA has also observed a significant
increase in specialized lending activities, including the use of third
parties to service indirect vehicle loans. NCUA began collecting
indirect loan data from all credit unions beginning with the June 30,
2004, Call Report. The portfolios of credit unions reporting indirect
loans increased to $58 billion (at June 30, 2005) from $45 billion (at
June 30, 2004), a 29 percent increase in one year.\1\ Based on
supervision and insurance information, the growth in indirect,
outsourced vehicle loan programs was even more rapid, and NCUA also
detected increasing concentration levels at particular credit unions in
these loans. Currently, NCUA estimates there are approximately twenty
or more credit unions with more than 100 percent of their net worth
invested in indirect, outsourced vehicle loans.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Based on anecdotal information, NCUA believes that the vast
majority of these indirect loans are vehicle loans.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In June 2005, the NCUA Board issued Risk Alert 05-RISK-01 (the Risk
Alert), Subject: Specialized Lending Activities--Third-Party Subprime
Indirect Lending and Participations, available on NCUA's website at
https://www.ncua.gov/letters/RiskAlert/2005/05-RISK-01.pdf. The Risk
Alert discussed concerns related to subprime, indirect automobile loans
underwritten or serviced by third parties. The Risk Alert further
discussed due diligence practices and on-going control mechanisms
appropriate for such programs.
Despite these NCUA supervision and insurance initiatives, the Board
remains concerned that some credit unions engaging in these programs
still do not undertake the requisite due diligence to understand and
protect themselves from the risks inherent in these programs. In fact,
some credit unions with significant concentrations in indirect,
outsourced loans have indicated to NCUA their desire to fund new loans
even though they have not yet completed the due diligence described in
NCUA issuances.
[[Page 75755]]
B. Proposed Rule
1. General
NCUA proposes a two-step, regulatory concentration limit for
indirect, outsourced programs with a waiver provision for higher limits
in appropriate cases. The Board believes the proposed rule is necessary
to protect the National Credit Union Share Insurance Fund (NCUSIF) from
the risks associated with this activity.
For the first 30 months of a new relationship, Sec. 701.21(h)(1)
limits a credit union's interest in indirect vehicle loans serviced by
any single third party to 50 percent of the credit union's net worth.
This permits a credit union to enter and gain experience with a new
indirect, outsourced vendor program. After 30 months of experience with
that third party's program, the proposed rule permits a credit union to
increase its interests in that program to 100 percent of the credit
union's net worth.
The Board believes that limits of 50 percent and 100 percent are
appropriate, assuming credit unions maintain an adequate due diligence
program. As explained below, however, a credit union that can
demonstrate appropriate initial and ongoing due diligence may apply for
a waiver to obtain higher limits.
In determining these concentration limits, the Board noted that
indirect, outsourced programs typically require a credit union to give
a third party servicer significant control over the loan assets. For
example, the third-party generally makes all contacts with the member-
borrowers; determines when the loans are in default; determines the
pace of and resource allocation to loan collection, vehicle
repossession, and vehicle remarketing; and also controls all the cash
flows.
The indirect lending aspect of these programs creates additional
loss of control for the credit union, as member-borrower information
does not come directly to the credit union but instead is filtered
through both the dealer and the vendor. In some of these programs, the
third-party also controls the quality of the loan receivables because
it dictates the underwriting criteria and processes the loan
applications. In addition, some third-party vendors control the
insurance coverage associated with these loans. The third-party may
even assume some of the credit risk through reinsurance arrangements or
stop-loss agreements. All these factors increase a credit union's
reliance on the third-party to produce a positive return for the credit
union. Some vendors have advertised these programs in the past by
promoting them as ``turn-key'' and suggesting that credit unions need
do very little in the way of due diligence.
The control exercised by the third-party in indirect, outsourced
programs is similar to the control exercised by an issuer of an asset
backed security (ABS) collateralized by loan receivables. The
originator of a pool of loan receivables (e.g., auto loans) sells the
receivables into a bankruptcy-remote grantor trust or owner trust
(i.e., the ABS issuer). The ABS issuer contracts with a servicer,
usually affiliated with the seller (e.g., seller/servicer), to service
the receivables, and determines what sort of credit enhancements or
insurance will be necessary to support issuance of ABS. The ABS issuer
also controls the cash flows. The Board believes the risks to a credit
union from indirect, outsourced programs are similar to those posed by
the purchase of an ABS investment. Accordingly, in determining
appropriate concentration limits for indirect, outsourced vendor loan
programs the Board examined established concentration limits for
investment in ABS.
Natural person federal credit unions are not authorized to invest
in ABS, even highly rated ABS.\2\ 12 U.S.C. 1757. National banks may
invest in ABS, but the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC)
limits a bank's aggregate investments in ABS issued by any one issuer
to 25 percent of capital and surplus.\3\ 12 CFR 1.3(f). For purposes of
this limit, the OCC requires aggregation of ABS issued by obligors that
are related directly or indirectly through common control. 12 CFR
1.4(d)(i).
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\2\ NCUA's corporate credit union rule, however, does permit
corporate credit unions to invest in ABS. 12 CFR 704.5(c)(5). The
corporate rule generally limits the aggregate of all investments,
including ABS, issued by any single obligor to 50 percent of the
corporate credit union's capital or $5 million, whichever is
greater. 12 CFR 704.6(c).
\3\ The capital and surplus of a national bank is roughly
equivalent to the net worth of a natural person credit union.
Compare 12 CFR 1.2(a) with 12 CFR 702.2(f) and the definition of the
``net worth'' in proposed Sec. 701.21(h)(3)(iv).
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The OCC established this 25 percent limit in 1996. Originally, the
OCC proposed an even more restrictive 15 percent limit, but ultimately
chose a 25 percent limit with the following explanation:
The OCC believes the 25 percent of capital limit is a prudential
limit that provides sufficient protection against undue risk
concentrations. This limit parallels the 25 percent credit
concentration benchmark in the Comptroller's Handbook for National
Bank Examiners. The Handbook identifies credit concentrations in
excess of 25 percent of a bank's capital as raising potential safety
and soundness concerns. For this purpose, the Handbook guidance
aggregates direct and indirect obligations of an obligor or issuer
and also specifically contemplates application of the 25 percent
benchmark to concentrations that may result from an acquisition of a
volume of loans from a single source, regardless of the diversity of
the individual borrowers.
61 FR 63972, 63977 (Dec. 2, 1996)(emphasis in original).
In comparing indirect, outsourced programs and ABS, the Board notes
there are certain protections for the ABS investor that do not exist in
the indirect, outsourced loan programs. The creation and sale of ABS
securities are regulated by the Securities and Exchange Commission,
while the various vendors that currently market indirect, outsourced
loan programs to credit unions have no specific regulatory oversight.
Further, the only ABS that corporate credit unions and national banks
may invest in are reviewed and rated by nationally recognized
statistical rating organizations (NRSROs) while the vendors currently
offering indirect, outsourced programs to credit unions are often
privately held companies with no NRSRO rating.
The proposed rule, with limits of 50 and 100 percent, is less
restrictive than the 25 percent that the OCC permits for national bank
investment in ABS. While investing is a secondary activity for credit
unions, lending is a primary purpose. Credit unions should have maximum
flexibility to make loans to members within the bounds of safety and
soundness.
The Board is generally not inclined to allow a credit union to
place over 100 percent of its net worth at risk. A credit union is not
likely to experience a 100 percent devaluation of any particular
indirect, outsourced vehicle loan portfolio but substantial
devaluations are possible, particularly in portfolios of poor credit
quality or in the event of fraud. In addition, inadequate oversight in
one credit union program, such as a lending program, may indicate poor
due diligence and potential losses in other programs at that credit
union. Accordingly, the Board has determined that a credit union should
be held to a maximum concentration of 100 percent of net worth unless
it can demonstrate a high level of due diligence and controls.
In determining when a credit union may move from the 50 percent
limit to the 100 percent limit, the Board examined the average life of
the loans that make up an indirect, outsourced program portfolio.
Average vehicle loan life depends on various factors. For
[[Page 75756]]
example, it can be as little as 20 to 24 months for subprime vehicle
loans, and as much as 36 months or more for prime, new vehicle loans.
After about 30 months of experience, then, a credit union that is
properly monitoring loan performance on vehicle loans should have a
sufficient understanding of the historical performance of that
portfolio. At the 30-month point, the Board believes that an increase
in concentration limits from 50 percent of net worth to 100 percent is
appropriate.
Regardless of whether a credit union is at or below its
concentration limit, all credit unions should conduct due diligence,
both before entering into indirect, outsourced lending programs and on
an on-going basis. Even at lesser concentration levels, these programs
entail significant risk that can negatively affect net worth. All
credit unions involved in these programs must be familiar with relevant
regulatory limitations and guidance, including those documents
referenced earlier in this preamble.
The proposed rule is limited in scope, in that it is limited to
loans made to finance vehicle purchases and the concentration limits do
not apply to servicers that are federally-insured depository
institutions or wholly-owned subsidiaries of federally-insured
depository institutions. The risks to credit unions associated with
these servicers are mitigated because federal regulators have access to
and oversight of these entities. Of course, credit unions must still
conduct appropriate due diligence even when using these servicers.
The proposed concentration limits are not, however, limited to
loans of any particular credit quality, such as prime, nonprime, or
subprime loans. Still, loan portfolios of lesser credit quality require
greater due diligence, as described in the Risk Alert.\4\ Also, the due
diligence required for a waiver of the concentration limits may
increase for portfolios of lesser credit quality.
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\4\ The Board would like to clarify that, potentially, there
could be vendor programs affected by this rulemaking that are not
affected by the Risk Alert, and vice versa. For example, an
indirect, outsourced program that only involves vehicle loans of
prime credit quality would be affected by the limits in this
proposed rule but not by the Risk Alert. On the other hand, any
vendor program that requires the credit union adopt vendor-generated
subprime underwriting criteria but does not involve any third-party
servicing would be subject to portions of the Risk Alert but not
subject to the limits imposed by this proposed rule.
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2. Waiver Provision
Section 701.21(h)(2) of the proposed rule establishes a waiver
process to permit credit unions with high levels of due diligence and
tight controls to have greater concentration limits. A credit union
requesting a waiver of the concentration limits may apply to the
regional director who will consider various criteria in determining
whether to grant a waiver, including:
The credit union's understanding of the third party
servicer's business model, organization, financial health, and the
program risks;
The credit union's due diligence in monitoring and
protecting against program risks;
The credit union's ability to control the servicer's
actions and replace an inadequate servicer as provided by contract;
Other relevant factors related to safety and soundness
considerations.
If a regional director determines that a waiver is appropriate, the
regional director will include appropriate limitations on the waiver
such as a substitute concentration limit and a waiver expiration date.
3. Waiver Criteria
Credit unions that desire greater concentration limits must have
high levels of due diligence and tight controls. A discussion of the
criteria a regional director will use when reviewing an application for
waiver follows.
a. The Credit Union's Understanding of the Third Party Servicer's
Organization, Business Model, Financial Health, and Program Risks
Often, an indirect, outsourced vendor is a privately held company
that processes significant cash flows for the credit union and also
controls important credit union records, such as the vehicle title
documents and current member contact information. A credit union
requesting a concentration limit waiver must demonstrate a
comprehensive understanding of the third party's organization, business
model, financial health, and the risks associated with the vendor's
program. The credit union must also demonstrate that the servicer is
adequately capitalized to meet its financial obligations.
A credit union requesting a waiver should provide detailed
information about the following in its waiver request to the regional
director:
The vendor's organization, including identification of
subsidiaries and affiliates involved in the program and the purpose of
each;
The various sources of income to the vendor and the credit
union in the program and any potential vendor conflicts with the
interests of the credit union;
The experience, character, and fitness of the vendor's
owners and key employees;
The vendor's ability to fulfill commitments, as evidenced
by aggregate financial commitments, capital strength, liquidity,
reputation, and operating results; \5\
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\5\ NRSRO ratings, multi-year audited and segmented financials,
and explanations of related party transactions and changes to the
net worth of the vendor, if any, are also relevant.
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How loan-related cash flows, including borrower payments,
borrower payoffs, and insurance payments, are tracked and identified in
the program;
The vendor's internal controls to protect against fraud
and abuse, as documented by, for example, a current SAS 70 type II
report prepared by an independent and well-qualified accounting firm;
Insurance offered by the vendor, including interrelated
insurance products, premiums, conditions for coverage beyond the
control of the credit union (e.g., a prohibition on extension of the
insured loans past maturity), and limitations such as aggregate loss
limits;
The underwriting criteria provided by the vendor,
including an analysis of the expected yield based on historical loan
data, and a sensitivity analysis considering the potential effects of a
deteriorating economic environment, failure of associated insurance,
the possibility of fraud at the servicer, a decline in average
portfolio credit quality, and, if applicable, movement in the program
back toward industry-wide performance statistics; \6\
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\6\ If the program loans have historically outperformed industry
averages, perhaps because of lower prepayment rates or lower default
proportions, the credit union should calculate expected yield should
the prepayment rates or default proportions move upwards toward the
industry averages.
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Vendor involvement in the underwriting and processing of
loan applications, including use of proprietary scoring or screening
models not included in the credit union approved underwriting criteria;
and
The program risks, including (1) credit risk, (2)
liquidity risk, (3) transaction risk, (4) compliance risk, (5)
strategic risk, (6) interest rate risk, and (7) reputation risk.
Some indirect, outsourced programs have complex business models
that include vendor management of the dealer relationship and also
insurance provided by the vendor. These business models can produce
situations where the vendor's financial interests are not aligned with
the credit union's interests. The credit union needs to be aware of
[[Page 75757]]
these situations and, if appropriate, take protective action.
For example, the dealer's interest in an indirect lending situation
is to obtain financing so that the dealer can sell a vehicle. The
credit union's interest is to ensure that loan applications are
properly underwritten, and that only members who are qualified for
loans receive loans. With an indirect, outsourced program, the third-
party vendor controls information on the quality of all of a particular
dealer's originations. A vendor could present loans to a credit union
from a changing list of dealers, making it difficult for the credit
union to identify and screen out such substandard dealers. This creates
a potential for the vendor to permit dealers with substandard
underwriting performance to remain active in the program.
Unlike typical indirect lending where the dealer receives an
origination fee, in some vendor programs the vendor processes the loan
application for the credit union and the vendor also receives
significant income from dealer fees. The credit union needs to fully
understand the relationship between the vendor and the dealers. Credit
unions seeking a concentration limit waiver should review agreements
between the vendor and associated dealers.
Some vendors provide third-party default insurance to credit
unions, and this presents a potential conflict. This insurance pays
most of the loan deficiency balance to the credit union if a loan
defaults and a vehicle is repossessed and sold at auction. In the event
of high loan default rates, the interests of the credit union and
insurance company may conflict. The credit union would like the
vehicles repossessed and sold and the insurance paid, while the
insurance company would rather not pay the claims if they can be
legally avoided. Some vendors align their interests with the insurance
company, not the credit union, through guaranty or reinsurance
agreements. That is, if the vehicle is repossessed and sold, the
insurance company passes some or all of its costs for paying the claim
through to the vendor. This creates a potential conflict of interest
and an incentive for the vendor, as servicer, not to repossess
vehicles. For example, a delay in repossession increases the odds that
a vehicle will disappear (i.e., go skip) or a borrower will declare and
complete a bankruptcy under chapter 13, and in neither situation will
the default insurance pay. In addition, a delay in repossession on a
default near loan maturity may also cause the insurance coverage to
lapse whether or not the vehicle is ultimately repossessed.
Accordingly, a credit union needs to understand the relationship
between the vendor and the insurance company and the associated risks
to the credit union. To understand this relationship fully, a credit
union desiring a concentration limit waiver should review all
agreements between the vendor, affiliates of the vendor, and the
associated insurance companies.
Another potential conflict exists where the vendor controls the
dealer relationship and can route a potential loan to multiple funding
sources. For example, some vendors track statistics on loan performance
by dealership. A credit union should be aware if a vendor then routes
loan applications from the preferred dealerships to the preferred
funding sources. A credit union desiring a waiver should understand the
various funding sources available to the vendor and document how the
vendor tracks vendor performance and makes funding decisions.
b. The Credit Union's Due Diligence in Monitoring and Protecting
Against Program Risks
Credit unions must design a due diligence program that identifies
and assesses all material risks. The nature and extent of the due
diligence required for a waiver depends on the nature and extent of the
identified risks. Higher concentration levels entail more risk to the
net worth of the credit union, and so the requisite due diligence also
depends on the substitute concentration limit that the credit union
requests.
c. Whether Contracts Between the Credit Union and the Third-Party
Servicer Grant the Credit Union Sufficient Control Over the Servicer's
Actions and Provide for Replacing an Inadequate Servicer
After a loan is funded, the most important activity affecting loan
performance is the quality of the servicing. As NCUA stated in LTCU No.
04-CU-13, and, again, in the Risk Alert, safety and soundness requires
a credit union to limit the power of a third-party servicer to alter
loan terms. Also, the servicing contract must contain a mechanism, or
exit clause, to replace an unsatisfactory servicer.
To qualify for a waiver of these regulatory concentration limits,
the servicing agreement should include more than minimal protections
for the credit union. Servicer performance standards should be
objective and clear, and the waiver request should clearly articulate
how the performance standards protect the interests of the credit
union. The exit clause, including any cure period, should be
exercisable in a reasonable period of time. The more intensive the
requisite servicing, such as for nonprime or subprime loans, the
shorter that period of time should be. A credit union's right to exit
the servicing agreement should be exercisable at a reasonable cost to
the credit union. If the credit union must pay a punitive fee to
replace a poor servicer, or give up valuable insurance protection or
legal rights without adequate compensation, the servicing agreement
will not satisfy this waiver criterion.
The regional director may also consider any legal reviews obtained
by the credit union on these contracts. The regional director should
consider the scope and depth of the review and the qualifications of
the reviewer.
d. Other Factors Related to Safety and Soundness
Regional directors may consider other relevant factors when
determining whether to grant a waiver of the concentration limits as
well as the size of any substitute limit. Other factors include, but
are not limited to, the demonstrated strength of the credit union's
management and the credit union's previous history in exercising due
diligence over similar programs.
4. Grandfathering
Several credit unions that currently participate in indirect,
outsourced programs have concentration levels that exceed the proposed
concentration limits. For those credit unions that exceed the
concentration limits on the effective date of any final rule, the rule
will not require any divestiture. The rule will prohibit these credit
unions from purchasing any additional loans, or interests in loans,
from the affected vendor program until such time as the credit union
either reduces its holdings below the appropriate concentration limit
or the credit union obtains a waiver to permit a greater concentration
limit.
The Board is concerned that some credit unions may consider making
large purchases of loans that would be subject to the rule before the
effective date of a final rule. NCUA will review any large purchases
closely and credit unions should be advised that NCUA may consider
appropriate supervisory action, including divestiture, to ensure that
the credit union's actions were safe and sound.
Regulatory Procedures
Regulatory Flexibility Act
The Regulatory Flexibility Act requires NCUA to prepare an analysis
to describe any significant economic
[[Page 75758]]
impact a proposed rule may have on a substantial number of small credit
unions (those under $10 million in assets). This proposed rule
establishes for federally-insured credit unions a concentration limit
on indirect vehicle loans serviced by third parties. As of May 31,
2005, NCUA estimates no more than five small credit unions were
involved in purchasing vehicle loans, or interests in loans, from an
indirect, outsourced vendor program. The proposed rule, therefore, will
not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small
credit unions and a regulatory flexibility analysis is not required.
Paperwork Reduction Act
The waiver provision of section 701.21(h)(2) contains information
collection requirements. As required by the Paperwork Reduction Act of
1995 (44 U.S.C. 3507(d)), NCUA has submitted a copy of this proposed
rule as part of an information collection package to the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) for its review and approval of a new
Collection of Information, Third-Party Servicing of Indirect Vehicle
Loans.
The proposed Sec. 701.21(h)(2) requires that credit unions
requesting a waiver provide sufficient information to NCUA to determine
if a waiver is appropriate. NCUA is not certain how many credit unions
may request a waiver. Currently, there are approximately twenty credit
unions that have in excess of 100 percent of net worth invested in
indirect, outsourced vehicle loan programs. NCUA believes that no more
than ten of these credit unions will request a waiver during the first
year. Also, during the first year, NCUA estimates that no more than
five additional credit unions will approach their concentration limits
and also request a waiver. It will take a credit union approximately
fifty hours to prepare the waiver request, including preparing a
description of current and planned due diligence efforts and making
copies of all supporting documentation. Fifteen respondents times fifty
hours each is a total annual burden of seven hundred and fifty hours.
Organizations and individuals desiring to submit comments on the
information collection requirements should direct them to the Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs, OMB, Attn: Mark Menchik, Room
10226, New Executive Office Building, Washington, DC 20503.
The NCUA considers comments by the public on this proposed
collection of information in--
--Evaluating whether the proposed collection of information is
necessary for the proper performance of the functions of the NCUA,
including whether the information will have a practical use;
--Evaluating the accuracy of the NCUA's estimate of the burden of the
proposed collection of information, including the validity of the
methodology and assumptions used;
--Enhancing the quality, usefulness, and clarity of the information to
be collected; and
--Minimizing the burden of collection of information on those who are
to respond, including through the use of appropriate automated
electronic, mechanical, or other technological collection techniques or
other forms of information technology; e.g., permitting electronic
submission of responses.
The Paperwork Reduction Act requires OMB to make a decision
concerning the collection of information contained in these proposed
regulations between 30 and 60 days after publication of this document
in the Federal Register. Therefore, a comment to OMB is best assured of
having its full effect if OMB receives it within 30 days of
publication. This does not affect the deadline for the public to
comment to the NCUA on the proposed regulations.
Executive Order 13132
Executive Order 13132 encourages independent regulatory agencies to
consider the impact of their actions on state and local interests. In
adherence to fundamental federalism principles, NCUA, an independent
regulatory agency as defined in 44 U.S.C. 3502(5), voluntarily complies
with the executive order. The proposed rule would not have substantial
direct effects on the states, on the connection between the national
government and the states, or on the distribution of power and
responsibilities among the various levels of government. NCUA has
determined that this proposed rule does not constitute a policy that
has federalism implications for purposes of the executive order.
The Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act, 1999--
Assessment of Federal Regulations and Policies on Families
NCUA has determined that this proposed rule would not affect family
well-being within the meaning of section 654 of the Treasury and
General Government Appropriations Act, 1999, Public Law 105-277, 112
Stat. 2681 (1998).
List of Subjects
12 CFR part 701
Credit unions, Loans.
12 CFR part 741
Credit unions, Requirements for insurance.
By the National Credit Union Administration Board on December
15, 2005.
Mary Rupp,
Secretary of the Board.
For the reasons stated in the preamble, the National Credit Union
Administration proposes to amend 12 CFR parts 701 and 741 as set forth
below:
PART 701--ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS OF FEDERAL CREDIT UNIONS
1. The authority citation for part 701 continues to read as
follows:
Authority: 12 U.S.C. 1752(5), 1755, 1756, 1757, 1759, 1761a,
1761b, 1766, 1767, 1782, 1784, 1787, and 1789. Section 701.6 is also
authorized by 31 U.S.C. 3717. Section 701.31 is also authorized by
15 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.; 42 U.S.C. 1981 and 3601-3619. Section 701.35
is also authorized by 42 U.S.C. 4311-4312.
2. In part 701, add a new paragraph (h) to Sec. 701.21 to read as
follows:
Sec. 701.21 Loans to Members and Lines of Credit to Members.
* * * * *
(h) Third-Party Servicing of Indirect Vehicle Loans.
(1) A federally-insured credit union must not acquire any vehicle
loan, or any interest in a vehicle loan, serviced by a third-party
servicer if the aggregate amount of vehicle loans and interests in
vehicle loans serviced by that third-party servicer and its affiliates
would exceed:
(i) 50 percent of the credit union's net worth during the initial
thirty months of that third-party servicing relationship; or
(ii) 100 percent of the credit union's net worth after the initial
thirty months of that third-party servicing relationship.
(2) Regional directors may grant a waiver of the limits in
paragraph (h)(1) of this section to permit greater limits upon written
application by a credit union. In determining whether to grant or deny
a waiver, a regional director will consider:
(i) The credit union's understanding of the third party servicer's
organization, business model, financial health, and the related program
risks;
(ii) The credit union's due diligence in monitoring and protecting
against program risks;
[[Page 75759]]
(iii) Whether contracts between the credit union and the third-
party servicer grant the credit union sufficient control over the
servicer's actions and provide for replacing an inadequate servicer;
and
(iv) Other factors relevant to safety and soundness.
(3) For purposes of paragraph (h) of this section:
(i) The term ``third-party servicer'' means any entity, other than
a federally-insured depository institution or a wholly-owned subsidiary
of a federally-insured depository institution, that receives any
scheduled periodic payments from a borrower pursuant to the terms of a
loan and distributes the payments of principal and interest and such
other payments with respect to the amounts received from the borrower
as may be required pursuant to the terms of the loan.
(ii) The term ``its affiliates,'' as it relates to the third-party
servicer, means any entities that:
(A) Control, are controlled by, or are under common control with,
that third-party servicer; or
(B) Are under contract with that third-party servicer or other
entity described in paragraph (h)(3)(ii)(A) of this section.
(iii) The term ``vehicle loan'' means any installment vehicle sales
contract or its equivalent that the credit union must report as an
asset under generally accepted accounting principles. The term does not
include loans made directly by the credit union to a member.
(iv) The term ``net worth'' means the retained earnings balance of
the credit union at quarter end as determined under generally accepted
accounting principles. For low income-designated credit unions, net
worth also includes secondary capital accounts that are uninsured and
subordinate to all other claims, including claims of creditors,
shareholders, and the National Credit Union Share Insurance Fund.
* * * * *
PART 741--REQUIREMENTS FOR INSURANCE
3. The authority citation for part 741 continues to read as
follows:
Authority: 12 U.S.C. 1757, 1766, 1781-1790, and 1790d. Section
741.4 is also authorized by 31 U.S.C. 3717.
4. Add a new paragraph (c) to Sec. 741.203 to read as follows:
Sec. 741.203 Minimum loan policy requirements.
* * * * *
(c) Adhere to the requirements stated in Sec. 701.21(h) of this
chapter concerning third-party servicing of indirect vehicle loans.
Before a state-chartered credit union applies to a regional director
for a waiver under Sec. 701.21(h)(2) it must first notify its state
supervisory authority. The regional director will not grant a waiver
unless the appropriate state official concurs in the waiver.
[FR Doc. E5-7584 Filed 12-20-05; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7535-01-P