Milk in the Pacific Northwest and Arizona-Las Vegas Marketing Areas; Final Decision on Proposed Amendments to Marketing Agreement and to Orders, 74166-74191 [05-24024]
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Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 239 / Wednesday, December 14, 2005 / Proposed Rules
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
Agricultural Marketing Service
7 CFR Parts 1124 and 1131
[Docket No. AO–368–A32, AO–271–A37;
DA–03–04B]
Milk in the Pacific Northwest and
Arizona-Las Vegas Marketing Areas;
Final Decision on Proposed
Amendments to Marketing Agreement
and to Orders
AGENCY:
Agricultural Marketing Service,
USDA.
ACTION:
Proposed rule.
SUMMARY: This document is the final
decision proposing to adopt changes to
provisions of the producer-handler
definitions of the Pacific Northwest and
Arizona-Las Vegas orders as contained
in a Recommended Decision published
in the Federal Register on April 13,
2005. This document is subject to
approval by producers.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Jack
Rower, Marketing Specialist or Gino
Tosi, Associate Deputy Administrator
for Order Formulation and Enforcement,
USDA/AMS/Dairy Programs, Order
Formulation and Enforcement Branch,
STOP 0231-Room 2971, 1400
Independence Avenue SW.,
Washington, DC 20250–0231, (202) 720–
2357 or (202) 690–1366, e-mail
addresses: jack.rower@usda.gov or
gino.tosi@usda.gov.
This
administrative action is governed by the
provisions of Sections 556 and 557 of
Title 5 of the United States Code and,
therefore, is excluded from the
requirements of Executive Order 12866.
The amendments to the rules
proposed herein have been reviewed
under Executive Order 12988, Civil
Justice Reform. They are not intended to
have a retroactive effect. If adopted, the
proposed amendments would not
preempt any state or local laws,
regulations, or policies, unless they
present an irreconcilable conflict with
this rule.
The Agricultural Marketing
Agreement Act of 1937, as amended (7
U.S.C. 601–674), provides that
administrative proceedings must be
exhausted before parties may file suit in
court. Under Section 608c(15)(A) of the
Act, any handler subject to an order may
request modification or exemption from
such order by filing with the Secretary
a petition stating that the order, any
provision of the order, or any obligation
imposed in connection with the order is
not in accordance with the law. A
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
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handler is afforded the opportunity for
a hearing on the petition. After a
hearing, the Secretary would rule on the
petition. The Act provides that the
district court of the United States in any
district in which the handler is an
inhabitant, or has its principal place of
business, has jurisdiction in equity to
review the Secretary’s ruling on the
petition, provided a bill in equity is
filed not later than 20 days after the date
of the entry of the ruling.
Regulatory Flexibility Act and
Paperwork Reduction Act
In accordance with the Regulatory
Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.), the
Agricultural Marketing Service has
considered the economic impact of this
action on small entities and has certified
that this final decision will not have a
significant economic impact on a
substantial number of small entities. For
the purpose of the Regulatory Flexibility
Act, a dairy farm is considered a ‘‘small
business’’ if it has an annual gross
revenue of less than $750,000, and a
dairy products manufacturer is a ‘‘small
business’’ if it has fewer than 500
employees. For the purposes of
determining which dairy farms are
‘‘small businesses,’’ the $750,000 per
year criterion was used to establish a
milk marketing guideline of 500,000
pounds per month. Although this
guideline does not factor in additional
monies that may be received by dairy
producers, it should be an inclusive
standard for most ‘‘small’’ dairy farmers.
For purposes of determining a handler’s
size, if the plant is part of a larger
company operating multiple plants that
collectively exceed the 500 employee
limit, the plant will be considered a
large business even if the local plant has
fewer than 500 employees.
Producer-handlers are defined as
dairy farmers that process only their
own milk production. These entities
must be dairy farmers as a pre-condition
to operating processing plants as
producer-handlers. The size of the dairy
farm determines the production level of
the operation and is the controlling
factor in the capacity of the processing
plant and possible sales volume
associated with the producer-handler
entity. Determining whether a producerhandler is considered small or large
business must depend on its capacity as
a dairy farm where a producer-handler
with annual gross revenue in excess of
$750,000 is considered a large business.
The amendments would place entities
currently considered to be producerhandlers under the Pacific Northwest or
the Arizona-Las Vegas orders on the
same terms as all other fully regulated
handlers provided they meet the criteria
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for being subject to the pooling and
pricing provisions of the two orders.
Entities currently defined as producerhandlers under the terms of these orders
will be subject to the pooling and
pricing provisions of the orders if their
route disposition of fluid milk products
is more than 3-million pounds per
month.
Producer-handlers with route
disposition of less than 3-million
pounds during the month will not be
subject to the pooling and pricing
provisions of the orders. To the extent
that current producer-handlers for each
order have route disposition of fluid
milk products outside of the marketing
areas, such route disposition will be
subject to an order’s pooling and pricing
provisions if total in-area route
disposition causes them to become fully
regulated.
Assuming that some current
producer-handlers will have route
disposition of fluid milk products of
more than 3-million pounds during the
month, such producer-handlers will be
regulated subject to the pooling and
pricing provisions of the orders like
other handlers. Such producer-handlers
will account to the pool for their uses
of milk at the applicable minimum class
prices and pay the difference between
their use-value and the blend price of
the order to the order’s producersettlement fund.
While this may cause an economic
impact on those entities with more than
3-million pounds of route sales who
currently are considered producerhandlers by the two orders, the impact
is offset by the benefit to other small
businesses. With respect to dairy
farmers whose milk is pooled on the
two marketing orders, such dairy
farmers who have not heretofore shared
in the additional revenue that accrues
from the marketwide pooling of Class I
sales by producer-handlers will share in
such revenue. This will have a positive
impact on 486 small dairy farmers in the
Pacific Northwest and Arizona-Las
Vegas marketing areas. Additionally, all
handlers who dispose of more than 3million pounds of fluid milk products
per month will pay at least the
announced Federal order Class I price
for such use. This will have a positive
impact on 18 small regulated handlers.
To the extent that current producerhandlers in the Pacific Northwest and
the Arizona-Las Vegas orders become
subject to the pooling and pricing
provisions, such will be determined in
their capacity as handlers. Such entities
will no longer have restrictions
applicable to their business operations
that were conditions for producerhandler status and exemption from the
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pooling and pricing provisions of the
two orders. In general, this includes
being able to buy or acquire any
quantity of milk from dairy farmers or
other handlers instead of being limited
by the current constraints of the two
orders. Additionally, the burden of
balancing their milk production is
relieved. Milk production in excess of
what is needed to satisfy their Class I
route disposition needs will receive the
minimum price protection established
under the terms of the two orders. The
burden of balancing milk supplies will
be borne by all producers and handlers
who are pooled and regulated under the
terms of the two orders.
During September 2003, the Pacific
Northwest had 16 pool distributing
plants, 1 pool supply plant, 3
cooperative pool manufacturing plants,
7 partially regulated distributing plants,
8 producer-handler plants and 2 exempt
plants. Of the 27 regulated handlers, 16
or 59 percent were considered large
businesses. Of the 691 dairy farmers
whose milk was pooled on the order,
223 or 32 percent were considered large
businesses. If these amendatory actions
are not undertaken, 68 percent of the
dairy farmers (468) in the Pacific
Northwest order who are small
businesses will continue to be adversely
affected by the operations of large
producer-handlers.
For the Arizona-Las Vegas order,
during September 2003 there were 3
pool distributing plants, 1 cooperative
pool manufacturing plant, 18 partially
regulated distributing plants, 2
producer-handler plants and 3 exempt
plants (including an exempt plant
located in Clark County Nevada)
operated by 22 handlers. Of these
plants, 15 or 68 percent were considered
large businesses. Of the 106 dairy
farmers whose milk was pooled on the
order, 88 or 83 percent were considered
large businesses. If these amendatory
actions are not undertaken, 17 percent
of the dairy farmers in the Arizona-Las
Vegas order who are small businesses
will continue to be adversely affected by
large producer-handler operations.
In their capacity as producers, 7
producer-handlers would be considered
as large producers as their annual
marketing exceeds 6-million pounds of
milk. Record evidence indicates that for
the Pacific Northwest marketing order at
the time of the hearing, four producerhandlers would potentially become
subject to the pooling and pricing
provisions of the order because of route
disposition of more than 3-million
pounds per month within the marketing
area. For the Arizona-Las Vegas order,
one producer-handler would be
considered a large producer because its
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annual marketing exceeds 6-million
pounds of milk and potentially subject
to the pooling and pricing provisions of
the order because of route disposition
exceeding 3-million pounds per month.
A review of reporting requirements
was completed under the Paperwork
Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C.
Chapter 35). It was determined that
these proposed amendments would
have minimal impact on reporting,
recordkeeping, or other compliance
requirements for entities currently
considered producer-handlers under the
Pacific Northwest and the Arizona-Las
Vegas marketing orders because they
would remain identical to the current
requirements applicable to all other
regulated handlers who are currently
subject to the pooling and pricing
provisions of the two orders. No new
forms are proposed and no additional
reporting requirements would be
necessary.
This notice does not require
additional information collection that
requires clearance by the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) beyond
currently approved information
collection. The primary sources of data
used to complete the forms are routinely
used in most business transactions.
Forms require only a minimal amount of
information which can be supplied
without data processing equipment or a
trained statistical staff. Thus, the
information collection and reporting
burden is relatively small. Requiring the
same reports for all handlers does not
significantly disadvantage any handler
that is smaller than the industry
average.
Prior documents in this proceeding:
Notice of Hearing: Issued July 31,
2003; published August 6, 2003 (68 FR
46505).
Correction to Notice of Hearing:
Issued August 20, 2003; published
August 26, 2003 (68 FR 51202).
Notice of Reconvened Hearing: Issued
October 27, 2003; published October 31,
2003 (68 FR 62027).
Notice of Reconvened Hearing: Issued
December 18, 2003; published
December 29, 2003 (68 FR 74874).
Recommended Decision: Issued April
7, 2005; published April 13, 2005 (70 FR
19636).
Preliminary Statement
A public hearing held on proposed
amendments to the marketing agreement
and order regulating the handling of
milk in the Pacific Northwest and
Arizona-Las Vegas marketing areas. The
hearing was held pursuant to the
provisions of the Agricultural Marketing
Agreement Act of 1937, as amended (7
U.S.C. 601–674), and the applicable
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rules of practice and procedure
governing the formulation of marketing
agreements and marketing orders (7 CFR
Part 900), at Tempe, Arizona, beginning
on September 23, 2003; reconvened, and
continuing at Seattle, Washington, on
November 17, 2003; and reconvened
and concluding at Alexandria, Virginia,
on January 23, 2004, pursuant to a
notice of hearing issued July 31, 2003,
and a correction to the notice issued
August 23, 2003, and notices of
reconvened hearings issued October 27,
2003, and December 18, 2003.
Upon the basis of the evidence
introduced at the hearing and the record
thereof, the Administrator, on April 7,
2005, issued a Recommended Decision
containing notice of the opportunity to
file written exceptions thereto.
The material issues, findings,
conclusions, and rulings of the
Recommended Decision are hereby
approved and adopted and set forth
herein. The material issue on the record
of hearing relate to:
1. The regulatory status of producerhandlers.
Findings and Conclusions
The following findings and
conclusions on the material issues are
based on evidence presented at the
hearing and the record thereof:
1. The Regulatory Status of ProducerHandlers
Amendments to the producer-handler
definitions of the Pacific Northwest and
the Arizona-Las Vegas milk marketing
orders are adopted. This decision will
result in all producer-handlers with inarea route disposition of more than 3million pounds of fluid milk products
per month being subject to the pooling
and pricing provisions of the applicable
order. This action will cause some
current producer-handlers to become
subject to the pooling and pricing
provisions of the orders.
Currently, the Pacific Northwest and
the Arizona-Las Vegas milk marketing
orders provide separate but similar
definitions that describe and define a
special category of handler known as
producer-handlers. While there are
specific differences in how each order
defines and describes producerhandlers, both orders—as do all Federal
milk marketing orders—exempt
producer-handlers from the pooling and
pricing provisions of the orders.
Exemption from the pooling and
pricing provisions of the orders
essentially means that the minimum
class prices established under the orders
that handlers must pay for milk are not
applicable to producer-handlers and
producer-handlers receive no minimum
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price protection for surplus milk
disposed of within either order’s
marketing area. Producer-handlers enjoy
keeping the entire value of their milk
production disposed of as fluid milk
products in the marketing area to
themselves and do not share this value
with other dairy farmers whose milk is
pooled on either of the two orders.
However, producer-handlers are
subject to strict definitions and
limitations in their business practices.
Both orders limit the ability of
producer-handlers to buy or acquire
milk that may be needed from dairy
farmers or other handlers. Additionally,
producer-handlers bear the entire
burden of balancing their own milk
production. Milk production in excess
of what is needed to satisfy their Class
I route disposition needs will receive
whatever price they are able to obtain.
Such milk does not receive the
minimum price protection of the order.
It is the exemption from the pooling
and pricing provisions of the Pacific
Northwest and Arizona-Las Vegas
orders that is the central issue of this
proceeding. While producer-handlers
are exempt from the pooling and pricing
provisions of the two orders, they are
‘‘regulated’’ to the extent that producerhandlers submit reports to the Market
Administrator who monitors producerhandler operations to ensure that such
entities are in compliance with the
conditions for such regulatory status.
For the purposes of brevity and
convenience, this decision will refer to
those handlers who are subject to the
pooling and pricing provisions of the
orders as ‘‘fully regulated handlers’’ in
contrast to producer-handlers.
Overview of the Proposals
This proceeding considered three
proposals seeking the application of
each order’s pooling and pricing
provisions, or full regulation, of
producer-handlers when their route
disposition of fluid milk products in the
marketing areas exceeded 3-million
pounds per month. These proposals
were published in the hearing notice as
Proposals 1, 2 and 3. Proposal 1 is
applicable to the Pacific Northwest milk
marketing order. Proposal 3 is
applicable to the Arizona-Las Vegas
milk marketing order. Proposal 2,
applicable to only the Pacific Northwest
order, is identical to Proposal 1 but also
seeks to limit a producer-handler from
distributing fluid milk products to a
wholesale customer who is served by a
fully regulated or partially regulated
distributing plant in the same-sized
package with a similar label during the
month. In this regard, Proposal 2 would
make the producer-handler definition
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for the Pacific Northwest order more
like the current Arizona-Las Vegas
order.
A fourth proposal, published in the
hearing notice as Proposal 4, seeking to
prevent the simultaneous pooling of the
same milk on the Arizona-Las Vegas
milk marketing order and on a stateoperated order that provides for
marketwide pooling, (commonly
referred to a ‘‘double-dipping’’) was
addressed in a separate final rule that
was issued November 18, 2005 (70 FR
70991) and will become effective on
January 1, 2006.
Summary of Testimony
Proposal 3 received testimony by a
witness appearing on behalf of United
Dairymen of Arizona (UDA). UDA is a
dairy cooperative supplying
approximately 88 percent of the milk in
the Arizona-Las Vegas milk marketing
order (Order 131). The UDA witness
testified in support of establishing a 3million pound limit in route disposition
of fluid milk products for producerhandlers in the marketing area, which,
if exceeded, would cause the producerhandler to become subject to the pooling
and pricing provisions of the order. The
witness was of the opinion that the
current producer-handler definition
contradicts the overall purposes of the
Federal milk order program to establish
uniform prices among all handlers and
the marketwide sharing of revenue
among all producers who supply the
market.
The UDA witness asserted that Sarah
Farms is the largest producer-handler in
the Order 131 marketing area and avoids
the classified pricing and pooling
requirements applicable to all other
handlers. The witness characterized this
as the operation of an individual
handler pool within a marketwide pool.
The witness stated that UDA is aware
that historically Federal orders have
exempted producer-handler operations
from the pricing and pooling provisions
of orders because they were small and
had little impact in the marketplace.
The witness contrasted this historical
perspective with Sarah Farms,
recognized as the largest producerhandler in Order 131, by citing a trade
journal article that ranked Sarah Farms
as the second largest U. S. dairy farm
with 13,000 cows in 1995.
The witness testified that UDA
estimates Sarah Farms’ Class I sales
within the Order 131 marketing area are
about 12 million pounds per month.
Because of Sarah Farms’ exemption
from the pooling and pricing provisions
of the order, the witness estimated a loss
in revenue to producers who pool milk
on the order at about $11,586,589 over
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the period of January 2000 through July
2003, or about a 10–14 cents per
hundredweight (cwt) impact on the
order’s blend price. In addition, the
witness estimated lost revenue of about
$3 million, or about a 10-cent per cwt
lower blend price for the period of
September 1997 through January 1999.
A second witness appearing on behalf
of UDA also testified in support of
Proposal 3. This witness explained that
the proposed 3-million pound route
disposition limit on producer-handlers
was partly based on provisions of the
Fluid Milk Promotion Act which
requires an assessment for the
promotion of fluid milk when a
handler’s sales are greater than 3million pounds per month. The witness
said that producer-handlers who have
the ability to enjoy this level of route
disposition should not be exempted
from pooling and pricing provisions and
that their continued exemption poses a
serious threat to orderly marketing and
the operation of the Federal milk order
program.
The second UDA witness claimed that
in December 1994, Sarah Farms was
considered an insignificant factor
within the Order 131 marketing area
because their monthly raw milk
production was less than 5 million
pounds, of which less than 1.3 million
pounds of Class I products were
distributed within the marketing area.
Relying on Market Administrator
statistics, the witness added that by
1996, UDA estimated that Sarah Farms’
monthly Class I route disposition had
increased to more than 6 million
pounds. The witness also testified that
from late 1998 until this proceeding,
Sarah Farms had been one of only two
producer-handlers selling Class I
products in the marketing area. Relying
on Market Administrator statistics, the
witness estimated that Sarah Farms’
Class I route sales within Order 131 had
increased from about 7 million pounds
per month to as much as 15 million
pounds per month by 2002.
A witness appearing on behalf of the
Kroger Company (Kroger), a fully
regulated handler under the Pacific
Northwest milk marketing order (Order
124) and Order 131, testified in support
of Proposals 1, 2, and 3. The witness
said that changes in marketing
conditions in both orders necessitate
changes in how the orders define
producer-handlers. In the opinion of the
witness, producer-handlers enjoy a
competitive sales advantage by being
exempted from the pooling and pricing
provisions of both orders. The witness
explained that producer-handlers have a
sales advantage because they have the
flexibility to set their internal raw milk
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price at a level well below the
announced Federal order minimum
Class I price that fully regulated
handlers must pay.
The Kroger witness also testified that
regulated handlers in Orders 124 and
131 have been forced to respond to
competitive situations with producerhandlers in supplying retail grocery
outlets. This was due in part to the
competitive sales advantage producerhandlers have in being able to lower
their price to retailers while still
maintaining an adequate profit margin,
the witness explained. The witness said
that Kroger’s retail outlets could not do
this competitively without eroding their
profit margins. Because of these
competitive situations, the witness
concluded that producer-handlers
exceeding more than 3 million pounds
per month in Class I sales was a
reasonable estimate of when producerhandlers are in direct competition with
fully regulated handlers and should
therefore receive the same regulatory
treatment. The same regulatory
treatment of producer-handlers as fully
regulated handlers above this threshold
would, according to the witness, reestablish equity among handlers
competing for Class I sales in these two
marketing areas.
The Kroger witness was of the
opinion that the volume of producerhandler route disposition was a key
aspect of the disorderly marketing
conditions in Orders 124 and 131.
However, the witness indicated that a
producer-handler’s processing plant size
alone was not necessarily an accurate
indicator of processing plant efficiency.
The witness testified that smaller plants
can be very competitive. In this regard,
the witness said that Kroger’s largest
plant was not its most efficient bottling
plant.
A witness appearing on behalf of
Western United Dairymen (WUD), the
largest dairy farmer association in
California representing approximately
1,100 of California’s 2,000 dairy farmers,
testified in support of Proposals 1 and
3. The witness expressed the opinion
that a primary reason for the exemption
of producer-handlers from the pricing
and pooling provisions of Orders 124
and 131 had been because these entities
were customarily small businesses that
operate self-sufficiently and do not have
a significant impact in the marketplace.
The WUD witness testified that the
regulatory exemption for producerhandlers has been largely unchanged in
the Federal order system for more than
50 years. The witness explained that
there had been no significant
demonstration of unfair advantages
accruing to producer-handlers because
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they are responsible for balancing their
fluid milk needs and cannot transfer
balancing costs to other pooled market
participants.
The WUD witness also testified that
some producer-handlers were becoming
much larger than fully regulated fluid
processors in Orders 124 and 131. The
witness was of the opinion that large
producer-handlers were effectively
taking greater and greater shares of the
Class I market in both orders and caused
pooled milk to be forced into lowervalued manufacturing uses. According
to the witness, these outcomes are
having a direct negative impact on
handlers and producers in both orders
and are generating instability in the
Federal milk marketing order system.
The WUD witness asserted that when
producer-handler sales growth
threatened the sales of fully regulated
handlers under California’s State-wide
regulatory system, the State acted to
maintain and protect their pooling and
pricing system by placing a limit on the
volumes of sales producer-handlers
could have within the State before
becoming fully regulated. The witness
was of the opinion that the Federal
order program also needs to act by
adopting the proposed amendments to
similarly limit the sales volume of
producer-handlers.
A witness appearing on behalf of the
Alliance of Western Milk Producers
(Alliance), an organization representing
California cooperatives, also testified in
support of Proposals 1, 2, and 3. The
witness indicated that how the Federal
order program deals with the producerhandler issue is of interest to California
dairy farmers because changes in Orders
124 and 131, which border California,
will have a direct impact on the State’s
milk marketing and regulatory program.
The witness was of the opinion that
producer-handlers have a tremendous
competitive advantage in the
marketplace because they are not
subject to minimum pricing and are
thereby able to avoid a pooling
obligation to share their Class I revenue
with all pooled market participants. The
witness asserted that unless some
limitation is put on the route sales
volume of producer-handlers, it may
encourage new producer-handlers to
enter the market and further erode the
equitable pricing principles relied on by
the Federal milk order program.
A witness appearing on behalf of
Northwest Dairy Association (NDA)
testified in support of Proposals 1 and
2. The witness provided a business
example demonstrating how producerhandlers enjoy a pricing and marketing
advantage by being exempt from the
pooling and pricing provisions of Order
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124. Relating past business experiences
as a fully regulated handler known as
Sunshine Dairy, the witness explained
how business was lost to a producerhandler competitor. The witness
attributed this loss of business to the
competitive sales advantage enjoyed by
producer-handlers resulting from their
exemption from the pooling and pricing
provisions of the order.
The NDA witness testified that as a
fully regulated handler known as
Sunshine Dairy they had also lost a
small customer who, at that time, was
buying about 25,000 gallons of milk per
week. The witness said that this
customer grew to constitute more than
10 percent of its fluid milk sales
volume. According to the witness, even
though they had provided great service
and products, they lost the account
because the customer could save
hundreds of thousands of dollars a year
by procuring milk from a producerhandler. According to the witness,
Sunshine Dairy lost this account
because the producer-handler was able
to price its milk at a level below the
minimum Federal order Class I price.
The witness also testified that the
producer-handler subsequently lost this
account to a fully regulated handler that
was of national scope.
The NDA witness expressed the
opinion that the goal of the Federal
Order system is to maintain order in the
market. In this regard, the witness
testified that handlers should not be
exempt from the pooling and pricing
provisions of an order because they own
their cows and produce their own milk
supply when other handlers are not
exempted. The witness stressed that
such an exemption is unfair, noting that
the vast majority of dairy farmers should
not receive smaller paychecks for the
same product as producer-handlers
because they lack a processing plant.
A witness appearing on behalf of
Maverick Milk Producers Association
(Maverick), a cooperative of dairy
farmers located in Arizona that markets
its milk in California and Arizona,
testified in support of Proposal 3. The
witness testified that all handlers who
market their milk in Order 131 should
be subject to the pooling and pricing
provisions of the order, including
producer-handlers. The witness inferred
from Market Administrator statistics
that the largest producer-handler in
Order 131, Sarah Farms, had cost
Maverick members in excess of $1.2
million in revenue since 1999 because
Sarah Farms had not been subject to the
pooling and pricing provisions of the
order. The witness testified that the
estimated loss of revenue to the Order
131 pool was based on an assumption
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that Sarah Farms produced about 18
million pounds of milk per month that
would have been pooled as Class I milk.
A former executive and co-owner of
Vitamilk, an independent handler no
longer operating as a going concern,
formerly located in Seattle, Washington,
appeared on behalf of Dairy Farmers of
America (DFA) and testified in support
of Proposals 1 and 2. This DFA witness
testified that in seeking alternative
markets for its milk products, Vitamilk
began to compete with producerhandlers for school milk supply
contracts through one of its wholesale
distributors. However, their bid
attempts were unsuccessful, the witness
testified, because the school district
sought fixed-price contracts for
packaged fluid milk which they could
not supply in competition with a
producer-handler. While conceding that
Vitamilk was inexperienced in bidding
for school-lunch business, the witness
asserted that the fixed price contract
offered by the producer-handler was
below the combined value of the
Federal order Class I price plus
Vitamilk’s cost allocations to marketing,
processing, distribution, overhead,
distributor profit, and risk.
This DFA witness explained that
Vitamilk tried to retain other customers
by lowering their prices in an effort to
keep and gain sales volume even though
the price represented no contribution to
covering their indirect costs. The
witness testified that prices offered by a
local producer-handler were 11 to 12
cents per gallon below Vitamilk’s best
net price to distributors. According to
the witness, even though Vitamilk’s
customers reported satisfaction with the
company’s service and other non-price
attributes, the producer-handler’s ability
to provide fluid milk products at a
lower cost resulted in the loss of
customer accounts. The witness asserted
that the loss of accounts was caused
largely by the producer-handler’s
inability to price Class I products below
what a fully regulated Class I handler
could price its products. In addition, the
witness testified that in 2003 Vitamilk
even attempted to sell its Class I
products at prices below breakeven and
was still unable to find a price whereby
it could successfully recapture business
lost to a producer-handler.
A witness appearing on behalf of
Shamrock Foods Company (Shamrock),
a fully regulated handler located in
Arizona and Colorado, testified in
support of Proposal 3. The witness
maintained that Shamrock is at a
competitive disadvantage with
producer-handlers because Shamrock is
required to pay the Federal order Class
I price for milk while producer-handlers
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are exempt from the pricing and pooling
provisions of Order 131. According to
the witness, the price of Class I products
offered to wholesale customers by
producer-handlers can be lower than
what Shamrock can offer profitably and
that Sarah Farms, a producer-handler of
the order, has been able to raid their
customer base. Furthermore, the witness
said that Shamrock’s ability to maintain
its policy of equitable pricing among its
customers, be able to hold its prices
fairly constant to maintain customer
loyalty, and avoid bidding against itself
for its own customers is undermined
because of the producer-handler pricing
advantage over fully regulated handlers.
The witness said Shamrock is unable to
quickly adjust their business practices
to meet such competition because of
their size and because of different
regulatory treatment.
The Shamrock witness was of the
opinion that the producer-handler
exemption from minimum pricing and
pooling provisions threatens the
economic viability of Order 131. For
example, the witness explained that
major customers such as Safeway,
Kroger, Wal-Mart and strong
independents like Costco, Bashas and
Sam’s Club buy milk on a wholesale
basis to resell to retail consumers. The
witness noted that these customers seek
the opportunity to buy milk at prices
similar to those offered by the producerhandler—at prices below the Federal
order Class I price. The witness testified
that if Proposal 3 or some other
restriction limiting route disposition
volume is not adopted, either there will
have to be an expansion of producerhandler supplies by expanding their
farms or existing fully regulated
handlers will need to reorganize their
business practices to develop their ownfarm production and become a
producer-handler to remain
competitive.
The Shamrock witness offered
testimony regarding market research
they routinely conduct through on-going
surveys of retail grocery stores in Order
131. The witness explained that
Shamrock salespersons do this to gather
market intelligence on their
competitors. According to the witness,
Shamrock’s marketing research
indicated that prices for bottled fluid
milk offered by Sarah Farms was
typically 6 to 8 cents a gallon below
their price—equating to about 48 to 64
cents on a per cwt basis. The witness
testified that their market research also
revealed that Sarah Farms’ production
and route disposition had grown from
approximately 8 million pounds in 1998
to nearly 17.2 million pounds by 2003.
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The Shamrock witness concluded that
a sales volume limitation of 3 million
pounds per month for producerhandlers was reasonable because a 3
million pound limit would represent
about three percent of the total Class I
sales in the Order 131 marketing area.
In addition, the witness testified that a
plant which processes 3 million pounds
per month is an indicator of a very
efficient plant operation. From these
views, the witness concluded that a
producer-handler with route disposition
in excess of 3 million pounds per month
is able to fully exploit economies of size
and should therefore be treated the same
as fully regulated handlers.
The Shamrock Foods witness
conceded that there are additional
challenges faced by producer-handlers
in terms of managing milk supplies and
disposing of surplus milk which fully
regulated handlers do not face. The
witness also acknowledged that there
are costs associated with managing
marketing risk, including the disposal of
surplus milk production. However, the
witness was of the opinion that these
costs are more than covered by the
competitive advantages that exist by
being exempt from the pooling and
pricing provisions of the order. One
example the witness provided was that
a producer-handler can balance its
supply by selling fluid milk products
into an unregulated area such as
California.
A witness appearing on behalf of
Shamrock Farms, which is affiliated
with Shamrock Foods, testified in
support of Proposal 3. Shamrock Farms
milks 6,500 cows and is located in
Maricopa County, Arizona. The witness
testified that Shamrock Farms has
always been a pooled producer on Order
131 and its predecessor order. The
witness asserted that Sarah Farms
operates dairy farms with approximately
10,000 to 12,000 milking cows. While
the witness conceded the lack of hard
data to confirm this assertion, the
witness arrived at this estimate of farm
size by counting the number of milk
tankers per day that delivered to the
Sarah Farms’ plant in Yuma, Arizona.
A consultant witness appearing on
behalf of Dairy Farmers of America
(DFA), proponents of Proposals 1, 2, and
3, had prepared a study that analyzed
and compared the value of raw milk to
a large producer-handler with the cost
of milk to fully regulated handlers and
described the economic impact of
competition between these two business
entities. The study conducted by this
witness was based on a proprietary
database of 150 milk processing plants
owned by businesses for which this
witness’ company performed accounting
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and other consulting services.
According to the witness, 20 plants
were selected as being representative of
the costs for 6 different size classes of
bottling plants. The witness explained
that the plant cost data was adjusted by
applying regional consumer price index
(CPI) factors as published by the U.S.
Department of Labor. According to the
witness, this method of adjusting data,
the selection of relevant plants, the
analytic methods employed in
conducting the study, and the
interpretation of the study results were
all based on Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles (GAAP).
The DFA consultant witness
acknowledged that while the study of
plant costs was based on actual plant
data acquired from fully regulated
handlers, the study did not include data
from plants located in either the Pacific
Northwest or the Arizona-Las Vegas
marketing areas. The witness also
acknowledged that the data for the
smallest plants in the study were taken
from producer-handler plants located in
western Pennsylvania, an area not
regulated by a Federal milk marketing
order. The witness also explained that
the study’s actual data could not be
offered for inspection and examination
in this proceeding because individual
plant cost and related information were
proprietary, adding that this also
explained why the data used in the
study were averaged. The witness
further testified that the selection of
appropriate plants for inclusion in the
study from all of the plants in the
witness’ proprietary database was based
on professional judgment and
experience.
The DFA consultant witness
explained that the analysis of the data
derived for the Northwest or the
Arizona-Las Vegas marketing areas
suggests that as plant volumes increase
per unit processing costs decrease and
that the highest per unit processing
costs are found at the smallest plant
sizes. At large plant sizes, the witness
contrasted, a processor, regardless of
regulatory status, can increase milk
processing volume at a nominal
additional per unit cost.
Relating an additional example of the
study’s findings, the DFA consultant
witness testified that, other things being
equal, a hypothetical plant bottling 3
million pounds of milk per month in 2gallon pack containers would have per
unit processing costs that were
significantly higher than a plant
producing 20 million pounds of milk
per month in the same size container
packs. In addition, the witness testified
that the study suggests that where a
large producer-handler and a handler
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subject to the pooling and pricing
provisions of an order compete for route
sales, the producer-handler will always
have a price advantage which could be
as large as the difference between the
Federal order Class I price and the
order’s blend price. The witness also
said that the examination across all
types of retail outlets reveals that a
producer-handler will always have a
price advantage in competing with fully
regulated handlers.
The consultant witness for DFA
provided a comparative cost analysis of
servicing a warehouse store account by
a fully regulated fluid milk plant and a
large producer-handler using actual
retail prices for 2-percent milk in
Phoenix, Arizona, during January
through June 2003. The witness testified
that based on the study’s data and
assumptions, a large producer-handler
can service such an account and return
a substantial above-market premium
over the producer blend price. However,
the study reveals that the handler
paying the Class I price for its raw milk
supply will have little or no margin, the
witness contrasted. The producerhandler’s raw milk cost advantage, the
witness said, allows it to service these
stores profitably at a price that cannot
be matched by a fully regulated handler.
The witness concluded that producerhandlers are in a position to acquire any
account they choose to service by
offering a price which the regulated
plant cannot meet.
In other testimony, the DFA
consultant witness provided a pro-forma
income statement for a regulated
handler in Order 124 developed using
certain assumptions about costs, prices
and income. The witness demonstrated
through an analysis of the pro-forma
income statement that a large producerhandler would be able to successfully
compete with fully regulated handlers if
regulated. The witness concluded from
this analysis that a successful producerhandler would be economically viable
even if it were subject to the order’s
pooling and pricing provisions.
The DFA consultant witness testified
that the cost data used in the study’s
pro-forma income statement example
was generated using statistical methods
based on one month’s representative
data for similar sized regulated handlers
and assumed that producer-handlers
and regulated handlers employed union
labor and operated within collective
bargaining agreements. The witness
testified that based on own business
experience, the characterization of labor
costs would be representative of large
fully regulated handler operations in the
Pacific Northwest or the Arizona-Las
Vegas marketing areas. In contrast, the
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witness indicated no direct knowledge
of the costs of labor employed by
producer-handlers in Orders 124 or 131.
The witness did conclude that use of
non-union labor by producer-handlers
would provide them with a clear cost
advantage over similar or larger size
fully regulated handlers that typically
employed unionized labor.
The DFA consultant witness was of
the professional opinion that current
Federal order regulations provide
producer-handlers with a significant
cost advantage that cannot be matched
by fully regulated handlers that are
subject to pooling and pricing
regulations. If the proposal to place a 3
million pound per month volume limit
on producer-handlers route disposition
is adopted, it will eliminate what the
witness described as an unfair economic
advantage for large producer-handlers
while serving to protect a more modest
pricing advantage for small producerhandlers.
In additional testimony, the
consultant witness for DFA
acknowledged the difficulty in
reconciling the 150,000 pound per
month route disposition limit
established for exempt plants with the
proposed 3 million pound per month
limit for producer-handlers. According
to the witness, the difference in these
two limits are for two distinctly
different entities and can be rationalized
by the Department by acknowledging a
value commensurate with milk
production risks incurred by a
producer-handler that are not incurred
by handlers who buy milk from dairy
farmers. A handler who buys milk from
dairy farmers does not incur the
production risks associated with
operating a farm enterprise, the witness
said. In this regard, the witness
acknowledged that the study focused
only on plant processing costs and not
on the cost of producing milk in the
farm enterprise function of a producerhandler.
A witness representing Dean Foods
(Dean) testified in support of proposals
establishing a volume limit on
producer-handler route disposition. The
witness testified that while Dean Foods
does not operate bottling plants in either
Orders 124 or 131, they do operate fluid
milk plants in many States regulated by
Federal milk marketing orders and in
areas not subject to Federal milk order
regulation. The witness testified that
where Dean faces competition from
plants that do not pay regulated
minimum prices, Dean is affected. The
witness stressed that milk bottling
plants need to have equitable raw milk
costs for the Federal milk order system
to remain valid.
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The Dean witness said that
competitiveness and efficiency are not
necessarily a function of processing
plant size. On this theme, the witness
provided an example where a small,
fully regulated milk bottler in Bryan,
Texas, successfully bid to supply a
Texas state prison against a much larger
Dean plant. The witness testified that
the Bryan plant had processing capacity
of less than 3 million pounds per month
but was more efficient than the Dean
plant and that because of its
management structure, it could adjust
more quickly to changing market
conditions.
A witness appearing on behalf of the
National Milk Producers Federation
(NMPF) testified in support of Proposals
1 and 3. The witness was of the opinion
that productivity increases resulting
from technological advances and the
growth of dairy farms enable large
producers to capture sufficient
economies of scale in processing ownfarm milk and thereby compete
effectively with established, fully
regulated handlers. In light of this, the
witness testified that such producers
can disrupt the orderly marketing of
milk in a market, adding that dairy
farmers ‘‘turned producer-handlers’’
could grow across a market causing
even greater disruption to orderly
marketing in other Federal milk
marketing orders.
The witness asserted that NMPF’s
own analysis, and a plant study by
Cornell University revealed that larger
fluid milk bottling plants have exhibited
decreasing processing costs on a per
gallon basis as the size of processing
facilities increase. The witness
explained that as the scale of processing
plants increase, average processing costs
tend to remain fairly constant, with the
lowest per unit cost levels being
exhibited over a relatively wide range of
processing capacities. The witness
testified that the lower per unit
processing cost advantages of larger
plant sizes tend to be greatest for very
large processing plants rather than
among smaller plants. The witness said
that significant cost and other
competitive advantages attributed to
economies of scale in fluid milk
processing become evident at about the
3-million pound per month processing
level.
According to the NMPF witness, the
exemption of producer-handlers from
the pooling and pricing provisions of
Orders 124 and 131 allows producerhandlers to effectively pay the
equivalent of the blend price for milk at
their plants, a price lower than the Class
I price that fully regulated competitors
pay. The witness testified that by using
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the economic concept of ‘‘transfer
pricing,’’ the maximum price that a
producer-handler ‘‘pays’’ for
transferring milk from its farm
production enterprise to its processing
enterprise can be estimated even though
the producer-handler does not actually
sell raw milk to itself. According to the
witness, transfer pricing in the context
of the producer-handler issue, predicts
that the price of milk assigned to milk
from the producer-handler farm
enterprise essentially becomes the price
at which milk could be sold to a
regulated handler—the Federal order
blend price. Accordingly, the witness
asserted that a producer-handler’s
advantage in raw milk procurement for
processing, as compared to fully
regulated handlers, would be the
difference between the Federal order
Class I price and the order’s blend price.
The NMPF witness testified that their
analysis reinforces the findings of the
consultant witness for DFA regarding
the magnitude of the pricing advantage
producers-handlers enjoy over handlers
who are subject to the pooling and
pricing provisions of a Federal order.
While noting that the DFA consultant
witness’ study used aggregated data that
does result in a significant loss of
information for analytical purposes, the
witness stressed that even with this
limitation it nevertheless remains the
best data available to rely upon.
The NMPF witness was of the opinion
that the producer-handler exemption
from an order’s pooling and pricing
provisions also creates inequity among
producers because it reduces the
amount of milk pooled as a Class I use
of milk, which in turn, lowers the total
revenue of the marketwide pool to be
shared among pooled producers.
According to the witness, this threatens
orderly marketing. The witness related
that farms with over 3 million pounds
of monthly production represent about
15 percent of the U.S. milk supply and
may represent some 40 percent of U.S.
fluid milk sales. According to the
witness, the steadily increasing number
of farms with this magnitude of monthly
milk production suggests that large
producers could exploit the producerhandler provision and thus further
erode equity to both producers and
handlers across the entire Federal milk
marketing order system.
The NMPF witness stated that the 3
million pound per month route
disposition limit proposed for producerhandlers as part of Proposals 1 and 3 is
also consistent with the promotion
assessment exemption of the Fluid Milk
Promotion Program. According to the
witness, the promotion exemption limit
set by Congress was based on the impact
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that a handler had in a marketing area.
Below 3 million pounds per month
route disposition, the witness said, the
impact of an individual handler is
negligible and therefore rationalizes
why smaller handlers are exempt from
fluid milk promotion assessments.
A witness appearing on behalf of DFA
testified in support of Proposals 1, 2,
and 3. The witness viewed the
exemption of producer-handlers from
the pooling and pricing provisions of
Federal orders as a loophole that
threatens the economic viability of the
Federal milk order system and the
economic well-being of pooled
producers. This witness, like the NMPF
witness, testified that a growing interest
by large dairy farmers in becoming
producer-handlers is a major factor in
DFA’s interest in seeking to amend the
producer-handler definition in the
Pacific Northwest or the Arizona-Las
Vegas orders. The witness testified that
the exemption from the pooling and
pricing provisions of these orders
provides producer-handlers with a
competitive advantage over fully
regulated handlers by effectively
permitting producer-handlers to
purchase milk at an internal price at or
below the Federal order blend price
while fully regulated handlers must pay
the usually higher Class I price for milk.
According to this DFA witness, the
difference between the Class I price and
the Federal order blend price represents
a significant windfall generated solely
by the regulatory exemptions accorded
to producer-handlers.
The DFA witness summarized that the
proposed 3 million pound per month
limitation on route disposition is based
on four considerations. According to the
witness, the proposed limit is: (1)
Consistent with the minimum volume of
milk sales that triggers the fluid milk
promotion assessment for handlers; (2)
the level at which producer-handlers
achieve competitive equity with fully
regulated handlers in terms of plant
processing efficiency; (3) the level of
route disposition that has a significant
impact on the pool value of milk; and
(4) the level of route disposition that has
a significant impact on the order’s
pooled producers and fully regulated
handlers. The witness indicated that if
a producer-handler’s volume is
sufficient to reduce a pool’s value by a
penny (1 cent) per hundredweight it is
significant and is of sufficient
magnitude to warrant ending producerhandler exemption from the pooling and
pricing provisions of the orders. The
witness also concluded from the study
conducted by the consultant witness for
DFA that when a producer-handler
reaches a 3 million pound per month
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distribution level, not only does the
producer-handler reach similar plant
processing cost efficiencies but it is also
of sufficient size to service a
considerable number of retail outlets on
a competitive par with fully regulated
handlers. According to the witness,
continuing the exemption from an
order’s pooling and pricing provisions
beyond the 3 million pound sales
volume level causes serious market
disruptions.
The DFA witness also testified that
the exemption of producer-handlers
from the pooling and pricing provisions
of the orders is encouraging large
producers to consider becoming
producer-handlers in both Orders 124
and 131 and in other Federal order
marketing areas. As an example, the
witness testified that some retail outlets
now seek packaged fluid milk supplies
from producer-handlers in an effort to
obtain lower cost milk supplies. The
witness was of the opinion that without
a limit on route disposition volume,
producer-handlers will displace pooled
producers and fully regulated handlers
as the dominant suppliers of fluid milk
not only in the Pacific Northwest and
Arizona-Las Vegas marketing areas, but
ultimately throughout all other Federal
milk marketing areas. The witness
cautioned that the potential for the
growth of producer-handlers gives rise
to considering lowering Class I milk
prices as a means to counter the
competitive price advantage that
producer-handlers are afforded by
regulatory exemption from pooling and
pricing provisions.
The DFA witness testified that the
current producer-handler definition
creates market disorder because it
disrupts the flow of Class I milk from
pooled producers to regulated handlers.
In addition, the witness testified that
pooled producers effectively subsidize
the balancing costs of producerhandlers. In the opinion of the witness,
these outcomes are destabilizing and are
producing disorder in both the Pacific
Northwest and Arizona-Las Vegas
marketing areas. In further explanation
of these points, the witness expressed
concern about the loss of Class I revenue
that would otherwise accrue to pooled
producers. As an example, relying on
Market Administrator data in making
professional inferences, the witness
testified that the largest producerhandler in the Order 131 marketing
area, Sarah Farms, had monthly route
disposition in the range of 12.1 to 19.1
million pounds. According to the
witness, the value of the sales revenue
lost to the Order 131 pool by not
subjecting Sarah Farms to the pooling
and pricing provisions of the order
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averaged some $317,000 per month, or
the equivalent of 12.5 cents per cwt.
The DFA witness testified that the
producer-handler price advantage over
fully regulated handlers provides a
powerful incentive for customers to
purchase milk from producer-handlers
rather than fully regulated handlers. The
witness testified that producer-handlers
have as much as a 15-cent per gallon
advantage over fully regulated handlers
in Order 131. According to the witness,
the advantage is based on the difference
between the Order 131 Class I price and
the order’s blend price which ranged
from 15.9 to as much as 18.3 cents per
gallon during the period of January 2000
through July 2003.
The DFA witness related that
wholesale milk buyers base
procurement decisions on tenths and
even hundredths of a cent differences in
the price per gallon, indicating that
price differences of more than 15 cents
per gallon overwhelmingly favors the
producer-handler in head-to-head price
competition. The witness testified that
lower-priced packaged fluid milk
products from producer-handlers is
used by wholesale buyers of milk as
leverage in daily price negotiations with
fully regulated handlers and is a form of
disorderly marketing. Such market
disorder, the witness said, causes all
processors to receive lower prices for
their packaged fluid milk products.
The DFA witness also expressed the
opinion that the plant costs faced by a
large producer-handler are similar to
those faced by fully regulated handlers
even though the witness had no direct
knowledge of individual producerhandler businesses in Order 124 or 131.
While agreeing with the characterization
that producer-handlers are a single and
seamless milk production and
processing enterprise, the witness
asserted that higher balancing and
operational costs attributable to
producer-handler operations are not
significantly different than those
associated with fully regulated handlers
of the same processing plant size. The
witness further asserted that the
producer-handler price advantage
combined with the ability to increase
production volume at negligible
additional costs per unit exaggerates the
advantage to a point where a producerhandler can increase market share
nearly at will.
Through a series of examples
depicting scenarios of different plant
sizes, the DFA witness testified that
producer-handlers with 80 and 90
percent Class I utilization could operate
profitably in spite of higher balancing
costs associated with operating as a
producer-handler. The witness
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explained that a large producer-handler
experiencing increasing returns to its
operation could continue to grow in size
until it controlled a substantial share of
the Class I market. The witness testified
that a producer-handler with route
disposition of 3 million pounds per
month could supply a small regional
grocery chain but likely would not be
able to diversify its marketing risk with
sales to other customers.
According to the DFA witness, if
producer-handlers are allowed to gain
Class I sales without restraint, fully
regulated handlers and pooled
producers would likely come to view
Federal milk marketing orders as
ineffective. According to the witness,
under these conditions producers
possibly would seek to terminate the
orders. The DFA witness characterized
this potential scenario as a form of
market disorder.
The DFA witness said that rising
interest in the producer-handler option
by large dairy farmers challenges the
long-term viability of the entire Federal
milk order system. The witness did
acknowledge that no new producerhandler operations have entered either
the Order 124 or 131 marketing areas in
recent years. The witness also
acknowledged that market information
kept by the Department shows that the
volume of sales by producer-handlers
had declined nationally from 1.47
billion pounds per year to 1.16 billion
pounds per year between 1988 and
1998.
The DFA witness offered
modifications to Proposal 1 that would
also be applicable to Proposal 3.
Basically, in addition to limiting a
producer-handlers route disposition to
less than 3 million pounds per month,
the modification made extensive
changes in terminology as to how
producer-handlers are defined. The
intent of these modifications, the
witness said, is to clarify that the
burden of proof and the responsibility
for providing all the details to
substantiate proof to the Market
Administrator for producer-handler
status rests with the producer-handler.
The DFA witness testified that Market
Administrators will continue to be
relied upon by Federal orders to use
their discretion in determining
producer-handler status. According to
the witness, the proposed modifications
for the producer-handler definitions are
expected to provide flexibility for a
Market Administrator to investigate and
audit proposed producer-handler
operations and to ensure qualification
requirements are met. In addition, the
witness said that if Proposals 1 and 3
are adopted, it was reasonable that
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existing producer-handlers in Orders
124 and 131 be given a period of time
to adjust their operations to the
proposed producer-handler
requirements.
Another witness appearing on behalf
of DFA testified in support of Proposals
1 and 3 on the basis that small and
average-sized dairy farmers, including
producer-handlers with milk production
below 3 million pounds of milk per
month, have higher production costs
than larger dairy farms. The witness
said that very large dairy farms tend to
have management expertise and
business sophistication, access to
capital, access to veterinary services,
and economies of size and scale that
tend to lower their per unit costs of milk
production. This DFA witness testified
that a dairy farm would need
approximately 1,800 cows to achieve a
3 million pound per month level of
production available for bottling and
route disposition.
The DFA witness did not know if 3
million pounds of route disposition per
month was the precise number above
which producer-handlers should
become subject to the pricing and
pooling provisions of Orders 124 and
131. Similarly, the witness did not
know what economic impact adopting
Proposals 1 and 3 would have on
producer-handlers in the respective
marketing areas. The witness did relate
having knowledge of interest being
expressed by dairy farmers who had
monthly production in excess of 3
million pounds per month seeking
possible producer-handler status.
A witness representing Northwest
Dairy Association (NDA) testified that
they market the milk of 603 milk
producers traditionally associated with
Order 124. The witness said that NDA
also is the parent company of WestFarm
Foods, an operator of three distributing
plants located in Seattle, Washington,
and Portland and Medford, Oregon. The
witness added that NDA also operates
four milk manufacturing plants in the
Order 124 marketing area. The witness
testified that while NDA does not have
a direct connection to Order 131, it
indirectly shares similar concerns with
the proponents of Proposal 3 in that
they share a border with California and
share similar concerns regarding the
Federal and State milk order systems. In
addition, the witness noted that Order
124 has the second largest volume of
producer-handler milk marketings of
any Federal order—second only to
Order 131.
The NDA witness was also appearing
on behalf of Tillamook County
Creamery Association, Farmers
Cooperative Creamery, Inland Dairy,
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and Northwest Independent Milk
Producers, hereinafter collectively
referred to as NDA, in support of
Proposals 1, 2, and 3. The witness
testified that the producer-handler
exemption from the pooling and pricing
provisions of Order 124 provides an
unfair competitive advantage to
producer-handlers at the expense of
pooled producers and fully regulated
handlers. According to the witness, the
historical justifications for exempting
producer-handlers because such entities
are small operators without significant
market impact on prices and they do not
provide significant competition with
fully regulated handlers are no longer
warranted. The witness testified that
producer-handlers in Order 124 are now
a significant force in the marketing area
and are likely to continue to increase in
size and market significance. The
witness noted that Congress had
effectively supported the Department’s
long-standing producer-handler
exemption from pooling and pricing
provisions of Federal orders since the
1960’s. The witness stated that only a
few large producer-handlers currently
operate in the Order 124 marketing area.
The witness indicated agreement with
other proponent testimony that a
producer-handler’s raw milk cost was
the Federal order blend price.
According to the witness, the blend
price represents an alternative market
price available to a producer-handler.
Accordingly, the witness asserted, the
only reason a producer-handler would
seek to continue an exemption from an
order’s pooling and pricing provisions
would be to maintain a competitive
advantage. The witness related that from
a producer viewpoint the competitive
advantage is the ability to retain the
entire Class I value and from the
handler viewpoint the competitive
advantage is not accounting to the pool
at the order’s Class I price. The witness
estimated the producer-handler
advantage over the period of January
2000 through October 2003 to be the
difference between the Order 124 Class
I and blend prices which averaged about
15.4 cents per gallon or $1.79 per cwt.
The NDA witness asserted that during
a period of rapidly rising milk prices,
producer-handlers also have a
competitive advantage by being able to
enter into long-term fixed price
contracts in a way fully regulated
handlers cannot. In the opinion of the
witness, by offering relatively long-term
fixed price contracts, a producerhandler may be able to attract and retain
customers using a pricing policy
unavailable to fully regulated handlers.
The witness stated that this represents
a form of disorderly marketing.
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According to the NDA witness,
producer-handlers use pooled producers
and pooled handlers to balance their
milk supply. The witness testified that
‘‘balancing off of the pool’’ involves
producer-handlers selling milk to retail
outlets until their milk supply is
exhausted with retail outlets buying
additional milk supplies from fully
regulated handlers to meet the shortfall.
According to the witness, the fully
regulated handler is not only the
residual milk supplier but also
effectively has the burden of balancing
the Class I needs of the market not
fulfilled by the producer-handler.
Consequently, these burdens are
transferred to the market’s pooled
producers by the regulated handlers.
According to the witness, this tactic
allows a producer-handler to maximize
its revenue by obtaining the highest
price available while essentially
avoiding any costs of surplus milk
disposal in lower-valued uses. This
advantage is amplified, the witness said,
when a producer-handler is able to
balance its milk production and sales
into areas not regulated by a Federal
milk marketing order.
The NDA witness testified that the
proposed 3 million pound per month
route disposition limit for producerhandlers is also based on political
considerations and on an intuitive
notion. The witness explained that
processing plants smaller than 3 million
pounds per month are exempted by
Congress from the 20-cent per
hundredweight processor-funded fluid
milk promotion program. As a result,
the witness related that the proponents
are of the opinion that this level would
also prove to be acceptable in the
context of its application to handlers
regulated under the terms of a milk
marketing order. In addition, the
witness testified that NDA’s subsidiary’s
(WestFarm Foods) own study of
processing plant size and costs suggests
that the DFA plant size and cost study
may actually understate when plant
processing cost efficiencies are gained.
According to the witness, NDA’s study
suggests that this occurs at about the
2.5-million pound per month level
indicating that plants of this size and
larger lower their processing costs by
about 10 cents per gallon. The witness
related that a plant processing 3 million
pounds per month would have a cost
savings of approximately 11.4 cents per
gallon. Accordingly, the witness
concluded that producer-handler plants
that dispose of Class I milk products in
excess of 3 million pounds per month
should therefore become subject to the
pooling and pricing provisions of Order
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124. The witness said this would ensure
that all similar handlers would have the
same raw milk costs.
The NDA witness also testified in
support of Proposal 2. The witness
viewed this as preventing producerhandlers from expanding the benefit of
their regulatory status by balancing their
supply on the market’s pooled
producers and at the same time tending
to ensure that fully regulated handlers
would not become residual suppliers of
fluid milk products to the market.
The NDA witness speculated that the
investment required for a processing
plant to produce only milk packaged in
gallons is relatively small when
compared to a very large dairy farmer’s
existing investment in land, livestock,
and equipment. The witness was of the
opinion that the potentially higher
returns on the additional investment for
a processing plant producing only
gallon containers of packaged fluid milk
would be attractive to very large dairy
farmers such that it would encourage
large producers to become producerhandlers. According to the witness,
such a scenario threatens the economic
attractiveness of the Federal order
program and the prevailing structure of
the dairy industry.
While the NDA witness testified only
to conditions affecting Order 124, the
witness did indicate fluid milk
marketing has been undergoing
considerable structural changes for
many years that are national in scope.
The structural changes taking place
throughout the dairy industry are most
markedly exhibited by consolidation in
the production, processing, marketing,
and distribution of dairy products, the
witness said. As an example, the
witness illustrated that Vitamilk’s
decision to go out of business was a
direct result of the acquisition of its two
largest grocery store customers by
Safeway and Kroger. The witness noted
that Safeway and Kroger are both
national companies that also process
milk as fully regulated handlers for their
own stores and other customers. The
witness was of the opinion that Vitamilk
could not find other profitable business
because it was unable to compete
effectively with existing producerhandlers and other competitors in the
Pacific Northwest after losing a
significant portion of its business by the
Safeway and Kroger acquisition of their
customers. The witness was of the
opinion that as consolidation continues
within the dairy industry, a Class I
handler may find a declining number of
marketing alternatives and thus give rise
to market disorder. The witness was of
the opinion that fully regulated handlers
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could be displaced by producerhandlers.
The NDA witness testified that the
rise of warehouse and very high volume
‘‘super stores’’ also has contributed to
the structural changes in the dairy
industry with packaged fluid milk
products being supplied as cheaply as
possible. According to the witness,
‘‘super stores’’ and warehouse stores are
able to exert market power in obtaining
the lowest market prices available for
fluid milk products at the wholesale
level.
The NDA witness testified that there
are approximately 800 pooled producers
on the Pacific Northwest order.
According to the witness, all of these
producers are small businesses who
would receive a benefit in the range of
2.4—4 cents per hundredweight for
their milk if Proposal 1 were adopted.
An increase in producer income would
result, the witness said, from the sharing
of Class I revenue by pooling the largest
producer-handlers in the marketing area
who individually have route disposition
in excess of 3 million pounds per
month. According to the witness, the
additional total Class I revenue that
would accrue to the Order 124 pool
would be in the range of $2.8—$4.0
million per month.
The NDA witness addressed concerns
regarding instances where handlers and
dairy farmers have made investments
based on the provisions of a Federal
milk order. In rationalizing concerns
about the impact a change in regulation
may have on business decisions using
current order provisions, the witness
noted several past Federal order
decisions where regulatory changes had
an impact on persons that had built and
designed their business practices on
existing order provisions. For example,
the witness noted that the elimination of
the ‘‘bulk tank handler’’ provision in the
Western milk marketing order by a
tentative final decision would have
effectively reduced the value that
proprietary bulk tank handlers could
assign to their facilities. In addition, the
witness related how the implementation
of Federal milk order reform eliminated
individual handler pools and reduced
the value of those investments.
According to the witness, these changes
occurred as a matter of course with the
operators of those facilities absorbing
the actual costs of the regulatory
changes. The witness also testified that
the elimination of ‘‘double dipping’’ in
the Upper Midwest, Central, Mideast,
Northeast, Pacific Northwest, and
Western orders had negative impacts on
the investments made by operators who
were able to take advantage of those
regulatory features before they were
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changed. These changes were made
without compensation to those
operators who engaged in the practice of
double dipping.
The NDA witness testified that
opponents to placing a route disposition
limit on producer-handlers incorrectly
argue that as vertically integrated
enterprises, producer-handlers face
more risks and higher costs than do
pooled producers and fully regulated
handlers. The witness asserted that the
Federal order program does not
incorporate a value for risk in its
regulatory framework. In addition, the
witness noted that some producerhandlers are continuing to stay in
business even as the total number of
producer-handlers has declined in the
last several years in the Order 124
marketing area. The witness related
historical data from Market
Administrator sources indicating that 10
of the 11 producer-handlers which have
gone out of business in recent years in
the Order 124 marketing area had
monthly route disposition of less than 3
million pounds.
In other testimony, the NDA witness
conceded that no handler is exempt
from, or subject to, Federal milk order
regulations on the basis of plant
operating costs. In addition, the witness
testified that a Federal milk order which
had many producer-handlers supplying
10 percent of the Class I market would
not represent a disruptive influence or
create market disorder if the market
share of the producer-handlers was
stable (did not grow.) Also, the witness
indicated that if the market share
supplied by producer-handlers was
stable but the number of producerhandlers supplying that market
decreased, the impact of producerhandlers on the marketing conditions in
the area would not be considered
disorderly.
The NDA witness testified that a route
disposition volume below 3 million
pounds per month does not tend to lend
a price or cost advantage to producerhandlers. The witness said that the
impact of a producer-handler on a
marketing area’s blend price is directly
related to the size of the marketing area.
In this regard, the witness related that
a 3 million pound milk bottling plant in
the Upper Midwest Federal order, for
example, would have a deminimus
impact on that order’s blend price but
nevertheless maintained that a 3 million
pound route disposition limit was a
reasonable trigger to cause producerhandlers to become subject to the
order’s pooling and pricing provisions.
The witness offered that an appropriate
limit could be more than 3 million
pounds, possibly as high as 4-million
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pounds, while still reasonably meeting
the overall objectives sought in Proposal
1. The witness cautioned that setting a
limit that is too low—for example at
500,000 pounds per month—would
essentially close the marketing and
regulatory option of market entry as a
producer-handler.
In agreeing with other testimony, a 3
million pound limit was consistent with
what the NDA witness characterized as
a political settlement reached with the
Department in determining when
handlers would become subject to a
fluid milk promotion program
assessment. According to the witness,
important consideration was given to
the threat of handlers with route
disposition of less than 3 million
pounds per month being able to band
together and vote to terminate the fluid
milk promotion program. The witness
indicated that a 3 million pound level
is also a coincidentally useful volume as
it supports the DFA’s consultant
witness’ plant size and cost study and
analysis.
A witness appearing on behalf of
NDA’s WestFarm Foods testified in
support of Proposals 1 and 2. The
witness provided data comparing the
variable costs of WestFarm’s Medford,
Oregon, bottling plant that processes 12
million pounds of milk per month with
a hypothetical plant processing less
than 3 million pounds per month. The
witness testified that the results of this
comparison were similar to the results
of the DFA’s study. The witness testified
that WestFarm Food’s study similarly
concluded that as plant sizes increase,
per unit processing costs tend to
decrease.
The NDA witness testified that
WestFarm Foods has lost significant
sales of packaged fluid milk products to
grocery stores and school milk contracts
to producer-handler competitors. The
witness reported that WestFarm Foods
competed with one producer-handler in
the Pacific Northwest for shelf space in
11 different retail outlets. According to
the witness, the total volume of these
sales was approximately 8 million
pounds per year. The witness indicated
that the producer-handler was able to
offer longer term, fixed price contracts
to retailers and thereby remove price
volatility. The witness said that fully
regulated handlers, like WestFarm
Foods, do not have this ability because
they must pay the Federal order Class I
price which fluctuates every month.
The WestFarm Foods witness asserted
that producer-handlers in Order 124
offer prices for fluid milk products that
range from 15 to 45 cents per gallon
cheaper than milk offered by fully
regulated Class I handlers, depending
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on the monthly changes in the order’s
Class I price. The witness further
asserted that producer-handlers are able
to displace the Class I use of milk on the
Order 124 pool by selling fluid milk
products into Alaska, an area not subject
to order regulation, at prices below the
Class I price. According to the witness,
when a producer-handler displaces
potential fully regulated handler sales in
Alaska, the fully regulated handler’s
milk is forced to a lower use value
which lowers the blend price paid to
pooled producers. The witness asserted
that if producer-handler competition
was absent in Alaska, WestFarm Foods
would be the dominant supplier to
customers in that market. While noting
that producer-handlers continue to
provide significant competition to
WestFarm’s bottling operations, the
witness testified that none of the
producer-handlers are selling fluid milk
products below the Federal order
minimum Class I price.
The WestFarm Foods witness testified
that WestFarm Foods must meet a
specified level of Class I sales to qualify
all of its milk receipts for pooling on
Order 124. According to the witness,
producer-handlers in the marketing area
have become very aggressive sellers of
milk and have increased their sales
volume to the point where fully
regulated Class I handlers are having
difficulty qualifying all of their
producer milk receipts for pooling on
the order. The witness attributed such
pooling difficulties to the lack of growth
in the Class I market combined with
growing producer-handler route
disposition. In addition, the witness
testified that NDA charges its customers
an over-order premium of between 30
and 45 cents per cwt.
A witness appearing on behalf of
Dean Foods offered testimony in
support of Proposals 1, 2, and 3. The
witness asserted that exemptions to
pooling and pricing provisions of
Federal milk marketing orders should be
few. According to the witness, the basic
underlying objectives of an order are to
efficiently assure an adequate supply of
milk for fluid uses and to enhance
returns to dairy farmers. The witness
said that the Federal milk orders
achieve these objectives by: using a
classified pricing plan setting minimum
class prices, utilizing the marketwide
pooling of the classified values of milk
to return a blend price to dairy farmers
and verifying handler reporting through
audits. The witness stressed that absent
uniform and universal application of an
order to market participants, some
market participants will reap
competitive advantages due solely to
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selective exemption from regulation
rather than for business reasons.
According to the Dean witness, only
a few types of firms have been
historically exempted from the pooling
and pricing provisions of Federal orders
which include government and
university facilities, small processors,
and producer-handlers—characterizing
the producer-handler exemption as one
of administrative convenience. The
witness was of the opinion that
producer-handlers should only be
exempt from the pooling and pricing
provisions of Federal orders when the
effect of providing a regulatory
exemption has a negligible effect on
market participants. In this regard, the
witness was of the opinion that a penny
or more impact on the order’s blend
price was significant. Relating this
opinion to conditions in Order 131, the
witness determined that the order’s
blend price would be affected by a
penny when the route distribution of a
producer-handler was at the 950,000
pound per month level.
The Dean witness testified that a dairy
farmer operating as a producer-handler
can receive a higher price than the
alternative of an order’s blend price,
depending on the internal transfer price.
The witness explained that a processor
operating as a producer-handler
essentially has the ability to ‘‘acquire’’
milk at a transfer price as the milk
moves from the farm enterprise to the
processing enterprise. In this regard, the
witness related that such a transfer price
can be represented by the difference
between the order’s blend price and the
Class I price. However, the witness
conceded that if the producer-handler is
viewed as a single seamless entity, the
application of transfer pricing may
reveal less information than would an
evaluation of all costs and revenues in
determining the extent of the
competitive advantage that a producerhandler may enjoy by regulatory
exemption from the pricing and pooling
provisions of an order.
The Dean witness also noted that
using an internal transfer price may be
of limited value as it does not involve
price discovery achieved through armslength transactions. However, the
witness was of the strong opinion that
regardless of a measure of operating
performance or efficiency, a producerhandler would always have a
competitive advantage over a fully
regulated handler. The witness asserted
that the competitive advantage which
accrues to the producer-handler is the
difference between the order’s Class I
price and the blend price. In this regard
the witness was of the opinion that
producer-handlers would always be able
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to compete more effectively than fully
regulated handlers because of their
exemption from the pooling and pricing
provisions of an order.
The witness offered an opinion as to
why there has not been significant
market entry of new producer-handlers
if being exempt from the pricing and
pooling provisions of an order confers
significant competitive advantages over
fully regulated handlers. In this regard,
the witness offered that resources do not
move easily between different
enterprises within the dairy industry
because of cost and regulatory risk. The
witness also offered the opinion that if
large companies, such as Kroger,
attempted to become a producerhandler, legislative changes to prevent
such outcomes would quickly result.
The Dean Foods witness was of the
opinion that the notion of disorderly
marketing should be seen to exist when
the regulatory terms of trade between
competitors are different. Along this
theme, the witness testified that in
Order 131, disorderly marketing
conditions exist because the terms of
trade between competitors are not the
same, citing specifically the regulatory
exemption from pooling and pricing for
producer-handlers and no similar
exemption for their fully regulated
competitors. However, the witness
contrasted the growing presence and
market share in fluid milk distribution
by producer-handlers in Order 131 with
the stable market share of producerhandlers in Order 124.
A witness appearing on behalf of Alan
Ritchey, Incorporated (ARI), a familyowned dairy farm business located in
Texas and Oklahoma, testified in
opposition to limiting route disposition
of producer-handlers as advanced in
Proposals 1 and 3. The witness testified
that ARI marketed its milk through DFA
because DFA was the only available
buyer in the area. The witness testified
that ARI opposed Proposals 1 and 3
because it would limit the option of
becoming a producer-handler for those
dairy farmers seeking alternative
marketing options for their milk. The
witness characterized the dairy industry
as consolidating and forcing dairy
farmers to consider abandoning their
traditional relationships with
cooperatives. The witness viewed
becoming a producer-handler as a highrisk business venture but an important
alternative that should continue to be
available to dairy farmers.
The ARI witness also testified that
cooperatives with membership and
market presence which is national in
scope have market power that may be
reducing the revenue of individual dairy
farmers who have no other milk
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marketing alternatives than through a
cooperative. In the opinion of the
witness, preserving the existing
producer-handler definition provides
dairy farmers with an alternative
mechanism to market their milk directly
and retain all of the revenue earned. In
this regard, the witness indicated that
ARI could see no reason why the route
disposition of a producer-handler
should be limited to 3 million pounds
per month while regulated handlers
have no limitations on route
disposition.
A witness appearing on behalf of
Braum’s Dairy (Braum’s), a producerhandler located in Tuttle, Oklahoma,
testified in opposition to Proposals 1
and 3. The witness testified that
Braum’s milks approximately 10,000
cows and processes its milk production
into fluid milk and cultured and ice
cream products. The witness said that
all of the milk and milk products
produced by Braum’s Dairy are
marketed exclusively through its own
retail outlets. The witness further
testified that Braum’s does not have
sales to wholesale customers and
maintained that they do not directly
compete with fully regulated handlers.
The Braum’s witness is of the opinion
that Proposals 1 and 3 seek to eliminate
competition by producer-handlers for
the benefit of fully regulated handlers
and will result in many producerhandlers becoming fully regulated. The
witness also was of the opinion that
Proposals 1 and 3 were advanced as a
means to ultimately seek amending the
producer-handler provision in all
Federal milk orders even though the
provision has worked well for the past
66 years.
The witness indicated that Braum’s
had not always been a producer-handler
but due to Federal order pooling rules
for out-of-area milk that were
detrimental to Braum’s interests, the
decision was made to become a
producer-handler. The witness said that
in addition to the problems posed by
pooling rules when the company was a
fully regulated handler, Braum’s also
attributed difficulty acquiring a reliable
and sufficient quantity of high-quality
milk on a timely basis as a reason for
becoming a producer-handler.
A witness appeared in opposition to
Proposals 1 and 3, on behalf of
Mallorie’s Dairy, Edaleen Dairy, and
Smith Brothers Dairy, all producershandlers in the Order 124 marketing
area. The witness was the owner of the
Pure Milk and Ice Cream Company
(Pure Milk), a large Texas producerhandler that is no longer in operation.
This witness, hereinafter referred to as
the SBEDMD witness, testified that Pure
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Milk was located in Waco, Texas, and
had route disposition across a large part
of Texas that is now part of the
Southwest milk marketing area.
According to the witness, Pure Milk was
the combination of a profitable dairy
farm whose milk was pooled on the
Texas order and a profitable fluid
distributing and manufacturing plant
that produced an array of various fluid
milk products, ice cream and ice cream
mixes. The witness was of the opinion
that limiting route disposition would
render the option of becoming a
producer-handler an unattractive
business option under any
circumstances. The witness stressed that
without the ability to grow or otherwise
attain economies of size and scale, the
producer-handler business model could
never be successful.
The SBEDMD witness testified to
participating in a Federal milk order
hearing that similarly sought to limit the
route disposition of producer-handlers
under the Texas order in 1989.
According to the witness, the argument
advanced at that time was that the
competitive advantage of being exempt
from the order’s pooling and pricing
provisions enjoyed by large producerhandlers would undermine the
economic viability of the Federal milk
order program by causing harm to
pooled producers and fully regulated
handlers. The witness indicated that
Pure Milk, operating as a producerhandler, failed not as a result of any
competitive advantage arising from
exemptions from pooling and pricing
provisions but from the unique risks
and costs associated with operating as a
producer-handler.
The SBEDMD witness testified that,
for a time, Pure Milk was convinced that
there was an advantage to operating as
a producer-handler instead of operating
as a pooled producer or a fully regulated
handler. The witness related that this
view was held until Pure Milk lost a
major customer that caused it to become
consistently unprofitable. In this regard,
the witness testified that Pure Milk had
an account with a very large grocery
chain in Texas and explained that when
the large grocery chain customer learned
of Pure Milk’s involvement in the 1989
milk order hearing the account was lost.
The witness characterized and
described this business loss as an
example of the regulatory risk of being
a producer-handler.
The SBEDMD witness also testified
that Pure Milk was unable to obtain and
retain significant long-term contracts
except for some school business and
prison sales. The witness said that as a
producer-handler, there was simply too
much marketing risk and insufficient
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long-term contract business to justify
the additional required investment in
plant and equipment to operate
profitably. The witness testified that as
a result of losing a large retail account
after being its supplier for two years to
a fully regulated handler, Pure Milk lost
sufficient revenue and decided to end
operations as a producer-handler.
The SBEDMD witness also related
that in order to operate its plant
profitably, Pure Milk would have had to
achieve a volume of 1.2 million pounds
per month, a level it never attained. In
addition, the witness said, the company
was never able to contain costs to a level
at which it could compete effectively
with large fully regulated handlers in
the marketing area. The witness testified
that Pure Milk’s fully regulated
competitors had larger plants and
operated 24 hours a day, 7 days a week,
while Pure Milk’s plant, in contrast,
operated about 17 hours a day, 5 days
a week. The witness concluded that
because their competitors operated at a
higher capacity, they had plant
efficiencies Pure Milk could not
achieve. The witness attributed Pure
Milk’s inability to achieve the desired
level of plant efficiency to the producerhandler definition which limited and
constrained their ability to purchase
additional milk supplies from others
during their low production seasons.
The witness also attributed Pure Milk’s
inability to achieve desired plant
efficiencies to their inability to market
surplus milk production at a profit
during high milk production seasons.
The witness described these as other
examples of regulatory risk faced by a
producer-handler.
At the closing of the Pure Milk plant,
the witness indicated that he then
managed Promised Land Dairy which
operated as a small producer-handler
from 1996–1999 supplying specialty
packaged fluid milk products to health
food and grocery stores. The witness
said that Promised Land Dairy’s
specialty operation, selling Jersey cow
milk in glass bottles, also failed to be
profitable for the same reasons as the
Pure Milk Company—the inability to
balance supplies, the inability to
achieve plant operating efficiencies, and
the inability to obtain and retain a longterm customer base. The witness
testified that Promised Land Dairy
ended its operation as a producerhandler because it could not achieve
profitability.
In additional testimony, the SBEDMD
witness was of the opinion that relying
on the concept of transfer pricing as a
means for demonstrating that a pricing
advantage accrues to producer-handlers
by being exempt from the order’s
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pooling and pricing provisions was
misplaced. The witness maintained that
as a producer-handler, the only measure
of success is the profitability of the
entire operation. However, the witness
said that Pure Milk used the marketing
order’s blend price as a transfer price for
the limited purpose of conducting
internal evaluations of its production
performance and to derive a measure of
its plant’s operating efficiency. The
witness testified that the company did
use Federal order minimum class prices
as a basis for pricing milk to its
customers and as a basis for making
contract bids.
A second witness appearing on behalf
of Smith Brothers Farms, Edaleen Dairy,
and Mallorie’s Dairy, testified in
opposition to Proposals 1, 2, and 3. This
witness, hereinafter referred to as the
SBEDMD second witness, was of the
opinion that these proposals would
adversely restrain competition in the
dairy industry in both the Order 124
and 131 marketing areas. The witness
testified that the producer-handler
exemption from pooling and pricing in
Orders 124 and 131 serve a needed and
useful purpose by providing market
niches and marketing alternatives for
operators with dairy production and
processing expertise as a means to
remain competitive in an era of
otherwise increasing industry
consolidation. The witness was of the
opinion that the best measure of
orderliness in dairy markets should be
on results rather than on the mechanics
and operations of a milk marketing
order. According to the witness, orderly
marketing implies protecting the rights
of producers to choose their market
outlet freely without coercion or
unreasonable barriers to market entry.
The SBEDMD second witness
criticized the proponent’s use of the
Cornell University processing plant
study, also relied upon by the NMPF
witness, as a basis to support the
proposed 3 million pound per month
route disposition limit for producerhandlers. The witness was critical of the
Cornell study, in part, because the
minimum plant sizes considered in the
study were 4 times or 12 million pounds
larger than the 3 million pound limit
contained as part of Proposals 1 and 3.
The witness also was of the opinion that
the Cornell plant study yielded results
that were statistically insignificant
because the number of plants used in
the study was too small to reveal useful
information. The witness explained that
the sample of plants used in the study
was not applicable to considerations
regarding marketing conditions in
Orders 124 and 131 because: (1) The
data were improperly grouped into
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regions using the Consumer Price Index
rather than the Producer Price Index, (2)
the sample of plants did not include any
plants located in the two marketing
order areas, and (3) the sample of plants
could not demonstrate any similarity to
producer-handlers in either of the two
marketing order areas.
The SBEDMD second witness also
testified that DFA’s plant cost study
results were similarly based on faulty
data. According to the witness, the
statistical analyses used in the DFA
plant cost study should have been based
on observations of individual plant
costs rather than by averaging plant cost
across the various classes of plant sizes
selected for inclusion in the study. In
addition, the witness testified that the
analyses should have considered all
plant costs by region, labor type, and
type of regulated handler rather than
relying only on selected costs.
The SBEDMD second witness was of
the opinion that the interest in
advancing Proposals 1 and 3 stems from
what the witness characterized as the
arbitrary setting of higher than needed
Class I differentials in all Federal milk
orders. According to the witness, higher
than needed Class I differential levels
were set because of proponent lobbying
efforts during Federal milk order reform.
According to the witness, lowering
Class I differential levels would
effectively reduce the incentive for
further business expansion of producerhandlers.
In addition, the SBEDMD second
witness was of the opinion that
producer-handlers add much needed
competition in the Order 124 and 131
marketing areas. According to the
witness, the high concentration ratio of
handlers-to-dairy farmers in both orders
has created a near monopsony of milk
buyers that has negative implications for
prices received by dairy farmers. The
witness also characterized the high
concentration ratio of handlers-to-dairy
farmers as contrary to the public interest
because it may result in higher prices to
consumers.
The SBEDMD second witness pointed
to other changes in marketing
conditions that warrant not changing
the current regulatory exemptions of
producer-handlers. The witness testified
that the consolidation of cooperatives
through mergers into fewer and larger
cooperatives, together with full-supply
marketing contracts, has reduced dairy
farmer income because cooperatives can
re-blend and re-distribute revenue to
their members at a value below the
order’s blend price. The witness also
testified that cooperatives that are
national in scope may not be meeting
the local needs of their dairy farmer
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members in markets where such
cooperatives are the dominant buyer of
milk because it leaves producers
without alternative marketing options
except to sell their milk through the
dominant cooperative. With such
changes to marketing conditions, the
witness concluded that becoming a
producer-handler provides dairy
farmers a useful and needed alternative
to limited marketing options resulting
from dairy industry consolidations.
The SBEDMD second witness
characterized the application of the
pooling and pricing provisions of
Orders 124 and 131 as essentially an
imposition of a tax on producerhandlers. The witness said that the
pooling and pricing provisions of the
orders should apply only to those
handlers that purchase milk from
producers. Along this theme, while
acknowledging that producer-handlers
are also handlers, the witness did not
view an intra-firm transfer of milk from
the farm production enterprise to the
processing plant enterprise as
equivalent to a purchase of milk by a
handler from a dairy farmer. The
witness testified to awareness of a court
ruling equating intra-firm transfers of
milk as identical to purchases of milk
but considered such rulings not being
relevant to the context of this
proceeding for limiting the route
disposition volume of a producerhandler.
A third witness appearing on behalf of
Smith Brothers Farms, Edaleen Dairy,
and Mallorie’s Dairy, also testified in
opposition to Proposals 1 and 2. The
witness provided financial information
regarding efficient dairy processing
plant size and costs. The witness
indicated that successful long-term
operators in the fluid processing
business must operate their plants
efficiently and process sufficient
volumes to achieve a competitive cost
structure. The witness said that
establishing a maximum monthly
processing limit of 3 million pounds for
producer-handlers limits them to
operating plants that would be unable to
capitalize on the economies of scale
required to further reduce per unit costs
to more competitive levels.
A former Market Administrator of the
pre-reform Central Arizona milk
marketing order testified in opposition
to Proposal 1, 2, and 3. The witness
explained that if regulated, producerhandlers would be subject to the
pooling and pricing provisions of an
order by being required to pay into the
producer-settlement fund of the order
on the basis of their Class I sales in the
marketing area.
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A witness appearing on behalf of
Smith Brothers Dairy (Smith Brothers),
a producer-handler located in the Order
124 marketing area, testified in
opposition to Proposals 1 and 2.
According to the witness, Smith
Brothers has been operating as a
producer-handler for some 43 years. The
witness testified that Smith Brothers is
a family owned and operated enterprise
that survives by serving niche markets
not well served by other market
participants, including fully regulated
handlers. The witness testified that the
largest single market niche served by
Smith Brothers is home delivery,
representing approximately 70 percent
of its fluid milk sales. According to the
witness, Smith Brothers purposely
pursued this market niche beginning in
1980 when home delivery represented
only a third of their fluid milk sales.
The witness was of the opinion that the
goal of the proponents advancing the
adoption of Proposal 1 is to eliminate
producer-handlers as competitors in the
Order 124 marketing area.
The witness maintained that Smith
Brothers has not been a disruptive factor
in the Order 124 marketing area. The
witness testified that Smith Brothers
does not directly compete for customers
with large fully regulated handlers as it
does not have sales to grocery chains,
convenience stores, or large commercial
retailers in the marketing area. Relying
on Market Administrator statistics for
Order 124, the witness related the
decline in the number of producerhandlers from 73 in 1997 to 11 in 2000
and a decline in route disposition by all
producer-handlers of nearly 6 percent
between 2000 and mid-2003 as evidence
that clearly demonstrates producerhandlers are not a source of market
disorder. The witness also discounted
the notion that producer-handlers enjoy
a competitive advantage by noting the
lack of entry of new producer-handlers
in the Order 124 marketing area.
The Smith Brothers witness testified
that the majority of regulated handlers
in Order 124 are much larger, more
diversified, and not interested in the
niche market of home delivery that
Smith Brothers serves. The witness
testified that limiting a producerhandler’s route disposition to less than
3 million pounds per month would
cause them to not only lose their status
as a producer-handler but may even
result in Smith Brothers terminating
operations altogether.
The Smith Brothers witness explained
that producer-handlers face different
costs and risks than do pooled
producers and fully regulated handlers.
According to the witness, producerhandlers have balancing risks, farm
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production risks, and processing risks
that, when combined into a single
business enterprise, are greater than
those borne by either pooled producers
or fully regulated handlers. The witness
asserted that any pricing advantage the
producer-handler may have is offset by
the combination of these costs and by
the loss of opportunity to produce,
acquire and market other dairy
products.
The witness testified that Smith
Brothers, in part, balances its own milk
production by selling surplus milk into
Alaska, an area not regulated by a
Federal milk order, and characterized
Alaska as an under-served market.
A second witness, an independent
milk distributor appearing on behalf of
Smith Brothers, also testified in
opposition to Proposals 1 and 2. The
witness testified to operating a milk
distribution business for more than 26
years and was one of approximately 60
other independent distributors selling
Smith Brothers dairy products to market
niches including coffee shops,
independent convenience stores, the
home delivery market, and daycare
operations that larger market
participants do not serve. The witness
attributed long-term business success as
a distributor to personal service,
nostalgia, and product quality. The
witness also attributed sales success by
advertising that the milk distributed is
produced without growth hormones and
that the milk is produced and processed
by a family farm business.
A third witness for Smith Brothers
Dairy also testified in opposition to
Proposals 1 and 2. The witness was of
the opinion that these proposals are
designed to eliminate producer-handlers
as competitors of fully regulated
handlers. The witness was also of the
opinion that both proposals are
intended to serve as an intentional
market entry barrier for other large
producers who may seek to become
producer-handlers as a means to regain
control of their milk marketings.
The witness related that Smith
Brothers evaluates itself as a single
integrated enterprise. The witness
testified that as the person responsible
for measuring the efficiency of the
operation, Smith Brothers does not rely
on the concept of transfer pricing as a
means to measure the efficiency or
market value of their milk production.
The witness testified that Smith
Brothers does not compare its cost of
production to the Federal order Class I
price or the blend price in measuring
the efficiency of its operations.
According to the witness, Smith
Brothers compares their total costs to
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the prices the company receives for its
products (total receipts).
A witness appearing on behalf of
Edaleen Dairy, a producer-handler
located in the Order 124 marketing area,
testified in opposition to Proposals 1
and 2. The witness stated that as the
milk production manager and co-owner
of Edaleen Dairy, their cost of milk
production is higher than that estimated
by those proposing a limit on the route
dispositions of producer-handlers. The
witness testified that Edaleen Dairy’s
milk production costs exceeded a recent
Order 124 blend price of $10.50 per cwt.
The witness testified that Edaleen
Dairy once held a milk supply contract
with Starbucks by replacing Sunshine
Dairy, a fully regulated handler.
According to the witness, the contract
provided more than a year’s lead time
for Edaleen Dairy to develop additional
milk production and processing
capacities. The witness said that the
Starbucks account was offered to
Edaleen Dairy on the basis of its
customer service, product quality and
price.
The witness testified that Edaleen
Dairy eventually lost its Starbucks’
contract to Safeway, a fully regulated
handler, noting that Starbucks phased
out Edaleen Dairy as a supplier over a
6-month period. The witness said that
reasons given for the loss of the account
was that Safeway offered to supply milk
at a lower price and Starbucks’ rapid
growth gave rise to geographical supply
needs that Edaleen Dairy could not
meet. The witness explained that the 6month phase-out of Edaleen Dairy as a
milk supplier to Starbucks was unusual
in the dairy business. The witness said
that more typically account
terminations are given with a month’s
notice or less.
The witness testified that Edaleen
Dairy’s balancing costs are greater than
that of the pooled producers of Order
124. The witness also testified that
during periods of low market prices for
milk, balancing costs are particularly
difficult to manage. The witness related
that Edaleen Dairy’s surplus milk
production is sold to fully regulated
handlers but they are paid $1.50 per cwt
less than the Class III price.
The Edaleen Dairy witness testified
that there are several factors that tend to
restrain the growth of producerhandlers. According to the witness,
environmental regulations, marketing
and production risks, and management
risks all act to limit the ability for
business expansion. The witness said
that the size of potential customers also
can constrain a producer-handler’s
operational flexibility and ability to
expand the business. The witness said,
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for example, that a very large customer,
such as a warehouse customer, may be
such a large part of a producer-handler’s
capacity that losing such a customer can
risk continued economic viability of the
entire operation because it is so difficult
to absorb the loss of revenue and to find
new customers.
The Edaleen Dairy witness testified
that producer-handlers also serve
market niches that fully regulated
handlers do not service. The witness
said that if a limit on producer-handler
route disposition had been in place
when the Starbucks account became
available, for example, the opportunity
to service that account would not have
been possible. The witness asserted that
limiting the sales volume of producerhandlers also would effectively
eliminate servicing new market niches
that might arise in the future. In this
regard, the witness cited the example of
coffee-kiosk shops that were not of
interest to fully regulated handlers until
the mid-1990’s.
The Edaleen Dairy witness testified
that an important element of why their
producer-handler operation is valued by
their customers is because they have
complete and total control of the
production and processing of their milk.
The witness testified that without the
producer-handler exemption from the
pooling and pricing provisions of Order
124, Edaleen Dairy would not be able to
offer such a differentiated fluid milk
product to its customers.
A second witness, also appearing on
behalf of Edaleen Dairy, testified in
opposition to Proposals 1, 2, and 3. The
witness testified that Edaleen Dairy
operates an efficient dairy farm
operation and processing plant as a
producer-handler. The witness was of
the opinion that a producer-handler
operates a farm and a plant with risks
that differ from the risks faced by dairy
farmers and processing plant operators.
According to the witness, a producerhandler differs from pooled dairy
farmers in three different ways: (1)
Pooled producers are guaranteed the
minimum Federal order blend price, (2)
pooled producers do not bear the
marketing risk and additional costs
involved in selling their milk, and (3)
pooled producers do not bear the risks
and costs of operating a processing
plant. With regard to how a producerhandler differs from fully regulated
handlers, the witness cited three
important differences: (1) Fully
regulated handlers purchase their milk
supply and therefore do not incur the
risk of production, (2) fully regulated
handlers know the cost of raw milk
before buying it from dairy farmers, and
(3) a producer-handler bears the risk
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and cost of balancing its milk supply
and operates at its sole risk and
enterprise, a regulatory constraint not
applicable to fully regulated handlers.
The Edaleen Dairy witness amplified
the above differences between
producers-handlers, dairy farmers, and
fully regulated handlers. With respect to
dairy farmer and producer-handler
differences, the witness noted that a
pooled producer can deliver milk to
alternative buyers if its primary buyer is
not available but that a producerhandler can only deliver milk to its own
plant and a dairy farmer has no legal
requirement or economic responsibility
for the viability of any particular
processing plant or handler. With
respect to the fully regulated handler
and producer-handler differences, the
witness noted that a fully regulated
handler can acquire any quantity of
milk from any number of dairy farmers
and the business failure of any
individual dairy farmer does not have
an overwhelming impact on the
economic viability of a fully regulated
handler’s operation.
The Edaleen Dairy witness testified
that combined risks—as a producer and
as a handler—are not incurred by either
a pooled producer or a fully regulated
handler. The witness testified, for
example, that if a producer-handler
loses a sale it continues to have milk
production that must be disposed of and
the costs of that milk production must
be paid regardless of whether a market
exists for that milk. According to the
witness, the risks and costs of
production, processing, and marketing
accrue to the entire operation because
producer-handlers are a single operating
enterprise.
Additionally, the Edaleen Dairy
witness said, there are inseparable links
between the production and processing
portions of the producer-handler
because if either the milk production
process fails or the processing process
fails, both processes affect the single
operating entity. The witness testified
that the regulation of the processing and
marketing operations of a producerhandler coincidentally regulates the
dairy farm portion of the producerhandler enterprise. According to the
witness, the most important benchmark
for a producer-handler is whether in the
long-run the total revenue received for
its milk exceeds the total costs of its
operation.
The Edaleen Dairy witness testified
that the Federal order blend price is
irrelevant to a successful producerhandler and bears no relation to the
prices received from its milk sales. The
witness expressed the irony of
testimony concerning the importance of
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the blend price to producer-handlers by
parties who do not operate as producerhandlers. The witness said that Edaleen
Dairy ignores what the Federal order
blend price may be for the month and
seeks to sell milk at the highest possible
price but never intentionally below the
Federal order Class I price. The witness
noted that during the past several years
there have been times when the Class I
price fell below the cost of production.
During such times, the witness was of
the opinion that fully regulated handlers
have a distinct advantage over producerhandlers.
The Edaleen Dairy witness testified
that cooperatives have certain regulatory
advantages by being able to re-blend
pool proceeds and actually pay their
members less than the order blend
price. The witness claimed that reblending allows cooperatives to use
their bottling operations to essentially
subsidize their processing operations.
The witness testified that if a producerhandler’s route disposition was more
than 3 million pounds per month, the
required payment into the producersettlement fund would return no benefit
to the producer-handler. According to
the witness, the proceeds paid to the
producer-settlement fund would simply
be distributed to other pooled
producers. This would, according to the
witness, have an adverse impact on
small businesses such as Edaleen Dairy,
a business with fewer than 500
employees.
In addition, the Edaleen Dairy witness
saw no justification for limiting the
route disposition of producer-handlers
in Order 124 because Market
Administrator statistics indicate a
declining market share of the Class I
market by producer-handlers. The
witness also asserted that limiting the
route distribution of producer-handlers
would essentially close the marketing
option that becoming a producerhandler offers to large producers. The
witness viewed such restrictions as
acting to reduce competition among
handlers rather than enhancing it.
A third witness, the founder of
Edaleen Dairy, also testified in
opposition to Proposals 1, 2, and 3. The
witness related that when acquiring
financing, bank loan officers will only
consider Edaleen Dairy’s cows as
appropriate collateral for financing. The
witness testified that bankers place no
asset value for loan collateralization on
Edaleen Dairy’s processing plant
facilities.
A witness appearing on behalf of
Mallorie’s Dairy, a producer-handler
located in the Order 124 marketing area,
testified in opposition to Proposals 1
and 2. The witness said that Mallorie’s
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Dairy markets its milk on a wholesale
basis directly and through independent
distributors and small independent
retailing establishments ranging from
grocery stores to coffee shops.
According to the witness, the milk
production enterprise of their producerhandler operation is very efficient,
producing an average of 80 pounds of
milk per day per cow. The witness
testified that Mallorie’s Dairy’s largest
customer is an independent distributor
who has developed a niche market by
supplying small companies that other
fully regulated handlers do not serve.
According to the witness, Mallorie’s
Dairy lost a grocery store chain account
which had been one of its large longterm customers to a fully regulated
handler. The witness stressed that any
price advantage that Mallorie’s Dairy
derives from the existing producerhandler exemption from the pooling and
pricing provisions of Order 124 is offset
by the cost of balancing its milk supply,
about 20 percent of its production. The
witness said that Mallorie’s Dairy
performs its balancing requirements by
selling its surplus milk to a local
cooperative at the lower of the Class III
or Class IV price minus a substantial
discount. According to the witness,
balancing sales represents about 10
percent of Mallorie’s’ total sales while
specialty milk sales to commercial food
processors represent the remainder.
The Mallorie’s Dairy witness was
unsure of the full impact that adoption
of Proposals 1 and 2 would have on
Mallorie’s Dairy. However, the witness
said that Mallorie’s Dairy would lose its
producer-handler status and thus be
forced to expand its plant size in order
to continue operating, to remain
competitive and to exploit their current
marketing strengths while seeking new
business from warehouse stores such as
Costco and Walmart.
The founder of Sarah Farms, a
producer-handler located in the Order
131 marketing area, testified in
opposition to Proposals 1, 2, and 3. The
witness was of the opinion that the
purpose of the public hearing was to
eliminate Sarah Farms as a competitor
in the Order 131 marketing area. The
witness said that imposing a 3-million
pound per month route disposition limit
on producer-handlers would restrict the
growth of Sarah Farms while leaving
competing cooperatives and proprietary
handlers free to compete without
additional restraints. The witness was of
the opinion that imposing a route
disposition limit on producer-handlers
as advanced in Proposal 3, was based on
projected future conditions and was
therefore both unjustified and
speculative. According to the witness, a
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restriction on sales volume would force
a dramatic change to Sarah Farms’
business structure and practices when
there was no evidence of an unfair
regulatory advantage by being exempt
from the Order 131 pooling and pricing
provisions.
The witness testified that Sarah
Farms’ sales exceed 3 million pounds
per month, noting that the majority of
its current sales, and sales since
becoming a producer-handler in 1995,
are in Arizona. The witness said that
some major customers include Sam’s
Club, Basha’s (a grocery store chain),
Costco, and other smaller independent
retailers. The witness said that Sarah
Farms’ growth was directly related to its
ability to fill a market void left by
competitors who exited the dairy
business leaving an opportunity that
others could not completely fill.
The witness asserted that Sarah Farms
produces a differentiated product from
that of its competitors by marketing its
fluid milk products with tamper
resistant caps and by delivering their
fluid milk products to customers within
24 hours of milking which, according to
the witness, adds up to 7 days to the
shelf life of its products. The witness
also said that Sarah Farms’ gallon-sized
fluid milk products are shipped in
cardboard containers, which further
differentiates these products from their
competitors.
The Sarah Farms witness testified that
being a producer-handler is a high-risk
undertaking. Relying on Market
Administrator data, the witness noted
that the number of producer-handlers in
Order 131 has declined from six in 1980
to only two in 2003, an important
indicator of the high-risk nature of being
a producer-handler.
The witness testified that Sarah Farms
pays its own balancing costs and does
not transfer these costs to other fully
regulated handlers or pooled producers
of Order 131. In addition, the witness
testified that as a producer-handler,
Sarah Farms simultaneously bears all of
its own production, marketing, and
processing costs and risks unlike pooled
producers and fully regulated handlers.
The witness also was of the opinion that
a fluid milk processing plant under
construction in Clark County, Nevada,
an area exempt from Federal milk
regulation, poses a greater competitive
threat to producers and fully regulated
handlers than any other entity. The
witness also testified that Sarah Farms
does not sell its milk below the Order
131 Class I price plus the cost of
transportation, packaging, and
processing.
A witness representing Food City, a
retail grocery chain, testified on behalf
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of Sarah Farms. The witness testified
that Food City, and its parent company,
the Basha’s operate some 144 stores in
Arizona, New Mexico, and California.
The witness said that Food City buys
milk from Sarah Farms and from a fully
regulated handler. The witness
indicated that Food City’s opposition to
Proposal 3 was to help assure that Food
City continues to have more than a
single supplier for its fluid milk needs.
The witness indicated that in the longer
term, the availability of multiple
suppliers tends to assure competitive
pricing, reliable service, and product
quality. The witness said that Food
City’s interest in multiple suppliers
transcended the issue of whether the
supplier is a fully regulated handler or
a producer-handler.
Post Hearing Briefs and Motions
Post hearing briefs filed on behalf of
proponents and opponents made
extensive arguments as they relate to
case law, arguing legal contexts for why
large producer-handlers should or
should not become subject to the
pooling and pricing provisions of the
Pacific Northwest and the Arizona-Las
Vegas marketing orders. Presented
herein are discussions of the briefs as
they relate to the economic and
marketing conditions of the two orders.
A brief filed on behalf of NDA
reiterated its support for the adoption of
Proposals 1, 2, and 3. They noted that
both Orders 124 and 131 have fully
regulated handlers operating plants
whose route disposition of Class I milk
are smaller than the largest producerhandlers in the two orders. NDA
stressed that the Department cannot
ignore a situation where the smallest
regulated handlers in the market are not
provided equitable minimum prices as
intended by Congress when the AMAA
established the requirement that
classified pricing be uniform to all
handlers.
In brief, NDA took issue with the
notion by opponents that producerhandler balancing costs are greater than
that of fully regulated handlers. NDA
argued that the milk order program does
not attempt to consider all costs or
address issues of profitability. They
noted that balancing costs are typically
borne by regulated handlers over and
above the minimum cost structure
reflected in the orders. In this regard,
NDA noted that opponents expanded on
the burden of their own balancing costs
but did not consider balancing costs
incurred by fully regulated handlers.
They further explained that balancing
costs may also be absorbed by
marketwide pooling through the
mechanism of Class III and Class IV
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pricing, which stressed NDA, is not
applicable to producer-handlers.
The rapid and extensive growth of
Sarah Farms was also noted by NDA
who claimed that Sarah Farms now has
captured 15 to 20 percent of all the
Class I sales in Order 131. This equates,
the NDA brief said, to a reduction in
Class I premium dollars by at least $2.5
million per year. In the Order 124 area,
added NDA, producer-handlers account
for about 10 percent of total in-area
Class I sales and similarly reduce Class
I premium dollars.
A brief filed on behalf of DFA
reiterated their support for the adoption
of proposals 1, 2, and 3 stressing that
small dairies which do not impact total
pool value should be the only exempted
producer-handlers. DFA noted that in
Order 124 the three largest producerhandlers, which average nearly 5.0
million pounds of Class I sales each per
month, are larger in size than one-third
of the order’s fully regulated
distributing plants. According to the
DFA brief, in Order 131, Sarah Farms
has captured more than 15 million
pounds of Class I sales per month. DFA
was of the opinion that orderly
marketing conditions can only be
maintained if any exceptions to
classified pricing are limited and
justified. DFA emphasized that large
producer-handlers in the two orders
have captured a significant share of the
Class I sales which thereby reduces
returns to all producers while retaining
substantial Class I proceeds for each
producer-handler on an individual
handler pool basis.
The DFA brief also reiterated reasons
why 3 million pounds of Class I route
distribution should be established as the
cap for producer-handler exemption
from full regulation. They stated that
there is a similar benchmark applicable
in the Fluid Milk Promotion Act of
1990. They also indicated that volumes
of milk sales from stores in the
marketing areas indicate that at the 3
million pound level, a handler could
supply a number of small stores. They
noted that at this threshold size,
producer-handlers’ economies of scale
are sufficient enough that as handlers,
producer-handlers can be competitive
with fully regulated handlers. Lastly,
DFA maintained that, as producers,
producer-handlers have substantial
economies of scale in on-farm milk
production that if exempt from pooling,
gives producer-handlers a significant
advantage in the marketplace for fluid
milk sales.
A brief filed on behalf of UDA
continued to iterate its support for the
adoption of Proposal 3. They indicated
that they did not support limiting
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producer-handlers sales to 3 million
pounds per month on the basis that it
was the same benchmark as in the Fluid
Milk Promotion Act of 1990. Rather,
UDA finds merit in regulating large
producer-handlers above 3 million
pounds per month in route sales
because at such a size they are able to
achieve economies of scale that enable
them to be competitive factors in the
market and able to compete with fully
regulated handlers.
A brief was filed on behalf of
Shamrock Foods Company, Shamrock
Farms Company and the Dean Foods
Company in continued support of the
adoption of Proposal 3. They
emphasized that Sarah Farms’ doubling
of Class I sales between 1998 and 2003
was not known and could not have been
known during the time of adopting the
consolidated orders as a part of Federal
milk order reform. In this regard, they
also noted that at the time of Federal
milk order reform, the Department
could not have known of the growing
importance to integrated operations
such as Kroger and Safeway of price
competition from large warehouse box
stores such as Costco caused by large
producer-handler sales. Lastly, they
indicated that no limit had been placed
on producer-handlers during Federal
milk order reform because it could not
have been known that losses to pooled
participants would increase by a
multiple of nearly four from before to
after implementation of order reform.
A brief filed on behalf of NMPF
continued to iterate its support for
adoption of proposals that would limit
the size of producer-handlers. NMPF
was of the opinion that the exemption
for producer-handlers violates the
principles of producer equity upon
which the milk order program relies. In
addition, they were of the opinion that
producer-handler exemption threatens
orderly marketing. They explained that
farms with over 3 million pounds of
monthly production account for about
15 percent of the total U.S. milk supply
which equates to about 40 percent of
fluid milk sales. Continued exemption
of producer-handlers from pooling and
pricing, the NMPF maintained,
threatens both producer and handlers.
A Statement of Interest was filed on
behalf of two cooperatives, Select Milk
Producers and Continental Dairy
Products, indicating support for
adoption of Proposal 3 as submitted by
UDA. Select Milk Producers is a New
Mexico milk marketing cooperative and
Continental Dairy Products is an Ohio
milk marketing cooperative.
A consolidated brief filed on behalf of
Edaleen Dairy, Mallorie’s Dairy, Smith
Brothers Farms, and Sarah Farms
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stressed that as producer-handlers who
have sales in excess of three million
pounds per month, adoption of any
proposal that would subject them to the
pooling and pricing provisions of the
orders would cause their organizations
to be severely affected. They stressed
that if they become required to make
equalization payments to the producersettlement funds, this would take
millions of dollars per year away from
their operations and redistribute it to
other producers with no return benefit
to their operations.
In brief, Edaleen Dairy, Mallorie’s
Dairy, Smith Brothers Farms, and Sarah
Farms indicated that the advantages
producer-handlers have as alleged by
proponents, vanish when the financial
benefits of not having to pay minimum
prices and avoiding equalization
payments to the producer-settlement
fund are offset by their balancing costs.
Any remaining advantage should be
viewed as acceptable given the
increased risks producer-handlers incur
in the marketplace. They indicated that
rational persons would not take on
additional risk without the prospect of
additional rewards.
In brief, Edaleen Dairy, Mallorie’s
Dairy, Smith Brothers Farms, and Sarah
Farms stressed that, in their opinion,
neither milk supply or prices for milk in
the two marketing areas had fluctuated
unreasonably, noting that milk was in
such sufficient supply that with or
without producer-handlers supplies are
plentiful. They did not view their fluid
milk sales in the marketing area as
contributing to the erosion of classified
prices or blend prices. They cited
hearing record statistics to assert that
they are not a cause of market disorder
or cause the inefficient movement of
milk. They cited the reduction in the
number of producer-handlers,
emphasizing that between 1975 and
2000, the Pacific Northwest order
producer-handler numbers fell from 73
to 11 with average daily pounds of
production increasing only 4.7 percent
between 1985 and 2000. For the
Arizona-Las Vegas order, they noted
that since 1982, the number of
producer-handlers fell from seven to
two. According to the brief, on the basis
of such statistics, there can be no
finding that producer-handlers have
unabated growth or that they are a
source of market disruption.
A motion to strike the testimony and
related exhibits concerning plant
operating costs offered by DFA’s
consultant witness was filed on behalf
of Edaleen Dairy, Mallorie’s Dairy,
Smith Brothers Farms and Sarah Farms.
The presiding Administrative Law Judge
received this motion after the
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certification of the hearing record on
June 1, 2004. Given that the objection
goes to the weight to be given to the
testimony and exhibits and not to their
admissibility, the motion is denied.
A Motion to Strike the exceptions and
comments of the large producerhandlers—Sarah Farms, Edaleen Dairy,
Mallorie’s Dairy, and Smith Brothers
Farms—was filed on behalf of DFA.
This motion was received on July 11,
2005, and sought to prevent the
introduction of new material into the
record by opponent producer-handlers.
The Department has concluded that the
testimony, briefs, and the relevance of
comments and exceptions filed by all
parties are clearly delineated in the
context of the official record.
Accordingly, the motion by DFA, and a
subsequent motion filed jointly on
behalf of DFA, Dean, UDA, Shamrock
Farms and Shamrock Foods, are denied.
A Motion to Supplement the Public
Record due to ex parte communications
was filed on behalf of Sarah Farms on
April 7, 2005. This motion sought
additional information to amplify the
public record of this proceeding based
on the attendance of the AMS Dairy
Programs Deputy Administrator at the
annual meeting of Dairylea Cooperative
where a speaker publicly addressed
issues germane to this proceeding and
producer-handlers in the Federal milk
order program in a speech. A
Memorandum to the Record Regarding
Ex Parte Communications was issued on
May 23, 2005, by the Deputy
Administrator, Dairy Programs
explaining that no Dairy Programs
officials engaged in ex parte discussions
of the material issues of this proceeding
at the Dairylea Cooperative meeting on
October 12–13, 2004, nor at the DFA
annual meeting on March 23–24, 2005,
nor at any other forum. This
memorandum is available for public
inspection at the Office of the USDA
Hearing Clerk and at the Dairy Programs
Web site, www.ams.usda.gov/dairy/.
Comments and Exceptions
A number of proponents for
regulating large producer-handlers,
including Shamrock Foods Company,
Dean Foods Company, United Dairymen
of Arizona, and Shamrock Farms
(hereinafter Shamrock, et al.) submitted
joint comments and exceptions to the
Recommended Decision. The
proponents were joined by the Alliance
of Western Milk Producers representing
California cooperatives (1100 dairy
farmer members) in support of the
Recommended Decision’s findings.
The Shamrock, et al., comments
agreed with the Recommended
Decision’s finding that the criteria for
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determining whether a producerhandler is a small or large business rest
on the producer-handler’s capacity as a
producer. Proponents noted that most
handlers, regardless of their regulatory
status, would be considered small
businesses because of the 500 employee
threshold established by the Small
Business Administration’s definition of
a large business for milk processing
plants.
The Shamrock, et al., comment
reiterated the position of the proponents
that an impact of more than a penny per
cwt per month on an order’s blend price
is sufficient to indicate a significant
impact on the blend price that dairy
farmers receive by pooling milk on these
orders. In addition, they agreed with the
Recommended Decision’s finding that
producer-handlers with route
disposition of fluid milk products in
excess of 3 million pounds per month
had a significant and disruptive impact
in these marketing areas. According to
the comment, these impacts are large
enough to warrant a new review of the
producer-handler exemption from the
pooling and pricing provisions of the
orders.
Shamrock, et al., took exception to the
recommended 3 million pound per
month in-area Class I route disposition
as the threshold beyond which
producer-handlers would become
subject to the pooling and pricing
provisions of the orders. They explained
that this threshold was too generous and
should have been set at some level less
than 3 million pounds per month.
Shamrock, et al., was joined in this
exception by the National Milk
Producers Federation. Shamrock et al.,
also took exception to the charge of ex
parte communications between USDA
officials and certain leaders of DFA
alleged by large producer-handlers who
would likely become regulated if the
orders were amended. According to the
comment, such allegations were
unwarranted.
Comments and exceptions by DFA
similarly supported the findings of the
Recommended Decision. The comments
by DFA called for immediate
implementation of the proposed full
regulation of producer-handlers with inarea route disposition of fluid milk
products in excess of 3 million pounds
per month. They noted that each
month’s delay in implementing the
proposed rule significantly reduces the
blend price for pooled producers. They
agreed with the Recommended Decision
and the Shamrock, et al; conclusion that
a producer-handler’s characterization of
being a small or large business should
be based on the producer-handler’s
capacity as a producer.
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DFA’s comments also noted that the
record of the proceeding supported the
conclusions of the Recommended
Decision on the disorder caused by
exempting large producer-handlers from
the pooling and pricing provisions of
the orders. In this regard, their
comments reiterated from their posthearing brief that large producerhandler balancing costs are much lower
in these marketing areas than historical
balancing costs of small producerhandlers. As with Shamrock, et al., the
comment noted that allegations of ex
parte communications between DFA
and USDA officials were unfounded.
As with Shamrock, et al., DFA took
exception to adopting a threshold of 3
million pounds per month of in-area
route disposition. They maintained that
the threshold should include all route
disposition not just in-area route
disposition. DFA was joined in this
exception by National Milk Producers
Federation.
Six hundred ten e-mail comments
received expressed support for the
Recommended Decision’s findings.
These comments were from dairy farmer
members of cooperatives, employees of
cooperatives, representatives of
producer and processor organizations
from California, as well as producer and
processor organizations in the Pacific
Northwest and Arizona-Las Vegas
marketing areas. Comments indicating
support received via the U.S. Postal
Service and fax also were largely from
dairy farmers, cooperatives, associations
of cooperatives, and their employees.
Supporting comments for the
Recommended Decision’s findings by
dairy farmer and dairy farmer
organizations focused on the pricing
and sales advantages that producerhandlers have by being exempt from
classified pricing and marketwide
pooling. Specifically, these comments
stressed that the impact on fully
regulated handlers and pooled
producers is directly related to the size
of producer-handlers. In general, these
comments contain the common theme
that the pricing advantage enjoyed by
producer-handlers has been the
difference between an order’s Class I
price and blend price. The comments
generally support the conclusion that
small producer-handlers, having route
disposition below 3 million pounds per
month, have not been a significant
factor in the Pacific Northwest or
Arizona-Las Vegas marketing areas.
The large producer-handlers from the
Arizona-Las Vegas and Pacific
Northwest marketing areas submitted
joint comments and exceptions in
opposition to the findings of the
Recommended Decision. These entities
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included Sarah Farms, Mallorie’s Dairy,
Edaleen Dairy, and Smith Brothers
Farms, Inc. Their exceptions specifically
reiterated opposition to adopting any
measure that would cause them to be
subject to the order’s pooling and
pricing provisions. They also took
exception to the finding that impacts on
an order’s blend price are significant
and disruptive to orderly marketing.
This finding, they stressed, is arbitrary
and capricious because, in their
opinion, record evidence is not
sufficient to reach this conclusion.
The large producer-handlers’ joint
exception disagreed with the
Recommended Decision’s finding that
large producer-handlers should be
viewed as large businesses in their
capacity as dairy farmers rather than in
their capacity as handlers. In this
regard, they concluded that if producerhandlers are considered for regulation
on the basis that they are large in their
capacity as dairy farmers, they cannot
have their exemption from pooling and
pricing provisions removed because the
AMAA provides the authority to only
regulate handlers and not dairy farmers.
They continued to assert that they are
seamless integrated entities that cannot
be viewed in separate capacities as
producers and handlers. Thus, the
exception concluded that large
producer-handlers should be viewed as
small businesses because they have
fewer than 500 employees.
The large producer-handlers’ took
exception to the Recommended
Decision’s findings concerning the
impact on order blend prices noting that
milk market prices vary over time as
marketing conditions change. They
concluded that such variations in prices
are unrelated to the level of route
disposition of producer-handlers
individually or in the aggregate. In
addition, they stressed that even if large
producer-handlers enjoyed advantages
as claimed by proponents, their
aggregate share of the market in the
Pacific Northwest during the period
2000–2003 had decreased.
The large producer-handlers’ joint
exception asserted that the record
demonstrates that fully regulated
handlers are able to compete effectively
with large producer-handlers. They took
exception to the Recommended
Decision’s finding that large producerhandlers are the cause of market
disruption and characterized the finding
as arbitrary and capricious. In their
view, such a finding is not established
or supported in the record. The
exception maintains that normal
variability in milk prices and gains or
losses of commercial accounts are
contained in the record as examples and
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explanations of activities that the
Recommended Decision incorrectly
characterizes as market disruption and
disorderly marketing.
In separate exceptions, Sarah Farms
reiterated their opposition to the
findings of the Recommended Decision
maintaining that market disorder
resulting from the alleged advantages
enjoyed by producer-handlers is not
demonstrated in the record. They noted
that producer-handler market share in
the Pacific Northwest order had
declined in the year preceding the
hearing—from 10 percent to 9 percent.
They asserted that producer-handler
market share in the Arizona-Las Vegas
order was 10 percent during the same
period, concluding that no finding of
either competitive advantage or market
disorder can be made. Mallorie’s Dairy,
Edaleen Dairy, and Smith Brothers
Farms, presented separate and similar
exceptions.
Each large producer-handler noted in
their separate exception that at current
route disposition levels, their monthly
revenue would decline significantly if
they become required to make
equalization payments to the order’s
producer-settlement fund. Edaleen
Dairy, for example, stated that their
monthly revenue would decline by
$125,000. The other large producerhandlers noted in their separate
exceptions that owners, employees and
customers would experience similar
losses in revenue from reduced sales
volume in their efforts to maintain
producer-handler status.
In separate exceptions Edaleen Dairy
noted that lowered revenues may in
turn reduce employment at their dairy
farm and processing plant and may even
affect employment in supporting service
businesses as a result of down-sizing
their operations. They were joined in
similar exceptions by Smith Brothers
Farms, Mallorie’s Dairy, and Sarah
Farms. All large producer-handlers also
asserted that their full regulation would
decrease competition and that their
customers would likely experience
increased prices and reduced product
choices.
Within the April 13–June 13, 2005,
comment period, 12,223 e-mail
comments and more than 5,600 hardcopy comments were received through
the U.S. Postal Service or by fax that
opposed fully regulating large producerhandlers. In addition, 1969 pages of
petitions containing a total of 26,267
signatures opposing the findings of the
Recommended Decision were received.
The signed petitions were submitted by
Edaleen Dairy, Mallorie’s Dairy, and
Sarah Farms. Of the 12,223 e-mail
comments received, approximately
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11,590, or about 95 percent, opposed the
Recommended Decision’s findings.
These comments were generated as part
of a write-in campaign by what
appeared to be customers located in the
United States, Canada, and Mexico of
the large producer-handlers opposing
their full regulation.
Other comments received in
opposition to the Recommended
Decision included letters from the
United States Senators from Alaska and
some members of the U.S. House of
Representatives from the States of
Oregon, Washington, and Arizona.
Several Oregon and Washington elected
State, county and municipal officials
and regional economic development
organizations provided exceptions
expressing opposition to the
Recommended Decision’s findings. The
exceptions speculated that fully
regulating producer-handlers might
result in job losses at locations where
these producer-handlers produce and
bottle milk and market their dairy
products. Some of these comments
speculated that independent residential
milk route operators in Oregon might be
forced out of business if large producerhandlers became fully regulated.
Exceptions opposing implementation
of the Recommended Decision were
submitted on behalf of consumer and
processor interests from unregulated
areas who currently purchase milk from
some of the large producer-handlers.
These parties expressed concern that
milk prices in unregulated areas, such
as Alaska, would rise significantly if
large producer-handlers became fully
regulated.
Findings
Although producer-handlers have not
been fully regulated as a general
practice, the AMAA provides the
authority to regulate handlers of milk to
carry out the purposes of the AMAA.
With respect to producer-handlers, the
legislative history indicates that there is
authority to regulate such operations if
they are so large as to disrupt the market
for producers. In the past during other
rulemaking proceedings, producerhandlers have been found not to disrupt
the marketing of milk and milk
products.
Nevertheless, restrictions were placed
on producer-handlers. Both the Pacific
Northwest and the Arizona-Las Vegas
orders currently permit producerhandlers to purchase up to 150,000
pounds per month of supplemental milk
only from pool sources. In addition, the
Arizona-Las Vegas order, prohibits the
disposition of Class I products by a
producer-handler to a wholesale
customer who is also serviced by a pool
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distributing plant that supplies the same
product in a same-sized package with a
similar label in the same month. While
each order has its own unique
definition, it is accurate to say that in
general, producer-handlers are required
to operate their businesses at their own
enterprise and risk, meaning that the
care and management of the dairy
animals and other resources necessary
for the production, processing, and
distribution of their Class I products are
the sole responsibility of the producerhandlers.
Producer-handler exclusion from
pooling and pricing provisions also has
been historically based on the premise
that the objectives of the AMAA
(orderly marketing) could be achieved
without extending regulation to this
category of handler. In previous
rulemaking decisions, the Department
has articulated its authority to subject
producer-handlers to further regulation,
including being subject to marketwide
pooling and minimum pricing
provisions, if they singularly or
collectively have an impact on the
market. For example, in a Final Decision
(31 FR 7062–7064; May 13, 1966) for the
Puget Sound order, a predecessor to the
Pacific Northwest order, the Department
found that producer-handlers should
continue to be exempt from pooling and
pricing provisions of the order with the
caveat that the producer-handlers could
be subject to further regulation if
justified by prevailing market
conditions. This position was amplified
in a subsequent Puget Sound Final
Decision (32 FR 1073–1074; July 21,
1967) where the Department found that
a hearing should be held to consider the
regulation of producer-handlers if the
marketing area is susceptible to being
affected by producer-handlers or if
producer-handler sales could disrupt or
operate to the detriment of other
producers in the market. Such policy
was also articulated in another decision
concerning producer-handlers (Texas
and Southwest Plains, Recommended
Decision, 54 FR 27179, June 28, 1989).
That decision concluded that subjecting
producer-handlers to the pooling and
pricing provisions of the order would be
appropriate if it could be shown that
producer-handlers cause market
disruption to the market’s dairy farmers
or regulated handlers.
The proposals for fully regulating
producer-handlers in this proceeding,
specifically making them subject to the
order’s pooling and pricing provisions,
are based primarily on issues relating to
producer-handler size, specifically the
volume of Class I route disposition. The
producer-handler exemption from
pooling and pricing provisions is
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proposed to end when the volume of
Class I route disposition in the
marketing area exceeds 3 million
pounds per month.
In considering issues relating to size,
producer-handlers are dairy farmers that
process and sell only their own milk
production. These entities are dairy
farmers as a pre-condition to operating
a processing plant as producer-handlers.
Consequently, the size of the dairy farm
determines the production level of the
operation and is the controlling factor in
the capacity of the processing plant and
possible sales volume. Accordingly, the
major consideration in determining
whether a producer-handler is a large or
small business focuses on its capacity as
a dairy farm. Under SBA criteria, a dairy
farm is considered large if its gross
revenue exceeds $750,000 per year with
a production guideline of 500,000
pounds of milk per month. Accordingly,
a dairy farm with sales of its own milk
that exceeds 3 million pounds per
month is considered a large business.
Another factor to consider regarding
the size of producer-handlers is their
ability to have an impact on the
market’s pooled participants. Indicators
of market disruption affecting dairy
farmers who pool their milk on the
orders and by the orders’ fully regulated
handlers should be determined on the
basis of prices that are uniform to
producers and equitable among
handlers. When these price conditions
are present, milk marketing order areas
are considered to be exhibiting orderly
marketing—a key objective of the
AMAA that relies on the tools of
classified pricing and marketwide
pooling. In the absence of equity among
producers and handlers such conditions
are and should be deemed to be
disorderly.
As already discussed above, producerhandler exemptions from the pooling
and pricing provisions of the orders are
based upon the premise that the burden
of surplus disposal of their milk
production is borne by them alone.
Consequently, they have not shared the
additional value of their production that
arose from Class I sales with pooled
dairy farmers. In this regard, to the
extent that producer-handlers are no
longer bearing the burden of surplus
disposal, specifically disposal of milk
production in some form other than
Class I, gives rise to considering
regulatory measures that would tend to
provide price equity among producers
and handlers that is eroded when
producer-handlers are permitted to
retain the entire additional value of milk
accruing from Class I sales.
The record supports finding that
producer-handlers with more than 3
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million pounds of route disposition per
month in both the Pacific Northwest
and the Arizona-Las Vegas marketing
areas are the primary source of
disruption to the orderly marketing of
milk. This disorder is evidenced by
significantly inequitable minimum
prices that handlers pay and reduced
blend prices that dairy farmers receive
under the terms of each area’s marketing
order. Accordingly, producer-handler
status under the Pacific Northwest and
the Arizona-Las Vegas orders should
end when a producer-handler exceeds 3
million pounds per month of in-area
Class I route disposition.
Review of the intent of the producerhandler provision and the marketing
conditions arising from this provision in
these orders could warrant finding that
the original producer-handler
exemption is no longer valid or should
be limited to 150,000 pounds per month
Class I route disposition limit. However,
the hearing notice for this proceeding
constrains such a finding to a level of
not less than 3 million pounds per
month of Class I route dispositions.
Adopting a 3 million pound Class I
route disposition limit on producerhandlers is supported in direct
testimony by proponent witnesses and
other marketing data, most notably the
volume of Class I route disposition
relative to the total volume of Class I
sales, and structural changes in the
markets. Producer-handlers with more
than 3 million pounds of Class I route
disposition significantly affect the blend
price received by producers. This
decision finds merit in DFA’s and
Dean’s testimony that a blend price
impact of 1-cent per cwt is significant.
The reduction in the blend prices
received by producers in the Pacific
Northwest and Arizona-Las Vegas
orders, attributable to producer-handler
route disposition are significant and
greater than 1-cent per cwt. The record
evidence supports a conclusion that the
exemption of producer-handlers from
pooling and pricing has reduced the
blend price between $0.04 to $0.06 per
cwt per month in the Arizona-Las Vegas
marketing area and between $0.02 to
$0.04 per cwt per month for the Pacific
Northwest marketing area since January
2000. The causes of the blend price
reduction arise from a producerhandler’s ability to price fluid milk at an
amount between the blend price and the
order’s Class I price combined with the
producer-handler’s size relative to the
total volume of Class I milk disposition
in the respective marketing areas.
In general, the difference between the
Class I price and the blend price not
paid into the producer-settlement fund
is the pricing advantage enjoyed by
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producer-handlers over fully regulated
handlers. While this has always been
the case, those producer-handlers with
route disposition of more than 3 million
pounds of milk per month in these two
orders are large enough to have a
negative impact on the prices received
by pooled dairy farmers. Since fully
regulated handlers do not have the
ability to escape payment into the
producer-settlement fund of the
difference in their use-value of milk and
the order’s blend price like producerhandlers, regulated handlers competing
against large producer-handlers are at a
competitive price disadvantage.
Even though producer-handlers argue
otherwise, this decision agrees with
proponent arguments, most notably by
the NMPF witness, that the difference
between the Class I price and the blend
price is a reasonable estimate of the
pricing advantage producer-handlers
enjoy even if it is not possible to
determine the precise pricing advantage
of any individual producer-handler.
This pricing advantage is compounded
as producer-handler size, and the
accompanying increase in the volume of
Class I sales in the marketing area,
begins to increasingly affect the blend
price received by pooled producers.
The record contains specific examples
demonstrating that producer-handlers
with route disposition of more than 3
million pounds per month have and are
placing their fully regulated competitors
at a comparative sales disadvantage. For
example, Shamrock Foods, a regulated
handler with substantial sales in the
Arizona-Las Vegas marketing area, is
constrained in competing on a price
basis for customers by the order’s
minimum prices that must be paid for
milk procurement. Meanwhile, the large
producer-handler is able to compete for
commercial customers at prices that a
regulated handler is unable to match.
The competitive pricing advantage of
producer-handlers is clearly attributable
to their exemption from paying the
difference between the Class I and blend
price into the producer-settlement fund.
This competitive pricing advantage has
been recognized previously by the
Department (Milk in the Texas
Southwest Plains Marketing Area, 54 FR
27182) and determined not to cause
disorderly marketing conditions.
However, marketing conditions and the
overall dairy industry’s marketing
structure have changed significantly in
these orders resulting in disorderly
marketing conditions as evidenced by
lower blend prices received by pooled
producers. The producer-handlers are
significantly larger in these two orders
and while they are solely responsible for
their production and processing
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facilities, they are not assuming the
entire burden of balancing their
production with their fluid milk
requirements as discussed later in this
decision.
The record evidence supports
concluding that the one large producerhandler represents between 12–18
percent of the total Class I sales volume
in the Arizona-Las Vegas marketing
area. The record evidence supports a
conclusion that the exemption of this
producer-handler has reduced the blend
price received by pooled producers
between $0.04 and $0.06 per cwt per
month in the Arizona-Las Vegas
marketing area. Similarly, record
evidence reveals that producer-handler
exemption from pooling and pricing in
the Pacific Northwest reduces the blend
price to all other dairy farmers by
$0.02–$0.04 per cwt. The Pacific
Northwest marketing area has eight
producer-handlers, with four having
Class I route disposition exceeding 3
million pounds per month. In the
aggregate, all producer-handlers in the
Pacific Northwest account for nearly 10
percent of the total Class I sales in the
marketing area. Importantly, the impact
on the marketing area’s blend price by
the exemption from the pooling and
pricing provision by any of the
individual producer-handlers whose
sales exceed 3 million pounds per
month on average exceeds $0.01, a level
found to be significant and disruptive to
orderly marketing. While the marketing
conditions of the Pacific Northwest area
differ from the Arizona-Las Vegas
marketing area in the number of
producer-handlers and the relative
market share of producer-handlers,
evidence of market disruption by
producer-handlers resulting in lower
blend prices is a common factor of both
orders.
The record, based on Market
Administrator data, supports
concluding that the annualized
reduction in revenue received by the
average pooled producer in the Pacific
Northwest marketing area would range
from $1,500–$3,000 from the $0.02–
$0.04 cents per cwt per month reduction
on the order’s blend price during 2003.
For the Arizona-Las Vegas marketing
area the record supports concluding that
the annualized reduction in revenue
received by the average pooled producer
would range between $11,000–$17,000
from the $0.04–$0.06 per cwt impact of
large producer-handlers on that order’s
blend price per month for 2003.
As in the Arizona-Las Vegas
marketing area, producer-handlers in
the Pacific Northwest similarly enjoy a
competitive sales advantage because
they do not procure milk at the order’s
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Class I price as required of fully
regulated handlers. This has resulted in
fully regulated handlers not being able
to compete with producer-handlers for
Class I route sales. For example,
Vitamilk testified that as regional
grocery chains were acquired by
national handlers in the Pacific
Northwest marketing area, independent
regulated handlers such as Vitamilk
found themselves unable to compete for
sales with large producer-handlers in
the changed marketing environment of
fewer wholesale customers on a price
basis. Vitamilk demonstrated that the
pricing advantage that accrues to
producer-handlers from their exemption
from pooling and pricing provisions
created an insurmountable marketing
obstacles that eliminated Vitamilk’s
ability to compete for available
customers in the marketing area on the
basis of minimum Class I prices
established by the order.
For both the Pacific Northwest and
the Arizona-Las Vegas marketing areas,
record evidence demonstrates that large
producer-handlers have a comparative
pricing advantage over fully regulated
handlers. Without full regulation of
large producer-handlers, the order is not
able to ensure equitable minimum
prices to similarly situated handlers.
Such an advantage has resulted in fully
regulated handlers losing sales to
producer-handlers on the basis of
minimum prices. Producer-handlers
have similarly lost accounts to fully
regulated handlers but for reasons other
than minimum prices established by the
orders.
Consideration was given to the
themes of the more than 12,000 e-mail
comments, petition subjects and
arguments advanced by large producerhandlers that were received during the
briefing and comment periods of the
Recommended Decision. One of these
themes is that large producer-handlers
are family-owned business enterprises
in both orders that should receive
support through their special status.
This concern does not acknowledge that
the producers who are the competitors
of large producer-handlers are nearly all
family-owned dairy farms who are
members of cooperatives. Another
highly commented theme given
consideration in this decision and
raised by large producer-handlers was
that certain market niches that they
serve in the public interest such as
providing home delivery and hormone
free milk will not be provided by fully
regulated handlers and may not occur if
they become fully regulated. There is no
record evidence to support concluding
that home-delivery or availability of
hormone free milk would be disrupted
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by having the pooling and pricing
provisions of the orders apply to large
producer-handlers. Accordingly, this
decision does not agree with the
arguments of either the large producerhandlers or in those exceptions of other
interested parties arguments that full
regulation would eliminate their ability
to provide home-delivery or hormonefree milk to their customers. No
provision of any Federal milk marketing
order prevents or promotes the
marketing practices that handlers use to
service their customer demands for
home-delivery or in providing hormonefree milk products.
The record supports concluding that
producer-handlers with more than 3
million pounds of route disposition per
month have gained the ability to no
longer bear the burden of the surplus
disposal of their milk production. This
represents a significant development
that warrants the need for regulatory
action because producer-handler
exemption from the pooling and pricing
provisions of the orders has been
rationalized on the basis that producerhandlers bear the entire burden of
balancing their own production. A
producer-handler not bearing the
burden of balancing their milk
production essentially shifts such
burden to the market’s pooled producers
while simultaneously retaining the full
value of Class I sales for themselves.
Record evidence, reinforced by
subsequent exceptions, demonstrates
that large producer-handlers are able to
use their pricing advantage to transfer
their burden of surplus disposal to
regulated handlers. Evidence provided
by an affiliate of NDA demonstrates that
producer-handlers were able to use their
pricing advantage to displace sales of
regulated handlers into Alaska.
According to the witness testimony,
producer-handlers were able, at will, to
displace the established accounts of
fully regulated handlers on the basis of
minimum prices. The testimony
supports concluding that such sales by
large producer-handlers displace fluid
milk sales of fully regulated handlers
that would otherwise have been
producer-handler surplus.
A changing retail environment gives
rise to the potential of producerhandlers entering into sales agreements
to furnish the retailers with as much
milk as the producer-handler can
deliver. Marketing milk to national
grocery discounters creates an
environment in which the producerhandlers can sell nearly their entire
production to such a retailer, bypassing
the need to balance their production. In
such a marketing environment, the
regulated market’s pooled producers
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essentially become the residual
suppliers of Class I milk to the market
when a producer-handler’s production
is not able to satisfy the fluid milk
demands of their customer. The retailer
need only purchase milk from fully
regulated handlers to offset what a
producer-handler is not able to supply.
This is of growing concern to both
producer and regulated handler
interests in the Pacific Northwest and
the Arizona-Las Vegas marketing areas
because consumers are buying an
increasing share of their grocery needs
from discount outlets.
The record evidence, reinforced with
subsequent comments, also reveals that
producer-handlers in both the Pacific
Northwest and the Arizona-Las Vegas
marketing areas with route disposition
of more than 3 million pounds per
month enjoy sales of fluid milk products
into unregulated areas such as Alaska
and California. These examples
contribute to demonstrating a shifting of
the burden of balancing their milk
production onto the order’s pooled
producers. This outcome has the
compounded disadvantage for regulated
handlers and their producer-suppliers
because fully regulated handlers must
account to the marketwide pool for
Class I sales outside of the marketing
area at the order’s Class I price. This
yields a two-fold advantage to producerhandlers—the ability to eliminate
balancing their milk production through
Class I sales at the expense of the
regulated market and the ability to
compete on a consistent basis at prices
that fully regulated handlers are unable
to meet.
This evidence contradicts the notion
that the balancing of their milk
production is a burden borne
exclusively by the producer-handler.
Thus it is reasonable to find that
producer-handlers with Class I route
distribution in excess of 3 million
pounds per month in the Pacific
Northwest and the Arizona-Las Vegas
marketing areas are not truly balancing
their production. Accordingly, this
decision finds that the burden of
balancing has been essentially shifted to
the market’s pooled participants. This
decision also finds that large producerhandlers have and use a pricing
advantage that cannot be overcome by
fully regulated handlers. This advantage
increases only as producer-handler size
increases. Therefore, it is reasonable
that large producer-handler status
should be limited.
This decision considered the
relevance of a 3 million pound route
disposition threshold on producerhandler route disposition. The relative
impact on the market’s pooled
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participants by producer-handlers
having more than 3-million pounds of
route disposition in the market is
measurable and significant in both the
Pacific Northwest and Arizona-Las
Vegas marketing areas. When
considered in the aggregate, producerhandlers in the Pacific Northwest with
over 3 million pounds of route
disposition collectively have more
significant share of the Class I market
which further lowers the blend price
received by dairy farmers.
All handlers have different
production and processing costs. These
differences may be due to differing
levels of plant operating efficiencies
related to their size or to that portion of
their milk supply that may be produced
and supplied from their own farms.
Whatever the cost differences, all fully
regulated handlers must pay the same
minimum Class I price and equalize
their use-value of milk (generally, the
difference between the Class I price and
the blend price) into the order’s
producer-settlement fund. Similarly, all
producers have differing milk
production costs. Producer cost
differences, for example, may be the
result of farm size or differing milk
production levels attributable to
management ability. Nevertheless,
producers, regardless of their costs,
receive the same minimum blend price.
This decision finds that disorderly
marketing conditions exist in the Pacific
Northwest and Arizona-Las Vegas
marketing areas. The source of the
disorder is directly attributable to the
operations of large producer-handlers
and their exemption from the pooling
and pricing provisions of the orders.
The record evidence for full regulation
of large producer-handlers with route
disposition in excess of 3 million
pounds per month support finding that
market disruption is present because the
blend prices paid to producers in both
orders are measurably and significantly
lowered.
This decision finds that producerhandlers with route disposition in
excess of 3 million pounds per month
enjoy significant competitive sales
advantages because they do not account
to the marketwide pool at the same
minimum Class I price for raw milk
procurement. This clearly gives large
producer-handlers a pricing advantage
over fully regulated handlers when
competing for sales. This pricing
advantage becomes amplified as
producer-handler size increases further
affecting the minimum price producers
receive. Adoption of a 3 million pound
per month threshold for producerhandlers should tend to significantly
reduce disorderly marketing conditions
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that arise from inequitable Class I prices
to handlers. A 3 million pound per
month limitation on route disposition
would likely result in the full regulation
of a current producer-handler in the
Arizona-Las Vegas marketing area. Of
the producer-handlers operating in the
Pacific Northwest marketing area, four
producer-handlers would likely become
regulated by adopting the 3 million
pound per month limitation on route
disposition. Adoption of this limitation
will not completely eliminate the
impact of the other producer-handlers
in the Pacific Northwest marketing area
but should nevertheless result in a
significant and immediate reduction in
market disorder and disruption by
assuring that similarly situated handlers
face the same minimum Class I prices
and producers receive the same blend
prices.
The hearing notice contained a
proposal that would make the producerhandler definition of the Pacific
Northwest order the same as that for the
Arizona-Las Vegas order, most notably
the proposed requirement would not
permit a producer-handler to market to
the same client the same product in a
similar package with a similar label in
the same month as a regulated handler.
The record does not contain sufficient
evidence of disorderly marketing
conditions that would support
recommending a prohibition on
producer-handlers in marketing to the
same client the same product in a
similar package with a similar label in
the same month as a regulated handler.
Additionally, the proposals contained
in the hearing notice seeking the full
regulation of producer-handlers when
they surpass a 3-million pound per
month threshold in Class I route
dispositions in the marketing area were
substantially modified during the
hearing. The modifications redescribe
producer-handlers and harmonize the
producer-handler definitions between
the two orders with changed
terminology. The record evidence does
not support finding that a compelling
need exists to make the Pacific
Northwest producer-handler definition
the same as that for the Arizona-Las
Vegas order. The current producerhandler definitions of both orders
adequately describe those entities that
qualify as producer-handlers.
General Findings
The findings and determinations
hereinafter set forth supplement those
that were made when the Pacific
Northwest and the Arizona-Las Vegas
orders were first issued and when they
were amended. The previous findings
and determinations are hereby ratified
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and confirmed, except where they may
conflict with those set forth herein.
(a) The tentative marketing agreement
and the order, as hereby proposed to be
amended, and all of the terms and
conditions thereof, will tend to
effectuate the declared policy of the Act;
(b) The parity prices of milk as
determined pursuant to Section 2 of the
Act are not reasonable in view of the
price of feeds, available supplies of
feeds, and other economic conditions
which affect market supply and demand
for milk in the marketing area(s), and
the minimum prices specified in the
tentative marketing agreements and the
orders, as hereby proposed to be
amended, are such prices as will reflect
the aforesaid factors, insure a sufficient
quantity of pure and wholesome milk,
and be in the public interest;
(c) The tentative marketing
agreements and the orders, as hereby
proposed to be amended, will regulate
the handling of milk in the same
manner as, and will be applicable only
to persons in the respective classes of
industrial and commercial activity
specified in marketing agreements upon
which a hearing has been held; and
(d) All milk and milk products
handled by handlers, as defined in the
tentative marketing agreement and the
order as hereby proposed to be
amended, are in the current of interstate
commerce or directly burden, obstruct,
or affect interstate commerce in milk or
its products.
Rulings and Exceptions
In arriving at the findings and
conclusions, and the regulatory
provisions of this decision, each of the
exceptions received was carefully and
fully considered in conjunction with the
record evidence. To the extent that the
findings and conclusions and the
regulatory provisions of this decision
are at variance with any of the
exceptions, such exceptions are thereby
overruled for the reasons previously
stated in this decision.
Marketing Agreement and Order
Annexed hereto and made a part
hereof is one document—A Marketing
Agreement regulating the handling of
milk.
It is hereby ordered that this entire
final decision and the Marketing
Agreement annexed hereto be published
in the Federal Register.
Referendum Order To Determine
Producer Approval; Determination of
Representative Period; and Designation
of Referendum Agent
It is hereby directed that a referendum
be conducted and completed on or
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before the 30th day from the date this
decision is published in the Federal
Register, in accordance with the
procedure for the conduct of referenda
(7 CFR 900.300–311), to determine
whether the issuance of the order as
amended and hereby proposed to be
amended, regulating the handling of
milk in the Pacific Northwest and
Arizona-Las Vegas marketing areas are
approved or favored by producers, as
defined under the terms of the order, as
amended and as hereby proposed to be
amended, who during such
representative period were engaged in
the production of milk for sale within
the aforesaid marketing area.
The representative period for the
conduct of such referendum is hereby
determined to be June 2003.
The agent of the Secretary to conduct
such referendum is hereby designated to
be James R. Daugherty, the Pacific
Northwest and Arizona-Las Vegas
Market Administrator.
List of Subjects in 7 CFR Parts 1124 and
1131
Milk marketing orders.
Dated: December 9, 2005.
Lloyd C. Day,
Administrator, Agricultural Marketing
Service.
Order Amending the Order Regulating
the Handling of Milk in the Pacific
Northwest and Arizona-Las Vegas
Marketing Areas
(This order shall not become effective
unless and until the requirements of
§ 900.14 of the rules of practice and
procedure governing proceedings to
formulate marketing agreements and
marketing orders have been met).
Findings and Determinations
The findings and determinations
hereinafter set forth supplement those
that were made when the order was first
issued and when it was amended. The
previous findings and determinations
are hereby ratified and confirmed,
except where they may conflict with
those set forth herein.
(a) Finding. A public hearing was held
upon certain proposed amendments to
the tentative marketing agreement and
to the order regulating the handling of
milk in the Pacific Northwest and
Arizona-Las Vegas marketing areas. The
hearing was held pursuant to the
provisions of the Agricultural Marketing
Agreement Act of 1937, as amended (7
U.S.C. 601–674), and the applicable
rules of practice and procedure (7 CFR
Part 900).
Upon the basis of the evidence
introduced at such hearing and the
record thereof, it is found that:
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(1) The said order as hereby amended,
and all of the terms and conditions
thereof, will tend to effectuate the
declared policy of the act;
(2) The parity prices of milk, as
determined pursuant to Section 2 of the
Act, are not reasonable in view of the
price of feeds, available supplies of
feeds, and other economic conditions
which affect market supply and demand
for milk in the aforesaid marketing area.
The minimum prices specified in the
order as hereby amended are such
prices as will reflect the aforesaid
factors, insure a sufficient quantity of
pure and wholesome milk, and be in the
public interest; and
(3) The said order as hereby amended
regulates the handling of milk in the
same manner as, and is applicable only
to persons in the respective classes of
industrial or commercial activity
specified in, a marketing agreement
upon which a hearing has been held.
(4) All milk and milk products
handled by handlers, as defined in the
tentative marketing agreement and the
order as hereby proposed to be
amended, are in the current of interstate
commerce or directly burden, obstruct,
or affect interstate commerce in milk or
its products.
Order Related to Handling
It is therefore ordered, that on and
after the effective date hereof, the
handling of milk in the Pacific
Northwest and Arizona-Las Vegas
marketing areas shall be in conformity
to and in compliance with the terms and
conditions of the order, as amended,
and as hereby amended as follows:
The provisions of the order amending
the order contained in the
Recommended Decision issued by the
Administrator, Agricultural Marketing
Service, on April 7, 2005, and published
in the Federal Register on April 13,
2005 (70 FR 19636), are adopted and
shall be the terms and provisions of
these orders. The revised orders read as
follows:
1. The authority citation for 7 CFR
Parts 1124 and 1131 continues to read
as follows:
Authority: 7 U.S.C. 601–674.
PART 1124—MILK IN THE PACIFIC
NORTHWEST MARKETING AREA
2. Amend the Producer-handler
definition of the Pacific Northwest milk
marketing order by revising § 1124.10 to
read as follows:
§ 1124.10
Producer-handler.
Producer-handler means a person
who operates a dairy farm and a
distributing plant from which there is
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route distribution within the marketing
area during the month not to exceed 3
million pounds and who the market
administrator has designated a
producer-handler after determining that
all of the requirements of this section
have been met.
(a) Requirements for designation.
Designation of any person as a
producer-handler by the market
administrator shall be contingent upon
meeting the conditions set forth in
paragraphs (a)(1) through (5) of this
section. Following the cancellation of a
previous producer-handler designation,
a person seeking to have their producerhandler designation reinstated must
demonstrate that these conditions have
been met for the preceding month.
(1) The care and management of the
dairy animals and the other resources
and facilities designated in paragraph
(b)(1) of this section necessary to
produce all Class I milk handled
(excluding receipts from handlers fully
regulated under any Federal order) are
under the complete and exclusive
control, ownership and management of
the producer-handler and are operated
as the producer-handler’s own
enterprise and its own risk.
(2) The plant operation designated in
paragraph (b)(2) of this section at which
the producer-handler processes and
packages, and from which it distributes,
its own milk production is under the
complete and exclusive control,
ownership and management of the
producer-handler and is operated as the
producer-handler’s own enterprise and
at its sole risk.
(3) The producer-handler neither
receives at its designated milk
production resources and facilities nor
receives, handles, processes, or
distributes at or through any of its
designated milk handling, processing, or
distributing resources and facilities
other source milk products for
reconstitution into fluid milk products
or fluid milk products derived from any
source other than:
(i) Its designated milk production
resources and facilities (own farm
production);
(ii) Pool handlers and plants regulated
under any Federal order within the
limitation specified in paragraph (c)(2)
of this section; or
(iii) Nonfat milk solids which are
used to fortify fluid milk products.
(4) The producer-handler is neither
directly nor indirectly associated with
the business control or management of,
nor has a financial interest in, another
handler’s operation; nor is any other
handler so associated with the
producer-handler’s operation.
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(5) No milk produced by the herd(s)
or on the farm(s) that supply milk to the
producer-handler’s plant operation is:
(i) Subject to inclusion and
participation in a marketwide
equalization pool under a milk
classification and pricing program
under the authority of a State
government maintaining marketwide
pooling of returns, or
(ii) Marketed in any part as Class I
milk to the non-pool distributing plant
of any other handler.
(b) Designation of resources and
facilities. Designation of a person as a
producer-handler shall include the
determination of what shall constitute
milk production, handling, processing,
and distribution resources and facilities,
all of which shall be considered an
integrated operation, under the sole and
exclusive ownership of the producerhandler.
(1) Milk production resources and
facilities shall include all resources and
facilities (milking herd(s), buildings
housing such herd(s), and the land on
which such buildings are located) used
for the production of milk which are
solely owned, operated, and which the
producer-handler has designated as a
source of milk supply for the producerhandler’s plant operation. However, for
purposes of this paragraph, any such
milk production resources and facilities
which do not constitute an actual or
potential source of milk supply for the
producer-handler’s operation shall not
be considered a part of the producerhandler’s milk production resources and
facilities.
(2) Milk handling, processing, and
distribution resources and facilities
shall include all resources and facilities
(including store outlets) used for
handling, processing, and distributing
fluid milk products which are solely
owned by, and directly operated or
controlled by the producer-handler or in
which the producer-handler in any way
has an interest, including any
contractual arrangement, or over which
the producer-handler directly or
indirectly exercises any degree of
management control.
(3) All designations shall remain in
effect until canceled, pursuant to
paragraph (c) of this section.
(c) Cancellation. The designation as a
producer-handler shall be canceled
upon determination by the market
administrator that any of the
requirements of paragraph (a)(1) through
(5) of this section are not continuing to
be met, or under any of the conditions
described in paragraphs (c)(1), (2) or (3)
of this section. Cancellation of a
producer-handler’s status pursuant to
this paragraph shall be effective on the
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first day of the month following the
month in which the requirements were
not met or the conditions for
cancellation occurred.
(1) Milk from the milk production
resources and facilities of the producerhandler, designated in paragraph (b)(1)
of this section, is delivered in the name
of another person as producer milk to
another handler.
(2) The producer-handler handles
fluid milk products derived from
sources other than the milk production
facilities and resources designated in
paragraph (b)(1) of this section, except
that it may receive at its plant, or
acquire for route disposition, fluid milk
products from fully regulated plants and
handlers under any Federal order if
such receipts do not exceed 150,000
pounds monthly. This limitation shall
not apply if the producer-handler’s
own-farm production is less than
150,000 pounds during the month.
(3) Milk from the milk production
resources and facilities of the producerhandler is subject to inclusion and
participation in a marketwide
equalization pool under a milk
classification and pricing plan operating
under the authority of a State
government.
(d) Public announcement. The market
administrator shall publicly announce:
(1) The name, plant location(s), and
farm location(s) of persons designated as
producer-handlers;
(2) The names of those persons whose
designations have been cancelled; and
(3) The effective dates of producerhandler status or loss of producerhandler status for each. Such
announcements shall be controlling
with respect to the accounting at plants
of other handlers for fluid milk products
received from any producer-handler.
(e) Burden of establishing and
maintaining producer-handler status.
The burden rests upon the handler who
is designated as a producer-handler to
establish through records required
pursuant to § 1000.27 that the
requirements set forth in paragraph (a)
of this section have been and are
continuing to be met, and that the
conditions set forth in paragraph (c) of
this section for cancellation of the
designation do not exist.
PART 1131—MILK IN THE ARIZONALAS VEGAS MARKETING AREA
3. Amend the Producer-handler
definition of the Arizona-Las Vegas milk
marketing order by revising § 1131.10 to
read as follows:
§ 1131.10
Producer-handler.
Producer-handler means a person
who operates a dairy farm and a
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distributing plant from which there is
route distribution within the marketing
area during the month not to exceed 3
million pounds and who the market
administrator has designated a
producer-handler after determining that
all of the requirements of this section
have been met.
(a) Requirements for designation.
Designation of any person as a
producer-handler by the market
administrator shall be contingent upon
meeting the conditions set forth in
paragraphs (a)(1) through (5) of this
section. Following the cancellation of a
previous producer-handler designation,
a person seeking to have their producerhandler designation reinstated must
demonstrate that these conditions have
been met for the preceding month.
(1) The care and management of the
dairy animals and the other resources
and facilities designated in paragraph
(b)(1) of this section necessary to
produce all Class I milk handled
(excluding receipts from handlers fully
regulated under any Federal order) are
under the complete and exclusive
control, ownership and management of
the producer-handler and are operated
as the producer-handler’s own
enterprise and its own risk.
(2) The plant operation designated in
paragraph (b)(2) of this section at which
the producer-handler processes and
packages, and from which it distributes,
its own milk production is under the
complete and exclusive control,
ownership and management of the
producer-handler and is operated as the
producer-handler’s own enterprise and
at its sole risk.
(3) The producer-handler neither
receives at its designated milk
production resources and facilities nor
receives, handles, processes, or
distributes at or through any of its
designated milk handling, processing, or
distributing resources and facilities
other source milk products for
reconstitution into fluid milk products
or fluid milk products derived from any
source other than:
(i) Its designated milk production
resources and facilities (own farm
production);
(ii) Pool handlers and plants regulated
under any Federal order within the
limitation specified in paragraph (c)(2)
of this section; or
(iii) Nonfat milk solids which are
used to fortify fluid milk products.
(4) The producer-handler is neither
directly nor indirectly associated with
the business control or management of,
nor has a financial interest in, another
handler’s operation; nor is any other
handler so associated with the
producer-handler’s operation.
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(5) No milk produced by the herd(s)
or on the farm(s) that supply milk to the
producer-handler’s plant operation is:
(i) Subject to inclusion and
participation in a marketwide
equalization pool under a milk
classification and pricing program
under the authority of a State
government maintaining marketwide
pooling of returns, or
(ii) Marketed in any part as Class I
milk to the non-pool distributing plant
of any other handler.
(6) The producer-handler does not
distribute fluid milk products to a
wholesale customer who is served by a
plant described in § 1131.7(a), (b), or (e),
or a handler described in § 1000.8(c)
that supplied the same product in the
same-sized package with a similar label
to a wholesale customer during the
month.
(b) Designation of resources and
facilities. Designation of a person as a
producer-handler shall include the
determination of what shall constitute
milk production, handling, processing,
and distribution resources and facilities,
all of which shall be considered an
integrated operation, under the sole and
exclusive ownership of the producerhandler.
(1) Milk production resources and
facilities shall include all resources and
facilities (milking herd(s), buildings
housing such herd(s), and the land on
which such buildings are located) used
for the production of milk which are
solely owned, operated, and which the
producer-handler has designated as a
source of milk supply for the producerhandler’s plant operation. However, for
purposes of this paragraph, any such
milk production resources and facilities
which do not constitute an actual or
potential source of milk supply for the
producer-handler’s operation shall not
VerDate Aug<31>2005
16:40 Dec 13, 2005
Jkt 208001
be considered a part of the producerhandler’s milk production resources and
facilities.
(2) Milk handling, processing, and
distribution resources and facilities
shall include all resources and facilities
(including store outlets) used for
handling, processing, and distributing
fluid milk products which are solely
owned by, and directly operated or
controlled by the producer-handler or in
which the producer-handler in any way
has an interest, including any
contractual arrangement, or over which
the producer-handler directly or
indirectly exercises any degree of
management control.
(3) All designations shall remain in
effect until canceled pursuant to
paragraph (c) of this section.
(c) Cancellation. The designation as a
producer-handler shall be canceled
upon determination by the market
administrator that any of the
requirements of paragraph (a)(1) through
(5) of this section are not continuing to
be met, or under any of the conditions
described in paragraphs (c)(1), (2) or (3)
of this section. Cancellation of a
producer-handler’s status pursuant to
this paragraph shall be effective on the
first day of the month following the
month in which the requirements were
not met or the conditions for
cancellation occurred.
(1) Milk from the milk production
resources and facilities of the producerhandler, designated in paragraph (b)(1)
of this section, is delivered in the name
of another person as producer milk to
another handler.
(2) The producer-handler handles
fluid milk products derived from
sources other than the milk production
facilities and resources designated in
paragraph (b)(1) of this section, except
that it may receive at its plant, or
PO 00000
Frm 00027
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4702
74191
acquire for route disposition, fluid milk
products from fully regulated plants and
handlers under any Federal order if
such receipts do not exceed 150,000
pounds monthly. This limitation shall
not apply if the producer-handler’s
own-farm production is less than
150,000 pounds during the month.
(3) Milk from the milk production
resources and facilities of the producerhandler is subject to inclusion and
participation in a marketwide
equalization pool under a milk
classification and pricing plan operating
under the authority of a State
government.
(d) Public announcement. The market
administrator shall publicly announce:
(1) The name, plant location(s), and
farm location(s) of persons designated as
producer-handlers;
(2) The names of those persons whose
designations have been cancelled; and
(3) The effective dates of producerhandler status or loss of producerhandler status for each. Such
announcements shall be controlling
with respect to the accounting at plants
of other handlers for fluid milk products
received from any producer-handler.
(e) Burden of establishing and
maintaining producer-handler status.
The burden rests upon the handler who
is designated as a producer-handler to
establish through records required
pursuant to § 1000.27 that the
requirements set forth in paragraph (a)
of this section have been and are
continuing to be met, and that the
conditions set forth in paragraph (c) of
this section for cancellation of the
designation do not exist.
[FR Doc. 05–24024 Filed 12–9–05; 2:16 pm]
BILLING CODE 3410–02–P
E:\FR\FM\14DEP2.SGM
14DEP2
Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 70, Number 239 (Wednesday, December 14, 2005)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 74166-74191]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 05-24024]
[[Page 74165]]
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Part IV
Department of Agriculture
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Agricultural Marketing Service
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7 CFR Parts 1124 and 1131
Milk in the Pacific Northwest and Arizona-Las Vegas Marketing Areas;
Final Decision on Proposed Amendments to Marketing Agreement and to
Orders; Proposed Rule
Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 239 / Wednesday, December 14, 2005 /
Proposed Rules
[[Page 74166]]
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DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
Agricultural Marketing Service
7 CFR Parts 1124 and 1131
[Docket No. AO-368-A32, AO-271-A37; DA-03-04B]
Milk in the Pacific Northwest and Arizona-Las Vegas Marketing
Areas; Final Decision on Proposed Amendments to Marketing Agreement and
to Orders
AGENCY: Agricultural Marketing Service, USDA.
ACTION: Proposed rule.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: This document is the final decision proposing to adopt changes
to provisions of the producer-handler definitions of the Pacific
Northwest and Arizona-Las Vegas orders as contained in a Recommended
Decision published in the Federal Register on April 13, 2005. This
document is subject to approval by producers.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Jack Rower, Marketing Specialist or
Gino Tosi, Associate Deputy Administrator for Order Formulation and
Enforcement, USDA/AMS/Dairy Programs, Order Formulation and Enforcement
Branch, STOP 0231-Room 2971, 1400 Independence Avenue SW., Washington,
DC 20250-0231, (202) 720-2357 or (202) 690-1366, e-mail addresses:
jack.rower@usda.gov or gino.tosi@usda.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This administrative action is governed by
the provisions of Sections 556 and 557 of Title 5 of the United States
Code and, therefore, is excluded from the requirements of Executive
Order 12866.
The amendments to the rules proposed herein have been reviewed
under Executive Order 12988, Civil Justice Reform. They are not
intended to have a retroactive effect. If adopted, the proposed
amendments would not preempt any state or local laws, regulations, or
policies, unless they present an irreconcilable conflict with this
rule.
The Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, as amended (7
U.S.C. 601-674), provides that administrative proceedings must be
exhausted before parties may file suit in court. Under Section
608c(15)(A) of the Act, any handler subject to an order may request
modification or exemption from such order by filing with the Secretary
a petition stating that the order, any provision of the order, or any
obligation imposed in connection with the order is not in accordance
with the law. A handler is afforded the opportunity for a hearing on
the petition. After a hearing, the Secretary would rule on the
petition. The Act provides that the district court of the United States
in any district in which the handler is an inhabitant, or has its
principal place of business, has jurisdiction in equity to review the
Secretary's ruling on the petition, provided a bill in equity is filed
not later than 20 days after the date of the entry of the ruling.
Regulatory Flexibility Act and Paperwork Reduction Act
In accordance with the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601 et
seq.), the Agricultural Marketing Service has considered the economic
impact of this action on small entities and has certified that this
final decision will not have a significant economic impact on a
substantial number of small entities. For the purpose of the Regulatory
Flexibility Act, a dairy farm is considered a ``small business'' if it
has an annual gross revenue of less than $750,000, and a dairy products
manufacturer is a ``small business'' if it has fewer than 500
employees. For the purposes of determining which dairy farms are
``small businesses,'' the $750,000 per year criterion was used to
establish a milk marketing guideline of 500,000 pounds per month.
Although this guideline does not factor in additional monies that may
be received by dairy producers, it should be an inclusive standard for
most ``small'' dairy farmers. For purposes of determining a handler's
size, if the plant is part of a larger company operating multiple
plants that collectively exceed the 500 employee limit, the plant will
be considered a large business even if the local plant has fewer than
500 employees.
Producer-handlers are defined as dairy farmers that process only
their own milk production. These entities must be dairy farmers as a
pre-condition to operating processing plants as producer-handlers. The
size of the dairy farm determines the production level of the operation
and is the controlling factor in the capacity of the processing plant
and possible sales volume associated with the producer-handler entity.
Determining whether a producer-handler is considered small or large
business must depend on its capacity as a dairy farm where a producer-
handler with annual gross revenue in excess of $750,000 is considered a
large business.
The amendments would place entities currently considered to be
producer-handlers under the Pacific Northwest or the Arizona-Las Vegas
orders on the same terms as all other fully regulated handlers provided
they meet the criteria for being subject to the pooling and pricing
provisions of the two orders. Entities currently defined as producer-
handlers under the terms of these orders will be subject to the pooling
and pricing provisions of the orders if their route disposition of
fluid milk products is more than 3-million pounds per month.
Producer-handlers with route disposition of less than 3-million
pounds during the month will not be subject to the pooling and pricing
provisions of the orders. To the extent that current producer-handlers
for each order have route disposition of fluid milk products outside of
the marketing areas, such route disposition will be subject to an
order's pooling and pricing provisions if total in-area route
disposition causes them to become fully regulated.
Assuming that some current producer-handlers will have route
disposition of fluid milk products of more than 3-million pounds during
the month, such producer-handlers will be regulated subject to the
pooling and pricing provisions of the orders like other handlers. Such
producer-handlers will account to the pool for their uses of milk at
the applicable minimum class prices and pay the difference between
their use-value and the blend price of the order to the order's
producer-settlement fund.
While this may cause an economic impact on those entities with more
than 3-million pounds of route sales who currently are considered
producer-handlers by the two orders, the impact is offset by the
benefit to other small businesses. With respect to dairy farmers whose
milk is pooled on the two marketing orders, such dairy farmers who have
not heretofore shared in the additional revenue that accrues from the
marketwide pooling of Class I sales by producer-handlers will share in
such revenue. This will have a positive impact on 486 small dairy
farmers in the Pacific Northwest and Arizona-Las Vegas marketing areas.
Additionally, all handlers who dispose of more than 3-million pounds of
fluid milk products per month will pay at least the announced Federal
order Class I price for such use. This will have a positive impact on
18 small regulated handlers.
To the extent that current producer-handlers in the Pacific
Northwest and the Arizona-Las Vegas orders become subject to the
pooling and pricing provisions, such will be determined in their
capacity as handlers. Such entities will no longer have restrictions
applicable to their business operations that were conditions for
producer-handler status and exemption from the
[[Page 74167]]
pooling and pricing provisions of the two orders. In general, this
includes being able to buy or acquire any quantity of milk from dairy
farmers or other handlers instead of being limited by the current
constraints of the two orders. Additionally, the burden of balancing
their milk production is relieved. Milk production in excess of what is
needed to satisfy their Class I route disposition needs will receive
the minimum price protection established under the terms of the two
orders. The burden of balancing milk supplies will be borne by all
producers and handlers who are pooled and regulated under the terms of
the two orders.
During September 2003, the Pacific Northwest had 16 pool
distributing plants, 1 pool supply plant, 3 cooperative pool
manufacturing plants, 7 partially regulated distributing plants, 8
producer-handler plants and 2 exempt plants. Of the 27 regulated
handlers, 16 or 59 percent were considered large businesses. Of the 691
dairy farmers whose milk was pooled on the order, 223 or 32 percent
were considered large businesses. If these amendatory actions are not
undertaken, 68 percent of the dairy farmers (468) in the Pacific
Northwest order who are small businesses will continue to be adversely
affected by the operations of large producer-handlers.
For the Arizona-Las Vegas order, during September 2003 there were 3
pool distributing plants, 1 cooperative pool manufacturing plant, 18
partially regulated distributing plants, 2 producer-handler plants and
3 exempt plants (including an exempt plant located in Clark County
Nevada) operated by 22 handlers. Of these plants, 15 or 68 percent were
considered large businesses. Of the 106 dairy farmers whose milk was
pooled on the order, 88 or 83 percent were considered large businesses.
If these amendatory actions are not undertaken, 17 percent of the dairy
farmers in the Arizona-Las Vegas order who are small businesses will
continue to be adversely affected by large producer-handler operations.
In their capacity as producers, 7 producer-handlers would be
considered as large producers as their annual marketing exceeds 6-
million pounds of milk. Record evidence indicates that for the Pacific
Northwest marketing order at the time of the hearing, four producer-
handlers would potentially become subject to the pooling and pricing
provisions of the order because of route disposition of more than 3-
million pounds per month within the marketing area. For the Arizona-Las
Vegas order, one producer-handler would be considered a large producer
because its annual marketing exceeds 6-million pounds of milk and
potentially subject to the pooling and pricing provisions of the order
because of route disposition exceeding 3-million pounds per month.
A review of reporting requirements was completed under the
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. Chapter 35). It was
determined that these proposed amendments would have minimal impact on
reporting, recordkeeping, or other compliance requirements for entities
currently considered producer-handlers under the Pacific Northwest and
the Arizona-Las Vegas marketing orders because they would remain
identical to the current requirements applicable to all other regulated
handlers who are currently subject to the pooling and pricing
provisions of the two orders. No new forms are proposed and no
additional reporting requirements would be necessary.
This notice does not require additional information collection that
requires clearance by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) beyond
currently approved information collection. The primary sources of data
used to complete the forms are routinely used in most business
transactions. Forms require only a minimal amount of information which
can be supplied without data processing equipment or a trained
statistical staff. Thus, the information collection and reporting
burden is relatively small. Requiring the same reports for all handlers
does not significantly disadvantage any handler that is smaller than
the industry average.
Prior documents in this proceeding:
Notice of Hearing: Issued July 31, 2003; published August 6, 2003
(68 FR 46505).
Correction to Notice of Hearing: Issued August 20, 2003; published
August 26, 2003 (68 FR 51202).
Notice of Reconvened Hearing: Issued October 27, 2003; published
October 31, 2003 (68 FR 62027).
Notice of Reconvened Hearing: Issued December 18, 2003; published
December 29, 2003 (68 FR 74874).
Recommended Decision: Issued April 7, 2005; published April 13,
2005 (70 FR 19636).
Preliminary Statement
A public hearing held on proposed amendments to the marketing
agreement and order regulating the handling of milk in the Pacific
Northwest and Arizona-Las Vegas marketing areas. The hearing was held
pursuant to the provisions of the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act
of 1937, as amended (7 U.S.C. 601-674), and the applicable rules of
practice and procedure governing the formulation of marketing
agreements and marketing orders (7 CFR Part 900), at Tempe, Arizona,
beginning on September 23, 2003; reconvened, and continuing at Seattle,
Washington, on November 17, 2003; and reconvened and concluding at
Alexandria, Virginia, on January 23, 2004, pursuant to a notice of
hearing issued July 31, 2003, and a correction to the notice issued
August 23, 2003, and notices of reconvened hearings issued October 27,
2003, and December 18, 2003.
Upon the basis of the evidence introduced at the hearing and the
record thereof, the Administrator, on April 7, 2005, issued a
Recommended Decision containing notice of the opportunity to file
written exceptions thereto.
The material issues, findings, conclusions, and rulings of the
Recommended Decision are hereby approved and adopted and set forth
herein. The material issue on the record of hearing relate to:
1. The regulatory status of producer-handlers.
Findings and Conclusions
The following findings and conclusions on the material issues are
based on evidence presented at the hearing and the record thereof:
1. The Regulatory Status of Producer-Handlers
Amendments to the producer-handler definitions of the Pacific
Northwest and the Arizona-Las Vegas milk marketing orders are adopted.
This decision will result in all producer-handlers with in-area route
disposition of more than 3-million pounds of fluid milk products per
month being subject to the pooling and pricing provisions of the
applicable order. This action will cause some current producer-handlers
to become subject to the pooling and pricing provisions of the orders.
Currently, the Pacific Northwest and the Arizona-Las Vegas milk
marketing orders provide separate but similar definitions that describe
and define a special category of handler known as producer-handlers.
While there are specific differences in how each order defines and
describes producer-handlers, both orders--as do all Federal milk
marketing orders--exempt producer-handlers from the pooling and pricing
provisions of the orders.
Exemption from the pooling and pricing provisions of the orders
essentially means that the minimum class prices established under the
orders that handlers must pay for milk are not applicable to producer-
handlers and producer-handlers receive no minimum
[[Page 74168]]
price protection for surplus milk disposed of within either order's
marketing area. Producer-handlers enjoy keeping the entire value of
their milk production disposed of as fluid milk products in the
marketing area to themselves and do not share this value with other
dairy farmers whose milk is pooled on either of the two orders.
However, producer-handlers are subject to strict definitions and
limitations in their business practices. Both orders limit the ability
of producer-handlers to buy or acquire milk that may be needed from
dairy farmers or other handlers. Additionally, producer-handlers bear
the entire burden of balancing their own milk production. Milk
production in excess of what is needed to satisfy their Class I route
disposition needs will receive whatever price they are able to obtain.
Such milk does not receive the minimum price protection of the order.
It is the exemption from the pooling and pricing provisions of the
Pacific Northwest and Arizona-Las Vegas orders that is the central
issue of this proceeding. While producer-handlers are exempt from the
pooling and pricing provisions of the two orders, they are
``regulated'' to the extent that producer-handlers submit reports to
the Market Administrator who monitors producer-handler operations to
ensure that such entities are in compliance with the conditions for
such regulatory status. For the purposes of brevity and convenience,
this decision will refer to those handlers who are subject to the
pooling and pricing provisions of the orders as ``fully regulated
handlers'' in contrast to producer-handlers.
Overview of the Proposals
This proceeding considered three proposals seeking the application
of each order's pooling and pricing provisions, or full regulation, of
producer-handlers when their route disposition of fluid milk products
in the marketing areas exceeded 3-million pounds per month. These
proposals were published in the hearing notice as Proposals 1, 2 and 3.
Proposal 1 is applicable to the Pacific Northwest milk marketing order.
Proposal 3 is applicable to the Arizona-Las Vegas milk marketing order.
Proposal 2, applicable to only the Pacific Northwest order, is
identical to Proposal 1 but also seeks to limit a producer-handler from
distributing fluid milk products to a wholesale customer who is served
by a fully regulated or partially regulated distributing plant in the
same-sized package with a similar label during the month. In this
regard, Proposal 2 would make the producer-handler definition for the
Pacific Northwest order more like the current Arizona-Las Vegas order.
A fourth proposal, published in the hearing notice as Proposal 4,
seeking to prevent the simultaneous pooling of the same milk on the
Arizona-Las Vegas milk marketing order and on a state-operated order
that provides for marketwide pooling, (commonly referred to a ``double-
dipping'') was addressed in a separate final rule that was issued
November 18, 2005 (70 FR 70991) and will become effective on January 1,
2006.
Summary of Testimony
Proposal 3 received testimony by a witness appearing on behalf of
United Dairymen of Arizona (UDA). UDA is a dairy cooperative supplying
approximately 88 percent of the milk in the Arizona-Las Vegas milk
marketing order (Order 131). The UDA witness testified in support of
establishing a 3-million pound limit in route disposition of fluid milk
products for producer-handlers in the marketing area, which, if
exceeded, would cause the producer-handler to become subject to the
pooling and pricing provisions of the order. The witness was of the
opinion that the current producer-handler definition contradicts the
overall purposes of the Federal milk order program to establish uniform
prices among all handlers and the marketwide sharing of revenue among
all producers who supply the market.
The UDA witness asserted that Sarah Farms is the largest producer-
handler in the Order 131 marketing area and avoids the classified
pricing and pooling requirements applicable to all other handlers. The
witness characterized this as the operation of an individual handler
pool within a marketwide pool. The witness stated that UDA is aware
that historically Federal orders have exempted producer-handler
operations from the pricing and pooling provisions of orders because
they were small and had little impact in the marketplace. The witness
contrasted this historical perspective with Sarah Farms, recognized as
the largest producer-handler in Order 131, by citing a trade journal
article that ranked Sarah Farms as the second largest U. S. dairy farm
with 13,000 cows in 1995.
The witness testified that UDA estimates Sarah Farms' Class I sales
within the Order 131 marketing area are about 12 million pounds per
month. Because of Sarah Farms' exemption from the pooling and pricing
provisions of the order, the witness estimated a loss in revenue to
producers who pool milk on the order at about $11,586,589 over the
period of January 2000 through July 2003, or about a 10-14 cents per
hundredweight (cwt) impact on the order's blend price. In addition, the
witness estimated lost revenue of about $3 million, or about a 10-cent
per cwt lower blend price for the period of September 1997 through
January 1999.
A second witness appearing on behalf of UDA also testified in
support of Proposal 3. This witness explained that the proposed 3-
million pound route disposition limit on producer-handlers was partly
based on provisions of the Fluid Milk Promotion Act which requires an
assessment for the promotion of fluid milk when a handler's sales are
greater than 3-million pounds per month. The witness said that
producer-handlers who have the ability to enjoy this level of route
disposition should not be exempted from pooling and pricing provisions
and that their continued exemption poses a serious threat to orderly
marketing and the operation of the Federal milk order program.
The second UDA witness claimed that in December 1994, Sarah Farms
was considered an insignificant factor within the Order 131 marketing
area because their monthly raw milk production was less than 5 million
pounds, of which less than 1.3 million pounds of Class I products were
distributed within the marketing area. Relying on Market Administrator
statistics, the witness added that by 1996, UDA estimated that Sarah
Farms' monthly Class I route disposition had increased to more than 6
million pounds. The witness also testified that from late 1998 until
this proceeding, Sarah Farms had been one of only two producer-handlers
selling Class I products in the marketing area. Relying on Market
Administrator statistics, the witness estimated that Sarah Farms' Class
I route sales within Order 131 had increased from about 7 million
pounds per month to as much as 15 million pounds per month by 2002.
A witness appearing on behalf of the Kroger Company (Kroger), a
fully regulated handler under the Pacific Northwest milk marketing
order (Order 124) and Order 131, testified in support of Proposals 1,
2, and 3. The witness said that changes in marketing conditions in both
orders necessitate changes in how the orders define producer-handlers.
In the opinion of the witness, producer-handlers enjoy a competitive
sales advantage by being exempted from the pooling and pricing
provisions of both orders. The witness explained that producer-handlers
have a sales advantage because they have the flexibility to set their
internal raw milk
[[Page 74169]]
price at a level well below the announced Federal order minimum Class I
price that fully regulated handlers must pay.
The Kroger witness also testified that regulated handlers in Orders
124 and 131 have been forced to respond to competitive situations with
producer-handlers in supplying retail grocery outlets. This was due in
part to the competitive sales advantage producer-handlers have in being
able to lower their price to retailers while still maintaining an
adequate profit margin, the witness explained. The witness said that
Kroger's retail outlets could not do this competitively without eroding
their profit margins. Because of these competitive situations, the
witness concluded that producer-handlers exceeding more than 3 million
pounds per month in Class I sales was a reasonable estimate of when
producer-handlers are in direct competition with fully regulated
handlers and should therefore receive the same regulatory treatment.
The same regulatory treatment of producer-handlers as fully regulated
handlers above this threshold would, according to the witness, re-
establish equity among handlers competing for Class I sales in these
two marketing areas.
The Kroger witness was of the opinion that the volume of producer-
handler route disposition was a key aspect of the disorderly marketing
conditions in Orders 124 and 131. However, the witness indicated that a
producer-handler's processing plant size alone was not necessarily an
accurate indicator of processing plant efficiency. The witness
testified that smaller plants can be very competitive. In this regard,
the witness said that Kroger's largest plant was not its most efficient
bottling plant.
A witness appearing on behalf of Western United Dairymen (WUD), the
largest dairy farmer association in California representing
approximately 1,100 of California's 2,000 dairy farmers, testified in
support of Proposals 1 and 3. The witness expressed the opinion that a
primary reason for the exemption of producer-handlers from the pricing
and pooling provisions of Orders 124 and 131 had been because these
entities were customarily small businesses that operate self-
sufficiently and do not have a significant impact in the marketplace.
The WUD witness testified that the regulatory exemption for producer-
handlers has been largely unchanged in the Federal order system for
more than 50 years. The witness explained that there had been no
significant demonstration of unfair advantages accruing to producer-
handlers because they are responsible for balancing their fluid milk
needs and cannot transfer balancing costs to other pooled market
participants.
The WUD witness also testified that some producer-handlers were
becoming much larger than fully regulated fluid processors in Orders
124 and 131. The witness was of the opinion that large producer-
handlers were effectively taking greater and greater shares of the
Class I market in both orders and caused pooled milk to be forced into
lower-valued manufacturing uses. According to the witness, these
outcomes are having a direct negative impact on handlers and producers
in both orders and are generating instability in the Federal milk
marketing order system.
The WUD witness asserted that when producer-handler sales growth
threatened the sales of fully regulated handlers under California's
State-wide regulatory system, the State acted to maintain and protect
their pooling and pricing system by placing a limit on the volumes of
sales producer-handlers could have within the State before becoming
fully regulated. The witness was of the opinion that the Federal order
program also needs to act by adopting the proposed amendments to
similarly limit the sales volume of producer-handlers.
A witness appearing on behalf of the Alliance of Western Milk
Producers (Alliance), an organization representing California
cooperatives, also testified in support of Proposals 1, 2, and 3. The
witness indicated that how the Federal order program deals with the
producer-handler issue is of interest to California dairy farmers
because changes in Orders 124 and 131, which border California, will
have a direct impact on the State's milk marketing and regulatory
program. The witness was of the opinion that producer-handlers have a
tremendous competitive advantage in the marketplace because they are
not subject to minimum pricing and are thereby able to avoid a pooling
obligation to share their Class I revenue with all pooled market
participants. The witness asserted that unless some limitation is put
on the route sales volume of producer-handlers, it may encourage new
producer-handlers to enter the market and further erode the equitable
pricing principles relied on by the Federal milk order program.
A witness appearing on behalf of Northwest Dairy Association (NDA)
testified in support of Proposals 1 and 2. The witness provided a
business example demonstrating how producer-handlers enjoy a pricing
and marketing advantage by being exempt from the pooling and pricing
provisions of Order 124. Relating past business experiences as a fully
regulated handler known as Sunshine Dairy, the witness explained how
business was lost to a producer-handler competitor. The witness
attributed this loss of business to the competitive sales advantage
enjoyed by producer-handlers resulting from their exemption from the
pooling and pricing provisions of the order.
The NDA witness testified that as a fully regulated handler known
as Sunshine Dairy they had also lost a small customer who, at that
time, was buying about 25,000 gallons of milk per week. The witness
said that this customer grew to constitute more than 10 percent of its
fluid milk sales volume. According to the witness, even though they had
provided great service and products, they lost the account because the
customer could save hundreds of thousands of dollars a year by
procuring milk from a producer-handler. According to the witness,
Sunshine Dairy lost this account because the producer-handler was able
to price its milk at a level below the minimum Federal order Class I
price. The witness also testified that the producer-handler
subsequently lost this account to a fully regulated handler that was of
national scope.
The NDA witness expressed the opinion that the goal of the Federal
Order system is to maintain order in the market. In this regard, the
witness testified that handlers should not be exempt from the pooling
and pricing provisions of an order because they own their cows and
produce their own milk supply when other handlers are not exempted. The
witness stressed that such an exemption is unfair, noting that the vast
majority of dairy farmers should not receive smaller paychecks for the
same product as producer-handlers because they lack a processing plant.
A witness appearing on behalf of Maverick Milk Producers
Association (Maverick), a cooperative of dairy farmers located in
Arizona that markets its milk in California and Arizona, testified in
support of Proposal 3. The witness testified that all handlers who
market their milk in Order 131 should be subject to the pooling and
pricing provisions of the order, including producer-handlers. The
witness inferred from Market Administrator statistics that the largest
producer-handler in Order 131, Sarah Farms, had cost Maverick members
in excess of $1.2 million in revenue since 1999 because Sarah Farms had
not been subject to the pooling and pricing provisions of the order.
The witness testified that the estimated loss of revenue to the Order
131 pool was based on an assumption
[[Page 74170]]
that Sarah Farms produced about 18 million pounds of milk per month
that would have been pooled as Class I milk.
A former executive and co-owner of Vitamilk, an independent handler
no longer operating as a going concern, formerly located in Seattle,
Washington, appeared on behalf of Dairy Farmers of America (DFA) and
testified in support of Proposals 1 and 2. This DFA witness testified
that in seeking alternative markets for its milk products, Vitamilk
began to compete with producer-handlers for school milk supply
contracts through one of its wholesale distributors. However, their bid
attempts were unsuccessful, the witness testified, because the school
district sought fixed-price contracts for packaged fluid milk which
they could not supply in competition with a producer-handler. While
conceding that Vitamilk was inexperienced in bidding for school-lunch
business, the witness asserted that the fixed price contract offered by
the producer-handler was below the combined value of the Federal order
Class I price plus Vitamilk's cost allocations to marketing,
processing, distribution, overhead, distributor profit, and risk.
This DFA witness explained that Vitamilk tried to retain other
customers by lowering their prices in an effort to keep and gain sales
volume even though the price represented no contribution to covering
their indirect costs. The witness testified that prices offered by a
local producer-handler were 11 to 12 cents per gallon below Vitamilk's
best net price to distributors. According to the witness, even though
Vitamilk's customers reported satisfaction with the company's service
and other non-price attributes, the producer-handler's ability to
provide fluid milk products at a lower cost resulted in the loss of
customer accounts. The witness asserted that the loss of accounts was
caused largely by the producer-handler's inability to price Class I
products below what a fully regulated Class I handler could price its
products. In addition, the witness testified that in 2003 Vitamilk even
attempted to sell its Class I products at prices below breakeven and
was still unable to find a price whereby it could successfully
recapture business lost to a producer-handler.
A witness appearing on behalf of Shamrock Foods Company (Shamrock),
a fully regulated handler located in Arizona and Colorado, testified in
support of Proposal 3. The witness maintained that Shamrock is at a
competitive disadvantage with producer-handlers because Shamrock is
required to pay the Federal order Class I price for milk while
producer-handlers are exempt from the pricing and pooling provisions of
Order 131. According to the witness, the price of Class I products
offered to wholesale customers by producer-handlers can be lower than
what Shamrock can offer profitably and that Sarah Farms, a producer-
handler of the order, has been able to raid their customer base.
Furthermore, the witness said that Shamrock's ability to maintain its
policy of equitable pricing among its customers, be able to hold its
prices fairly constant to maintain customer loyalty, and avoid bidding
against itself for its own customers is undermined because of the
producer-handler pricing advantage over fully regulated handlers. The
witness said Shamrock is unable to quickly adjust their business
practices to meet such competition because of their size and because of
different regulatory treatment.
The Shamrock witness was of the opinion that the producer-handler
exemption from minimum pricing and pooling provisions threatens the
economic viability of Order 131. For example, the witness explained
that major customers such as Safeway, Kroger, Wal-Mart and strong
independents like Costco, Bashas and Sam's Club buy milk on a wholesale
basis to resell to retail consumers. The witness noted that these
customers seek the opportunity to buy milk at prices similar to those
offered by the producer-handler--at prices below the Federal order
Class I price. The witness testified that if Proposal 3 or some other
restriction limiting route disposition volume is not adopted, either
there will have to be an expansion of producer-handler supplies by
expanding their farms or existing fully regulated handlers will need to
reorganize their business practices to develop their own-farm
production and become a producer-handler to remain competitive.
The Shamrock witness offered testimony regarding market research
they routinely conduct through on-going surveys of retail grocery
stores in Order 131. The witness explained that Shamrock salespersons
do this to gather market intelligence on their competitors. According
to the witness, Shamrock's marketing research indicated that prices for
bottled fluid milk offered by Sarah Farms was typically 6 to 8 cents a
gallon below their price--equating to about 48 to 64 cents on a per cwt
basis. The witness testified that their market research also revealed
that Sarah Farms' production and route disposition had grown from
approximately 8 million pounds in 1998 to nearly 17.2 million pounds by
2003.
The Shamrock witness concluded that a sales volume limitation of 3
million pounds per month for producer-handlers was reasonable because a
3 million pound limit would represent about three percent of the total
Class I sales in the Order 131 marketing area. In addition, the witness
testified that a plant which processes 3 million pounds per month is an
indicator of a very efficient plant operation. From these views, the
witness concluded that a producer-handler with route disposition in
excess of 3 million pounds per month is able to fully exploit economies
of size and should therefore be treated the same as fully regulated
handlers.
The Shamrock Foods witness conceded that there are additional
challenges faced by producer-handlers in terms of managing milk
supplies and disposing of surplus milk which fully regulated handlers
do not face. The witness also acknowledged that there are costs
associated with managing marketing risk, including the disposal of
surplus milk production. However, the witness was of the opinion that
these costs are more than covered by the competitive advantages that
exist by being exempt from the pooling and pricing provisions of the
order. One example the witness provided was that a producer-handler can
balance its supply by selling fluid milk products into an unregulated
area such as California.
A witness appearing on behalf of Shamrock Farms, which is
affiliated with Shamrock Foods, testified in support of Proposal 3.
Shamrock Farms milks 6,500 cows and is located in Maricopa County,
Arizona. The witness testified that Shamrock Farms has always been a
pooled producer on Order 131 and its predecessor order. The witness
asserted that Sarah Farms operates dairy farms with approximately
10,000 to 12,000 milking cows. While the witness conceded the lack of
hard data to confirm this assertion, the witness arrived at this
estimate of farm size by counting the number of milk tankers per day
that delivered to the Sarah Farms' plant in Yuma, Arizona.
A consultant witness appearing on behalf of Dairy Farmers of
America (DFA), proponents of Proposals 1, 2, and 3, had prepared a
study that analyzed and compared the value of raw milk to a large
producer-handler with the cost of milk to fully regulated handlers and
described the economic impact of competition between these two business
entities. The study conducted by this witness was based on a
proprietary database of 150 milk processing plants owned by businesses
for which this witness' company performed accounting
[[Page 74171]]
and other consulting services. According to the witness, 20 plants were
selected as being representative of the costs for 6 different size
classes of bottling plants. The witness explained that the plant cost
data was adjusted by applying regional consumer price index (CPI)
factors as published by the U.S. Department of Labor. According to the
witness, this method of adjusting data, the selection of relevant
plants, the analytic methods employed in conducting the study, and the
interpretation of the study results were all based on Generally
Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP).
The DFA consultant witness acknowledged that while the study of
plant costs was based on actual plant data acquired from fully
regulated handlers, the study did not include data from plants located
in either the Pacific Northwest or the Arizona-Las Vegas marketing
areas. The witness also acknowledged that the data for the smallest
plants in the study were taken from producer-handler plants located in
western Pennsylvania, an area not regulated by a Federal milk marketing
order. The witness also explained that the study's actual data could
not be offered for inspection and examination in this proceeding
because individual plant cost and related information were proprietary,
adding that this also explained why the data used in the study were
averaged. The witness further testified that the selection of
appropriate plants for inclusion in the study from all of the plants in
the witness' proprietary database was based on professional judgment
and experience.
The DFA consultant witness explained that the analysis of the data
derived for the Northwest or the Arizona-Las Vegas marketing areas
suggests that as plant volumes increase per unit processing costs
decrease and that the highest per unit processing costs are found at
the smallest plant sizes. At large plant sizes, the witness contrasted,
a processor, regardless of regulatory status, can increase milk
processing volume at a nominal additional per unit cost.
Relating an additional example of the study's findings, the DFA
consultant witness testified that, other things being equal, a
hypothetical plant bottling 3 million pounds of milk per month in 2-
gallon pack containers would have per unit processing costs that were
significantly higher than a plant producing 20 million pounds of milk
per month in the same size container packs. In addition, the witness
testified that the study suggests that where a large producer-handler
and a handler subject to the pooling and pricing provisions of an order
compete for route sales, the producer-handler will always have a price
advantage which could be as large as the difference between the Federal
order Class I price and the order's blend price. The witness also said
that the examination across all types of retail outlets reveals that a
producer-handler will always have a price advantage in competing with
fully regulated handlers.
The consultant witness for DFA provided a comparative cost analysis
of servicing a warehouse store account by a fully regulated fluid milk
plant and a large producer-handler using actual retail prices for 2-
percent milk in Phoenix, Arizona, during January through June 2003. The
witness testified that based on the study's data and assumptions, a
large producer-handler can service such an account and return a
substantial above-market premium over the producer blend price.
However, the study reveals that the handler paying the Class I price
for its raw milk supply will have little or no margin, the witness
contrasted. The producer-handler's raw milk cost advantage, the witness
said, allows it to service these stores profitably at a price that
cannot be matched by a fully regulated handler. The witness concluded
that producer-handlers are in a position to acquire any account they
choose to service by offering a price which the regulated plant cannot
meet.
In other testimony, the DFA consultant witness provided a pro-forma
income statement for a regulated handler in Order 124 developed using
certain assumptions about costs, prices and income. The witness
demonstrated through an analysis of the pro-forma income statement that
a large producer-handler would be able to successfully compete with
fully regulated handlers if regulated. The witness concluded from this
analysis that a successful producer-handler would be economically
viable even if it were subject to the order's pooling and pricing
provisions.
The DFA consultant witness testified that the cost data used in the
study's pro-forma income statement example was generated using
statistical methods based on one month's representative data for
similar sized regulated handlers and assumed that producer-handlers and
regulated handlers employed union labor and operated within collective
bargaining agreements. The witness testified that based on own business
experience, the characterization of labor costs would be representative
of large fully regulated handler operations in the Pacific Northwest or
the Arizona-Las Vegas marketing areas. In contrast, the witness
indicated no direct knowledge of the costs of labor employed by
producer-handlers in Orders 124 or 131. The witness did conclude that
use of non-union labor by producer-handlers would provide them with a
clear cost advantage over similar or larger size fully regulated
handlers that typically employed unionized labor.
The DFA consultant witness was of the professional opinion that
current Federal order regulations provide producer-handlers with a
significant cost advantage that cannot be matched by fully regulated
handlers that are subject to pooling and pricing regulations. If the
proposal to place a 3 million pound per month volume limit on producer-
handlers route disposition is adopted, it will eliminate what the
witness described as an unfair economic advantage for large producer-
handlers while serving to protect a more modest pricing advantage for
small producer-handlers.
In additional testimony, the consultant witness for DFA
acknowledged the difficulty in reconciling the 150,000 pound per month
route disposition limit established for exempt plants with the proposed
3 million pound per month limit for producer-handlers. According to the
witness, the difference in these two limits are for two distinctly
different entities and can be rationalized by the Department by
acknowledging a value commensurate with milk production risks incurred
by a producer-handler that are not incurred by handlers who buy milk
from dairy farmers. A handler who buys milk from dairy farmers does not
incur the production risks associated with operating a farm enterprise,
the witness said. In this regard, the witness acknowledged that the
study focused only on plant processing costs and not on the cost of
producing milk in the farm enterprise function of a producer-handler.
A witness representing Dean Foods (Dean) testified in support of
proposals establishing a volume limit on producer-handler route
disposition. The witness testified that while Dean Foods does not
operate bottling plants in either Orders 124 or 131, they do operate
fluid milk plants in many States regulated by Federal milk marketing
orders and in areas not subject to Federal milk order regulation. The
witness testified that where Dean faces competition from plants that do
not pay regulated minimum prices, Dean is affected. The witness
stressed that milk bottling plants need to have equitable raw milk
costs for the Federal milk order system to remain valid.
[[Page 74172]]
The Dean witness said that competitiveness and efficiency are not
necessarily a function of processing plant size. On this theme, the
witness provided an example where a small, fully regulated milk bottler
in Bryan, Texas, successfully bid to supply a Texas state prison
against a much larger Dean plant. The witness testified that the Bryan
plant had processing capacity of less than 3 million pounds per month
but was more efficient than the Dean plant and that because of its
management structure, it could adjust more quickly to changing market
conditions.
A witness appearing on behalf of the National Milk Producers
Federation (NMPF) testified in support of Proposals 1 and 3. The
witness was of the opinion that productivity increases resulting from
technological advances and the growth of dairy farms enable large
producers to capture sufficient economies of scale in processing own-
farm milk and thereby compete effectively with established, fully
regulated handlers. In light of this, the witness testified that such
producers can disrupt the orderly marketing of milk in a market, adding
that dairy farmers ``turned producer-handlers'' could grow across a
market causing even greater disruption to orderly marketing in other
Federal milk marketing orders.
The witness asserted that NMPF's own analysis, and a plant study by
Cornell University revealed that larger fluid milk bottling plants have
exhibited decreasing processing costs on a per gallon basis as the size
of processing facilities increase. The witness explained that as the
scale of processing plants increase, average processing costs tend to
remain fairly constant, with the lowest per unit cost levels being
exhibited over a relatively wide range of processing capacities. The
witness testified that the lower per unit processing cost advantages of
larger plant sizes tend to be greatest for very large processing plants
rather than among smaller plants. The witness said that significant
cost and other competitive advantages attributed to economies of scale
in fluid milk processing become evident at about the 3-million pound
per month processing level.
According to the NMPF witness, the exemption of producer-handlers
from the pooling and pricing provisions of Orders 124 and 131 allows
producer-handlers to effectively pay the equivalent of the blend price
for milk at their plants, a price lower than the Class I price that
fully regulated competitors pay. The witness testified that by using
the economic concept of ``transfer pricing,'' the maximum price that a
producer-handler ``pays'' for transferring milk from its farm
production enterprise to its processing enterprise can be estimated
even though the producer-handler does not actually sell raw milk to
itself. According to the witness, transfer pricing in the context of
the producer-handler issue, predicts that the price of milk assigned to
milk from the producer-handler farm enterprise essentially becomes the
price at which milk could be sold to a regulated handler--the Federal
order blend price. Accordingly, the witness asserted that a producer-
handler's advantage in raw milk procurement for processing, as compared
to fully regulated handlers, would be the difference between the
Federal order Class I price and the order's blend price.
The NMPF witness testified that their analysis reinforces the
findings of the consultant witness for DFA regarding the magnitude of
the pricing advantage producers-handlers enjoy over handlers who are
subject to the pooling and pricing provisions of a Federal order. While
noting that the DFA consultant witness' study used aggregated data that
does result in a significant loss of information for analytical
purposes, the witness stressed that even with this limitation it
nevertheless remains the best data available to rely upon.
The NMPF witness was of the opinion that the producer-handler
exemption from an order's pooling and pricing provisions also creates
inequity among producers because it reduces the amount of milk pooled
as a Class I use of milk, which in turn, lowers the total revenue of
the marketwide pool to be shared among pooled producers. According to
the witness, this threatens orderly marketing. The witness related that
farms with over 3 million pounds of monthly production represent about
15 percent of the U.S. milk supply and may represent some 40 percent of
U.S. fluid milk sales. According to the witness, the steadily
increasing number of farms with this magnitude of monthly milk
production suggests that large producers could exploit the producer-
handler provision and thus further erode equity to both producers and
handlers across the entire Federal milk marketing order system.
The NMPF witness stated that the 3 million pound per month route
disposition limit proposed for producer-handlers as part of Proposals 1
and 3 is also consistent with the promotion assessment exemption of the
Fluid Milk Promotion Program. According to the witness, the promotion
exemption limit set by Congress was based on the impact that a handler
had in a marketing area. Below 3 million pounds per month route
disposition, the witness said, the impact of an individual handler is
negligible and therefore rationalizes why smaller handlers are exempt
from fluid milk promotion assessments.
A witness appearing on behalf of DFA testified in support of
Proposals 1, 2, and 3. The witness viewed the exemption of producer-
handlers from the pooling and pricing provisions of Federal orders as a
loophole that threatens the economic viability of the Federal milk
order system and the economic well-being of pooled producers. This
witness, like the NMPF witness, testified that a growing interest by
large dairy farmers in becoming producer-handlers is a major factor in
DFA's interest in seeking to amend the producer-handler definition in
the Pacific Northwest or the Arizona-Las Vegas orders. The witness
testified that the exemption from the pooling and pricing provisions of
these orders provides producer-handlers with a competitive advantage
over fully regulated handlers by effectively permitting producer-
handlers to purchase milk at an internal price at or below the Federal
order blend price while fully regulated handlers must pay the usually
higher Class I price for milk. According to this DFA witness, the
difference between the Class I price and the Federal order blend price
represents a significant windfall generated solely by the regulatory
exemptions accorded to producer-handlers.
The DFA witness summarized that the proposed 3 million pound per
month limitation on route disposition is based on four considerations.
According to the witness, the proposed limit is: (1) Consistent with
the minimum volume of milk sales that triggers the fluid milk promotion
assessment for handlers; (2) the level at which producer-handlers
achieve competitive equity with fully regulated handlers in terms of
plant processing efficiency; (3) the level of route disposition that
has a significant impact on the pool value of milk; and (4) the level
of route disposition that has a significant impact on the order's
pooled producers and fully regulated handlers. The witness indicated
that if a producer-handler's volume is sufficient to reduce a pool's
value by a penny (1 cent) per hundredweight it is significant and is of
sufficient magnitude to warrant ending producer-handler exemption from
the pooling and pricing provisions of the orders. The witness also
concluded from the study conducted by the consultant witness for DFA
that when a producer-handler reaches a 3 million pound per month
[[Page 74173]]
distribution level, not only does the producer-handler reach similar
plant processing cost efficiencies but it is also of sufficient size to
service a considerable number of retail outlets on a competitive par
with fully regulated handlers. According to the witness, continuing the
exemption from an order's pooling and pricing provisions beyond the 3
million pound sales volume level causes serious market disruptions.
The DFA witness also testified that the exemption of producer-
handlers from the pooling and pricing provisions of the orders is
encouraging large producers to consider becoming producer-handlers in
both Orders 124 and 131 and in other Federal order marketing areas. As
an example, the witness testified that some retail outlets now seek
packaged fluid milk supplies from producer-handlers in an effort to
obtain lower cost milk supplies. The witness was of the opinion that
without a limit on route disposition volume, producer-handlers will
displace pooled producers and fully regulated handlers as the dominant
suppliers of fluid milk not only in the Pacific Northwest and Arizona-
Las Vegas marketing areas, but ultimately throughout all other Federal
milk marketing areas. The witness cautioned that the potential for the
growth of producer-handlers gives rise to considering lowering Class I
milk prices as a means to counter the competitive price advantage that
producer-handlers are afforded by regulatory exemption from pooling and
pricing provisions.
The DFA witness testified that the current producer-handler
definition creates market disorder because it disrupts the flow of
Class I milk from pooled producers to regulated handlers. In addition,
the witness testified that pooled producers effectively subsidize the
balancing costs of producer-handlers. In the opinion of the witness,
these outcomes are destabilizing and are producing disorder in both the
Pacific Northwest and Arizona-Las Vegas marketing areas. In further
explanation of these points, the witness expressed concern about the
loss of Class I revenue that would otherwise accrue to pooled
producers. As an example, relying on Market Administrator data in
making professional inferences, the witness testified that the largest
producer-handler in the Order 131 marketing area, Sarah Farms, had
monthly route disposition in the range of 12.1 to 19.1 million pounds.
According to the witness, the value of the sales revenue lost to the
Order 131 pool by not subjecting Sarah Farms to the pooling and pricing
provisions of the order averaged some $317,000 per month, or the
equivalent of 12.5 cents per cwt.
The DFA witness testified that the producer-handler price advantage
over fully regulated handlers provides a powerful incentive for
customers to purchase milk from producer-handlers rather than fully
regulated handlers. The witness testified that producer-handlers have
as much as a 15-cent per gallon advantage over fully regulated handlers
in Order 131. According to the witness, the advantage is based on the
difference between the Order 131 Class I price and the order's blend
price which ranged from 15.9 to as much as 18.3 cents per gallon during
the period of January 2000 through July 2003.
The DFA witness related that wholesale milk buyers base procurement
decisions on tenths and even hundredths of a cent differences in the
price per gallon, indicating that price differences of more than 15
cents per gallon overwhelmingly favors the producer-handler in head-to-
head price competition. The witness testified that lower-priced
packaged fluid milk products from producer-handlers is used by
wholesale buyers of milk as leverage in daily price negotiations with
fully regulated handlers and is a form of disorderly marketing. Such
market disorder, the witness said, causes all processors to receive
lower prices for their packaged fluid milk products.
The DFA witness also expressed the opinion that the plant costs
faced by a large producer-handler are similar to those faced by fully
regulated handlers even though the witness had no direct knowledge of
individual producer-handler businesses in Order 124 or 131. While
agreeing with the characterization that producer-handlers are a single
and seamless milk production and processing enterprise, the witness
asserted that higher balancing and operational costs attributable to
producer-handler operations are not significantly different than those
associated with fully regulated handlers of the same processing plant
size. The witness further asserted that the producer-handler price
advantage combined with the ability to increase production volume at
negligible additional costs per unit exaggerates the advantage to a
point where a producer-handler can increase market share nearly at
will.
Through a series of examples depicting scenarios of different plant
sizes, the DFA witness testified that producer-handlers with 80 and 90
percent Class I utilization could operate profitably in spite of higher
balancing costs associated with operating as a producer-handler. The
witness explained that a large producer-handler experiencing increasing
returns to its operation could continue to grow in size until it
controlled a substantial share of the Class I market. The witness
testified that a producer-handler with route disposition of 3 million
pounds per month could supply a small regional grocery chain but likely
would not be able to diversify its marketing risk with sales to other
customers.
According to the DFA witness, if producer-handlers are allowed to
gain Class I sales without restraint, fully regulated handlers and
pooled producers would likely come to view Federal milk marketing
orders as ineffective. According to the witness, under these conditions
producers possibly would seek to terminate the orders. The DFA witness
characterized this potential scenario as a form of market disorder.
The DFA witness said that rising interest in the producer-handler
option by large dairy farmers challenges the long-term viability of the
entire Federal milk order system. The witness did acknowledge that no
new producer-handler operations have entered either the Order 124 or
131 marketing areas in recent years. The witness also acknowledged that
market information kept by the Department shows that the volume of
sales by producer-handlers had declined nationally from 1.47 billion
pounds per year to 1.16 billion pounds per year between 1988 and 1998.
The DFA witness offered modifications to Proposal 1 that would also
be applicable to Proposal 3. Basically, in addition to limiting a
producer-handlers route disposition to less than 3 million pounds per
month, the modification made extensive changes in terminology as to how
producer-handlers are defined. The intent of these modifications, the
witness said, is to clarify that the burden of proof and the
responsibility for providing all the details to substantiate proof to
the Market Administrator for producer-handler status rests with the
producer-handler.
The DFA witness testified that Market Administrators will continue
to be relied upon by Federal orders to use their discretion in
determining producer-handler status. According to the witness, the
proposed modifications for the producer-handler definitions are
expected to provide flexibility for a Market Administrator to
investigate and audit proposed producer-handler operations and to
ensure qualification requirements are met. In addition, the witness
said that if Proposals 1 and 3 are adopted, it was reasonable that
[[Page 74174]]
existing producer-handlers in Orders 124 and 131 be given a period of
time to adjust their operations to the proposed producer-handler
requirements.
Another witness appearing on behalf of DFA testified in support of
Proposals 1 and 3 on the basis that small and average-sized dairy
farmers, including producer-handlers with milk production below 3
million pounds of milk per month, have higher production costs than
larger dairy farms. The witness said that very large dairy farms tend
to have management expertise and business sophistication, access to
capital, access to veterinary services, and economies of size and scale
that tend to lower their per unit costs of milk production. This DFA
witness testified that a dairy farm would need approximately 1,800 cows
to achieve a 3 million pound per month level of production available
for bottling and route disposition.
The DFA witness did not know if 3 million pounds of route
disposition per month was the precise number above which producer-
handlers should become subject to the pricing and pooling provisions of
Orders 124 and 131. Similarly, the witness did not know what economic
impact adopting Proposals 1 and 3 would have on producer-handlers in
the respective marketing areas. The witness did relate having knowledge
of interest being expressed by dairy farmers who had monthly production
in excess of 3 million pounds per month seeking possible producer-
handler status.
A witness representing Northwest Dairy Association (NDA) testified
that they market the milk of 603 milk producers traditionally
associated with Order 124. The witness said that NDA also is the parent
company of WestFarm Foods, an operator of three distributing plants
located in Seattle, Washington, and Portland and Medford, Oregon. The
witness added that NDA also operates four milk manufacturing plants in
the Order 124 marketing area. The witness testified that while NDA does
not have a direct connection to Order 131, it indirectly shares similar
concerns with the proponents of Proposal 3 in that they share a border
with California and share similar concerns regarding the Federal and
State milk order systems. In addition, the witness noted that Order 124
has the second largest volume of producer-handler milk marketings of
any Federal order--second only to Order 131.
The NDA witness was also appearing on behalf of Tillamook County
Creamery Association, Farmers Cooperative Creamery, Inland Dairy, and
Northwest Independent Milk Producers, hereinafter collectively referred
to as NDA, in support of Proposals 1, 2, and 3. The witness testified
that the producer-handler exemption from the pooling and pricing
provisions of Order 124 provides an unfair competitive advantage to
producer-handlers at the expense of pooled producers and fully
regulated handlers. According to the witness, the historical
justifications for exempting producer-handlers because such entities
are small operators without significant market impact on prices and
they do not provide significant competition with fully regulated
handlers are no longer warranted. The witness testified that producer-
handlers in Order 124 are now a significant force in the marketing area
and are likely to continue to increase in size and market significance.
The witness noted that Congress had effectively supported th