Amergen Energy Company, LLC; Clinton Power Station, Unit 1; Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact, 61651-61654 [E5-5874]
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Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 205 / Tuesday, October 25, 2005 / Notices
currently residing in Range 63, Target
Area 10, at Nellis Air Force Base.
Therefore, no consultation is required
under Section 106 of the National
Historic Preservation Act.
On September 23, 2004, the staff
consulted with two Nevada State
officials, Mr. Stan Marshall of the
Radiological Health Section of the
Nevada State Health Division, Bureau of
Health Protection Services and Ms.
Jolene Johnson of the Nevada Division
of Environmental Protection, regarding
the environmental impact of the
proposed action. Neither State Official
had any comments regarding the draft
EA. Additionally, the staff consulted
with the Idaho State official, Mr. Doug
Walker of the Idaho Department of
Environmental Quality. On November 2,
2004, the State of Idaho, Department of
Environmental Quality, provided
comments regarding the draft EA, and
those comments have been incorporated
in the final EA.
III. Finding of No Significant Impact
On the basis of the environmental
assessment, the NRC concludes that the
proposed action will not have a
significant effect on the quality of the
human environment. Accordingly, the
NRC has determined not to prepare an
environmental impact statement for the
proposed action.
IV. Further Information
Documents related to this action,
including the license amendment
request and supporting documentation,
are available electronically at the NRC’s
Electronic Reading Room at https://
www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html.
From this site, you may access the
NRC’s Agencywide Document Access
and Management System (ADAMS),
which provides text and image files of
NRC’s public documents. The ADAMS
accession numbers for the documents
related to this notice are: U.S. NRC
Radioactive Materials License:
Department of the Air Force, Docket
Number 030–28641, License Number
42–23539–01AF; Request letter dated
June 23, 2004, U.S. Department of the
Air Force (ML041810555); NRC
Technical Review of Code of Federal
Regulations (10 CFR) Part 20.2002
request by U.S. Department of the Air
Force (ML042120512); Safety Evaluation
Report, August 5, 2005 (ML052170209);
Environmental Assessment and FONSI.
August 5, 2005 (ML052170216); Title 10
Code of Federal Regulations, 20.2002,
‘‘Method of Obtaining Approval of
Proposed Disposal Procedures’’; and
Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations,
Part 51, ‘‘Environmental Protection
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61651
Regulations for Domestic Licensing and
Related Regulatory Functions.’’
If you do not have access to ADAMS
or if there are problems with accessing
the documents located in ADAMS,
contact the NRC Public Document Room
(PDR) Reference staff at (800) 397–4203,
(301) 415–4737, or by e-mail to
pdr@nrc.gov. These documents may also
be viewed electronically on the public
computers located the NRC’s PDR, O1
F21, One White Flint North, 11555
Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD 20852.
The PDR reproduction contractor will
copy documents for a fee. The PDR is
open from 7:45 a.m. to 4:15 p.m.,
Monday through Friday, except on
Federal holidays.
The Need for the Proposed Action
The loss of full core discharge
capability at CPS is projected to occur
during the February 2006 refueling
outage, based on current projections. To
maintain spent fuel storage capability,
AmerGen would like to expand SFP
storage capacity. The proposed action
would result in the increased fuel
storage capacity in the SFP and the
addition of fuel storage capacity in the
fuel cask storage pool. The proposed
expansion will increase the total storage
capacity from 2,512 to 4,159 fuel
assemblies. The additional capacity is
expected to allow operation without
loss of full-core discharge capability
until the year 2016.
Dated at Arlington, Texas, this 12th day of
October 2005
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Jack E. Whitten,
Chief, Nuclear Materials Licensing Branch,
Division of Nuclear Materials Safety, Region
IV.
[FR Doc. E5–5878 Filed 10–24–05; 8:45 am]
Environmental Impacts of the Proposed
Action
BILLING CODE 7590–01–P
NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION
[Docket No. 50–461]
Amergen Energy Company, LLC;
Clinton Power Station, Unit 1;
Environmental Assessment and
Finding of No Significant Impact
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) is considering
issuance of an amendment to Facility
Operating License No. NPF–62 issued to
AmerGen Energy Company, LLC
(AmerGen or the licensee), for operation
of Clinton Power Station, Unit 1 (CPS),
located in DeWitt County, Illinois.
Therefore, as required by 10 CFR 51.21,
the NRC is issuing this environmental
assessment and finding of no significant
impact.
Environmental Assessment
Identification of the Proposed Action
The proposed action would revise
Technical Specification 4.3, ‘‘Fuel
Assemblies,’’ for CPS to reflect the
increased fuel storage capacity in the
spent fuel pool (SFP) and the addition
of fuel storage capacity in the fuel cask
storage pool. The proposed expansion
will increase the total storage capacity
from 2,512 to 4,159 fuel assemblies.
The proposed action is in accordance
with the licensee’s application dated
August 18, 2004, as supplemented on
May 13 and 25, June 14, and August 17,
2005.
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Radioactive Waste Treatment
CPS uses waste treatment systems
designed to collect and process gaseous,
liquid, and solid waste that might
contain radioactive material. These
radioactive waste treatment systems
were evaluated in the Final
Environmental Statement (FES) for CPS,
Unit 1, dated May 1982. The proposed
changes to the SFP will not involve any
change in the waste treatment systems
described in the FES.
Gaseous Radioactive Wastes
The increase in the number of spent
fuel assemblies stored in the SFP will
potentially result in an increase in the
radioactive gasses evolving from the
pool. However, the level of gaseous
radioactivity in the pool water is
dominated by the most recent reactor
core offload to the pool, not the fuel
already stored in the pool. Therefore,
the storage of additional aged spent fuel
assemblies in the pool will have a
minimal contribution to radioactivity in
the pool. The overall release of
radioactive gases from CPS will remain
within the limits of Title 10, Code of
Federal Regulations (10 CFR), Section
20.1301.
Solid Radioactive Wastes
Spent resins are generated by the
processing of SFP water through the
pools’ purification system. These spent
resins are disposed of as solid
radioactive waste. Resin replacement is
determined primarily by the
requirement for water clarity and is
normally done approximately once per
year. No significant increase in the
volume of solid radioactive waste is
expected with the expanded storage
capacity. During pool re-racking
operations, small amounts of additional
waste resin may be generated by the
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Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 205 / Tuesday, October 25, 2005 / Notices
pools’ cleanup systems on a one-time
basis. Additional solid radioactive waste
will consist of the existing contaminated
fuel storage racks. The old existing fuel
storage racks will be washed down prior
to being removed from the pool to
remove as much contamination as
possible. Then the racks will be shipped
to a volume reduction facility for
processing and subsequent disposal at a
burial site. Shipping containers and
procedures will conform to Federal
regulations as specified in 10 CFR Part
71, ‘‘Packaging and Transportation of
Radioactive Material,’’ and to the
requirements of any state through which
the shipment may pass, as set forth by
the state department of transportation.
Liquid Radioactive Wastes
The release of radioactive liquids will
not be affected directly as a result of the
SFP modifications. The SFP ion
exchanger resins remove soluble
radioactive materials from the pool
water. When the resins are replaced, the
small amount of resin sluice water that
is released is processed by the radwaste
systems. As previously stated, the
frequency of resin replacement may
increase slightly during the installation
of the new racks. However, the increase
in the amount of radioactive liquid
released to the environment as a result
of the proposed SFP expansion is
expected to be negligible.
Occupational Dose Consideration
All operations involved in the fuel
rack installations will follow detailed
procedures prepared in accordance with
as low as reasonably achievable
(ALARA) principles. Personnel
performing the re-racking operation will
be given pre-job briefings to ensure
awareness of job responsibilities and
necessary precautions. Radiation
protection personnel at CPS will
monitor and control work, personnel
traffic, and equipment movement in the
SFP area to minimize contamination
and assure that exposures are
maintained ALARA. Personnel
monitoring equipment (including
thermoluminescence dosimeter (TLDs)),
protective clothing, and respiratory
protective equipment will be issued as
required. Alarming dosimeters will be
used as needed to confirm exposure and
dose rates to workers.
The licensee plans to use divers in the
pool to remove underwater interferences
and assist in fuel storage rack removal.
Procedures for controlling diving
operations will comply with the
guidance in Regulatory Guide 8.38,
‘‘Control of Access to High and Very
High Radiation Areas in Nuclear Power
Plants.’’ During the diving operations,
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the licensee estimates that dose rates
will average from 20 to 40 mrem/hr.
Special precautions such as physical
barriers or tethers will be used to
prevent a diver from coming in close
proximity to highly radioactive
materials in the pool. The diver will be
confined to a safe diving area within the
pool, which will be clearly delineated in
the pre-job brief as well as physically
marked in the pool. The diver will be
visually monitored, either directly or
remotely, at all times during the dive. In
addition, the diver will be monitored by
a remote dose telemetry system. This
system enables the radiation protection
personnel supervising the dive to obtain
the dose being delivered to the diver’s
body. The diver will have a hand-held
probe to complete radiological surveys
when entering the water. Divers exiting
the pool will be monitored for radiation
and contamination, as will all items
removed from the pool. Appropriate
measures will be taken to minimize the
spread of contamination. The existing
fuel racks that are removed from the
pool will be rinsed and surveyed as they
break the water’s surface, allowed to
‘‘drip dry,’’ and then placed in plastic
shipping bags to contain any
contamination until they are placed in
shipping containers to be taken offsite
for disposal.
The increased storage capacity will
not affect dose rates in areas adjacent to
the SFP and transfer canal. The concrete
side walls of the SFP provide sufficient
shielding that the maximum dose rate in
adjacent areas from fuel in the SFP is
calculated to be 2 mrem/hr, if the pool
is completely filled with freshly
offloaded fuel. The walls of the fuel cask
storage pool are not as thick, and the
licensee’s shielding calculations
indicate that filling the racks that are
proposed to be installed in the fuel cask
storage pool with freshly offloaded fuel
could result in dose rates of up to 26
mrem/hr in adjacent areas. This could
be mitigated by filling the outer
(peripheral) three rows of the storage
cells with older (more decayed) fuel,
thus reducing the maximum dose rate in
the adjacent areas to 4.4 mrem/hr. The
licensee will implement administrative
controls to ensure that fuel stored in the
peripheral storage cells will have been
stored outside of the reactor for a
minimum of 10 years, allowing
sufficient decay time.
On the basis of its review of the
licensee’s proposal, the NRC staff
concludes that the CPS SFP re-racking
operations can be performed in a
manner that will ensure that doses to
workers will be maintained ALARA and
that the generation of additional solid
radioactive waste will be minimized.
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The staff concludes that the projected
dose for the project of 7 to 14 personrem is in the range of doses for similar
modifications at other nuclear plants.
Accident Considerations
The licensee evaluated the impact of
newly installed higher density storage
racks in the SFP and fuel storage in the
fuel cask storage pool on the current
design basis accident (DBA) dose
analyses, as discussed in the CPS
Updated Safety Analysis Report. The
DBAs that are potentially affected by the
proposed change to the SFP storage
capacity are the fuel handling accident
(FHA) and the cask drop accident. By
Amendment No. 147, dated April 3,
2002, the CPS licensing basis for the
FHA was changed by a selective
implementation of an alternative source
term, per the provisions of 10 CFR
50.67. In support of that amendment
request, AmerGen demonstrated that the
radiological consequences of an FHA,
either in the containment or in the fuel
building, are within the offsite and
control room dose acceptance criteria
specified in NUREG–0800, ‘‘Standard
Review Plan for the Review of Safety
Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power
Plants,’’ and General Design Criterion 19
of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, and
well within the dose criteria given in 10
CFR 50.67.
The NRC staff performed a review of
the licensee’s analysis of the proposed
action on DBA dose analyses. Adding
additional spent fuel storage does not
increase the amount of fuel assumed to
be damaged in an FHA, and the
proposed action does not significantly
change the source term in the DBA;
therefore, the staff finds that the current
licensing basis FHA dose analysis
remains applicable after the expansion
of the spent fuel storage capacity. The
licensee plans to install spent fuel
storage racks in the fuel cask storage
pool. The licensee will implement
administrative controls to ensure that
fuel will be removed from the racks in
the fuel cask storage pool prior to any
fuel cask being moved in the area.
Therefore, there would be no damage to
spent fuel or radiological consequences
as a result of a cask drop on the empty
fuel storage racks in the fuel cask
storage area. Based on its review, the
staff finds that the current licensing
basis analysis of the cask drop accident
remains bounding with respect to
radiological consequences.
During removal and installation of
fuel storage racks in the SFP and fuel
cask storage pool, AmerGen will ensure
that all work will be controlled and
performed in strict accordance with
specific written guidance. Any
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Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 205 / Tuesday, October 25, 2005 / Notices
movement of fuel assemblies required to
support removal and installation of
racks will be performed as during
normal refueling operations, and no
shipping cask movement will be
performed during this time frame. The
licensee will determine and follow safe
load paths and written procedures to
ensure that no racks are carried over any
portions of the existing fuel storage
racks containing fuel assemblies.
Based on its review, the staff
concludes that the current DBA dose
analyses remain bounding for the
installation of expanded spent fuel
storage capacity in the SFP and fuel
cask storage pool.
The proposed action will not
significantly increase the probability or
consequences of accidents. No changes
are being made in the types of effluents
that may be released off site. There is no
significant increase in the amount of
any effluent released off site. There is no
significant increase in occupational or
public radiation exposure. Therefore,
there are no significant radiological
environmental impacts associated with
the proposed action.
With regard to potential nonradiological impacts, the proposed
action does not have a potential to affect
any historic sites. It does not affect nonradiological plant effluents and has no
other environmental impact. Therefore,
there are no significant non-radiological
environmental impacts associated with
the proposed action.
Accordingly, the NRC concludes that
there are no significant environmental
impacts associated with the proposed
action.
Alternatives to the Proposed Action
Shipping Fuel to a Permanent Federal
Fuel Storage/Disposal Facility
Shipment of spent fuel to a high-level
radioactive storage facility is an
alternative to increasing the onsite spent
fuel storage capacity. However, the U.S.
Department of Energy’s (DOE’s)
proposed high-level radioactive waste
repository is not expected to begin
receiving spent fuel in the near future.
Therefore, shipping the spent fuel to the
DOE repository is not considered an
alternative to increased onsite fuel
storage capacity at this time.
Shipping Fuel to a Reprocessing Facility
Reprocessing of spent fuel from CPS
is not a viable alternative since there are
no operating commercial reprocessing
facilities in the United States. Therefore,
spent fuel would have to be shipped to
an overseas facility for reprocessing.
However, this approach has never been
used and it would require approval by
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15:53 Oct 24, 2005
Jkt 208001
the Department of State as well as other
entities.
Additionally, the cost of spent fuel
reprocessing is not offset by the salvage
value of the residual uranium;
reprocessing represents an added cost.
Shipping the Fuel Offsite to Another
Utility or another Exelon/AmerGen Site
The shipment of fuel to another utility
or transferring fuel to another of the
licensee’s facilities would provide shortterm relief from the shortage of SFP
storage at CPS. However, the Nuclear
Waste Policy Act of 1982, Subtitle B,
Section 131(a)(1) clearly places the
responsibility for the interim storage of
spent fuel with each owner or operator
of a nuclear plant. The SFPs at the other
reactor sites were designed with
capacity to accommodate spent fuel
from those particular sites. Therefore,
transferring spent fuel from CPS to other
sites would create storage capacity
problems at those locations. The
shipment of spent fuel to another site or
transferring it to another Exelon/
AmerGen site is not an acceptable
alternative because of increased fuel
handling risks and additional
occupational radiation exposure, as well
as the fact that no additional storage
capacity would be created.
Alternatives Creating Additional
Storage Capacity
Alternative technologies that would
create additional storage capacity
include rod consolidation, dry cask
storage, modular vault dry storage, and
constructing a new pool. Rod
consolidation involves disassembling
the spent fuel assemblies and storing the
fuel rods from two or more assemblies
into a stainless steel canister that can be
stored in the spent fuel racks. Industry
experience with rod consolidation is
currently limited, primarily due to
concerns for potential gap activity
release due to rod breakage, the
potential for increased fuel cladding
corrosion due to some of the protective
oxide layer being scraped off, and
because the time-consuming
consolidation activity could interfere
with ongoing plant operations. Dry cask
storage is a method of transferring spent
fuel, after storage in the pool for several
years, to high capacity casks with
passive heat dissipation features. After
loading, the casks are stored outdoors
on a seismically qualified concrete pad.
Concerns for dry cask storage include
the need for special security provisions
and high cost. Vault storage consists of
storing spent fuel in shielded stainless
steel cylinders in a horizontal
configuration in a reinforced concrete
vault. The concrete vault provides
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61653
missile and earthquake protection and
radiation shielding. Concerns for vault
dry storage include security, land
consumption, eventual
decommissioning of the new vault, the
potential for fuel or clad rupture due to
high temperatures, and high cost. The
alternative of constructing and licensing
new SFPs is not practical for CPS
because such an effort would require
about 10 years to complete and would
be an expensive alternative.
The alternative technologies that
could create additional storage capacity
involve additional fuel handling with an
attendant opportunity for an FHA,
involve higher cumulative dose to
workers affecting the fuel transfers,
require additional security measures
that are significantly more expensive,
and would not result in a significant
reduction in environmental impacts
compared to the proposed re-racking
modifications.
Reduction of Spent Fuel Generation
Generally, improved usage of the fuel
and/or operation at a reduced power
level would be an alternative that would
decrease the amount of fuel being stored
in the SFPs and, thus, increase the
amount of time before the maximum
storage capacities of the SFPs are
reached. However, operating the plant at
a reduced power level would not make
effective use of available resources, and
would cause unnecessary economic
hardship on the licensee and its
customers. Therefore, reducing the
amount of spent fuel generated by
reducing power is not considered a
practical alternative.
Impact on SFP Storage From Increasing
Length of Fuel Cycle
By letter dated May 20, 2004, as
supplemented May 23 and September
30, 2005, the licensee requested changes
to the Technical Specification
Surveillance Requirement frequencies to
support 24-month fuel cycles at CPS in
accordance with the guidance of
Generic Letter 91–04, ‘‘Changes in
Technical Specification Surveillance
Intervals to Accommodate a 24-Month
Fuel Cycle.’’ Currently, this request is
under review by the NRC staff. If this
request is approved, CPS will
experience a loss of full core discharge
capability sooner. Therefore, this is not
a practical alternative to the proposed
action.
The No-Action Alternative
The NRC staff also considered denial
of the proposed action (i.e., the ‘‘noaction’’ alternative). Denial of the
application would result in no change
in current environmental impacts. The
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environmental impacts of the proposed
action and this alternative action are
similar.
Alternative Use of Resources
The action does not involve the use of
any different resources than those
previously considered in the FES for
CPS, Unit 1, dated May 1982.
Agencies and Persons Contacted
In accordance with its stated policy,
on September 27, 2005, the NRC staff
consulted with Illinois State Official,
Frank Niziolek of the Illinois Emergency
Management Agency, regarding the
environmental impact of the proposed
action. The state official had no
comments.
Finding of No Significant Impact
On the basis of the environmental
assessment, the NRC concludes that the
proposed action will not have a
significant effect on the quality of the
human environment. Accordingly, the
NRC has determined not to prepare an
environmental impact statement for the
proposed action.
For further details with respect to the
proposed action, see the licensee’s letter
dated August 18, 2004, as supplemented
by letters dated May 13 and 25, June 14,
and August 17, 2005. Documents may
be examined, and/or copied for a fee, at
the NRC’s Public Document Room
(PDR), located at One White Flint North,
11555 Rockville Pike (first floor),
Rockville, Maryland. Publicly available
records will be accessible electronically
from the Agencywide Documents
Access and Management System
(ADAMS) Public Electronic Reading
Room on the NRC Web site, https://
www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html.
Persons who do not have access to
ADAMS or who encounter problems in
accessing the documents located in
ADAMS should contact the NRC PDR
Reference staff at 1–800–397–4209, or
301–415–4737, or send an e-mail to
pdr@nrc.gov.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 17th day
of October, 2005.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Kahtan N. Jabbour,
Sr. Manager, Section 2, Project Directorate
III, Division of Licensing Project Management,
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. E5–5874 Filed 10–24–05; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590–01–P
NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION
Sunshine Act Meeting
AGENCY HOLDING THE MEETINGS: Nuclear
Regulatory Commission.
DATE: Weeks of October 24, 31,
November 7, 14, 21, 28, 2005.
PLACE: Commissioner’s Conference
Room, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville,
Maryland.
STATUS: Public and closed.
MATTERS TO BE CONSIDERED:
Week of October 24, 2005
Wednesday, October 26, 2005
1:20 p.m.
Affirmation Session (Public Meeting)
(Tentative).
a. U.S. Army (Jefferson Proving
Ground Site) (Materials License
Amendment) (tentative).
b. Dominion Nuclear Connecticut,
Inc. (Millstone Nuclear Power
Station, Units 2 and 3), Docket Nos.
50–336–LR & 50–423–LR, LBP–05–
16 (July 20, 2005) (tentative).
c. Amergen Energy Co. (Three Mile
Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1),
Docket No. 50–289–LT–2 (tenative).
d. Exelon Generation Company, LLC
& PSEG Nuclear, LLC (Peach
Bottom Atomic Power Station,
Units 2 and 3, Docket Nos. 50–277–
LT & 50–278–LT (tentative).
1:30 p.m.
Discussion of Security Issues
(Closed—Ex. 1).
Thursday, October 27, 2005
10 a.m.
Discussion of Security Issues
(Closed—Ex. 1).
Week of October 31, 2005—Tentative
Tuesday, November 1, 2005
9:30 a.m.
Briefing on Implementation of DavisBesse Lessons Learned Task Force
(DBLLTF) Recommendations
(Public Meeting). (Contact: Brendan
Moroney, (301) 415–3974).
This meeting will be Webcast live at
the Web address—https://www.nrc.gov.
Week of November 7, 2005—Tentative
There are no meetings scheduled for
the Week of November 7, 2005.
Week of November 14, 2005—Tentative
There are no meetings scheduled for
the Week of November 14, 2005.
Week of November 21, 2005—Tentative
Monday, November 21, 2005
9:30 a.m.
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Briefing on Status of New Reactor
Issues, Part 1 (Public Meeting).
(Contact: Laura Dudes, (301) 415–
0146).
1:30 p.m.
Briefing on Status of New Reactor
Issues, Part 2 (Public Meeting).
(Contact: Laura Dudes, (301) 415–
0146).
This meeting will be Webcast live at
the Web address—https://www.nrc.gov.
Week of November 28, 2005—Tentative
Wednesday, November 30, 2005
9:30 a.m.
Briefing on EEO Program (Public
Meeting). (Contact: Corenthis
Kelley, (301) 415–7380).
This meeting will be Webcast live at
the Web address—https://www.nrc.gov.
*The schedule for Commission
meetings is subject to change on short
notice. To verify the status of meetings
call (recording)—(301) 415–1292.
Contact person for more information.
Michelle Schroll, (301) 415–1662.
Additional Information
By a vote of 5–0 on October 18, 2005,
the Commission determined pursuant to
U.S.C. 552b(e) and § 9.107(a) of the
Commission’s rules that ‘‘Affirmation of
a. Louisiana Energy Services, L.P.
(National Enrichment Facility),
Intervenors’ Petition for Review of LBP–
05–13 (Decision on Environmental
Contentions); b. Louisiana Energy
Services, L.P. (National Enrichment
Facility), Licensing Board’s Referral of
Memorandum and Order Rejecting
Amended and Supplemental
Contentions; and c. Private Fuel Storage
(Independent Spent Fuel Storage
Installations) Docket No. 72–22–ISFSI;
Review of Board’s September 15, 2005
order regarding safeguards redactions’’
be held October 19, 2005, and on less
than one week’s notice to the public.
The NRC Commission Meeting
Schedule can be found on the Internet
at: https://www.nrc.gov/what-we-do/
policy-making/schedule.html.
The NRC provides reasonable
accommodation to individuals with
disabilities where appropriate. If you
need a reasonable accommodation to
participate in these public meetings, or
need this meeting notice or the
transcript or other information from the
public meetings in another format (e.g.,
braille, large print), please notify the
NRC’s Disability Program Coordinator,
August Spector, at (301) 415–7080,
TDD: (301) 415–2100, or by e-mail at
aks@nrc.gov. Determinations on
requests for reasonable accommodation
will be made on a case-by-case basis.
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]]>Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 70, Number 205 (Tuesday, October 25, 2005)]
[Notices]
[Pages 61651-61654]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E5-5874]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket No. 50-461]
Amergen Energy Company, LLC; Clinton Power Station, Unit 1;
Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is considering
issuance of an amendment to Facility Operating License No. NPF-62
issued to AmerGen Energy Company, LLC (AmerGen or the licensee), for
operation of Clinton Power Station, Unit 1 (CPS), located in DeWitt
County, Illinois. Therefore, as required by 10 CFR 51.21, the NRC is
issuing this environmental assessment and finding of no significant
impact.
Environmental Assessment
Identification of the Proposed Action
The proposed action would revise Technical Specification 4.3,
``Fuel Assemblies,'' for CPS to reflect the increased fuel storage
capacity in the spent fuel pool (SFP) and the addition of fuel storage
capacity in the fuel cask storage pool. The proposed expansion will
increase the total storage capacity from 2,512 to 4,159 fuel
assemblies.
The proposed action is in accordance with the licensee's
application dated August 18, 2004, as supplemented on May 13 and 25,
June 14, and August 17, 2005.
The Need for the Proposed Action
The loss of full core discharge capability at CPS is projected to
occur during the February 2006 refueling outage, based on current
projections. To maintain spent fuel storage capability, AmerGen would
like to expand SFP storage capacity. The proposed action would result
in the increased fuel storage capacity in the SFP and the addition of
fuel storage capacity in the fuel cask storage pool. The proposed
expansion will increase the total storage capacity from 2,512 to 4,159
fuel assemblies. The additional capacity is expected to allow operation
without loss of full-core discharge capability until the year 2016.
Environmental Impacts of the Proposed Action
Radioactive Waste Treatment
CPS uses waste treatment systems designed to collect and process
gaseous, liquid, and solid waste that might contain radioactive
material. These radioactive waste treatment systems were evaluated in
the Final Environmental Statement (FES) for CPS, Unit 1, dated May
1982. The proposed changes to the SFP will not involve any change in
the waste treatment systems described in the FES.
Gaseous Radioactive Wastes
The increase in the number of spent fuel assemblies stored in the
SFP will potentially result in an increase in the radioactive gasses
evolving from the pool. However, the level of gaseous radioactivity in
the pool water is dominated by the most recent reactor core offload to
the pool, not the fuel already stored in the pool. Therefore, the
storage of additional aged spent fuel assemblies in the pool will have
a minimal contribution to radioactivity in the pool. The overall
release of radioactive gases from CPS will remain within the limits of
Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), Section 20.1301.
Solid Radioactive Wastes
Spent resins are generated by the processing of SFP water through
the pools' purification system. These spent resins are disposed of as
solid radioactive waste. Resin replacement is determined primarily by
the requirement for water clarity and is normally done approximately
once per year. No significant increase in the volume of solid
radioactive waste is expected with the expanded storage capacity.
During pool re-racking operations, small amounts of additional waste
resin may be generated by the
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pools' cleanup systems on a one-time basis. Additional solid
radioactive waste will consist of the existing contaminated fuel
storage racks. The old existing fuel storage racks will be washed down
prior to being removed from the pool to remove as much contamination as
possible. Then the racks will be shipped to a volume reduction facility
for processing and subsequent disposal at a burial site. Shipping
containers and procedures will conform to Federal regulations as
specified in 10 CFR Part 71, ``Packaging and Transportation of
Radioactive Material,'' and to the requirements of any state through
which the shipment may pass, as set forth by the state department of
transportation.
Liquid Radioactive Wastes
The release of radioactive liquids will not be affected directly as
a result of the SFP modifications. The SFP ion exchanger resins remove
soluble radioactive materials from the pool water. When the resins are
replaced, the small amount of resin sluice water that is released is
processed by the radwaste systems. As previously stated, the frequency
of resin replacement may increase slightly during the installation of
the new racks. However, the increase in the amount of radioactive
liquid released to the environment as a result of the proposed SFP
expansion is expected to be negligible.
Occupational Dose Consideration
All operations involved in the fuel rack installations will follow
detailed procedures prepared in accordance with as low as reasonably
achievable (ALARA) principles. Personnel performing the re-racking
operation will be given pre-job briefings to ensure awareness of job
responsibilities and necessary precautions. Radiation protection
personnel at CPS will monitor and control work, personnel traffic, and
equipment movement in the SFP area to minimize contamination and assure
that exposures are maintained ALARA. Personnel monitoring equipment
(including thermoluminescence dosimeter (TLDs)), protective clothing,
and respiratory protective equipment will be issued as required.
Alarming dosimeters will be used as needed to confirm exposure and dose
rates to workers.
The licensee plans to use divers in the pool to remove underwater
interferences and assist in fuel storage rack removal. Procedures for
controlling diving operations will comply with the guidance in
Regulatory Guide 8.38, ``Control of Access to High and Very High
Radiation Areas in Nuclear Power Plants.'' During the diving
operations, the licensee estimates that dose rates will average from 20
to 40 mrem/hr. Special precautions such as physical barriers or tethers
will be used to prevent a diver from coming in close proximity to
highly radioactive materials in the pool. The diver will be confined to
a safe diving area within the pool, which will be clearly delineated in
the pre-job brief as well as physically marked in the pool. The diver
will be visually monitored, either directly or remotely, at all times
during the dive. In addition, the diver will be monitored by a remote
dose telemetry system. This system enables the radiation protection
personnel supervising the dive to obtain the dose being delivered to
the diver's body. The diver will have a hand-held probe to complete
radiological surveys when entering the water. Divers exiting the pool
will be monitored for radiation and contamination, as will all items
removed from the pool. Appropriate measures will be taken to minimize
the spread of contamination. The existing fuel racks that are removed
from the pool will be rinsed and surveyed as they break the water's
surface, allowed to ``drip dry,'' and then placed in plastic shipping
bags to contain any contamination until they are placed in shipping
containers to be taken offsite for disposal.
The increased storage capacity will not affect dose rates in areas
adjacent to the SFP and transfer canal. The concrete side walls of the
SFP provide sufficient shielding that the maximum dose rate in adjacent
areas from fuel in the SFP is calculated to be 2 mrem/hr, if the pool
is completely filled with freshly offloaded fuel. The walls of the fuel
cask storage pool are not as thick, and the licensee's shielding
calculations indicate that filling the racks that are proposed to be
installed in the fuel cask storage pool with freshly offloaded fuel
could result in dose rates of up to 26 mrem/hr in adjacent areas. This
could be mitigated by filling the outer (peripheral) three rows of the
storage cells with older (more decayed) fuel, thus reducing the maximum
dose rate in the adjacent areas to 4.4 mrem/hr. The licensee will
implement administrative controls to ensure that fuel stored in the
peripheral storage cells will have been stored outside of the reactor
for a minimum of 10 years, allowing sufficient decay time.
On the basis of its review of the licensee's proposal, the NRC
staff concludes that the CPS SFP re-racking operations can be performed
in a manner that will ensure that doses to workers will be maintained
ALARA and that the generation of additional solid radioactive waste
will be minimized. The staff concludes that the projected dose for the
project of 7 to 14 person-rem is in the range of doses for similar
modifications at other nuclear plants.
Accident Considerations
The licensee evaluated the impact of newly installed higher density
storage racks in the SFP and fuel storage in the fuel cask storage pool
on the current design basis accident (DBA) dose analyses, as discussed
in the CPS Updated Safety Analysis Report. The DBAs that are
potentially affected by the proposed change to the SFP storage capacity
are the fuel handling accident (FHA) and the cask drop accident. By
Amendment No. 147, dated April 3, 2002, the CPS licensing basis for the
FHA was changed by a selective implementation of an alternative source
term, per the provisions of 10 CFR 50.67. In support of that amendment
request, AmerGen demonstrated that the radiological consequences of an
FHA, either in the containment or in the fuel building, are within the
offsite and control room dose acceptance criteria specified in NUREG-
0800, ``Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports
for Nuclear Power Plants,'' and General Design Criterion 19 of 10 CFR
Part 50, Appendix A, and well within the dose criteria given in 10 CFR
50.67.
The NRC staff performed a review of the licensee's analysis of the
proposed action on DBA dose analyses. Adding additional spent fuel
storage does not increase the amount of fuel assumed to be damaged in
an FHA, and the proposed action does not significantly change the
source term in the DBA; therefore, the staff finds that the current
licensing basis FHA dose analysis remains applicable after the
expansion of the spent fuel storage capacity. The licensee plans to
install spent fuel storage racks in the fuel cask storage pool. The
licensee will implement administrative controls to ensure that fuel
will be removed from the racks in the fuel cask storage pool prior to
any fuel cask being moved in the area. Therefore, there would be no
damage to spent fuel or radiological consequences as a result of a cask
drop on the empty fuel storage racks in the fuel cask storage area.
Based on its review, the staff finds that the current licensing basis
analysis of the cask drop accident remains bounding with respect to
radiological consequences.
During removal and installation of fuel storage racks in the SFP
and fuel cask storage pool, AmerGen will ensure that all work will be
controlled and performed in strict accordance with specific written
guidance. Any
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movement of fuel assemblies required to support removal and
installation of racks will be performed as during normal refueling
operations, and no shipping cask movement will be performed during this
time frame. The licensee will determine and follow safe load paths and
written procedures to ensure that no racks are carried over any
portions of the existing fuel storage racks containing fuel assemblies.
Based on its review, the staff concludes that the current DBA dose
analyses remain bounding for the installation of expanded spent fuel
storage capacity in the SFP and fuel cask storage pool.
The proposed action will not significantly increase the probability
or consequences of accidents. No changes are being made in the types of
effluents that may be released off site. There is no significant
increase in the amount of any effluent released off site. There is no
significant increase in occupational or public radiation exposure.
Therefore, there are no significant radiological environmental impacts
associated with the proposed action.
With regard to potential non-radiological impacts, the proposed
action does not have a potential to affect any historic sites. It does
not affect non-radiological plant effluents and has no other
environmental impact. Therefore, there are no significant non-
radiological environmental impacts associated with the proposed action.
Accordingly, the NRC concludes that there are no significant
environmental impacts associated with the proposed action.
Alternatives to the Proposed Action
Shipping Fuel to a Permanent Federal Fuel Storage/Disposal Facility
Shipment of spent fuel to a high-level radioactive storage facility
is an alternative to increasing the onsite spent fuel storage capacity.
However, the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE's) proposed high-level
radioactive waste repository is not expected to begin receiving spent
fuel in the near future. Therefore, shipping the spent fuel to the DOE
repository is not considered an alternative to increased onsite fuel
storage capacity at this time.
Shipping Fuel to a Reprocessing Facility
Reprocessing of spent fuel from CPS is not a viable alternative
since there are no operating commercial reprocessing facilities in the
United States. Therefore, spent fuel would have to be shipped to an
overseas facility for reprocessing. However, this approach has never
been used and it would require approval by the Department of State as
well as other entities.
Additionally, the cost of spent fuel reprocessing is not offset by
the salvage value of the residual uranium; reprocessing represents an
added cost.
Shipping the Fuel Offsite to Another Utility or another Exelon/AmerGen
Site
The shipment of fuel to another utility or transferring fuel to
another of the licensee's facilities would provide short-term relief
from the shortage of SFP storage at CPS. However, the Nuclear Waste
Policy Act of 1982, Subtitle B, Section 131(a)(1) clearly places the
responsibility for the interim storage of spent fuel with each owner or
operator of a nuclear plant. The SFPs at the other reactor sites were
designed with capacity to accommodate spent fuel from those particular
sites. Therefore, transferring spent fuel from CPS to other sites would
create storage capacity problems at those locations. The shipment of
spent fuel to another site or transferring it to another Exelon/AmerGen
site is not an acceptable alternative because of increased fuel
handling risks and additional occupational radiation exposure, as well
as the fact that no additional storage capacity would be created.
Alternatives Creating Additional Storage Capacity
Alternative technologies that would create additional storage
capacity include rod consolidation, dry cask storage, modular vault dry
storage, and constructing a new pool. Rod consolidation involves
disassembling the spent fuel assemblies and storing the fuel rods from
two or more assemblies into a stainless steel canister that can be
stored in the spent fuel racks. Industry experience with rod
consolidation is currently limited, primarily due to concerns for
potential gap activity release due to rod breakage, the potential for
increased fuel cladding corrosion due to some of the protective oxide
layer being scraped off, and because the time-consuming consolidation
activity could interfere with ongoing plant operations. Dry cask
storage is a method of transferring spent fuel, after storage in the
pool for several years, to high capacity casks with passive heat
dissipation features. After loading, the casks are stored outdoors on a
seismically qualified concrete pad. Concerns for dry cask storage
include the need for special security provisions and high cost. Vault
storage consists of storing spent fuel in shielded stainless steel
cylinders in a horizontal configuration in a reinforced concrete vault.
The concrete vault provides missile and earthquake protection and
radiation shielding. Concerns for vault dry storage include security,
land consumption, eventual decommissioning of the new vault, the
potential for fuel or clad rupture due to high temperatures, and high
cost. The alternative of constructing and licensing new SFPs is not
practical for CPS because such an effort would require about 10 years
to complete and would be an expensive alternative.
The alternative technologies that could create additional storage
capacity involve additional fuel handling with an attendant opportunity
for an FHA, involve higher cumulative dose to workers affecting the
fuel transfers, require additional security measures that are
significantly more expensive, and would not result in a significant
reduction in environmental impacts compared to the proposed re-racking
modifications.
Reduction of Spent Fuel Generation
Generally, improved usage of the fuel and/or operation at a reduced
power level would be an alternative that would decrease the amount of
fuel being stored in the SFPs and, thus, increase the amount of time
before the maximum storage capacities of the SFPs are reached. However,
operating the plant at a reduced power level would not make effective
use of available resources, and would cause unnecessary economic
hardship on the licensee and its customers. Therefore, reducing the
amount of spent fuel generated by reducing power is not considered a
practical alternative.
Impact on SFP Storage From Increasing Length of Fuel Cycle
By letter dated May 20, 2004, as supplemented May 23 and September
30, 2005, the licensee requested changes to the Technical Specification
Surveillance Requirement frequencies to support 24-month fuel cycles at
CPS in accordance with the guidance of Generic Letter 91-04, ``Changes
in Technical Specification Surveillance Intervals to Accommodate a 24-
Month Fuel Cycle.'' Currently, this request is under review by the NRC
staff. If this request is approved, CPS will experience a loss of full
core discharge capability sooner. Therefore, this is not a practical
alternative to the proposed action.
The No-Action Alternative
The NRC staff also considered denial of the proposed action (i.e.,
the ``no-action'' alternative). Denial of the application would result
in no change in current environmental impacts. The
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environmental impacts of the proposed action and this alternative
action are similar.
Alternative Use of Resources
The action does not involve the use of any different resources than
those previously considered in the FES for CPS, Unit 1, dated May 1982.
Agencies and Persons Contacted
In accordance with its stated policy, on September 27, 2005, the
NRC staff consulted with Illinois State Official, Frank Niziolek of the
Illinois Emergency Management Agency, regarding the environmental
impact of the proposed action. The state official had no comments.
Finding of No Significant Impact
On the basis of the environmental assessment, the NRC concludes
that the proposed action will not have a significant effect on the
quality of the human environment. Accordingly, the NRC has determined
not to prepare an environmental impact statement for the proposed
action.
For further details with respect to the proposed action, see the
licensee's letter dated August 18, 2004, as supplemented by letters
dated May 13 and 25, June 14, and August 17, 2005. Documents may be
examined, and/or copied for a fee, at the NRC's Public Document Room
(PDR), located at One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike (first
floor), Rockville, Maryland. Publicly available records will be
accessible electronically from the Agencywide Documents Access and
Management System (ADAMS) Public Electronic Reading Room on the NRC Web
site, https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. Persons who do not have
access to ADAMS or who encounter problems in accessing the documents
located in ADAMS should contact the NRC PDR Reference staff at 1-800-
397-4209, or 301-415-4737, or send an e-mail to pdr@nrc.gov.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 17th day of October, 2005.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Kahtan N. Jabbour,
Sr. Manager, Section 2, Project Directorate III, Division of Licensing
Project Management, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. E5-5874 Filed 10-24-05; 8:45 am]
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