Airworthiness Directives; MD Helicopters, Inc. Model 369D, 369E, 369F, 369FF, 500N, and 600N Helicopters, 60206-60211 [05-20678]
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Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 199 / Monday, October 17, 2005 / Rules and Regulations
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39
Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation
safety, Safety.
Adoption of the Amendment
PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS
DIRECTIVES
1. The authority citation for part 39
continues to read as follows:
I
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.
Accordingly, pursuant to the authority
delegated to me by the Administrator,
the Federal Aviation Administration
amends part 39 of the Federal Aviation
Regulations (14 CFR part 39) as follows:
I
§ 39.13
[Amended]
2. Section 39.13 is amended by adding
a new airworthiness directive to read as
follows:
I
2005–21–04 Bell Helicopter Textron (Bell)
and Coastal Helicopters, Inc. (CHI)
Model
With scissors assembly P/N
(1) Bell Model 47D1, 47G, 47G–2, 47G–2A,
47G–2A–1, 47G–3, 47G–3B, 47G–3B–1,
47G–3B–2, 47G–3B–2A, 47G–4, 47G–4A,
47G–5, 47G–5A; and
(2) CHI OH–13H (Tomcat Mark 5A, 6B, or 6C).
74–150–949–9 or 74–150–949–5 or 74–150–
249–5M.
Compliance: Required as indicated, unless
accomplished previously.
To prevent using a scissors assembly or
weld assembly scissors bracket past it’s life
limit, which could result in failure of the part
and subsequent loss of control of the
helicopter, accomplish the following:
(a) Within 60 days, determine and record
on the service record or equivalent record the
total hours time-in-service (TIS) of each
affected part. If the TIS hours cannot be
determined, replace the part with an
airworthy part with known hours TIS before
further flight.
(b) Thereafter, replace each affected part
before it accumulates 5,000 hours TIS.
Note: Texas Helicopter Co., Inc. Service
Bulletin No. SB 003, dated December 1, 2002,
pertains to the subject of this AD.
(c) This AD establishes a life limit of 5,000
hours TIS for each affected PMA-produced
scissors assembly and each affected PMAproduced weld assembly scissors bracket.
(d) To request a different method of
compliance or a different compliance time
for this AD, follow the procedures in 14 CFR
39.19. Contact the Rotorcraft Certification
Office, Rotorcraft Directorate, FAA, for
information about previously approved
alternative methods of compliance.
(e) This amendment becomes effective on
November 21, 2005.
Issued in Fort Worth, Texas, on October 7,
2005.
David A. Downey,
Manager, Rotorcraft Directorate, Aircraft
Certification Service.
[FR Doc. 05–20680 Filed 10–14–05; 8:45 am]
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. 2004–SW–13–AD; Amendment
39–14340; AD 2005–21–02]
RIN 2120–AA64
Airworthiness Directives; MD
Helicopters, Inc. Model 369D, 369E,
369F, 369FF, 500N, and 600N
Helicopters
Federal Aviation
Administration, DOT.
ACTION: Final rule; request for
comments.
AGENCY:
SUMMARY: This amendment supersedes
an existing airworthiness directive (AD)
for the MD Helicopters, Inc. (MDHI)
Model 369A, H, HE, HM, HS, D, and E
helicopters with a certain partnumbered main rotor blade (blade) and
modified with a Helicopter Technology
Company, LLC (HTC), Supplemental
Type Certificate (STC) No. SR09172RC,
SR09074RC, or SR09184RC. That AD
currently requires recording on the
component history card or equivalent
record (record) each torque event (TE)
on each blade, inspecting both surfaces
of the blade, and replacing any cracked
blade with an airworthy blade. Also,
that AD establishes life limits for certain
part-numbered blades. This amendment
revises the model applicability, adds
MDHI part-numbered blades, removes
any reference to the life limits of the
blades, changes the requirements for
inspecting the blades, and revises the
STC applicability. This amendment also
provides that compliance with portions
of certain documents constitutes
alternative methods of compliance with
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(formerly Continental Copters, Inc.; and
Tom-Cat Helicopters, Inc.): Docket No.
FAA–2005–21725; Amendment No. 39–
14342; Directorate Identifier 2004–SW–
45–AD.
Applicability: The following helicopter
models with the referenced Texas Helicopter
Co., Inc. (THC) scissors assembly part
number (P/N) or weld assembly scissors
bracket P/N installed as a Parts Manufacturer
Approval (PMA) replacement part or as part
of the modification in accordance with
Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) No.
SH2772SW, certificated in any category.
Or weld assembly scissors bracket P/N
74–150–117–13M.
portions of this AD, contains editorial
changes for clarification, and makes
some corrections. This amendment is
prompted by additional reports of
cracked blades and by the comments
received in response to AD 2003–24–01.
The actions specified in this AD are
intended to detect fatigue cracking of
the blade to prevent blade failure and
subsequent loss of control of the
helicopter.
Effective November 1, 2005.
Comments for inclusion in the Rules
Docket must be received on or before
December 16, 2005.
ADDRESSES: Submit comments in
triplicate to the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), Office of the
Regional Counsel, Southwest Region,
Attention: Rules Docket No. 2004–SW–
13–AD, 2601 Meacham Blvd., Room
663, Fort Worth, Texas 76137. You may
also send comments electronically to
the Rules Docket at the following
address: 9-asw-adcomments@faa.gov.
The service information referenced in
this AD may be obtained from the
following addresses: MD Helicopters
Inc., Attn: Customer Support Division,
4555 E. McDowell Rd., Mail Stop M615,
Mesa, Arizona 85215–9734, telephone
1–800–388–3378, fax 480–346–6813, or
on the Web at https://
www.mdhelicopters.com and Helicopter
Technology Company, LLC, 12902
South Broadway, Los Angeles, CA
90061, telephone 310–523–2750, fax
310–523–2745.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: John
Cecil, Aviation Safety Engineer, FAA,
Los Angeles Aircraft Certification
Office, Airframe Branch, 3960
Paramount Blvd., Lakewood, California
90712–4137, telephone (562) 627–5228,
fax (562) 627–5210.
DATES:
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Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 199 / Monday, October 17, 2005 / Rules and Regulations
On
November 17, 2003, the FAA issued AD
2003–24–01, Amendment 39–13370 (68
FR 66004, November 25, 2003), to
require recording TE and inspecting
certain blades with 13,720 TEs and 750
hours TIS. The AD also requires
replacing any cracked blade with an
airworthy blade. Also, the AD revises
the Limitations and Conditions of HTC,
LLC, STC Nos. SR09172RC, SR09074RC,
and SR09184RC by establishing life
limits for certain part-numbered blades.
The AD was prompted by reports of
certain blades cracking due to a higher
number of TEs per hour than originally
calculated. This condition, if not
corrected, could result in fatigue
cracking of the blade, blade failure, and
subsequent loss of control of the
helicopter.
Interested persons were afforded an
opportunity to participate in the making
of AD 2003–24–01. The FAA received
several comments from 10 commenters.
We have given due consideration to the
comments received.
One commenter, the manufacturer
(MDHI), states the scope of the AD
should be expanded to add the OH–6A
designation immediately after the model
to read ‘‘Model 369A (OH–6A), H, etc.’’
The FAA disagrees that we should
add the Model OH–6A. We included
STC No. SR09184RC and the Model
369A (OH–6A), H, HE, HM, and HS
helicopters to AD 2003–24–01 in error.
We have reviewed reports, summaries
about rates of use, incident reports,
certification data, weight limits, and
other information from the
manufacturer. These models may have
the affected part-numbered blades
installed. However, the data shows that
even with a higher than expected
number of TEs, these models have
approved operating limitations that
assume operations at maximum gross
weight and are conservative enough to
compensate for the higher TEs. We have
received no reports of these blades
cracking in the areas affected by this
AD. These blades should reach their
retirement lives based on hours TIS
before the number of TEs results in
cracks in the affected area. Also, we
have determined that we should have
included STC No. SR01050LA and the
Model 369F, FF, 500N, and 600N
helicopters in the AD applicability. Our
data shows the unsafe condition
addressed by this AD correlates to a
flight profile with a higher number of
TEs than expected during certification
(six TEs per hour). The Model 369D, E,
F, FF, 500N and 600N helicopters, with
a higher gross weight limit, fit that
profile. Therefore, we have determined
that this AD should apply only to the
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
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Model 369D, E, F, FF, 500N and 600N
helicopters.
Five commenters state the new
definition of a TE in AD 2003–24–01 is
inconsistent with the definition given in
other ADs and in a service letter. One
commenter, MDHI, states the new
definition is likely to cause confusion.
The FAA agrees. The definition
introduced in AD 2003–24–01 is
inconsistent with previously issued ADs
and could unnecessarily burden and
confuse the operators. Therefore, we
have changed the definition to make it
consistent with the definition of a TE as
that term is defined in AD 98–15–26,
Amendment 39–10675, Docket 98–SW–
22–AD. The TE definition in AD 98–15–
26 is also consistent with the definition
in MDHI Service Letter SL369H–132R1,
SL369D–111R1, SL369E–063R1,
SL369F–056R1, SL500N–008R1, and
SL600N–005R1, dated May 15, 2001.
One commenter asks that the word
‘‘reliably’’ be added to the AD paragraph
requiring operators to determine the
number of TEs. The commenter states
that FAA approved service information
reads, ‘‘operators who cannot reliably
determine the actual number of TEs for
a blade * * *.’’
The FAA does not agree. The word
‘‘reliably’’ is subjective and does not
assist operators in determining
accumulated TEs. The requirement is
that operators determine actual TEs or
assume 13,720 accumulated TEs.
One commenter, MDHI, states the
actions in the AD do not prevent cracks
but mandate a 35-hour repetitive
inspection to detect cracks before blade
failure.
The FAA agrees. The AD wording is
revised to read: ‘‘The actions specified
in this AD are intended to detect fatigue
cracking to prevent * * *’’
Four commenters do not agree with
the blade inspection requirements. One
commenter states the inspection is
unnecessary. The four commenters state
the use of a 10X or higher magnifying
glass is unnecessary and that cracks
have been found without the use of a
magnifying glass. Three commenters ask
if pilots can do the inspections instead
of a mechanic.
The FAA disagrees and has
determined the inspection is necessary
because the affected blades on these
model helicopters continue to crack.
The manufacturer has not identified a
permanent modification but has
identified TE counting or replacing the
blade as a corrective measure. The FAA
has also determined that a 10X or higher
magnifying glass is necessary to detect
a chord-wise crack protruding from
under the root fitting and doubler on the
bottom-side of the blade to prevent
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60207
blade failure because these cracks may
not be detectable without a 10X
magnifying glass until they are near
failure. Current FAA policy does not
allow pilots to do these inspections.
Pilots may only perform simple visual
checks authorized by the AD. Pilots may
perform checks that do not require the
use of tools, precision measuring
equipment, training, pilot logbook
endorsements, or the use of or reference
to technical data not contained in the
body of the AD. The inspection in the
AD requires the use of a 10X or higher
magnifying glass, which is not
considered a simple visual check.
One commenter states that an eddy
current inspection is effective in
detecting cracks in the ‘‘C’’ channel of
certain blades. The commenter states
the FAA may want to consider having
the manufacturer incorporate an eddy
current inspection into the maintenance
instructions for all blades.
The FAA does not agree that an eddy
current inspection is necessary to detect
a crack in the blade in the areas
specified in this AD. We have
determined the cracks can be detected
in the specified areas by inspecting the
blades using a 10X or higher magnifying
glass.
Two commenters suggest the service
bulletins and their amendments, created
by MDHI and HTC, are adequate to
address the unsafe condition. One of
those commenters states that normally
an AD is coordinated with the
manufacturer who produces a service
bulletin (SB) and the FAA backs it up
with an AD stating the operators must
comply. That commenter further states
that the idea of an AD should be to
address an issue the manufacturer is
either unaware of or has not addressed.
The FAA is responsible for
determining which portions, if any, of
an SB to incorporate in an AD and any
additional requirements necessary to
correct the unsafe condition. Even
though an SB may address an unsafe
condition, an AD mandates compliance
with the actions specified in the SB by
all affected operators. While we
generally seek technical information
from the manufacturer, we neither
solicit the manufacturer’s assistance in
drafting an AD nor its consent before
issuing an AD. However, we do note in
this AD that complying with certain
portions of certain documents
constitutes an approved alternative
method of compliance for certain parts
of this AD.
One commenter states that only a few
companies consistently have cracked
blades. That commenter suggests that
we should look at those companies. The
same commenter states an AD is not
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needed because the maintenance
manual criteria are sufficient to detect a
cracked blade.
The FAA partially concurs with the
commenter. The commenter is correct in
that most cracked blades do appear to
occur as a result of the operations of a
relatively few operators. However, the
affected blades from these relatively few
operators may be placed on any of the
affected model helicopters regardless of
their previous use. Thus, the AD must
include all affected model helicopters.
Although we agree that the maintenance
manual criteria are sufficient to detect a
cracked blade, we do not agree that the
AD is not needed. The AD requires
determining and recording the number
of TEs accumulated on each blade and
provides the required time intervals to
perform the inspections. We have
determined the affected blades must be
inspected to determine if a crack exists
at the required TEs or hours TIS.
One commenter, MDHI, states that it
disagrees that specific blade station
inspections are any more meaningful
than the area described as ‘‘* * *
around the root fitting, doubler and skin
* * *.’’
The FAA, upon reconsideration,
agrees and no longer refers to the six
blade stations because the reference is
not necessary to identify the required
inspection area.
One commenter, the blade
manufacturer, HTC, states the
instructions in paragraph (b)(2) of AD
2003–24–01 ‘‘(parallel to the blade) from
the center of the root fitting and lead lag
attach bolt-holes closest to the trailing
edge,’’ are confusing. The commenter
asks if the direction is perhaps ‘‘span
wise’’ and states that the trailing edge of
the blade is not relevant. The
commenter also states the instructions
will cause many operators to perform
the inspection in the wrong areas.
The FAA included the specific
measurements, reference points, and
directions in paragraph (b)(2) of AD
2003–24–01 to provide the mechanic
the location of the specific blade
stations stated in HTC SB No. 2100–
3R2. To simplify these instructions, we
have decided to remove the specific
locations from the AD and include a
figure that depicts the blade inspection
area.
Six commenters commented on the
cost analysis stating the AD poses an
economic burden on operators. One
commenter states it will cause a
hardship on the industry. Another
commenter states it will not be
economically feasible. Another
commenter states the AD will put
operators out of work and force them to
switch to other aircraft types. Another
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commenter states the AD will cause an
increase in paperwork. Another
commenter asks what is the basis for the
cost of the blades and the number of
additional inspections. Another
commenter states the economic impact
should be redone using realistic blade
rejections due to fatigue cracks.
While the FAA must consider the
economic burdens caused by issuing an
AD, the primary purpose of an AD is to
correct an unsafe condition. We did,
however, reassess the cost analysis as a
result of the comments. Therefore, we
are assuming a total of 9000 TE
inspections and blade replacements will
be required for 10 percent of the fleet.
Also, we have determined the
paperwork costs will be negligible.
A commenter, HTC, states the AD
establishes life limits for certain blades
that already have published service
lives, the action is FAA approved, and
the life limits are contained in
Maintenance Manual HTCM–001.
The FAA agrees with the commenters
statements. When the life limits were
originally issued, they were
inadvertently omitted from the
Limitations and Conditions of HTC,
LLC, STC Nos. SR09172RC, SR01050LA,
and SR09184RC. The STCs were
amended and now include the life
limits. However, the life limits can only
be established in an AD because a
change to a life limit appearing only in
a manual or on type certificate data
sheets, even if FAA-approved, does not
require compliance by the pilot or
operator. To be legally required, the
change must be made through an AD.
We are addressing the issue of
establishing life limits in another AD.
Therefore, the paragraph establishing
life limits is excluded from this AD.
A commenter, HTC, notes the AD
states that this proposal is prompted by
several reports. The commenter states
there are two known reports, both from
the same Canadian operator, and they
received only one of those two reports.
The FAA agrees there were two
reports when AD 2003–24–01 was
issued, and we also note that we
inadvertently called the ‘‘action’’
required by the AD a ‘‘proposal’’.
However, since the AD was issued, we
have received additional reports. We
have reviewed a total of five reports in
making our decision to issue this AD.
Three commenters question the
statement in AD 2003–24–01, paragraph
(a)(2), about recording the total number
of TEs. One commenter asks whether
the AD intent is to require that the pilots
land or record the 100 TEs by taking
their hands off the controls. Another
commenter wants to know the basis for
the 100 external lifts. Another
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commenter states that requiring the
operator to record TEs after 100 external
lifts will add a burden and a penalty to
the operator in having to land and
record the TEs. That same commenter
suggests that they be allowed to record
TE at the end of daily operations.
The FAA partially agrees with the
comments. The AD does not dictate the
flight profile of the helicopter when
recording TEs. It’s up to the operator to
record the TEs. The time required to
record the number of TEs is a negligible
burden. The basis for our initial
assessment was that in any given day
there would be 100 external lift
operations. We have since determined
the use of 100 external lift operations is
not realistic given that some operators
often exceed that number before a single
day of operation. Therefore, after
additional analysis, we have determined
that recording the TEs at the end of each
day’s operation or on or before
accumulating an additional 200 TEs,
whichever occurs first, is sufficient.
One commenter states that AD 98–15–
26 requires recording unknown TEs
using a formula to determine TE against
TIS. In AD 2003–24–01, the operator
must assume a penalty of 13,720 TEs for
blades with unknown TEs. The
commenter expresses concern that at
some future date, the FAA will decide
that these HTC blades must be retired at
a similar TE as the MD blades now have.
The commenter further states that this
could cost operators about $44,000,000.
The FAA has determined that because
of the critical nature of the unsafe
condition, the formula for TEs as
required in AD 98–15–26 would not
adequately address the unsafe
condition. While we cannot rule out
further AD action related to this unsafe
condition, any such action would
require justification and consideration
of the financial impact of that action.
One commenter states the paragraph
in the preamble of the AD that begins
with the statement, ‘‘This unsafe
condition is likely to exist or develop on
other helicopters * * *’’ seems to
indicate that only HTC-built blades
could cause the condition.
The FAA issues an AD when it
believes there is an unsafe condition in
a product and that an unsafe condition
is likely to exist or develop in other
products of the same type design. In AD
2003–24–01, the unsafe condition was
identified as fatigue cracking of the partnumbered blades listed in the
‘‘applicability’’ section and installed as
part of the three listed STCs. These
helicopter models, listed in the
‘‘applicability section’’ with the affected
blades installed, are susceptible to
fatigue cracking of the blades. These
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blades include both MDHI and HTC
blades. Therefore, this AD retains
similar wording for the revised model
helicopters and STCs for helicopters
with blades installed, which are
susceptible to fatigue cracking.
One commenter, HTC, states the
comment period for an NPRM is 1 year.
The commenter asks why is this AD so
urgent when the FAA was so
unconcerned before. The same
commenter also states that they
requested an NPRM more than 16
months ago.
The FAA comment period for an
NPRM is usually 60 days. We issued AD
2003–24–01 as a final rule; request for
comments with a typical 60-day
comment period. Since the original
incident, we have been evaluating the
reports and data as it becomes available
to determine the necessary corrective
action. In addition to the reports of
cracked blades that prompted the AD,
we have received additional reports of
cracked blades. We have determined
that this critical unsafe condition and
the short compliance time to correct it
require an immediate AD.
Two commenters suggest the January
26, 2003, date for receipt of comments
for inclusion in the rules docket may be
a typographical error.
The FAA agrees the date was a
typographical error and should have
been January 26, 2004.
Finally, two commenters state the
FAA should include and cross-reference
the blades specified in the HTC and
MDHI SBs so that operators understand
that the new AD affects both HTC and
MDHI part number (P/N) blades.
The FAA agrees. In this AD, we
include both MDHI and HTC partnumbered blades and cross-reference
the part numbers and the STCs to
clearly show the affected helicopters,
blades, and STC’s.
Since issuing AD 2003–24–01, the
FAA has reviewed MDHI SB369H–
245R2, SB369E–095R2, SB500N–023R2,
SB369D–201R2, SB369F–079R2,
SB600N–031R2, dated February 4, 2004.
The SB contains information about the
blade TEs and determining an
inspection interval. Also, the SB lists
certain MDHI helicopter models and
HTC and MDHI blade part numbers.
HTC superseded Mandatory Notice
No. 2100–3R2, dated December 20,
2002, with Notice No. 2100–3R3, dated
January 5, 2004. Notice No. 2100–3R3
contains information about blade TE
inspections and determining an
inspection interval. The notice
references the information contained in
MDHI CSP–HMI–2, Section 62–10–00,
Main Rotor Blade Torque Event
Inspection. Also, Notice No. 2100–3R3
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‘‘revises the model effectivity and the
scope of the additional inspection with
a 10X glass.’’
Also since issuing AD 2003–24–01,
the FAA determined that STC
SR09184RC approves the installation of
blades, P/N 500P2100–301 and –303,
only, on the MDHI 369A, H, HE, HM,
and HS model helicopters. Based on our
determination, this AD will not apply to
these five model helicopters. Likewise,
the AD will not apply to STC
SR09184RC and blades, P/N 500P2100–
301 and –303. However, we will
establish life limits for these blades in
a subsequent AD.
Also, after further review of the
service information, the FAA has
determined that helicopters modified
under STC SR01050LA, STC
SR09172RC, and STC SR09074RC may
have the affected blades installed.
Therefore, they are included in the
applicability of this AD.
In addition, since issuing AD 2003–
24–01, the FAA has received three
additional reports of incidents of
cracked blades in 2004 and 2005. A
preliminary evaluation of the cracked
blades continues to indicate that the
cracking is related to a high number of
TEs accumulated by the blades. None of
the blades identified in incident reports
that caused the FAA to publish AD
2003–24–01 or this final rule involved
helicopters modified with STC
SR09184RC. Therefore, exclusion of
STC SR09184RC is appropriate because
none of the blades used in that
modification, based on a review of
technical data and accident records,
should be affected by this AD.
An unsafe condition is likely to exist
or develop on other Model 369D, 369E,
369F, 369FF, 500N, and 600N
helicopters of these same type designs
modified with an HTC STC No.
SR09172RC, SR09074RC, or
SR01050LA. Therefore, this AD
supersedes AD 2003–24–01 to require:
• On or before the next 50-hours
time-in-service (TIS), unless
accomplished previously, determine
and record the number of TEs
accumulated on each blade. A TE is the
transition to a hover from forward flight
or any external lift operation. Each
transition to a hover from forward flight
is recorded as a TE, and any external lift
operation is recorded as two TEs.
Forward flight is considered to be flight
at any airspeed (or direction) after
attaining translational lift. If you cannot
determine the number of TEs, assume
13,720. Continue to record the number
of TEs accumulated (actual usage)
throughout the life of the blades and the
hours TIS. On or before accumulating an
additional 200 TEs or at the end of each
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60209
day’s operation, whichever occurs first,
record and update the accumulated TEs
total.
• For each blade that has
accumulated 13,720 or more TEs and
750 or more hours TIS, before further
flight, unless accomplished previously,
and thereafter at intervals not to exceed
200 TEs or 35 hours TIS, whichever
occurs first, perform a main rotor blade
torque event inspection.
• If a crack is found, replace the blade
with an airworthy blade before further
flight.
The short compliance time involved
is required because the previously
described critical unsafe condition can
adversely affect the controllability and
structural integrity of the helicopter.
Some operators not affected by AD
2003–24–01 may have already exceeded
the 13,720 TEs and 750 hours TIS.
Therefore, based on the high usage rate
of some of these model helicopters, the
35-hour TIS or 200 TE inspections may
occur in a short time span, and this AD
must be issued immediately.
Since a situation exists that requires
the immediate adoption of this
regulation, it is found that notice and
opportunity for prior public comment
hereon are impracticable, and that good
cause exists for making this amendment
effective in less than 30 days.
The FAA estimates that this AD will:
• Affect 886 helicopters of U.S.
registry;
• Take about 1 work hour per
helicopter for inspecting blades,
assuming 9000 TE inspections for 10
percent of the fleet, at an average labor
rate of $65 per work hour;
• Cost about $50,000 for one set of
blades (on condition), assuming 10
percent of the fleet has blades that are
replaced; and
• Have paperwork costs that are
negligible.
Based on these figures, we estimate
the total cost impact of the AD on U.S.
operators is $56,261,000, assuming 10
percent of the fleet is affected.
Comments Invited
Although this action is in the form of
a final rule that involves requirements
affecting flight safety and, thus, was not
preceded by notice and an opportunity
for public comment, comments are
invited on this rule. Interested persons
are invited to comment on this rule by
submitting such written data, views, or
arguments as they may desire.
Communications should identify the
Rules Docket number and be submitted
in triplicate to the FAA, Office of the
Regional Counsel, Southwest Region,
2601 Meacham Blvd., Room 663, Fort
Worth, Texas. All communications
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60210
Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 199 / Monday, October 17, 2005 / Rules and Regulations
received on or before the closing date
for comments will be considered, and
this rule may be amended in light of the
comments received. Factual information
that supports the commenter’s ideas and
suggestions is extremely helpful in
evaluating the effectiveness of the AD
action and determining whether
additional rulemaking action would be
needed.
Comments are specifically invited on
the overall regulatory, economic,
environmental, and energy aspects of
the rule that might suggest a need to
modify the rule. All comments
submitted will be available in the Rules
Docket for examination by interested
persons. A report that summarizes each
FAA-public contact concerned with the
substance of this AD will be filed in the
Rules Docket.
Commenters wishing the FAA to
acknowledge receipt of their mailed
comments submitted in response to this
rule must submit a self-addressed,
stamped postcard on which the
following statement is made:
‘‘Comments to Docket No. 2004–SW–
13–AD.’’ The postcard will be date
stamped and returned to the
commenter.
Regulatory Findings
The regulations adopted herein will
not have a substantial direct effect on
the States, on the relationship between
the national Government and the States,
or on the distribution of power and
responsibilities among the various
levels of government. Therefore, it is
determined that this final rule does not
have federalism implications under
Executive Order 13132.
The FAA has determined that this
regulation is an emergency regulation
that must be issued immediately to
correct an unsafe condition in aircraft,
and that it is not a ‘‘significant
regulatory action’’ under Executive
Order 12866. It has been determined
further that this action involves an
emergency regulation under DOT
Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44
FR 11034, February 26, 1979). If it is
determined that this emergency
regulation otherwise would be
significant under DOT Regulatory
Policies and Procedures, a final
regulatory evaluation will be prepared
and placed in the Rules Docket. A copy
of it, if filed, may be obtained from the
Rules Docket at the location provided
under the caption ADDRESSES.
MDHI blade part No. (P/N)
500N ........................................................................
600N ........................................................................
14:06 Oct 14, 2005
Jkt 208001
Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation
safety, Safety.
Adoption of the Amendment
Accordingly, pursuant to the authority
delegated to me by the Administrator,
the Federal Aviation Administration
amends part 39 of the Federal Aviation
Regulations (14 CFR part 39) as follows:
I
PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS
DIRECTIVES
1. The authority citation for part 39
continues to read as follows:
I
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.
Title 49 of the United States Code
specifies the FAA’s authority to issue
rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I,
section 106, describes the authority of
the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII,
Aviation Programs, describes in more
detail the scope of the Agency’s
authority.
We are issuing this rulemaking under
the authority described in subtitle VII,
part A, subpart III, section 44701,
‘‘General requirements.’’ Under that
section, Congress charges the FAA with
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in
air commerce by prescribing regulations
for practices, methods, and procedures
the Administrator finds necessary for
safety in air commerce. This regulation
is within the scope of that authority
because it addresses an unsafe condition
369D ........................................................................
369E .........................................................................
369F, FF ..................................................................
VerDate Aug<31>2005
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39
Authority for This Rulemaking
Helicopter model
Note 1: The terms ‘‘BSC’’ and ‘‘Basic’’ are
interchangeable when identifying blades
produced by MDHI and HTC.
Compliance: Required as indicated.
To detect fatigue cracking of the blade to
prevent blade failure and subsequent loss of
control of the helicopter, accomplish the
following:
(a) On or before the next 50 hours time-inservice (TIS), unless accomplished
previously:
(1) Determine and record the number of
torque events accumulated on each blade. A
torque event (TE) is the transition to a hover
from forward flight or any external lift
that is likely to exist or develop on
products identified in this rulemaking
action.
369D21100 Basic, –516, –517,
369D21120–501,
369D21102 Basic, –503, –517,
369D21121–501,
369D21102–503, –517,
369D21121–501,
369D21102–517,
369D21121–501,
Frm 00008
Fmt 4700
Sfmt 4700
[Amended]
2. Section 39.13 is amended by
removing Amendment 39–13370 (68 FR
66004, November 25, 2003), and by
adding a new airworthiness directive
(AD), Amendment 39–14340, to read as
follows:
I
2005–21–02 MD Helicopters, Inc.:
Amendment 39–14340. Docket No.
2004–SW–13–AD. Supersedes AD 2003–
24–01, Amendment 39–13770, Docket
No. 2003–SW–16–AD.
Applicability: Models 369D, 369E, 369F,
369FF, 500N, or 600N with either an MD
Helicopter, Inc. (MDHI) main rotor blade
(blade) installed or modified with Helicopter
Technology Company, LLC (HTC),
Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) No.
SR09172RC, SR09074RC, or SR01050LA with
an HTC blade installed as listed in the
following table, certificated in any category:
HTC blade P/N
–523
–503
–523
–503
–523
–503
–523
–503
operation. Each transition to a hover from
forward flight is recorded as a TE, and any
external lift operation is recorded as two TEs.
Forward flight is considered to be flight at
any airspeed (or direction) after attaining
translational lift. If you cannot determine the
number of TEs, use 13,720 TEs.
(2) Continue to record the number of TEs
accumulated (actual usage) throughout the
life of the blades along with hours TIS. On
or before accumulating an additional 200 TEs
or at the end of each day’s operations,
whichever occurs first, record and update the
accumulated TEs total.
PO 00000
§ 39.13
HTC STC Nos.
500P2100–BSC, –BSC–1
500P2100–101, –103
500P2300–501, –503
SR09172RC
SR09074RC
SR01050LA
500P2300–501, –503
SR01050LA
500P2300–501, –503
SR01050LA
(b) For each blade that has accumulated
13,720 or more TEs and 750 or more hours
TIS, before further flight, unless
accomplished previously, and thereafter at
intervals not to exceed 200 TEs or 35 hours
TIS, whichever occurs first, perform a main
rotor blade torque event inspection.
Note 2: MD Helicopters, Inc. Maintenance
Manual CSP–HMI–2, Revision 36, section
62–10–00, paragraph 8, Main Rotor Blade
Torque Event Inspection, pertains to the
subject of this AD.
(c) If a crack is found, replace the blade
with an airworthy blade before further flight.
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Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 199 / Monday, October 17, 2005 / Rules and Regulations
Note 3: MDHI Maintenance Manual CSP–
HMI–2, Section 20–30–00 Main Rotor Blade
Painting pertains to the subject of this AD.
This section of the maintenance manual
recommends painting the inboard 24 inches
(not to be exceeded) of the blade gloss white
to aid in detecting a crack; and if this is done,
painting all blades alike and rebalancing
them.
Note 4: TEs are used only to establish an
additional inspection interval and not to
establish an alternative retirement life.
(d) To request a different method of
compliance or a different compliance time
for this AD, follow the procedures in 14 CFR
39.19. Contact the Los Angeles Aircraft
Certification Office, Transport Airplane
Directorate, for information about previously
approved alternative methods of compliance.
Note 5: Complying with the inspection
procedures in the Accomplishment
Instructions, paragraphs 2.B.(2). and 2.B.(3).,
of MD Helicopter Inc. Service Bulletin (SB)
SB369H–245R2, SB369E–095R2, SB500N–
023R2, SB369D–201R2, SB369F–079R2,
SB600N–031R2, dated February 4, 2004,
constitutes an approved alternative method
of conducting the inspection required by
paragraph (b) of this AD.
Note 6: Complying with the Inspection
Instructions procedures in paragraphs 2 and
3 of HTC Mandatory SB, Notice No. 2100–
3R3, dated January 5, 2004, constitutes an
approved alternative method of conducting
the inspection required by paragraph (b) of
this AD.
(e) This amendment becomes effective on
November 1, 2005.
Issued in Fort Worth, Texas, on October 7,
2005.
David A. Downey,
Manager, Rotorcraft Directorate, Aircraft
Certification Service.
[FR Doc. 05–20678 Filed 10–14–05; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–13–P
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. 96–ANE–35–AD; Amendment
39–14339; AD 2005–21–01]
RIN 2120–AA64
Airworthiness Directives; Pratt &
Whitney JT8D–200 Series Turbofan
Engines
Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Final rule.
AGENCY:
SUMMARY: This amendment supersedes
an existing airworthiness directive (AD)
that applies to Pratt & Whitney (PW)
JT8D–200 series turbofan engines. That
AD currently requires installing and
periodically inspecting individual or
sets of certain part number (P/N)
VerDate Aug<31>2005
14:06 Oct 14, 2005
Jkt 208001
temperature indicators on the No. 4 and
5 bearing compartment scavenge oil
tube and performance of any necessary
corrective action. This AD requires
installing and periodically inspecting
two temperature indicators on all PW
JT8D–200 series turbofan engines,
including those incorporating high
pressure turbine (HPT) containment
hardware. This AD results from five
uncontained HPT shaft failures. We are
issuing this AD to prevent oil fires and
the resulting fracture of the HPT shaft
which can result in uncontained release
of engine fragments; engine fire; inflight engine shutdown; and possible
airplane damage.
DATES: This AD becomes effective
November 21, 2005. The Director of the
Federal Register approved the
incorporation by reference of certain
publications listed in the regulations as
of November 21, 2005.
ADDRESSES: You can get the service
information identified in this AD from
Pratt & Whitney, 400 Main St., East
Hartford, CT 06108; telephone (860)
565–7700, fax (860) 565–1605.
You may examine the AD docket at
the FAA, New England Region, Office of
the Regional Counsel, 12 New England
Executive Park, Burlington, MA. You
may examine the service information, at
the FAA, New England Region, Office of
the Regional Counsel, 12 New England
Executive Park, Burlington, MA.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Keith Lardie, Aerospace Engineer,
Engine Certification Office, FAA, Engine
and Propeller Directorate, 12 New
England Executive Park, Burlington, MA
01803–5299; telephone (781) 238–7189,
fax (781) 238–7199.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The FAA
proposed to amend 14 CFR part 39 by
superseding AD 97–19–13, Amendment
39–10134 (62 FR 49135, September 19,
1997). The proposed AD applies to PW
JT8D–200 series turbofan engines. We
published the proposed AD in the
Federal Register on September 29, 2004
(69 FR 58099). That action proposed to
require installing and periodically
inspecting two P/N 810486 temperature
indicators on all PW JT8D–200 series
turbofan engines, including those
incorporating HPT containment
hardware. Thirteen HPT shaft fractures
resulted in five uncontained HPT shaft
failures. The HPT shafts fractured
through the No. 41⁄2 oil return holes due
to oil fires within the No. 4 and 5
bearing compartment.
Examining the AD Docket
You may examine the AD Docket
(including any comments and service
information), by appointment, between
PO 00000
Frm 00009
Fmt 4700
Sfmt 4700
60211
8 a.m. and 4:30 p.m., Monday through
Friday, except Federal holidays. See
ADDRESSES for the location.
Comments
We provided the public the
opportunity to participate in the
development of this AD. We have
considered the comments received.
Concerns Over Considering the Engine
Unserviceable
Four commenters state that an engine
should not be considered unserviceable
and the engine removed from service if
both temperature indicators are missing.
The commenters state that we should
allow installing new temperature
indicators followed by a ground
diagnostic test before further flight.
One of those commenters states that
considering the engine unserviceable
imposes an undue hardship on
operators. If one of the indicators is
missing, PW Alert Service Bulletin
(ASB) No. JT8D A5944 requires that the
engine be tested using specific
instructions to determine its
serviceability and the engine be
dispositioned accordingly. The theory
used for one indicator missing is that
the serviceability of the engine is now
questionable and the engine must be
proven serviceable before it can be
returned to service. The commenter
further states that any time engine
serviceability is in question, it must be
proven and cannot be assumed.
Requiring operators to remove the
engine from service, simply because
both of the indicators are missing, forces
operators into a position without
recourse. The commenter further states
that this is the same condition already
covered when one indicator is missing.
The procedure to determine
serviceability for both indicators
missing should follow the procedure for
one indicator missing but with minor
changes.
We agree. We have changed the
compliance section of the AD to allow
a ground diagnostic test before further
flight if both temperature indicators are
missing.
AD Instructions Not Clear
One commenter states that the AD
instructions for a missing indicator are
not clear. The instructions for one
indicator missing assume that the
missing indicator has a red window that
has turned black. The commenter asks
if the yellow window of the missing
indicator should be assumed to be
normal color or black. The condition of
the remaining indicator would make a
difference as to whether a diagnostic
E:\FR\FM\17OCR1.SGM
17OCR1
]]>Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 70, Number 199 (Monday, October 17, 2005)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 60206-60211]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 05-20678]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. 2004-SW-13-AD; Amendment 39-14340; AD 2005-21-02]
RIN 2120-AA64
Airworthiness Directives; MD Helicopters, Inc. Model 369D, 369E,
369F, 369FF, 500N, and 600N Helicopters
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration, DOT.
ACTION: Final rule; request for comments.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive
(AD) for the MD Helicopters, Inc. (MDHI) Model 369A, H, HE, HM, HS, D,
and E helicopters with a certain part-numbered main rotor blade (blade)
and modified with a Helicopter Technology Company, LLC (HTC),
Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) No. SR09172RC, SR09074RC, or
SR09184RC. That AD currently requires recording on the component
history card or equivalent record (record) each torque event (TE) on
each blade, inspecting both surfaces of the blade, and replacing any
cracked blade with an airworthy blade. Also, that AD establishes life
limits for certain part-numbered blades. This amendment revises the
model applicability, adds MDHI part-numbered blades, removes any
reference to the life limits of the blades, changes the requirements
for inspecting the blades, and revises the STC applicability. This
amendment also provides that compliance with portions of certain
documents constitutes alternative methods of compliance with portions
of this AD, contains editorial changes for clarification, and makes
some corrections. This amendment is prompted by additional reports of
cracked blades and by the comments received in response to AD 2003-24-
01. The actions specified in this AD are intended to detect fatigue
cracking of the blade to prevent blade failure and subsequent loss of
control of the helicopter.
DATES: Effective November 1, 2005. Comments for inclusion in the Rules
Docket must be received on or before December 16, 2005.
ADDRESSES: Submit comments in triplicate to the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), Office of the Regional Counsel, Southwest Region,
Attention: Rules Docket No. 2004-SW-13-AD, 2601 Meacham Blvd., Room
663, Fort Worth, Texas 76137. You may also send comments electronically
to the Rules Docket at the following address: 9-asw-adcomments@faa.gov.
The service information referenced in this AD may be obtained from
the following addresses: MD Helicopters Inc., Attn: Customer Support
Division, 4555 E. McDowell Rd., Mail Stop M615, Mesa, Arizona 85215-
9734, telephone 1-800-388-3378, fax 480-346-6813, or on the Web at
https://www.mdhelicopters.com and Helicopter Technology Company, LLC,
12902 South Broadway, Los Angeles, CA 90061, telephone 310-523-2750,
fax 310-523-2745.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: John Cecil, Aviation Safety Engineer,
FAA, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, Airframe Branch, 3960
Paramount Blvd., Lakewood, California 90712-4137, telephone (562) 627-
5228, fax (562) 627-5210.
[[Page 60207]]
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On November 17, 2003, the FAA issued AD
2003-24-01, Amendment 39-13370 (68 FR 66004, November 25, 2003), to
require recording TE and inspecting certain blades with 13,720 TEs and
750 hours TIS. The AD also requires replacing any cracked blade with an
airworthy blade. Also, the AD revises the Limitations and Conditions of
HTC, LLC, STC Nos. SR09172RC, SR09074RC, and SR09184RC by establishing
life limits for certain part-numbered blades. The AD was prompted by
reports of certain blades cracking due to a higher number of TEs per
hour than originally calculated. This condition, if not corrected,
could result in fatigue cracking of the blade, blade failure, and
subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
Interested persons were afforded an opportunity to participate in
the making of AD 2003-24-01. The FAA received several comments from 10
commenters. We have given due consideration to the comments received.
One commenter, the manufacturer (MDHI), states the scope of the AD
should be expanded to add the OH-6A designation immediately after the
model to read ``Model 369A (OH-6A), H, etc.''
The FAA disagrees that we should add the Model OH-6A. We included
STC No. SR09184RC and the Model 369A (OH-6A), H, HE, HM, and HS
helicopters to AD 2003-24-01 in error. We have reviewed reports,
summaries about rates of use, incident reports, certification data,
weight limits, and other information from the manufacturer. These
models may have the affected part-numbered blades installed. However,
the data shows that even with a higher than expected number of TEs,
these models have approved operating limitations that assume operations
at maximum gross weight and are conservative enough to compensate for
the higher TEs. We have received no reports of these blades cracking in
the areas affected by this AD. These blades should reach their
retirement lives based on hours TIS before the number of TEs results in
cracks in the affected area. Also, we have determined that we should
have included STC No. SR01050LA and the Model 369F, FF, 500N, and 600N
helicopters in the AD applicability. Our data shows the unsafe
condition addressed by this AD correlates to a flight profile with a
higher number of TEs than expected during certification (six TEs per
hour). The Model 369D, E, F, FF, 500N and 600N helicopters, with a
higher gross weight limit, fit that profile. Therefore, we have
determined that this AD should apply only to the Model 369D, E, F, FF,
500N and 600N helicopters.
Five commenters state the new definition of a TE in AD 2003-24-01
is inconsistent with the definition given in other ADs and in a service
letter. One commenter, MDHI, states the new definition is likely to
cause confusion.
The FAA agrees. The definition introduced in AD 2003-24-01 is
inconsistent with previously issued ADs and could unnecessarily burden
and confuse the operators. Therefore, we have changed the definition to
make it consistent with the definition of a TE as that term is defined
in AD 98-15-26, Amendment 39-10675, Docket 98-SW-22-AD. The TE
definition in AD 98-15-26 is also consistent with the definition in
MDHI Service Letter SL369H-132R1, SL369D-111R1, SL369E-063R1, SL369F-
056R1, SL500N-008R1, and SL600N-005R1, dated May 15, 2001.
One commenter asks that the word ``reliably'' be added to the AD
paragraph requiring operators to determine the number of TEs. The
commenter states that FAA approved service information reads,
``operators who cannot reliably determine the actual number of TEs for
a blade * * *.''
The FAA does not agree. The word ``reliably'' is subjective and
does not assist operators in determining accumulated TEs. The
requirement is that operators determine actual TEs or assume 13,720
accumulated TEs.
One commenter, MDHI, states the actions in the AD do not prevent
cracks but mandate a 35-hour repetitive inspection to detect cracks
before blade failure.
The FAA agrees. The AD wording is revised to read: ``The actions
specified in this AD are intended to detect fatigue cracking to prevent
* * *''
Four commenters do not agree with the blade inspection
requirements. One commenter states the inspection is unnecessary. The
four commenters state the use of a 10X or higher magnifying glass is
unnecessary and that cracks have been found without the use of a
magnifying glass. Three commenters ask if pilots can do the inspections
instead of a mechanic.
The FAA disagrees and has determined the inspection is necessary
because the affected blades on these model helicopters continue to
crack. The manufacturer has not identified a permanent modification but
has identified TE counting or replacing the blade as a corrective
measure. The FAA has also determined that a 10X or higher magnifying
glass is necessary to detect a chord-wise crack protruding from under
the root fitting and doubler on the bottom-side of the blade to prevent
blade failure because these cracks may not be detectable without a 10X
magnifying glass until they are near failure. Current FAA policy does
not allow pilots to do these inspections. Pilots may only perform
simple visual checks authorized by the AD. Pilots may perform checks
that do not require the use of tools, precision measuring equipment,
training, pilot logbook endorsements, or the use of or reference to
technical data not contained in the body of the AD. The inspection in
the AD requires the use of a 10X or higher magnifying glass, which is
not considered a simple visual check.
One commenter states that an eddy current inspection is effective
in detecting cracks in the ``C'' channel of certain blades. The
commenter states the FAA may want to consider having the manufacturer
incorporate an eddy current inspection into the maintenance
instructions for all blades.
The FAA does not agree that an eddy current inspection is necessary
to detect a crack in the blade in the areas specified in this AD. We
have determined the cracks can be detected in the specified areas by
inspecting the blades using a 10X or higher magnifying glass.
Two commenters suggest the service bulletins and their amendments,
created by MDHI and HTC, are adequate to address the unsafe condition.
One of those commenters states that normally an AD is coordinated with
the manufacturer who produces a service bulletin (SB) and the FAA backs
it up with an AD stating the operators must comply. That commenter
further states that the idea of an AD should be to address an issue the
manufacturer is either unaware of or has not addressed.
The FAA is responsible for determining which portions, if any, of
an SB to incorporate in an AD and any additional requirements necessary
to correct the unsafe condition. Even though an SB may address an
unsafe condition, an AD mandates compliance with the actions specified
in the SB by all affected operators. While we generally seek technical
information from the manufacturer, we neither solicit the
manufacturer's assistance in drafting an AD nor its consent before
issuing an AD. However, we do note in this AD that complying with
certain portions of certain documents constitutes an approved
alternative method of compliance for certain parts of this AD.
One commenter states that only a few companies consistently have
cracked blades. That commenter suggests that we should look at those
companies. The same commenter states an AD is not
[[Page 60208]]
needed because the maintenance manual criteria are sufficient to detect
a cracked blade.
The FAA partially concurs with the commenter. The commenter is
correct in that most cracked blades do appear to occur as a result of
the operations of a relatively few operators. However, the affected
blades from these relatively few operators may be placed on any of the
affected model helicopters regardless of their previous use. Thus, the
AD must include all affected model helicopters. Although we agree that
the maintenance manual criteria are sufficient to detect a cracked
blade, we do not agree that the AD is not needed. The AD requires
determining and recording the number of TEs accumulated on each blade
and provides the required time intervals to perform the inspections. We
have determined the affected blades must be inspected to determine if a
crack exists at the required TEs or hours TIS.
One commenter, MDHI, states that it disagrees that specific blade
station inspections are any more meaningful than the area described as
``* * * around the root fitting, doubler and skin * * *.''
The FAA, upon reconsideration, agrees and no longer refers to the
six blade stations because the reference is not necessary to identify
the required inspection area.
One commenter, the blade manufacturer, HTC, states the instructions
in paragraph (b)(2) of AD 2003-24-01 ``(parallel to the blade) from the
center of the root fitting and lead lag attach bolt-holes closest to
the trailing edge,'' are confusing. The commenter asks if the direction
is perhaps ``span wise'' and states that the trailing edge of the blade
is not relevant. The commenter also states the instructions will cause
many operators to perform the inspection in the wrong areas.
The FAA included the specific measurements, reference points, and
directions in paragraph (b)(2) of AD 2003-24-01 to provide the mechanic
the location of the specific blade stations stated in HTC SB No. 2100-
3R2. To simplify these instructions, we have decided to remove the
specific locations from the AD and include a figure that depicts the
blade inspection area.
Six commenters commented on the cost analysis stating the AD poses
an economic burden on operators. One commenter states it will cause a
hardship on the industry. Another commenter states it will not be
economically feasible. Another commenter states the AD will put
operators out of work and force them to switch to other aircraft types.
Another commenter states the AD will cause an increase in paperwork.
Another commenter asks what is the basis for the cost of the blades and
the number of additional inspections. Another commenter states the
economic impact should be redone using realistic blade rejections due
to fatigue cracks.
While the FAA must consider the economic burdens caused by issuing
an AD, the primary purpose of an AD is to correct an unsafe condition.
We did, however, reassess the cost analysis as a result of the
comments. Therefore, we are assuming a total of 9000 TE inspections and
blade replacements will be required for 10 percent of the fleet. Also,
we have determined the paperwork costs will be negligible.
A commenter, HTC, states the AD establishes life limits for certain
blades that already have published service lives, the action is FAA
approved, and the life limits are contained in Maintenance Manual HTCM-
001.
The FAA agrees with the commenters statements. When the life limits
were originally issued, they were inadvertently omitted from the
Limitations and Conditions of HTC, LLC, STC Nos. SR09172RC, SR01050LA,
and SR09184RC. The STCs were amended and now include the life limits.
However, the life limits can only be established in an AD because a
change to a life limit appearing only in a manual or on type
certificate data sheets, even if FAA-approved, does not require
compliance by the pilot or operator. To be legally required, the change
must be made through an AD. We are addressing the issue of establishing
life limits in another AD. Therefore, the paragraph establishing life
limits is excluded from this AD.
A commenter, HTC, notes the AD states that this proposal is
prompted by several reports. The commenter states there are two known
reports, both from the same Canadian operator, and they received only
one of those two reports.
The FAA agrees there were two reports when AD 2003-24-01 was
issued, and we also note that we inadvertently called the ``action''
required by the AD a ``proposal''. However, since the AD was issued, we
have received additional reports. We have reviewed a total of five
reports in making our decision to issue this AD.
Three commenters question the statement in AD 2003-24-01, paragraph
(a)(2), about recording the total number of TEs. One commenter asks
whether the AD intent is to require that the pilots land or record the
100 TEs by taking their hands off the controls. Another commenter wants
to know the basis for the 100 external lifts. Another commenter states
that requiring the operator to record TEs after 100 external lifts will
add a burden and a penalty to the operator in having to land and record
the TEs. That same commenter suggests that they be allowed to record TE
at the end of daily operations.
The FAA partially agrees with the comments. The AD does not dictate
the flight profile of the helicopter when recording TEs. It's up to the
operator to record the TEs. The time required to record the number of
TEs is a negligible burden. The basis for our initial assessment was
that in any given day there would be 100 external lift operations. We
have since determined the use of 100 external lift operations is not
realistic given that some operators often exceed that number before a
single day of operation. Therefore, after additional analysis, we have
determined that recording the TEs at the end of each day's operation or
on or before accumulating an additional 200 TEs, whichever occurs
first, is sufficient.
One commenter states that AD 98-15-26 requires recording unknown
TEs using a formula to determine TE against TIS. In AD 2003-24-01, the
operator must assume a penalty of 13,720 TEs for blades with unknown
TEs. The commenter expresses concern that at some future date, the FAA
will decide that these HTC blades must be retired at a similar TE as
the MD blades now have. The commenter further states that this could
cost operators about $44,000,000.
The FAA has determined that because of the critical nature of the
unsafe condition, the formula for TEs as required in AD 98-15-26 would
not adequately address the unsafe condition. While we cannot rule out
further AD action related to this unsafe condition, any such action
would require justification and consideration of the financial impact
of that action.
One commenter states the paragraph in the preamble of the AD that
begins with the statement, ``This unsafe condition is likely to exist
or develop on other helicopters * * *'' seems to indicate that only
HTC-built blades could cause the condition.
The FAA issues an AD when it believes there is an unsafe condition
in a product and that an unsafe condition is likely to exist or develop
in other products of the same type design. In AD 2003-24-01, the unsafe
condition was identified as fatigue cracking of the part-numbered
blades listed in the ``applicability'' section and installed as part of
the three listed STCs. These helicopter models, listed in the
``applicability section'' with the affected blades installed, are
susceptible to fatigue cracking of the blades. These
[[Page 60209]]
blades include both MDHI and HTC blades. Therefore, this AD retains
similar wording for the revised model helicopters and STCs for
helicopters with blades installed, which are susceptible to fatigue
cracking.
One commenter, HTC, states the comment period for an NPRM is 1
year. The commenter asks why is this AD so urgent when the FAA was so
unconcerned before. The same commenter also states that they requested
an NPRM more than 16 months ago.
The FAA comment period for an NPRM is usually 60 days. We issued AD
2003-24-01 as a final rule; request for comments with a typical 60-day
comment period. Since the original incident, we have been evaluating
the reports and data as it becomes available to determine the necessary
corrective action. In addition to the reports of cracked blades that
prompted the AD, we have received additional reports of cracked blades.
We have determined that this critical unsafe condition and the short
compliance time to correct it require an immediate AD.
Two commenters suggest the January 26, 2003, date for receipt of
comments for inclusion in the rules docket may be a typographical
error.
The FAA agrees the date was a typographical error and should have
been January 26, 2004.
Finally, two commenters state the FAA should include and cross-
reference the blades specified in the HTC and MDHI SBs so that
operators understand that the new AD affects both HTC and MDHI part
number (P/N) blades.
The FAA agrees. In this AD, we include both MDHI and HTC part-
numbered blades and cross-reference the part numbers and the STCs to
clearly show the affected helicopters, blades, and STC's.
Since issuing AD 2003-24-01, the FAA has reviewed MDHI SB369H-
245R2, SB369E-095R2, SB500N-023R2, SB369D-201R2, SB369F-079R2, SB600N-
031R2, dated February 4, 2004. The SB contains information about the
blade TEs and determining an inspection interval. Also, the SB lists
certain MDHI helicopter models and HTC and MDHI blade part numbers.
HTC superseded Mandatory Notice No. 2100-3R2, dated December 20,
2002, with Notice No. 2100-3R3, dated January 5, 2004. Notice No. 2100-
3R3 contains information about blade TE inspections and determining an
inspection interval. The notice references the information contained in
MDHI CSP-HMI-2, Section 62-10-00, Main Rotor Blade Torque Event
Inspection. Also, Notice No. 2100-3R3 ``revises the model effectivity
and the scope of the additional inspection with a 10X glass.''
Also since issuing AD 2003-24-01, the FAA determined that STC
SR09184RC approves the installation of blades, P/N 500P2100-301 and -
303, only, on the MDHI 369A, H, HE, HM, and HS model helicopters. Based
on our determination, this AD will not apply to these five model
helicopters. Likewise, the AD will not apply to STC SR09184RC and
blades, P/N 500P2100-301 and -303. However, we will establish life
limits for these blades in a subsequent AD.
Also, after further review of the service information, the FAA has
determined that helicopters modified under STC SR01050LA, STC
SR09172RC, and STC SR09074RC may have the affected blades installed.
Therefore, they are included in the applicability of this AD.
In addition, since issuing AD 2003-24-01, the FAA has received
three additional reports of incidents of cracked blades in 2004 and
2005. A preliminary evaluation of the cracked blades continues to
indicate that the cracking is related to a high number of TEs
accumulated by the blades. None of the blades identified in incident
reports that caused the FAA to publish AD 2003-24-01 or this final rule
involved helicopters modified with STC SR09184RC. Therefore, exclusion
of STC SR09184RC is appropriate because none of the blades used in that
modification, based on a review of technical data and accident records,
should be affected by this AD.
An unsafe condition is likely to exist or develop on other Model
369D, 369E, 369F, 369FF, 500N, and 600N helicopters of these same type
designs modified with an HTC STC No. SR09172RC, SR09074RC, or
SR01050LA. Therefore, this AD supersedes AD 2003-24-01 to require:
On or before the next 50-hours time-in-service (TIS),
unless accomplished previously, determine and record the number of TEs
accumulated on each blade. A TE is the transition to a hover from
forward flight or any external lift operation. Each transition to a
hover from forward flight is recorded as a TE, and any external lift
operation is recorded as two TEs. Forward flight is considered to be
flight at any airspeed (or direction) after attaining translational
lift. If you cannot determine the number of TEs, assume 13,720.
Continue to record the number of TEs accumulated (actual usage)
throughout the life of the blades and the hours TIS. On or before
accumulating an additional 200 TEs or at the end of each day's
operation, whichever occurs first, record and update the accumulated
TEs total.
For each blade that has accumulated 13,720 or more TEs and
750 or more hours TIS, before further flight, unless accomplished
previously, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 200 TEs or 35
hours TIS, whichever occurs first, perform a main rotor blade torque
event inspection.
If a crack is found, replace the blade with an airworthy
blade before further flight.
The short compliance time involved is required because the
previously described critical unsafe condition can adversely affect the
controllability and structural integrity of the helicopter. Some
operators not affected by AD 2003-24-01 may have already exceeded the
13,720 TEs and 750 hours TIS. Therefore, based on the high usage rate
of some of these model helicopters, the 35-hour TIS or 200 TE
inspections may occur in a short time span, and this AD must be issued
immediately.
Since a situation exists that requires the immediate adoption of
this regulation, it is found that notice and opportunity for prior
public comment hereon are impracticable, and that good cause exists for
making this amendment effective in less than 30 days.
The FAA estimates that this AD will:
Affect 886 helicopters of U.S. registry;
Take about 1 work hour per helicopter for inspecting
blades, assuming 9000 TE inspections for 10 percent of the fleet, at an
average labor rate of $65 per work hour;
Cost about $50,000 for one set of blades (on condition),
assuming 10 percent of the fleet has blades that are replaced; and
Have paperwork costs that are negligible.
Based on these figures, we estimate the total cost impact of the AD
on U.S. operators is $56,261,000, assuming 10 percent of the fleet is
affected.
Comments Invited
Although this action is in the form of a final rule that involves
requirements affecting flight safety and, thus, was not preceded by
notice and an opportunity for public comment, comments are invited on
this rule. Interested persons are invited to comment on this rule by
submitting such written data, views, or arguments as they may desire.
Communications should identify the Rules Docket number and be submitted
in triplicate to the FAA, Office of the Regional Counsel, Southwest
Region, 2601 Meacham Blvd., Room 663, Fort Worth, Texas. All
communications
[[Page 60210]]
received on or before the closing date for comments will be considered,
and this rule may be amended in light of the comments received. Factual
information that supports the commenter's ideas and suggestions is
extremely helpful in evaluating the effectiveness of the AD action and
determining whether additional rulemaking action would be needed.
Comments are specifically invited on the overall regulatory,
economic, environmental, and energy aspects of the rule that might
suggest a need to modify the rule. All comments submitted will be
available in the Rules Docket for examination by interested persons. A
report that summarizes each FAA-public contact concerned with the
substance of this AD will be filed in the Rules Docket.
Commenters wishing the FAA to acknowledge receipt of their mailed
comments submitted in response to this rule must submit a self-
addressed, stamped postcard on which the following statement is made:
``Comments to Docket No. 2004-SW-13-AD.'' The postcard will be date
stamped and returned to the commenter.
Regulatory Findings
The regulations adopted herein will not have a substantial direct
effect on the States, on the relationship between the national
Government and the States, or on the distribution of power and
responsibilities among the various levels of government. Therefore, it
is determined that this final rule does not have federalism
implications under Executive Order 13132.
The FAA has determined that this regulation is an emergency
regulation that must be issued immediately to correct an unsafe
condition in aircraft, and that it is not a ``significant regulatory
action'' under Executive Order 12866. It has been determined further
that this action involves an emergency regulation under DOT Regulatory
Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979). If it is
determined that this emergency regulation otherwise would be
significant under DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures, a final
regulatory evaluation will be prepared and placed in the Rules Docket.
A copy of it, if filed, may be obtained from the Rules Docket at the
location provided under the caption ADDRESSES.
Authority for This Rulemaking
Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the
authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII, Aviation Programs,
describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.
We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in
subtitle VII, part A, subpart III, section 44701, ``General
requirements.'' Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing
regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator
finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within
the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition
that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this
rulemaking action.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39
Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Safety.
Adoption of the Amendment
0
Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the
Administrator, the Federal Aviation Administration amends part 39 of
the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) as follows:
PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES
0
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.
Sec. 39.13 [Amended]
0
2. Section 39.13 is amended by removing Amendment 39-13370 (68 FR
66004, November 25, 2003), and by adding a new airworthiness directive
(AD), Amendment 39-14340, to read as follows:
2005-21-02 MD Helicopters, Inc.: Amendment 39-14340. Docket No.
2004-SW-13-AD. Supersedes AD 2003-24-01, Amendment 39-13770, Docket
No. 2003-SW-16-AD.
Applicability: Models 369D, 369E, 369F, 369FF, 500N, or 600N
with either an MD Helicopter, Inc. (MDHI) main rotor blade (blade)
installed or modified with Helicopter Technology Company, LLC (HTC),
Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) No. SR09172RC, SR09074RC, or
SR01050LA with an HTC blade installed as listed in the following
table, certificated in any category:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Helicopter model MDHI blade part No. (P/N) HTC blade P/N HTC STC Nos.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
369D............................................................... 369D21100 Basic, -516, -517, -523 500P2100-BSC, -BSC-1 SR09172RC
369E............................................................... 369D21120-501, -503 500P2100-101, -103 SR09074RC
369F, FF........................................................... 369D21102 Basic, -503, -517, -523 500P2300-501, -503 SR01050LA
369D21121-501, -503 ............................ .................
500N............................................................... 369D21102-503, -517, -523 500P2300-501, -503 SR01050LA
369D21121-501, -503 ............................ .................
600N............................................................... 369D21102-517, -523 500P2300-501, -503 SR01050LA
369D21121-501, -503
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note 1: The terms ``BSC'' and ``Basic'' are interchangeable when
identifying blades produced by MDHI and HTC.
Compliance: Required as indicated.
To detect fatigue cracking of the blade to prevent blade failure
and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter, accomplish the
following:
(a) On or before the next 50 hours time-in-service (TIS), unless
accomplished previously:
(1) Determine and record the number of torque events accumulated
on each blade. A torque event (TE) is the transition to a hover from
forward flight or any external lift operation. Each transition to a
hover from forward flight is recorded as a TE, and any external lift
operation is recorded as two TEs. Forward flight is considered to be
flight at any airspeed (or direction) after attaining translational
lift. If you cannot determine the number of TEs, use 13,720 TEs.
(2) Continue to record the number of TEs accumulated (actual
usage) throughout the life of the blades along with hours TIS. On or
before accumulating an additional 200 TEs or at the end of each
day's operations, whichever occurs first, record and update the
accumulated TEs total.
(b) For each blade that has accumulated 13,720 or more TEs and
750 or more hours TIS, before further flight, unless accomplished
previously, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 200 TEs or 35
hours TIS, whichever occurs first, perform a main rotor blade torque
event inspection.
Note 2: MD Helicopters, Inc. Maintenance Manual CSP-HMI-2,
Revision 36, section 62-10-00, paragraph 8, Main Rotor Blade Torque
Event Inspection, pertains to the subject of this AD.
(c) If a crack is found, replace the blade with an airworthy
blade before further flight.
[[Page 60211]]
Note 3: MDHI Maintenance Manual CSP-HMI-2, Section 20-30-00 Main
Rotor Blade Painting pertains to the subject of this AD. This
section of the maintenance manual recommends painting the inboard 24
inches (not to be exceeded) of the blade gloss white to aid in
detecting a crack; and if this is done, painting all blades alike
and rebalancing them.
Note 4: TEs are used only to establish an additional inspection
interval and not to establish an alternative retirement life.
(d) To request a different method of compliance or a different
compliance time for this AD, follow the procedures in 14 CFR 39.19.
Contact the Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, Transport
Airplane Directorate, for information about previously approved
alternative methods of compliance.
Note 5: Complying with the inspection procedures in the
Accomplishment Instructions, paragraphs 2.B.(2). and 2.B.(3)., of MD
Helicopter Inc. Service Bulletin (SB) SB369H-245R2, SB369E-095R2,
SB500N-023R2, SB369D-201R2, SB369F-079R2, SB600N-031R2, dated
February 4, 2004, constitutes an approved alternative method of
conducting the inspection required by paragraph (b) of this AD.
Note 6: Complying with the Inspection Instructions procedures in
paragraphs 2 and 3 of HTC Mandatory SB, Notice No. 2100-3R3, dated
January 5, 2004, constitutes an approved alternative method of
conducting the inspection required by paragraph (b) of this AD.
(e) This amendment becomes effective on November 1, 2005.
Issued in Fort Worth, Texas, on October 7, 2005.
David A. Downey,
Manager, Rotorcraft Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.
[FR Doc. 05-20678 Filed 10-14-05; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P
