Improved Seats in Air Carrier Transport Category Airplanes, 56542-56559 [05-19208]

Agencies

• Federal Aviation Administration
• DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

[Federal Register Volume 70, Number 186 (Tuesday, September 27, 2005)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 56542-56559]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 05-19208]



[[Page 56541]]

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Part III





Department of Transportation





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Federal Aviation Administration



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14 CFR Part 121



Improved Seats in Air Carrier Transport Category Airplanes; Final Rule

Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 186 / Tuesday, September 27, 2005 / 
Rules and Regulations

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 121

[Docket No. FAA-2002-13464-2; Amendment No. 121-315]
RIN 2120-AC84


Improved Seats in Air Carrier Transport Category Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: This final rule amends the FAA's regulations on the 
crashworthiness of passenger and flight attendant seats on transport 
category airplanes used in part 121 passenger-carrying operations. This 
final rule requires those transport category airplanes type-
certificated after January 1, 1958 which have not yet been manufactured 
that are used in part 121 passenger-carrying operations to have 
passenger and flight attendant seats that meet the current improved 
crashworthiness standards. This action is necessary because research, 
accident data, and analysis show that these improvements provide 
increased occupant protection in airplanes involved in impact-
survivable accidents.

DATES: This amendment becomes effective October 27, 2005. Transport 
category airplanes manufactured on and after October 27, 2009 used in 
part 121 passenger carrying operations must comply with this final 
rule.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Hal Jensen, Aircraft Engineering 
Division, AIR-100, Federal Aviation Administration, 800 Independence 
Avenue SW., Washington, DC 20591; telephone (202) 267-8807; facsimile 
(202) 267-5340, e-mail hal.jensen@faa.gov.

Authority for This Rulemaking

    This rulemaking is promulgated under the authority described in 
Title 49, Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701, General 
requirements, and Section 44705, Air carrier operating certificates. 
Under section 44701(b), the FAA may prescribe minimum safety standards 
for an air carrier to which the agency issues a certificate under 
section 44705. Under section 44705, the FAA issues an operating 
certificate to a person desiring to operate as an air carrier if the 
FAA finds, after investigation, that the person properly and adequately 
is equipped and able to operate safely under Part A and the regulations 
and standards prescribed under it.
    This regulation is within the scope of section 44701 because it 
establishes new minimum safety standards that the seats in transport 
category airplanes that are used in part 121 passenger-carrying 
operations must meet to protect occupants of that airplane if it is 
involved in an impact-survivable accident. The regulation also is 
within the scope of section 44705 since the section requires that the 
person to whom the FAA issues an air carrier operating certificate be 
properly and adequately equipped to operate safely. The improved seats 
mandated by this regulation will increase the safety of air carrier 
operations.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Availability of Rulemaking Documents

    You can get an electronic copy of this final rule using the 
Internet by:
    (1) Searching the Department of Transportation's electronic Docket 
Management System (DMS) Web page (https://dms.dot.gov/search);
    (2) Visiting the Office of Rulemaking's Web page at https://
www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/; or
    (3) Accessing the Government Printing Office's Web page at https://
www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs/aces/aces140.html.
    You can also get a copy by filing a request with the Federal 
Aviation Administration, Office of Rulemaking, ARM-1, 800 Independence 
Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20591, or by calling (202) 267-9680. To 
facilitate a prompt response, please make sure to identify the 
amendment number, notice number or docket number of this rulemaking in 
your request.

Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act

    The Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA) of 
1996 requires the FAA to comply with small entity requests for 
information or advice about compliance with statutes and regulations 
within its jurisdiction. If you are a small entity and you have a 
question about this document, you may contact your local FAA official, 
or the person listed under FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT. You can 
find out more about SBREFA on the Internet at our Web page, https://
www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/rulemaking/sbre_act/, or by e-
mailing us at 9-AWA-SBREFA@faa.gov.

Background

A. History

1. Pre-SNPRM
    This final rule is in response to Section 303(b) of the Airport and 
Airway Safety and Capacity Expansion Act of 1987 (Pub. L. 100-223) (the 
Act of 1987) and follows a notice of proposed rulemaking published in 
1988 and a supplemental notice of proposed rulemaking published in 2002 
(SNPRM). The Act of 1987 directed the Secretary of Transportation to:

    ``* * * initiate a rulemaking proceeding to consider requiring 
all seats onboard all air carrier aircraft to meet improved 
crashworthiness standards based upon the best available testing 
standards for crashworthiness.''

    In 1988 the FAA concurrently published a final rule, ``Improved 
Seat Safety Standards'' (53 FR 17640, May 17, 1988)(Amendment 25-64) 
and a notice of proposed rulemaking, ``Retrofit of Improved Seats In 
Air Carrier Transport Category Airplanes'' (53 FR 17650, May 17, 1988) 
(Notice 88-8). Amendment 25-64 upgraded the certification standards for 
occupant protection during emergency landing conditions in transport 
category airplanes from only a 9g static standard to an upgraded 9g 
static standard and a new 16g dynamic standard. Notice 88-8 proposed to 
prohibit, after June 16, 1995, the operation of transport category 
airplanes under parts 121 and 135 that were type-certificated after 
January 1, 1958 unless all seats onboard met the certification 
requirements of Sec.  25.785 in effect on June 16, 1988. These 
certification requirements include the 16g standard created by 
Amendment 25-64.
    The FAA received 70 comments to Notice 88-8. Based on these 
comments, we decided that we needed more information to determine the 
impact of Notice 88-8 on the aviation community. Even though much 
research and development on the dynamic testing of seats had been done 
to support the 16g standard, the process of certifying seats to the 16g 
standard was still new. The dynamic testing requirements for 16g seats 
represented an increase in sophistication and complexity over the 
simpler static testing used for 9g seats. Industry needed time to work 
out the technical problems of meeting the 16g seat standard, and we 
needed time to evaluate specific problems presented by industry and to 
develop proper guidance material for obtaining 16g seat certification.
    As these issues were addressed by industry and the FAA, our 
standards

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and guidance material evolved. This helped the aircraft seat 
manufacturing industry transition from producing 9g seats to 16g seats 
that could meet the new requirements. During this time, we never lost 
sight of the goal of improving the crashworthiness of seats in 
transport category airplanes. The significant actions taken during this 
time included:
     On March 6, 1990, we published an advisory circular (AC) 
to provide industry guidance on the dynamic test process. This was AC 
25.562-1, ``Dynamic Evaluation of Seat Restraint Systems & Occupant 
Protection on Transport Airplanes.'' AC 25.562-1A superseded AC 25.562-
1 on January 19, 1996.
     We worked with industry through the Society of Automotive 
Engineers SEAT Committee to develop a standard that would detail the 
requirements for dynamic testing of a 16g seat. That standard 
(Aerospace Standard (AS) 8049, Performance Standard for Seats in Civil 
Rotorcraft, Transport Aircraft and General Aviation Aircraft) was 
incorporated in Technical Standard Order (TSO)-C127 (Rotorcraft, 
Transport Airplane, and Normal and Utility Airplane Seating Systems) in 
1992 and revised in 1998 (TSO-C127a).
     We held a public meeting on October 23 and 24, 1995, in 
Seattle, Washington, to gather information on challenges the industry 
had in meeting our 16g dynamic seat certification requirements for new 
programs and for existing airplanes that would be affected by the 
proposed rulemaking. We presented our views and listened to comments 
from the aviation industry at that meeting. The information gained 
during this public meeting led us to reconsider the original rule 
proposed in Notice 88-8.
    From the mid-to-late 1990s, although industry and the FAA continued 
to address significant 16g seat issues primarily related to occupant 
protection, enough progress had been made that 16g seats were being 
produced and approved regularly. Therefore, we determined it was 
suitable to move forward with our proposed rulemaking to improve seats 
on transport category airplanes. As a result, we held a public meeting 
on December 8 and 9, 1998. The goals of this meeting were to discuss 
our proposed revisions to Notice 88-8 and to get current information 
and viewpoints. In addition to seeking comments at the public meeting, 
we reopened the docket for comments. We received approximately 40 
additional comments by the close of this comment period.
    The above is a summary of the events leading up to the publication 
of the SNPRM. For a more detailed discussion, please read the 
``Background'' section of the SNPRM.
2. SNPRM
    On October 4, 2002, the FAA published a supplemental notice of 
proposed rulemaking (SNPRM), ``Improved Seats in Air Carrier Transport 
Category Airplanes'' (67 FR 62294, October 4, 2002). The SNPRM proposed 
the following:
     For all airplanes manufactured on or after four years 
after the effective date of the final rule, all passenger and flight 
attendant seats on the airplane must meet the requirements of Sec.  
25.562 in effect on June 16, 1988 (proposed Sec.  121.311(j)(1));
     For all airplanes manufactured before four years after the 
effective date of the final rule, all passenger and flight attendant 
seats on the airplane must meet the requirements of Sec.  25.562 in 
effect on June 16, 1988, after any passenger seat or any flight 
attendant seat in that airplane is replaced (proposed Sec.  
121.311(j)(2)); and
     On or after fourteen years after the effective date of the 
final rule, no person could operate a transport category airplane type-
certificated after January 1, 1958, in passenger-carrying operations 
under this part unless all passenger and all flight attendant seats on 
the airplane meet the requirements of Sec.  25.562 in effect on June 
16, 1988 (proposed Sec.  121.311(k)).
    In preparing the SNPRM, the FAA hired a consultant to conduct an 
analysis of the benefits of 16g seats over 9g seats in transport 
category airplanes. This consultant, R.G.W. Cherry & Associates Limited 
(Cherry), performed this analysis and produced a report entitled ``A 
Benefit Analysis for Aircraft 16g Dynamic Seats'' (Report DOT/FAA/AR-
00/13/April 2000)(the Cherry Report).
    The Cherry Report studied those transport category airplane 
accidents that occurred from 1984 to 1998 and predicted the benefits to 
the occupants if 16g seats had been installed in those airplanes. It 
predicted:
     A range in the reduction of serious injuries to occupants 
in impact-survivable accidents if they were in 16g seats instead of 9g 
seats; and
     A range in the reduction of fatalities to occupants in 
impact-survivable accidents if they were in 16g seats instead of 9g 
seats.
    Since publication of the SNPRM, Cherry completed an addendum report 
entitled ``A Benefit Analysis for Aircraft 16-g Dynamic Seats 
Configured Without Enhancements to Head Injury Criteria'' (DOT/FAA/AR-
04/27, March 2003)(the Cherry Report Addendum). The Cherry Report 
Addendum assessed the incremental benefits resulting from the enhanced 
Head Injury Criteria.

B. Seat Classifications--9g/16g/16g ``Compatible''

    Currently, there are several classifications of seats in transport 
category airplanes used in part 121 operations. They are as follows:
1.9g Seats
a. What is a 9g seat?
    A 9g seat is tested to different load factors in different 
directions. The highest load factor is in the forward direction at 
9g's. This is why these seats are commonly referred to as 9g seats. The 
testing procedure is typically accomplished by applying a force to the 
seat through the safety belt by means of a cable and winch system. The 
minimum force that the seat must be capable of reacting in the forward 
direction without structural failure is 9 times the combined weight of 
the seat and a 170 pound occupant in each seat place. As an example, if 
a seat had three places and the seat weighs 100 pounds, then the seat 
must be capable of reacting 5490 pounds ((170 pounds per occupant times 
3 seat places plus 100 pounds of seat weight) times 9).
b. Regulations and the TSO for 9g Seats
    In 1952, the regulations for transport category airplane seats were 
revised to increase the emergency landing condition forward load factor 
from 6g's to 9g's. Five years later, the FAA issued TSO-C39 (``Aircraft 
Seats and Berths'') that included guidance on static testing to 9g's 
for seats that would be used in transport category airplanes. It is 
important to note that obtaining TSO C39 approval for a seat does not 
mean that the seat is approved for installation in an airplane. A 
separate approval, known as an installation approval, is necessary to 
show the seat's compliance with all the applicable regulations of the 
FAA. However, because TSO C39 was closely aligned with the other 
applicable regulations then in effect, installation approval was easy 
to attain if the seat had TSO C39 approval. This was generally the 
process for getting a 9g seat approved for use in an airplane until 
1988.
2.16g Seats
a. What is a 16g seat?
    For transport category airplanes, a 16g seat is one that meets the 
9g requirements of Sec.  25.561 and the

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dynamic requirements of Sec.  25.562. A 16g seat is tested in a manner 
that simulates the loads that could be expected in an impact-survivable 
accident. Two separate dynamic tests are conducted to simulate two 
different accident scenarios: one in which the forces are predominantly 
in the vertical downward direction and one in which the forces are 
predominantly in the longitudinal forward direction. The highest load 
factor is in the forward direction at 16 g's. This is why these seats 
are commonly referred to as 16g seats. The test procedure requires 
``crash testing'' the seat (i.e., rapidly decelerating the seat in 
accordance with the criteria in Sec.  25.562(b)). For the 16g test, 
this means deceleration must go from a minimum of 44ft/sec to 0 ft/sec 
in not more than 0.09 seconds with a peak deceleration of at least 
16g's. The seats are tested with seat floor tracks that are 
representative of those that will be used in the airplane installation.
    The seats are also tested with test dummies in each seat position. 
The reaction of the test dummies during the dynamic test imparts loads 
into the seat restraints and seat structure more accurately than the 
cable and winch system used in the 9g seat static pull test. The test 
dummies are instrumented to measure data like forces and accelerations 
that are then used for evaluating occupant protection criteria. As an 
example, accelerometers in the heads of the test dummies measure 
accelerations that are used in calculating the Head Injury Criteria 
(HIC). Limitations on an acceptable level of HIC serve to protect the 
occupant from serious head injury where head contact with seats or 
other structure can occur. 16g seats also:
     Protect the occupant from debilitating leg and spine 
injuries;
     Improve the attachment to the airframe;
     Protect crewmembers from serious chest injury when upper 
torso restraints are used; and
     Ensure occupants do not become trapped in their seats due 
to excessive seat deformation.
b. Regulations and the TSO for 16g Seats
    In 1988, the emergency landing conditions were revised to include 
dynamic landing conditions to improve occupant protection. Four years 
later, TSO-C127 (``Rotorcraft, Transport Airplane, Normal and Utility 
Airplane Seating Systems'') was issued and included guidance on dynamic 
testing of 16 g's for seats that would be used in transport category 
airplanes. As previously stated, TSO seat approval is not installation 
approval. Although TSO C127 is the basis for getting most 16g seats 
approved for use in transport category airplanes, installation approval 
is not as easy as it is for a 9g seat.
    The 16g seat installation approval process is more complicated than 
the 9g seat installation approval process because the dynamic standard 
includes several occupant protection criteria not required for the 9g 
seat. These occupant protection criteria can only be completely 
evaluated when the seat is considered in relationship to how and where 
it is installed in the airplane. For example, the dynamic test will 
cause a test dummy's upper torso and head to swing forward in an arcing 
motion since the test dummy is constrained only at the pelvis by the 
safety belt. A record of the motion of the test dummy's head through 
the arc, called a headpath trace, can be recorded during the testing 
for the TSO approval. The headpath trace is used during the 
installation approval process to ensure there is enough clearance from 
objects, like bulkheads or equipment mounted to partitions, to reduce 
the possibility of a head strike. Because airplane interior 
arrangements differ by airplane model--and even from operator to 
operator for the same airplane model--the headpath trace must be 
evaluated for each unique installation. This illustrates one reason why 
installation approval cannot rely solely on the TSO approval.
3. 16g ``Compatible'' Seats
    Transport category airplanes designed between 1952 and 1988 were 
required to have seats that met the 9g emergency landing conditions in 
Sec.  25.561. These standards were met by the static testing described 
above in the section entitled ``Regulations and TSO for 9g seats.'' 
Typically, the seats approved in those airplanes were also approved to 
TSO-C39. When Amendment 25-64 went into effect in 1988, any transport 
category airplane design submitted for approval was required to have 
seats that met both the 9g static standard in Sec.  25.561 and the 16g 
dynamic standard in Sec.  25.562.
    However, Amendment 25-64 applied only to new airplane designs like 
the Boeing B-777. Airframe manufacturers occasionally redesign an 
existing airplane design to meet marketing demands rather than develop 
a new design from scratch. These redesigned airplanes are referred to 
as derivative models, since they are based largely on a previously 
approved airplane design. An example of this is the Boeing B-737NG 
models (737-600, -700, -800, -900), which are based on the previously 
approved B-737 airplane design. The basis for a derivative model design 
approval is the regulations in place at the time of the original design 
approval. However, for a variety of reasons, the derivative model 
design will be approved to regulations more current than those in 
existence when the original design was approved, but not quite to the 
level of the regulations current at the time of application for a 
derivative model design approval.
    There are numerous derivative transport category airplane models 
approved after 1988 whose original design was approved before 1988. 
These airplane models' seats do not meet all the requirements of Sec.  
25.562 (16g seats), but meet more than the requirements of Sec.  25.561 
(9g seats). The dynamic standard in Sec.  25.562 includes criteria to 
evaluate the seat's structural integrity and occupant protection during 
dynamic testing. Most of the derivative models meet the seat structural 
integrity requirements in Sec.  25.562 but none or only a few of the 
occupant protection requirements in Sec.  25.562. Seats that have been 
approved to meet the 9g requirements in Sec.  25.561 and the seat 
structural integrity requirements in Sec.  25.562 are commonly called 
16g ``compatible'' seats.

Discussion of Comments

A. Request for Extension

    Based on requests for an extension of the comment period from the 
Aerospace Industries Association, Airbus, the Aviation Technical and 
Safety Committee Cabin Safety Working Group, The Boeing Company, the 
General Aviation Manufacturers Association and the Regional Airline 
Association, the FAA extended the SNPRM's comment period from December 
3, 2002 to March 3, 2003.

B. General Summary

    In addition to the requests for extension, the FAA received forty-
six comment submissions in response to the SNPRM. Two of these comment 
submissions are duplicates and one is an attachment from another 
comment, from which it had been separated. In addition, two individual 
commenters address issues about passengers with disabilities and are 
directed at other rulemaking initiatives. We will not address these two 
comment submissions in this discussion of comments.
    Of the remaining forty-one comment submissions, twelve commenters 
either express support for the proposed rule or their support can be 
implied from their comments. Another ten commenters generally support 
the proposed rule, but suggest changes. These twenty-two commenters are 
mostly individuals and

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companies that provide aircraft interior components. Among the reasons 
given for their support:
     The results of the cost-benefit analysis are reasonable 
and the amortized cost of seat upgrades will be offset by increased 
ticket prices;
     Any safety increase justifies any rise in ticket prices;
     Economies of scale will make safety improvements 
economical;
     The deaths and injuries being avoided far outweigh the 
issue of cost to conform to the proposed rule; and
     The safety of passengers and their ability to survive an 
impact-survivable accident is very important.
    Six of these commenters also favor shorter implementation periods 
than those proposed in the SNPRM.
    Fourteen commenters oppose the proposed rule. These commenters are 
mostly air carriers and airframe manufacturers. These commenters base 
their opposition on a belief that:
     The cost-benefit analysis is flawed because it fails to 
adequately address issues like how the costs would impact an industry 
struggling in a post-9/11 travel economy or whether the industry's 
limited resources would be better spent on other safety initiatives 
that would result in bigger dividends;
     The proposed rule is contrary to the Safer Skies and 
Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST) initiatives; and/or
     No convincing accident data exists to support the need for 
16g seats and, therefore, a convincing safety benefit case cannot be 
made for requiring 16g seats.
    The remaining five commenters recommend one or more of the 
following actions in addition, or as alternatives, to the proposed 
rule:
     Requiring the use of rearward facing seats;
     Making child restraint improvements and setting up 
regulatory changes that would mandate securing all children in safety 
seats;
     Requiring the use of three-point harness restraints or 
shoulder harnesses;
     Requiring the use of air bags;
     Requiring the use of a standardized seat belt latching 
mechanism or, without such standardization, telling passengers of any 
variations among seat belt latching mechanisms;
     Improving seat belt security, using fewer seats or 
changing seating configuration; and
     Focusing the FAA's attention on flight crew safety and 
health issues.
    Some of those commenters expressing support or opposition for the 
proposed rule also recommend some of the above actions as possible 
alternatives.

C. Acronyms

    In this Discussion of Comments section, we use the following 
acronyms or abbreviated company names to identify the associated 
commenters:
     Air Transport Association (ATA)
     AMSAFE Aviation (AMSAFE)
     Association of Asia Pacific Airlines (AAPA)
     Association of European Airlines (AEA)
     Association of Flight Attendants (AFA)
     Association of Professional Flight Attendants (APFA)
     Aviation Technical and Safety Committee Cabin Safety 
Working Group (ATASCO)
     B/E Aerospace, Inc. (B/E)
     The Boeing Company (Boeing)
     The International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT)
     National Air Disaster Alliance/Foundation (NADA/F)
     RECARO Aircraft Seating (RECARO)
     Regional Airline Association (RAA)
     Sicma Aero Seat Services (Sicma)

D. Removal of Retrofit Requirements

    As stated in the regulatory evaluation supporting the SNPRM, the 
FAA believed there were two viable options to improve seats in 
transport category airplanes operating under part 121 at that time:
     Requiring full 16g seats in newly manufactured airplanes 
only (Option 2 in the SNPRM's regulatory evaluation); and
     Requiring full 16g seats in newly manufactured airplanes 
and replacement with full 16g seats for all other in-service airplanes 
(Option 5 in the SNPRM's regulatory evaluation).
    While Option 2 was projected to have a benefit-to-cost ratio 
greater than 1.0 at that time, it also averted fewer fatalities and 
serious injuries than Option 5. Therefore, we decided to move forward 
with Option 5.
    Based on the comments received to the SNPRM, we decided to re-
evaluate the retrofit requirements of proposed Sec. Sec.  121.311(j)(2) 
and 121.311(k). After detailed consideration, we now believe the final 
rule should not contain these retrofit requirements and that we should 
proceed with the requirement for newly manufactured airplanes only.
    There are several reasons why the FAA's current analysis of Options 
2 and 5 has resulted in a different conclusion from that in the SNPRM. 
All of these reasons are the result of the dramatic changes in the 
airline industry since the publication of the SNPRM.
1. Accelerated Retirement of Pre-1992 Manufactured Airplanes
    Initially, the terrorist events of September 11, 2001 significantly 
impacted the airline industry because many people were less likely to 
fly. Rather than flying airplanes with empty seats, many airlines 
choose to ``park'' or ``retire'' their older airplanes. While the 
impact of the terrorist attacks on passenger boardings has passed, the 
industry remains in poor shape financially for reasons including, but 
not limited to, high fuel prices and increased competition from low-
cost carriers. Therefore, those older airplanes that are inefficient to 
operate remain ``retired.''
    Since 9/11, part 121 operators have ``retired'' over 1,360 
airplanes. This represents 23.6% of the pre-9/11 part 121-fleet. The 
majority of these airplanes were manufactured before 1992 (for example, 
B-727, B-737-100/200/300, B-747-100/200, DC-9, F-100, DC-10, L-1011, 
MD-80) and were certified for 9g seats. Due to the high operating costs 
associated with these airplanes, it is unlikely that many of these 
``retired'' airplanes will find their way back into the part-121 fleet.
    The retirement of these pre-1992 manufactured airplanes has 
occurred at a rate far faster than that projected in the SNPRM's 
regulatory evaluation. In that regulatory evaluation, those seats 
installed on airplanes manufactured prior to 1992 fell into one of two 
categories: Group I or Group II seats.\1\ In 1999, the seats in Groups 
I and II totaled 477,991 and comprised approximately 66% of the total 
seats in the part 121-fleet. For 2004, the projected seat total barely 
changed (477,707) and comprised approximately 54% of the part 121-
fleet. The decrease from a projected 66% to a projected 54% was based 
on more airplanes with 16g seats entering the part 121-fleet. For the 
last forecast year in the SNPRM's regulatory evaluation (2020), these 
seats were projected to still make-up approximately 20% of all seats in 
the part 121-fleet. Therefore, with such a significant percentage of 
potential 9g seats projected to be in the part 121-fleet over the 
course of the forecast period (1999-2020), the need

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for the retrofit requirement was more apparent.
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    \1\ Group I covered those seats in airplanes manufactured before 
1992 having seats installed before 1992. While 16g seats were being 
installed before this date, the majority of these seats are 9g. 
Group II covered those seats in airplanes manufactured before 1992 
having replacement seats installed after 1991. Some (unknown) 
proportion of seats in this group may have partial 16g performance 
although no airplane model in this group is 16g certificated.
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    However, the accelerated retirement of so many pre-1992 
manufactured airplanes alters this conclusion. These airplane 
retirements mean approximately 155,000 Group I and Group II seats were 
removed from the part-121 fleet. By comparison, for the last forecast 
year of the SNPRM's regulatory evaluation (2020), only 109,020 Group I 
and Group II seats were projected to have been removed from the part-
121 fleet. The removal of these 155,000 seats also has a dramatic 
affect on the percentages discussed before. The percentage of Group I 
and Group II seats in the 2004 part-121 fleet drops from a projected 
54% to an actual 36%. These seats are now at a level previously 
projected to occur in 2011.
    Based on this accelerated retirement of pre-1992 manufactured 
airplanes, the FAA believes the level of occupant protection has 
increased dramatically over the past few years in the part-121 fleet. 
The FAA also believes the accelerated retirement of pre-1992 
manufactured airplanes will continue to occur as airlines strive to 
increase the efficiency of their operations.
2. Increased Appeal and Use of Regional Jets
    One factor that assisted in the accelerated retirement of pre-1992 
manufactured airplanes is the continued appeal of regional jets and the 
new ways airlines are using these airplanes. As pointed out in the 
comment from RAA, within the last 10 years, the U.S. regional fleet has 
rapidly transitioned from a mostly turboprop fleet to a majority 
regional jet fleet. As of October, 2004, almost 1,600 regional jets 
were in operations with part 121 carriers, with over 600 more on firm 
order and options and conditional orders for over 1,700 more.\2\
    Most of these regional jets are newer designs that must meet the 
requirements of Amendment 25-64. According to RAA, in 2004, about 77% 
of the entire regional fleet was capable of meeting at least the 
structural requirements of Amendment 25-64.
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    \2\ Figures from the Regional Air Service Initiative (https://
www.regionalairservice.org).
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    The effects of 9/11 on the airline industry have increased the 
appeal of the regional jet. Whereas, in the past, the regional jet was 
primarily used to replace turboprops or open new markets, several 
airlines are now using it as a tool to replace inefficient larger jets 
on certain routes. In addition, JetBlue and USAirways have placed large 
orders for regional jets that will be used in their own operations.
    Based on developments such as these, the FAA expects that regional 
jets will play an even larger role in the part 121-fleet than 
considered for the SNPRM. As a result, this will further increase the 
percentage of 16g seats in the part 121-fleet.
3. Effect of Certification Costs
    Based on the dramatic changes in the part-121 fleet over the past 3 
years, which are expected to continue for the foreseeable future, the 
FAA believes the resource expenditure associated with retrofitting 
seats on existing airplanes would no longer be cost beneficial.
    As stated before, the installation approval process for a 16g seat 
is more complicated than the installation approval process for a 9g 
seat because the dynamic standard includes occupant protection criteria 
not required for the 9g seat. The occupant criteria can only be 
completely evaluated when the seat is considered in relationship to how 
and where it is installed in the airplane's cabin. A seat's 
installation in relationship to other seats and other objects in the 
airplane affects the number of dynamic tests that must be successfully 
completed. If all seats were uniformly installed at the same distance 
from one row to the next in every airplane, only a few forward tests 
would be required: perhaps one to show structural adequacy and one or 
two to demonstrate occupant protection. However, this is not the case. 
Cabin configurations vary from airplane to airplane and also from 
operator to operator. Some operators even have different configurations 
within the same airplane model in their fleets.
    Therefore, different tests are required to determine the effect of 
such things as seatback video monitors, bulkheads, partitions, seat 
pitch and seat angle (seats installed in tail sections where the 
fuselage tapers are frequently installed at an angle relative to the 
other rows). These examples represent some of the installation issues 
that result in numerous forward dynamic testing for a single airplane 
configuration. The testing and resultant seat approval can be used for 
other airplanes of the same model that have identical configurations. 
However, even if another operator uses the same seating configurations, 
if it uses seats from a different seat manufacturer or a different seat 
model from the same manufacturer, a new series of tests will be 
required.
    Because approval to Sec.  25.562 is largely dependent on the 
airplane's interior, considerable effort is expended by the seat 
manufacturer and the airframe manufacturer to ensure the seat design 
will work with the airplane design prior to any seat testing. If 
failure to meet Sec.  25.562 becomes evident during testing, there are 
several options available to resolve the non-compliance: the seat can 
be redesigned, the seat can be reconfigured within the airplane, or the 
airplane can be redesigned. Usually redesigning the airplane is the 
last option chosen due to expense and time needed to integrate the 
change. But, if required, the design change can be accomplished at less 
expense in airplanes manufactured in the future than in existing 
airplanes. Upgrading existing airplanes to meet Sec.  25.562 may 
require modification and substantiation of a range of seat pitches, 
changes to bulkheads to which flight attendant seats are mounted, 
increasing seat setbacks from bulkheads, partitions, and emergency 
exits, and removal of seats in some circumstances. All of these 
concerns can be handled more effectively when time is allowed for 
proper planning of the redesign and integration in airplanes 
manufactured in the future. Resolving the same non-compliances in 
existing airplanes require more costly modifications to the interiors 
and is more likely to result in the loss of revenue-generating seats.
4. Conclusion
    Based on the above, the FAA decided to mandate improved seats for 
only those airplanes type-certificated after January 1, 1958 which have 
not yet been manufactured. While this requirement may require airframe 
manufacturers to make design modifications, we believe that the four-
year compliance period provides sufficient time for them to develop 
efficient solutions.
    The FAA still believes that this final rule is necessary to improve 
occupant protection in impact-survivable accidents. We believe that 
these types of accidents can still occur and this rule focuses on 
protecting occupants when these accidents do occur. Although we 
recognize that most of the seats in the current part-121 passenger 
carrying fleet are capable of meeting the dynamic testing structural 
criteria, we want to ensure that all occupant protection criteria `` 
including HIC `` are met. In addition, the airplanes covered by this 
final rule include several models that have hundreds of outstanding 
orders. These airplanes will remain in the part-121 passenger carrying 
fleet the longest and should, therefore, offer the best level of 
occupant protection available for seat certification. Finally, as we 
discuss below in more detail, this final rule is also cost-beneficial, 
with a benefits-to-costs ratio of 2.27 to 1 (or,

[[Page 56547]]

2.15 to 1 and 1.98 to 1 when underlying estimates are in present value 
at 3% and 7%. respectively).
    We acknowledge that, for some yet-to-be manufactured airplanes, the 
requirement of this final rule will have no practical effect as 16g 
seats are already mandated as a result of the airplane's certification 
basis. Specifically, the requirements of Amendment 25-64 are applicable 
to those airplanes for which an application for a type certificate was 
made on or after June 16, 1988. Therefore, no action should be 
necessary to bring those airplanes into compliance with this final rule 
assuming that they comply fully with Sec.  25.562. In general, this 
final rule will require compliance action for those new production 
airplane models that were type-certificated after January 1, 1958 and 
before June 16, 1988 and derivatives of such models for which an 
application for an amended type-certificate was made after January 1, 
1958.
    We do not believe that the removal of the retrofit requirement will 
cause an increase in the use of 9g seats. There is no incentive for 
seat manufacturers and operators to reverse the current trend away from 
9g seats. Both domestic and foreign seat manufacturers have changed the 
way they manufacture seats in order to meet the requirements for 16g 
``compatible'' and 16g seats. It currently does not make financial 
sense for them to run a separate 9g seat manufacturing line to meet a 
declining need. While some seats are sold with a 9g label, it is our 
belief that these seats are the same seats that are sold as 16g 
``compatible.'' We see no reason why this situation would change. 
However, we will continue to monitor this issue. If we see an increase 
in the use of 9g seats, we will consider taking action to stop this 
development.

E. Discussion of Non-Retrofit Comments

    Since the retrofit requirements have been removed from this final 
rule, the comments that address only those provisions (i.e., proposed 
Sec. Sec.  121.311(j)(2) and 121.311(k)) are no longer relevant to this 
rulemaking action and will not be addressed in detail in this final 
rule. We discuss the other comments received about the SNPRM in the 
following order:
     General comments about the cost-benefit analysis;
     Comments about the cost side of the cost-benefit analysis;
     Comments about the benefit side of the cost-benefit 
analysis;
     General comments about flight attendant seats;
     Comments about the cost-benefit analysis for flight 
attendant seats;
     General technical comments; and
     Other comments.
    In the following discussion of comments, we use the term ``newly 
manufactured airplanes.'' This means those transport category airplanes 
type certificated after January 1, 1958 and manufactured on or after 
October 27, 2009, that are used in part 121 passenger-carrying 
operations.

Cost-Benefit Analysis--General

Proposed Rule Will Result in Increased Ticket Prices

    A commenter states that the proposed rule would result in increased 
ticket prices. The commenter believes these higher prices would then 
force some of the traveling public to drive instead of fly, thereby 
increasing their risk of injury or death. This commenter suggests that 
we perform further analysis on this issue.
    FAA Response: The FAA has greatly reduced the scope of this 
rulemaking from that proposed in the SNPRM. This change produces a 
reduction in predicted costs from $519 million to $34.7 million (or, 
$22.3 million and $13.3 million in present value at 3% and 7%, 
respectively).
    Based on historical evidence and the vastly lower predicted costs 
of this rulemaking, we do not expect that this final rule will result 
in an increase in ticket prices.

Cost-Benefit Ratio Does Not Justify the Change

    A commenter believes the cost-benefit ratio does not justify the 
proposed rule.
    FAA Response: For the base case scenario presented in the 
regulatory evaluation supporting this final rule (i.e., using accident 
rates for the 1984-1998 period), the total costs of this rulemaking, 
over the analysis period, are $34.7 million (or, $22.3 million and 
$13.3 million in present value at 3% and 7%, respectively). The total 
benefits of installing fully compliant 16g seats are $78.9 million (or, 
$47.9 million and $26.4 million in present value at 3% and 7%, 
respectively). Therefore, this rulemaking is cost-beneficial, with a 
benefit-to-cost ratio of 2.27 to 1 (or, 2.15 to 1 and 1.98 to 1 when 
underlying estimates are in present value at 3% and 7%, respectively).
    While the final rule in its entirety is cost-beneficial, the FAA 
notes that, separately, the requirements for passenger seats and flight 
attendant seats are each cost-beneficial. For passenger seats, the 
benefits of installing fully compliant 16g seats are approximately 
$76.3 million (or, $46.4 million and $25.5 million in present value at 
3% and 7%, respectively), as compared to the costs of $33.7 million 
(or, $21.5 million and $12.8 million in present value at 3% and 7%, 
respectively).
    For flight attendant seats, the benefits of installing fully 
compliant 16g seats are $2.5 million (or, $1.5 million and $850,000 
million in present value at 3% and 7%, respectively), as compared to 
the costs of approximately $954,000 ($731,000 and $529,000 in present 
value at 3% and 7%, respectively).
    A copy of this regulatory evaluation is in the docket for this 
final rule. You can get a copy of this analysis by using any of the 
methods listed above in the ``Availability of Rulemaking Documents'' 
section of this final rule.

Analysis Fails to Accurately Account for Impact on Small Businesses

    RAA states that the FAA fails to accurately account for the 
proposal's impact on small business operators.
    FAA Response: The FAA performed a regulatory flexibility analysis 
for both the proposed rule and this final rule. Both assessments showed 
no significant impact on small businesses. A detailed discussion of 
this determination is located later in this document in the section 
entitled ``Regulatory Flexibility Analysis'' and in the regulatory 
evaluation supporting this final rule.

Analysis Fails to Consider Differences Between Regional Transport 
Category Airplanes and Very Large Transport Category Aircraft

    RAA believes the cost-benefit analysis does not consider the 
differences between regional transport category airplanes and very 
large transport category airplanes. RAA argues that the benefit 
methodology assumes there will be 100 occupants per accident, while the 
average number of seats on regional transport category airplanes is 
well below 50 occupants.
    FAA Response: The Cherry Report does not assume there will be 100 
occupants per accident. The methodology in the Cherry Report used 100 
occupants as an example to explain the concept of ``survivability 
chains.'' Of the 25 accidents that provided enough information for 
analysis, the number of passenger and flight attendant seats ranged 
from 38 to about 350.

Analysis Fails to Account for Fewer Flight Attendants in Regional 
Transport Category Airplanes

    RAA states that regional transport category airplanes typically 
have only one flight attendant, not two. According

[[Page 56548]]

to RAA, this difference further skews the cost-benefit analysis.
    FAA Response: Based on the FAA's flight attendant requirements as 
specified in Sec.  121.391, the SNPRM's regulatory evaluation assumed 
one flight attendant per 50 passengers regardless of the aircraft size. 
Therefore, the cost and benefit calculations were normalized between 
regional transport category airplanes and larger transport category 
airplanes. This assumption remains in the regulatory evaluation 
supporting this final rule. We believe this assumption is conservative 
as air carriers often provide more flight attendants than the number 
required by regulation.

Rulemaking Does Not Provide the Most Safety Value for the Economic 
Investment

    Boeing states the proposed rule does not provide the most safety 
value for the economic investment. Boeing states that since the 
aircraft manufacturing and airline industries have been reeling from 
some of the worst economic conditions in their histories, it is now 
more important than ever to invest in the safety initiatives that 
provide the best return. Therefore, Boeing believes we should reexamine 
the cost-benefit analysis.
    FAA Response: As discussed above, based, in part, on comments 
received, the FAA reconsidered the proposed rule and removed 
requirements from the final rule to upgrade seats in existing 
airplanes. However, it still requires improved seats in newly 
manufactured airplanes. As a result, the costs of this final rule are 
substantially less than those of the proposed rule (from $519 million 
to $34.7 million). As noted above, this rulemaking is now cost 
beneficial with a benefits to costs ratio of 2.27 to 1.

Cost-Benefit Analysis--Costs

Costs Too Low

    ATA believes the FAA's cost-benefit analysis is faulty because we:
    (1) Failed to consider the high costs of upgrading monument walls 
to support flight attendant seats;
    (2) Failed to consider the high costs associated with removing 
seats to meet the front-row head injury criteria (HIC); and
    (3) Failed to consider the cost of demonstrating compliance with 
the more complex requirements than were discussed in previous 16g seat 
retrofit comment periods (1998, 1988).
    ATASCO agrees that the FAA's cost forecast is ``too low'' and ``far 
from the realistic cost.'' ATASCO would like the FAA to perform the 
cost-benefit analysis again based on the comments received.
    FAA Response: As for the issue of removing seats to comply with 
front-row HIC, the FAA notes that reasonable solutions and 
alternatives, like air-bag technology, exist and/or can be developed to 
prevent the need for removing a row of seats. Since this final rule 
does not require compliance for four years from its effective date, we 
believe that this compliance date provides industry with enough time to 
carry out cost-effective solutions.
    As for ATA's concerns about compliance costs, we have included 
estimates of compliance costs in our cost-benefit analysis for this 
final rule.
    Finally, our analysis includes estimates of the costs associated 
with strengthening monument walls to support 16g flight attendant 
seats. We based our estimates on data provided by an airframe 
manufacturer.

Analysis Fails to Consider Increase in Certification Costs

    Boeing asserts that the FAA's cost analysis does not consider the 
added complexity of the new certification requirements. Boeing 
maintains that certification to the dynamic requirements of Sec.  
25.562 is more complex and time consuming than certification to the 
static testing requirements. This added complexity takes more time and 
resources for the airframe manufacturer, as well as the seat suppliers 
and the airlines. Boeing believes this ``complexity-factor'' is 
overlooked by our cost analysis.
    ATA agrees with Boeing.
    FAA Response: The FAA agrees that dynamic testing is more complex 
and time consuming than static testing. In addition, we acknowledge 
that we did not include this ``complexity-factor'' in the SNPRM's 
regulatory evaluation.
    However, to ensure the accuracy of our estimates of the 
certification costs in the regulatory evaluation supporting this final 
rule, we obtained updated cost information from Boeing on this subject 
and have included it in our analysis. Since our estimates are now in-
line with Boeing's cost information, we believe that the regulatory 
evaluation supporting the final rule does consider the complexity of 
certification to the dynamic requirements of Sec.  25.562.

Cost-Benefit Analysis--Benefits

Analysis Fails to Consider Declining Accident Rate

    Boeing believes the cost-benefit analysis fails to account for 
declining accident rates over the past decade. Boeing claims the 
accident statistics used by the FAA to support the proposed rule ignore 
impressive improvements made in aviation safety. Based on these 
improvements, Boeing maintains that the benefits analysis does not 
consider a declining future accident rate that is consistent with the 
Safer Skies goals. Boeing believes the FAA should revise the regulatory 
analysis to match FAA published safety goals.
    RAA agrees with Boeing, stating that the Commercial Aviation Safety 
Team (CAST) projects an 80% reduction in accidents by 2007 through 
implementing a terrain awareness and warning system (TAWS) retrofit, 
implementing constant descent approach and other safety enhancement 
procedures. RAA states that the FAA's cost-benefit analysis should 
account for these safety improvements when forecasting the accident 
rate for the next 20 years.
    ATA and AAPA agree with RAA and Boeing.
    FAA Response: In the regulatory evaluation supporting this final 
rule, the FAA has performed sensitivity tests of our accident rate 
using multiple time periods. In each case, the predicted benefits 
exceed the predicted costs of this final rule.
    Considerable progress has been made under CAST and Safer Skies to 
reduce the accident rate. However, we believe that impact-survivable 
accidents can still occur and this rule focuses on protecting occupants 
when these accidents do occur.

Analysis Fails to Consider Impact of September 11

    Boeing comments that the FAA enplanement estimates do not account 
for the slowing world economy and the effects of the September 11, 2001 
terrorist attacks. Boeing recommends that the FAA update the benefit 
analysis to reflect future estimated enplanements using 2001 or, 
preferably, 2002 data.
    ATA agrees, stating that forecasts for future enplanements have 
decreased and this should impact the cost-benefit analysis.
    FAA Response: The FAA acknowledges that we based the proposed 
rule's regulatory evaluation on pre-9/11 information. At that time, the 
long-term effects of 9/11 on enplanements were difficult to predict.
    However, for the regulatory evaluation supporting this final rule, 
we based our enplanement estimates on the data in ``FAA Aerospace 
Forecasts for Fiscal Years 2003-2014'' (FAA-APO-03-1, March 2003). This 
forecast accounts for recent world events, including the events of 
September 11, 2001.

[[Page 56549]]

Analysis Fails to Consider U.S. Fleet Changes

    Boeing states the benefit analysis does not account for changes in 
fleet capacity and fleet age resulting from recent world events. Boeing 
argues that the current part 121-fleet has changed dramatically since 
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Boeing states that many 
airlines are retiring their oldest aircraft because of system 
overcapacity and most of these retired aircraft have 9g seats. Boeing 
recommends that the FAA revise the benefit analysis to reflect this 
change.
    FAA Response: Since, in the final rule, the FAA is no longer 
requiring existing seats to be retrofitted, changes in fleet capacity 
resulting from recent world events have only a negligible effect on the 
cost-benefit analysis. However, as we stated above, part 121-fleet 
changes since 9/11 are a factor in our decision to remove the retrofit 
provisions from the final rule. In particular, the retirement of old 
airplanes and the addition of new airplanes since 9/11 result in a 
younger fleet with more airplanes that are fully or partially compliant 
with Sec.  25.562. We believe that newly manufactured seats used for 
replacement seats in existing airplanes--even when labeled as 9g 
seats--have, in general, the capability of meeting the 16g structural 
requirements. Based on this, when operators replace 9g seats with newly 
manufactured seats, the level of occupant protection improves. These 
factors support our decision for not going forward with rulemaking that 
affects the existing fleet.

``Double Counting'' of Benefits

    Boeing believes the FAA gave credit to seat improvements for lives 
already saved by other safety initiatives. Boeing states that a subset 
of accident scenarios used to justify 16g seats includes accidents 
involving controlled flight into terrain (CFIT), wind shear, takeoff 
with improper flap/slat setting, and approach and landing accidents. 
Boeing believes we are ``double counting'' benefits already realized 
through other safety actions. Therefore, Boeing believes we should 
remove such accidents from the Cherry Report and recalculate the 
benefits.
    FAA Response: Even though the accident rate has declined, impact-
survivable (as well as non-survivable) accidents will still occur. For 
these impact-survivable accidents, installation of 16g seats in new 
airplanes will reduce the number of fatalities and serious injuries.
    Further, the FAA reassessed the accidents used in the Cherry Report 
to determine if any of the accidents studied would not have happened 
today based on any regulatory change since their occurrence. We found 
that none of these regulatory changes would have directly affected the 
outcome of the accidents in the Cherry Report. Of further note, 10 of 
the 25 accidents studied yielded no reduction of fatalities or serious 
injuries due to using improved seats. This attests to the non-bias of 
the assessment.

Safety Analysis Inadequate

    ATA states that the FAA's safety analysis is inadequate.
    FAA Response: The FAA has continued to assess the merits of 16g 
seats since this rule was first proposed in 1988. During that time, we 
examined many options available to improve seats in transport category 
airplanes.
    Based on this review, we believe there is a clear need to improve 
safety for passengers and flight attendants in the event of an impact-
survivable accident. The Cherry Report demonstrates this need. Based on 
the predicted benefits of 16g seats over 9g seats in the Cherry Report 
and in the regulatory evaluation supporting this final rule, this final 
rule should achieve that goal.

Accidents Studied not Appropriate for this Analysis and No Proof 16g 
Seats Would Have Reduced Fatalities and Serious Injuries in Accidents 
Studied

    Boeing states the benefit analysis was not well correlated with the 
types of accidents where 16g seats would have been an influence in 
saving lives. For example, Boeing claims the Cherry Report cited 
accidents where survival was a matter of chance. Boeing argues that 
such accidents are atypical of those used to justify part 25 standards. 
According to Boeing, it is inappropriate to use such accidents to 
justify the need for equipment that was not specifically designed to be 
effective in these severe events. Boeing believes that the FAA should 
not use these accidents in the benefit analysis.
    In addition, Boeing believes the assessment of whether the use of 
16g seats would have actually reduced the number of fatalities and 
serious injuries is ``inadequate.'' Boeing believes the Cherry Report's 
assessment approach is nothing more than ``guesswork.''
    FAA Response: The FAA believes that the accidents studied were 
appropriate. The Cherry Report looked at only those impact-survivable 
accidents that had sufficient textural data from NTSB accident reports 
to make a determination whether a 16g seat would have made a difference 
in occupant survivability. The resulting 25 accidents were then studied 
to determine the difference in fatalities and serious injuries to 
occupants had 16g seats been in place. The assessment of these 
accidents was then used to make a more general assessment on similar 
impact-survivable accidents that lacked adequate textural information 
in the accident reports to make an individual finding.
    The FAA also disagrees with Boeing's negative assertion about the 
Cherry Report's assessment approach. The Cherry Report used a logical 
three-stage assessment approach that eliminated any ``guesswork.'' 
First, as stated above, the Cherry Report determined which accidents 
were valid to study to evaluate the effect of 16g seats. The Cherry 
Report then looked at each space within the accident aircraft that 
exhibited a similar threat to the occupants. This prevented making 
gross assumptions about the effect of 16g seats on occupant 
survivability for the entire aircraft based on the worst-case area of 
the aircraft for each accident. Finally, for each space that posed a 
similar threat to the occupants, the Cherry Report then examined that 
space on a seat-by-seat basis to determine the effect a 16g seat would 
have made had it been in place. The FAA believes this assessment 
approach is the best analysis to date to predict the benefits of 16g 
seats. Nonetheless, as we stated before, we reevaluated the Cherry 
Report to see if any of the accidents studied would not have happened 
today based on any regulatory change since their occurrence. We found 
that none of these regulatory changes would have directly affected the 
outcome of the accidents in the Cherry Report. Therefore, we believe 
that these accidents remain valid candidates for evaluating the effect 
of 16g seats and provide sufficient proof of the benefits of such 
seats.
    While survival for each occupant in an accident may be a matter of 
chance to some extent, the Cherry Report's analysis determined that the 
use of 16g seats would have increased those chances of survival for 
occupants in those accidents evaluated.

Analysis Overstates Benefits of Streamlined Seat Certification Process

    ATA states the cost-benefit analysis is inaccurate and overstates 
the benefits of the FAA-Industry Seat Certification Streamlining 
activities. More importantly, ATA points out that this streamlining 
process does not yet exist. ATA believes we should not include 
efficiencies from streamlining the seat certification process in the 
cost-benefit analysis until they have been demonstrated.

[[Page 56550]]

    AAPA agrees, claiming that our analysis takes credit for 
undemonstrated certification streamlining.
    Boeing concurs, stating that the efforts to improve the seat 
certification process over the past several years have not materially 
improved the cost or flow time to certify seats. Therefore, Boeing 
argues that before the FAA can take the benefit from these activities, 
there must be demonstrated results.
    FAA Response: The regulatory evaluation supporting the SNPRM did 
not quantify any benefits from the effects of the Seat Certification 
Streamlining efforts. The regulatory evaluation only stated that 
potential unclaimed benefits exist due to the efforts made by both 
industry and the FAA under the Seat Certification Streamlining program. 
This is the same approach used in the regulatory evaluation supporting 
this final rule.
    To try to reduce certification costs and simplify the seat 
certification process, we will continue to work with industry under the 
Seat Certification Streamlining program. In the past, this cooperation 
has resulted in the FAA implementing many of industry's recommendations 
to improve the seat certification process and reduce costs.

Analysis Overestimates Performance of 16g Seats

    Boeing states the benefits analysis vastly overestimates the 
expectation of 16g seat performance in past accident scenarios. Boeing 
believes we should recalculate the benefits to reflect this more 
accurately.
    FAA Response: The performance expectation of 16g seats is based on 
long-standing FAA/industry-coordinated research. The genesis of the 16g 
seat standard came from recognition that many deaths or serious 
injuries in general aviation airplanes could be avoided if the 
crashworthiness of the airplane was improved. Additional research 
showed this also applied to transport category airplanes. Please refer 
to the ``Background'' section above for more information on the 
development of the 16g standard. The FAA viewed the new dynamic seat 
standards as a necessity and major improvement over existing static 
seat standards. While it is difficult to precisely quantify the 
improvements of seats that meet the dynamic standard over seats that 
meet only the static standard, we believe the estimates used to develop 
the regulatory evaluation are reasonable, justified and the best 
available data. No commenter provided data or expert opinion to dispute 
our assessment of 16g seat performance during the comment period.

Use of High Benefit Estimates in Error

    Boeing is concerned that, in the FAA's benefit analysis, we used 
the Cherry Report's ``high'' benefit estimate of the decrease in 
fatalities and serious injuries because of the possible unmeasured 
benefits of ``better than 9g seats.'' Boeing believes that, of the 
accidents analyzed, it is likely that many of the accidents did not 
involve aircraft with ``better than 9g seats.'' According to Boeing, 
only five of the accidents studied definitely involved aircraft with 
``better than 9g seats.'' Therefore, any unmeasured benefit of ``better 
than 9g'' seats should be specific to those 5 accidents.
    ATA states that by using the ``high'' benefit estimate from the 
Cherry Report, we inaccurately stated the true costs/benefits of the 
proposed rule. ATA believes the use of the Cherry Report's ``high'' 
benefit estimate is not reasonable because of the number of 16g 
compatible seats in the fleet.
    FAA Response: Based on our review of the comments received and a 
re-examination of the Cherry Report, the FAA agrees that the ``median'' 
benefit estimate from the Cherry Report represents a better estimate 
based on the available data. For the regulatory evaluation supporting 
this final rule, we have reassessed the benefits using the Cherry 
Report's ``median'' benefits estimate of the decrease in fatalities and 
serious injuries.

Flight Attendant Seats--General

Inclusion in Rule--General--Support

    Goodrich Aircraft Interior Products strongly supports the inclusion 
of the 16g standard for flight attendant seats in the proposed rule. 
This support is based on the potential for additional passenger lives 
being saved by flight attendants who would not be injured due to their 
being seated in 16g seats during an accident.
    IBT concurs, stating that the FAA has recognized the critical role 
of cabin crews in evacuating airplanes in survivable accidents.
    An individual commenter also supports the inclusion of flight 
attendant seats in the proposed rule, stating there is little value in 
increasing passenger survivability without providing an equal increase 
for flight attendants.
    A second individual commenter agrees, stating that cabin crews 
should be afforded the best crash protection against incapacitating 
injuries that could prevent them from performing their role during 
emergency evacuations.
    FAA Response: The FAA agrees and is requiring flight attendant 
seats and passenger seats in newly manufactured airplanes to meet all 
the requirements of Sec.  25.562. In this manner, the requirements for 
passenger an