Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.; Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Amendment to Facility Operating License, Proposed No Significant Hazards; Consideration Determination, and Opportunity for a Hearing, 48985-48987 [E5-4554]
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Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 161 / Monday, August 22, 2005 / Notices
provide at least the same measure of
protection as the existing standard.
measure of protection as the existing
standard.
7. Unimin Corporation
Request for Comments
Persons interested in these petitions
are encouraged to submit comments via
Federal eRulemaking Portal: https://
www.regulations.gov; E-mail: zzMSHAComments@dol.gov; Fax: (202) 693–
9441; or Regular Mail/Hand Delivery/
Courier: Mine Safety and Health
Administration, Office of Standards,
Regulations, and Variances, 1100
Wilson Boulevard, Room 2350,
Arlington, Virginia 22209. All
comments must be postmarked or
received in that office on or before
September 21, 2005. Copies of these
petitions are available for inspection at
that address.
[Docket No. M–2005–003–M]
Unimin Corporation, 258 Elm Street,
New Canaan, Connecticut 06840 has
filed a petition to modify the
application of 30 CFR 56.13020 (Use of
compressed air) to its Unimin Hamilton
Operation (MSHA I.D. No. 45–00779)
located in Skagit County, Washington.
The petitioner proposes to implement a
clothes cleaning booth process that has
been jointly developed with and
successfully tested by the National
Institute for Occupational Safety and
Health (NIOSH). The petitioner states
that the process utilizes controlled
compressed air for the purpose of
cleaning miners’ dust laden clothing.
The petitioner asserts that the proposed
alternative method would provide at
least the same measure of protection as
the existing standard.
8. Unimin Corporation
BILLING CODE 4510–43–P
[Docket No. M–2005–004–M]
Unimin Corporation, 258 Elm Street,
New Canaan, Connecticut 06840 has
filed a petition to modify the
application of 30 CFR 56.13020 (Use of
compressed air) to its Unimin McIntyre
Operation (MSHA I.D. No. 09–00128)
located in Wilkinson County, Georgia.
The petitioner proposes to implement a
clothes cleaning booth process that has
been jointly developed with and
successfully tested by the National
Institute for Occupational Safety and
Health (NIOSH). The petitioner states
that the process utilizes controlled
compressed air for the purpose of
cleaning miners’ dust laden clothing.
The petitioner asserts that the proposed
alternative method would provide at
least the same measure of protection as
the existing standard.
9. Phelps Dodge Bagdad
[Docket No. M–2005–005–M]
Phelps Dodge Bagdad, 100 Main
Street, Bagdad, Arizona 86321 has filed
a petition to modify the application of
30 CFR 56.6309 (Fuel oil requirements
for ANFO) to its Bagdad Mine (MSHA
I.D. No. 02–00137) located in Yavapai
County, Arizona. The petitioner
proposes to use recycled waste oil
blended with diesel fuel to produce
ammonium nitrate-fuel oil for use as a
blasting agent. The petitioner has listed
specific procedures in this petition for
modification that would be followed
when the proposed alternative method
is implemented. The petitioner asserts
that the proposed alternative method
would provide at least the same
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16:09 Aug 19, 2005
Dated at Arlington, Virginia this 17th day
of August 2005.
Rebecca J. Smith,
Acting Director, Office of Standards,
Regulations, and Variances.
[FR Doc. 05–16625 Filed 8–19–05; 8:45 am]
Jkt 205001
NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION
[Docket Nos. 50–424 AND 50–425]
Southern Nuclear Operating Company,
Inc.; Notice of Consideration of
Issuance of Amendment to Facility
Operating License, Proposed No
Significant Hazards; Consideration
Determination, and Opportunity for a
Hearing
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (the Commission) is
considering issuance of amendments to
Facility Operating License Nos. NPF–68
and NPF–81 issued Southern Nuclear
Operating Company, Inc. (SNC), for
operation of the Vogtle Electric
Generating Plant (VEGP), Units 1 and 2,
located in Burke County, Georgia.
The proposed amendment would
revise, on a one-time basis, Technical
Specification (TS) 5.5.9, ‘‘Steam
Generator (SG) Tube Surveillance
Program,’’ to incorporate changes in the
SG inspection scope for VEGP, Unit 2
during Refueling Outage 11 and the
subsequent operating cycle. The
proposed changes are applicable to Unit
2 only for inspections during Refueling
Outage 11 and for the subsequent
operating cycle. The proposed changes
modify the inspection requirements for
portions of SG tubes within the hot leg
tubesheet region of the SGs. The license
for VEGP, Unit 1 is affected only due to
the fact that Units 1 and 2 use common
TSs.
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48985
Before issuance of the proposed
license amendment, the Commission
will have made findings required by the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended
(the Act), and the Commission’s
regulations.
The Commission has made a
proposed determination that the
amendment request involves no
significant hazards consideration. Under
the Commission’s regulations in Title 10
of the Code of Federal Regulations (10
CFR) Section 50.92, this means that
operation of the facility in accordance
with the proposed amendment would
not (1) involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an
accident previously evaluated; or (2)
create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any
accident previously evaluated; or (3)
involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety. As required by 10 CFR
50.91(a), the licensee has provided its
analysis of the issue of no significant
hazards consideration, which is
presented below:
SNC has evaluated whether or not a
significant hazards consideration is involved
with the proposed changes by focusing on
the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92,
‘‘Issuance of Amendment,’’ as discussed
below:
1. Does the proposed license amendment
involve a significant increase in the
probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated?
No. The previously analyzed accidents are
initiated by the failure of plant structures,
systems, or components. The proposed
changes that alter the SG inspection criteria
do not have a detrimental impact on the
integrity of any plant structure, system, or
component that initiates an analyzed event.
The proposed changes will not alter the
operation of, or otherwise increase the failure
probability of any plant equipment that
initiates an analyzed accident. Therefore, the
proposed change does not involve a
significant increase in the probability of an
accident previously evaluated.
Of the applicable accidents previously
evaluated, the limiting transients with
consideration to the proposed changes to the
SG tube inspection criteria, are the SG tube
rupture (SGTR) event and the steam line
break (SLB) accident.
During the SGTR event, the required
structural integrity margins of the SG tubes
will be maintained by the presence of the SG
tubesheet. SG tubes are hydraulically
expanded in the tubesheet area. Tube rupture
in tubes with cracks in the tubesheet is
precluded by the constraint provided by the
tubesheet. This constraint results from the
hydraulic expansion process, thermal
expansion mismatch between the tube and
tubesheet and from the differential pressure
between the primary and secondary side.
Based on this design, the structural margins
against burst, discussed in Regulatory Guide
(RG) 1.121, ‘‘Bases for Plugging Degraded
PWR [Pressurized-Water Reactor] SG Tubes,’’
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48986
Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 161 / Monday, August 22, 2005 / Notices
are maintained for both normal and
postulated accident conditions.
The proposed changes do not affect other
systems, structures, components or
operational features. Therefore, the proposed
changes result in no significant increase in
the probability of the occurrence of a SGTR
accident. At normal operating pressures,
leakage from primary water stress corrosion
cracking (PWSCC) below the proposed
limited inspection depth is limited by both
the tube-to-tubesheet crevice and the limited
crack opening permitted by the tubesheet
constraint. Consequently, negligible normal
operating leakage is expected from cracks
within the tubesheet region. The
consequences of an SGTR event are affected
by the primary-to-secondary leakage flow
during the event.
Primary-to-secondary leakage flow through
a postulated broken tube is not affected by
the proposed change since the tubesheet
enhances the tube integrity in the region of
the hydraulic expansion by precluding tube
deformation beyond its initial hydraulically
expanded outside diameter.
The probability of a SLB is unaffected by
the potential failure of a SG tube as this
failure is not an initiator for a SLB.
The consequences of a SLB are also not
significantly affected by the proposed
changes. During a SLB accident, the
reduction in pressure above the tubesheet on
the shell side of the SG creates an axially
uniformly distributed load on the tubesheet
due to the reactor coolant system pressure on
the underside of the tubesheet. The resulting
bending action constrains the tubes in the
tubesheet thereby restricting primary-tosecondary leakage below the midplane.
Primary-to-secondary leakage from tube
degradation in the tubesheet area during the
limiting accident (i.e., SLB) is limited by flow
restrictions resulting from the crack and tubeto-tubesheet contact pressures that provide a
restricted leakage path above the indications
and also limit the degree of potential crack
face opening as compared to free span
indications. The primary-to-secondary leak
rate during postulated SLB accident
conditions would be expected to be less than
that during normal operation for indications
near the bottom of the tubesheet (i.e.,
including indications in the tube end welds).
This conclusion is based on the observation
that while the driving pressure causing
leakage increases by approximately a factor
of two, the flow resistance associated with an
increase in the tube-to-tubesheet contact
pressure, during a SLB, increases by up to
approximately a factor of three. While such
a leakage decrease is logically expected, the
postulated accident leak rate could be
conservatively bounded by twice the normal
operating leak rate if the increase in contact
pressure is ignored. Since normal operating
leakage is administratively limited (by NEI
[Nuclear Energy Institute] 97–06) to less than
0.10 gpm (150 gpd) in the Vogtle Unit 2
steam generators, the attendant accident
condition leak rate, assuming all leakage to
be from lower tubesheet indications, would
be bounded by 0.20 gpm, which is less than
the accident analysis assumption of 0.35 gpm
included in Section 15.1.5 of the Vogtle Unit
2 UFSAR. Hence it is reasonable to omit any
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16:09 Aug 19, 2005
Jkt 205001
consideration of inspection of the tube, tube
end weld, bulges/overexpansions or other
anomalies below 17 inches from the top of
the hot leg tubesheet. Therefore, the
consequences of a SLB accident remain
unaffected.
Based on the above discussion, the
proposed changes do not involve an increase
in the consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
2. Does the proposed license amendment
create the possibility of a new or different
kind of accident from any accident
previously evaluated?
No. The proposed changes do not involve
the use or installation of new equipment and
the currently installed equipment will not be
operated in a new or different manner. No
new or different system interactions are
created and no new processes are introduced.
The proposed changes will not introduce any
new failure mechanisms, malfunctions, or
accident initiators not already considered in
the design and licensing bases.
Based on this evaluation, the proposed
change does not create the possibility of a
new or different kind of accident from any
accident previously evaluated.
3. Does the proposed amendment involve
a significant reduction in a margin of safety?
No. The proposed changes maintain the
required structural margins of the SG tubes
for both normal and accident conditions.
Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 97–06, ‘‘Steam
Generator Program Guidelines,’’ Revision 1
and Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.121, ‘‘Bases for
Plugging Degraded PWR Steam Generator
Tubes,’’ are used as the bases in the
development of the limited hot leg tubesheet
inspection depth methodology for
determining that SG tube integrity
considerations are maintained within
acceptable limits. RG 1.121 describes a
method acceptable to the NRC for meeting
General Design Criteria (GDC) 14, ‘‘Reactor
coolant pressure boundary,’’ GDC 15,
‘‘Reactor coolant system design,’’ GDC 31,
‘‘Fracture prevention of reactor coolant
pressure boundary,’’ and GDC 32,
‘‘Inspection of reactor coolant pressure
boundary,’’ by reducing the probability and
consequences of a SGTR. RG 1.121 concludes
that by determining the limiting safe
conditions for tube wall degradation the
probability and consequences of a SGTR are
reduced. This RG uses safety factors on loads
for tube burst that are consistent with the
requirements of Section III of the American
Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME)
Code.
Application of the limited hot leg
tubesheet inspection depth criteria will
preclude unacceptable primary-to-secondary
leakage during all plant conditions. The
methodology for determining leakage
provides for large margins between
calculated and actual leakage values in the
proposed limited hot leg tubesheet
inspection depth criteria.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not
involve a significant hazards consideration
under the criteria set forth in 10 CFR
50.92(c).
The NRC staff has reviewed the
licensee’s analysis and, based on this
review, it appears that the three
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Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff
proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves no
significant hazards consideration.
The Commission is seeking public
comments on this proposed
determination. Any comments received
within 30 days after the date of
publication of this notice will be
considered in making any final
determination.
Normally, the Commission will not
issue the amendment until the
expiration of 60 days after the date of
publication of this notice. The
Commission may issue the license
amendment before expiration of the 60day period provided that its final
determination is that the amendment
involves no significant hazards
consideration. In addition, the
Commission may issue the amendment
prior to the expiration of the 30-day
comment period should circumstances
change during the 30-day comment
period such that failure to act in a
timely way would result, for example in
derating or shutdown of the facility.
Should the Commission take action
prior to the expiration of either the
comment period or the notice period, it
will publish in the Federal Register a
notice of issuance. Should the
Commission make a final No Significant
Hazards Consideration Determination,
any hearing will take place after
issuance. The Commission expects that
the need to take this action will occur
very infrequently.
Written comments may be submitted
by mail to the Chief, Rules and
Directives Branch, Division of
Administrative Services, Office of
Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Washington, DC 20555–
0001, and should cite the publication
date and page number of this Federal
Register notice. Written comments may
also be delivered to Room 6D59, Two
White Flint North, 11545 Rockville
Pike, Rockville, Maryland, from 7:30
a.m. to 4:15 p.m. Federal workdays.
Documents may be examined, and/or
copied for a fee, at the NRC’s Public
Document Room (PDR), located at One
White Flint North, Public File Area O1
F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor),
Rockville, Maryland.
The filing of requests for hearing and
petitions for leave to intervene is
discussed below.
Within 60 days after the date of
publication of this notice, the licensee
may file a request for a hearing with
respect to issuance of the amendment to
the subject facility operating license and
any person whose interest may be
affected by this proceeding and who
E:\FR\FM\22AUN1.SGM
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Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 161 / Monday, August 22, 2005 / Notices
wishes to participate as a party in the
proceeding must file a written request
for a hearing and a petition for leave to
intervene. Requests for a hearing and a
petition for leave to intervene shall be
filed in accordance with the
Commission’s ‘‘Rules of Practice for
Domestic Licensing Proceedings’’ in 10
CFR Part 2. Interested persons should
consult a current copy of 10 CFR 2.309,
which is available at the Commission’s
PDR, located at One White Flint North,
Public File Area O1F21, 11555
Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville,
Maryland. Publicly available records
will be accessible from the Agencywide
Documents Access and Management
System’s (ADAMS) Public Electronic
Reading Room on the Internet at the
NRC Web site, https://www.nrc.gov/
reading-rm/doc-collections/cfr/. If a
request for a hearing or petition for
leave to intervene is filed by the above
date, the Commission or a presiding
officer designated by the Commission or
by the Chief Administrative Judge of the
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board
Panel, will rule on the request and/or
petition; and the Secretary or the Chief
Administrative Judge of the Atomic
Safety and Licensing Board will issue a
notice of a hearing or an appropriate
order.
As required by 10 CFR 2.309, a
petition for leave to intervene shall set
forth with particularity the interest of
the petitioner in the proceeding, and
how that interest may be affected by the
results of the proceeding. The petition
should specifically explain the reasons
why intervention should be permitted
with particular reference to the
following general requirements: (1) The
name, address and telephone number of
the requestor or petitioner; (2) the
nature of the requestor’s/petitioner’s
right under the Act to be made a party
to the proceeding; (3) the nature and
extent of the requestor’s/petitioner’s
property, financial, or other interest in
the proceeding; and (4) the possible
effect of any decision or order which
may be entered in the proceeding on the
requestor’s/petitioner’s interest. The
petition must also identify the specific
contentions which the petitioner/
requestor seeks to have litigated at the
proceeding.
Each contention must consist of a
specific statement of the issue of law or
fact to be raised or controverted. In
addition, the petitioner/requestor shall
provide a brief explanation of the bases
for the contention and a concise
statement of the alleged facts or expert
opinion which support the contention
on which the petitioner intends to rely
in proving the contention at the hearing.
The petitioner/requestor must also
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16:09 Aug 19, 2005
Jkt 205001
provide references to those specific
sources and documents of which the
petitioner is aware and on which the
petitioner intends to rely to establish
those facts or expert opinion. The
petition must include sufficient
information to show that a genuine
dispute exists with the applicant on a
material issue of law or fact.
Contentions shall be limited to matters
within the scope of the amendment
under consideration. The contention
must be one which, if proven, would
entitle the petitioner to relief. A
petitioner/requestor who fails to satisfy
these requirements with respect to at
least one contention will not be
permitted to participate as a party.
Those permitted to intervene become
parties to the proceeding, subject to any
limitations in the order granting leave to
intervene, and have the opportunity to
participate fully in the conduct of the
hearing.
If a hearing is requested, the
Commission will make a final
determination on the issue of no
significant hazards consideration. The
final determination will serve to decide
when the hearing is held. If the final
determination is that the amendment
request involves no significant hazards
consideration, the Commission may
issue the amendment and make it
immediately effective, notwithstanding
the request for a hearing. Any hearing
held would take place after issuance of
the amendment. If the final
determination is that the amendment
request involves a significant hazards
consideration, any hearing held would
take place before the issuance of any
amendment.
Nontimely requests and/or petitions
and contentions will not be entertained
absent a determination by the
Commission or the presiding officer of
the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board
that the petition, request and/or the
contentions should be granted based on
a balancing of the factors specified in 10
CFR 2.309(c)(1)(I)–(viii).
A request for a hearing or a petition
for leave to intervene must be filed by:
(1) First class mail addressed to the
Office of the Secretary of the
Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Washington, DC 20555–
0001, Attention: Rulemaking and
Adjudications Staff; (2) courier, express
mail, and expedited delivery services:
Office of the Secretary, Sixteenth Floor,
One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville
Pike, Rockville, Maryland, 20852,
Attention: Rulemaking and
Adjudications Staff; (3) E-mail
addressed to the Office of the Secretary,
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
HEARINGDOCKET@NRC.GOV; or (4)
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48987
facsimile transmission addressed to the
Office of the Secretary, U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, Washington,
DC, Attention: Rulemakings and
Adjudications Staff at (301) 415–1101,
verification number is (301) 415–1966.
A copy of the request for hearing and
petition for leave to intervene should
also be sent to the Office of the General
Counsel, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Washington, DC 20555–
0001, and it is requested that copies be
transmitted either by means of facsimile
transmission to 301–415–3725 or by email to OGCMailCenter@nrc.gov. A copy
of the request for hearing and petition
for leave to intervene should also be
sent to Arthur H. Domby, Esquire,
Troutman Sanders, NationsBank Plaza,
600 Peachtree Street, NE., Suite 5200,
Atlanta, GA 30308–2216, the attorney
for the licensee.
For further details with respect to this
action, see the application for
amendment dated August 12, 2005,
which is available for public inspection
at the Commission’s PDR, located at
One White Flint North, File Public Area
O1 F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first
floor), Rockville, Maryland. Publicly
available records will be accessible from
the Agencywide Documents Access and
Management System’s (ADAMS) Public
Electronic Reading Room on the Internet
at the NRC Web site, https://
www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html.
Persons who do not have access to
ADAMS or who encounter problems in
accessing the documents located in
ADAMS, should contact the NRC PDR
Reference staff by telephone at 1–800–
397–4209, 301–415–4737, or by e-mail
to pdr@nrc.gov.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 16th day
of August 2005.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Christopher Gratton,
Sr. Project Manager, Section 1, Project
Directorate II, Division of Licensing Project
Management, Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation.
[FR Doc. E5–4554 Filed 8–19–05; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590–01–P
OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
MANAGEMENT
Submission for OMB Review;
Comment Request for Reclearance of
an Information Collection: SF 2817
Office of Personnel
Management.
ACTION: Notice.
AGENCY:
SUMMARY: In accordance with the
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (Pub.
L. 104–13, May 22, 1995), this notice
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Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 70, Number 161 (Monday, August 22, 2005)]
[Notices]
[Pages 48985-48987]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E5-4554]
=======================================================================
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket Nos. 50-424 AND 50-425]
Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.; Notice of Consideration
of Issuance of Amendment to Facility Operating License, Proposed No
Significant Hazards; Consideration Determination, and Opportunity for a
Hearing
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is
considering issuance of amendments to Facility Operating License Nos.
NPF-68 and NPF-81 issued Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
(SNC), for operation of the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP),
Units 1 and 2, located in Burke County, Georgia.
The proposed amendment would revise, on a one-time basis, Technical
Specification (TS) 5.5.9, ``Steam Generator (SG) Tube Surveillance
Program,'' to incorporate changes in the SG inspection scope for VEGP,
Unit 2 during Refueling Outage 11 and the subsequent operating cycle.
The proposed changes are applicable to Unit 2 only for inspections
during Refueling Outage 11 and for the subsequent operating cycle. The
proposed changes modify the inspection requirements for portions of SG
tubes within the hot leg tubesheet region of the SGs. The license for
VEGP, Unit 1 is affected only due to the fact that Units 1 and 2 use
common TSs.
Before issuance of the proposed license amendment, the Commission
will have made findings required by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as
amended (the Act), and the Commission's regulations.
The Commission has made a proposed determination that the amendment
request involves no significant hazards consideration. Under the
Commission's regulations in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations
(10 CFR) Section 50.92, this means that operation of the facility in
accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1) involve a
significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or
(3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. As required
by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue
of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:
SNC has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards
consideration is involved with the proposed changes by focusing on
the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, ``Issuance of
Amendment,'' as discussed below:
1. Does the proposed license amendment involve a significant
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated?
No. The previously analyzed accidents are initiated by the
failure of plant structures, systems, or components. The proposed
changes that alter the SG inspection criteria do not have a
detrimental impact on the integrity of any plant structure, system,
or component that initiates an analyzed event. The proposed changes
will not alter the operation of, or otherwise increase the failure
probability of any plant equipment that initiates an analyzed
accident. Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a
significant increase in the probability of an accident previously
evaluated.
Of the applicable accidents previously evaluated, the limiting
transients with consideration to the proposed changes to the SG tube
inspection criteria, are the SG tube rupture (SGTR) event and the
steam line break (SLB) accident.
During the SGTR event, the required structural integrity margins
of the SG tubes will be maintained by the presence of the SG
tubesheet. SG tubes are hydraulically expanded in the tubesheet
area. Tube rupture in tubes with cracks in the tubesheet is
precluded by the constraint provided by the tubesheet. This
constraint results from the hydraulic expansion process, thermal
expansion mismatch between the tube and tubesheet and from the
differential pressure between the primary and secondary side. Based
on this design, the structural margins against burst, discussed in
Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.121, ``Bases for Plugging Degraded PWR
[Pressurized-Water Reactor] SG Tubes,''
[[Page 48986]]
are maintained for both normal and postulated accident conditions.
The proposed changes do not affect other systems, structures,
components or operational features. Therefore, the proposed changes
result in no significant increase in the probability of the
occurrence of a SGTR accident. At normal operating pressures,
leakage from primary water stress corrosion cracking (PWSCC) below
the proposed limited inspection depth is limited by both the tube-
to-tubesheet crevice and the limited crack opening permitted by the
tubesheet constraint. Consequently, negligible normal operating
leakage is expected from cracks within the tubesheet region. The
consequences of an SGTR event are affected by the primary-to-
secondary leakage flow during the event.
Primary-to-secondary leakage flow through a postulated broken
tube is not affected by the proposed change since the tubesheet
enhances the tube integrity in the region of the hydraulic expansion
by precluding tube deformation beyond its initial hydraulically
expanded outside diameter.
The probability of a SLB is unaffected by the potential failure
of a SG tube as this failure is not an initiator for a SLB.
The consequences of a SLB are also not significantly affected by
the proposed changes. During a SLB accident, the reduction in
pressure above the tubesheet on the shell side of the SG creates an
axially uniformly distributed load on the tubesheet due to the
reactor coolant system pressure on the underside of the tubesheet.
The resulting bending action constrains the tubes in the tubesheet
thereby restricting primary-to-secondary leakage below the midplane.
Primary-to-secondary leakage from tube degradation in the
tubesheet area during the limiting accident (i.e., SLB) is limited
by flow restrictions resulting from the crack and tube-to-tubesheet
contact pressures that provide a restricted leakage path above the
indications and also limit the degree of potential crack face
opening as compared to free span indications. The primary-to-
secondary leak rate during postulated SLB accident conditions would
be expected to be less than that during normal operation for
indications near the bottom of the tubesheet (i.e., including
indications in the tube end welds). This conclusion is based on the
observation that while the driving pressure causing leakage
increases by approximately a factor of two, the flow resistance
associated with an increase in the tube-to-tubesheet contact
pressure, during a SLB, increases by up to approximately a factor of
three. While such a leakage decrease is logically expected, the
postulated accident leak rate could be conservatively bounded by
twice the normal operating leak rate if the increase in contact
pressure is ignored. Since normal operating leakage is
administratively limited (by NEI [Nuclear Energy Institute] 97-06)
to less than 0.10 gpm (150 gpd) in the Vogtle Unit 2 steam
generators, the attendant accident condition leak rate, assuming all
leakage to be from lower tubesheet indications, would be bounded by
0.20 gpm, which is less than the accident analysis assumption of
0.35 gpm included in Section 15.1.5 of the Vogtle Unit 2 UFSAR.
Hence it is reasonable to omit any consideration of inspection of
the tube, tube end weld, bulges/overexpansions or other anomalies
below 17 inches from the top of the hot leg tubesheet. Therefore,
the consequences of a SLB accident remain unaffected.
Based on the above discussion, the proposed changes do not
involve an increase in the consequences of an accident previously
evaluated.
2. Does the proposed license amendment create the possibility of
a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated?
No. The proposed changes do not involve the use or installation
of new equipment and the currently installed equipment will not be
operated in a new or different manner. No new or different system
interactions are created and no new processes are introduced. The
proposed changes will not introduce any new failure mechanisms,
malfunctions, or accident initiators not already considered in the
design and licensing bases.
Based on this evaluation, the proposed change does not create
the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any
accident previously evaluated.
3. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant reduction
in a margin of safety?
No. The proposed changes maintain the required structural
margins of the SG tubes for both normal and accident conditions.
Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 97-06, ``Steam Generator Program
Guidelines,'' Revision 1 and Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.121, ``Bases
for Plugging Degraded PWR Steam Generator Tubes,'' are used as the
bases in the development of the limited hot leg tubesheet inspection
depth methodology for determining that SG tube integrity
considerations are maintained within acceptable limits. RG 1.121
describes a method acceptable to the NRC for meeting General Design
Criteria (GDC) 14, ``Reactor coolant pressure boundary,'' GDC 15,
``Reactor coolant system design,'' GDC 31, ``Fracture prevention of
reactor coolant pressure boundary,'' and GDC 32, ``Inspection of
reactor coolant pressure boundary,'' by reducing the probability and
consequences of a SGTR. RG 1.121 concludes that by determining the
limiting safe conditions for tube wall degradation the probability
and consequences of a SGTR are reduced. This RG uses safety factors
on loads for tube burst that are consistent with the requirements of
Section III of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME)
Code.
Application of the limited hot leg tubesheet inspection depth
criteria will preclude unacceptable primary-to-secondary leakage
during all plant conditions. The methodology for determining leakage
provides for large margins between calculated and actual leakage
values in the proposed limited hot leg tubesheet inspection depth
criteria.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant
hazards consideration under the criteria set forth in 10 CFR
50.92(c).
The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
The Commission is seeking public comments on this proposed
determination. Any comments received within 30 days after the date of
publication of this notice will be considered in making any final
determination.
Normally, the Commission will not issue the amendment until the
expiration of 60 days after the date of publication of this notice. The
Commission may issue the license amendment before expiration of the 60-
day period provided that its final determination is that the amendment
involves no significant hazards consideration. In addition, the
Commission may issue the amendment prior to the expiration of the 30-
day comment period should circumstances change during the 30-day
comment period such that failure to act in a timely way would result,
for example in derating or shutdown of the facility. Should the
Commission take action prior to the expiration of either the comment
period or the notice period, it will publish in the Federal Register a
notice of issuance. Should the Commission make a final No Significant
Hazards Consideration Determination, any hearing will take place after
issuance. The Commission expects that the need to take this action will
occur very infrequently.
Written comments may be submitted by mail to the Chief, Rules and
Directives Branch, Division of Administrative Services, Office of
Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC
20555-0001, and should cite the publication date and page number of
this Federal Register notice. Written comments may also be delivered to
Room 6D59, Two White Flint North, 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville,
Maryland, from 7:30 a.m. to 4:15 p.m. Federal workdays. Documents may
be examined, and/or copied for a fee, at the NRC's Public Document Room
(PDR), located at One White Flint North, Public File Area O1 F21, 11555
Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland.
The filing of requests for hearing and petitions for leave to
intervene is discussed below.
Within 60 days after the date of publication of this notice, the
licensee may file a request for a hearing with respect to issuance of
the amendment to the subject facility operating license and any person
whose interest may be affected by this proceeding and who
[[Page 48987]]
wishes to participate as a party in the proceeding must file a written
request for a hearing and a petition for leave to intervene. Requests
for a hearing and a petition for leave to intervene shall be filed in
accordance with the Commission's ``Rules of Practice for Domestic
Licensing Proceedings'' in 10 CFR Part 2. Interested persons should
consult a current copy of 10 CFR 2.309, which is available at the
Commission's PDR, located at One White Flint North, Public File Area
O1F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland.
Publicly available records will be accessible from the Agencywide
Documents Access and Management System's (ADAMS) Public Electronic
Reading Room on the Internet at the NRC Web site, https://www.nrc.gov/
reading-rm/doc-collections/cfr/. If a request for a hearing or petition
for leave to intervene is filed by the above date, the Commission or a
presiding officer designated by the Commission or by the Chief
Administrative Judge of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel,
will rule on the request and/or petition; and the Secretary or the
Chief Administrative Judge of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board
will issue a notice of a hearing or an appropriate order.
As required by 10 CFR 2.309, a petition for leave to intervene
shall set forth with particularity the interest of the petitioner in
the proceeding, and how that interest may be affected by the results of
the proceeding. The petition should specifically explain the reasons
why intervention should be permitted with particular reference to the
following general requirements: (1) The name, address and telephone
number of the requestor or petitioner; (2) the nature of the
requestor's/petitioner's right under the Act to be made a party to the
proceeding; (3) the nature and extent of the requestor's/petitioner's
property, financial, or other interest in the proceeding; and (4) the
possible effect of any decision or order which may be entered in the
proceeding on the requestor's/petitioner's interest. The petition must
also identify the specific contentions which the petitioner/requestor
seeks to have litigated at the proceeding.
Each contention must consist of a specific statement of the issue
of law or fact to be raised or controverted. In addition, the
petitioner/requestor shall provide a brief explanation of the bases for
the contention and a concise statement of the alleged facts or expert
opinion which support the contention on which the petitioner intends to
rely in proving the contention at the hearing. The petitioner/requestor
must also provide references to those specific sources and documents of
which the petitioner is aware and on which the petitioner intends to
rely to establish those facts or expert opinion. The petition must
include sufficient information to show that a genuine dispute exists
with the applicant on a material issue of law or fact. Contentions
shall be limited to matters within the scope of the amendment under
consideration. The contention must be one which, if proven, would
entitle the petitioner to relief. A petitioner/requestor who fails to
satisfy these requirements with respect to at least one contention will
not be permitted to participate as a party.
Those permitted to intervene become parties to the proceeding,
subject to any limitations in the order granting leave to intervene,
and have the opportunity to participate fully in the conduct of the
hearing.
If a hearing is requested, the Commission will make a final
determination on the issue of no significant hazards consideration. The
final determination will serve to decide when the hearing is held. If
the final determination is that the amendment request involves no
significant hazards consideration, the Commission may issue the
amendment and make it immediately effective, notwithstanding the
request for a hearing. Any hearing held would take place after issuance
of the amendment. If the final determination is that the amendment
request involves a significant hazards consideration, any hearing held
would take place before the issuance of any amendment.
Nontimely requests and/or petitions and contentions will not be
entertained absent a determination by the Commission or the presiding
officer of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board that the petition,
request and/or the contentions should be granted based on a balancing
of the factors specified in 10 CFR 2.309(c)(1)(I)-(viii).
A request for a hearing or a petition for leave to intervene must
be filed by: (1) First class mail addressed to the Office of the
Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC 20555-0001, Attention: Rulemaking and Adjudications
Staff; (2) courier, express mail, and expedited delivery services:
Office of the Secretary, Sixteenth Floor, One White Flint North, 11555
Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland, 20852, Attention: Rulemaking and
Adjudications Staff; (3) E-mail addressed to the Office of the
Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, HEARINGDOCKET@NRC.GOV;
or (4) facsimile transmission addressed to the Office of the Secretary,
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC, Attention:
Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff at (301) 415-1101, verification
number is (301) 415-1966. A copy of the request for hearing and
petition for leave to intervene should also be sent to the Office of
the General Counsel, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC
20555-0001, and it is requested that copies be transmitted either by
means of facsimile transmission to 301-415-3725 or by e-mail to
OGCMailCenter@nrc.gov. A copy of the request for hearing and petition
for leave to intervene should also be sent to Arthur H. Domby, Esquire,
Troutman Sanders, NationsBank Plaza, 600 Peachtree Street, NE., Suite
5200, Atlanta, GA 30308-2216, the attorney for the licensee.
For further details with respect to this action, see the
application for amendment dated August 12, 2005, which is available for
public inspection at the Commission's PDR, located at One White Flint
North, File Public Area O1 F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor),
Rockville, Maryland. Publicly available records will be accessible from
the Agencywide Documents Access and Management System's (ADAMS) Public
Electronic Reading Room on the Internet at the NRC Web site, https://
www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. Persons who do not have access to
ADAMS or who encounter problems in accessing the documents located in
ADAMS, should contact the NRC PDR Reference staff by telephone at 1-
800-397-4209, 301-415-4737, or by e-mail to pdr@nrc.gov.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 16th day of August 2005.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Christopher Gratton,
Sr. Project Manager, Section 1, Project Directorate II, Division of
Licensing Project Management, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. E5-4554 Filed 8-19-05; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P