Public Health and Environmental Radiation Protection Standards for Yucca Mountain, NV, 49014-49065 [05-16193]
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Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 161 / Monday, August 22, 2005 / Proposed Rules
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY
40 CFR Part 197
[OAR–2005–0083; FRL–7952–1]
RIN 2060–AN15
Public Health and Environmental
Radiation Protection Standards for
Yucca Mountain, NV
Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA).
ACTION: Proposed rule.
AGENCY:
SUMMARY: We, the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA), are proposing
to revise certain of our public health
and safety standards for radioactive
material stored or disposed of in the
potential repository at Yucca Mountain,
Nevada. Section 801(a) of the Energy
Policy Act of 1992 (EnPA, Pub. L. 102–
486) directed us to develop these
standards. These standards (the 2001
standards) were originally promulgated
on June 13, 2001 (66 FR 32074). Section
801 of the EnPA also required us to
contract with the National Academy of
Sciences (NAS) to conduct a study to
provide findings and recommendations
on reasonable standards for protection
of the public health and safety. The
health and safety standards promulgated
by EPA are to be ‘‘based upon and
consistent with’’ the findings and
recommendations of NAS. On August 1,
1995, NAS released its report (the NAS
Report), titled ‘‘Technical Bases for
Yucca Mountain Standards.’’ In
promulgating our standards, we
considered the NAS Report as the EnPA
directs.
On July 9, 2004, in response to a legal
challenge by the State of Nevada and the
Natural Resources Defense Council, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit vacated portions of
our standards that addressed the period
of time for which compliance must be
demonstrated. The Court ruled that the
time frame for regulatory compliance
was not ‘‘based upon and consistent
with’’ the findings and
recommendations of the NAS and
remanded those portions of the
standards to us for revision. These
remanded provisions are the subject of
today’s action.
Today’s proposal incorporates
multiple compliance criteria applicable
at different times for protection of
individuals and in circumstances
involving human intrusion into the
repository. Compliance will be judged
against a standard of 150 microsievert
per year (15 millirem per year)
committed effective dose equivalent at
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times up to 10,000 years after disposal
and against a standard of 3.5 millisievert
per year (350 millirem per year)
committed effective dose equivalent at
times after 10,000 years and up to 1
million years after disposal. Today’s
proposal also includes several
supporting provisions affecting DOE’s
performance projections. DOE will
measure the median of the distribution
of doses against the dose standard
beyond 10,000 years, will calculate
doses using updated scientific factors,
and will incorporate specific direction
on analyzing features, events, and
processes that may affect performance.
Section 801(b) of the EnPA requires
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC) to modify its technical
requirements for licensing of the Yucca
Mountain repository to be consistent
with the standards promulgated by EPA.
NRC did incorporate EPA’s Yucca
Mountain standards into its licensing
regulations and the regulatory time
frame provision of these was similarly
struck down by the Court of Appeals.
Once revised regulatory time frame
components of our standards have been
promulgated, NRC must revise its
licensing regulations to be consistent
with our revised standards. The
Department of Energy (DOE) plans to
submit a license application providing a
compliance demonstration. The NRC
will determine whether DOE has
demonstrated compliance with NRC’s
licensing regulations, which must be
consistent with our standards, prior to
granting or denying the necessary
licenses to dispose of radioactive
material in Yucca Mountain.
DATES: Comments must be received on
or before October 21, 2005.
ADDRESSES: Submit your comments,
identified by Docket ID No. OAR–2005–
0083, by one of the following methods:
1. Electronically. If you submit an
electronic comment as prescribed
below, EPA recommends that you
include your name, mailing address,
and an e-mail address or other contact
information in the body of your
comment. Also include this contact
information on the outside of any disk
or CD–ROM you submit, and in any
cover letter accompanying the disk or
CD–ROM. This ensures that you can be
identified as the submitter of the
comment and allows EPA to contact you
in case we cannot read your comment
due to technical difficulties or we need
further information on the substance of
your comment. EPA’s policy is that we
will not edit your comment, and any
identifying or contact information
provided in the body of a comment will
be included as part of the comment that
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is placed in the official public docket,
and made available in EPA’s electronic
public docket. If EPA cannot read your
comment due to technical difficulties
and cannot contact you for clarification,
we may not be able to consider your
comment.
i. Federal eRulemaking Portal: https://
www.regulations.gov. Follow the on-line
instructions for submitting comments.
ii Agency Web site: EPA’s preferred
method for receiving comments is via its
website, EDOCKET. EDOCKET is an
‘‘anonymous access’’ system, which
means EPA will not know your identity,
e-mail address, or other contact
information unless you provide it in the
body of your comment. Go directly to
EDOCKET at https://www.epa.gov/
edocket, or, from the EPA Internet Home
Page (www.epa.gov), select ‘‘Information
Sources’’ (in the left column), then
‘‘Dockets,’’ then ‘‘EPA Dockets’’ (in the
first paragraph). For either route, then
click on ‘‘Quick Search’’ (in the left
column). In the search window, type in
the docket identification number OAR–
2005–0083. Please be patient, the search
could take about 30 seconds. This will
bring you to the ‘‘Docket Search
Results’’ page. At that point, click on
OAR–2005–0083. From the resulting
page, you may submit a comment by
clicking on the balloon icon in the
‘‘Submit Comment’’ column and
following the subsequent directions.
iii. E-mail: Comments may be sent by
electronic mail (e-mail) to a-and-rdocket@epa.gov, Attention Docket ID
No. OAR–2005–0083. In contrast to
EPA’s electronic public docket, EPA’s email system is not an ‘‘anonymous
access’’ system. If you send an e-mail
comment directly to the Docket without
going through EPA’s electronic public
docket, EPA’s e-mail system
automatically captures your e-mail
address. E-mail addresses that are
automatically captured by EPA’s e-mail
system are included as part of the
comment that is placed in the official
public docket, and made available in
EPA’s electronic public docket.
2. Surface Mail. Send your comments
to: EPA Docket Center (EPA/DC), Air
and Radiation Docket, Environmental
Protection Agency, EPA West, Mail
Code 6102T, 1200 Pennsylvania
Avenue, NW., Washington, DC 20460.
Attention Docket ID No. OAR–2005–
0083.
3. Hand Delivery or Courier. Deliver
your comments to: Air and Radiation
Docket, EPA Docket Center, (EPA/DC)
EPA West, Room B102, 1301
Constitution Ave., NW., Washington,
DC, Attention Docket ID No. OAR–
2005–0083. Such deliveries are only
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accepted during the Docket Center’s
normal hours of operation.
4. Facsimile. Fax your comments to:
202–566–1741, Attention Docket ID. No.
OAR–2005–0083.
Instructions for submitting
information to EDOCKET: Direct your
comments and information to Docket ID
No. OAR–2005–0083. It is important to
note that EPA’s policy is that public
comments, whether submitted
electronically or in paper, will be made
available for public viewing in EPA’s
electronic public docket as EPA receives
them and without change, unless the
comment contains copyrighted material,
CBI, or other information whose
disclosure is restricted by statute. When
EPA identifies a comment containing
copyrighted material, EPA will provide
a reference to that material in the
version of the comment that is placed in
EPA’s electronic public docket. The
entire printed comment, including the
copyrighted material, will be available
in the public docket.
Certain types of information will not
be placed in EDOCKET. Information
claimed as CBI and other information
whose disclosure is restricted by statute,
which is not included in the official
public docket, will not be available for
public viewing in EPA’s electronic
public docket. EPA’s policy is that
copyrighted material will not be placed
in EPA’s electronic public docket but
will be available only in printed, paper
form in the official public docket. To the
extent feasible, publicly available
docket materials will be made available
in EPA’s electronic public docket. When
a document is selected from the index
list in EPA Dockets, the system will
identify whether the document is
available for viewing in EPA’s electronic
public docket. Although not all docket
materials may be available
electronically, you may still access any
of the publicly available docket
materials through the docket facility.
EPA intends to work towards providing
electronic access to all of the publicly
available docket materials through
EPA’s electronic public docket.
The EPA EDOCKET and the federal
regulations.gov websites are
‘‘anonymous access’’ systems, which
means EPA will not know your identity
or contact information unless you
provide it in the body of your comment.
If you send an e-mail comment directly
to EPA without going through
EDOCKET or regulations.gov, your email address will be automatically
captured and included as part of the
comment that is placed in the public
docket and made available on the
Internet. If you submit an electronic
comment, EPA recommends that you
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include your name and other contact
information in the body of your
comment and with any disk or CD–ROM
you submit. If EPA cannot read your
comment due to technical difficulties
and cannot contact you for clarification,
EPA may not be able to consider your
comment. Electronic files should avoid
the use of special characters, any form
of encryption, and be free of any defects
or viruses.
Public comments submitted on
computer disks that are mailed or
delivered to the docket will be
transferred to EPA’s electronic public
docket. Public comments that are
mailed or delivered to the docket will be
scanned and placed in EPA’s electronic
public docket. Where practical, physical
objects will be photographed, and the
photograph will be placed in EPA’s
electronic public docket along with a
brief description written by the docket
staff.
For additional information about
EPA’s electronic public docket visit EPA
Dockets online or see 67 FR 38102, May
31, 2002.
Docket: The official docket is the
collection of materials that is available
for public viewing at the Air and
Radiation Docket in the EPA Docket
Center (EPA/DC), EPA West, Room
B102, 1301 Constitution Ave., NW.,
Washington, DC. The EPA Docket
Center Public Reading Room is open
from 8:30 a.m. to 4:30 p.m., Monday
through Friday, excluding legal
holidays. The telephone number for the
Public Reading Room is 202–566–1744.
The telephone number for the Air and
Radiation Docket is 202–566–1742. As
provided in EPA’s regulations at 40 CFR
part 2, and in accordance with normal
EPA docket procedures, if copies of any
docket materials are requested, a
reasonable fee may be charged.
All documents in the docket are listed
in the EDOCKET index at https://
www.epa.gov/edocket. Although listed
in the index, some information is not
publicly available since it will not be
placed in EDOCKET. That is, although
a part of the official docket, EDOCKET
does not include Confidential Business
Information (CBI) or other information
whose disclosure is restricted by statute.
Information claimed as CBI and other
information whose disclosure is
restricted by statute, which is not
included in the official public docket,
will not be available for public viewing
in EPA’s EDOCKET. In addition, EPA
policy is that copyrighted material will
not be placed in EPA’s EDOCKET, but
will be available only in printed, paper
form in the official public docket. To the
extent feasible, publicly available
docket materials will be made available
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in EPA’s EDOCKET. When a document
is selected from the index list in
EDOCKET, the system will identify
whether the document is available for
viewing. Although not all docket
materials may be available
electronically, you may still access any
of the publicly available docket
materials through the docket facility.
EPA intends to work towards providing
electronic access to all of the publicly
available docket materials through
EPA’s electronic public docket.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ray
Clark, Office of Radiation and Indoor
Air, Radiation Protection Division
(6608J), U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, 1200 Pennsylvania Ave., NW.,
Washington, DC 20460–0001; telephone
number: 202–343–9601; fax number:
202–343–2305; e-mail address:
clark.ray@epa.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. General Information
A. Does This Action Apply to Me?
The DOE is the only entity regulated
by these standards. Our standards affect
NRC only because, under Section 801(b)
of the EnPA, 42 U.S.C. 10141 n., NRC
must modify its licensing requirements,
as necessary, to make them consistent
with our final standards. Before it may
accept waste at the Yucca Mountain
site, DOE must obtain a license from
NRC. DOE will be subject to NRC’s
modified regulations, which NRC will
implement through its licensing
proceedings.
B. What Should I Consider as I Prepare
My Comments for EPA?
1. Submitting CBI. If you submit CBI,
clearly mark the part or all of the
information that you claim to be CBI.
For CBI information on a disk or CD–
ROM that you mail to EPA, mark the
outside of the disk or CD–ROM as CBI
and then identify electronically within
the disk or CD–ROM the specific
information that is claimed as CBI. In
addition to one complete version of the
comment that includes information
claimed as CBI, a copy of the comment
that does not contain the information
claimed as CBI must be submitted for
inclusion in the public docket.
Information so marked will not be
disclosed except in accordance with
procedures set forth in 40 CFR part 2.
2. Tips for Preparing Your Comments.
You may find the following suggestions
helpful for preparing your comments:
1. Explain your views as clearly as
possible.
2. Describe any assumptions that you
used.
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3. Provide any technical information
and/or data you used that support your
views.
4. If you estimate potential burden or
costs, explain how you arrived at your
estimate.
5. Provide specific examples to
illustrate your concerns.
6. Offer alternatives.
7. Make sure to submit your
comments by the comment period
deadline identified.
8. Respond to specific questions from
the Agency.
9. To ensure proper receipt by EPA,
identify the appropriate docket
identification number in the subject line
on the first page of your response.
C. How Can I View Items in the Docket?
1. Information Files. EPA is working
with the Lied Library at the University
of Nevada-Las Vegas (https://
www.library.unlv.edu/about/
hours.html#desks) and the Amargosa
Valley, Nevada public library (https://
www.amargosavalley.com/Library.html)
to provide information files on this
rulemaking. These files are not legal
dockets, however every effort will be
made to put the same material in them
as in the official public docket in
Washington, DC. The Lied Library
information file is at the Research and
Information Desk, Government
Publications Section (702–895–2200).
Hours vary based upon the academic
calendar, so we suggest that you call
ahead to be certain that the library will
be open at the time you wish to visit (for
a recorded message, call 702–895–2255).
The other information file is in the
Public Library in Amargosa Valley,
Nevada (phone 775–372–5340). As of
the date of publication, the hours are
Monday, Wednesday, and Friday (9
a.m.–5 p.m.); Tuesday and Thursday (9
a.m.–7 p.m.); and Saturday (9 a.m.–1
p.m.). The library is closed on Sunday.
These hours can change, so we suggest
that you call ahead to be certain when
the library will be open.
2. Electronic Access. An electronic
version of the public docket is available
through EPA’s electronic public docket
and comment system, EPA Dockets
(EDOCKET). You may use EDOCKET to
submit or view comments, access the
index listing of the contents of the
official public docket, and to access
those documents in the public docket
that are available electronically. To
access the docket either go directly to
https://www.epa.gov/edocket/ or, from
the EPA Internet Home Page
(www.epa.gov), select ‘‘Information
Sources’’ (in the left column), then
‘‘Dockets,’’ then ‘‘EPA Dockets’’ (in the
first paragraph). For either route, then
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click on ‘‘Quick Search’’ (in the left
column). In the search window, type in
the docket identification number OAR–
2005–0083. Please be patient, the search
could take about 30 seconds. This will
bring you to the ‘‘Docket Search
Results’’ page. At that point, click on
OAR–2005–0083. From the resulting
page, you may access the docket
contents (e.g., OAR–2005–0083–0002)
by clicking on the icon in the
‘‘Rendition’’ column.
D. Can I Access Information by
Telephone or Via the Internet?
Yes. You may call our toll-free
information line (800–331–9477) 24
hours per day. By calling this number,
you may listen to a brief update
describing our rulemaking activities for
Yucca Mountain, leave a message
requesting that we add your name and
address to the Yucca Mountain mailing
list, or request that an EPA staff person
return your call. In addition, we have
established an electronic listserv
through which you can receive
electronic updates of activities related to
this rulemaking. To subscribe to the
listserv, go to https://lists.epa.gov/read/
all_forums. In the alphabetical list,
locate ‘‘yucca-updates’’ and select
‘‘subscribe’’ at the far right of the screen.
You will be asked to provide your email address and choose a password.
You also can find information and
documents relevant to this rulemaking
on the World Wide Web at https://
www.epa.gov/radiation/yucca. We also
recommend that you examine the
preamble and regulatory language for
the earlier proposed and final rules,
which appeared in the Federal Register
on August 27, 1999 (64 FR 46976) and
June 13, 2001 (66 FR 32074),
respectively.
E. What Documents Are Referenced in
Today’s Proposal?
We refer to a number of documents
that provide supporting information for
our Yucca Mountain standards. All
documents relied upon by EPA in
regulatory decisionmaking may be
found in our docket (OAR–2005–0083).
Other documents, e.g., statutes,
regulations, proposed rules, are readily
available from public sources. The
documents below are referenced most
frequently in today’s proposal.
Item No. (OAR–2005–0083–xxxx)
0044 ‘‘Safety Indicators in Different
Time Frames for the Safety
Assessment of Underground
Radioactive Waste Repositories,’’
International Atomic Energy
Agency
TECDOC–767, 1994
0045 ‘‘Regulatory Decision Making
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in the Presence of Uncertainty in
the Context of Disposal of Long
Lived Radioactive Wastes,’’
International Atomic Energy
Agency
TECDOC–975, 1997
0046 ‘‘The Handling of Timescales
in Assessing Post-Closure Safety:
Lessons Learnt from the April 2002
Workshop in Paris, France,’’
Nuclear Energy Agency
(Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development), 2004
0051 ‘‘Geological Disposal of
Radioactive Waste,’’ International
Atomic Energy Agency Draft Safety
Requirements (DS154), April 2005
0061 ‘‘Principles and Standards for
Disposal of Long-Lived Radioactive
Wastes,’’ Neil Chapman and Charles
McCombie, Elsevier Press, 2003
0062 ‘‘An International Peer Review
of the Yucca Mountain Project
TSPA–SR,’’ Joint Report by the
OECD Nuclear Energy Agency and
the International Atomic Energy
Agency, OECD, 2002
0076 Technical Bases for Yucca
Mountain Standards (the NAS
Report), National Research Council,
National Academy Press, 1995
0077 ‘‘Assessment of Variations in
Radiation Exposure in the United
States,’’ EPA Technical Support
Document, July 2005
0085 ‘‘Assumptions, Conservatisms,
and Uncertainties in Yucca
Mountain Performance
Assessments,’’ EPA Technical
Support Document, July 2005
0086 DOE Final Environmental
Impact Statement, DOE/EIS–0250,
February 2002
Acronyms and Abbreviations
We use many acronyms and
abbreviations in this document. These
include:
BID—background information
document
CED—committed effective dose
CEDE—committed effective dose
equivalent
DOE—U.S. Department of Energy
DOE/VA—DOE’s Viability Assessment
EIS—Environmental Impact Statement
EnPA—Energy Policy Act of 1992
EPA—U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency
FEIS—Final Environmental Impact
Statement
FEPs—features, events, and processes
FR—Federal Register
GCD—greater confinement disposal
HLW—high-level radioactive waste
HSK—Swiss Federal Nuclear Safety
Inspectorate
IAEA—International Atomic Energy
Agency
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ICRP—International Commission on
Radiological Protection
KASAM—Swedish National Council for
Nuclear Waste
LLW—low-level radioactive waste
MCL—maximum contaminant level
MTHM—metric tons of heavy metal
NAPA—National Academy of Public
Administration
NAS—National Academy of Sciences
NEA—Nuclear Energy Agency
NEI—Nuclear Energy Institute
NRC—U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission
NRDC—Natural Resources Defense
Council
NTS—Nevada Test Site
NTTAA—National Technology Transfer
and Advancement Act
NWPA—Nuclear Waste Policy Act of
1982
NWPAA—Nuclear Waste Policy
Amendments Act of 1987
OECD—Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development
OMB—Office of Management and
Budget
RMEI—reasonably maximally exposed
individual
SSI—Swedish Radiation Protection
Authority
SNF—spent nuclear fuel
SR—Site recommendation
TRU—transuranic
TSPA—Total System Performance
Assessment
UK—United Kingdom
UMRA—Unfunded Mandates Reform
Act of 1995
U.S.C.—United States Code
WIPP LWA—Waste Isolation Pilot Plant
Land Withdrawal Act of 1992
Outline of Today’s Action
I. What is the History of Today’s Action?
A. Promulgation of 40 CFR part 197 in
2001
1. What are the Elements of EPA’s 2001
Standards?
a. What is the Standard for Storage of the
Waste? (Subpart A, §§ 197.1 through
197.5)
b. What Are the Standards for Disposal?
(Subpart B, §§ 197.11 through 197.36)
i. What is the Standard for Protection of
Individuals? (§§ 197.20 through 197.21)
aa. Who Represents the Exposed
Population?
bb. How Far Into the Future Must
Performance be Assessed?
ii. What is the Standard for Human
Intrusion? (§§ 197.25 through 197.26)
iii. What are the Standards to Protect
Ground Water? (§§ 197.30 through
197.31)
c. What is ‘‘Reasonable Expectation’’?
(§ 197.14)
B. Legal Challenges to 40 CFR part 197
1. Challenges by the State of Nevada and
Natural Resources Defense Council
2. Challenge by the Nuclear Energy
Institute
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C. Ruling by the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit
1. What Did the Court of Appeals Rule on
the Issue of Compliance Period?
a. What Were NAS’s Findings
(‘‘Conclusions’’) and Recommendations
on the Issue of Compliance Period?
2. What Did the Court of Appeals Rule on
Other Issues Related to EPA’s Standards?
II. How Will EPA Address the Decision by
the Court of Appeals?
A. How Will Elements of the Disposal
Standards be Affected?
1. Individual-Protection Standard
2. Human-Intrusion Standard
3. Ground-Water Protection Standards
4. Reasonable Expectation
5. Effects of Uncertainty
B. How Does the Application of
‘‘Reasonable Expectation’’ Influence
Today’s Proposal?
C. How Is EPA Proposing to Revise the
Individual-Protection Standard
(§ 197.20) to Address Peak Dose?
1. Multiple Dose Standards Applicable to
Different Compliance Periods
2. What Other Options Did EPA Consider?
a. Maintain the 10,000-year Standard
Alone Without Addressing Peak Dose
b. Dose Standard To Apply at Peak Dose
Alone
c. Peak Dose Standard Varying Over Time
d. Standard Expressed as a Dose Target,
Rather Than Limit
e. Standard Expressed as a Statistical
Distribution
3. What Dose Level is EPA Proposing for
Peak Dose?
4. What Other Peak Dose Levels Did EPA
Consider?
a. Maintain the 15 mrem/yr Standard at
Peak Dose
b. 100 mrem/yr Standard at Peak Dose
c. Peak Dose Standard Based on Regional
Background Radiation Levels
5. How Will NRC Judge Compliance?
6. How Will DOE Calculate the Dose?
D. How Will Today’s Proposal Affect the
Way DOE Conducts Performance
Assessments?
1. Performance Assessments Up To 10,000
Years After Disposal
2. Performance Assessments for Periods
Longer Than 10,000 Years After Disposal
a. Consideration of Likely, Unlikely, and
Very Unlikely FEPs
b. Consideration of Seismic FEPs
c. Consideration of Igneous (Volcanic)
FEPs
d. Consideration of Climatological FEPs
E. How Is EPA Proposing To Revise the
Human-Intrusion Standard (§ 197.25) To
Address Peak Dose?
F. Summary of Today’s Proposal by
Section
III. Statutory and Executive Order Reviews
A. Executive Order 12866: Regulatory
Planning and Review
B. Paperwork Reduction Act
C. Regulatory Flexibility Act
D. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
E. Executive Order 13132: Federalism
F. Executive Order 13175: Consultation
and Coordination with Indian Tribal
Governments
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G. Executive Order 13045: Protection of
Children from Environmental Health &
Safety Risks
H. Executive Order 13211: Actions that
Significantly Affect Energy Supply,
Distribution, or Use
I. National Technology Transfer and
Advancement Act
I. What Is the History of Today’s
Action?
Radioactive wastes result from the use
of nuclear fuel and other radioactive
materials. Today, we are proposing to
revise certain standards pertaining to
spent nuclear fuel (SNF), high-level
radioactive waste (HLW), and other
radioactive waste (we refer to these
items collectively as ‘‘radioactive
materials’’ or ‘‘waste’’) that may be
stored or disposed of in the Yucca
Mountain repository. (When we discuss
storage or disposal in this document in
reference to Yucca Mountain, we note
that no decision has been made
regarding the acceptability of Yucca
Mountain for storage or disposal as of
the date of this publication. To save
space and to avoid excessive repetition,
we will not describe Yucca Mountain as
a ‘‘potential’’ repository; however, we
intend this meaning to apply.) Pursuant
to Section 801(a) of the Energy Policy
Act of 1992 (EnPA, Pub. L. 102–486),
these standards apply only to facilities
at Yucca Mountain.
Once nuclear reactions have
consumed a certain percentage of the
uranium or other fissionable material in
nuclear reactor fuel, the fuel no longer
is useful for its intended purpose. It
then is known as ‘‘spent’’ nuclear fuel
(SNF). It is possible to recover specific
radionuclides from SNF through
‘‘reprocessing,’’ which is a process that
dissolves the SNF, thus separating the
radionuclides from one another.
Radionuclides not recovered through
reprocessing become part of the acidic
liquid wastes that the Department of
Energy (DOE) plans to convert into
various types of solid materials. Highlevel waste (HLW) is the highly
radioactive liquid or solid wastes that
result from reprocessing SNF. The SNF
that does not undergo reprocessing prior
to disposal remains inside the fuel
assembly and becomes the final waste
form.
In the U.S., SNF and HLW have been
produced since the 1940s, mainly as a
result of commercial power production
and defense activities. Since the
inception of the nuclear age, the proper
disposal of these wastes has been the
responsibility of the Federal
government. The Nuclear Waste Policy
Act of 1982 (NWPA, 42 U.S.C. Chapter
108) formalizes the current Federal
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program for the disposal of SNF and
HLW by:
(1) Making DOE responsible for siting,
building, and operating an underground
geologic repository for the disposal of
SNF and HLW;
(2) Directing us to set generally
applicable environmental radiation
protection standards based on authority
established under other laws 1; and
(3) Requiring the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) to implement our
standards by revising its licensing
requirements for SNF and HLW
repositories to be consistent with our
standards.
This general division of
responsibilities continues for the Yucca
Mountain repository. Thus, today we
are proposing to establish or revise
specific aspects of our public health
protection standards at 40 CFR part 197
(which are, pursuant to EnPA Section
801(a), applicable only to Yucca
Mountain, rather than generally
applicable). The NRC will issue
implementing regulations for these
standards. The DOE plans to submit a
license application to NRC. The NRC
then will determine whether DOE has
met NRC’s regulations and whether to
grant or deny a license for Yucca
Mountain.
In 1985, we established generic
standards for the management, storage,
and disposal of SNF, HLW, and
transuranic (TRU) radioactive waste (see
40 CFR part 191, 50 FR 38066,
September 19, 1985), which were
intended to apply to any facilities
utilized for the storage or disposal of
these wastes, including Yucca
Mountain. In 1987, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit remanded
the disposal standards in 40 CFR part
191 (NRDC v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1258 (1st
Cir. 1987)). As discussed below, we later
amended and reissued these standards
to address issues that the court raised.
Also in 1987, the Nuclear Waste Policy
Amendments Act (NWPAA, Pub. L.
100–203) amended the NWPA by,
among other actions, selecting Yucca
Mountain, Nevada, as the only potential
site that DOE should characterize for a
long-term geologic repository. In
October 1992, the Waste Isolation Pilot
Plant Land Withdrawal Act (WIPP
LWA, Pub. L. 102–579) and the EnPA
became law. These statutes changed our
obligations concerning radiation
standards for the Yucca Mountain
candidate repository. The WIPP LWA:
(1) Reinstated the 40 CFR part 191
disposal standards, except those
1 These laws include the Atomic Energy Act of
1954, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2011–2296) and
Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970 (5 U.S.C.
Appendix 1).
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portions that were the specific subject of
the remand by the First Circuit;
(2) Required us to issue standards to
replace the portion of the challenged
standards remanded by the court; and
(3) Exempted the Yucca Mountain site
from the 40 CFR part 191 disposal
standards.
We issued the amended 40 CFR part 191
disposal standards, which addressed the
judicial remand, on December 20, 1993
(58 FR 66398). The EnPA, enacted in
1992, set forth our responsibilities as
they relate to Yucca Mountain. In the
EnPA, Congress directed us to set public
health and safety radiation standards for
Yucca Mountain. Specifically, section
801(a)(1) of the EnPA directed us to
‘‘promulgate, by rule, public health and
safety standards for the protection of the
public from releases from radioactive
materials stored or disposed of in the
repository at the Yucca Mountain site.’’
Section 801(a)(2) directed us to contract
with the National Academy of Sciences
(NAS) to conduct a study to provide us
with its findings and recommendations
on reasonable standards for protection
of public health and safety from releases
from the Yucca Mountain disposal
system. Moreover, it provided that our
standards shall be the only such
standards applicable to the Yucca
Mountain site and are to be based upon
and consistent with NAS’s findings and
recommendations. On August 1, 1995,
NAS released its report, ‘‘Technical
Bases for Yucca Mountain Standards’’
(the NAS Report) (Docket No. OAR–
2005–0083–0076).
A. Promulgation of 40 CFR Part 197 in
2001
Following the direction in the EnPA,
we developed standards specifically
applicable to releases from radioactive
material stored or disposed of in the
Yucca Mountain repository. In doing so,
we gave special weight to both the NAS
Report and our generic standards in 40
CFR part 191, and also considered other
relevant information, precedents, and
analyses.
We evaluated 40 CFR part 191
because those standards were developed
to apply to any site selected for storage
and disposal of SNF and HLW, and
would have applied to Yucca Mountain
had Congress not directed otherwise.
Thus, we believed that 40 CFR part 191
already included the major components
of standards needed for any specific
site, such as Yucca Mountain. However,
we recognized that all the components
would not necessarily be directly
transferable to the situation at Yucca
Mountain, and that some modification
might be necessary. We also considered
that some components of the generic
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standards would not be carried into sitespecific standards, simply because not
all of the conditions found among all
sites are present at each site. See 66 FR
32076–32078, June 13, 2001 (Docket No.
OAR–2005–0083–0042), for a more
detailed discussion of the role of 40 CFR
part 191 in developing 40 CFR part 197.
We also considered the findings and
recommendations of the NAS in
developing standards for Yucca
Mountain. In some cases, provisions of
40 CFR part 191 were already consistent
with NAS’s analysis (e.g., level of
protection for the individual). In other
cases, we used the NAS Report to
modify or draw out parts of 40 CFR part
191 to apply more directly to Yucca
Mountain (e.g., the stylized drilling
scenario for human intrusion). See the
NAS Report for a complete description
of findings and recommendations.
Because our standards are intended to
apply specifically to the Yucca
Mountain disposal system, in a number
of areas we tailored our approach to
consider the characteristics of the site
and the local populations. Yucca
Mountain is in southwestern Nevada
approximately 100 miles northwest of
Las Vegas. The eastern part of the site
is on the Nevada Test Site (NTS). The
northwestern part of the site is on the
Nellis Air Force Range. The
southwestern part of the site is on
Bureau of Land Management land. The
area has a desert climate with
topography typical of the Basin and
Range province. Yucca Mountain is
made of layers of ashfalls from volcanic
eruptions that happened more than 10
million years ago. There are two major
aquifers beneath Yucca Mountain.
Regional ground water in the vicinity of
Yucca Mountain is believed to flow
generally in a south-southeasterly
direction. The DOE plans to build the
repository about 300 meters below the
surface and about 300 to 500 meters
above the water table. For more detailed
descriptions of Yucca Mountain’s
geologic and hydrologic characteristics,
and the disposal system, please see
chapter 7 of the 2001 BID (Docket No.
OAR–2005–0083–0050) and the
preamble to the proposed rule (64 FR
46979–46980, August 27, 1999, Docket
No. OAR–2005–0083–0041).
We proposed standards for Yucca
Mountain on August 27, 1999 (64 FR
46976). In response to our proposal, we
received more than 800 public
comments and conducted four public
hearings. After evaluating public
comments, we issued final standards (66
FR 32074, June 13, 2001). See the
Response to Comments document from
that rulemaking for more discussion of
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comments (Docket No. OAR–2005–
0083–0043).
1. What Are the Elements of EPA’s 2001
Standards?
We are issuing today’s proposal to
respond to a ruling by the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit (‘‘the Court’’) that vacated
portions of 40 CFR part 197. Sections I.B
(‘‘Legal Challenges to 40 CFR part 197’’)
and I.C (‘‘Ruling by U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit’’) discuss aspects of the legal
challenges on which the Court ruled.
This section summarizes some of the
key provisions and concepts in 40 CFR
part 197 to provide a context to better
understand the basis for the legal
actions and today’s proposed action,
which is described in Section II of this
document (‘‘How Will EPA Address the
Decision by the Court of Appeals?’’).
The standards issued in 2001 as 40
CFR part 197 included the following:
• A standard to protect the public
during storage operations at the Yucca
Mountain site;
• An individual-protection standard
to protect the public after disposal from
releases from the undisturbed
repository;
• A human-intrusion standard to
protect the public after disposal from
releases caused by a drilling penetration
into the repository;
• A set of standards to protect ground
water from radionuclide contamination
caused by releases from the repository
after disposal;
• The requirement that compliance
with the disposal standards be shown
for 10,000 years;
• The requirement that DOE continue
its projections for the individualprotection and human-intrusion
standards beyond 10,000 years to the
time of peak (maximum) dose, and place
those projections in the Environmental
Impact Statement (EIS);
• The concept of the Reasonably
Maximally Exposed Individual (RMEI),
defined as a hypothetical person whose
lifestyle is representative of the local
population, as the individual against
whom the disposal standards should be
assessed; and
• The concept of a ‘‘controlled area,’’
defined as an area immediately
surrounding the repository whose
geology is considered part of the natural
barrier component of the overall
disposal system, and inside of which
radioactive releases are not regulated.
We emphasize that today’s proposal is
narrowly focused to respond to the
Court ruling. Most sections of our 2001
rule are unaffected by the Court’s ruling
and are not implicated in today’s
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proposal. We are requesting and will
respond to comments only on those
provisions we are proposing to change
today.
a. What Is the Standard for Storage of
the Waste? (Subpart A, §§ 197.1
Through 197.5)
Section 801(a)(1) of the EnPA calls for
EPA’s public health and safety
standards to apply to radioactive
materials ‘‘stored or disposed of in the
repository at the Yucca Mountain site.’’
The repository is the excavated portion
of the facility constructed underground
within the Yucca Mountain site. The
storage standard, therefore, applies to
waste inside the repository, prior to
disposal.
The DOE also will handle, and might
store, radioactive material outside the
repository prior to subsurface
emplacement. Therefore, our standards
will provide public health and safety
protection for surface management and
storage activities on the surface of the
Yucca Mountain site and in the Yucca
Mountain repository. The combined
doses incurred by any individual in the
general environment from these
activities must not exceed 150 µSv (15
mrem) committed effective dose
equivalent per year (CEDE/yr).
b. What Are the Standards for Disposal?
(Subpart B, §§ 197.11 Through 197.36)
Subpart B of our 2001 rule consisted
of three separate standards (or sets of
standards) that apply after disposal,
which are discussed in more detail in
the appropriate sections of this
document (e.g., Section II.A, ‘‘How Will
Elements of the Disposal Standards be
Affected?’’). For additional detail, see
the preamble to the June 2001
rulemaking (66 FR 32074, June 13,
2001). The disposal standards are:
• An individual-protection standard;
• A human-intrusion standard; and
• Ground-water protection standards.
i. What Is the Standard for Protection of
Individuals? (§§ 197.20 Through 197.21)
The first standard is an individualprotection standard. It specifies the
maximum dose that a reasonably
maximally exposed individual (RMEI)
may receive from releases from the
Yucca Mountain repository.
Our individual-protection standard
set a limit of 150 µSv (15 mrem) CEDE/
yr. This limit corresponds to an annual
risk of fatal cancer within the range that
NAS suggested as a ‘‘reasonable starting
point for EPA’s rulemaking’’ (NAS
Report p. 5, Docket No. OAR–2005–
0083–0076). The NAS s suggested risk
range corresponds to approximately 2 to
20 mrem CEDE/yr.
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The standard described above applies
for a period of 10,000 years after
disposal, and is to be measured against
exposures to the RMEI at a location
outside the controlled area (in the
‘‘accessible environment’’).
aa. Who Represents the Exposed
Population?
To determine whether the Yucca
Mountain disposal system complies
with our standard, DOE must calculate
the dose received by some individual or
group of individuals exposed to releases
from the repository and compare the
calculated dose with the limit
established in the standard. The
standard specifies, therefore, the
representative individual for whom
DOE must make the dose calculation as
the RMEI. It was left to NRC to define
the details, beyond those which we
specified, necessary for the dose
calculation. NRC has further defined the
RMEI as an adult (10 CFR 63.312(e)) and
specified that the average concentration
of radionuclides in well water ingested
by the RMEI be based on a water
demand of 3,000 acre-feet per year (10
CFR 63.312(c)).
The Reasonably Maximally Exposed
Individual (RMEI)
The approach we chose (the RMEI)
embodies the intent of the
internationally-accepted concept to
protect those individuals most at risk
from the proposed repository but
specifies one or a few site-specific
parameters at their maximum values.
The characteristics of the RMEI are
defined from consideration of current
population distribution and groundwater usage, and average food
consumption patterns for the population
downgradient from Yucca Mountain in
Amargosa Valley, Nevada.
Our RMEI is a theoretical individual
representative of a future population
group or community termed ‘‘ruralresidential’’ (see Chapter 8 of the 2001
BID for a description of this concept,
Docket No. OAR–2005–0083–0050). We
assume that the rural-residential RMEI
is exposed through the same general
pathways as a subsistence farmer.
However, this RMEI would not be a fulltime farmer. Rather, the RMEI might do
personal gardening and earn income
from other sources of work in the area.
Under our standard, the RMEI will have
food and water intake rates, diet, and
physiology similar to those of
individuals living in Amargosa Valley,
Nevada. We assume that all of the
drinking water and some of the food
(based upon surveys) consumed by the
RMEI is from the local area. Similarly,
we assume that local food production
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will use water contaminated with
radionuclides released from the disposal
system. We believe this lifestyle is
conservative but similar to that of most
people living in Amargosa Valley today.
Location of the RMEI. The location of
the RMEI is a basic part of the exposure
scenario. We require that the RMEI be
located in the accessible environment
(i.e., outside the controlled area) above
the highest concentration of
radionuclides in the plume of
contamination. Based upon a review of
available site-specific information (see
Chapter 8 of the 2001 BID, Docket No.
OAR–2005–0083–0050), we identified
the southern edge of the Nevada Test
Site as the southernmost extent of the
controlled area. The actual compliance
point will be determined through the
licensing process. (Even if the RMEI
were to be located north of this line of
latitude, the RMEI must still have the
characteristics described in § 197.21.)
As discussed in Section I.B (‘‘Legal
Challenges to 40 CFR part 197’’) and I.C
(‘‘Ruling by the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit’’),
the location of the RMEI was a subject
of the Court decision, was upheld, and
is not a subject of today’s proposal.
bb. How Far Into the Future Must
Performance Be Assessed?
In 2001, we established a compliance
period of 10,000 years. Under the 2001
standards, the peak dose within 10,000
years after disposal would be required
to comply with the individualprotection standard. In addition, we
required calculation of the peak dose
beyond 10,000 years, but within the
period of geologic stability. We required
DOE to include the results and bases of
the additional analyses in the EIS for
Yucca Mountain as an indicator of the
future performance of the disposal
system. The rule did not, however,
require that DOE meet a specific dose
limit after 10,000 years. The compliance
period was a subject of the Court
decision and is the primary subject of
today’s proposal.
ii. What Is the Standard for Human
Intrusion? (§§ 197.25 Through 197.26)
We adopted NAS’s suggested starting
point for a human-intrusion scenario.
As NAS recommended, our standard
required a single-borehole intrusion
scenario based upon Yucca Mountainspecific conditions. The intended
purpose of analyzing this scenario
‘‘* * * is to examine the site- and
design-related aspects of repository
performance under an assumed
intrusion scenario to inform a
qualitative judgment’’ (NAS Report p.
111). The assessment would result in a
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calculated RMEI dose arriving through
the pathway created by the assumed
borehole (with no other releases
included). Consistent with the NAS
Report, we also required ‘‘that the
conditional risk as a result of the
assumed intrusion scenario should be
no greater than the risk levels that
would be acceptable for the
undisturbed-repository case’’ (NAS
Report p. 113). We interpreted NAS’s
term ‘‘undisturbed’’ to mean that the
Yucca Mountain disposal system is not
disturbed by human intrusion but that
other processes or events that are likely
to occur could disturb the system.
The DOE is not required to use
probabilistic performance assessment
for the human-intrusion analysis, as it is
for the individual-protection standard.
However, if it chooses to do so, we
required that the human-intrusion
analysis of disposal system performance
use the same methods and RMEI
characteristics for the performance
assessment as those required for the
individual-protection standard, with the
exception that the human-intrusion
analysis would exclude unlikely natural
features, events, and processes (FEPs).
The DOE must determine when the
intrusion would occur based upon the
earliest time that current technology and
practices could lead to waste package
penetration without the drillers noticing
the canister penetration. In general, we
believe that the time frame for the
drilling intrusion should be within the
period that a small percentage of the
waste packages have failed but before
significant migration of radionuclides
from the engineered barrier system has
occurred because, based upon our
understanding of drilling practices, this
period would be about the earliest time
that a driller would not recognize an
impact with a waste package.
The compliance standard for human
intrusion parallels that for the
individual-protection scenario. If the
intrusion were to occur at or earlier than
10,000 years after disposal, DOE must
demonstrate a reasonable expectation
that annual exposures incurred by the
RMEI within 10,000 years as a result of
the intrusion event would not exceed
150 µSv (15 mrem) CEDE. However, if
the intrusion occurred after 10,000
years, or when earlier intrusions result
in exposures projected to occur after
10,000 years, DOE would not have to
compare its results against a numerical
standard, but would have to include
those results in its EIS.
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iii. What Are the Standards To Protect
Ground Water? (§§ 197.30 Through
197.31)
We established separate ground-water
standards as a means to protect the
aquifer as both a resource for current
users and a potential resource for larger
numbers of future users either near the
repository or farther away in
communities comprised of a
substantially larger number of people
than presently exist in the vicinity of
Yucca Mountain. The standards DOE
must meet are equivalent to the
radionuclide Maximum Contaminant
Levels (MCLs) established for drinking
water.
To implement the ground-water
protection standards in § 197.30, we
required that DOE use the concept of a
‘‘representative volume’’ of ground
water (§ 197.31). Under this approach,
DOE must project the concentration of
radionuclides or the resultant doses
within a ‘‘representative volume’’ of
ground water for comparison against the
standards. We selected a value of 3,000
acre-ft/yr as a ‘‘cautious, but
reasonable’’ figure for the representative
volume. Section 197.31 also describes
two methods by which DOE may
calculate radionuclide concentrations in
ground water. See the preamble to the
2001 rulemaking for more discussion of
the representative volume and
approaches for calculating radionuclide
concentrations for compliance purposes.
As with the individual-protection
standard, compliance with the groundwater protection standards must be
determined at the point of highest
concentration in the plume of
contamination in the accessible
environment. The controlled area was
defined in the same way as for the
individual-protection standard. The
ground-water protection standards were
a subject of the Court decision, were
upheld, and are not a subject of today’s
proposal.
c. What Is ‘‘Reasonable Expectation’’?
(§ 197.14)
An important provision of our
standards is the establishment of the
principle of ‘‘reasonable expectation’’ to
guide implementation of our standards
and provide context for evaluating
projections against the numerical
compliance standards discussed above.
It is a critical element in implementing
our standards, but its importance might
easily be overlooked or misunderstood.
We use the concept of ‘‘reasonable
expectation’’ in these standards to
reflect our intent regarding the level of
‘‘proof’’ necessary for NRC to determine
whether the projected performance of
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the Yucca Mountain disposal system
complies with the standards (see
§§ 197.20, 197.25, and 197.30). In
issuing our 2001 standards, we noted
that this term is meant to convey our
position that unequivocal numerical
proof of compliance is neither necessary
nor likely to be obtained for geologic
disposal systems. We believe
unequivocal proof is not possible
because of the extremely long time
periods involved and because disposal
system performance assessments require
extrapolations of conditions and the
actions of processes that govern disposal
system performance over those long
time periods.
The primary means for demonstrating
compliance with the standards is the
use of computer modeling to project the
performance of the disposal system
under the range of expected conditions.
These modeling calculations involve the
extrapolation of site conditions and the
interactions of important processes over
long time periods, extrapolations that
involve inherent uncertainties in the
necessarily limited amount of
information that can be collected
through field and laboratory studies and
the unavoidable uncertainties involved
in simulating the complex and timevariable processes and events involved
in long-term disposal system
performance. Overly conservative
assumptions made in developing
performance scenarios can bias the
analyses in the direction of
unrealistically extreme situations,
which in reality may be highly
improbable, and can deflect attention
from questions critical to developing an
adequate understanding of the expected
features, events, and processes
(‘‘Assumptions, Conservatisms, and
Uncertainties in Yucca Mountain
Performance Assessments,’’ Sections 11
and 12, July 2005, Docket No. OAR–
2005–0083–0085). The reasonable
expectation approach focuses attention
on understanding the uncertainties in
projecting disposal system performance
so that regulatory decision making will
be done with a full understanding of the
uncertainties involved. Thus, realistic
analyses are preferred over conservative
and bounding assumptions, to the
extent practical.
B. Legal Challenges to 40 CFR Part 197
Various aspects of our standards were
challenged in lawsuits filed with the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit in July 2001. Oral
arguments were conducted on
January 14, 2004. These challenges and
the outcome are described in the
following sections.
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1. Challenges by the State of Nevada and
Natural Resources Defense Council
The State of Nevada, the Natural
Resources Defense Council (NRDC), and
several other environmental and public
interest groups challenged several
aspects of our final standards on the
grounds that they were insufficiently
protective and had not been adequately
justified. Specifically, they claimed that:
• EPA’s promulgation of standards
that apply for 10,000 years after disposal
violates the EnPA because such
standards are not ‘‘based upon and
consistent with’’ the findings and
recommendations of the NAS. NAS
recommended standards that would
apply to the time of maximum risk and
stated that there is ‘‘no scientific basis
for limiting the time period of the
individual-risk standard to 10,000 years
or any other value.’’
• The size of the controlled area
defined by EPA, which represents the
maximum extent of the disposal system
and inside which DOE need not
demonstrate compliance with the EPA
standards, rests on inappropriate
assumptions regarding the ability of
people to live closer to the repository
and violates the Safe Drinking Water
Act provisions against endangering
sources of drinking water.
• EPA’s definition of ‘‘disposal’’ in 40
CFR 197.12 deviates from the definition
in the NWPA by inserting the qualifying
phrase ‘‘for as long as reasonably
possible,’’ suggesting that the Yucca
Mountain disposal system would be
held to a lesser standard of protection
because it would not have to provide
‘‘permanent isolation.’’
2. Challenge by the Nuclear Energy
Institute
The Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) is
a trade organization representing
nuclear power producers, who collect a
surcharge from ratepayers for the
Nuclear Waste Fund (established by the
NWPA, see 42 U.S.C. 10222). NEI
challenged the ground-water protection
provisions in 40 CFR 197.30 on several
grounds, including that:
• They conflict with the direction in
the EnPA that EPA issue standards
‘‘based upon and consistent with the
findings and recommendations of’’ NAS
and that EPA’s ‘‘standards shall
prescribe the maximum annual effective
dose equivalent * * * from releases
* * * from radioactive materials stored
or disposed of in the repository.’’ NEI
argued that EPA’s ground-water
standards: (1) were in a form other than
effective dose equivalent (EDE); (2) were
not recommended by NAS, which stated
that such standards were not ‘‘necessary
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49021
to limit risks to individuals’’ (NAS
Report p. 121); and (3) were not limited
to releases from the repository because
they require that DOE consider natural
background when determining
compliance.
• The science underlying the groundwater standards uses the outdated
‘‘critical organ’’ methodology, which
results in inconsistent risk estimates
and is inconsistent with other radiationprotection standards.
• EPA justified its ground-water
standards on cost grounds without
conducting a thorough cost-benefit
analysis; NEI believes such an analysis
would show that the ground-water
standards provide no benefit to public
health but will increase the cost and
slow the construction of the repository.
• EPA is inappropriately applying
drinking water standards, which were
derived to apply to customers of public
water supplies (i.e., ‘‘at the tap’’) to
ground water.
C. Ruling by the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit
Oral arguments for the challenges
described above were heard on January
14, 2004. The challenges to EPA’s
standards were consolidated with
challenges to NRC’s licensing
requirements, DOE’s siting guidelines,
and the Presidential recommendation of
the Yucca Mountain site and the
subsequent Congressional resolution.
The Court’s ruling was handed down on
July 9, 2004. The Court upheld EPA’s
Yucca Mountain rule in all respects,
save for the regulatory compliance
period.
1. What Did the Court of Appeals Rule
on the Issue of Compliance Period?
The Court upheld the challenge to
EPA’s 10,000-year compliance period,
ruling that EPA’s action was not ‘‘based
upon and consistent with’’ the NAS
Report, and that EPA had not
sufficiently justified its decision to
apply compliance standards only to the
first 10,000 years after disposal on
policy grounds. Nuclear Energy Institute
v. Environmental Protection Agency,
373 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (NEI) (Docket
No. OAR–2005–0083–0080). On that
point, the Court stated that:
NAS’s conclusion that EPA ‘‘might choose
to establish consistent policies’’ is of little
importance * * * And although our case law
makes clear that a phrase like ‘‘based upon
and consistent with’’ does not require EPA to
hew rigidly to NAS’s findings, EnPA Section
801(a) cannot reasonably be read to allow a
regulation wholly inconsistent with NAS
recommendations. (NEI, 373 F.3d at 30.)
Similarly, the Court rejected EPA’s
reasoning that the requirement of 40
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CFR 197.35 that DOE project
performance to the time of peak dose
and place those projections in the
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS)
addressed the intent of the NAS
recommendation by ensuring that
assessments would not be arbitrarily cut
off at some earlier time:
Although EPA’s addition of this provision
might well represent a nod to NAS, it hardly
makes the agency’s regulation consistent
with the Academy’s findings. NAS
recommended that the compliance period
extend to the time of peak risk, yet EPA’s rule
requires only that DOE calculate peak doses
and expressly provides that ‘‘[n]o regulatory
standard applies to the results of this
analysis.’’ (Id. at 31, emphasis in original)
While the Court suggested that under
different circumstances the Agency’s
standard might have been upheld, it
nevertheless rejected the Agency’s
limitation of the compliance period to
10,000 years:
In sum, because EPA’s chosen compliance
period sharply differs from NAS’s findings
and recommendations, it represents an
unreasonable construction of section 801(a)
of the Energy Policy Act. Although EnPA’s
‘‘based upon and consistent with’’ mandate
leaves EPA with some flexibility in crafting
standards in light of NAS’s findings, EPA
may not stretch this flexibility to cover
standards that are inconsistent with the NAS
Report. Had EPA begun with the Academy’s
recommendation to base the compliance
period on peak dosage and then made
adjustments to accommodate policy
considerations not considered by NAS, this
might be a very different case. But as the
foregoing discussion demonstrates, EPA
wholly rejected the Academy’s
recommendations. We will thus vacate part
197 to the extent that it requires DOE to show
compliance for only 10,000 years following
disposal. (Id. at 31.)
Finally, the Court concluded that ‘‘we
vacate 40 CFR part 197 to the extent that
it incorporates a 10,000-year compliance
period’’ * * * (Id. at 100.) The Court
did not address the protectiveness of the
150 Sv/yr (15 mrem/yr) dose standard
applied over the 10,000-year
compliance period, nor was the
protectiveness of the standard
challenged. It ruled only that the
compliance period could not be found
consistent with or based upon the NAS
findings and recommendations, and
therefore was contrary to the plain
language of the EnPA.
a. What Were NAS’s Findings
(‘‘Conclusions’’) and Recommendations
on the Issue of Compliance Period?
As the Court noted, NAS stated that
it had found ‘‘no scientific basis for
limiting the time period of the
individual-risk standard to 10,000 years
or any other value,’’ and that
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‘‘compliance assessment is feasible
* * * on the time scale of the long-term
stability of the fundamental geologic
regime—a time scale that is on the order
of 106 years at Yucca Mountain.’’ As a
result, and given that ‘‘at least some
potentially important exposures might
not occur until after several hundred
thousand years * * * we recommend
that compliance assessment be
conducted for the time when the
greatest risk occurs’’ (NAS Report pp. 6–
7).
However, NAS also stated ‘‘although
the selection of a time period of
applicability has scientific elements, it
also has policy aspects that we have not
addressed. For example, EPA might
choose to establish consistent policies
for managing risks from disposal of both
long-lived hazardous nonradioactive
materials and radioactive materials’
(NAS Report p. 56).
2. What Did the Court of Appeals Rule
on Other Issues Related to EPA’s
Standards?
The Court did not sustain any of the
other challenges lodged by Nevada,
NRDC, or NEI. Instead, the Court found
that:
• In defining the controlled area,
EPA’s conclusions regarding the likely
extent of the future population and their
exposures were reasonable. Further, the
provisions of the Safe Drinking Water
Act do not apply at Yucca Mountain (by
virtue of the EnPA statement that EPA’s
standards ‘‘shall be the only standards
applicable to the Yucca Mountain site’’).
(NEI, 373 F. 3d at 32–38.)
• EPA is not bound to follow the
NWPA definition of ‘‘disposal’’ because
the enabling authority for this action is
the EnPA, which does not require that
NWPA definitions be used and does not
itself define ‘‘disposal.’’ Therefore, EPA
acted reasonably ‘‘in filling that
statutory gap.’’ (Id. at 38–39.)
• EPA’s interpretation of the EnPA as
permitting separate ground-water
standards is reasonable because: (1) The
EnPA does not restrict EPA to establish
only EDE standards, but requires that
EPA ‘‘establish a set of health and safety
standards, at least one of which must
include an EDE-based, individualprotection standard’’; (2) NAS made no
‘‘finding or recommendation’’ either for
or against a ground-water standard, so
consistency with NAS is not at issue;
and (3) ‘‘Part 197 * * * does not
regulate background radiation * * * the
rule requires only that DOE take
background levels into account when
measuring permissible releases of
radionuclides from the repository.
Therefore, part 197 could not possibly
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run afoul of EnPA’s focus on released
radiation.’’ (Id. at 43–48.)
• NEI’s arbitrary and capricious
arguments in NEI were the same as the
arguments that NEI had raised in a
challenge to EPA’s radionuclide MCLs
under the Safe Drinking Water Act,
which the Court had rejected only one
year previously in City of Waukesha v.
EPA. (Id. at 48–49.)
• EPA ‘‘unremarkably’’ concluded
that ground-water protection standards
represent sound pollution prevention
policy and will encourage a more robust
repository design. This reasoning
prevailed with the Court on both the
cost-effectiveness and ‘‘at the tap’’
challenges. (Id. at 49–50.)
II. How Will EPA Address the Decision
by the Court of Appeals?
As promulgated, 40 CFR part 197
contained four sets of standards against
which compliance would be assessed.
The storage standard applies to
exposures of the general public during
the operational period, when waste is
received at the site, handled in
preparation for emplacement in the
repository, emplaced in the repository,
and stored in the repository until final
closure. The three disposal standards
apply to releases of radionuclides from
the disposal system after final closure,
and include an individual-protection
standard, a human-intrusion standard,
and a set of ground-water protection
standards.
In today’s action, we are not
proposing to revise all of these
standards, only those affected by the
Court decision. Therefore, we are
proposing to revise only the individualprotection and human-intrusion
standards, along with certain supporting
provisions related to the way DOE must
consider features, events, and processes
(FEPs) in its compliance analyses. In
addition, we are proposing to adopt
updated scientific factors for calculating
doses to show compliance with the
storage, individual-protection, and
human-intrusion standards, as
described in more detail in Section
II.C.6. We are not proposing to change
any aspect of the ground-water
protection standards. We are providing
notice and requesting public comment
only on our proposed revisions to 40
CFR part 197. With the exception of the
updated factors for calculating doses for
the storage standard, we are not
requesting and will not consider public
comment on either the storage or
ground-water protection standards.
Furthermore, we are not requesting, nor
will we consider, comments on those
aspects of the individual-protection and
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human-intrusion standards to which no
changes are proposed.
We are proposing to address the
Court’s decision by revising elements of
our standards to incorporate the time of
peak dose into the determination of
compliance. We are also proposing to
further delineate how DOE should
incorporate features, events, and
processes that may take place over very
long times into its calculation of peak
dose, consistent with our ‘‘reasonable
expectation’’ standard.
A. How Will Elements of the Disposal
Standards be Affected?
The Court’s ruling vacated only one
aspect of 40 CFR part 197, the 10,000year compliance period. Thus, we
considered the language and reasoning
of the Court’s decision to determine its
applicability to each element of the
disposal standards. The three main
components of the standards are
discussed in the following sections. We
also considered the need to modify
certain other aspects that would
influence how DOE would conduct its
performance assessments beyond 10,000
years. These aspects are discussed in
more detail in Section II.D (‘‘How Will
Today’s Proposal Affect the Way DOE
Conducts Performance Assessments?’’).
1. Individual-Protection Standard
The Court’s decision clearly affects
the compliance period for the
individual-protection standard, which is
the primary standard for public health
and safety called for by the EnPA. The
legal challenge and the Court’s response
left no doubt that the compliance period
for the individual-protection standard
was at issue and the decision centered
on the NAS’s recommendation
regarding the compliance period for the
individual-protection standard.
Therefore, as described in Section II.C,
we are proposing today to modify the
individual-protection standard to
incorporate a compliance measure
effective at the time of peak dose, in
addition to the 15 mrem/yr standard
applicable for the first 10,000 years after
disposal, which we are retaining.
Section I.A.1.b.i discusses other
elements of the individual-protection
standard, specifically the definition of
the controlled area and the use of the
RMEI as the representative exposed
person. We are not modifying the
definition of the controlled area, which
was upheld by the Court. We have
described the maximum extent of the
area, using current conditions and
relatively near-term plans for
development. The actual compliance
point will be determined through the
licensing process, and DOE will have to
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justify its reasons for selecting a
particular location to NRC.
Similarly, we are not proposing to
alter the description of the RMEI as a
person having a ‘‘rural-residential’’
lifestyle as reflected in today’s
population. We have described at length
our reasons for using current
characteristics as an appropriate means
to avoid excessive speculation about
which of the infinite number of possible
future lifestyles would be most
representative over very long periods
(see 66 FR 32088–32094 (Docket No.
OAR–2005–0083–0042) and Section 4 of
the Response to Comments document
for the 2001 rulemaking (Docket No.
OAR–2005–0083–0050)). Some
comments on our 1999 proposal
disagreed with our reasoning and choice
of RMEI. We recognize that interested
parties may see an extension of the
compliance period as justifying a
different description for the RMEI, at
least for time frames well beyond 10,000
years. They may point to climate change
scenarios as potentially making the
‘‘rural-residential’’ lifestyle as it is
defined in our 2001 rule incompatible
with climate change assumptions. It
may be argued that climate change
could significantly affect the types of
locally grown food in the RMEI’s diet,
as well as the use of contaminated
ground water for irrigation or watering
livestock, which would ultimately
influence exposures. NAS alluded to
such a possibility, noting that one effect
of climate change could be ‘‘a shift in
the distribution and activities of human
populations’’ (NAS Report p. 92).
However, NAS also concluded that
‘‘there is no simple relation between
future climatic conditions and future
population’’ (NAS Report p. 92). We
agree that it is difficult to predict
exactly how climate change, or other
evolutionary scenarios, would influence
lifestyles, nor can we predict the
viability or distribution of agricultural
activities compared with those pursued
today. In fact, we believe that the RMEI
as a current ‘‘rural-residential’’
individual may be among the more
conservative possibilities. Given the
importance of irrigation and other uses
of ground water in the Amargosa Valley
region, it is likely that potential
exposures to contaminated ground
water would be lower under many
wetter climate change scenarios where
greater precipitation could reduce the
use of ground water for irrigation and
other practices.
Some commenters might question
whether it is important to have internal
consistency between climate/biosphere
characteristics and RMEI lifestyle and
characteristics. We believe that it would
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be highly speculative to select RMEI
characteristics to correspond to some
future climate state. We require that
DOE consider climate change within
10,000 years, and are proposing today
also to require consideration of climate
change for much longer times (see
Section II.D.2.d, ‘‘Consideration of
Climatological FEPs’’). As noted above,
we believe the present-day RMEI
represents a conservative choice if, as
seems likely, future climate in the
Yucca Mountain region tends to be
cooler and wetter. Under wetter
conditions, agricultural activities
around the site area would rely less on
irrigation using well water. With less
use of contaminated ground water for
irrigation, the contribution to the RMEI
dose from contaminated food would
presumably be lowered or perhaps
eliminated. In counterpoint, under
wetter conditions, it is possible to
speculate that individuals could live
closer to the repository than is
considered for present-day conditions
and potentially tap contaminated
ground waters closer to Yucca Mountain
than at the RMEI location. We believe
that the RMEI, as presently defined for
present-day conditions, is a reasonably
conservative approach for the dose
assessments, and is appropriate for
wetter climate conditions. Assumptions
regarding the possible uses of ground
water are quite speculative and have
been avoided to the extent possible in
the setting of the standards (66 FR
32111). Therefore we are not redefining
the RMEI characteristics in any attempt
to correlate them with climatic
variations, primarily due to speculation
regarding the uses of ground water by
man. As noted above, this approach is
consistent with the NAS’s conclusion
that there is no exact correlation
between potential climate changes and
shifts in the distribution and activities
of human populations. Comments on
the definition of the controlled area and
specification of the RMEI are outside the
scope of today’s proposal. We will not
consider or respond to comments on
these topics.
2. Human-Intrusion Standard
While the Court did not specifically
address the human-intrusion standard,
we believe it is logical and defensible to
modify it to parallel the individualprotection standard. Like the
individual-protection standard, our
provisions for human intrusion
envisioned some consideration of
performance beyond 10,000 years. The
2001 standard required that DOE
determine when an intrusion by drilling
would be possible and assess the
consequences. The resulting exposures
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were then subject to the same
compliance standard as the individualprotection standard (15 mrem/yr at
10,000 years or earlier and dose
projections beyond 10,000 years to be
compiled in the EIS). In proposing
revisions to the human-intrusion
standard to conform to changes we are
proposing to make to the individualprotection provisions, we are adhering
to the NAS recommendation that ‘‘EPA
require that the estimated risk
calculated from the assumed intrusion
scenario be no greater than the risk limit
adopted for the undisturbed-repository
case’’ (NAS Report p. 12). In light of this
recommendation, and the Court’s
interpretation of how closely we must
align with the NAS recommendations to
be deemed ‘‘based upon and
consistent,’’ we believe it is both
prudent and reasonable to propose to
revise the human-intrusion standards to
incorporate peak dose compliance
measures that conform to the proposed
revisions for individual protection.
Aside from the application of dose
standards at both 10,000 years and the
time of peak dose, the foundation of the
proposed revised human-intrusion
standard is unchanged. DOE must
determine the earliest time at which it
would be possible to penetrate waste
packages by drilling. The scenario
described in § 197.26 would still apply
(i.e., penetration of a single package,
direct pathway to ground water, etc.).
The decision to apply a regulatory
standard for the period of geologic
stability does not in any way affect the
reasoning underlying the selection of
this scenario. It remains fully consistent
with the NAS conclusion that at Yucca
Mountain ‘‘there is no scientific basis
for estimating the probability of
intrusion at far-future times’’ (NAS
Report p. 106). Instead, NAS
recommended that ‘‘the result of the
analysis should not be integrated into an
assessment of repository performance
based on risk, but rather should be
considered separately. The purpose of
this consequence analysis is to evaluate
the resilience of the repository to
intrusion’’ (NAS Report p. 109). NAS
further suggested that EPA describe a
‘‘stylized’’ intrusion scenario based on
current drilling technologies, an
approach we adopted in § 197.26 and
which will remain unchanged by
today’s proposal.
The circumstances of the intrusion
scenario in § 197.26 are required to be
developed based on present-day
practices, in accordance with the NAS
recommendation. This approach was
fully justified for the reasons given by
NAS and unchallenged for the 10,000year time frame. We find that
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maintaining the approach beyond
10,000 years is also fully justified and
consistent with the NAS for the same
reasons. If anything, it would be even
more speculative to attempt to project
changes to the circumstances of the
intrusion at time frames potentially out
to 1 million years. Furthermore, in
keeping with the purpose of the humanintrusion analysis as a test of repository
resilience, it is appropriate to continue
to exclude unlikely natural events and
processes from the analysis.
The intrusion scenario requires
consideration of package degradation,
premised on the assumption that
drillers encountering an intact package
would cease drilling and releases would
be avoided. We believe that this
assumption is equally valid both within
and beyond a 10,000-year time frame. In
our 2001 rule, DOE would not have
been required to demonstrate
compliance with a dose limit if
packages were determined not to
degrade sufficiently within 10,000 years
to permit intrusion (or, in any event, if
the consequences of the intrusion were
not calculated to occur within 10,000
years). We are proposing to modify our
rule to require that DOE show
compliance with a dose limit regardless
of when the consequences of the
intrusion occur. Consistent with the
proposed revised individual-protection
standard, DOE will have to show
compliance with a peak dose standard
beyond 10,000 years, in addition to a
150 µSv/yr (15 mrem/yr) standard
applicable up to 10,000 years. The dose
standard that applies to exposures to the
RMEI through the period of geologic
stability will be the same as for the
individual-protection standard (see
Section II.C.3, ‘‘What Dose Level is EPA
Proposing for Peak Dose?’’). Overall, this
scenario continues to represent a
reasonable test that ‘‘can provide useful
insight into the degree to which the
ability of a repository to protect public
health would be degraded by intrusion’’
(NAS Report p. 108). We are not
soliciting, and will not consider,
comments on the overall intrusion
scenario or other aspects of the humanintrusion standard that are not proposed
to be changed.
3. Ground-Water Protection Standards
The Court’s decision does not affect
the ground-water protection standards.
The Court upheld our statutory reading
of the EnPA as providing the authority
to establish such standards as the
Agency deemed necessary to
supplement the individual-protection
standard, as well as the scientific basis
of those standards. (See NEI, 373 F.3d
at 43–48, Docket No. OAR–2005–0083–
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0080.) The Court further concluded that
our reasoning for including such a
standard as a means to protect the
ground-water resource was sound and
consistent with the Agency’s overall
pollution prevention policies. Regarding
consistency with the NAS
recommendations, the Court stated that:
Although we concluded earlier in this
opinion that EPA violated section 801’s
‘‘based upon and consistent with’’
requirement by adopting a 10,000-year
compliance period, we reach the opposite
conclusion here because NAS treated the
compliance-period and ground-water issues
quite differently. Whereas NAS expressly
rejected a 10,000-year compliance period, it
said nothing at all about the need to add a
separate ground-water standard * * * Put
another way, NAS made no ‘‘finding’’ or
‘‘recommendation’’ that EPA’s regulation
could fail to be ‘‘based upon and consistent
with.’’
NEI, 373 F.3d at 46–47.
As a result, we do not believe the
Court’s ruling regarding the 10,000-year
compliance period applies to the
ground-water protection standards,
which have the same compliance
period. Further, unlike the individualprotection and human-intrusion
standards, we never envisioned that
DOE would project its compliance with
the ground-water protection standards
beyond 10,000 years, even for inclusion
in the EIS. The Court decision leaves
EPA with discretion in formulating the
provisions for ground-water standards.
We believe (and the Court agreed) that
the application over 10,000 years of
limits equivalent to MCLs is a
conservative but reasonable regulatory
scheme that represents sound pollution
prevention policy. Furthermore,
protection of public health from releases
to ground water over times beyond
10,000 years will be provided by
extending the individual-protection
standard to the time of peak dose, which
accounts for transport and exposure
through all pathways. For these reasons,
we are not proposing to modify the
ground-water protection standards,
either by extending the period of
compliance or in any other respect. We
are not requesting, and will not
consider, comments regarding any
aspect of the ground-water protection
standards.
4. Reasonable Expectation
‘‘Reasonable expectation’’ is the
compliance concept underlying our
disposal standards. That is, we require
that DOE show a ‘‘reasonable
expectation’’ that the standards will be
met. As discussed extensively in our
2001 Yucca Mountain rulemaking,
‘‘proof’’ of disposal system performance
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in the traditional sense of the word
cannot be attained for periods extending
into the thousands or hundreds of
thousands of years (66 FR 32101–32103,
June 13, 2001, Docket No. OAR–2005–
0083–0042). In such situations, it is a
natural tendency to give greater
emphasis to aspects that may not be the
most likely to occur, but have the
potential to significantly affect
performance. This may be particularly
true in areas where physical data are
limited. However, assessments that are
built around conservative assumptions
at every decision point may in fact
result in highly unrealistic performance
projections. Simplifications and
assumptions are involved out of
necessity because of the complexity and
time frames involved, and the choices
made will determine the extent to
which modeling simulations
realistically simulate the disposal
system’s performance. If choices are
made that make the simulations very
unrealistic, the confidence that can be
placed on modeling results is very
limited. The uncertainties involved with
these simplifications must be
recognized. Overly conservative
assumptions made in developing
performance scenarios can bias the
analyses in the direction of
unrealistically extreme situations,
which in reality may be highly
improbable, and can deflect attention
from questions critical to developing an
adequate understanding of the expected
features, events, and processes.
‘‘Reasonable expectation’’ encourages
the use of ‘‘cautious, but reasonable’’
assumptions and discourages the
reliance on highly conservative
assumptions. It recognizes that
projections of disposal system
performance over very long times are
best viewed as indicators of
performance, rather than as firm
predictions. It further requires the
applicant and regulator to focus on the
full range of outcomes and not to give
greater weight to certain projections
simply because they are more
conservative.
The concept of ‘‘reasonable
expectation’’ was a guiding principle in
the formulation of our 2001 standards.
We believe the concept is equally
applicable for periods well beyond
10,000 years, and is in fact more
important for very long time periods. In
our view, it is ‘‘reasonable’’ to consider
approaches for uncertainties in
calculations at several hundred
thousand years that may differ from the
approach for uncertainties considered
within 10,000 years after disposal. An
approach applying standards
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‘‘acceptable today for the period of
geologic stability would ignore this
cumulative uncertainty and the extreme
difficulty of using highly uncertain
assessment results to determine
compliance with that standard’’ (66 FR
32098, June 13, 2001, Docket No. OAR–
2005–0083–0042). We therefore
emphasize the primacy of ‘‘reasonable
expectation’’ in compliance with 40
CFR part 197 and retain it without
change. However, we have considered
how DOE and NRC might need to
approach the concept to account for the
much greater overall uncertainty in
projections over periods as long as 1
million years. Section II.B describes the
overall concept of ‘‘reasonable
expectation’’ and our thoughts for
today’s proposal in more detail.
5. Effects of Uncertainty
We believe that the most problematic
aspect of extending the compliance
period to peak dose is the uncertainty
involved in making projections over
such long time frames, which we
discussed in some detail in our
proposed and final rulemakings in 1999
and 2001, respectively. This remains a
critical factor in formulating today’s
proposal, which we feel must be
emphasized and explored in detail.
Although we refer generally to
‘‘uncertainties’’ throughout this
document, it may not always be clear to
readers exactly what we mean by this
term, why their effects are difficult to
manage, and why they should have an
impact on the decision-making process.
It may be useful to consider an
analogous situation that will be readily
familiar, such as the tracking of
hurricanes.
The strength and path of hurricanes
are functions of factors such as
temperature, humidity, barometric
pressure, and wind speed. There is
natural variation in these parameters,
and their variation can make the
difference between a Category 5 storm
(the most severe) striking a populated
coastal area and a tropical storm that
remains out in the ocean. When one
views the projected path of a storm, the
surrounding envelope of possible paths
expands as one looks into the future and
may spread over several hundred miles.
The critical task in tracking the storm is
identifying which populated areas are in
the path of the storm, and whether they
must be evacuated.
By this analogy, a 10,000-year dose
projection might be comparable to
selecting a single town to evacuate
when the storm is still two hundred
miles from landfall, while a peak dose
projection might be more like
pinpointing the correct location when a
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49025
tropical depression first forms
thousands of miles away, which may be
weeks earlier. Regardless of the level of
rigor that can be applied to the technical
calculation, it is simply not possible to
place the same level of confidence in
the two selections. We see similar
difficulties in ‘‘predicting’’ the ‘‘true’’
behavior of the Yucca Mountain
disposal system, or the multiple
engineered and natural components of
that system, for periods on the order of
hundreds of thousands of years.
We are aware that some stakeholders
dispute our position that uncertainties
increase significantly with time, and
therefore believe that uncertainty offers
little justification for placing less
confidence in very long-term projections
than can be placed in those that apply
over the relatively near term. Some
stakeholders, for example, suggest that
uncertainty should have little impact on
peak dose projections and that DOE
should be required to identify where
uncertainty, rather than reasonably
expected performance, influences dose
projections (Docket No. OAR–2005–
0083–0029 and 0033). They have
pointed to statements in the NAS Report
to bolster this position, such as:
‘‘analyses that are uncertain at one time
might not be so uncertain at a later time;
for example, the uncertainties about
cumulative releases to the biosphere
that depend on the rate of failure of the
waste packages are large in the near
term but are smaller later, when enough
time has passed that all of the packages
will have failed’’ (NAS Report pp. 29–
30); ‘‘Because there is a continuing
increase in uncertainty about most of
the parameters describing the repository
system farther in the distant future, it
might be expected that compliance of
the repository in the near term could be
assessed with more confidence. This is
not necessarily true’’ (NAS Report p.
72); ‘‘Detailed estimates of time for
canister failure are less important for
much longer-term estimates of
individual dose or risk’’ (NAS Report p.
85).
Although NAS pointed out that
uncertainties associated with some
disposal system components will
decrease over time (e.g., at some time all
waste packages will be degraded), our
view, and the view of many others
(including NAS, as should be clear from
the above citation: ‘‘Because there is a
continuing increase in uncertainty
* * *’’), is that uncertainties generally
increase with time, at least to the time
of peak dose. (See, for example, IAEA
Draft Safety Requirements DS154,
‘‘Geological Disposal of Radioactive
Waste,’’ Section A.7, page 37, April
2005 (Docket No. OAR–2005–0083–
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0051), which states, ‘‘It is recognized
that radiation doses to people in the
future can only be estimated and the
uncertainties associated with these
estimates will increase farther into the
future’’; the Nuclear Energy Agency
report on ‘‘The Handling of Timescales
in Assessing Post-Closure Safety,’’ pp.
13–14 (Docket No. OAR–2005–0083–
0046), which states, ‘‘These events and
changes are subject to uncertainties,
which generally increase with time and
must be taken into account in safety
assessments. Eventually, but at very
different times for different parts of the
system, uncertainties are so large that
predictions regarding the evolution of
the repository and its environment
cannot meaningfully be made’’; and the
Swiss National Cooperative for the
Disposal of Radioactive Waste (Nagra),
which states, in Technical Report 02–05
(pp. 27–28) (Docket No. OAR–2005–
0083–0075), ‘‘HSK–R–21 [Swiss
disposal regulation] acknowledges that
there is inevitable uncertainty in model
calculations and the further into the
future predictions are made, the greater
the uncertainty. The implementer has to
show what processes and events could
affect the repository over the course of
time and then to derive and evaluate
potential evolution scenarios from
these.’’) For some aspects of the system,
such uncertainties can increase
dramatically (‘‘Assumptions,
Conservatisms, and Uncertainties in
Yucca Mountain Performance
Assessments,’’ Section 12.3, July 2005,
Docket No. OAR–2005–0083–0085). To
repeat, we are in agreement with NAS
that such projections can be performed
and even ‘‘bounded’’ to some extent.
However, the central question here is
how the results of very long-term
assessments can have sufficient
meaning to provide an adequate basis
for a licensing decision that the
repository should or should not be
approved.
NAS demonstrated some concern
with this issue by recognizing that the
level of confidence that could be placed
in projections was of key importance,
and offered constructive guidance in
limiting or considering the effects of
uncertainties. Unfortunately, the NAS
statements on decreasing uncertainty
regarding some disposal system
components do not draw a clear
relationship to the time of peak dose at
which it recommended compliance be
measured. While we generally agree
with these statements, we find that they
are most relevant to times after peak
dose and, therefore, after the time frame
most important from a regulatory
perspective. Returning to our hurricane
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analogy, it is true that uncertainties
eventually decrease; one might be able
to predict with equal confidence both
the storm’s location in two hours and
that in two weeks it will have
completely dissipated. In this sense, one
can agree with the NAS’s conclusion
that ‘‘it is not necessarily true’’ that
long-term projections are more
uncertain than near-term projections.
Nevertheless, relatively high confidence
about the endpoint of the hurricane has
little impact on the ability to predict
where and when it might cause the
greatest damage along its path.
Similarly, for Yucca Mountain,
increasing confidence in certain aspects
of the system’s components (e.g., the
endpoint of the waste packages, much
like the endpoint of the hurricane) does
not necessarily inform estimates of peak
dose.
NAS notes that ‘‘uncertainties about
cumulative releases’’ that ‘‘depend on
the rate of failure of the waste packages’’
will be lessened at far future times when
‘‘all of the packages will have failed’’
(NAS Report p. 28–29). The emphasis
here on eventual failure cannot help us
when the direction is to assess peak
dose. It is self-evident and noncontroversial that the engineered barrier
system cannot be expected to last
forever. However, assumptions
regarding ‘‘the rate of failure of waste
packages’’ are exactly the critical
element in estimating the timing and
magnitude of the peak dose
(‘‘Assumptions, Conservatisms, and
Uncertainties in Yucca Mountain
Performance Assessments,’’ Sections
12.3 and 12.4, July 2005, Docket No.
OAR–2005–0083–0085). Thus,
identifying factors that would decrease
overall system uncertainty at times
approaching 1 million years does not
adequately support a conclusion that
uncertainties can be equally well
managed at the time of peak dose, even
if that time is much less than 1 million
years.
In addressing this larger question of
how to consider long-term projections
in a regulatory process, we have
considered guidance and precedents
from international programs. NAS
provided important scientific and
technical reasoning for evaluating
compliance at peak dose, which we
augment with guidance from sources
who approached the problem of
uncertainty from the regulatory
perspective. For regulatory compliance
over 10,000 years, we were able to
identify several (albeit limited)
analogous regulatory programs in the
U.S., including those for the WIPP and
EPA’s underground injection control
program (see the preamble to the 2001
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rulemaking, 66 FR 32098, Docket No.
OAR–2005–0083–0042). For time frames
extending potentially to 1 million years,
there are no precedents in U.S.
regulation. In response to the Court
decision, therefore, important sources
for guidance and models for
contemplating regulations at such long
times were other international programs
grappling with the same issues, namely
disposal of highly radioactive and longlived waste. Throughout this document,
we quote extensively from a number of
international sources, from both
multinational organizations (such as
IAEA) and individual countries (such as
Sweden). We do this because we find
ourselves in a situation that is, if not
unique, shared by a rather small circle.
We have found it useful to consult the
ideas of those faced with a similar
situation. In general, they reinforce two
points we emphasize throughout this
document. The first, which we have
already discussed, is that uncertainties
generally increase with time. The
second point is that projections at those
longer times cannot be viewed with the
same level of confidence as shorter-term
projections, and may in fact be viewed
as more qualitative indicators of
disposal system performance.
For example, the IAEA has stated that,
for periods lasting from about 10,000 to
1 million years, ‘‘While it may be
possible to make general predictions
about geological conditions, the range of
possible biospheric conditions and
human behaviour is too wide to allow
reliable modelling * * * Such
calculations can therefore only be
viewed as illustrative and the ‘doses’ as
indicative’’ (IAEA–TECDOC–767,
‘‘Safety Indicators in Different Time
Frames for the Safety Assessment of
Underground Radioactive Waste
Repositories,’’ p. 19, 1994, Docket No.
OAR–2005–0083–0044). Also, ‘‘[t]he
utility of individual numerical
indicators will vary greatly and, given
the large uncertainties, considerable
caution is needed to avoid any
suggestion or expectation that any given
indicator of disposal system
performance can be an accurate estimate
of future reality. Such an indicator
typically provides only an estimate of
what might happen under certain
assumed conditions * * * The aim of
the assessment is not to predict the
actual performance of the disposal
system * * * but rather to reach
reasonable assurance that it will provide
an adequate level of safety’’ (IAEA–
TECDOC–975, ‘‘Regulatory Decision
Making in the Presence of Uncertainty
in the Context of the Disposal of Long
Lived Radioactive Wastes,’’ pp. 22, 24,
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1997, Docket No. OAR–2005–0083–
0045). Finally, ‘‘[c]are has to be
exercised in applying the criteria for
periods beyond the time where the
uncertainties become so large that the
criteria may no longer serve as a
reasonable basis for decision making’’
(IAEA Draft Safety Requirements DS154,
‘‘Geological Disposal of Radioactive
Waste,’’ Section A.7, p. 37, April 2005,
Docket No. OAR–2005–0083–0051).
The Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA)
states that ‘‘[t]here is an increasing
consensus among both implementers
and regulators that, in carrying out
safety assessments, calculations of dose
and risk should not be extended to
times beyond those for which the
assumptions underlying the models and
data can be justified * * * Eventually,
but at very different times for different
parts of the system, uncertainties are so
large that predictions regarding the
evolution of the repository and its
environment cannot meaningfully be
made’’ (‘‘The Handling of Timescales in
Assessing Post-Closure Safety,’’ pp. 10,
13, 2004, Docket No. OAR–2005–0083–
0046). Similarly, the Swedish Radiation
Protection Authority (SSI) has proposed
draft guidance for the disposal of SNF,
stating that ‘‘[f]or very long periods
* * * [t]he intention should be to shed
light on the protective capability of the
repository and to provide a qualitative
picture of the risks’’ (p. 7, Docket No.
OAR–2005–0083–0048). This draft
guidance is intended to supplement
SSI’s standards (SSI FS 1998:1,
September 28, 1998, Docket No. OAR–
2005–0083–0047), which require that
‘‘[f]or the first thousand years after
disposal, the assessment of the
repository’s protective capability shall
be based on quantitative analyses of the
impact on human health and the
environment’’ (§ 11), but do not specify
quantitative analyses as the basis for
longer-term assessments (‘‘shall be
based on various possible sequences for
the development of the repository’s
properties, its environment and the
biosphere,’’ § 12).
We acknowledge that detailing the
effects of uncertainty is itself uncertain.
We recognize that knowledge is not
absolute up to 10,000 years, with
uncertainties burgeoning shortly beyond
that time. We also recognize that there
can be considerable uncertainty in
measurements of current conditions.
Further, we concur with NAS that
uncertainties can be qualitatively
different for different aspects of the
assessment. For example, NAS points
out that human behavior can be
projected for a few decades at most,
while the geologic record can be studied
for evidence of processes that have
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occurred over millions of years (and are
still occurring today). However, the
assessment of Yucca Mountain’s
performance depends not only on the
ability to project large-scale geologic
processes, such as seismicity and
volcanism, but also the gradual
evolution of complex saturated and
unsaturated zone characteristics, such
as the chemistry of infiltrating water or
the direction and connectivity of a
fracture-flow system.
B. How Does the Application of
‘‘Reasonable Expectation’’ Influence
Today’s Proposal?
Under today’s proposal, projecting
disposal system performance involves
the extrapolation of physical conditions
and the interaction of natural processes
with the wastes for unprecedented time
frames in human experience, i.e.,
possibly hundreds of thousands of
years. In this sense, the projections of
the disposal system’s long-term
performance cannot be confirmed. Not
only is the projected performance of the
disposal system not subject to
confirmation, the natural conditions in
and around the repository site will vary
over time and these changes are also not
subject to confirmation, making their
use in performance assessments equally
problematic over the long-term. In light
of these fundamental limitations on
assessing the disposal system’s longterm performance, we believe that the
approach used to evaluate disposal
system performance must take into
account the fundamental limitations
involved and not hold out the prospect
of a greater degree of ‘‘proof’’ than in
reality can be obtained.
There are several fundamental
components to be established in setting
up and analyzing disposal system
performance scenarios. A model must
be created that translates the physical
processes operating at the site into
mathematical statements, such as
ground-water flow equations, that can
calculate the movement of
radionuclides through the various
components of the disposal system and
into the accessible environment. A
model may be very generic or highly
sophisticated and tailored to capture
distinct aspects of a particular site. Two
additional steps are necessary in order
to develop dose projections. First, the
possible performance scenarios
themselves and associated assumptions
must be established, and second, the
distribution of expected values for the
parameters involved in the performance
calculations must be determined. The
scenarios are developed from an
understanding of the natural processes,
the engineered barrier design, and the
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interactions of the engineered barrier
system with the repository environment.
The range of expected parameter values
for the analyses is based upon the
results of site characterization studies,
laboratory testing, and expert judgment.
For both of these components,
unrealistic and perhaps extreme choices
can be made that would, in effect, give
false expectations of disposal system
performance, or hide important
uncertainties that would, in reality,
have important consequences on the
performance projections (the model
itself may also have conservatisms built
into it, which may be even more
difficult to identify). If extreme
assumptions are made in defining the
scenario, a de facto ‘‘worst-case’’
scenario is developed at the outset and
analyses using the upper end of the
range of parameter values result in
performance projections that are in fact
extreme cases, rather than representing
the full range of expected performance.
Effectively, such a restrictive approach
results in emphasis on what would be
the conservative extremes of the
probability distributions for the
performance assessments and analyses
rather than if a realistic approach were
taken. In such a case, the regulatory
judgment would be focusing on extreme
situations, rather than on evaluating
safety under reasonably expected
conditions. On the other hand, if the
scenario were defined more realistically
and the same distribution of parameter
values used, the resultant distribution of
doses would be closer to the actual
expected performance and regulatory
decisions could be made with
confidence that the assessments
represent a more realistic range of
expected performance. Including
multiple ‘‘worst-case’’ assumptions in
setting up the performance scenarios,
combined with selecting conservative
values for site-related parameter
distributions, actually corresponds to
assessing very low-probability/highconsequence scenarios that can then
easily be mistaken as expected-case
analyses. Under the reasonable
expectation approach, expected case as
compared to conservative and worstcase assessments are more explicitly
identified and the uncertainties
presented more directly so that the
reasoning behind regulatory decisions
can be more easily understood and
defended. We note that this approach
was also recommended by a joint NEA–
IAEA peer review of DOE’s TSPA to
support its site recommendation, which
states in Section 4.1.3 (‘‘Realism or
conservatism’’):
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At a fundamental level, it is useful to resort
to a probabilistic analysis of a system
evolution in time if a realistic model can be
attempted but legitimate uncertainties
persist. However, if the starting model is
built a priori to be conservative, exercising it
probabilistically has little or no added value,
as one would still obtain conservative results.
In the TSPA–SR a hybrid conservative/
probabilistic methodology is used, which
causes assumptions and reality to be mixed
in a confusing way. In the future it may be
appropriate to present: (i) A probabilistic
analysis based on a realistic or credible
representation; and (ii) a set of
complementary analyses with different
conservatisms, in order to place the best
available knowledge in perspective. These
ancillary analyses could be given a
probabilistic weight as well. This should
satisfy the regulatory requirements whilst
providing a better basis for dialogue and
decision-making.
‘‘An International Peer Review of the
Yucca Mountain Project TSPA–SR,’’ pp.
54–55, 2002, Docket No. OAR–2005–
0083–0062, emphasis in original.
In making its decisions, the primary
task for NRC is to examine the
projections put forward by DOE to
determine ‘‘how much is enough’’ in
terms of the information and analyses
presented, i.e., how NRC determines
when the analyses provide an
acceptable level of confidence and the
results can be interpreted in a way
meaningful for regulatory compliance.
In 40 CFR part 197 as originally
promulgated, we did not have specific
measures in our standards on how to
make that judgment. NRC, as the
implementing agency, must be satisfied
with DOE’s presentation; therefore, we
concluded those specific measures of
satisfaction were appropriate for NRC to
determine. Neither did EPA specify: (1)
Confidence measures for such
judgments or numerical analyses; (2)
analytical methods that must be used for
performance assessments; (3) quality
assurance measures that must be
applied; (4) statistical measures that
define the number or complexity of
analyses that should be performed; or
(5) any assurance measures in addition
to the numerical limits in the standards.
We specified only that the mean of the
dose assessments must meet the
exposure limit.
We anticipate that if these very longrange performance projections (beyond
10,000 years) indicate that repository
performance would degrade
dramatically under a wide range of
conditions at some point in time, that
this would become a concern in the
licensing decision. If such a dramatic
deterioration were projected to occur
close to the regulatory time period it
would be a more pressing concern for
licensing decisions than if it were to
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occur many hundreds of thousands of
years into the future (remembering that
the uncertainty in performance
projections increases with time). With
the initial issuance of 40 CFR part 197,
EPA elected to leave the handling of the
very long-term projections of
performance as an implementation
decision for the regulatory authority, but
to impose the requirement that such
analyses be performed and reported in
the EIS. The degree of ‘‘weight’’ that
should be given to these very long-term
assessments, we said, is an
implementation decision that should be
left to NRC to determine, by balancing
the projected performance and the
inherent uncertainties in these
projections against the projected dose
levels (2001 Response to Comments, p.
7–13, Docket No. OAR–2005–0083–
0043).
We propose to continue this general
approach of not specifying the bases or
mechanisms for a compliance decision,
except that the post-10,000-year
analyses are now proposed to be part of
the 40 CFR part 197 standards with a
quantitative limit imposed.
As noted earlier, the conceptual
framework of ‘‘reasonable expectation’’
as promulgated in our 2001 rulemaking
is applicable even when extending the
compliance period to peak dose. In fact,
we believe it becomes even more
important as the level of confidence that
can be placed in numerical projections
decreases over time. However, we are
not proposing to expand or modify the
definition in § 197.14 to account for the
greater uncertainty between 10,000
years and the time of peak dose (within
1 million years of disposal). The
existing definition describes principles
that are applicable for both shorter and
very long time frames (although the
implications of these principles may be
different, depending on the time frame).
To provide insight into our
interpretation of reasonable expectation
at very long times, we provide
additional information in the remainder
of this section and throughout our
discussion of the proposed changes for
NRC to consider as it implements our
peak dose standard. We believe such
guidance will be useful, particularly in
the context of handling long-term FEPs,
as discussed in Section II.D of this
document.
We emphasize that parameters and
scenarios should be included in the
performance assessment even if they are
not among the more highly conservative
approaches. There is a tendency in longterm assessment to introduce
conservatisms and to focus on the
higher-end dose projections, while
discounting lower dose projections that
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may actually be just as probable or
perhaps represent higher-probability
scenarios. We stress that DOE should
work to ensure that the results express
the full range of possible outcomes
within the bounds of credible scenarios
and parameter values. Less conservative
scenarios (i.e., lower projected doses)
should not be eliminated unless they are
deemed to be highly improbable. Of
course, the compliance measure will be
expressed as a specific statistical
measure of the results, not the entire
range of results. The entire range of
results is context to be used to assist the
licensing authority in judging the
likelihood of the facility to meet the
standards. In that context, the results of
the performance assessments are not to
be biased by an overemphasis on lowprobability scenarios at the expense of
results for the entire spectrum of
reasonably credible and supportable
scenarios and parameter values. Our
position is that the reasonable
expectation approach accounts for the
inherent uncertainties involved in
projecting disposal system performance
by taking into account a large spectrum
of possible parameter values rather than
making assumptions that reflect only
conservative to very conservative
values. We also emphasize that the
uncertainties in site characteristics over
long time frames, and how the long-term
projections of expected performance of
the disposal system were made, need to
be well understood before regulatory
decisions are made. We stress again the
purpose of the assessments as expressed
by IAEA: ‘‘The aim of the assessment is
not to predict the actual performance of
the disposal system * * * but rather to
reach reasonable assurance that it will
provide an adequate level of safety’’
(IAEA–TECDOC–975, p. 24, Docket No.
OAR–2005–0083–0045). NAS agrees
that ‘‘[t]he results of compliance
analysis should not, however, be
interpreted as accurate predictions of
the expected behavior of a geologic
repository’’ (NAS Report p. 71, Docket
No. OAR–2005–0083–0076).
In Section II.D of this document
(‘‘How Will Today’s Proposal Affect the
Way DOE Conducts Performance
Assessments?’’), we propose to limit
speculation over the long compliance
period now being addressed by
requiring compliance within a
performance assessment that continues
to emphasize the most significant
features, events, and processes. The
purpose is to provide a reasonable test
of performance over a range of
conditions. To do so, we propose to
eliminate very unlikely features, events,
and processes, and the scenarios
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including them, from consideration and
specify this in the standards. We believe
this is consistent with a finding of the
NAS: ‘‘It is always possible to conceive
of some circumstance that, however
unlikely it may be, will result in
someone at some time being exposed to
an unacceptable radiation dose * * *
The challenge is to define a standard
that specifies a high level of protection
but that does not rule out an adequately
sited and well-designed repository
because of highly improbable events’’
(NAS Report pp. 27–28). We have
chosen to do this by continuing to place
reasonable constraints on the scenarios
that need to be examined. We believe
this is consistent with another finding of
the NAS: ‘‘We conclude that the
probabilities and consequences of
modifications generated by climate
change, seismic activity, and volcanic
eruptions at Yucca Mountain are
sufficiently boundable so that these
factors can be included in performance
assessments that extend over periods on
the order of about 106 years’’ (NAS
Report p. 91). Typically, as we discuss
elsewhere in this document, the term
‘‘boundable’’ implies a ‘‘worst case’’
approach (i.e., a ‘‘bounding analysis’’) to
assessing the limits of disposal system
performance. We do not believe such an
approach is appropriate and are not
proposing to adopt it. Instead, in this
context, we interpret ‘‘boundable’’ as
referring to limits that may be placed on
the scenarios so that they will represent
a reasonable test of disposal system
performance over the very long term,
but not be driven by extreme
assumptions or endless speculation.
Thus, we view our treatment of these
‘‘modifiers’’ as comparable to our
specification of a ‘‘stylized’’ scenario for
human intrusion, and consistent with
the NAS statement that ‘‘[i]t is
important that the ‘rules’ for the
compliance assessment be established
in advance of the licensing process’’
(NAS Report p. 73).
In our 1999 preamble to proposed 40
CFR part 197, we said that if we were
to regulate longer than 10,000 years, we
would expect the licensing judgment to
be less strict in relying on dose
projections compared to 10,000 years
(64 FR 46998, August 17, 1999, Docket
No. OAR–2005–0083–0041): ‘‘We note
that if the compliance period for the
individual-protection standard extended
to the time of peak dose within the
period of geologic stability (which NAS
estimated to be 1 million years for the
Yucca Mountain site), this [reasonable
expectation] test would allow for
decreasing confidence in the numerical
results of the performance assessments
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as the compliance period increases
beyond 10,000 years. For example, this
means that the weight of evidence
necessary, based upon reasonable
expectation, for a compliance period of
10,000 years would be greater than that
required for a compliance period of
hundreds of thousands of years.’’ Given
the increased uncertainty that is
unavoidable in the capabilities of
science and technology to project and
affect outcomes over the next 1 million
years, the concept of reasonable
expectation underlying our standards
implies that a dose limit for that very
long period that is higher than the 15
mrem/yr limit that applies in the
relatively ‘‘certain’’ pre-10,000-year
compliance period could still provide a
comparable judgment of overall safety.
See Section II.C.3 (‘‘What Dose Level is
EPA Proposing for Peak Dose?’’) for a
specific discussion of the dose limit in
today’s proposal.
In formulating an approach to
compliance out to the time of peak dose,
we have established 10,000 years as an
indicator for times when uncertainties
in projecting performance are more
manageable and for which comparisons
can be made with other regulated
systems. We realize that uncertainties
exist within the initial 10,000-year
period and that 10,000 years does not
represent a strict dividing point between
periods over which projections can be
made with certainty or not. Clearly, we
believe that calculations beyond 10,000
years have value, or we would not have
previously required DOE to include
them in its EIS. However, we also
believe that over the very long periods
leading up to the time of the peak dose,
the uncertainties in projecting climatic
and geologic conditions become
extremely difficult to reliably predict
and a technical consensus about their
effects on projected performance in a
licensing process would be very
difficult, or perhaps impossible, to
achieve. This is one of the major reasons
that the 10,000-year time frame was
originally selected in the generic
standard for land disposal of the types
of waste intended for the Yucca
Mountain repository (40 CFR part 191)
(2001 Response to Comments, p. 7–17,
Docket No. OAR–2005–0083–0043). In
such a situation, one might conclude
that little or no weight should be given
to highly uncertain projections as a
basis for a licensing decision.
Conversely, others might conclude that
the inability to produce highly reliable
performance estimates should preclude
the possibility of licensing at all. Such
a conclusion would be inconsistent with
any concept of permanent disposal,
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49029
which necessarily requires examination
of time frames and events that cannot be
predicted with certainty. We believe
that the performance projections at
Yucca Mountain, if constructed and
interpreted consistent with the concept
of ‘‘reasonable expectation,’’ can
provide useful information on the
facility’s performance and can form a
key part of the basis for a licensing
decision. Clearly NAS agreed, since it
recognized that significant uncertainties
exist, yet nonetheless recommended
that projections to peak dose form the
basis for EPA’s standards to be used in
judging compliance for licensing the
Yucca Mountain disposal system. NAS
further recognized that an approach
akin to reasonable expectation is
warranted: ‘‘No analysis of compliance
will ever constitute an absolute proof;
the objective instead is a reasonable
level of confidence in analyses that
indicates whether limits established by
the standard will be exceeded’’ (NAS
Report p. 71).
C. How Is EPA Proposing To Revise the
Individual-Protection Standard
(§ 197.20) To Address Peak Dose?
In considering how to revise the
individual-protection standard, we have
sought an approach that would be:
• Responsive to the Court ruling;
• Protective of public health and
safety;
• Reflective of the best science and
cognizant of the limits of long-term
projections;
• Implementable by NRC in its
licensing process; and
• Limited in scope and focused on
aspects critical to accomplishing the
above goals.
In balancing these goals, we have
carefully examined the NAS
recommendations and looked more
broadly to international models and
guidance on long-term radioactive waste
disposal. We believe today’s proposal
satisfies these goals. We believe the first
three are straightforward and our
reasoning outlined in the next sections
will clearly show how they influenced
our proposal. The fourth point relates to
an essential purpose of our action that
can sometimes be overshadowed by
emphasis on the NAS recommendations
and the Court ruling. As NAS stated,
‘‘standards are only useful if it is
possible to make meaningful
assessments of future repository
performance with which the standards
can be compared’’ (NAS Report p. 34).
Ultimately, NRC must be able to use our
standards to judge whether DOE has
provided sufficient evidence that the
disposal system will be protective of
public health and safety. While there are
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significant scientific aspects to this
decision, regulatory judgment must
bridge the gap between what science
can show and the unprecedented time
frames involved. The licensing process
must consider the confidence that can
be placed in performance assessments
used to represent disposal system
evolution and the information necessary
to make a decision. Our ‘‘reasonable
expectation’’ standard is critical to
making this judgment.
The last point above refers to the legal
status of our rule. Today’s proposal is
specifically targeted toward addressing
the Court ruling regarding the
compliance period. Many other aspects
of our rule were either upheld by the
Court or not challenged. As discussed in
Section II.A, we are not revisiting those
issues.
In a similar vein, when considering
potential approaches to address the
Court’s decision, we did not feel
constrained by our actions in the 2001
rulemaking. Nor do we believe that
rejecting certain approaches in that
rulemaking creates a legal barrier to
incorporating them into today’s
proposal. Our preferred approach was
rejected by the Court in favor of a
compliance standard applicable at the
time of peak dose, whenever it might
occur within the period of geologic
stability. In our 2001 rulemaking, we
considered, discussed, and accepted
comment on the length of the
compliance period, including
consideration of the time of peak dose.
We ultimately chose not to establish a
compliance period applicable
throughout the period of geologic
stability. Thus, it is difficult to see how
we could satisfy the Court’s ruling if we
were not permitted to reconsider or
revise our previous conclusions.
1. Multiple Dose Standards Applicable
to Different Compliance Periods
In balancing the considerations
described above, the central problem is
to determine what is achievable in terms
of the reliability of dose projections. Our
task was clearly presented by the Court,
and our starting position is to fulfill that
task by proposing a compliance
standard at the time of peak dose,
whenever it might occur within the
period of geologic stability. We have
discussed at length our concerns
regarding the quality of very long-term
projections and their application in a
licensing process; even in light of the
Court decision, those concerns remain.
However, we also believe it is clear that
shorter-term projections do have
sufficient reliability to serve as the basis
for regulatory decision-making. On the
one hand, we do not want to place more
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regulatory emphasis on peak dose
projections than can be justified; on the
other, a standard effective at relatively
short times, where we believe such
emphasis is warranted, is unlikely on its
own to be responsive to the Court
ruling. We have sought to reconcile
these two extremes in order to satisfy all
of the goals outlined earlier.
In what we see as the best solution to
this difficulty, today we are proposing
that the individual-protection standard
consist of two parts, which will apply
over different time frames. One part of
the standard, which will apply over the
initial 10,000 years after disposal,
consists of the 15 mrem/yr individualprotection standard promulgated in
2001 as 40 CFR 197.20. The other part
other part of the standard, which is
being proposed today, will apply
beyond 10,000 years to the time of peak
dose up to a limit of 1 million years. We
believe this approach appropriately
recognizes the relative manageability of
uncertainties at such disparate times,
and the resulting level of confidence
that can be derived from performance
projections.
There is no disagreement
internationally that quantitative
projections are the most direct means of
evaluating disposal system performance,
or that comparison of such projections
with an acceptable level of performance
is a straightforward and transparent
method of assessing disposal system
safety. However, there is also a general
consensus that reliance on quantitative
projections to determine safety may be
misleading and incomplete, becoming
more so at times very far into the future.
IAEA notes that ‘‘[q]uantitative analysis
is undertaken, at least over the time
period for which regulatory compliance
is required, but the results from detailed
models of safety assessment are likely to
be more uncertain for time periods in
the far future’’ (DS154, Section 3.48, p.
25, Docket No. OAR–2005–0083–0051).
Also, ‘‘an indication that calculated
doses could exceed the dose constraint,
in some unlikely circumstances, need
not necessarily result in the rejection of
a safety case * * * In general, when
irreducible uncertainties make the
results of calculations for the safety
assessment less reliable, then
comparisons with dose or risk
constraints have to be treated with
caution’’ (DS154, Sections A.7, A.8, pp.
36–37, Docket No. OAR–2005–0083–
0051). As suggested by the discussion of
reasonable expectation in Section II.A.4,
at longer time periods, the quantitative
projections should be considered less
for their strict numerical outcomes and
more as one component in a qualitative
evaluation of the overall safety case.
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In their book ‘‘Principles and
Standards for the Disposal of LongLived Radioactive Wastes’’ (2003,
Docket No. OAR–2005–0083–0061),
Chapman and McCombie state that ‘‘[a]n
approach commonly used is to calculate
releases, doses or risks out to peak
consequences—but to use different
approaches to judging acceptability in
different time frames. At far future times
(>10 ka) [>10,000 years] * * *
calculated doses may then be more
appropriately compared with less
stringent limits than the typical limits at
shorter times’’ (p. 79). They also present
the concept of ‘‘time-graded
containment objectives’’ in which the
first 1,000 years or so is characterized by
‘‘total containment of all activity in the
repository.’’ For the ‘‘next one (or a few)
hundred thousand years * * * doses
* * * are below the range of natural
background radiation.’’ Finally, ‘‘after
this time * * * there is no further
containment objective: doses may be
envisaged in the range of those from
natural background radiation.’’ (p. 114)
Different countries have approached
this situation in various ways, and many
national regulations are still evolving.
For example, as summarized by
Chapman and McCombie in Table 5.1
(Docket No. OAR–2005–0083–0061):
Canada at one time limited quantitative
compliance to 10,000 years, to be
followed by qualitative evaluation, with
special attention to the rate of increase
in projected risk; Germany takes a
similar approach in official guidance,
but does not specify a time frame in
regulation; France requires quantitative
compliance for 100,000 years, with the
situation becoming ‘‘hypothetical’’
afterward; Switzerland requires
numerical compliance at all times. The
Swedish draft guidance referred to in
Section II.A.5 states that ‘‘[f]or long
periods of time, thousands of years and
even longer, the risk analysis should be
successively regarded as an illustration
of the protective capability of the
repository assuming certain conditions’’
(p. 7, Docket No. OAR–2005–0083–
0048). We believe the approach
proposed today, outlined in the
paragraphs below, is consistent with
that trend.
First, we are retaining the standard
promulgated in 2001 as § 197.20, which
requires that DOE demonstrate a
reasonable expectation that the RMEI
will not incur annual exposures greater
than 150 µSv (15 mrem) (expressed as
a committed effective dose equivalent)
from releases of radionuclides from the
Yucca Mountain disposal system for
10,000 years after disposal. DOE will
make this demonstration using the
arithmetic mean of performance
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assessment results (see Section II.C.5,
‘‘How Will NRC Judge Compliance?’’ for
further discussion of the mean). We
believe this is appropriate, protective,
and will maintain consistency with our
generic standards (now applied to the
WIPP) and other precedents described
earlier. Further, NAS stated that the
‘‘range [of 10¥5 to 10¥6 per year for
risk] could therefore be used as a
reasonable starting point for EPA’s
rulemaking’’ (NAS Report p. 49,
emphasis in original). By maintaining
the 15 mrem/yr standard for 10,000
years we clearly establish a ‘‘starting
point’’ for assessing compliance that is
consistent with both NAS and our
overall risk management policies, and
serves as a logical foundation for us to
incorporate concerns regarding far
future projections.
Because of the emphasis on peak dose
as the key benchmark of safety in both
the NAS Report and the Court decision,
some commenters may question not
only the need for a standard at such
relatively short times, but also whether
it is legally permissible, given the
Court’s decision. We believe there is
ample justification for a separate 10,000year standard on both counts. Taking
the legal questions first, there was no
legal challenge and the Court made no
ruling on the protectiveness of our
standard up to 10,000 years. Further, the
Court ruled that we must address peak
dose, but did not state, and we do not
believe intended, that we could not
have additional measures to bolster the
overall protectiveness of the standard.
As the Court noted, the EnPA requires
that EPA ‘‘establish a set of health and
safety standards, at least one of which
must include an EDE-based, individual
protection standard’’ (NEI, 373 F.3d at
45, Docket No. OAR–2005–0083–0080),
but does not restrict us from issuing
additional standards. Thus, as long as
we issue ‘‘at least one’’ standard
addressing the NAS recommendation
regarding peak dose, we are not
precluded from issuing other,
complementary, standards to apply for a
different compliance period. The
Court’s concern was whether we had
been inconsistent with the NAS
recommendation by not extending the
period of compliance to times longer
than 10,000 years. NAS itself did not
address the idea of having separate
standards to apply over different time
periods. We believe such a decision falls
well within our policy discretion and in
that context the 10,000-year standard is
analogous to our ground-water
protection standards.
An important reason for retaining a
standard applicable for the first 10,000
years is to address the possibility,
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however unlikely, that significant doses
could occur within 10,000 years, even if
the peak dose occurs significantly later,
as DOE currently projects.
Examination of DOE’s Total System
Performance Assessments (TSPA) for
the site shows that the time of peak dose
occurs in the hundreds of thousands of
years (FEIS, DOE/EIS–0250, Appendix I,
Section 5.3, February 2002, Docket No.
OAR–2005–0083–0086). The waste
packages assessed in the TSPA are
heavily engineered to provide corrosion
resistance under the conditions
expected in the repository, and are
projected to remain essentially
unbreached for periods well beyond
10,000 years. The scientific data that
underlie these corrosion resistance
projections are laboratory tests on the
metals, under conditions intended to
stress the metals and simulate their
performance in the repository. These
testing methods are typical ‘‘state-of-theart’’ techniques for corrosion testing.
However, it must be recognized that the
extrapolation of laboratory test results in
a predictive sense involves significant
uncertainties, and our experience in
verifying such projections is only for
time frames of decades in the case of
industrial applications (‘‘Assumptions,
Conservatisms, and Uncertainties in
Yucca Mountain Performance
Assessments,’’ Section 5, July 2005,
Docket No. OAR–2005–0083–0085).
While DOE projects, based upon the
results of laboratory testing, that the
waste containers will maintain their
integrity for thousands to tens of
thousands of years, it is not possible to
claim unequivocally that no information
will come to light that might cause a
reassessment of the containers’ behavior
and its effect on disposal system
performance. Although we believe that
significant doses within 10,000 years are
highly unlikely, we also believe it
important to structure our regulations to
preclude the chance that protection at
Yucca Mountain would be less than that
provided for WIPP or the Greater
Confinement Disposal facility (GCD,
which is a group of 120-feet deep
boreholes, located within NTS, which
contain disposed transuranic wastes). It
would be inappropriate to apply a
standard designed to accommodate the
uncertainties in projections many tens
to hundreds of thousands of years into
the future to projections within 10,000
years, when uncertainties are much
more manageable. The 15 mrem/yr dose
limit is the measure against which
compliance would be judged during the
initial 10,000-year period.
In today’s action, we are proposing to
add a standard of compliance that
would apply at the time of peak dose,
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49031
if DOE determines that the peak occurs
at any time beyond 10,000 years but
within 1 million years (as recommended
by NAS). Specifically, in addition to
retaining the 15 mrem/yr standard
applicable up to 10,000 years, we are
proposing to establish a separate
numerical compliance standard against
which the median of peak dose
projections would be compared (see
Section II.C.3 for a discussion of the
proposed dose limit and Section II.C.5
for a discussion of the arithmetic mean
and median). As discussed earlier, we
recognize that there is strong consensus
in the international radioactive waste
community that dose projections
extending for periods into the many tens
to hundreds of thousands of years can
best be viewed as qualitative indicators
of disposal system performance, rather
than as firm predictions that can be
compared against strict numerical
criteria. The primary concern, which we
have also expressed, is managing the
uncertainties that become more
prominent at longer time frames.
Nevertheless, we believe that the best
way to address the Court decision is to
establish a numerical compliance
standard for the time of peak dose so
that a clear test for compliance decisionmaking can be applied to the results of
quantitative performance assessments.
What we are proposing is
unprecedented in our national
regulatory schemes, and we remain
greatly concerned about the ability of
the implementing agencies to manage
the uncertainties in very long-term
projections in order to make
comparisons with a numerical standard
meaningful. We discuss elsewhere in
this document (see Sections II.B and
II.D.2, for example) ways in which NRC
and DOE might temper the effects of
uncertainty in dose projections, e.g.,
through the selection of parameter
distributions or scenarios.
Some readers may note that we
rejected similar approaches offered in
comments on our 1999 proposed rule.
One commenter in particular suggested
that the dose standard could be
increased over time, i.e., 15 mrem/yr up
to 10,000 years, 150 mrem/yr from
10,000 to 100,000 years, and 1.5 rem/yr
from 100,000 to 1 million years (Docket
A–95–12, Item IV–D–35). As stated in
our Response to Comments document
published in conjunction with the 2001
final rulemaking (p. 3–8, Docket No.
OAR–2005–0083–0043), we considered
that our approach accomplished the
same goal as that offered by the
commenter. While we did state that ‘‘no
regulatory body that we are aware of
considers doses of 150 mrem to be
acceptable,’’ we also stated that ‘‘the
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uncertainties involved in very long-term
assessments would make it more
difficult to judge compliance with any
numerical standard,’’ which we still
believe is true. It is clear that we
struggled to reconcile the competing
claims of confidence in projections and
intergenerational equity. We sought an
approach that would account for what
we see as potentially unmanageable
uncertainties, but did not depart from
levels of risk that are considered
protective today. Nevertheless, the
Court’s decision puts us in the position
of establishing a quantitative standard at
the time of peak dose. It is necessary for
us to re-evaluate potential approaches to
doing so, including whether and under
what conditions a higher dose standard
can be justified. We discuss an approach
similar to that offered by the commenter
in Section II.C.2.c (‘‘Peak Dose Standard
Varying Over Time’’).
We are not requesting comment on
the 15 mrem/yr standard or its
applicability for the initial 10,000-year
period. The public record reflects an
exhaustive level of comment and
consideration on these points (see our
1999 proposed and 2001 final
rulemakings, as well as Sections 3 and
4 of the 2001 Response to Comments
Document (Docket Nos. OAR–2005–
0083–0041, 0042, 0043, respectively).
The Court did not question the scientific
basis of the 15 mrem/yr dose standard,
the protective nature of that limit, or its
well-established precedents in
regulation for periods as long as 10,000
years (including its implementation at
WIPP and GCD), nor indeed were any of
these aspects of the rule challenged.
Further, as noted above, the Court did
not rule that the 10,000-year compliance
period had no value, only that it was not
by itself consistent with the NAS
recommendation (‘‘We will thus vacate
part 197 to the extent that it requires
DOE to show compliance for only
10,000 years following disposal,’’ NEI,
373 F.3d at 31, Docket No. OAR–2005–
0083–0080).
We are requesting comment on the
combination of the 15 mrem/yr standard
with a separate standard applicable
beyond 10,000 years through the period
of geologic stability. We believe we have
provided a rational basis for taking this
approach and that it is consistent with
the Court’s position that we could have
‘‘taken the Academy’s recommendations
into account and then tailored a
standard that accommodated the
agency’s policy concerns.’’ NEI, 373
F.3d at 26, Docket No. OAR–2005–
0083–0080.
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2. What Other Options Did EPA
Consider?
We considered a number of other
approaches to respond to the Court’s
decision, each of which had attractive
qualities, as well as disadvantages.
These disadvantages generally relate to
the difficulty of implementation given
the increasing complexity and
uncertainty of much longer-term
projections.
a. Maintain the 10,000-Year Standard
Alone Without Addressing Peak Dose
The Court suggested that, ‘‘[h]ad EPA
begun with the NAS recommendation to
base the compliance period on peak
dosage and then made adjustments to
accommodate policy considerations not
considered by NAS,’’ the 40 CFR part
197 standards issued in 2001 might
have been accorded more deference.
NEI, 373 F.3d at 31, Docket No. OAR–
2005–0083–0080. However, it is not
clear how EPA’s earlier explanation of
its policy concerns might be reconciled
with NAS’s technical recommendation.
In view of this, we believe that the most
direct and responsive action to address
the Court ruling is to revise our
standards to include consideration of
the time when peak dose occurs.
Therefore, although we are retaining the
previous 10,000-year provisions as one
component of our revised standards, we
are also proposing an additional
measure to address the time of peak
exposure within the period of geologic
stability beyond 10,000 years. We
believe that this approach, coupled with
the selection of the dose standard to
apply at the time of peak dose (see
Section II.C.3) and specification of
certain aspects of DOE’s performance
assessment (see Section II.D), will
adequately address our policy concerns.
b. Dose Standard To Apply at Peak Dose
Alone
The second option we considered is
simply to replace the 10,000-year
standard with one that applies at the
time of peak dose, whenever it might
occur. This approach is attractive
primarily because it would be
straightforward in responding to the
Court decision. Although we believe
that 10,000 years has value as a
precedent for safety assessments, and
are retaining that element of the
standards, it is not intrinsically
significant as a demarcation point for
addressing a peak dose standard beyond
10,000 years. A peak dose standard
alone (i.e., not in conjunction with the
10,000-year standard we are retaining)
would remove confusion on that point,
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but introduces additional difficulties, as
described in the following sections.
As discussed in Section II.C.4.a, we
do not believe it is reasonable or
justifiable simply to extend the
application of a 15 mrem/year dose
limit over the entire period up to the
time of peak dose. Rather, at the time of
peak dose, which could potentially
occur hundreds of thousands of years
into the future, we believe rising
uncertainties justify adopting a different
(higher) dose level. However, as
discussed in Section II.C.3, this
approach, while more cognizant of the
effect of uncertainties and the dangers of
relying on specific numerical indicators
at very long times, departs from our
previous standards of protectiveness in
the event that peak doses occur within
relatively short time periods.
Specifically, if peak doses occur within
10,000 years, we would be in the
position of measuring safety against a
dose level that we have explicitly
rejected as not sufficiently protective
over that time frame, both in our generic
standards and in our earlier Yucca
Mountain rulemaking. Further, there
would be a clear contrast between the
level of protection offered to the
population in the vicinity of the WIPP
and that offered the population affected
by Yucca Mountain. We recognize that
our insistence on maintaining a 15
mrem/yr standard over the initial 10,000
years might appear inconsistent with
our proposal, which could allow peak
doses shortly after 10,000 years at levels
well above 15 mrem. However, as
discussed previously, we believe NRC
has the authority, as part of its licensing
process, to consider the timing and
magnitude of peak dose in assessing the
safety of Yucca Mountain. Furthermore,
we do not believe it is prudent to
disregard the usefulness of a stringent
10,000-year measure simply because
uncertainties at longer time frames make
it infeasible to conduct a performance
assessment with the same level of rigor.
Our view on this point is discussed in
Section II.A.1.
c. Peak Dose Standard Varying Over
Time
We also considered a variation on our
proposed approach, in which the post10,000-year dose level would rise
incrementally as time and the effects of
uncertainty increase. This approach
would provide greater continuity with
the 10,000-year standard and a gradual
transition as the role of uncertainty
increases. The difficulty in this
approach is identifying criteria to define
the timing and level of these transitions,
which would have to incorporate some
appraisal and comparison of the effects
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of uncertainty at various times. Some of
the advantages of this approach are also
captured by the statistical approach
discussed in Section II.C.2.e. We have
not identified a defensible way to derive
transition levels or the times at which
these dose level changes could be made.
d. Standard Expressed as a Dose Target,
Rather Than Limit
Although we have chosen to add a
standard extending the compliance
period beyond 10,000 years, we believe
that the most problematic aspect of
doing so is the uncertainty involved in
making projections over such long time
frames, which we discussed in some
detail in our proposed and final
rulemakings for 40 CFR part 197 in 1999
and 2001, respectively (Docket Nos.
OAR–2005–0083–0041 and 0042). To
repeat, we are in agreement with NAS
that such projections can be performed
and even ‘‘bounded’’ to some extent.
However, we remain concerned about
whether and under what conditions
results of very long-term assessments
can have sufficient meaning to provide
the basis for a licensing decision that
the repository should or should not be
approved.
One way to take these uncertainties
into account is to establish a more
flexible compliance benchmark for very
long time periods, one that would
represent a more qualitative ‘‘target’’ for
dose assessments rather than a strict
numerical limit. This approach would
be generally consistent with several
international programs. For example,
the Swedish Radiation Protection
Authority (SSI) has proposed draft
guidance for the disposal of SNF, stating
that ‘‘[f]or very long periods * * * [t]he
intention should be to shed light on the
protective capability of the repository
and to provide a qualitative picture of
the risks’’ (p. 7, Docket No. OAR–2005–
0083–0048). The Swedish regulations
themselves are not detailed regarding
the way different time periods should be
addressed, although it is clear that times
beyond 1,000 years are seen differently
than the period up to 1,000 years. For
the first thousand years after closure,
‘‘the assessment of the repository’s
protective capability shall be based on
quantitative analyses of the impact on
human health and the environment,’’
but for longer periods that assessment
‘‘shall be based on various possible
sequences for the development of the
repository’s properties, its environment
and the biosphere’’ (Sections 11 and 12,
respectively, Docket No. OAR–2005–
0083–0047).
In some cases, this reasoning is also
applied to near-surface disposal
facilities involving much shorter time
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frames. For example, in the United
Kingdom, ‘‘[t]he Government therefore
considers it inappropriate to rely on a
specified risk limit or risk constraint as
an acceptance criterion for a disposal
facility after control is withdrawn. It is,
however, considered appropriate to
apply a risk target in the design process.
However, if the estimated risk is above
the target, the Agency will need to be
satisfied not only that an appropriate
level of safety is assured, but also that
any further improvements in safety
could be achieved only at
disproportionate cost * * * In the very
long term, irreducible uncertainties
about the geological, climatic and
resulting geomorphological changes that
may occur at a site provide a natural
limit to the timescale over which it is
sensible to attempt to make detailed
calculations of disposal system
performance. Simpler scoping
calculations and qualitative information
may be required to indicate the
continuing safety of the facility at longer
times’’ (UK Environment Agencies,
‘‘Disposal Facilities on Land for Low
and Intermediate Level Radioactive
Waste: Guidance on Requirements for
Authorisation,’’ sections 6.14 and 8.23,
Docket No. OAR–2005–0083–0063).
Thus, in the UK approach, estimated
risks may be allowed to exceed the
numerical target if it is determined that
further restrictions in risk are
impossible or impractical.
Our approach in the 2001 rulemaking,
which required peak dose projections to
be placed in the Environmental Impact
Statement, was based on similar
reasoning. It allowed NRC to evaluate
those results qualitatively, but did not
prescribe that they be compared against
a dose limit. We also believe such an
approach would be consistent with our
‘‘reasonable expectation’’ standard,
which intends to avoid a narrow focus
on numerical calculations and
encourages consideration of the totality
of the assessment in the context of the
overall safety case (ICRP took the same
view in its Publication 81, ‘‘Radiation
Protection Recommendations as
Applied to the Disposal of Long-Lived
Solid Radioactive Waste,’’ stating that
‘‘as the time frame increases, some
allowance should be made for assessed
dose or risk exceeding the dose or risk
constraint. This must not be
misinterpreted as a reduction in the
protection of future generations and,
hence, a contradiction with the
principle of equity of protection, but
rather as an adequate consideration of
the uncertainties associated with the
calculated results’’ (Docket No. OAR–
2005–0083–0087); similarly, IAEA states
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49033
‘‘that calculated doses are less than the
dose constraint is not in itself sufficient
for acceptance of a safety case * * *
Conversely, an indication that
calculated doses could exceed the dose
constraint * * * need not necessarily
result in the rejection of a safety case,’’
DS154, Section A.7, pp. 36–37, Docket
No. OAR–2005–0083–0051). In
considering how to address peak dose in
this standard, however, we believe it is
more implementable and will be viewed
as more rigorous to set a specific dose
limit and provide direction concerning
assumptions and methodologies for
peak dose calculations, and leave it to
NRC to consider the quantitative
projections of peak dose as a
particularly important part of the ‘‘full
record before it’’ that it will consider in
determining whether there is a
reasonable expectation that the dose
limit will be achieved.
e. Standard Expressed as a Statistical
Distribution
Finally, we considered a standard of
compliance that would combine
features of the qualitative and
quantitative approaches described
earlier. Rather than incorporating a
specific numerical limit that must be
met by a single compliance measure
(such as the median or arithmetic mean
of a distribution), this approach would
be based upon the characteristics of the
distribution itself. It would take into
account the range of results for
performance assessment by examining
multiple representative dose estimates
such as upper and lower percentile
values. Under this formulation, DOE
might have to show that some
percentage of the peak dose projections
would remain within a certain range of
a reference dose level. For example, this
standard might say that at least 10% of
peak annual dose results must be 15
mrem or lower, and that no more than
10% of results can exceed some upper
limit. Using these parameters and
assuming that DOE ran 100 assessments
of system performance using
probabilistically-sampled input
parameter values, each resulting in a
separately calculated ‘‘peak’’ dose, at
least ten of those results would have to
be 15 mrem or lower and no more than
ten could be above the ‘‘upper limit’’.
This approach seems to address some
of our concerns. First, it recognizes
growing uncertainties but constrains
how much is acceptable by specifying
characteristics of the distribution that
must apply at all times without being
overly affected by ‘‘outliers.’’ In fact, the
value of the projected peak dose is
considered only in determining where it
falls in relation to the designated upper
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and lower percentile measures. In this
example, no more than 10% of the
results may exceed the ‘‘upper limit’’,
but the amount by which they exceed
that limit is not taken into account (and
similarly for doses below 15 mrem/yr).
Thus, projected doses of 1 rem/yr (1,000
mrem/yr) would carry the same
significance as much lower projected
doses, as long as both were higher than
the ‘‘upper limit’’. As a result, this
approach might provide additional
flexibility in judging the level of
conservatism appropriate to addressing
uncertainties (and perhaps compensate
for conservatism) across a range of
scenarios because the results would not
be disproportionately affected by lowprobability scenarios resulting in very
high doses, as the arithmetic mean
would be. In addition, the lower dose
threshold acts as a conservative
performance requirement in that it
requires that the disposal system
provide a specified level of performance
tied to the 15 mrem/yr dose standard
applicable to performance up to 10,000
years.
A firm base of assessments at lower
levels (e.g., 15 mrem/yr) would tie
DOE’s results to, and provide continuity
with, the 10,000-year projections. It
could be reasonable to allow a small
number of results to exceed the ‘‘upper
limit,’’ so long as the ‘‘expected’’
performance remains within a given
range (within about an order of
magnitude of 15 mrem, if we were to
use as the ‘‘upper limit’’ the value of
350 mrem/yr we are proposing today). It
should be kept in mind that even using
the mean of the distribution as the
compliance measure allows for a
percentage of results to exceed the limit,
depending to some extent on how the
distribution is skewed; this statistical
approach offered for discussion is
simply more precise in specifying the
percentage.
Second, while accounting for
uncertainties, it can be linked to the
standards of safety established for
geologic repositories at earlier time
frames. Percentile curves could be
compared against reference levels based
upon well-established limits within the
U.S. and internationally, such as 15
mrem/yr, 25 mrem/yr, 30 mrem/yr, or
100 mrem/yr, or the 350 mrem/yr we are
proposing today. This could provide
continuity with our approach at 10,000
years. It is reasonable to assume that
uncertainties will tend to become less
manageable as time increases, but there
is no clear and predictable demarcation
for when uncertainties become
‘‘unmanageable.’’
Third, this approach would be
consistent with our ‘‘reasonable
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expectation’’ standard, which is
intended to encourage DOE to focus on
‘‘cautious, but reasonable’’ scenarios
and examine the full range of results to
obtain the best possible understanding
of the long-term behavior of the disposal
system. In applying a standard that must
address times from 10,000 years up to
1 million years, it might be more
representative of system behavior to
consider the entire distribution of
results that may occur over those times
than to focus on a single number as
indicative of acceptable performance.
Using this approach, NRC would be
assured that the bulk of the results will
fall within reasonable limits, may be
better able to understand why results
fall at certain points along the
continuum, and would have additional
flexibility to determine compliance
within those limits.
We used a somewhat similar
approach in developing the containment
requirements in 40 CFR 191.13(a). In
that section of our generic regulations,
we required that calculations show that
a disposal system have no more than
one chance in ten of exceeding the
release limits, and no more than one
chance in 1,000 of exceeding ten times
the release limits. In establishing those
requirements, we explained that the
release limits applied to ‘‘those
processes that are expected to occur as
well as relatively likely disruptions.’’
The release limits multiplied by ten
applied to ‘‘more likely natural
disruptive events * * * [and the] range
of probabilities was selected to include
the anticipated uncertainties in
predicting the likelihood of these
natural phenomena. Greater releases are
allowed for these circumstances because
they are so unlikely to occur.’’ In part
191, no release limits were applied to
even lower-probability (i.e., ‘‘very
unlikely’’) events, analogous to our
approach of screening out very unlikely
events at Yucca Mountain: ‘‘the Agency
believes there is no benefit to public
health or the environment from trying to
regulate the consequences of such very
unlikely events’ (50 FR 38071,
September 19, 1985, Docket No. OAR–
2005–0083–0064). We have successfully
implemented this regulation at WIPP.
While we see several potential
positive aspects of this statistical
approach, we also have concerns
regarding both the overall approach and
the ways in which it could give a
misleading impression of disposal
system performance in a compliance
demonstration. First, there is a difficulty
in defining exactly where percentile
limits should be placed and how they
should be justified. Second, while the
criteria we have suggested would apply
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to the entire distribution of results, they
would essentially give the ‘‘tails’’ of the
distribution a strong role in determining
whether the disposal system should be
licensed. As we discuss later in Section
II.C.5 (‘‘How Will NRC Judge
Compliance?’’), we believe it is
appropriate to consider an indicator of
the ‘‘central tendency’’ of the results as
demonstrative of performance.
Our second concern relates to the idea
that the calculated peak dose values
themselves are not explicitly
incorporated into the compliance
determination through calculation of a
separate statistical measure, such as the
mean. While this offers an advantage
insofar as the overall measure is not
overly influenced by very high results,
for any defined set of cut-offs there is
always the possibility that the
distribution will fall just outside the
acceptable criteria. While strictly
speaking only the number of doses
above the higher cut-off level enters into
the compliance demonstration, the
magnitude of those doses would also be
important in the regulator’s confidence
in the overall acceptability of the
disposal system. Similarly, a
distribution that falls just outside the
cut-offs could be judged ‘‘better’’ than a
distribution that meets the criteria, if a
different measure such as the mean or
median were used for comparison. In
considering a series of 100 realizations,
for example, a distribution with 11
above, but only slightly above, the
‘‘upper limit’’ and only nine at 15
mrem/yr or lower (but with the next
highest at only 16 mrem) would fail the
test, even if the bulk of the results were
relatively low (say, below 100 mrem).
However, a distribution with ten
realizations significantly higher than the
‘‘upper limit’’ (e.g., 500 mrem/yr and
higher), ten at 15 mrem/yr, and most of
the remaining doses well above 100
mrem/yr, would pass the test, even
though it is likely that the arithmetic
mean would be noticeably higher in the
second case. Such a disparity might also
indicate the presence of high-dose
scenarios in one distribution that were
not included in the other.
Therefore, we have chosen not to
propose this approach for Yucca
Mountain. We are concerned that it will
be less transparent to the public and not
give a clear indication of the necessary
level of performance. Further, upper
and lower percentiles and dose limits
must be selected, as in the example
above; the selection of all these values
would need to account for risk
management and policy considerations.
It is difficult to identify a specific set of
criteria that would lead to the selection
of one set of values over another.
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3. What Dose Level is EPA Proposing for
Peak Dose?
Having determined that it would be
appropriate to propose a numerical peak
dose standard for the period of geologic
stability beyond 10,000 years, we must
then determine the appropriate level for
that standard. We considered several
factors in selecting the level proposed
today. First, and most significant, is the
issue of uncertainty in long-term
projections. Uncertainties are
problematic not only because they are
challenging to quantify, but also because
their impact will differ depending on
initial assumptions and the time at
which peak dose is projected to occur.
Further, the natural tendency in
modeling long-term processes is to
introduce additional conservatisms to
help ensure that actual performance will
be no worse than projected
performance. Thus, excessive
conservatism in addressing uncertainty
drives assessments away from
‘‘cautious, but reasonable’’ assumptions
and may result in an unrealistic, overly
pessimistic view of disposal system
performance. As we stated in our earlier
rulemaking, ‘‘[s]etting a strict numerical
standard at a level of risk acceptable
today would ignore this cumulative
uncertainty and the extreme difficulty of
using highly uncertain assessment
results to determine compliance with
that standard’’ (66 FR 32098, June 13,
2001, Docket No. OAR–2005–0083–
0042).
This raises a broader point regarding
the significance of very-long term
projections and how they should be
considered in the context of repository
safety. Leaving aside the uncertainties
inherent in projecting geologic
characteristics over such periods, even a
well-characterized site will display
natural variability in the parameters that
influence radionuclide transport. This
natural variability exists at every
possible site and can be reduced (or at
least better estimated) by site
characterization, but can never be
eliminated, no matter how stable the
site. As assessments extend to longer
time periods, this natural variability
will lead to an increasing spread of
results even if conditions do not change
significantly (it may be useful again for
the reader to refer to the hurricane
analogy discussed in Section II.A.5,
where the range of possible storm paths
increases as forecasts look farther ahead
in time). Therefore, given the difference
in the level of confidence regarding the
‘‘real’’ performance of the disposal
system for projections at 250,000 years
as at 10,000 years, we believe that
emphasizing incremental dose increases
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when such increases are overwhelmed
by fundamental uncertainties
inappropriately takes attention away
from an evaluation of the overall safety
of the disposal system and its ability to
contain and isolate wastes or respond to
disturbances. On that point, we have
argued against viewing projections as
‘‘predictions’’ of disposal system
performance and have emphasized that
assessments should aim to provide a
‘‘reasonable expectation’’ that
performance will be within acceptable
limits (on this point, see the NAS
Report, for example p. 71: ‘‘The results
of compliance analysis should not,
however, be interpreted as accurate
predictions of the expected behavior of
a geologic repository’’). While there is a
body of experience in applying the
‘‘reasonable expectation’’ concept for
10,000 years, we are also considering its
implications for time periods in the
hundreds of thousands of years (see
Section II.B, ‘‘How Does the Application
of ‘‘Reasonable Expectation’’ Influence
Today’s Proposal?’’).
We have also considered the potential
impacts to future generations that would
be represented by a dose standard
applied to periods up to 1 million years.
Impacts on future generations could
come in the form of economic cost,
health impacts, or a reduction in the
options available to make decisions to
address the problems faced by those
generations. A number of regulatory and
scientific bodies suggest that it is
appropriate to relate longer-term
standards to background radiation
levels. NEA, for example, suggests that
consideration of future generations
‘‘implies that the safety implications of
a repository need to be assessed for as
long as the waste presents a hazard’’ but
that such assessments need not focus on
exposures: ‘‘In view of the way in which
uncertainties generally increase with
time, or simply for practical reasons,
some cut-off time is inevitably applied
to calculations of dose or risk. There is,
however, generally no cut-off time for
the period to be addressed in some way
in safety assessment, which is seen as a
wider activity involving the
development of a range of arguments for
safety’’ (‘‘The Handling of Timescales in
Assessing Post-Closure Safety,’’ p. 39,
2004, Docket No. OAR–2005–0083–
0046, emphasis in original). This
reasoning supports the idea that dose
projections should be given
progressively less weight in the overall
decision as time passes. We note that
ICRP recently discussed a similar
concept. Specifically, ICRP suggests that
future projected doses can be weighted
to take into account a variety of factors,
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49035
and that ‘‘[w]eights can also be assigned
according to the time at which the
exposure will occur’’ (‘‘The
Optimisation of Radiological
Protection,’’ draft for consultation, p. 29,
April 2005, Docket No. OAR–2005–
0083–0052). Such an approach could
involve giving doses in the far future
less weight, either in a numeric sense or
in the context of the overall safety case.
The National Academy of Public
Administration (NAPA), in its 1997
report ‘‘Deciding for the Future:
Balancing Risks, Costs, and Benefits
Fairly Across Generations’’ (Docket No.
OAR–2005–0083–0087), recognizes that
each generation must consider not only
how its actions will affect future
generations, but also the extent to which
inaction will compromise its own
interests and negatively affect those
same future generations.
To inform decision-making, NAPA
defined four basic principles:
• Trustee: Every generation has
obligations as trustee to protect the
interests of future generations;
• Sustainability: No generation
should deprive future generations of the
opportunity for a quality of life
comparable to its own;
• Chain of Obligation: Each
generation’s primary obligation is to
provide for the needs of the living and
succeeding generations. Near-term
concrete hazards have priority over
long-term hypothetical hazards;
• Precautionary: Actions that pose a
realistic threat of irreversible harm or
catastrophic consequences should not
be pursued unless there is some
countervailing need to benefit either
current or future generations.
Under NAPA’s approach, there is no
absolute freedom of succeeding
generations to escape the effect of the
preceding generations’ decisions.
Rather, it is the responsibility of each
generation to consider those decisions
and their consequences in the light of
new knowledge, technology, societal
attitudes, and economic or other factors.
NAPA terms this the ‘‘rolling present.’’
As it relates to the management of spent
nuclear fuel, there is no question that
the next several generations may incur
societal as well as economic costs,
whether it involves continued
development of the Yucca Mountain
repository, development of interim
storage facilities or expanded storage at
reactor sites, or decisions regarding the
future use of nuclear power.
Application of the NAPA principles
would lead each generation to an
approach that would best address the
problem without unduly limiting the
options available to succeeding
generations to modify that approach or
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to take other actions to address their
needs.
In general, while there is wide
agreement that future generations
should not be unduly compromised by
the decisions of the current generation,
there is no clear consensus regarding the
extent of the claims held by future
generations on the current generation
(i.e., how many generations should be
considered, how to compare their
interests to those of the current
generation, or what it means to
‘‘compromise’’ their ability to take
action). The Swedish National Council
for Nuclear Waste (KASAM) concludes
that increasing uncertainties ‘‘means
that our capacity to assume
responsibilities changes with time. In
other words, our moral responsibility
diminishes on a sliding scale over the
course of time’’ (Nuclear Waste State-ofthe-Art Reports 1998, p. 27, Docket No.
OAR–2005–0083–0056). KASAM
suggests that for the next 5 or 6
generations (roughly 150 years), we can
apply a ‘‘Strong Principle of Justice’’ so
that these generations can be expected
to achieve a quality of life equivalent to
that of the current generation. For a
further 5 or 6 generations, we may only
be able to apply a ‘‘Weak Principle of
Justice’’ to ensure that these generations
can at least satisfy their basic needs.
Beyond that point, the best we can do
is conduct ourselves today so as not to
jeopardize future generations’
possibilities for life (the ‘‘Minimal
Principle of Justice’’). In the case of
spent fuel disposal, these considerations
lead to the idea that a repository must
provide reasonable protection and
security for the very far future, but this
may not necessarily be at levels deemed
protective (and controllable) for the
current or succeeding generations.2
2 This sentiment, however, is not universal.
Chapman and McCombie point out that the Swiss
radiation protection regulations make the argument
‘‘that since the current generation is the beneficiary
of nuclear power future doses should be less’’ (p.
53). They then acknowledge, however, that such
arguments are complex, noting that ‘‘it has been
pointed out that future generations do indeed
benefit from nuclear technology through the
technical advances made, the conservation of fossil
reserves, the reduction in greenhouse gases, etc.’’
Further, they go on to write:
In addition, the inability to guarantee long-term
or effectively permanent institutional control over
long-lived uranium mining wastes disposed of at
the earth’s surface or over historical ‘‘legacy
wastes’’ in countries where defence programmes
have resulted in large-scale contamination, means
that we are implicitly accepting (for this type of
waste, and some NORM wastes) that future
generations may have lower levels of protection
than today. This is causing re-examination of the
appropriate balance of radiological protection
standards for the future for these materials. The
most commonly accepted principle today for
disposal of nuclear fuel cycle wastes is that future
generations must be protected for very long times
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In any case, it is clear that
quantitative regulatory limits cannot be
applied indefinitely. There is general
agreement that assessments (and
corresponding regulatory safety limits or
reference points) for periods longer than
1 million years are of limited value in
any case (e.g., IAEA states that ‘‘little
credibility can be attached to
assessments beyond 106 years. Even
qualitative assessments will contribute
little to the decision making process’’
(‘‘Safety Indicators in Different Time
Frames for the Safety Assessment of
Underground Radioactive Waste
Repositories,’’ IAEA–TECDOC–767, p.
19, 1994, Docket No. OAR–2005–0083–
0044), and Sweden’s draft guidance
states that ‘‘[n]o account need be given
for periods beyond a million years after
closure, even if’’ peak exposures would
be expected after that time (p. 7, Docket
OAR–2005–0083–0048).
In addition to examining international
guidance and precedents, we also
reviewed the NAS’s statements on the
subject. As discussed in detail later in
this section, NAS refrained from
recommending any specific dose or risk
limit for regulations, but instead
suggested a range of risks as a ‘‘starting
point’’ for EPA’s consideration. Further,
while NAS stated that a standard that
‘‘could * * * apply uniformly over time
and generations * * * would be
consistent with the principle of
intergenerational equity,’’ it also
recognized that other approaches are
possible: ‘‘Whether to adopt this or
some other expression of the principle
of intergenerational equity is a matter
for social judgment’’ (NAS Report pp.
56–57).
In determining an appropriate level of
protection for periods up to 1 million
years, we believe it is appropriate to
consider potential exposures from the
Yucca Mountain disposal system in the
context of exposures incurred by
residents of other areas of the United
States from natural sources.
Specifically, we believe it is reasonable
to set a standard that would represent a
level of incremental radiation exposure
such that the total annual exposure of
the RMEI could be comparable to the
total natural radiation exposures
incurred now by current residents of
well-populated areas. Given the large
uncertainties surrounding the outcomes
at these unprecedented time frames, we
(at least 10,000 years) to at least reach the level of
protection expected by today’s generations; for
extremely long times the growing tendency is to
then make comparisons with natural sources of
radiation, such as ore bodies.
‘‘Principles and Standards for the Disposal of
Long-Lived Radioactive Wastes,’’ pp. 53–54, 2003,
Docket No. OAR–2005–0083–0061.
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believe such an action is justifiable and
protective. Using this approach, we are
proposing to establish a standard of 350
mrem (3.5 mSv) per year, which will
limit total radiation exposures of the
RMEI to levels comparable to those
incurred today from natural sources by
residents of a nearby western State.
We believe this level of protection
appropriately blends the concerns
outlined above with current and
historical thinking regarding the
acceptability of risks associated with
background radiation, while recognizing
the conceptual difficulties inherent in
regulating at times potentially hundreds
of thousands of years into the future.
NAS recognized that the level of
protection was a matter best left to EPA
to establish through rulemaking: ‘‘We do
not directly recommend a level of
acceptable risk’’ (NAS Report p. 49).
Thus, the NAS Report does not bind us
to apply any particular dose limit in our
Yucca Mountain standards.
We note that a number of
international scientific and regulatory
bodies and programs suggest natural
sources of radioactivity serve as a point
of comparison when uncertainties
become significant. For example, the
IAEA has stated that, for time frames
extending from about 10,000 to 1
million years, ‘‘it may be appropriate to
use quantitative and qualitative
assessments based on comparisons with
natural radioactivity and naturally
occurring toxic substances’’ (‘‘Safety
Indicators in Different Time Frames for
the Safety Assessment of Underground
Radioactive Waste Repositories,’’ IAEA–
TECDOC–767, p. 19, 1994, Docket No.
OAR–2005–0083–0044). IAEA also
suggests that ‘‘[i]n very long time frames
* * * uncertainties could become much
larger and calculated doses may exceed
the dose constraint. Comparison of the
doses with doses from naturally
occurring radionuclides may provide a
useful indication of the significance of
such cases’’ (‘‘Geological Disposal of
Radioactive Waste,’’ DS154, Section
A.7, p. 37, April 2005, Docket No. OAR–
2005–0083–0051). Similarly, in
summarizing the results of a workshop
to assess long-term assessments, the
NEA suggests that at time frames when
the ‘‘system [is] responding to external
change,’’ a key performance indicator
could be ‘‘comparison with background
radiation levels.’’ At that workshop, the
idea was presented that up to 100,000
years, ‘‘a dose constraint derived from
natural background levels is prescribed’’
and beyond that point ‘‘the eventual
redistribution of the residual activity by
natural processes remains
indistinguishable from natural regional
variations in radiation levels’’ (‘‘The
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Handling of Timescales in Assessing
Post-Closure Safety: Lessons Learnt
from the April 2002 Workshop in Paris,
France,’’ pp. 33, 35, 2004, Docket No.
OAR–2005–0083–0046). Further, as
regards low- and intermediate-level
waste disposal, the UK Environment
Agencies (consisting of the Environment
Agency of England and Wales, the
Scottish Environment Protection
Agency, and the Department of the
Environment for Northern Ireland) state
that ‘‘At times longer than those for
which the conditions of the engineered
and geological barriers can be modelled
or reasonably assumed * * *
Comparisons with the ambient levels of
radioactivity in the environment may
also be appropriate’’ (‘‘Disposal
Facilities on Land for Low and
Intermediate Level Radioactive Wastes:
Guidance on Requirements for
Authorisation,’’ section 6.22, 1996,
Docket No. OAR–2005–0083–0063).
We therefore considered which
natural sources of radioactivity in the
United States might provide similar
reference points for a dose standard
beyond 10,000 years. Natural
background radiation in the U.S.
averages roughly 300 mrem/yr, but
varies significantly across the country,
from a low of about 100 mrem/yr in
coastal areas to above 1 rem/yr (1,000
mrem/yr) in certain localized regions.
For purposes of this discussion, natural
background radiation consists of
external exposures from cosmic and
terrestrial sources, and internal
exposures from indoor exposures to
naturally-occurring radon. Altitude and
geology are two of the primary variables
accounting for regional variations;
however, there can be tremendous
fluctuation even within a city or county,
primarily due to variations in radon
emissions. These fluctuations introduce
some uncertainty in estimates of
localized background radiation levels,
which are also affected by factors such
as the number and distribution of
samples within a geographic area,
whether the samples are short-term or
averaged over a longer period, the
structure of the building, the location of
the sampling point(s) within a building,
and assumptions in translating
measured concentrations to estimated
doses.
In order to assess total exposures and
derive a dose limit, it is necessary to
establish levels of natural background
radiation already experienced in the
vicinity of Yucca Mountain. We selected
Amargosa Valley as the point of
comparison for this analysis. We believe
this is an appropriate approach, as the
RMEI is defined as having a lifestyle
and diet representative of current
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residents of Amargosa Valley. It is
reasonable to consider total exposures
in light of exposures already incurred by
people in the immediate vicinity of
Yucca Mountain. However, there are
varying estimates of exposures from
natural background sources in that area.
DOE estimates that the natural
background in Amargosa Valley is
equivalent to the average across the
U.S., or 300 mrem/yr (FEIS, DOE/EIS–
0250, Table 3–28, Docket No. OAR–
2005–0083–0086). However, that overall
figure is highly dependent on the radon
contribution, which DOE also assumes
is equivalent to the average across the
U.S., or 200 mrem/yr. Based on EPA
radon studies, we believe it is
reasonable and somewhat conservative
to assume that radon exposures to
residents of Amargosa Valley would be
slightly higher (say 25%) than the
national average (and possibly as much
as 100 mrem/yr higher than the
statewide average), resulting in a radon
contribution to those residents of about
250 mrem/yr. Thus, combined with the
cosmic and terrestrial exposures
estimated by DOE, we estimate total
annual natural background radiation at
Amargosa Valley to be approximately
350 mrem/yr.3
To make the comparison with total
exposures, it is also necessary to
consider what total exposures provide a
reasonable reference point for limiting
releases from Yucca Mountain. As noted
above, our goal is to ensure that releases
from Yucca Mountain will not cause
total exposures to the RMEI to exceed
natural background levels with which
other populations live routinely. We
3 Data from EPA studies in 1993 indicate that the
total average natural background exposure in the
State of Nevada is 222 mrem/yr (‘‘Assessment of
Variations in Radiation Exposure in the United
States,’’ 2005, Docket No. OAR–2005–0083–0077),
which is roughly 75% of the national average.
Because data were not available specifically for
Amargosa Valley, we used the statewide average as
a starting point to estimate background radiation at
Amargosa Valley. The overall statewide average is
significantly affected by estimated exposures in
Clark County (where Las Vegas is located), and not
necessarily representative of exposures closer to
Yucca Mountain. Clark County accounts for roughly
two-thirds of the state’s population (Census Bureau,
Nevada State Data Center, https://
dmla.clan.lib.nv.us/docs/nsla/sdc/). As outlined
above, data support the conclusion that average
exposures in Clark County would be significantly
lower than in the rest of the state, primarily because
of indoor radon exposures. EPA’s map of radon
zones developed in the early 1990s found Clark
County to be the only county in Nevada placed into
the lowest emission category, in which average
exposure potential is less than 200 mrem/yr (‘‘EPA
Map of Radon Zones,’’ EPA–402–R–93–071, Docket
No. OAR–2005–0083–0065). Most of the other
counties, including Nye County (where Yucca
Mountain and Amargosa Valley are located), fell
into the intermediate category, in which average
exposure potential is estimated in the range
between 200 and 400 mrem/yr.
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49037
selected the State of Colorado as the
reference point in meeting this goal. We
considered several factors in this
selection. First, we must recognize that
some incremental exposure will be
allowed; that is, it is a foregone
conclusion that even the most protective
standard cannot be expected to reduce
natural background exposures, and
clearly we cannot establish a negative
standard. Thus, the reference point
would have to have a higher level of
background than does the area near
Yucca Mountain. In addition, because of
the aforementioned complications in
estimating localized background
radiation (due primarily to the radon
component), we chose to examine
statewide averages, which are less
uncertain. Of the states with sufficient
data, 32 have average background
radiation levels higher than Nevada. In
selecting among these, we considered
characteristics such as geographic
location and population. Our preference
is to choose a state in the western part
of the country that is fairly wellpopulated and might otherwise have
characteristics considered reasonably
comparable to Nevada (such as radon
potential, surface water/coastal features,
or size of major cities). We find that
Colorado best fits those criteria.
According to the population data (U.S.
Census Bureau Statistical Abstract of the
United States, July 1, 2004, https://
www.census.gov/statab/ranks/
rank01.html), Colorado ranks 22nd
among all states in total population
(Nevada is 35th). Colorado’s average
annual background radiation is
estimated at 700 mrem/yr (see
‘‘Assessment of Variations in Radiation
Exposure in the United States,’’ 2005,
Docket No. OAR–2005–0083–0077, for
both background radiation and
population information). Other states
have comparable or higher radon
potential and higher background levels
with which people live routinely
(background levels in North Dakota,
South Dakota, and Iowa, for example,
are 789 mrem/yr, 963 mrem/yr, and 784
mrem/yr, respectively), and might also
be used for comparison. However, we
believe Colorado is more representative
of the characteristics exhibited by
Nevada (and Amargosa Valley).
In view of these factors, we selected
Colorado as our point of reference.
Thus, comparing Colorado’s estimated
average annual background radiation of
700 mrem/yr to our estimate for
Amargosa Valley, we derive an
incremental exposure level of 350
mrem/yr, which we are proposing to
establish today as the dose limit to
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apply to the time of peak dose beyond
10,000 years.
The limit we are proposing today is
somewhat higher than the average
natural background level of 300 mrem/
yr across the U.S., which places it above
two other options we considered (see
Sections II.C.4.b and II.C.4.c). One
option is the limit of 100 mrem/yr based
on international guidance for all sources
of exposure except natural, accidental,
and medical. The other is 200 mrem/yr,
which we derived through a somewhat
different way of looking at total
background levels nationwide. In our
view, the 350 mrem/yr level and these
other values are within a range of values
for which projections might well be
indistinguishable after several hundred
thousand years. That is, when taking
increasing uncertainties into account in
the very long term, the effects of factors
that would distinguish projections of
100, 200, and 350 mrem/yr within a
10,000-year time frame are more
difficult to identify clearly at very long
times, so that such projections may be
qualitatively identical to each other and
to the level of performance represented
by projections of 15 mrem/yr at 10,000
years. That is, modest differences in
basic modeling assumptions regarding
such factors as temperature inside the
repository over the first few hundred
years after disposal can lead to
differences in projected doses. Such
differences reflect uncertainties and
changes in models, and should not be
interpreted as representing meaningful
differences in the level of safety that can
be expected to be achieved. Given the
difficulty in estimating performance in
the very far future, we would also view
350 mrem/yr as representing a
satisfactory level of performance should
it be the ‘‘true’’ value at such long times.
We recognize that a standard based on
variations in natural background
radiation would be higher than previous
non-occupational standards in the U.S.
In our 2001 rulemaking, we justified the
dose limit of 15 mrem/yr and the
10,000-year compliance period in part
because they were consistent with other
EPA policies. In particular, a peak dose
standard of 350 mrem/yr (and the time
frame of up to 1 million years over
which that standard could apply) may
appear to some to be a departure from
the risk-management policies EPA has
adopted and applied in a variety of
Agency programs, most notably in the
Superfund cleanup program. We believe
the circumstances involved in today’s
proposal are significantly different from
the situations addressed under
Superfund or any other existing U.S.
regulatory program, and that it should
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be clear that comparisons between the
two are inappropriate.
It should be clear that we are not
arguing that most people take into
account levels of background radiation
when deciding where to live or work, or
that it in any way plays a major role in
their decision-making. Rather, in
establishing a standard to apply to the
RMEI over unprecedented times, we
believe it is reasonable to consider
exposures incurred routinely today by
people in other locations, which in our
view do not ‘‘pose a realistic threat of
irreversible harm or catastrophic
consequences’’ to those people.
In that context, we note that EPA does
not consider the risks from such
exposures to be excessive in the context
of radon occurrence in residences. As
described earlier, radon exposures can
vary widely even in localized areas for
a number of reasons. While average
radon doses are estimated to be roughly
200 mrem/yr, measurements indicate
that some exposures could be more than
ten times that level in unique situations.
The concentration at which EPA
recommends action be taken to mitigate
exposures is 4 pCi/l, which translates
roughly to 800 mrem/yr. The Agency
further recommends that homeowners
consider taking action only if the
measured concentration is between 2
and 4 pCi/l (i.e., above 400 mrem/yr)
(‘‘A Citizen’s Guide to Radon: The
Guide to Protecting Yourself and Your
Family from Radon,’’ EPA 402–K–02–
006, May 2004, Docket No. OAR–2005–
0083–0058). It should be understood
that this recommendation is not based
solely on risk, but considers factors such
as the voluntary nature of the exposure,
the application to private property, and
the capabilities of mitigation
technology. The dose limit proposed
today is well below the ‘‘action level’’
recommended for radon.
One way to provide context for
comparisons with natural radioactivity
is to evaluate the radiotoxicity of the
waste itself. In particular, it has been
suggested that assessment time frames
could be tied to the time necessary for
the waste to decay to levels roughly
comparable to the uranium ore from
which the fuel was derived, which is
often on the order of several hundred
thousand years. For example, IAEA
states that ‘‘[r]adiotoxicity indices are
useful in putting the potential hazards
of radioactive waste disposal into
perspective * * * they are qualitative
indicators of the time-scales of interest
for safety analysis’’ (‘‘Safety Indicators
in Different Time Frames for the Safety
Assessment of Underground Radioactive
Waste Repositories,’’ TECDOC–767, p.
15, 2004, Docket No. OAR–2005–0083–
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0044). NEA takes a similar position:
‘‘radiological toxicity and comparison
with natural systems such as uranium
ores offer a basis for a safety indicator
that can usefully complement dose and
risk’’ (‘‘The Handling of Timescales in
Assessing Post-Closure Safety,’’ p. 30,
2004, Docket No. OAR–2005–0083–
0046). Standards developed in Finland
explicitly incorporate this comparison
by defining the ‘‘farthest future’’ for
assessments as the period when the
activity in spent fuel becomes less than
that in the natural uranium from which
the fuel was fabricated (NEA, p. 34,
Docket No. OAR–2005–0083–0046).
Draft guidance for the Swedish program
states that assessments ‘‘need not be
extended beyond the point in time
when the initial content of the
radioactive substances in the repository
has decayed to a level at which the
potential of causing harmful effects or
other environmental consequences has
decreased to insignificant levels’’ (p. 7,
Docket No. OAR–2005–0083–0048). One
technical paper presented in the U.S.
concludes that ‘‘regardless of the
assumptions used, the risk to public
health from a HLW or spent fuel waste
repository will always become less than
that of the original uranium ore deposit’’
and that ‘‘[c]onsidering the nature of the
many barriers to release that are
included in the repository design, [it]
should easily be the case’’ that this
‘‘crossover time’’ (the time at which the
radiotoxicity, or overall hazard, of the
remaining waste will be equivalent to
that of the original ore used to make the
fuel) will be less than 10,000 years (‘‘An
Assessment of Issues Related to
Determination of Time Periods Required
for Isolation of High Level Waste,’’
Proceedings of the Symposium on
Waste Management at Tucson, Arizona,
February 26–March 2, 1989, Docket No.
OAR–2005–0083–0049).
While it is clear that consideration of
natural radioactivity is a widely
accepted concept for supporting safety
assessments over very long times, it
should also be clear that we believe
regulatory standards for the Yucca
Mountain disposal system based on
background exposures can be reconciled
with considerations of impacts on future
generations, as outlined earlier in this
section. Some international statements
regarding natural radioactivity reflect
the lack of consensus on what
constitutes an undue burden. For
example, NEA notes that when ‘‘the
repository has become comparable to a
natural system in certain important
aspects, this does not necessarily
indicate a return to unconditionally safe
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conditions’’ (NEA, p. 30, Docket No.
OAR–2005–0083–0046).
However, Chapman and McCombie
directly address this question, stating
that, at these very long times, ‘‘There is
no logical or ethical reason for trying to
provide more protection than the
population already has from Earth’s
natural radiation environment, in which
it lives and evolves * * * it must be
recognized that man cannot be expected
over infinite times to do much better
than nature. The potential exists for
natural uranium ore deposits, or spent
fuel or HLW repositories, to give rise
locally to doses that are higher than the
global average for natural radiation,
particularly if they are eventually
eroded in the near-surface environment.
However people exist today in many
locations where doses are tens, even up
to a hundred times higher than the
average. Thus, a repository is not
providing, globally, a novel source of
exposure and does not at these long
times represent any unusual anomaly in
the global environment’’ (‘‘Principles
and Standards for Disposal of LongLived Radioactive Wastes,’’ pp. 114–
115, 2003, Docket No. OAR–2005–0083–
0061).
We do not mean to suggest that
uranium ore bodies are benign entities,
and there is certainly a difference
between exposures incurred by direct
contact with the material and those
incurred at a distance after
environmental transport of material has
provided some lowering of potential
exposures by natural retardation
processes. These comparisons are
relevant in the sense that exposures
from longer-term releases from the
Yucca Mountain disposal system would
not be expected to be worse than those
from natural features that are fairly
common in parts of the country. The
exposures that might result from ore
body releases are highly dependent on
the characteristics of the ore body and
surrounding environment, as well as the
other assumptions applied
(measurements of releases from
unmined ore bodies are limited;
however, some surficial radiation
measurements from unmined ore bodies
suggest that a person at the site could
easily receive several hundred mrem/yr
(‘‘The Uranium District of the Texas
Gulf Coastal Plain’’, U.S. Department of
Energy Symposium Proceedings,
CONF–780422, Vol. 2, 1978, Docket No.
OAR–2005–0083–0081). On this point,
we stated in our 1985 final rulemaking
for 40 CFR part 191 that ‘‘estimates of
the risks from unmined ore bodies
ranged from about 10 to more than
100,000 excess cancer deaths over
10,000 years. Thus, leaving the ore
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unmined appears to present a risk to
future generations comparable to the
risks from disposal of wastes covered by
these standards’’ (50 FR 38083,
September 19, 1985, Docket No. OAR–
2005–0083–0064). In the terms of the
Precautionary Principle as presented by
NAPA, exposures of this magnitude that
are projected to occur several hundred
thousand years into the future should
not be considered to ‘‘pose a realistic
threat of irreversible harm or
catastrophic consequences’’ (Docket No.
OAR–2005–0083–0087).
We recognize that meaningful
distinctions are made today between
natural background radiation and
additional incremental (and
involuntary) exposures caused by
human activity. However, at long time
frames (potentially as long as 1 million
years into the future), such distinctions
are less meaningful, and natural
radiation levels can serve as a
reasonable and logical reference point
for assessing radiological impacts. We
agree with NEA that a reasonable overall
aim ‘‘is to leave future generations an
environment that is protected to a
degree acceptable to our own generation
* * * this level of protection will
ensure that any radiological impacts due
to disposal will not raise levels of
radiation above the range that typically
occurs naturally’’ (NEA, p. 9, Docket No.
OAR–2005–0083–0046). Our proposed
approach limits doses from the Yucca
Mountain disposal system in the far
future to levels that represent variations
in natural background and are far below
doses that can be projected from
uranium ore bodies or natural radiation
in some locations in the U.S. and
worldwide. Our proposed limit is
somewhat higher than the annual
average background radiation in the
U.S. Using the reasoning described
above, under this standard the
additional radiation exposure at the
time of peak dose to a resident of
Amargosa Valley from the Yucca
Mountain disposal system would be no
greater than what would be incurred if
that person moved today from the
vicinity of Yucca Mountain to a nearby
state. Using the NAS suggestions as a
starting point, and considering
international guidance and examples,
we have derived the proposed dose
limit to balance competing factors
highlighted by NAS and acknowledged
by us as important: the dual objectives
to effectively address the effects of
uncertainty on compliance assessment
and to adhere as closely as possible to
the relevant ethical principles,
including a consideration of impacts on
future generations. We believe that our
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49039
selection of a 350 mrem standard is
reasonable and effectively addresses the
factors it is necessary to consider when
projecting exposures very far into the
future. By applying over the entire
period of geologic stability beyond
10,000 years (up to 1 million years), it
will capture the peak dose during that
period. By doing so, our proposal is
consistent with the NAS
recommendation to have a standard
with compliance measured ‘‘at the time
of peak risk, whenever it occurs within
the limits imposed by the long-term
stability of the geologic environment,
which is on the order of one million
years’’ (NAS Report p. 2).
In all of our discussion of potential
dose standards, we have emphasized the
importance of perspective in evaluating
dose projections at very long times. It is
important to distinguish between effects
that are meaningful in assuring public
health and safety and those that simply
illustrate a modeling exercise. We are
proposing an approach to setting a dose
level derived from variations in current
natural background radiation in the U.S.
that would relate potential exposures to
the RMEI to exposures incurred today
by people in other locations from
sources of natural background radiation.
Given the long times involved in dose
projections, and the significant
uncertainties, we believe that
comparisons with natural sources of
radiation are appropriate.
Finally, from a regulatory perspective,
we have also considered that the peak
dose limit would apply at any time after
10,000 years. The limit we select must
be credible both at times close to 10,000
years and times much further into the
future. Readers may also question
whether a 350 mrem/yr standard can be
considered credible at times beyond but
closer to 10,000 years. (We have
acknowledged that uncertainties are not
immediately overwhelming and
unmanageable for a period up to 10,000
years.) We think it unlikely that the
peak would occur at a relatively early
time beyond 10,000 years. However,
should that be the case, we believe that
NRC has the authority to consider not
only the magnitude of the peak, but also
the timing and overall trends of dose
projections as it evaluates the license
application. NRC will examine the full
record before it in determining whether
there is a reasonable expectation that
the standards will be met. As an
alternative, we might identify a sliding
scale of compliance limits applicable at
different times, but, as discussed in
Section II.C.2.c, we do not believe there
is a clear basis for doing so.
In addition to our proposed level of
350 mrem/yr, we took into account the
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factors described above in considering
various options for the peak dose limit,
as discussed in the next section. Clearly,
the competing considerations described
above are not easily resolved. While the
final standard may not be identical to
any of these options, we believe that
they encompass the range of values we
might reasonably select. We request
comment upon our proposed annual
peak dose limit of 350 mrem applicable
beyond 10,000 years through the period
of geologic stability, the reasoning
outlined above, and other ways in
which we might reconcile the various
influential factors at very long times.
4. What Other Peak Dose Levels Did
EPA Consider?
We considered several other dose
options before selecting 350 mrem as
the value to propose. We request
comment on the dose levels discussed
in the following sections.
a. Maintain the 15 Mrem/Yr Standard at
Peak Dose
One approach would be simply to
apply the same level deemed protective
at 10,000 years to peak exposures,
whenever they might occur. This
approach has been recommended by
some stakeholders (Docket No. OAR–
2005–0083–0022). Stakeholders have
suggested defining the ‘‘compliance
period’’ as the time from disposal to
peak dose, stating that ‘‘[t]his new
compliance period is absolutely
required by [NAS], which rejects any
10,000-year limitation on the
compliance period.’’ However, for the
reasons discussed earlier, while we are
proposing to extend the compliance
period throughout the period of geologic
stability, we have concerns that an
approach that applies the same dose
level throughout that period would not
adequately recognize the complexities
inherent in projections that could
extend for several hundred thousand
years. As a result, we believe a 15
mrem/yr standard at very long times
would not be a meaningful indicator of
disposal system performance, and may
in fact be misleading.
We disagree with the view that the
Court’s decision requires us to amend
our standards by extending both the
compliance period and the dose limit
applicable at 10,000 years to the time of
peak dose up to 1 million years, and
forbids us to establish standards
applicable at intermediate times. The
Court’s decision reflected its judgment
that our 2001 standards were not
consistent with the recommendations of
NAS as they related to the compliance
period. Our goal in today’s proposal is
to amend our standards so that they are
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clearly consistent with the NAS
recommendations, but also address the
policy and other concerns we raised in
our 2001 rulemaking. Extending the
compliance period directly addresses
NAS’s primary recommendation.
Regarding the dose limit applicable at
the time of peak dose, NAS stated ‘‘we
do not directly recommend a level of
acceptable risk’’ (NAS Report p. 49).
Similarly, NAS offered no opinion on
approaches involving multiple dose
standards, stating only that it viewed a
10,000-year standard by itself as
insufficient (NAS Report pp. 54–56). As
the Court made clear in its
consideration of the ground-water
protection standards, where ‘‘NAS made
no ‘finding’ or ‘recommendation’ that
EPA’s regulation could fail to be ‘based
upon and consistent with’ * * * [the
EnPA] left [EPA] free’’ to promulgate
standards to address its policy concerns.
(NEI, 373 F.3d at 47, Docket No. OAR–
2005–0083–0080.) In our view, the
standard applicable for the first 10,000
years and the derivation of a different
dose limit applicable beyond 10,000
years are both permissible under our
EnPA authority.
From a regulatory perspective, a
compliance standard on the order of 15
mrem/yr implies far more precision in
projections for very long times than can
be supported and, as such, is
inconsistent with the ‘‘reasonable
expectation’’ approach. We have also
discussed at length the general
agreement among international bodies
and programs that longer-term standards
should recognize the uncertainties
involved and projections must be
considered in a more qualitative
manner, as one element in the overall
safety case. As such, we believe it is
inappropriate to portray that projections
of incremental doses at such low levels
can be precisely controlled at far future
times and to give them excessive
influence when they are not critical to
improvements in health and safety. Here
again, we believe our statement from the
2001 rulemaking bears repeating:
‘‘[s]etting a strict numerical standard at
a level of risk acceptable today would
ignore this cumulative uncertainty and
the extreme difficulty of using highly
uncertain assessment results to
determine compliance with that
standard’’ (66 FR 32098). From that
perspective, holding the Yucca
Mountain disposal system to a 15
mrem/yr standard would not merely be
an issue of ‘‘fairness’’ to very far future
generations. Instead, by not recognizing
the factors that fundamentally affect
dose projections at such times, it would
place those generations’ interests in a
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much higher regard, and by doing so
would unreasonably constrain the
current and succeeding generations’
abilities to pursue achievable solutions
they deem best suited to meet the
interests of all generations. It would, in
other words, undermine the Chain of
Obligation Principle by giving ‘‘longterm hypothetical hazards’’ precedence
over ‘‘near-term concrete hazards’’
(‘‘Deciding for the Future: Balancing
Risks, Costs, and Benefits Fairly Across
Generations,’’ 1997, Docket No. OAR–
2005–0083–0087). It is not simply a
question of whether a 15 mrem/yr
standard could be met in actuality;
rather, the question is whether holding
probabilistic assessments to such a level
over hundreds of thousands of years,
when rising uncertainties exist in
performance projections and various
high-consequence (but necessarily
somewhat speculative) scenarios must
be considered in the analyses,
represents a reasonable test of the
disposal system. We believe it does not.
b. 100 Mrem/Yr Standard at Peak Dose
In evaluating dose limits that might be
responsive to the concerns outlined
above, we also considered 100 mrem/yr
as a value that may be appropriate for
peak dose calculations. The value of 100
mrem/yr has potential benefits in terms
of precedent. The ICRP has since 1985
(Publication 45, ‘‘Quantitative Bases for
Developing a Unified Index of Harm,’’
Statement from the 1985 Paris Meeting
of the ICRP, Docket No. OAR–2005–
0083–0087) recommended 100 mrem/yr
as the principal overall dose limit for
public exposures from all sources
excluding natural background, medical,
occupational, and accidental (these
three man-made sources can involve
higher exposures, can involve greater
understanding of the reasons for
exposure, and may require informed
consent from the exposed person). NRC
requires that its licensees conduct
operations so that individual members
of the public are not exposed above this
level (10 CFR 20.1301). We view this
figure as representing a national and
international precedent as a generallyaccepted benchmark for annual public
exposures from various sources.
The use of 100 mrem/yr can also be
interpreted as protective of future
generations’ interests, yet not so
restrictive as to represent an
unreasonable standard for the very far
future. We recognize that in practice
today, doses from any particular source
of radiation are generally kept to a
fraction of the 100 mrem overall limit,
in recognition that a person may be
exposed to more than one practice or
source. Given our current responsibility
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to propose a peak dose standard,
however, we would argue that
allocation to a single source at the time
of peak dose could be reasonable, as
other contributors currently in the
Yucca Mountain area are negligible by
comparison (FEIS, DOE/EIS–0250,
Section 8.3.2, Docket No. OAR–2005–
0083–0086). Moreover, to assume (or
even to estimate the chance) whether,
how, or where other radiation facilities
could develop in the far future would
require immense speculation about the
long-term evolution of government
programs, population demographics,
and technology. Relying on current
conditions rather than speculating on
future sources of exposure to the local
population, as recommended by NAS,
would justify allocating the entire 100
mrem to Yucca Mountain.4
Nevertheless, we have decided not to
propose a peak dose standard of 100
mrem/yr because over the very longterm, we believe that natural
background levels to which individuals
are or could be currently exposed
provides a more reasonable context in
which to judge the performance of the
Yucca Mountain disposal system, and
because our proposed approach
appropriately reflects international
guidance and consensus on this issue.
See Section II.C.3 (‘‘What Dose Level Is
EPA Proposing for Peak Dose?’’).
c. Peak Dose Standard Based on
Regional Background Radiation Levels
We also considered an alternative
approach also based on an examination
of natural background radiation levels
across the country. In this approach,
rather than examining total background
radiation at a specific location (or State),
as we did to derive the 350 mrem/yr
level we are proposing today, we have
looked at average levels across many
States (‘‘Assessment of Variation in
Radiation Exposure in the United
States,’’ 2005, Docket No. OAR–2005–
0083–0077). One reason for taking this
approach is that it compares statewide
averages calculated on a common basis.
Even so, the cautions we expressed in
Section II.C.3 regarding the
uncertainties and variation in
4 This
approach would also be consistent with the
recent ICRP draft for consultation on optimization
of radiological protection, which states ‘‘the choice
of the relevant dose constraint for protection against
exposures from the licensed facility under
consideration will depend largely on whether or not
this facility is the dominant source to the exposed
public under consideration. If the facility is the
dominant source, a dose constraint of 1 mSv/a [100
mrem/yr] would be the appropriate starting point
for optimisation of protection’’ (‘‘The Optimisation
of Radiological Protection,’’ p. 45, April 2005,
Docket No. OAR–2005–0083–0052).
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background radiation values remain
relevant.
Using this approach, we arrived at a
dose limit of 200 mrem/yr. As with our
proposed approach, our overall policy
goal is to establish a standard that
would keep total exposures to the RMEI
within the range of exposures incurred
by residents of other locations today
from natural background sources alone.
We would not view 200 mrem/yr as
excessive in the context of exposures
routinely encountered today,
particularly when considering the
uncertainties in projecting potential
doses over the very long times involved
(i.e., 10,000 to 1 million years).
We started by considering States with
higher average background levels than
Nevada. As with our proposed
approach, we believe this is reasonable
because the limit we establish must
represent some positive incremental
exposure to the RMEI. The data
compiled in ‘‘Assessment of Variation
in Radiation Exposure in the United
States’’ (Docket No. OAR–2005–0083–
0077) show that 32 States have higher
average background levels than
Nevada’s 222 mrem/yr. Rather than
identify any particular State as the
reference point, as we did in the direct
comparison with Amargosa Valley, we
averaged the values for those 32 States
and obtained an average background
radiation level of 429 mrem/yr. We
compared this value to the statewide
average for Nevada as an indicator of
more regional, rather than localized,
differences. Thus, on average, residents
of those 32 States today receive roughly
200 mrem/yr more from natural
background radiation sources than a
resident of Nevada. Considering all of
the factors involved in very long-term
projections, such a limit would
represent a level of exposure consistent
with that routinely and normally
incurred in other locations. However,
we have decided not to propose this
approach today because our preference
is to use Amargosa Valley (and the
RMEI as the person our standards are
designed to protect) as a point of
reference, but we welcome comment on
both the approach and the dose level of
200 mrem/yr derived from it.
5. How Will NRC Judge Compliance?
We require that DOE use probabilistic
performance assessment to demonstrate
compliance with the individualprotection standard in § 197.20 (DOE
may, but is not required to, use the same
technique to show compliance with the
human-intrusion and ground-water
protection standards). With this method,
DOE will obtain a distribution of
calculated dose results. This
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distribution will be influenced by
variations in parameter values as well as
fundamental uncertainties and the
assumptions underlying the conceptual
model(s) of disposal system evolution.
In making a compliance demonstration,
DOE must satisfy NRC that a specified
portion of that distribution satisfies the
dose criterion. In our 2001 rulemaking,
we specified in § 197.13 that the mean
of the distribution of results be used to
demonstrate compliance with § 197.20.
In doing so, we intended that the
arithmetic mean (commonly known as
the average) of the distribution be used,
but did not feel the need to be so
specific. The arithmetic mean is a wellunderstood measure that is used in
many compliance applications,
including at WIPP. As discussed later,
we intend to retain the arithmetic mean
for the compliance measure for the first
10,000 years after disposal.
However, for the period beyond
10,000 years, for which we must
consider assessing performance for as
long as 1 million years (the NAS’s
estimated period of ‘‘geologic stability’’),
we realize that some additional
specification is necessary. Although we
do not believe that the basic approach
to performance assessment should be
affected, we discuss in Section II.D
certain aspects of that approach that
may need to be modified or given
special attention to effectively address
these much longer times in a
meaningful way. Similarly, we must
consider whether the arithmetic mean
used for compliance at 10,000 years
remains the appropriate measure of
compliance, particularly at very long
times, or whether another measure is
more appropriate.
We believe that for these very longterm projections, a measure that
represents a ‘‘central tendency’’ in the
distribution of calculated doses is most
appropriate to adequately consider the
range of uncertainty in making dose
projections over such very long time
spans. Such a measure should not be
strongly influenced by high or low-end
projections that represent low
probability situations. Today we are
proposing to specify that compliance
with the standard that will apply
beyond 10,000 years should be
measured against the median of the
distribution of projected doses. The
remainder of this section discusses our
rationale for this approach.
In general, the compliance measure
we select must be meaningful and
representative of the entire distribution
of calculated doses, but, as we have
stated, not easily influenced by results
either at the very high or very low end
of the distribution. In conducting
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performance assessments many
assumptions and uncertainties must be
incorporated into the complex
calculations. In constructing scenarios
for repository performance, there are
uncertainties in describing how the
disposal system will perform and evolve
over time, under the influence of natural
conditions and the effects of the
repository itself on the surrounding host
rock. There are significant uncertainties
in predicting when discrete events, such
as seismic activity, will occur at and
around the immediate repository
location and the possible effects of these
events. Some scenarios incorporating
these uncertainties would be of low
probability, and the results could vary
from relatively poor performance to
exceptionally good performance of the
disposal system. The results of such
low-probability situations with
dramatically different results than the
majority of the projections would show
up in the ‘‘tails’’ of the dose results
distribution. While we believe such
low-probability situations should not be
ignored in compliance decisions,
neither do we believe they should be
given undue influence in judging
compliance. Therefore, we believe that
the appropriate compliance measure
should represent a central measure for
the dose projections, and should not be
defined in a way that it can be strongly
affected by extreme results (‘‘outliers’’)
in the dose projections (‘‘Assumptions,
Conservatisms, and Uncertainties in
Yucca Mountain Performance
Assessments, Sections 12.1 and 12.2,
July 2005, Docket No. OAR–2005–0083–
0085).
Today we are retaining, and more
clearly specifying, the arithmetic mean
of the dose projections for compliance
within the initial 10,000-year period.
We believe the arithmetic mean is a
familiar and well-understood statistical
concept, and that its application in
probabilistic risk assessment is
sufficiently established to support our
decision. In addition, while
uncertainties are present in performance
assessments during this time frame, we
believe that the uncertainties increase in
importance as the assessments stretch
into the extremely long time frames
beyond 10,000 years but within the
period of geologic stability. In this
sense, we believe that the arithmetic
mean (average value) of the dose
projections can still be a reasonably
reliable measure of the total dose
distribution during the 10,000-year
period. More importantly, however, we
believe it is valuable to maintain
consistency between the compliance
measure used for the first 10,000 years
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of disposal system performance for the
Yucca Mountain repository and the
measure applied for any other geologic
disposal application under the authority
of our generic regulation for geologic
disposal, 40 CFR part 191. We believe
that the Yucca Mountain disposal
system should be required to meet the
same level of protection, and be
evaluated under the same regulatory
compliance framework, as any other
geologic disposal application for the
10,000-year period considered in part
191, which has been applied to the
WIPP facility specifically and would
apply to any other disposal system in
the future. In the unlikely event that
performance assessments show that the
peak dose would occur within the
10,000-year period, we believe that the
same compliance measure and
evaluation should be applied for the
Yucca Mountain disposal system as for
any other geologic disposal system.
However, we have noted repeatedly
that extending the compliance period to
time frames well in excess of 10,000
years introduces additional uncertainty
in making disposal system performance
projections, since the natural system
will continue to change through time
(see ‘‘Assumptions, Conservatisms, and
Uncertainties in Yucca Mountain
Performance Assessments,’’ Section
12.5, July 2005, Docket No. OAR–2005–
0083–0085, and the 2001 BID, section
7.3.11, Docket No. OAR–2005–0083–
0050). We believe probabilistic
calculations are the most appropriate
approach to assess the range of potential
doses over very long time frames, both
for the period up to 10,000 years and
after. The probabilistic approach
examines a spectrum of possible site
conditions, and allows the construction
of conceptual models that address
reasonable alternative models of
performance within that range of
possible physical and chemical
conditions at the site. A distribution of
projected peak doses will result from
these analyses, each representing a
possible ‘‘future’’ and a dose associated
with the specific parameter values
chosen for each calculation. Only by
examining the relative effects of
variations in the parameter values on
the calculated dose can the important
Adriver’’ parameters be identified.
Without these types of analyses, an
understanding of the disposal system’s
behavior in the long term would not be
possible, and a compliance case
supporting a decision about the
protectiveness of the disposal system
might not be a reasonable representation
of potential risks. We are proposing to
require that DOE apply this general
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approach for assessments regardless of
time frame, although, as we have
discussed earlier, there is much
agreement that the level of confidence
or meaning that can be placed in such
analyses decreases over very long
periods. The challenge lies in defining
a performance measure that balances the
uncertainties inherent in very long term
projections and provides a reasonable
level of protectiveness.
Similarly, some discussion is
warranted on the role of conservatism in
performance assessment. Excess
conservatism in constructing scenarios,
i.e., making assumptions to include or
exclude specific FEPs and defining
parameter value ranges, can easily lead
to very high dose estimates due to a
compounding effect of very conservative
assumptions. Such excessive
conservatism is misleading if
incorporated in assessments described
as the Anominal’’ or Abase case’’
performance projections. A simple
arithmetic mean calculated for an
excessively conservative analysis would
suggest that the ‘‘most likely’’ dose is
higher than if a more reasonable and
realistic approach were taken to framing
the assessments. Recognizing that
conservatism in long-term performance
projections may be unavoidable in
practice, as discussed below, we believe
that a regulatory performance measure
should not give undue emphasis to
high-end projections. It is always
possible to propose scenarios where
releases are high, even though the
probability of these particular scenarios
may be extremely small or very difficult
to estimate. The same reasoning also
applies to scenarios that result in very
low releases in the very long term. The
‘‘bounding’’ approach to assessments
plays an important role in the light of
the increasing uncertainties. Once the
time frame for performance projections
is extended into the very long term, the
confidence that can be placed on either
the high- or low-end release scenarios
becomes progressively more difficult to
estimate even though a ‘‘bounding’’
approach may simplify calculations.
Consequently, we believe that a
performance measure for these very long
term assessments should not over
emphasize high-end release scenarios or
ignore low-end release scenarios under
the motivation for conservatism in the
assessments.
In addition, uncertainty and
conservatism can influence one another.
Characterization of the site today yields
a range of values for important
parameters that would have a dominant
effect on projecting doses from
contamination plumes eventually
released from the repository, and these
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data form the base of the parameter
value distributions input to the dose
calculations. Attempting to project the
evolution of these parameter values over
the 1 million year geologic stability
period adds additional uncertainty in
their variations. To address these
uncertainties in parameter value
estimation and scenario construction,
analyses of disposal system performance
may be done Aconservatively,’’ i.e., by
selecting parameter values, constructing
scenarios, and making assumptions that
deliberately overestimate projected
doses. This approach provides some
confidence that uncertainties and other
potential negative influences have been
adequately considered and that
regulatory decisions will not be based
on overly optimistic views of disposal
system performance. However, the
distribution of doses, as well as peak
doses, from such an approach will be
biased toward high-end values. As a
result of making conservative
assumptions and parameter
distributions, there is a very real
possibility that high-end projections
could represent highly improbable
situations in a physical sense
(‘‘Assumptions, Conservatisms, and
Uncertainties in Yucca Mountain
Performance Assessments,’’ Sections 1
through 12, July 2005, Docket No. OAR–
2005–0083–0085). For such cases,
arriving at a compliance decision
becomes complex and speculative.
Thus, we believe the appropriate
measure of compliance for peak dose
estimates is a ‘‘central tendency’’
measure which is not strongly
influenced by low-probability
realizations giving either very high-end
or low-end dose estimates
(‘‘Assumptions, Conservatisms, and
Uncertainties in Yucca Mountain
Performance Assessments,’’ Sections
12.1 and 12.2, July 2005, Docket No.
OAR–2005–0083–0085).
The NAS also found this approach to
have merit. NAS recommended that
regulatory decision making should
consider the period when risks are at
their highest, whenever that occurs, i.e.,
the time of peak dose (NAS Report pp.
2, 6). In defining ‘‘risk,’’ the NAS used
the term Aexpected value’’ in referring
to a probabilistic distribution of
projected doses (NAS Report p.65). NAS
did not further define this term in a
statistical context, but elsewhere
provided qualitative language
describing the overall goal: ‘‘define the
standard in such a way that it is a useful
measure of the degree to which the
public is to be protected from releases
from a repository’’ and ‘‘does not rule
out an adequately sited and well-
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designed repository because of highly
improbable events’’ (NAS Report pp.
27–28). NAS in its recommendations
did not speak explicitly to any
particular performance measure to be
used in determining compliance with
regulatory standards. This decision was
to be left to EPA in the course of
rulemaking.
Disposal programs abroad also have to
consider the role of uncertainty in
developing performance assessments.
The U.S. is ahead of most other geologic
repository programs abroad in terms of
having a specific site that has been
extensively characterized and for which
detailed performance assessments have
been done. While other programs have
not reached the stage of developing
specific regulatory criteria for judging
the acceptability of a particular
repository site and design, there is a
general consensus that multiple lines of
evidence and analysis are desirable in
establishing a safety case, and that
judgment plays a critical role in
assessments of disposal system
performance as well as establishing and
applying regulatory criteria (IAEA–
TECDOC–975, Docket No. OAR–2005–
0083–0045). The joint NEA-IAEA
International Peer Review for DOE’s
TSPA-SR modeling highlighted the
difficulty of specifying the statistical
measure of compliance, noting that ‘‘the
TSPA nominal case is treated
probabilistically yet it involves a
mixture of embedded conservatism and
statistical analyses to determine the
mean, median and the various
percentiles of the dose distribution. The
reported ‘‘mean’’ is therefore not the
true mean in a statistical sense.
Moreover, that value is reported in the
Executive Summary of the TSPA–SR
and elsewhere as the expected value of
effective dose, without any
qualification. This stretches credibility
especially as the discrete numerical
values are given for times in the far
future. The USDOE needs to indicate
that, for compliance purposes, a
performance indicator has been chosen
that is meant to illustrate the safety of
the system and argue the compliance
with regulation.’’ The Peer Review
Team further recommended that ‘‘when
a best estimate/best knowledge
probabilistic analysis is performed, the
best estimate or the most probable range
of the calculated ‘dose’ should also be
given.’’ (pp. 54–55, Docket No. OAR–
2005–0083–0062)
In determining the ‘‘expected value’’
of performance, some international
efforts have considered the possibility of
viewing the performance assessment as
separate representations of scenarios
driven by their relative likelihood, and
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which might be compared to different
regulatory standards. For example,
regulatory agencies of France and
Belgium have developed a joint
document that suggests preparation of
‘‘reference evolution’’ and ‘‘altered
evolution’’ scenarios (‘‘Geological
Disposal of Radioactive Waste: Elements
of a Safety Approach,’’ p. 24, 2004,
Docket No. OAR–2005–0083–0066). The
reference evolution scenarios would
consider ‘‘the most likely effects of
certain or very probable events or
phenomena,’’ while the altered
evolution scenarios ‘‘take into account
the least likely effects of these events or
phenomena’’ as well as considering ‘‘the
consequences of events or phenomena
that are not integrated into the reference
scenario, as the likelihood of occurrence
is lower.’’ Under this approach, the
reference evolution scenarios might be
directly compared to the dose
constraint, while the altered evolution
scenarios ‘‘must be appraised on a case
by case basis depending on’’ various
factors, and may then be ‘‘compared to
different references * * * without this
comparison constituting an absolute
acceptance criterion.’’ This approach
appears to go further than that
recommended by the TSPA–SR Peer
Review Team (and discussed in relation
to our reasonable expectation principle
in Section II.B). DOE similarly identifies
‘‘nominal’’ and ‘‘disruptive’’ scenarios,
but aggregates the results for
comparison with the relevant criteria.
As stated earlier, we required in our
2001 rulemaking that DOE use the
arithmetic mean of the distribution of
results to demonstrate compliance with
the 10,000-year dose limit (and are
today proposing to clarify the use of that
measure). However, in considering the
much longer times, we are concerned
that the arithmetic mean is too easily
influenced by extremes in the
distribution, particularly very high dose
projections resulting from scenarios that
are unlikely to occur. A conservative
approach to constructing and evaluating
performance scenarios tends to generate
high-end results and a simple averaging
of these results would drive the
arithmetic mean to higher values that
would not be as representative overall of
the actual distribution of projected
doses. Therefore, we do not believe the
arithmetic mean will satisfy the goals
laid out earlier in this section for a
performance measure for periods well in
excess of 10,000 years.
While typically the ‘‘average’’ of a
series of values (i.e., a distribution) is
thought of as near the midpoint between
the highest and lowest values, if a
somewhat conservative approach is
taken or there are significant outliers, it
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is not unusual for the arithmetic mean
to approach significantly higher
percentiles. In such cases, the regulatory
compliance decision can be influenced
by the high-end doses of an overall set
of very conservative performance
assessment results. In fact, for early
occurrences of disruptive events
(human intrusion or igneous intrusion),
DOE assessments show that at some
periods of time the arithmetic mean of
the projected doses can exceed the 95th
percentile of the distribution of TSPA
results (FEIS, DOE/EIS–0250, Appendix
I, Section 5.3, Docket No. OAR–2005–
0083–0086). While conservatism in
assumptions is not the only reason for
the arithmetic mean to occur at a
relatively high percentile, in general we
do not believe this can be reasonably
interpreted to be an adequate
representation of central tendency for
the purpose of judging the performance
of the Yucca Mountain disposal system.
Thus, we found it necessary to
consider what other statistical measures
might better represent the central
tendency for performance assessments
at very long time frames. The
identification of appropriate statistical
measures for central tendency of a dose
distribution is influenced by the shape
of the distribution, when these estimates
are plotted for a particular point in time,
or more specifically for the peak dose
values from each computer modeling
simulation in the disposal system
performance assessments. We have
examined three measures of central
tendency: the arithmetic mean, the
geometric mean, and the median. The
degree to which they reliably represent
the central tendency of a particular
distribution, and more importantly how
well they could serve as compliance
measures, is discussed below. Like the
arithmetic mean we have discussed
above, each measure has advantages and
disadvantages, and is dependent on the
actual shape of the dose distribution as
to how well it would represent the
central tendency (‘‘Assumptions,
Conservatisms, and Uncertainties in
Yucca Mountain Performance
Assessment,’’ Sections 12.1 and 12.2,
July 2005, Docket No. OAR–2005–0083–
0085).
The most familiar shape for a
distribution is the bell-shaped ‘‘normal’’
distribution. In a normal distribution,
the ‘‘peak’’ occurs in the center of the
distribution and the remaining values
lie evenly on both sides of the center
value. A normal distribution is often
seen when values are relatively close
together (i.e., the range of values does
not cover many orders of magnitude),
and are produced from a continuous
function composed of additive terms.
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Because the values of the distribution
are evenly spread out around the central
peak, the distribution can be seen to be
symmetrical; that is, one side is the
‘‘mirror image’’ of the other. The
arithmetic mean can be easily
determined from such a distribution
because an equal number of values are
found at the same distance from the
peak (e.g., if the peak is at 10, there will
be equal occurrences at 9 and 11, at 8
and 12, and so on). Thus, the center line
in a purely normal distribution
represents the arithmetic mean of the
distribution. From the discussion earlier
in this section, it should be clear that
the performance results do not represent
a purely normal distribution. In a purely
normal distribution, the arithmetic
mean cannot be as high as the 60th
percentile, much less the 70th, 80th, or
95th percentile. It must always be the
50th percentile. For this reason, we
believe it likely that at long times the
arithmetic mean will be more strongly
influenced by higher-end estimates
(estimates lower than zero are not
possible) and less representative of the
overall distribution.
As an alternative, we considered
whether the geometric mean of the
distribution would be an appropriate
statistical measure. Referring back to the
shape of the distribution as an indicator
of the measure of central tendency, we
noted earlier that the bell-shaped curve
is the most familiar shape. However,
many measured quantities in nature
show a distribution skewed toward
higher-end values, i.e., there is no
symmetrical distribution around a
central value (‘‘The Lognormal
Distribution in Environmental
Applications,’’ EPA/600/S–97/006,
December 1997, Docket No. OAR–2005–
0083–0057). When data like these are
transformed by taking their logarithms
and plotted on a logarithmic scale, the
data can appear ‘‘normally’’ distributed.
Such distributions are referred to as lognormal. For such ‘‘transformed’’ data,
the geometric mean is used as the
measure of central tendency (that is, the
geometric mean of a log-normal
distribution has a comparable
significance to the arithmetic mean of a
normal distribution).5 The fact that the
5 The formula for calculating the geometric mean
(GM) for a series of values, x1, x2, x3 . . . . Xn, is
GM = n √ x1 * x2 * x3 . . . . Xn, while the formula
for calculating the arithmetic mean (AM) is AM =
(x1 + x2 + x3 . . . xn)/n. For the GM calculation no
zeros are permissible, and the GM is always less
than the AM. For parameter values in a skewed
distribution (skewed to high-end values) that is
transformed into a log-normal distribution, the
formula for the GM is expressed as ln GM = (1/n)(1n
x1 + 1n x2 + 1n x3 . . . . + 1n xn). It can be seen
that the GM of the log-transformed values in a lognormal distribution is calculated in the same
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arithmetic mean has been significantly
higher than the 50th percentile in DOE’s
published performance assessment
results suggests those distributions
might be log-normal in nature, which
would indicate the geometric mean as
the appropriate statistical measure of
central tendency. As a point of
comparison, the geometric mean of a
log-normal distribution is always lower
than the arithmetic mean. This makes
the geometric mean attractive if we are
concerned about the undue influence of
high-end estimates, as the geometric
mean will always show less influence
than the arithmetic mean.
However, there are some difficulties
in using the geometric mean that must
be considered. One difficulty is related
to the nature of the geometric mean
itself. Because the calculation involves
the taking of the logarithm, the
distribution values are expressed in
terms of their exponential values, which
may then be ‘‘averaged.’’ For example,
the logarithm of 100 is 2, because 100
= 102 (or 10 to the 2nd power).
Similarly, the logarithm of numbers less
than 1 are expressed as negative
numbers (e.g., the logarithm of 0.01 =
¥2, because 0.01 can also be written as
10¥2). Thus, in the same way that the
arithmetic mean might be affected by a
few very large values in a distribution,
the geometric mean can be affected by
very small numbers whose logarithms
are expressed as very large negative
numbers.
In practical applications, this means
that a distribution that generally appears
log-normal can contain some very small
numbers (outliers) that affect the
geometric mean as a measure of central
tendency. Depending on how many and
how small these outliers are, the
calculated geometric mean can also be
very different from the 50th percentile
of the distribution. For Yucca Mountain,
this situation could represent a case
where the waste packages remain
essentially unbreached through the
geologic stability period, leading to very
small doses (and correspondingly high
negative logarithms of those dose
values). This scenario might have a very
low probability in reality, but could
influence the geometric mean, possibly
causing it to be lower than the 50th
percentile of results calculated from all
the performance scenarios taken in total
(and possibly very much lower).
Alternatively, extremely pessimistic
scenarios for waste package releases
could give high-end outliers, although
fashion as the AM for a normal distribution. Both
the AM and the GM are measures of central
tendency for their respective distributions and
equivalent to the median of the distributions as long
as the distributions are truly normal or log-normal.
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the high-end projections may not affect
the geometric mean as much because
the site’s characteristics will not easily
allow orders of magnitude increase in
releases to reach the RMEI. In terms of
the logarithmic values, the difference
between 0.001 mrem and 0.1 mrem is
exactly the same as the difference
between 1 mrem and 100 mrem (two
orders of magnitude), yet the difference
in actual site performance is clearly
more significant between 1 mrem and
100 mrem. Thus, while it is possible to
have very low-dose estimates, microrem/yr and below, which have large
negative logarithms, there will not be
correspondingly high dose estimates in
the tens to hundreds of thousands of
rem/yr (with equally high positive
logarithms) to counterbalance the very
low numbers, and therefore these very
low numbers could exert a stronger
effect on the geometric mean as an
indicator of central tendency. In such
cases, the values of the geometric mean
as a central tendency performance
measure could be compromised.
An additional complication exists for
the regulator using the geometric mean
to judge compliance. Because the
logarithm of the value must be taken,
dose projections of zero must be
removed from consideration altogether
(the logarithm cannot be calculated).
However, extremely low (and highly
influential) non-zero values may be
retained in the analyses, simply because
computers are able to track them. That
is, projected doses that are in reality
essentially indistinguishable from zero
can be calculated and carried through
the analysis. If care is not taken,
projections could include doses such as
10¥20 mrem/yr, which is meaningless in
actuality (and clearly the logarithmic
value of ¥20 cannot be offset by any
single high-end estimate). The
regulatory analyst is then faced with the
prospect of ignoring simulations that
yield no dose, eliminating values below
a certain level (for very low dose
estimates), or assigning some arbitrary
value to them simply to calculate a
geometric mean. Eliminating small
values from consideration would not be
consistent with our cautions (see
discussions on reasonable expectation)
that low-end projections should not be
discounted in favor of higher estimates.
It is also not proven that the
distribution of performance assessment
results is truly log-normal. As noted
above, DOE’s previously published
TSPA results indicate that the
distribution of the peak dose values is
skewed to one side, so that values are
not evenly distributed around a central
point (FEIS, DOE/EIS–0250, Appendix I,
Section 5.3, Docket No. OAR–2005–
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0083–0086). We have mentioned the
role of conservatism in framing dose
assessments and biasing them to highend values, so this skewed distribution
is not surprising. Such skewed
distributions often appear to be lognormal, for which the geometric mean
represents the central tendency.
However, while we have some
confidence that future DOE results will
be skewed toward the high end, we
cannot predict with certainty that the
distributions are truly log-normal,
although we can say that they display
two prominent characteristics of lognormal distributions. First, the results
span several orders of magnitude,
making the use of logarithmic
conversions effective in putting the
values on a convenient scale. Second,
its derivation involves multiplicative
functions which are imbedded in the
performance simulations, while normal
distributions arise from simpler
functions that are additive in nature.
Their actual shape will be affected by
DOE’s modifications to the TSPA as it
works through the licensing process.
The geometric mean may not actually
represent the best measure of central
tendency if the distribution is not lognormal.
For these reasons, we are not
proposing to use the geometric mean as
the measure of compliance at the time
of peak dose. This brings us to the third
statistical measure we considered for
these very long times, the median of the
distribution, for which 50% of the
values lie above and 50% lie below. The
median is a simpler measure of central
value for any distribution of dose
estimates. It is independent of the shape
of the distribution and therefore avoids
concerns about how well the
performance assessment results may or
may not strictly conform to the normal
or log-normal profiles, and attendant
uncertainty about how close the
respective ‘‘means’’ are to the center of
the distribution. In this respect, the
median is an attractive alternative to the
geometric or arithmetic means as a
measure of central tendency that will
not be strongly influenced by high or
low-end outliers in the calculated
projections. There is no need to
eliminate or truncate results at the low
end, as there may be for the geometric
mean. Further, if the distribution
includes many very low estimates, the
median could actually be higher than
the geometric mean. As such, it is also
consistent with our reasonable
expectation principle.
As an additional advantage, if the
distribution ultimately falls close to
either a normal or log-normal
distribution, the median converges with
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the arithmetic or geometric mean,
respectively. It can be clearly seen that
the median and arithmetic mean are
identical for a normal distribution, as
the ‘‘mirror image’’ around the
arithmetic mean also shows that exactly
half of the results fall on either side. For
a log-normal distribution, the same
result can be seen when the initial
values are transformed by taking their
logarithms. Since by definition the
transformed data takes on the shape of
the normal distribution, the geometric
mean assumes the role of the arithmetic
mean for that transformed distribution
and is coincident with the median.
From the formulas in footnote 5, it is
evident that the geometric mean for logtransformed data (a log-normal
distribution) is calculated in the same
manner as the arithmetic mean for nontransformed data in a normal
distribution. This means that, if the
performance assessment results align
closely with the defined normal or lognormal distributions, the median will
converge with the other statistically
defined measures of central tendency
for those distributions. If the results are
very highly skewed toward a true lognormal distribution, the geometric mean
essentially equates to the median, but
without the calculational issues
described earlier. If less conservatism is
incorporated into the analyses and the
resulting distribution is less skewed so
that it more closely resembles a normal
distribution, the arithmetic mean
essentially converges with the median
and the performance measure
approaches that used to show
compliance within 10,000 years.
These relationships between the
arithmetic and geometric means and the
median are strictly correct only as long
as the distributions fit the profiles for
either the normal or log-normal
distributions. If the actual shapes of the
distributions differ to some degree from
the ideal defined shapes, the means,
either arithmetic or geometric, will not
be coincident with the median values
for the distributions, the degree of
departure being dependent on exactly
how much the distributions depart from
the ideal ‘‘normal’’ or log-normal’’
shapes. Deviations from the ideal
normal and log-normal distribution
shapes and the effects on these
measures as representative of the central
tendency for the calculated dose
projections, are of critical importance in
selecting the compliance measure. The
likelihood of deviations discourages our
use of either the arithmetic or geometric
mean at the time of peak dose, but has
limited effect on the use of the median.
Therefore, we propose to use the
median of the dose distribution as the
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performance measure for compliance in
the post-10,000-year period and request
comment on that decision. Readers may
note that our 1999 proposal, as well as
40 CFR part 191, specified that DOE use
the (arithmetic) mean or median,
whichever was higher. We determined
that the arithmetic mean would always
be higher for periods up to 10,000 years.
Thus, we specified the more
conservative measure to apply up to
10,000 years. However, as noted above,
the arithmetic mean may be overly
influenced by higher-end estimates.
Therefore, we do not consider it the
appropriate measure for times in excess
of 10,000 years.
In summary, we propose to maintain
and clarify the use of the arithmetic
mean for compliance with the 10,000year standard. We believe this is
appropriate because the shorter-term
projections are not as influenced by the
uncertainties or variability in
performance scenarios seen at much
longer times. Fewer very high-end
estimates are expected and, therefore,
overall the distribution of doses would
be less skewed and more representative
of ‘‘expected’’ performance. Further, in
the unlikely event that the peak dose is
found to occur within the first 10,000
years, the arithmetic mean would be
consistent with the statistical measure
used in all other applications for
geologic disposal, i.e., 40 CFR parts 191
and 194 for the 10,000-year time frame.
We request comment on the clarification
of the arithmetic mean as the 10,000year compliance measure. For the
period extending beyond 10,000 years,
we propose to use the median of the
distribution of doses calculated from the
performance assessments as the
compliance measure, and we request
comment on this choice.
6. How Will DOE Calculate the Dose?
Our 2001 standards required DOE to
calculate doses as an annual committed
effective dose equivalent (annual CEDE)
to demonstrate compliance with the
storage, individual-protection, and
human-intrusion standards. Today we
are proposing to modify that
requirement in a way that would
incorporate updated scientific factors
necessary for the calculation, but would
not change the underlying methodology.
Specifically, we are proposing to require
DOE to calculate the annual CEDE using
the radiation- and organ-weighting
factors in ICRP Publication 60 (‘‘1990
Recommendations of the ICRP’’), rather
than those in ICRP Publication 26
(‘‘1977 Recommendations of the ICRP’’).
This point may seem straightforward to
many readers. We wish to incorporate
the most recent science into the
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calculation of dose, so why should we
not do so? The complication arises from
the terminology employed in the EnPA
and ICRP 60 (and the follow-on
implementing Publication 72, ‘‘AgeDependent Doses to Members of the
Public from Intake of Radionuclides:
Part 5 Compilation of Ingestion and
Inhalation Dose Coefficients,’’ 1996,
Docket No. OAR–2005–0083–0087).
Section 801(a)(1) of the EnPA explicitly
requires our standards to ‘‘prescribe the
maximum annual effective dose
equivalent to individual members of the
general public.’’ Thus, we are required
by law to issue an individual-protection
standard presented as an effective dose
equivalent. The Court agreed with this
reasoning when it stated that the EnPA
‘‘require[s] EPA to establish a set of
health and safety standards, at least one
of which must include an EDE-based,
individual protection standard.’’ (NEI,
373 F.3d at 45, Docket No. OAR–2005–
0083–0080.)
ICRP is an independent body formed
to develop consensus recommendations
on appropriate radiation protection
measures. In doing so, ICRP considers
the principles and scientific bases
involved in practices that involve the
generation of radiation and radioactive
materials, as well as the use of those
materials. Over the years, ICRP
recommendations have been adopted by
regulatory authorities and other
scientific and advisory bodies, and have
helped to provide a consistent basis for
national and international regulatory
standards.
In 1977 and 1979, ICRP published
Report Nos. 26 and 30 (‘‘Limits for
Intake of Radionuclides by Workers’’),
respectively (Docket Nos. OAR–2005–
0083–0087). These two reports reflect
advances in the state of knowledge of
radionuclide dosimetry and biological
transport of radionuclides in humans
that occurred over the 20 years since
ICRP’s 1957 dose methodology
recommendation (ICRP 2). This
methodology, known as the effective
dose equivalent (EDE) methodology, is
the basis for dose calculations
performed to demonstrate compliance
with 40 CFR part 191 and envisioned to
be applied (although not specified) in
the 2001 version of 40 CFR part 197.
The EDE methodology was first
incorporated into Federal Guidance in
1987, in ‘‘Radiation Protection Guidance
to Federal Agencies for Occupational
Exposure’’ (52 FR 2822, January 27,
1987; Docket No. OAR–2005–0083–
0078).
The basis of the EDE methodology is
that each organ in the body reacts to
radiation differently, i.e., some are more
likely than others to react by developing
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a cancer. This methodology takes these
differences into account by assigning a
‘‘weighting factor’’ to each organ relative
to the whole body. The weighting factor
reflects the likelihood, that is, risk, of
fatal cancer developing in that organ per
unit of dose. When added together, the
risk-weighted doses incurred by the
individual organs of the body become
the ‘‘effective dose equivalent.’’ In this
manner, the risk of radiation exposure
to various parts of the body can be
regulated through use of a single
numerical standard.
ICRP 26/30 uses the term ‘‘effective
dose equivalent.’’ ICRP 60/72, which
offers some improvements to the
biokinetic models used in ICRP 30 and
thereupon updates the organ-weighting
factors based on more recent scientific
studies, uses the term ‘‘effective dose.’’
It may appear from this difference in
terminology that we cannot both fulfill
our statutory mandate and specify the
use of the ICRP 60/72 factors.
However, we do not believe this is the
case. First, ICRP made it clear in
Publication 60 that it was adopting the
shorter nomenclature for ease of use, but
did not intend to change the underlying
approach of ICRP 26/30: ‘‘The weighted
equivalent dose (a doubly weighted
absorbed dose) has previously been
called the effective dose equivalent but
this name is unnecessarily cumbersome,
especially in more complex
combinations such as collective
committed effective dose equivalent.
The Commission has now decided to
use the simpler name effective dose, E’’
(ICRP Publication 60, p. 7, Docket No.
OAR–2005–0083–0087).
Second, we have used the different
terms interchangeably in various
applications over the years. Historically,
this concept has been referred to as
effective dose equivalent, effective dose,
and total effective dose equivalent,
depending on when the terms were used
and the weighting factors applied. The
concept of a ‘‘committed’’ dose is
inherent in the methodology (and
recognized by ICRP, as in the previous
citation), but we have applied the term
to more explicitly acknowledge the
continuing dose contribution over a
period of years from radionuclides taken
into the body through ingestion,
inhalation, or absorption.
For example, our standards in 40 CFR
part 191 are written in terms of
committed effective dose (CED). These
standards were finalized in 1993, after
the publication of ICRP 60 and passage
of the EnPA. At that time, our most
recent Federal Guidance Report No. 11,
‘‘Limiting Values of Radionuclide Intake
and Air Concentration and Dose
Conversion Factors for Inhalation,
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Submersion, and Ingestion’’ (EPA–520/
1–88–020, September 1988, Docket No.
OAR–2005–0083–0071), which was
issued to serve as the basis for
regulations setting upper bounds on
exposures in the workplace, specified
the ICRP 26/30 method to calculate
CEDE. Appendix B of 40 CFR part 191
also specified use of the ICRP 26/30
weighting factors, but to calculate CED.
Thus, we used two different (albeit
similar) terms to represent the use of an
identical methodology and associated
weighting factors. From this, it should
be clear that we have historically
considered CED and CEDE to represent
essentially the same approach,
regardless of the weighting factors used.
In today’s proposal, we are specifying
in the definition of effective dose
equivalent in § 197.2 that DOE will
calculate annual CEDE using the
radiation- and organ-weighting factors
in ICRP 60/72, which we are proposing
to be incorporated into a new Appendix
A. This represents the most recent
science and dose calculation approaches
in the area of radiation protection,
which we previously endorsed in our
Federal Guidance Report No. 13
(‘‘Cancer Risk Coefficients for
Environmental Exposure to
Radionuclides,’’ EPA 402–R–99–001,
September 1999, Docket No. OAR–
2005–0083–0072). We believe this
change is appropriate and reflective of
the direction of the international
radiation-protection community as well
as EPA’s own guidance. Furthermore,
we believe this approach is consistent
with the intent and direction of the
EnPA. The EnPA directs us to prescribe
our standard for protection of
individuals in the form of a general
class of standards known as effective
dose equivalent standards. We have
done that by using a standard in the
form of committed effective dose
equivalent, which is a member of the
class of effective dose equivalent
standards. We request comment on this
proposed change.
Regardless of the preferences of
radiation experts, the public may be
unfamiliar with the differences between
the two methods and ask whether a
given dose level (for example, 15 mrem/
yr) is equally protective when expressed
under each method. The calculation of
dose from individual radionuclides may
be affected in different ways, depending
on which organs they tend to affect and
the pathway through which they enter
the body. For example, consider two
radionuclides that occur in the expected
inventory at Yucca Mountain, such as
technecium-99 and neptunium-237. For
a given intake, the dose from
technecium-99 is higher using the ICRP
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60/72 system than it is using the ICRP
26/30 system. On the other hand, the
dose from a given intake of neptunium237 is lower using the latter system
compared to that calculated using the
former. However, in the majority of
cases, the effect of changing from one
system to the other is small
(‘‘Dosimetric Significance of the ICRP’s
Updated Guidance and Models, 1989–
2003, and Implications for Federal
Guidance,’’ ORNL/TM–2003/207,
August 2003, Docket No. OAR–2005–
0083–0070). Further, the overall factors
used to convert dose to risk remain
unchanged by today’s proposal.
Therefore, the estimated risk from a
given radiation dose remains the same.
Therefore, the 15 mrem/yr standard
incorporated into today’s proposal
represents the same level of protection
as the originally promulgated standards.
We have also considered whether to
allow for the use of future updates to the
organ weighting or other factors. We
believe this may be appropriate because
DOE will continue to perform
projections for many years, and the final
demonstration before repository closure
and license termination may be decades
or even more than one hundred years
into the future. A provision allowing
such updates ensures that the most
current science can be applied at all
times. Therefore, we are including a
provision in our proposed Appendix A
allowing DOE to use, with NRC
approval, updated dose calculation
factors. We have tried in today’s
proposal to make clear the basis for our
acceptance of the ICRP 60/72 factors as
sufficiently validated to be incorporated
into rulemaking. To ensure that such
factors that might be considered in the
future have been appropriately reviewed
and accepted by the scientific
community, we propose that NRC may
only approve factors that have been
issued by independent scientific bodies
(such as ICRP and its successor bodies)
and incorporated by EPA into Federal
Guidance. To ensure compliance with
the EnPA, we would also require that
the new approach be compatible with
the effective dose equivalent
methodology incorporated into today’s
proposal. We request comment on this
approach.
Commenters may be aware that the
NAS released in June 2005 the latest in
a series of studies on the Biological
Effects of Ionizing Radiation (BEIR VII,
Docket No. OAR–2005–0083–0087).
EPA is a major sponsor of these studies,
which we consider in developing our
regulations and Federal Guidance. The
BEIR VII report reaffirmed that evidence
exists that even the smallest radiation
dose may convey some risk of incurring
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49047
a cancer, and that risk increases
proportionally to the dose (i.e., if the
dose doubles, the risk also doubles).
This approach, known as the ‘‘linear
non-threshold’’ hypothesis, has served
for many years as the basis for all
radiation protection regulation and
guidance, including those issued by
EPA. Further, the linear non-threshold
approach is the source of the
assumptions regarding the dose-risk
relationship underlying both our 2001
rulemaking and today’s proposal. Thus,
the primary conclusion of the BEIR VII
study does not affect the revision of our
Yucca Mountain standards.
For a detailed discussion of potential
health effects related to exposure to
radiation, as well as further explanation
of the underlying relationship between
radiation dose and cancer risk, see the
preamble to the 1999 proposed rule (64
FR 46978–46979, August 27, 1999,
Docket No. OAR–2005–0083–0041) and
Chapter 6 of the 2001 BID (Docket No.
OAR–2005–0083–0050).
D. How Will Today’s Proposal Affect the
Way DOE Conducts Performance
Assessments?
We find it important to emphasize
certain key aspects of the performance
assessment that will apply regardless of
the time frame involved. First, the
overall purpose of our standards is to
provide a reasonable test of disposal
system performance. The overall
purpose of the performance assessment
is to provide a reasonable test for
compliance with those standards. A
major part of providing that reasonable
test is determining which features,
events, and processes (FEPs) are to be
included in the performance assessment
performed by DOE. Regardless of time
frame, we find it reasonable to limit the
consideration of FEPs and scenarios
(sequences or combinations of FEPs) to
those reasonably likely to occur and to
affect the disposal system during the
compliance period. Finally, in
addressing those scenarios, it is also
reasonable to further prescribe certain
aspects of the way they are considered
(‘‘stylizing’’), particularly when their
characteristics are difficult to establish
with confidence. This section provides
an overview of the performance
assessment process and addresses in
more detail the key aspects just
mentioned.
The long-term performance of the
disposal system is assessed through
complex probabilistic computer
simulations aimed at quantifying the
behavior of the disposal system over
time. The change in the compliance
period does not affect fundamentally
how the disposal system performance
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assessment simulations are constructed
and executed. The performance
assessment takes into consideration the
physical and chemical characteristics of
the disposal system, and imposes on
that characterization the events and
processes expected to occur during the
compliance period. The DOE has
already conducted and published many
of its performance assessment results
focusing on periods up to 10,000 years
to support its Viability Assessment,
FEIS, and site recommendation. While
many of those projections did cover
times up to 1 million years, DOE did not
focus as much attention on the
assumptions and characterization of
those longer-term processes and events,
or necessarily conduct those projections
in a way suitable for demonstrating
compliance with a regulatory standard
because there was no quantitative
standard past 10,000 years. Today we
are proposing certain provisions that
will affect DOE’s treatment of longerterm projections for compliance
purposes, but will not alter the
requirements issued in 2001 for
compliance within 10,000 years.
The performance assessment is
developed by first compiling listings of
features (characteristics of the disposal
system, such as the description of the
disposal system geologic setting), events
(discrete events that can occur at the
site, such as seismic events, i.e.,
earthquakes), and processes anticipated
to be active during the performance
period of the disposal system (such as
corrosion processes operating on the
metallic waste package). These items are
collectively referred to as ‘‘FEPs’’
(features, events and processes). These
FEPs are then used in combination to
construct scenarios, which are
essentially potential ‘‘futures’’ for the
disposal system. A scenario describes
one possible path along which the
disposal system could evolve from the
time of closure through the time of peak
dose. Individual FEPs are components
of scenarios and can be combined in
various ways; while some FEPs, such as
infiltration of water through the
repository, will be included in nearly all
scenarios, low-probability FEPs may
appear in only a few. Thus, a scenario
can be visualized as a time history for
the disposal system, beginning, for
example, with precipitation over Yucca
Mountain and water infiltration into the
subsurface above the repository, and
ending with a dose assessment for the
down-gradient RMEI making use of the
ground water moving from beneath the
site. Natural parameter variations (such
as differing ground-water movement
rates through the repository and in the
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aquifers below the repository) give rise
to many potential ‘‘futures’’ for a
particular scenario, depending on the
exact parameter values chosen from the
distribution of possible values, for each
computer simulation of repository
performance. For ease of calculations,
scenarios with similar characteristics
may be grouped into scenario classes.
More extensive descriptions of the
scenarios used to assess disposal system
performance for Yucca Mountain are
detailed in DOE documents supporting
such analyses for various purposes (see
the Viability Assessment, DOE/RW–
0508/V.3, Vol. 3, Chapter 1.3, December
1998, Docket No. OAR–2005–0083–
0086, and the Science and Engineering
Report, DOE/RW–0539, Chapters 4.3
and 4.4, May 2001, Docket Nos. OAR–
2005–0083–0069).
Scenarios have differing probabilities,
depending on the likelihood of
particular FEPs included in them. The
dose results calculated for individual
scenarios are weighted as a function of
their probability to develop an overall
distribution of doses with time that is
the final product of the analyses. From
this distribution of doses, compliance
with the regulatory standard is
determined in the licensing process.
In considering how to approach
assessments potentially out to 1 million
years, we have considered international
consensus on the qualitative nature of
such calculations. Although also true at
the 10,000-year time frame, for peak
dose it is even more evident that the
performance assessment cannot be
viewed as a predictor of future events
and resultant releases. Instead the goal
is to design an assessment that is a
reasonable test of the disposal system
under a range of conditions that
represent the expected case, as well as
relatively less likely (but not wholly
speculative) scenarios with potentially
significant consequences. The challenge
is to define the parameters of the
assessment so that they demonstrate
whether or not the disposal system is
resilient and safe in response to
meaningful disruptions, while avoiding
extremely speculative (and in some
cases, fantastical) events. As NAS notes,
‘‘The results of compliance analysis
should not be interpreted as accurate
predictions of the expected behavior of
a geologic repository’’ (NAS Report p.
71).
We recognize that many uncertainties
can be bounded, and methods exist to
take these uncertainties into account in
evaluating compliance of the disposal
system. Examples include the use of
cautious, but reasonable, parameter
values and assumptions that ensure the
models err on the side of conservatism,
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and the use of probabilistic models in
order to explore the range of
possibilities of total system evolution.
We further recognize that it can be
difficult to determine when
conservatism is appropriate and when it
is excessive. However, as discussed
earlier in this preamble, we are
concerned that systematic conservatism
in the face of uncertainties is
inconsistent with the concept of
reasonable expectation embodied in our
standards. This view is also shared at
the international level. A joint report by
the IAEA and the NEA concludes that
‘‘[w]hen uncertainty exists there is a
tendency to skew the model or values of
parameters towards conservatism,’’
which ‘‘results in embedded
conservatism’’ (‘‘An International Peer
Review of the Yucca Mountain Project
TSPA–SR,’’ p. 52, 2002, Docket No.
OAR–2005–0083–0062). However, those
aspects of the disposal system and waste
behavior that depend upon physical and
geological properties can be estimated
within reasonable limits of uncertainty.
Still, ‘‘[e]ven in the initial phase of
the repository lifetime, a compliance
decision must be based on a reasonable
level of confidence in the predicted
behavior rather than any absolute proof’’
(NAS Report p. 72). For performance
projections made past 10,000 years, the
confidence that can be placed in those
projections decreases as time increases.
While NAS indicated that analyses of
the performance of the Yucca Mountain
system dealing with the far future can
be bounded, ‘‘the uncertainties in some
of the calculations that might be
required could render further
calculation scientifically meaningless’’
(NAS Report p. 29). What is more, a
different panel convened by NAS has
recently stated that uncertainties often
become so large that the results of a risk
assessment must be deemed
indeterminate (‘‘Risk and Decisions
About Disposition of Transuranic and
High-Level Radioactive Waste,’’ NAS, p.
91, 2005, Docket No. OAR–2005–0083–
0060). Regarding natural processes and/
or events that can occur during a large
period of time, it becomes necessary to
restrict the scenarios available to
include in a performance assessment by
not including events or processes that
have a nearly negligible probability of
occurrence over the period of geologic
stability, or that introduce additional
uncertainty without providing
significantly new or different
information about the performance of
the disposal system.
It is neither useful nor necessary for
EPA to require DOE to predict or model
every conceivable scenario that could
occur at Yucca Mountain. Rather, we
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believe that it is our responsibility to
design a reasonable test of the disposal
system’s performance over a very long
time period. This implies that some
possible performance scenarios should
not be included in the performance
assessment because their probability of
occurrence is extremely low. As a
means of restricting scenarios, in setting
the standards in 40 CFR part 197, the
Agency outlined how to identify FEPs.
For purposes of the performance
assessment, the value of considering a
particular FEP (or series of FEPs)
diminishes if either its likelihood of
occurrence or its potential consequence
is insignificant. Therefore, a time frame
and probability cut-off measure are
needed to limit the range of FEPs that
could be included as candidates for the
performance assessment. Without such
measures, the list of FEPs would be
limitless, bounded only by the
imagination. The Agency determined
that FEPs that could occur with a
probability equal to or greater than 1 in
10,000 over a period of 10,000 years
would be sufficiently likely to occur, so
that they should be included among the
FEPs available for selection in any
particular scenario. FEPs with lower
probabilities could be excluded from the
analyses. This probability limit
represents an annual probability of
occurrence of 10¥8 (1 in 100 million).
This means, for example, an event with
this minimum probability has only a
one-hundredth of one percent chance of
happening in any given 10,000-year
period. This is an extremely
conservative screening criterion.
Extending the regulatory compliance
period to as much as 1 million years and
maintaining the annual probability cutoff of 10¥8 would still mean that FEPs
with only a one percent chance of
occurring over this time period must be
considered. This probability cut-off for
screening FEPs for inclusion in the
disposal system performance
assessment provides a robust test of
compliance, in that even FEPs with very
low probabilities are not a priori
excluded from the assessments.
Given the conservative nature of this
low probability cut-off for initial FEPs
screening efforts, the application of the
screening criteria still produce a large
number of scenarios that could be
postulated, presenting perhaps an
unmanageable task for the analyses and
ultimately the regulatory compliance
decision. In the generic rule for geologic
disposal, 40 CFR part 191, and the 2001
rule for Yucca Mountain, we provided
a means to manage the situation, by
allowing individual FEPs or scenarios to
be deleted from the licensing
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performance assessment if they
contribute little to the dose received by
the RMEI, i.e., their consequences are
low—either due to the low probability
of the FEPs or the low doses calculated
for the scenario. In extending the
regulatory performance period in the
regulation to the time of peak dose, a
similar provision aimed at managing the
scope of the analyses is called for.
The need to maintain the assessment
within a reasonable scope as a way to
manage uncertainties leads us to
conclude that a strict extension of the
approach for 10,000-year assessments
would not accomplish this overall goal.
If, for example, we required
consideration of events with a
probability of occurrence of 10¥4 over
1 million years ‘‘an approach that has
been suggested by some stakeholders ‘‘
it would equate to an annual probability
of 10¥10 (one in 10 billion), which
encompasses events nearly as remote as
the ‘‘big bang’’ that created our universe.
No disposal system, and perhaps not
even our planet itself, would be
expected to survive the effects of such
an event, and we therefore do not find
it a useful indicator to distinguish
between safe or unsafe performance of
the disposal system. There are an
unlimited number of possible futures,
some of which would involve risks from
a repository and others that would not.
We must balance these factors to
‘‘define a standard that specifies a high
level of protection but that does not rule
out an adequately sited and welldesigned repository because of highly
improbable events’’ (NAS Report p. 28).
In addition, NAS recommended
‘‘against an approach under which a
large number of future scenarios are
specified for compliance assessment,
since such an approach could be seen as
putting both the regulator and the
applicant in the indefensible position of
claiming to have considered a sufficient
number of scenarios and that all
reasonable future situations are
represented in the analysis’’ (NAS
Report p. 98). NAS explicitly recognized
that ‘‘[i]t is important that the ‘rules’ for
the compliance assessment be
established in advance of the licensing
process; that is, that the scenarios that
might be excluded from the integrated
risk analysis be identified’’ (NAS Report
p. 73). We emphasize that the purpose
of making exposure scenario
assumptions is not to identify
exhaustively every possible future, but
to construct a reasonable (or, as NAS
put, a ‘‘fair’’) test of disposal system
performance for the protection of public
health. This is the case regardless of the
time frame involved, and from that
perspective today’s proposal will not
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alter the way in which DOE will
approach its performance assessments.
In addition to placing limits on the
probability of FEPs that should be
considered, an additional tool to
construct the test (or set ‘‘the ‘rules’ for
the compliance assessment,’’ as NAS
stated) is to specify how certain
scenarios should be assessed. This
‘‘stylizing’’ of scenarios is similar to the
approach we took (and NAS
recommended) to defining the humanintrusion scenario. In a more general
sense, NAS acknowledged that
establishing the ‘‘rules’’ ‘‘requires using
the rulemaking process to arrive at a
regulatory decision about certain
assumptions as part of the standard’’
(NAS Report p. 34). The NEA has also
recommended exploring the possibility
of using a similar stylized approach to
address uncertainties in the evolution of
the surface environment and the nature
of future human actions (‘‘The Handling
of Timescales in Assessing Post-Closure
Safety,’’ pp. 22–23, 2004, Docket No.
OAR–2005–0083–0046). This approach
would avoid speculation regarding the
evolution of the geologic environment at
times when the hazards associated with
the waste are reduced compared to
when the waste is emplaced.
Stylized approaches can be utilized to
address associated uncertainties in
order to allow consideration of events
that are deemed potentially important to
performance but whose characteristics
are difficult to establish with certainty.
There is international consensus that
this approach may be used to define
assumptions that are too difficult to
bound (NEA, p. 22, Docket No. OAR–
2005–0083–0046). This approach could
therefore be used for the determination
of the evolution of the geological
environment over long periods. As
noted above, this approach is similar to
that recommended by NAS, and utilized
by EPA in examining human intrusion
(NAS Report p. 108). The NAS
determined that it was technically
infeasible to assess the probability of
human intrusion into a repository over
the long term. It concluded that it was
not scientifically justified to incorporate
a myriad of alternative scenarios of
human intrusion into a fully risk-based
compliance assessment that requires
knowledge of the character and
frequency of various intrusion
scenarios. Accordingly, NAS
recommended that we specify in our
standards a typical intrusion scenario to
be analyzed for its consequences on the
performance of the repository. The
intent of this ‘‘stylized scenario’’ is to
avoid non-productive speculation on
the forms and frequencies of intrusion
that can never be predicted, while
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allowing the ‘‘robustness’’ of the
containment properties of the repository
to be evaluated by a scenario that is
plausible, and potentially causes some
levels of exposure. The same factors
must be balanced in considering how to
assess key geologic and other features
over very long time frames when it is
exceedingly difficult to establish exact
parameters—or even distributions of
parameter values—with any certainty.
The modifications proposed in
Section II.C (‘‘How is EPA Proposing to
Revise the Individual-Protection
Standard to Address Peak Dose?’’)
would require DOE to project exposures
to the RMEI until the time of peak dose
and subject them to a compliance
determination. The key aspects
emphasized at the beginning of this
section guide our requirements for the
scope of performance assessments both
at 10,000 years and over times
extending through the entire period of
geologic stability. However, their
implementation carries different
implications for those different time
periods, given the nature of
uncertainties and the types of events
that can be envisioned to occur. To
address these implications, we are
proposing four provisions that will
affect the judgment of compliance when
that judgment is extended to periods up
to 1 million years. Specifically, we are
proposing:
• A separate compliance standard for
the peak dose beyond 10,000 years;
• That compliance beyond 10,000
years be demonstrated using the median
of the distribution of results;
• That FEPs and scenarios not
included in the 10,000-year analysis
because of their limited consequence
during that period need not be
considered in the peak dose
calculations;
• That scenarios involving climate
change, seismic activity, igneous
activity, and general corrosion be
explicitly considered in the peak dose
calculations.
We have already discussed the peak
dose standard and the use of the median
to demonstrate compliance (see Sections
II.C.3 and II.C.5). The selection of FEPs
(including general corrosion) is
discussed in detail in Section II.D.2.a
(‘‘Consideration of Likely, Unlikely, and
Very Unlikely FEPs’’). Discussion of
climate, seismic, and igneous scenarios
is included in Sections II.D.2.b, c, and
d, respectively.
1. Performance Assessments Up To
10,000 Years After Disposal
Our 2001 rulemaking established a
framework within which DOE would
conduct its performance assessments to
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show compliance with the 10,000-year
standard. The previous section touched
on various aspects of this framework.
Essentially, the performance assessment
involves three basic steps: (1) Identify
the FEPs and scenarios that might affect
the Yucca Mountain disposal system,
along with their probabilities of
occurrence; (2) examine the effects of
those FEPs and scenarios on disposal
system performance; and (3) estimate
the dose consequences from those FEPs
and scenarios, weighted by their
probabilities of occurrence. Today’s
proposal will not affect this framework
in any way.
We supplemented this basic
framework with two additional
provisions. The first, the underlying
principle of reasonable expectation, we
have discussed in detail in Sections
II.A.4 and II.B. The other important
provision, touched on in the previous
section, establishes the approach to
identifying FEPs and scenarios and their
probability of occurrence. We specified
that FEPs or scenarios with a probability
of occurrence lower than 1 in 10,000
over 10,000 years need not be
considered in the performance
assessment. FEPs or scenarios with a
higher probability of occurrence also
need not be considered if they would
not significantly change the results of
the performance assessment. We are not
proposing to alter this provision as it
applies to the 10,000-year standard. The
standards in 40 CFR part 191 (the EPA
regulation that addresses geologic
disposal generically) also used this
formulation as the means of determining
FEPs for any prospective disposal
system. In developing 40 CFR part 197
in 2001, the Agency determined that
there was no reason, on a site-specific
basis, to depart from this conservative
screening criterion. We also note that
NAS endorsed this same probability
level in its specific discussion of
volcanism, and suggested that such a
level ‘‘might be sufficiently low to
constitute a negligible risk [of
occurrence]’’ (NAS Report p. 95).
Probabilities below this level are
associated with events such as the
appearance of new volcanoes outside of
known areas of volcanic activity or a
cataclysmic meteor impact in the area of
the repository. We believe there is little
or no benefit to public health or the
environment from trying to regulate the
effects of such very unlikely events.
2. Performance Assessments for Periods
Longer Than 10,000 Years After
Disposal
As discussed in the previous sections,
we do not believe that DOE’s
performance assessments need be
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changed fundamentally to accommodate
an extended compliance period. The
general framework described in the
previous section applies equally well to
periods beyond 10,000 years, although
we are proposing specific provisions to
apply to this longer period. We
recognize, however, that there may be
some confusion regarding the conduct
of assessments to demonstrate
compliance at two different times. DOE
will not necessarily conduct one set of
assessments to show compliance with
the 10,000-year standard, and a separate
set of assessments to show compliance
with the peak dose standard applicable
at times beyond 10,000 years. Rather,
DOE’s overall approach could be to run
its dose assessments from the time of
facility closure to the end of the period
of geologic stability (1 million years
after closure). The FEPs and scenarios
selected for each individual run would
continue to operate, and the disposal
system to evolve, over that entire time
period. DOE would extract the results
necessary for comparison with our
regulatory standards.
As it is with the 10,000-year
standards, the main purpose of the post10,000-year standards is to provide a
reasonable test of the performance of the
disposal system. The NAS stated it
another way: ‘‘The challenge is to define
a standard that specifies a high level of
protection but that does not rule out an
adequately sited and well-designed
repository because of highly improbable
events’’ (NAS Report p. 28).
In formulating our approach to an
extended compliance period, we began
by reviewing the NAS report. NAS
concluded that several gradual and
episodic natural processes or events
have the potential to modify the
properties of the repository and the
processes by which radionuclides are
transported. NAS concluded that the
probabilities and consequences of
modifications generated by volcanic
eruptions (volcanism), seismic activity,
and climate change are sufficiently
boundable so that these ‘‘modifiers,’’ as
it termed them, can be included (along
with an undisturbed scenario) in
performance assessments that extend
over the expected period of geologic
stability (on the order of 1 million years)
in the Yucca Mountain region (NAS
Report p. 91). NAS considered the
‘‘long-term stability of the geologic
environment at Yucca Mountain’’ to
describe the situation where geologic
processes such as earthquakes (and
similar physical and geological
processes that could affect the
performance assessment at the Yucca
Mountain site) are sufficiently
quantifiable and the related
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uncertainties boundable that the
performance can be assessed (NAS
Report p. 67). Furthermore, NAS
acknowledged that, conceptually, there
is a need for screening criteria to
distinguish significant FEPs from those
that can be considered to have
negligible effects (NAS Report, for
example, pp. 59, 61, 72, 95, 98). NAS
suggested that certain levels (including
a probability cut-off of 10¥8 per year)
might be appropriate, but made no
recommendation on this issue.
We believe the three categories of
FEPs identified by NAS deserve special
attention. We will require that DOE
consider these FEPs in its long-term
projections. However, we are proposing
to apply the same overall probability
threshold and handle such events in a
stylized manner to address only their
most significant effects. In essence, DOE
must include such FEPs in the peak
dose assessment, but need not assess in
detail every conceivable variation on
those events. Thus, our approach would
require that DOE develop reasonable
igneous, seismic and climate change
scenarios and assess the most likely and
significant impacts, with appropriate
variability in its assumptions, on dose
projections. The NAS did not identify
any other ‘‘modifiers’’ that it expected
could be addressed in a quantitative risk
assessment covering the period of
geologic stability. In addition, NAS
specifically mentioned potential effects
of these modifiers, but also noted that,
while possible, many of these effects
would be so unlikely or limited that
they would not be expected to
significantly affect disposal system
performance (NAS Report pp. 91–95).
These igneous, seismic, and
climatological FEPs are discussed in
more detail in the following sections.
We propose to specify certain
significant aspects or characteristics of
the event or process to which DOE may
limit its analyses, and DOE will assess
reasonable variations within those
bounds, considering such basic
assumptions as severity and time of
occurrence. DOE must then evaluate the
consequences on the disposal system
and resulting impacts to the RMEI. By
varying the time of occurrence within
the probability framework, DOE can also
address the effects of these FEPs on the
peak dose.
Having identified particular natural
FEPs that should be considered
throughout the period of geologic
stability, we then considered whether
there are FEPs affecting the engineered
barrier system that should also be
identified. In reviewing DOE’s
published TSPAs and other relevant
information, we conclude that general
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corrosion of the waste packages has
been shown to be a potentially
significant failure mechanism at times
in the hundreds of thousands of years
(Yucca Mountain Science and
Engineering Report, DOE/RW–0539,
Section 4.2.4, May 2001, Docket No.
OAR–2005–0083–0069). Unlike certain
other corrosion processes, as discussed
in the next section, which may be more
likely or faster-acting at earlier times,
general corrosion may not be a
significant factor within 10,000 years
and could potentially be removed from
consideration at those times because of
its limited consequence. Were we
simply to state that FEPs not included
in the 10,000-year analyses should not
be included in the post-10,000-year
analyses, there might be some question
as to whether DOE would need to
consider general corrosion at all. We
believe it has been shown potentially to
be of sufficient importance that it
should be included in those projections.
Therefore, we are proposing to remove
any ambiguity by specifying that DOE
must consider general corrosion in its
projections throughout the period of
geologic stability.
In general, we continue to believe that
it is reasonable to require DOE to
exclude from performance assessments
those FEPs whose likelihood of
occurrence is so small that they are very
unlikely, or whose consequence is
minimal, as described above. We
propose that this probability threshold
as expressed in our 2001 rule for the
10,000-year compliance period be
extended throughout the entire period
to peak dose (i.e., FEPs included in the
10,000-year assessments are included in
the assessments beyond 10,000 years),
but with the inclusion of the long-term
impacts of seismicity, volcanism, and
long-term climate change, as consistent
with the probability screening criteria
described herein (NAS Report p. 94).
These are the natural events and
processes that NAS determined were
reasonably boundable when compliance
time frames at Yucca Mountain are
extended out to the period of geologic
stability. We also propose that DOE
must consider the long-term effects of
general corrosion on the engineered
barriers, particularly on waste package
integrity. This is an extremely inclusive
standard. It captures significant events
in the life of the repository, and yet is
not so restrictive that no repository
could ever pass, given that there would
be no limit to the speculation of
scenarios that could occur during the
period of geologic stability.
As discussed further in the following
sections, we have examined a variety of
events and feel confident that the
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49051
screening analysis for 10,000 years—
with the assurance that seismic,
igneous, climate change, and general
corrosion scenarios are included—
includes the appropriate range and
severity of FEPs to also serve as a
reasonable test of disposal system
performance throughout the period of
geologic stability. We have not (and
have not claimed to) conducted an
exhaustive or detailed analysis of
variations or permutations of scenarios
out to the time of peak dose. In fact, this
is precisely the sort of unrestrained and
speculative exercise we wish to avoid.
We recognize that some commenters
may believe it is appropriate to consider
whether further analysis or new data
could reveal that an event excluded
from the 10,000-year screening is
important to performance of the
disposal system over the geologic
stability period. As discussed later, we
do not believe such scenarios are either
very likely or very important to
performance. Nor do we believe that
this approach inappropriately
constrains NRC, as the licensing
authority. Rather, we consider this
approach to be consistent with the NAS
position that conducting compliance
assessments ‘‘requires using the
rulemaking process to arrive at a
regulatory decision about certain
assumptions as part of the standard’’
(NAS Report p. 34).
a. Consideration of Likely, Unlikely, and
Very Unlikely FEPs
Our individual-protection standards
(§ 197.20) as promulgated in 2001
required DOE to consider in the
performance assessment FEPs with a
one in 10,000 or greater chance of
occurring during 10,000 years. FEPs
below this probability threshold are
considered ‘‘very unlikely’’ and can be
discounted based on probability alone.
We also allowed NRC and DOE to
remove from consideration FEPs with a
higher probability if their effects on
performance assessment results were
determined to be insignificant. In
addition, performance assessments
conducted to show compliance with the
human-intrusion and ground-water
protection standards may exclude FEPs
considered ‘‘unlikely.’’ We specified
that NRC was to determine the
probability below which FEPs would be
considered unlikely. NRC set that figure
at a probability of occurrence of 1 in 10
over 10,000 years (equivalent to an
annual probability of 10¥5) (67 FR
62634, October 8, 2002, Docket No.
OAR–2005–0083–0059).
In extending the period of
compliance, we must consider whether
our threshold for probability screening
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of ‘‘very unlikely’’ FEPs remains
appropriate. We believe it does, and are
proposing to retain it for the extended
compliance period. While we are
retaining the compliance standard of
150 µSv/yr (15 mrem/yr) applicable to
10,000 years, we are also proposing to
introduce a second compliance standard
of 3.5 mSv/yr (350 mrem/yr) for the
peak dose beyond 10,000 years, which
could potentially apply up to 1 million
years. This may lead some commenters
to suggest that the formulation for FEPs
screening should simply be extended by
two orders of magnitude, i.e., that very
unlikely FEPs would have less than a
one in 10,000 chance of occurring over
1 million years. This would recognize
that very low-probability FEPs would
become more likely to be seen simply
with the passage of time (essentially by
looking at many 10,000-year periods,
the cumulative probability, rather than
annual probability, would be increased).
However, in our view, such a
formulation would be unjustified and
unreasonable.
It is important to consider the real
meaning of these probability thresholds.
A FEP screened in at the existing lower
probability threshold would have only a
0.01% chance of occurring through
10,000 years, yet still must be included
in the FEPs considered for the
performance assessment. We question,
then, whether the effort involved in
incorporating even less likely events
into the ‘‘FEP pool,’’ with the level of
speculation likely to be attached to
them, would be rewarded with even
minimal contribution to safety.
The threshold for very unlikely events
suggested by NAS was an annual
probability of 10¥8 (1 in 100 million per
year), which NAS equated to 1 in 10,000
over 10,000 years, stating that this level
‘‘might be sufficiently low to constitute
a negligible risk’’ (NAS Report p. 95).
We consider these two expressions to be
functionally equivalent (and have
explicitly included both in our proposal
today), but adopted the latter as more
clearly tied to the 10,000-year
compliance period. Even though the
NAS statement above was referring to
volcanism, we believe that this
probability threshold is a generic
consideration that is applicable to any
risk at Yucca Mountain, not just
volcanism. If one extends the time
period of the assessment to 1 million
years, a FEP at this level would still
have only a 1 in 100, or 1%, chance of
occurring within that time, but would
still be considered in the performance
assessment process. We believe this is a
‘‘cautious, but reasonable’’ level,
especially when considering the
confounding effects of uncertainties at
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such long time periods. In fact, we are
unaware of any international precedents
for scrutinizing FEPs of this low
probability. Thus, we are proposing to
retain the 10¥8 annual probability
threshold for very unlikely FEPs for
both the 10,000-year and post-10,000year assessments.
Application of this screening criterion
deserves some additional discussion.
For FEPs involving the natural barrier,
an annual probability of 10¥8
theoretically indicates that to compile a
definitive list of all FEPs involving the
natural barrier, the geologic record at
the site would have to be examined back
to a time frame of 100 million years to
identify FEPs that would be projected to
occur at least once in that time period.
For the Yucca Mountain site, the
volcanic rocks containing the repository
are only on the order of 10 million years
in age, indicating that essentially any
FEP that could be identified in the
geologic record during the 10 million
year time frame would have an annual
probability higher than 10¥8, and would
be included in the list of FEPs for
scenario construction. We believe that
the Quaternary period, extending back
approximately 2 million years, is a
sufficiently long period of the geologic
record to allow DOE to make reasonable
estimates of natural FEPs (see 66 FR
32100). Observed FEPs from that period,
as well as other that can be inferred,
would be included in a 10¥8 cut-off.
For FEPs involving the engineered
barrier, a similar logic applies. However,
the ‘‘record’’ to be examined to identify
FEPs for the performance of man-made
materials and systems is much shorter
than the geologic record. Application of
the 10¥8 annual limit ensures all
relevant FEPs are considered for
inclusion. For example, corrosion
processes for which there is accelerated
testing and analog information at longer
time frames, could still be included in
scenario development. Even when such
processes would have a low probability,
the conservative probability cut-off
threshold would still assure they are
considered in scenario development.
For such processes, however, when
probabilities of occurrence over long
times may be difficult to assign, the
decision to consider them may be based
solely on consequence.
By contrast, were we to stretch the
probability threshold by two orders of
magnitude, to an annual probability of
10¥10 (one in 10 billion per year), we
would be introducing an unprecedented
level of conservatism into the
performance assessments. At such a
level, the performance assessment
would be required to consider geologic
events likely to have never happened,
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since the age of the Earth itself is
estimated at about 4.5 billion years
(https://pubs.usgs.gov/gip/geotime/
age.html). Further, an event of this
annual probability will not reach even
a 50% cumulative probability for
another 500 million years (a total of 5
billion years), or 500 times the period of
geologic stability at Yucca Mountain
(defined by NAS as on the order of 1
million years). A probability threshold
at that level would sweep in cataclysmic
volcanic and seismic events, as well as
meteor impacts of the type that
extinguished the dinosaurs 65 million
years ago. We simply find it
inconceivable that such events could be
considered a reasonable test of the
repository, or that requiring them to be
analyzed would provide any benefit to
public health and safety. To look at it
another way, an event at our current
probability threshold of one chance in
100 million per year would still be
likely to occur only a few times over an
incremental 500 million year period,
and roughly 50 times over the entire
history of the earth, of which humans
have been present only 0.0001% of the
time. Examining the geologic record at
the Yucca Mountain site for such a time
period to identify FEPs would not be
meaningful. Even looking at the geologic
record with the 10¥8 probability is
challenging. In fact, the volcanic rocks
that contain the repository were formed
by very extensive volcanism over an
area of thousands of square kilometers.
Using the annual probability figure
alone, it can be argued that such
extensive volcanism should be included
in the list of FEPs for the performance
assessment. We strongly disagree. As
emphasized by NAS, we reasonably
must confine ourselves to assessing
performance of the existing geologic
setting. To remove such extreme
assumptions, we addressed this
particular difficulty by recommending
the geologic record through the
Quaternary (a period of approximately 2
million years) as the basis for
identifying FEPs for the performance
assessment (66 FR 32100). Based on this
period as compared to the probability
threshold we have established, DOE
must consider for its performance
assessments events that can be shown or
reasonably inferred to have occurred
during the Quaternary, based on the
physical conditions of the site and
disposal system.
If the same probability threshold
applies at all times, as we are proposing,
then the FEP screening performed by
DOE for its 10,000-year projections
would be expected to adequately
represent those longer time periods. We
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believe it will, and do not believe it
should be necessary for DOE to reexamine its results to ‘‘screen in’’ FEPs
it has previously analyzed and rejected,
or FEPs that might be expected to be
more probable at longer times, if such
exist. Further, our view is that it would
be an endless task for DOE to analyze
every FEP postulated to occur several
hundred thousand years into the future,
simply because a scenario can be
invented to support it. Even if DOE were
to exhaustively pursue each nominated
FEP, their effects are likely to be
minimal at best, especially when
considering what are likely to be the
much larger effects of increasing
uncertainties and large-scale scenarios
such as climate change. It should be
clear, however, that FEPs selected for
the analysis will continue to unfold as
the assessment continues, up to 1
million years. That is, for all FEPs
included in the 10,000-year analysis,
DOE must project the effects of these
FEPs continuing to evolve over the
course of the period of geologic stability,
and account for their contributions to
the peak dose.
If we are starting from the basic
screening for 10,000 years, it is
reasonable to examine the reasons why
FEPs might have been excluded from
that screening when considering
whether any warrant further evaluation
in the post-10,000-year performance
analysis. We see three general categories
of FEPs (as opposed to the more specific
seismic, igneous, and climatic FEPs,
which are addressed separately in the
following sections of this document)
that may have been eliminated from the
full analysis:
unlikely for the first 10,000 years, but
would rise above that threshold within
the period of geologic stability (FEPs
whose probability of occurrence is
related to the condition of the
engineered barrier system are discussed
later in this section). It may be argued
that a FEP may become more likely if
certain other FEPs have altered the site’s
characteristics in a particular way. As a
basis for requiring additional FEP
screening, we would find such a claim
to be unreasonable and highly
speculative. FEP probabilities are
derived in large part from examinations
of the historic geologic and climatic
record going back millions of years. We
suggested that the Quaternary period
might be an appropriate benchmark for
such an examination (66 FR 32100).
Probabilities derived from such
evaluations are not amenable to that
level of fine-tuning. Furthermore, DOE
has currently included FEPs which are
at the boundary of the 10¥8 threshold,
such as volcanic events (estimated at 1.6
× 10¥8). We would not view such an
exercise as useful or of value in the
licensing process. We do not believe it
is necessary or appropriate for NRC to
re-consider the probability criterion.
FEPs Screened Out by Consequence
Within 10,000 Years
Our 2001 standards allow NRC to
eliminate FEPs whose effects would not
significantly change the performance
assessment results within 10,000 years.
We are proposing today to take the same
approach to the peak dose projections,
giving special attention to changes to
the magnitude of the peak dose. There
is no reason for DOE to re-consider FEPs
for their effects on the 10,000-year
FEPs Screened Out by Probability
projections, and we are aware that some
The first category consists of FEPs
FEPs have been included whose effects
determined to be ‘‘very unlikely’’ to
are manifest at times slightly beyond
occur. As described above, these are
10,000 years to give perspective on the
FEPs that would have a chance of
shorter-term evolution of the disposal
occurrence of less than one in 10,000
system, such as slower-acting corrosion
over 10,000 years, or an annual
mechanisms.
At issue, then, would be FEPs whose
probability less than 1 in 100 million
effects might not be evident or as
(10¥8). We see no reason to re-consider
prominent until several tens or
FEPs removed from the assessment
hundreds of thousands of years have
based on this criterion. Such a FEP
passed. Such FEPs might be considered
would have to be more likely to occur
at some time in the future than it is now. to be either gradual, continuing
processes or episodic, disruptive events
This does not simply mean that the
and processes. In general, we believe
cumulative expectation of an event or
that the 10,000-year assessments should
process having already occurred is
adequately address the more gradual
higher as time extends from 10,000 to 1
processes and that the more significant
million years, which would be the case
of those processes have been included
for any low-probability FEP; rather, it
in those assessments (for example,
means that the probability itself would
have to be higher at some later time (for infiltration of water through the
repository and the processes leading to
example, 10¥9 annual probability until
early failure of waste packages heavily
year 50,000, then a 10¥8 probability
influence the 10,000-year assessments
thereafter). We have not identified
and would do the same for peak dose
natural FEPs that would be very
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49053
projections). By the time those more
gradual processes would take effect, it is
likely that the effects of other processes
would already be felt at a much higher
level. One fundamental purpose of
probabilistic performance assessment is
to give proportionate emphasis to highly
improbable events and processes. With
one exception (discussed below), we
find it unlikely that any gradual,
continuing processes not already
included through the screening for the
10,000-year assessments under our
proposed rule could significantly affect
the projections over such long time
periods. It is more likely that their
effects would be overwhelmed by other,
higher-probability (or faster-acting)
processes operating over the same
period.
The single such slow-acting process
we have decided to include in today’s
proposal is general corrosion of the
engineered barriers, particularly its
effects on the waste packages. We
recognize that DOE has included general
corrosion in its previous analyses for
both the 10,000-year period and over the
longer term. However, even though
general corrosion is significant to
performance at longer times, it might
reasonably be considered insignificant
within the first 10,000 years and could,
thus, be screened out of the analysis to
demonstrate compliance with the
10,000-year standard. Under our overall
approach, were DOE to exclude general
corrosion on the basis of consequence
within the first 10,000 years, longerterm projections could also exclude this
factor. We think such an exclusion over
the period of geologic stability would
ignore a crucial factor in long-term
performance at Yucca Mountain. As we
have noted, DOE’s own analyses point
to general corrosion as the dominant
waste package failure mechanism, either
alone or in combination with disruptive
events (igneous events are assumed to
be less dependent on prior degradation
of waste packages). Without general
corrosion assumed to act, a large
proportion of the waste packages could
be assumed to remain intact even up to
or beyond 1 million years. Other
corrosion mechanisms, such as
localized corrosion, are highly
correlated with temperature and would
be expected to operate early in the
assessment period, when temperatures
inside the repository are likely to be
very much higher. Stress-corrosion
cracking is another mechanism that is
somewhat correlated with temperature,
but is of more importance in situations
involving mechanical failure, such as
rockfall resulting from seismic events.
Their longer-term impact is likely to be
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greatly reduced after the repository
cools. The same is not true for general
corrosion. The rate of general corrosion
is somewhat influenced by temperature,
but this process is expected to continue
even when the temperature is lower.
Our proposed approach would
eliminate any questions regarding
whether general corrosion should be
considered for the longer-term
assessments.
Although general corrosion was not
called out by NAS, as were the three
natural FEPs, we believe this approach
to general corrosion is consistent with
NAS’s overall expectations for the
evolution of the disposal system. We
have already discussed in the context of
uncertainty NAS’s expectation that a
significant proportion of the waste
packages would fail over the period of
geologic stability and that, while peak
doses might occur much later,
significant releases could be anticipated
within the first 10,000 years (see Section
II.A.5, ‘‘Effects of Uncertainty’’). For
example, NAS suggested that some
uncertainties will be lower ‘‘when
enough time has passed that all of the
packages will have failed’’ (NAS Report
p. 29–30); that ‘‘uncertainties in waste
canister lifetimes might have a more
significant effect on assessing
performance in the initial 10,000 years
than in performance in the range of
100,000 years’’ (NAS Report p. 72); that
‘‘[d]etailed estimates of time for canister
failure are less important for much
longer-term estimates of individual dose
or risk’’ (NAS Report p. 85); and that
‘‘[i]nflow of air through failed canisters
and oxidation of waste prior to
infiltration of water * * * would
probably affect estimates of 10,000-year
cumulative releases more than estimates
of longer-term doses and risks’’ (NAS
Report p. 86). Further, NAS clearly
identified corrosion as the dominant
process leading to waste package failure
and recognized its importance in
projecting peak dose: ‘‘Radionuclide
releases from an undisturbed repository
* * * can occur through * * *
degradation and failure of the waste
canister through corrosion’’ * * *’’
(NAS Report p. 26—see also pp. 68, 82,
85). We also believe our proposed
approach to general corrosion is
consistent with both NAS’s advice to
use ‘‘cautious, but reasonable’’
assumptions and our principle of
reasonable expectation, as general
corrosion represents a potentially
significant failure mechanism leading to
radionuclide releases.
Regarding natural FEPs, we are
proposing that DOE explicitly evaluate
the effects of seismic, volcanic, and
climatological FEPs in its assessments
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beyond 10,000 years, as discussed in the
following sections. It should be
understood, however, that these FEPs
may also be considered within the
10,000-year period if warranted by
probability or consequence. The
probabilities of seismic and igneous
events beyond 10,000 years will be the
same as those probabilities within
10,000 years. Events that DOE judges
fall below the 10¥8 probability
threshold need not be included in either
the 10,000-year or post-10,000-year
assessments. Such events might include
seismic episodes above a certain
magnitude. There is more certainty that
the climate will experience significant
changes over the period of geologic
stability, and therefore we require it to
be considered at all times. The effects of
climate change on Yucca Mountain’s
performance, however, are likely to be
minimal within 10,000 years, and
potentially more significant at longer
times when most of the waste packages
are breached.
FEPs Screened Out by Condition of the
Engineered Barrier System Within
10,000 Years
We are aware that DOE has identified
certain FEPs that were eliminated from
consideration within 10,000 years
because it was deemed impossible for
them to occur while the engineered
barrier system remains intact. We
believe such FEPs should be considered
as a special case, as they depend on the
condition of the engineered barrier
system rather than a strict probability of
occurrence.
The prime example of the FEPs in this
category is in-package nuclear
criticality. The possibility of this
occurring at Yucca Mountain was
discounted within 10,000 years on the
basis that the waste packages would
remain largely intact during that time
(although a certain level of premature
failures was assumed). DOE stated that
‘‘One of the required conditions is the
presence of a moderator, such as water,
in the waste package. The waste
packages will be designed to make the
probability of a criticality occurring
inside the waste package extremely
small’’ (FEIS, DOE/EIS–0250, section
I.2.12, p. I–21, Docket No. OAR–2005–
0083–0086). At some point beyond
10,000 years, however, packages are
anticipated to degrade sufficiently to
allow water inside, so the reason for
screening out this FEP is no longer
credible. We understand that NRC has
evaluated this possibility and initial
results suggest that the effects would not
be significant (‘‘System-Level
Performance Assessment of the
Proposed Repository at Yucca Mountain
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Using the TPA Version 4.1 Code,’’
CNWRA 2002–005, September 2002,
Revised March 2004, Appendix G,
Docket No. OAR–2005–0083–0067).
More recently, NRC staff analyses
regarding the potential effects of a
criticality event within the waste
package indicated that the effects would
be more significant within the first
10,000 years after disposal than at
longer times (‘‘Estimating In-Package
Criticality Impact on Yucca Mountain
Repository Performance,’’ International
High Level Radioactive Waste
Management Conference, Las Vegas,
Nevada, March 30–April 2, 2003, Docket
No. OAR–2005–0083–0082). Therefore,
we do not require that DOE consider inpackage criticality beyond 10,000 years
if it has not been considered for the first
10,000 years. To the extent DOE’s waste
package assumptions make such a
scenario credible within the initial
10,000 years, however, it would be
appropriate to include it in the post10,000-year projections.
There may be other FEPs that fall
within this category. However, this
illustrates the very possibility we wish
to avoid. It is possible to generate
complex and vaguely-defined
circumstances and insist that DOE
analyze them thoroughly. We see such
an exercise as being of no value. Rather,
we believe it would be detrimental to
the licensing process, as well as
contrary to our ‘‘reasonable
expectation’’ concept and the idea that
performance assessments should
represent credible projections of
disposal system safety.
Having considered the various types
of FEPs that may have been excluded
from the 10,000-year analysis, our goal
is to require an appropriate
consideration of FEPs in the analyses
beyond 10,000 years. We considered an
approach that would provide NRC with
broader flexibility to consider
previously excluded FEPs that it
believes should be included in the peak
dose analyses, perhaps based on the
effect of the FEP on the magnitude of
the peak dose. However, we believe that
any potential FEPs to be included are
likely to be overwhelmed by increasing
uncertainties or larger-scale FEPs such
as climate change. For this reason, we
do not believe the inclusion of such
FEPs will add materially to the
understanding of the disposal system’s
performance or will lead to a safer
disposal system. Furthermore, as stated
earlier, we are guided by our reasonable
expectation principle in not requiring
an exhaustive and completely accurate
prediction of repository conditions over
a million-year period. See Sections II.A,
II.B, and II.C for discussions of the
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relative confidence in calculations at
very long times, and the need to view
those calculations in a more qualitative
way. We aim to construct a reasonable
test of the disposal system that accounts
for the possible occurrence of significant
FEPs at Yucca Mountain, and the
system’s response to those stresses. We
believe that proposing the continued
exclusion from peak dose calculations
of events that are inconsequential for
10,000 years, with the exception of
general corrosion and those identified
by NAS, is consistent with this
approach.
To summarize our proposal for
§ 197.36, we propose that DOE continue
to use the FEPs selected for compliance
with the 10,000-year projections in its
projections for peak dose. This does not
require that DOE continue to define the
characteristics of those FEPs in exactly
the same way it has previously (for
example, in the FEIS). Rather, DOE may
continue to refine its representation of
FEPs in the analyses as its
understanding of the factors involved
improves. The contribution to dose
estimates of FEPs selected for the
analyses must be assessed throughout
the period of geologic stability. We do
require that DOE explicitly consider the
effects of seismic, igneous, and climate
change scenarios, within the overall
probability constraints, as described in
more detail in the following sections.
We also require that DOE consider the
effects of general corrosion throughout
the period of geologic stability. We have
considered two approaches for doing so.
Under the first approach, consistent
with our approach to climate change
outlined in Section II.D.2. DOE may
apply a constant representative
corrosion rate throughout the period of
geologic stability. Under the second
approach, consistent with our approach
to seismic and igneous FEPs outlined in
Sections II.D.2.b and c, DOE may apply
corrosion rates as derived for the
10,000-year period, which may be
dependent on other factors, such as
temperature within the repository.
We have stated our concerns that the
screening process should not be used to
put forward highly speculative and
implausible situations for DOE to
analyze. It is our belief that the relevant
FEPs are already captured within the
10,000-year screening process, and that
any others would be overshadowed by
other aspects of the longer-term
modeling. We believe our proposal to
explicitly include certain FEPs
important to the longer-term projections
appropriately balances these
considerations. We request comment on
this approach.
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b. Consideration of Seismic FEPs
The NAS stated, and we agree, that
the effects of seismicity in the area on
(1) the repository and (2) the hydrologic
regime are key aspects to be considered
during the period of geologic stability
(NAS Report p. 93). The effects of
seismicity may result in (most
significantly) early waste package
failure, an increase or decrease in
conductivity (movement of water) in the
saturated or vadose zones, or a shift in
direction of fluid movement in the area
(NAS Report pp. 92–93). In addition, we
believe the potential effects of seismic
activity on the structural stability of the
repository itself (i.e., drift collapse) may
be important in projecting the failure of
waste packages.
In order to reasonably assess the
effects of seismicity at the site, and yet
also address the increasing uncertainty
associated with magnitudes of seismic
events over the greatly increased time
period, we expect that DOE will take the
rate of occurrence of seismic events
originally derived for the 10,000-year
time period and extend the calculations
throughout the period of geologic
stability. We are proposing that DOE
may limit its assessment of seismicity to
the effects on the disposal system of
drift collapse and waste package failure,
i.e., effects on the engineered barriers
that comprise an essential component of
the disposal system. At times
sufficiently far into the future, a wide
range of possibilities could be proposed,
and some (for example, an earthquake of
such an extreme magnitude that it
collapses all the drifts of the repository,
allowing for complete destruction of the
facility), no matter how remote the
probability, could have far-reaching
implications for the disposal system. By
using this approach, we can adhere to
the basic premise that the risk
calculations reasonably predict the
geologic environment at the repository
out to peak dose. We can also capture
the potential effects of seismicity and
faulting at Yucca Mountain. By
extending the performance period to 1
million years, it is expected that more
events will occur, consistent with the
established seismic hazard curve for the
site. No new types or classes of seismic
or fault displacement disruptive events
can reasonably be anticipated. In the
case of seismicity, earthquakes are most
likely to occur on the existing network
of active seismogenic fault sources
under current tectonic conditions. In the
case of the fault displacement hazard, it
is more likely that fault slip will occur
on existing faults that on newly created
ones.
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49055
DOE has developed a seismic hazard
curve that describes the seismicity to be
expected at the site (‘‘Seismic
Consequence Abstraction,’’ MDL–WIS–
PA–00003–Rev 00, 2003, Docket No.
OAR–2005–0083–0073). A seismic
hazard curve determines what the
probability is of any particular strength
of ground shaking. The goal of
probabilistic seismic hazard analysis is
to quantify the rate (or probability) of
exceeding various ground-motion levels
at a site (or a map of sites), given all
possible earthquakes. It is reasonable to
assume that seismic events will
continue with activity rates and
magnitudes predicted by the seismic
and fault displacement hazards for the
site over the period of geologic stability
because the geologic record indicates
relative tectonic stability of the region
over the past 10 million years. This
implies that there is continuity in the
behavior of major geologic events (such
as earthquakes) over that entire time
frame. Further, the geologic record
extending back millions of years has
been used to establish the hazard
curves. There is not further data that
appropriately can be incorporated into
the analysis, or used to justify an
adjustment of the estimates simply
because they are to be projected further
into the future. It is expected that more
events, such as earthquakes and fault
displacements, will occur with the
extended performance period, but that
these events are much more likely to
occur on existing faults and seismic
sources than on newly created ones.
Therefore, the rates and magnitudes
considered in the probabilistic
calculations for 10,000 years can also be
used to generate estimates of seismicity
out to the period of peak dose. These
events should be defined on an annual
probability of occurrence. The
magnitudes and frequencies of potential
seismic events should remain the same
as in the 10,000-year analysis; however,
the analysis would be expected to show
greater consequences as potentially
more major seismic events are
incorporated into the assessment as a
result of extending the analysis
throughout the period of geologic
stability as events occur at times when
packages are expected to be largely
degraded and thus more easily
damaged.
The NAS stated that seismologic
effects on the hydrology at Yucca
Mountain can also be bounded over the
period of stability due to the fact that
the hydrology has been influenced by
many similar seismic events in the past
(NAS Report p. 93). Seismic activity can
account for a number of changes in the
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hydrology of the area, from the opening
or closing of fractures and large-scale
changes in water levels to a shift in the
direction of ground-water flow in the
region. It could also increase the
potential for enhanced movement of the
radionuclides in the waste, because the
potential for increased rate of water
movement could contribute to a greater
velocity of the ground water in the
aquifer, which could reduce the travel
time of radionuclides out to the
boundary of the controlled area.
However, we are proposing today that
DOE’s analysis for seismic events may
exclude the effects of seismicity on the
hydrology of the Yucca Mountain
disposal system. In making this
decision, we considered the NAS’s
guidance as well as the relative effects
of climate change on the hydrology of
the disposal system.
In its report, NAS observed that
seismicity potentially can affect the
hydrologic regime by causing
displacements and increasing
conductivity along existing fractures.
NAS noted that such displacements are
likely to occur along existing fractures
(as opposed to creating new ones) and,
further, that hydrology near Yucca
Mountain ‘‘has been conditioned by
many similar seismic events over
geologic time’’ (NAS Report p. 93).
Since no major new flow paths would
be created, these statements imply that
the most likely hydrologic effects are
changes in conductivity or a localized
shift in the ground-water flow.
Nevertheless, NAS concluded that
‘‘such displacements have an equal
probability of favorably changing the
hydrologic regime’’ (NAS Report p. 93).
We agree, and also conclude that
predicting the magnitude of changes in
hydraulic conductivity—whether
favorable or unfavorable—or the details
of localized changes in the direction of
ground-water flow is highly speculative,
especially in view of the highly
fractured nature of the geology at Yucca
Mountain.
However, we also agree with NAS that
‘‘the effect of seismicity on the
hydrologic regime could probably be
bounded’’ (NAS Report p. 93). The
endpoint of most concern resulting from
changes in flowpaths or hydraulic
conductivity would be the potential for
greater movement of water through the
disposal system. As previously
mentioned, this could enhance
movement of radionuclides from the
waste. Importantly, this is also the
endpoint of concern for climate change
scenarios. As discussed in more detail
in Section II.D.2.d, we are proposing
that DOE must consider climate change
scenarios that result in an increased
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flow of water through the disposal
system. Unlike seismic events, such
climate change scenarios do not have
the potential to favorably affect (i.e.,
reduce) the ground-water flow through
the disposal system (at best, they would
have a neutral effect on overall
performance). In addition, the effects on
water flow from climate change would
be expected to exceed any such effects
resulting from seismicity. Thus, we
believe that our proposed requirements
for DOE to consider climate change over
the period of geologic stability
effectively bound the potential
hydrologic effects and no further
analysis is required separately as part of
the seismic scenarios.
In contrast, the potential effects on
waste package failure through physical
impact with other elements of the
engineered barrier system or drift
collapse (rockfall) are not clearly
captured in analyses of other scenarios.
Waste package failure is generally of
importance because it is the immediate
step allowing water to contact the waste,
leading to release of radionuclides.
Waste packages may be more vulnerable
to seismic effects if corrosion processes
have weakened them. Seismic events
may cause the failure of the structures
supporting the waste packages, allowing
them to be physically damaged through
impacts with other objects (i.e., if waste
packages are no longer held in place,
they could collide with other packages
or elements of the engineered barrier
system). The collapse of the
emplacement drift itself could also be
significant at these longer times as
pieces of rock fall onto the alreadyweakened waste packages. Regarding
waste package failure caused by
seismicity, NAS concluded that the
rocks in the Yucca Mountain area are so
extensively fractured that future seismic
events are likely to occur along existing
fractures rather than new ones (NAS
Report p. 93). By knowing the location
of major fractures, DOE may be able to
minimize the adverse effects of
seismicity. For example, DOE can place
waste packages away from these areas
(fault avoidance), thereby decreasing the
risk of failure by seismic induced rock
falls. As can be seen by examples at the
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP),
engineering practices at repositories can
be successful in reducing the probability
of adverse effects on isolation
capabilities and DOE has criteria for
such practices at Yucca Mountain.
Because faults are being avoided by
design, we do not believe DOE must
assume they are not. In the end, DOE
might be able to show that seismic
effects on waste package failure ‘‘could
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be reduced sufficiently to result in
boundable and probably very low risk,’’
as postulated by NAS (NAS Report p.
93). Our proposal would require that
DOE specifically address waste package
failure resulting from seismic events
causing damage to the engineered
barrier system, either through physical
impacts within the drifts through failure
of the supporting structures or drift
collapse so that the significant effects
identified by NAS will be fully
considered.
There are other effects that can be
envisioned from seismic events near
Yucca Mountain. Beyond the key
aspects of seismicity discussed above,
however, we do not believe there are
others that would be expected to
significantly affect performance (for
example, from events that are of low
magnitude or sufficiently distant from
the disposal system), and NAS similarly
identified none. The consideration of
such effects would unnecessarily
complicate the development of the
performance assessment and the
licensing process without contributing
information on the protective
capabilities of the Yucca Mountain
disposal system. We believe they can
reasonably be excluded from analysis
over the period of geologic stability.
Therefore, in conclusion, we propose
that DOE evaluate the effects of seismic
activity throughout the period of
geologic stability, but limit those effects
to those resulting in damage to the
engineered barrier system and
ultimately the waste packages. The
probability of seismic events of different
magnitude and duration for the period
of geologic stability will be the same as
determined for the period within 10,000
years. We request comment on this
approach.
c. Consideration of Igneous (Volcanic)
FEPs
EPA recognizes that a volcanic
intrusion into the repository, although
an unlikely event, could release a
portion of the radioactive inventory. We
agree with the NAS that this possibility
exists over the period of geologic
stability (NAS Report p. 94). While
acknowledging the complexity of the
release of radionuclides from the
repository, given the known effects of
the various types of past volcanic events
and the study of the cinder cones in the
area, we believe it is possible to develop
reasonable estimates of the probability
of radionuclide release via volcanic
episodes through the repository through
the period of geologic stability.
We agree with NAS that the
probability of igneous events may be
great enough, and the potential
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consequences significant enough, that
they must be considered over the period
of geologic stability. An analysis of the
probability is based on extrapolations
into the future of volcanic activity from
the geologic record, and on assumptions
about the spatial distribution of future
volcanic eruptions in the Yucca
Mountain region. Volcanism by nature
is an episodic event. In the Yucca
Mountain region it has been
characterized as involving intermittent
concentrated activity followed by long
periods of quiescence (NAS Report p.
94). For example, the repository block
tuffs are in the age range of
approximately 11–12 million years old
and were generated by large-scale
volcanism involving a large area around
the site (‘‘Site Environmental Report for
the Yucca Mountain Project Calendar
Year 2003,’’ PGM–MGR–EC–000005–
REV 00, Section 1.1, October 2004,
Docket No. OAR–2005–0083–0086).
This material is made of layers of
ashfalls from volcanic eruptions that
consolidated into the rock (of a type
known as ‘‘tuff’’). Tuff has varying
degrees of compaction and fracturing
depending on the degree of ‘‘welding’’
caused by temperature and pressure
when the ash was deposited. An event
of this nature is not likely to be repeated
during the geologic stability period. It
has been suggested by NAS, and fits
within our FEPs screening, that a
probability of 10¥8/yr, which is a 1 in
10,000 possibility of a disruption
(affecting the repository, not simply a
volcanic event in the region) over
10,000 years ‘‘might be sufficiently low
to constitute a negligible risk’’ (NAS
Report p. 95). Based on available
information generated by DOE in its
TSPA (Yucca Mountain Science and
Engineering Report, DOE/RW–0539,
Section 4.4.3, May 2001, Docket No.
OAR–2005–0083–0069), the mean
annual probability of an igneous event
within the Yucca Mountain repository
footprint is estimated at 1.6 × 10¥8 per
year (which is slightly higher than a one
in 10,000 possibility of a disruption
over 10,000 years). This probability,
though extremely low, is just within the
regulatory threshold for inclusion of
events with very low probability of
occurrence, but it can be assumed that
this probability will hold throughout the
period of geologic stability (NAS Report
p. 94). For this reason, we are proposing
to require that DOE include
consideration of igneous FEPs extending
over the period of geologic stability.
We also agree with NAS that
reasonable estimates of the effects can
be developed (NAS Report p. 95). As
with the seismic FEPs, we believe this
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is best accomplished by limiting the
analysis to those effects most significant
for performance. As we stated in our
2001 rule, the geologic record is the best
source of evidence for the frequency and
magnitude of natural features, events,
and processes that could affect
repository performance, and the
geologic record is best preserved in the
relatively recent past (66 FR 32100).
Studies of the volcanic history of the
area in the recent past indicate a
different type of volcanic activity other
than the intermittent layering volcanic
activity that produced Yucca Mountain
has occurred (FEIS, DOE/EIS–0250,
Appendix I, Section 2.10, Docket No.
OAR–2005–0083–0086). Basalt
volcanism, exemplified by the Lathrop
Wells volcano, and other features near
the repository, appears to be the type of
igneous activity, though unlikely, that
has some probability of occurring
within the period of geologic stability.
By narrowing the type of events most
plausible during the period of stability,
we can attempt to constrain the
uncertainty involved in using
probabilistic analyses. The NAS noted
that the most significant effects are
related to future events that could
intersect the repository (NAS Report p.
94).
Existing DOE calculations provide an
example of analysis of such disruptive
igneous events. DOE states that, if
igneous activity occurred at Yucca
Mountain, possible effects on the
repository could be grouped into three
areas (FEIS, DOE/EIS–0250, Appendix I,
Section 2.10, Volcanism, Docket No.
OAR–2005–0083–0086):
• Igneous activity that would not
directly intersect the repository (can be
shown to have no effect on dose from
the repository);
• Volcanic eruptions in the repository
that would result in waste material
being entrained in the volcanic magma
or pyroclastic material, bringing waste
to the surface (resulting in atmospheric
transport of volcanic ash contaminated
with radionuclides and subsequent
human exposure downwind); or
• An igneous intrusion intersecting
the repository (no eruption but damage
to waste packages from exposure to the
igneous material that would enhance
release to the ground water and, thus,
enhance transport to the biosphere).
Based on studies of past activity in
the region, probabilities for different
types of igneous activity have been
estimated by DOE. Each type of event
was described in detail based on
observation of effects of past activities
as embodied in the geologic record of
the region. These descriptions include
geometry of intrusions, geometry of
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eruptions, physical and chemical
properties of volcanic materials,
eruption properties (velocity, power,
duration, volume, and particle
characteristics). Most of the parameters
describing the igneous activity were
entered in the modeling as probability
distributions (FEIS, DOE/EIS–0250,
Appendix I, Section 2.10, Volcanism,
Docket No. OAR–2005–0083–0086).
DOE’s current igneous activity
scenario contains two separate possible
events: a volcanic eruption that includes
exposure as a result of atmospheric
transport and deposition on the ground,
and an igneous intrusion ground-water
transport event. In the volcanic eruption
event, a dike (or dikes) would intersect
the repository and compromise all waste
packages in the conduit. Then, an
eruptive conduit of an associated
volcano would intersect waste packages
in its path. Waste packages in the path
of the conduit would be sufficiently
damaged that they provide no further
protection, and the waste in the
packages would be entrained in the
eruption and subject to atmospheric
transport. In the igneous intrusion
ground-water transport event, the
analysis calculated releases caused by a
dike (or dikes) intersecting
emplacement drifts, causing varying
degrees of waste-package damage and
making the contents of the containers
available for transport to the RMEI
through ground water. We believe these
are the most significant consequences
that would result from a volcanic event
through the repository. Other results
from igneous events—the occurrence of
distant events, potential drift instability,
or changes in rock fracturing—are
secondary to the direct releases of
radionuclides. In addition, the response
of the disposal system to such effects
would likely be captured by
consideration of other FEPs (such as
seismicity or climate change). Therefore,
we are proposing that DOE’s
consideration of igneous events over the
period of geologic stability may be
limited to events that intersect the
repository, damage the waste packages,
and cause releases of radionuclides
either directly to the atmosphere and
biosphere (i.e., an extrusive event) or to
the ground water. We expect that the
same probability of occurrence for these
events used in the 10,000-year analysis
be applied over the period of geologic
stability. Using this probability, it is
very unlikely that more than one
igneous event would be included in a
single realization. However, the two
types of events are very different in
terms of their potential effects and when
those effects would be greatest. We
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believe this approach is appropriate, as
described in the next paragraph.
DOE’s analysis of releases from waste
packages entrained by magma erupted
on the surface assume the waste
containers are breached by the eruption
itself and the wastes are available for
dispersal by the eruption. In this
scenario, the doses would be highest if
the eruption happened early in the
geologic stability period (before
significant decay of short-lived
radionuclides that provide a dose
through inhalation as well as through
deposition and uptake by plants), and
are lower if the event occurs at later
times. Assuming waste packages are
breached during the event provides that
the assessment is a ‘‘worst case’’ in
terms of potential doses because it does
not depend on assumptions regarding
other waste package failure
mechanisms, such as corrosion.
However, other analyses and laboratory
experiments have been presented
suggesting that intact waste containers
can withstand the temperatures of the
molten magma without melting or
otherwise sustaining significant damage
(‘‘Evaluation of the Igneous Extrusive
Scenario,’’ Presentation to the Nuclear
Waste Technical Review Board,
September 20, 2004, Docket No. OAR–
2005–0083–0074). These analyses
suggest that an early eruption might not
produce the highest doses since the
wastes could not be dispersed as easily.
Under these assumptions, an eruption
considerably later in the geologic
stability period, when the waste
containers have degraded considerably
from corrosion processes, is more likely
to result in widespread dispersal of the
wastes. However, at the later times, the
radionuclide inventory in the wastes
would have decreased from decay, and
projected releases would probably not
exceed those estimated for the early
eruption scenario DOE performed. The
existing assessments of the eruptive
event based on our previously issued
regulations contain a number of
assumptions, which we believe has led
to conservative assessments. Under
DOE’s assumptions, the highest dose as
a result of volcanic eruptions would
occur within the first 10,000 years
because that is when the radionuclide
inventory is at its highest. We are not
assuming this approach will be retained
in all details, and have structured our
proposed rule accordingly to ensure that
igneous events are considered over the
period of geologic stability. However,
we acknowledge that the current
approach, if retained, would meet our
requirements and be conservative. We
request comment on our proposal.
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d. Consideration of Climatological FEPs
The average of weather conditions
over a long period of time is the climate
(www.cogsci.princeton.edu/cgi-bin/
webwn), and it has been well
documented that climate can vary
significantly over geologic time (NAS
Report p. 91). Climate controls the range
of precipitation and temperature
conditions at Yucca Mountain. There
are a number of impacts, particularly on
the hydrologic regime, that must be
taken into account. Run-on, run-off, and
evapotranspiration of precipitation
influence the rate of infiltration into the
subsurface. The greater the amount of
infiltration, or recharge, the greater the
potential for an increase in ground
water to infiltrate into the repository,
allowing for an increase in the
dissolution of the radionuclides. This
could lead to higher release rates from
the waste. Consequently, it is important
to examine the effects of climate change
throughout the period of geologic
stability.
At present the Earth is in an
interglacial phase (NAS Report p. 91).
Climate change historically has been
cyclical: ‘‘Over a million-year time
scale, however, the global climate
regime is virtually certain to pass
through several glacial-interglacial
cycles * * *’’ (NAS Report p. 91).
Similarly, the Yucca Mountain FEIS
states: ‘‘The record shows continual
variation, often with very rapid jumps,
between cold glacial climates (* * *
pluvial periods) and warm interglacial
climates similar to the present.
Fluctuations average 100,000 years in
length’’ (FEIS, DOE/EIS–0250, p. 5–12,
Docket No. OAR–2005–0083–0086).
NAS stated the following with regard to
climate change at Yucca Mountain:
During the past 150,000 years, the climate
has fluctuated between glacial and
interglacial status. Although the range of
climatic conditions has been wide,
paleoclimatic research shows that the
bounding conditions, the envelope
encompassing the total climatic range have
been fairly stable (Jannik et al., 1991;
Winograd et al., 1992; Dansgaard et al.,
1993). Recent research has indicated that the
past 10,000 years are probably the only
sustained period of stable climate in the past
80,000 years (Dansgaard et al., 1993). Based
on this record, it seems plausible that the
climate will fluctuate between glacial and
interglacial states during the period
suggested for the performance assessment
calculations. Thus, the specified upper
boundary, or the physical top boundary of
the modeled system, would be a conservative
approach that captures the most severe,
detrimental performance effects of these
variations (especially in terms of groundwater recharge).
(NAS Report pp. 77–78.)
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We are concerned about the
possibility of over-speculation of
climatic change over such extremely
long time periods, possibly out to the
next 1 million years. The NAS
recognized this fact in its report, stating
‘‘Although the typical nature of past
climate changes is well known, it is
obviously impossible to predict in detail
either the nature or the timing of future
climate change. This fact adds to the
uncertainty of the model predictions’
(NAS Report p. 77).
EPA agrees with the NAS statement
and takes the position that it is not
useful to have unconstrained
speculation on future climate during the
period of geologic stability, because it is
possible to assume any number of
scenarios of climate over this large
amount of time, and there is very little
evidence available to accept or refute
most of them. Because it is not possible
to predict every situation that could
occur over such a long time, we feel that
the best course, as outlined below, is to
construct a climate scenario that
assumes reasonable temperature and
precipitation values, and allow this
scenario to run throughout the period of
geologic stability.
Climate change differs from seismic
and igneous events in that its effects
would not occur instantaneously, and it
can affect multiple portions of the
disposal system with a very direct effect
on performance since the movement of
water through the site is the primary
means for transporting radionuclides.
These effects can persist for very long
time periods, even longer than the
period of geologic stability. Seismic
events and volcanism, in contrast, are
episodic events; though the events occur
relatively quickly and deliver their
consequences over the short term, the
consequences themselves can be very
long-lasting and fundamentally change
the geologic setting.
There are three major effects that
climate change can impart on the
disposal system (NAS Report p. 91). The
first is that increases in erosion might
significantly decrease the burial depth
of the repository. NAS pointed out that
site-specific studies performed by DOE
indicate that an increase in erosion to
the extent necessary to expose the
repository within the period of geologic
stability is extremely unlikely (NAS
Report p. 91). Therefore, we do not
believe it is important or necessary to
require DOE to assess the potential for
erosion from climate change.
The second change might be a shift in
the distribution and activities of human
populations (NAS Report p. 92). A
cooler, wetter climate may provide a
more hospitable environment,
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increasing the population, and (some
have argued) possibly changing the
parameters we have outlined for the
RMEI. We are not proposing to change
the definition or characteristics of the
RMEI. We have discussed our reasoning
for taking this approach in greater detail
in Section II.A.1 of this document. We
do not believe that fixing the climate to
present-day characteristics is the
appropriate way to circumvent the
difficulties in defining a biosphere
applicable for 1 million years. Our view
is that evaluation of reasonable climate
change is critical to the integrity and
meaning of peak dose projections.
Further, as NAS noted, ‘‘there is no
simple relation between future climatic
conditions and future population’’ (NAS
Report p. 92).
Finally, for extremely long time
periods, major changes in the global
climate, for example a transition to a
glacial climate, could affect groundwater movement. NAS states ‘‘Change to
a cooler, wetter climate at Yucca
Mountain would likely result in greater
fluxes of water through the unsaturated
zone’’ (NAS Report pp. 91–92). NAS
observed that a doubling of the effective
wetness (the ratio of precipitation to
effective evapotranspiration) could
cause a significant increase in recharge
(NAS Report p. 91). This could affect
the rates of radionuclide release from
the waste and transport to the water
table, although the location of the
repository in the subsurface would
provide a time lag for climate change
effects. NAS states, ‘‘The time required
for unsaturated zone flux changes to
propagate down to the repository and
then to the water table is probably in the
range of hundreds to thousands of years.
The time required for saturated flowsystem responses is probably even
longer. For this reason, climate changes
on the time scale of hundreds of years
would probably have little if any effect
on repository performance, and the
effects of climate changes on the deep
hydrogeology can be assessed over
much longer time scales’’ (NAS Report
p. 92).
In its current analysis of future
climate states (‘‘Future Climate
Analysis,’’ ANL–NBS–GS–000008–Rev
00, 2000, Section 6.2, Docket No. OAR–
2005–0083–0068), DOE assumed that all
future climates were similar to current
conditions or wetter than current
conditions. The climate model provides
a forecast of future climates based on
information about past patterns of
climates. The model represents future
climate shifts as a series of instant
changes. During the first 10,000 years,
there are three changes, in order of
increasing wetness, from present-day to
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a monsoon and then to a glacialtransition climate. Between 10,000 years
and 1 million years there are 45 changes
between six climate states incorporated
in the TSPA model:
• Interglacial Climate (same as
present day)
• Intermediate Climate (same as the
Glacial-transition)
• Intermediate/Monsoon Climate
• Three stages of Glacial Climate of
varying infiltration rates
Precipitation that is not returned to
the atmosphere by evaporation or
transpiration enters the unsaturated
zone flow system. Water infiltration is
affected by a number of factors related
to climate, such as an increase or
decrease in vegetation on the ground
surface, total precipitation, air
temperature, and runoff. The infiltration
model uses data collected from studies
of surface infiltration in the Yucca
Mountain region. It treats infiltration as
variable in the region, with more
occurring along the crest of Yucca
Mountain than along its base. The
results of the climate model affect
assumed infiltration rates. For each
climate, there is a set of three
infiltration rates (high, medium, low)
and associated probabilities. This forms
a discrete distribution that is sampled in
the probabilistic modeling. Whenever a
particular climate state is in effect, the
associated infiltration rate distribution
is sampled for each realization of the
simulation.
One of the issues associated with
DOE’s existing modeling efforts on
climate at very long times is that the
analysis assumed instantaneous changes
between climate states. In other words,
the entire flow field was assumed to
immediately switch from one climate
state to another. This approach is
unrealistic because, as noted above, it
would likely take hundreds or
thousands of years for increased
infiltration from a wetter climate to
reach the underlying aquifer and affect
transport and flow patterns. DOE also
assumed that the climate change
occurred at the same time for all
realizations, which magnified the effect
of the instantaneous change of climate
when looked at as a probabilistic
analysis. The result is that the doses
calculated were the product of the
conservatism of the assumptions noted
above (e.g., instantaneous climate shift,
which was assumed to occur at the same
time for all realizations). Such
assumptions are unlikely to produce
meaningful or realistic results.
We believe that an approach should
be developed to answer several basic
questions about how climatological
effects realistically will impact the
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proposed repository until the time to
peak dose. The questions that concern
us are:
1. How much total water will
infiltrate into the repository over this
large amount of time?
2. Will more water infiltrate the
repository over time when modeled as
a wave function (current DOE modeling)
or as total average?
The answers to these questions assist
in identifying conservative, yet
reasonable, conditions the repository
may encounter over the period of
geologic stability. The amount of net
infiltration into Yucca Mountain has an
effect on the disposal system
performance because higher net
infiltration leads to the possibility that
a greater proportion of the repository
will experience ground-water seepage.
For solubility-limited radionuclides in
the waste, an increase in net infiltration
could lead to a higher release rate of
radionuclides from the disposal system,
thereby affecting the potential dose to
the RMEI in the accessible environment.
We do not believe that it is important
to know or predict with certainty
precisely when the climate states with
peak precipitation occur during the
modeling. There are too many
uncertainties and permutations
available in trying to project a future set
of climate conditions, and it is difficult
to place specific times on when discrete
pulses of precipitation should be
injected into the modeling (NAS Report
p. 77). Instead, we believe that it is
reasonable to assume an average
increase in precipitation over the entire
time from 10,000 years through the
period of geologic stability, and to
model those consequences. An increase
in average precipitation throughout the
period of geologic stability is a more
reasonable approach because it assumes
a constant source of precipitation,
creating more downward flow that will
eventually reach the repository. This
scenario need not be dominated by
highs or lows in precipitation over the
time period and does not require
speculation about the exact timing or
transient effects of shifts in climate.
Rather, setting a constant value
somewhat higher than today’s average
annual rainfall and extending it out to
the time of peak dose would account for
the greater potential for available fluids
at the time of the failure of the waste
packages. We believe that this approach
provides a reasonable test of the
repository conditions out to the time of
peak dose, and will give a more
conservative idea of potential fluid flow,
as well as potential for migration of
radionuclides out of the repository.
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We are proposing today that DOE,
based on past climate conditions in the
Yucca Mountain area, should determine
how the disposal system responds to the
effects of increased water flow through
the repository as a result of climate
change. We believe that the nature and
extent of climate change can be
reasonably represented by constant
conditions taking effect after 10,000
years out to the time of geologic
stability. We are proposing to explicitly
require that DOE assume water flow will
increase as a result of climate change.
We leave it to NRC as the licensing
authority to specify the values to be
used to represent climate change.
However, we expect that a doubling of
today’s average annual precipitation
beginning at 10,000 years and
continuing through the period of
geologic stability would provide a
reasonable scenario, given NAS’s
statements regarding potential effects on
recharge (NAS Report p. 92). NRC could
also use the range of projected
precipitation values for different climate
states and specify a reasonable longterm average precipitation based on the
duration of each climate state over the
period of geologic stability. We believe
that either approach will allow for a
reasonable estimate of how water will
impact the site without subjecting the
assessments to speculative assumptions
that may well be unresolvable, while
providing a reasonable indicator of
disposal system compliance. NRC might
choose to express the ground-water flow
effects directly as infiltration rates or
other representative parameters,
avoiding the necessity of translating
precipitation and other climate-related
parameters (e.g., temperature or
evapotranspiration rates) into
infiltration.
Finally, we note that there are other
potential effects of climate change such
as the formation of surficial ponds or
changes in fauna and flora (which could
affect infiltration through changes in
evapotranspiration rates). NAS did not
identify these as significant, and also
reiterated that speculation on the
evolution of the biosphere (aside from
climate) is unwarranted and
unproductive. We agree fully. Therefore,
in summary, we are proposing that DOE
must include consideration of climate
change in its performance assessment
for compliance with the dose standard
for the period of geologic stability. The
assessment may be limited to the effects
of increased water flow through the
repository as a result of climate change.
Climate change may be represented by
constant conditions, which NRC would
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specify in regulation. We request
comment on this proposal.
E. How Is EPA Proposing To Revise the
Human-Intrusion Standard (§ 197.25)
To Address Peak Dose?
As discussed in Section II.A.2, we
believe it is logical and defensible to
modify the human-intrusion standard in
§ 197.25 to parallel the revisions we are
proposing for the individual-protection
standard. We described in some detail
in that section the reasons why we
believe that course of action to be
appropriate, and briefly summarize our
proposal here. Like the individualprotection standard, our provisions for
human intrusion in the 2001 rule
envisioned some consideration of
performance beyond 10,000 years. The
exposures resulting from the event were
subject to the same compliance standard
as the individual-protection standard
(15 mrem/yr at 10,000 years or earlier
coupled with compilation in the EIS if
doses were projected to occur after
10,000 years). In deciding to propose
revisions to the human-intrusion
standard to conform to changes we are
proposing to make to the individualprotection provisions, we kept in mind
the NAS recommendation that ‘‘the
figure-of-merit for [the human-intrusion]
calculation should be the same as in the
undisturbed case * * * EPA should
require that the conditional risk as a
result of the assumed intrusion scenario
should be no greater than the risk levels
that would be acceptable for the
undisturbed-repository case’’ (NAS
Report pp. 112–113).
The 2001 standard required that DOE
determine when an intrusion by drilling
would be possible and assess the
consequences. We believe it is still
appropriate for DOE to determine the
time at which the intrusion could occur.
However, under our proposal today,
consequences at any time within the
period of geologic stability would be
subject to a compliance demonstration.
We are proposing to apply the same
dose limits to the human-intrusion
scenario as we are proposing for the
individual-protection scenario. Thus,
exposures incurred by the RMEI within
10,000 years after disposal as a result of
the intrusion must comply with a
standard of 150 µSv/yr (15 mrem/yr).
Exposures after that time within the
period of geologic stability must comply
with a standard of 3.5 mSv/yr (350
mrem/yr). DOE must still use the same
assumptions regarding the RMEI as it
used for the individual-protection
analysis.
We are not proposing to modify in
any way the circumstances of the
intrusion described in § 197.26. We
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believe those circumstances continue to
reflect two key points emphasized by
NAS. First, ‘‘there is no scientific basis
for estimating the probability of
intrusion at far-future times’’ (NAS
Report p. 106). Second, like future
society, future exploration technology
cannot be predicted (NAS Report p.
107). Therefore, there is no basis for
assuming a different set of
circumstances to apply to intrusions
beyond 10,000 years.
We request comment on our proposed
changes to the human-intrusion
standard. We are not soliciting, and will
not consider, comments on the overall
intrusion scenario or other aspects of
the human-intrusion standard that are
not proposed to be changed.
F. Summary of Today’s Proposal by
Section
Today’s proposal is limited in scope.
We are proposing to amend provisions
only as necessary to address the Court
ruling. Because of the unique nature of
the challenge facing us, in which we
must craft a regulatory standard to apply
to times up to 1 million years, we have
chosen to discuss many aspects of our
2001 rule in this document. We have
done so because we believe it important
that the public clearly understand what
actions we are proposing to take and
why, as well as reasons for not
amending other provisions. In the
listing that follows, we identify only
those provisions of the rule that we are
proposing to change today. We request
public comment only on these proposed
amendments. We are not proposing to
change any other provisions. Therefore,
we are not requesting, and will not
respond to, public comments related to
those provisions, since they have been
previously established in rulemaking
and are outside the scope of today’s
proposal.
Subpart A—Public Health and
Environmental Standards for Storage
§ 197.2, What definitions apply in
subpart A?—Amends the definition of
Effective Dose Equivalent to specify that
calculations be performed using organ
weighting factors in Appendix A.
Subpart B—Public Health and
Environmental Standards for Disposal
§ 197.12, What definitions apply in
subpart B?—Modifies the definition of
Performance Assessment to remove
reference to 10,000 years. Modifies the
definition of Period of Geologic Stability
as ending 1 million years after disposal.
§ 197.13, How is subpart B
implemented?—Specifies that the
arithmetic mean of the distribution of
projected doses is used to determine
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compliance within 10,000 years.
Specifies that the median of the
distribution of projected doses is used to
determine compliance beyond 10,000
years but within the period of geologic
stability (for §§ 197.20 and 197.25 only).
§ 197.15, How must DOE take into
account the changes that will occur
during the next 10,000 years after
disposal?—Replaces references to
10,000 years with ‘‘period of geologic
stability.’’
§ 197.20, What [individual-protection]
standard must DOE meet?—Retains the
standard of 15 mrem/yr to apply up to
10,000 years after disposal. Adds a
standard of 350 mrem/yr to apply
beyond 10,000 years within the period
of geologic stability.
§ 197.25, What [human-intrusion]
standard must DOE meet?—Retains the
standard of 15 mrem/yr to apply up to
10,000 years after disposal. Adds a
standard of 350 mrem/yr to apply
beyond 10,000 years within the period
of geologic stability. Removes references
to time of intrusion and to placement of
results in EIS.
§ 197.35, What other projections must
DOE make?—Section to be deleted.
§ 197.36, Are there limits on what
DOE must consider in the performance
assessments?—Addresses probability of
features, events, and processes in
assessments used to comply with
proposed § 197.20(b). Adds provisions
to address climate change, igneous,
seismic, and general corrosion
scenarios.
Appendix A, Calculation of
Committed Effective Dose Equivalent—
describes the method to calculate the
dose for comparison with the
appropriate standards.
III. Statutory and Executive Order
Reviews
A. Executive Order 12866: Regulatory
Planning and Review
Under Executive Order 12866, [58
Federal Register 51735 (October 4,
1993)] the Agency must determine
whether the regulatory action is
‘‘significant’’ and therefore subject to
OMB review and the requirements of
the Executive Order. The Order defines
‘‘significant regulatory action’’ as one
that is likely to result in a rule that may:
(1) Have an annual effect on the
economy of $100 million or more or
adversely affect in a material way the
economy, a sector of the economy,
productivity, competition, jobs, the
environment, public health or safety, or
State, local, or tribal governments or
communities;
(2) Create a serious inconsistency or
otherwise interfere with an action taken
or planned by another agency;
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(3) Materially alter the budgetary
impact of entitlements, grants, user fees,
or loan programs or the rights and
obligations of recipients thereof; or
(4) Raise novel legal or policy issues
arising out of legal mandates, the
President’s priorities, or the principles
set forth in the Executive Order.
Pursuant to the terms of Executive
Order 12866, it has been determined
that this rule is a ‘‘significant regulatory
action’’ because it raises novel legal or
policy issues arising out of the specific
legal mandate of Section 801 of the
Energy Policy Act of 1992. As such, this
action was submitted to OMB for
review. Changes made in response to
OMB suggestions or recommendations
will be documented in the public
record.
B. Paperwork Reduction Act
This action does not impose an
information collection burden under the
provisions of the Paperwork Reduction
Act, 44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq. We have
determined that this rule contains no
information collection requirements
within the scope of the Paperwork
Reduction Act.
Burden means the total time, effort, or
financial resources expended by persons
to generate, maintain, retain, or disclose
or provide information to or for a
Federal agency. This includes the time
needed to review instructions; develop,
acquire, install, and utilize technology
and systems for the purposes of
collecting, validating, and verifying
information, processing and
maintaining information, and disclosing
and providing information; adjust the
existing ways to comply with any
previously applicable instructions and
requirements; train personnel to be able
to respond to a collection of
information; search data sources;
complete and review the collection of
information; and transmit or otherwise
disclose the information.
An agency may not conduct or
sponsor, and a person is not required to
respond to a collection of information
unless it displays a currently valid OMB
control number. The OMB control
numbers for EPA’s regulations in 40
CFR are listed in 40 CFR part 9.
C. Regulatory Flexibility Act
The Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA)
generally requires an agency to prepare
a regulatory flexibility analysis of any
rule subject to notice and comment
rulemaking requirements under the
Administrative Procedure Act or any
other statute unless the agency certifies
that the rule will not have a significant
economic impact on a substantial
number of small entities. Small entities
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49061
include small businesses, small
organizations, and small governmental
jurisdictions.
For purposes of assessing the impacts
of today’s rule on small entities, small
entity is defined as: (1) A small business
as defined by the Small Business
Administration’s (SBA) regulations at 13
CFR 121.201; (2) a small governmental
jurisdiction that is a government of a
city, county, town, school district or
special district with a population of less
than 50,000; and (3) a small
organization that is any not-for-profit
enterprise which is independently
owned and operated and is not
dominant in its field.
However, the requirement to prepare
a regulatory flexibility analysis does not
apply if the Administrator certifies that
the rule will not, if promulgated, have
a significant economic impact upon a
substantial number of small entities (5
U.S.C. 605(b)). The rule proposed today
would establish requirements that apply
only to DOE. Therefore, it does not
apply to small entities. Accordingly, I
hereby certify that the rule, when
promulgated, will not have a significant
economic impact upon a substantial
number of small entities. We continue
to be interested in the potential impacts
of our proposed rules on small entities
and welcome comments on issues
related to such impacts.
D. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
Title II of the Unfunded Mandates
Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA), Pub. L.
104–4, establishes requirements for
Federal agencies to assess the effects of
their regulatory actions on State, local,
and tribal governments and the private
sector. Under section 202 of the UMRA,
EPA generally must prepare a written
statement, including a cost-benefit
analysis, for proposed and final rules
with ‘‘Federal mandates’’ that may
result in expenditures to State, local,
and tribal governments, in the aggregate,
or to the private sector, of $100 million
or more in any one year. Before
promulgating an EPA rule for which a
written statement is needed, section 205
of the UMRA generally requires EPA to
identify and consider a reasonable
number of regulatory alternatives and
adopt the least costly, most costeffective or least burdensome alternative
that achieves the objectives of the rule.
The provisions of section 205 do not
apply when they are inconsistent with
applicable law. Moreover, section 205
allows EPA to adopt an alternative other
than the least costly, most cost-effective
or least burdensome alternative if the
Administrator publishes with the final
rule an explanation why that alternative
was not adopted. Before EPA establishes
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any regulatory requirements that may
significantly or uniquely affect small
governments, including tribal
governments, it must have developed
under section 203 of the UMRA a small
government agency plan. The plan must
provide for notifying potentially
affected small governments, enabling
officials of affected small governments
to have meaningful and timely input in
the development of EPA regulatory
proposals with significant Federal
intergovernmental mandates, and
informing, educating, and advising
small governments on compliance with
the regulatory requirements.
Today’s proposed rule contains no
Federal mandates (under the regulatory
provisions of Title II of UMRA) for
State, local, or tribal governments or the
private sector. The proposed rule
implements requirements specifically
set forth by the Congress in section 801
of the EnPA and proposes radiological
protection standards applicable solely
and exclusively to the Department of
Energy’s potential storage and disposal
facility at Yucca Mountain. The rule
imposes no enforceable duty on any
State, local or tribal governments or the
private sector. Thus, today’s rule is not
subject to the requirements of sections
202 and 205 of UMRA.
E. Executive Order 13132: Federalism
Executive Order 13132, entitled
‘‘Federalism’’ (64 FR 43255, August 10,
1999), requires EPA to develop an
accountable process to ensure
‘‘meaningful and timely input by State
and local officials in the development of
regulatory policies that have federalism
implications.’’ ‘‘Policies that have
federalism implications’’ is defined in
the Executive Order to include
regulations that have ‘‘substantial direct
effects on the States, on the relationship
between the national government and
the States, or on the distribution of
power and responsibilities among the
various levels of government.’’
This proposed rule does not have
federalism implications. It will not have
substantial direct effects on the States,
on the relationship between the national
government and the States, or on the
distribution of power and
responsibilities among the various
levels of government, as specified in
Executive Order 13132. Thus, Executive
Order 13132 does not apply to this rule.
In the spirit of Executive Order 13132,
and consistent with EPA policy to
promote communications between EPA
and State and local governments, EPA
specifically solicits comment on this
proposed rule from State and local
officials.
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F. Executive Order 13175: Consultation
and Coordination With Indian Tribal
Governments
H. Executive Order 13211: Actions That
Significantly Affect Energy Supply,
Distribution, or Use
Executive Order 13175, entitled
‘‘Consultation and Coordination with
Indian Tribal Governments’’ (65 FR
67249, November 9, 2000), requires EPA
to develop an accountable process to
ensure ‘‘meaningful and timely input by
tribal officials in the development of
regulatory policies that have tribal
implications.’’ This proposed rule does
not have tribal implications, as specified
in Executive Order 13175. The rule
proposed today would regulate only
DOE on land owned by the Federal
government. The rule proposed today
does not have substantial direct effects
on one or more Indian tribes, on the
relationship between the Federal
Government and Indian tribes, or on the
distribution of power and
responsibilities between the Federal
Government and Indian tribes. Thus,
Executive Order 13175 does not apply
to this rule. EPA specifically solicits
additional comment on this proposed
rule from tribal officials.
This rule is not a ‘‘significant energy
action’’ as defined in Executive Order
13211, ‘‘Actions Concerning Regulations
That Significantly Affect Energy Supply,
Distribution, or Use’’ (66 FR 28355 (May
22, 2001)) because it is not likely to
have a significant adverse effect on the
supply, distribution, or use of energy.
The rule proposed today would apply
only to DOE. Construction, operation,
and closure of the repository at Yucca
Mountain would fulfill the Federal
government’s commitment to manage
the final disposition of spent nuclear
fuel from commercial power reactors.
However, there is no direct link between
operation of the repository and an
increased use of nuclear power. Other
economic, technical, and policy factors
will influence the extent to which
nuclear energy is utilized.
G. Executive Order 13045: Protection of
Children From Environmental Health &
Safety Risks
Executive Order 13045: ‘‘Protection of
Children from Environmental Health
Risks and Safety Risks’’ (62 FR 19885,
April 23, 1997) applies to any rule that:
(1) Is determined to be ‘‘economically
significant’’ as defined under Executive
Order 12866, and (2) concerns an
environmental health or safety risk that
EPA has reason to believe may have a
disproportionate effect on children. If
the regulatory action meets both criteria,
the Agency must evaluate the
environmental health or safety effects of
the planned rule on children, and
explain why the planned regulation is
preferable to other potentially effective
and reasonably feasible alternatives
considered by the Agency.
This proposed rule is not subject to
Executive Order 13045 because it is not
economically significant as defined in
Executive Order 12866, and because the
Agency does not have reason to believe
the environmental health risks or safety
risks addressed by this action present a
disproportionate risk to children. The
public is invited to submit or identify
peer-reviewed studies and data, of
which EPA may not be aware, that
assessed results of early life exposure to
radiation.
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I. National Technology Transfer and
Advancement Act
Section 12(d) of the National
Technology Transfer and Advancement
Act of 1995 (‘‘NTTAA’’), Public Law
104–113, 12(d) (15 U.S.C. 272 note)
directs EPA to use voluntary consensus
standards in its regulatory activities
unless to do so would be inconsistent
with applicable law or otherwise
impractical. Voluntary consensus
standards are technical standards (e.g.,
materials specifications, test methods,
sampling procedures, and business
practices) that are developed or adopted
by voluntary consensus standards
bodies. The NTTAA directs EPA to
provide Congress, through OMB,
explanations when the Agency decides
not to use available and applicable
voluntary consensus standards.
In our original proposal (64 FR 46976,
August 27, 1999), we requested public
comment on potentially applicable
voluntary consensus standards that
would be appropriate for inclusion in
the Yucca Mountain rule. We received
no comments on this aspect of the rule.
The closest analogy to consensus
standards for radioactive waste disposal
facilities are our regulations at 40 CFR
part 191. As discussed above in this
preamble, Congress expressly prohibited
the application of the 40 CFR part 191
standards to the Yucca Mountain
disposal facility, and, therefore, the
standards promulgated in 2001 and
today’s proposed revisions are sitespecific and developed solely for
application to the Yucca Mountain
disposal facility.
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Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 161 / Monday, August 22, 2005 / Proposed Rules
List of Subjects in 40 CFR Part 197
Environmental protection, Nuclear
energy, Radiation protection,
Radionuclides, Uranium, Waste
treatment and disposal, Spent nuclear
fuel, High-level radioactive waste.
Dated: August 9, 2005.
Stephen L. Johnson,
Administrator.
The Environmental Protection Agency
is hereby proposing to amend part 197
of title 40, Code of Federal Regulations,
as follows:
PART 197—PUBLIC HEALTH AND
ENVIRONMENTAL RADIATION
PROTECTION STANDARDS FOR
YUCCA MOUNTAIN, NEVADA
1. The authority citation for part 197
continues to read as follows:
Authority: Sec. 801, Pub. L. 102–486, 106
Stat. 2921, 42 U.S.C. 10141n.
Subpart A—Public Health and
Environmental Standards for Storage
2. Section 197.2 is amended by
revising the definition of ‘‘Effective dose
equivalent’’ to read as follows:
§ 197.2
A?
What definitions apply in subpart
*
*
*
*
*
Effective dose equivalent means the
sum of the products of the dose
equivalent received by specified tissues
following an exposure of, or an intake
of radionuclides into, specified tissues
of the body, multiplied by appropriate
weighting factors. Annual committed
effective dose equivalents shall be
calculated using weighting factors in
accordance with appendix A of this
part.
*
*
*
*
*
Subpart B—Public Health and
Environmental Standards for Disposal
3. Section 197.12 is amended by
revising paragraph (1) of the definition
of ‘‘Performance assessment’’ and the
definition of ‘‘Period of geologic
stability’’ to read as follows:
§ 197.12
B?
What definitions apply in subpart
*
*
*
*
*
Performance assessment means an
analysis that:
(1) Identifies the features, events,
processes, (except human intrusion),
and sequences of events and processes
(except human intrusion) that might
affect the Yucca Mountain disposal
system and their probabilities of
occurring;
*
*
*
*
*
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Period of geologic stability means the
time during which the variability of
geologic characteristics and their future
behavior in and around the Yucca
Mountain site can be bounded, that is,
they can be projected within a
reasonable range of possibilities. This
period is defined to end at 1 million
years after disposal.
*
*
*
*
*
4. Section 197.13 is revised to read as
follows:
§ 197.13
How is subpart B implemented?
dose equivalent from releases from the
undisturbed Yucca Mountain disposal
system:
(1) 150 microsieverts (15 millirems)
for 10,000 years following disposal; and
(2) 3.5 millisieverts (350 millirems)
after 10,000 years, but within the period
of geologic stability.
(b) The DOE’s performance
assessment must include all potential
pathways of radionuclide transport and
exposure.
7. Section 197.25 is revised to read as
follows:
(a) The NRC will determine
compliance based upon the arithmetic
mean of the projected doses from DOE’s
performance assessments for the period
within 10,000 years after disposal:
(1) For § 197.20 of this subpart; and
(2) For §§ 197.25 and 197.30 of this
subpart, if performance assessment is
used to demonstrate compliance with
either or both of these sections.
(b) NRC will determine compliance
based upon the median of the projected
doses from DOE’s performance
assessments for the period after 10,000
years of disposal and through the period
of geologic stability:
(1) For § 197.20 of this subpart; and
(2) For § 197.25, if a performance
assessment is used to demonstrate
compliance.
5. Section 197.15 is revised to read as
follows:
§ 197.25
§ 197.15 How must DOE take into account
the changes that will occur during the
period of geologic stability?
§ 197.35
The DOE should not project changes
in society, the biosphere (other than
climate), human biology, or increases or
decreases of human knowledge or
technology. In all analyses done to
demonstrate compliance with this part,
DOE must assume that all of those
factors remain constant as they are at
the time of license application
submission to NRC. However, DOE must
vary factors related to the geology,
hydrology, and climate based upon
cautious, but reasonable assumptions of
the changes in these factors that could
affect the Yucca Mountain disposal
system during the period of geologic
stability, consistent with the
requirements for performance
assessments specified at § 197.36.
6. Section 197.20 is revised to read as
follows:
§ 197.20
What standard must DOE meet?
(a) The DOE must demonstrate, using
performance assessment, that there is a
reasonable expectation that the
reasonably maximally exposed
individual receives no more than the
following annual committed effective
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49063
What standard must DOE meet?
(a) The DOE must determine the
earliest time after disposal that the
waste package would degrade
sufficiently that a human intrusion (see
§ 197.26) could occur without
recognition by the drillers.
(b) The DOE must demonstrate that
there is a reasonable expectation that
the reasonably maximally exposed
individual will receive an annual
committed effective dose equivalent, as
a result of the human intrusion, of no
more than:
(1) 150 microsieverts (15 millirems)
for 10,000 years following disposal; and
(2) 3.5 millisieverts (350 millirems)
after 10,000 years, but within the period
of geologic stability.
(c) The analysis must include all
potential environmental pathways of
radionuclide transport and exposure.
[Removed and Reserved]
8. Section 197.35 is removed and
reserved.
9. Section 197.36 is revised to read as
follows:
§ 197.36 Are there limits on what DOE
must consider in the performance
assessments?
(a) Yes, there are limits on what DOE
must consider in the performance
assessments. The DOE’s performance
assessments conducted to show
compliance with §§ 197.20(a)(1),
197.25(b)(1), and 197.30 shall not
include consideration of very unlikely
features, events, or processes, i.e., those
that are estimated to have less than one
chance in 10,000 of occurring within
10,000 years of disposal (less than one
chance in 100,000,000 per year). In
addition, unless otherwise specified in
these standards or NRC regulations,
DOE’s performance assessments need
not evaluate the impacts resulting from
any features, events, and processes or
sequences of events and processes with
a higher chance of occurrence if the
results of the performance assessments
would not be changed significantly in
the initial 10,000 year period after
disposal.
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10. Appendix A to part 197 is added
to read as follows:
Appendix A to Part 197—Calculation of
Annual Committed Effective Dose
Equivalent
Unless otherwise directed by NRC, DOE
shall use the radiation weighting factors and
tissue weighting factors in this Appendix to
calculate committed effective dose equivalent
for compliance with sections 20 and 25 of
this part. NRC may allow DOE to use updated
factors issued after the effective date of this
regulation. Any such factors shall have been
issued by consensus scientific organizations
and incorporated by EPA into Federal
radiation guidance in order to be considered
generally accepted and eligible for this use.
Further, they must be compatible with the
effective dose equivalent dose calculation
methodology established in ICRP 26/30 and
continued in ICRP 60/72, and incorporated in
this Appendix.
I. Equivalent Dose
The calculation of the committed effective
dose equivalent (CEDE) begins with the
determination of the equivalent dose, HT, to
a tissue or organ, T, listed in Table A.2 below
by using the equation:
H T = ∑ D T,R ⋅ w R
R
where DT,R is the absorbed dose in rads (one
gray, an SI unit, equals 100 rads) averaged
over the tissue or organ, T, due to radiation
type, R, and wR is the radiation weighting
factor which is given in Table A.1 below. The
unit of equivalent dose is the rem (sievert, in
SI units).
TABLE A.1.—RADIATION WEIGHTING
FACTORS, WR 1
Radiation type and energy
range 2
Photons, all energies ................
Electrons and muons, all energies ........................................
Neutrons, energy:
< 10 keV ...............................
10 keV to 100 keV ................
> 100 keV to 2 MeV .............
> 2 MeV to 20 MeV ..............
> 20 MeV ..............................
Protons, other than recoil protons, > 2 MeV .......................
Alpha particles, fission fragments, heavy nuclei ..............
1
1
5
10
20
10
5
5
20
values relate to the radiation incident
on the body or, for internal sources, emitted
from the source.
2 See paragraph A14 in ICRP Publication 60
for the choice of values for other radiation
types and energies not in the table.
II. Effective Dose Equivalent
The next step is the calculation of the
effective dose equivalent, E. The probability
of occurrence of a stochastic effect in a tissue
or organ is assumed to be proportional to the
equivalent dose in the tissue or organ. The
constant of proportionality differs for the
various tissues of the body, but in assessing
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TABLE A.2.—TISSUE WEIGHTING
FACTORS, WT
Tissue or organ
Gonads .....................................
Bone marrow (red) ...................
Colon ........................................
Lung ..........................................
Stomach ....................................
Bladder .....................................
Breast .......................................
Liver ..........................................
Esophagus ................................
Thyroid ......................................
Skin ...........................................
Bone surface ............................
Remainder ................................
wT value
0.20
0.12
0.12
0.12
0.12
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.01
0.01
a,b 0.05
a Remainder is composed of the following
tissues: adrenals, brain, extrathoracic airways,
small intestine, kidneys, muscle, pancreas,
spleen, thymus, and uterus.
b The value 0.05 is applied to the massweighted average dose to the Remainder tissues group, except when the following ‘‘splitting rule’’ applies: If a tissue of Remainder receives a dose in excess of that received by
any of the 12 tissues for which weighting factors are specified, a weighting factor of 0.025
(half of Remainder) is applied to that tissue or
organ and 0.025 to the mass-averaged committed equivalent dose equivalent in the rest of
the Remainder tissues.
III. Annual Committed Tissue or Organ
Equivalent Dose
wR value
1 All
PO 00000
health detriment the total risk is required.
This is taken into account using the tissue
weighting factors, wT in Table A.2, which
represent the proportion of the stochastic risk
resulting from irradiation of the tissue or
organ to the total risk when the whole body
is irradiated uniformly and HT is the
equivalent dose in the tissue or organ, T, in
the equation:
E = S wT · HT.
For internal irradiation from incorporated
radionuclides, the total absorbed dose will be
spread out in time, being gradually delivered
as the radionuclide decays. The time
distribution of the absorbed dose rate will
vary with the radionuclide, its form, the
mode of intake and the tissue within which
it is incorporated. To take account of this
distribution the quantity committed
equivalent dose, HT(t) where t is the
integration time in years following an intake
over any particular year, is used and is the
integral over time of the equivalent dose rate
in a particular tissue or organ that will be
received by an individual following an intake
of radioactive material into the body:
t0 +τ
H T ( τ) =
∫ H T (t ) dt
t0
for a single intake of activity at time t0 where
HT(t) is the relevant equivalent-dose rate in
a tissue or organ at time t. For the purposes
of this rule, the previously mentioned single
intake may be considered to be an annual
intake.
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EP22AU05.000
(b) For performance assessments
conducted to show compliance with
§§ 197.25(b) and 197.30, DOE’s
performance assessments shall exclude
unlikely features, events, or processes,
or sequences of events and processes.
The DOE should use the specific
probability of the unlikely features,
events, and processes as specified by
NRC.
(c) For performance assessments
conducted to show compliance with
§§ 197.20(a)(2) and 197.25(b)(2), DOE’s
performance assessments shall project
the continued effects of the features,
events, and processes included in
paragraph (a) of this section beyond the
10,000-year post-disposal period
through the period of geologic stability.
The DOE must evaluate all of the
features, events, or processes included
in paragraph (a) of this section, and also:
(1) The DOE must assess the effects of
seismic and igneous scenarios, subject
to the probability limits in paragraph (a)
of this section for very unlikely features,
events, and processes. Performance
assessments conducted to show
compliance with § 197.25(b)(2) are also
subject to the probability limits for
unlikely features, events, and processes
as specified by NRC.
(i) The seismic analysis may be
limited to the effects caused by damage
to the drifts in the repository and failure
of the waste packages.
(ii) The igneous analysis may be
limited to the effects of a volcanic event
directly intersecting the repository. The
igneous event may be limited to that
causing damage to the waste packages
directly, causing releases of
radionuclides to the biosphere,
atmosphere, or ground water.
(2) The DOE must assess the effects of
climate change. The climate change
analysis may be limited to the effects of
increased water flow through the
repository as a result of climate change,
and the resulting transport and release
of radionuclides to the accessible
environment. The nature and degree of
climate change may be represented by
constant climate conditions. The
analysis may commence at 10,000 years
after disposal and shall extend to the
period of geologic stability. The NRC
shall specify in regulation the values to
be used to represent climate change,
such as temperature, precipitation, or
infiltration rate of water.
(3) The DOE must assess the effects of
general corrosion on engineered
barriers. The DOE may use a constant
representative corrosion rate throughout
the period of geologic stability or a
distribution of corrosion rates correlated
to other repository parameters.
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If the committed equivalent doses to the
individual tissues or organs resulting from an
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annual intake are multiplied by the
appropriate weighting factors, wT, from table
A.2, and then summed, the result will be the
annual committed effective dose equivalent,
E(t):
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E( τ) = ∑ w T ⋅ H T ( τ).
T
[FR Doc. 05–16193 Filed 8–19–05; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6560–50–P
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IV. Annual Committed Effective Dose
Equivalent
49065
Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 70, Number 161 (Monday, August 22, 2005)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 49014-49065]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 05-16193]
[[Page 49013]]
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Part II
Environmental Protection Agency
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
40 CFR Part 197
Public Health and Environmental Radiation Protection Standards for
Yucca Mountain, Nevada; Proposed Rule
Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 161 / Monday, August 22, 2005 /
Proposed Rules
[[Page 49014]]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
40 CFR Part 197
[OAR-2005-0083; FRL-7952-1]
RIN 2060-AN15
Public Health and Environmental Radiation Protection Standards
for Yucca Mountain, NV
AGENCY: Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).
ACTION: Proposed rule.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: We, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), are proposing
to revise certain of our public health and safety standards for
radioactive material stored or disposed of in the potential repository
at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. Section 801(a) of the Energy Policy Act of
1992 (EnPA, Pub. L. 102-486) directed us to develop these standards.
These standards (the 2001 standards) were originally promulgated on
June 13, 2001 (66 FR 32074). Section 801 of the EnPA also required us
to contract with the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) to conduct a
study to provide findings and recommendations on reasonable standards
for protection of the public health and safety. The health and safety
standards promulgated by EPA are to be ``based upon and consistent
with'' the findings and recommendations of NAS. On August 1, 1995, NAS
released its report (the NAS Report), titled ``Technical Bases for
Yucca Mountain Standards.'' In promulgating our standards, we
considered the NAS Report as the EnPA directs.
On July 9, 2004, in response to a legal challenge by the State of
Nevada and the Natural Resources Defense Council, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit vacated portions of our
standards that addressed the period of time for which compliance must
be demonstrated. The Court ruled that the time frame for regulatory
compliance was not ``based upon and consistent with'' the findings and
recommendations of the NAS and remanded those portions of the standards
to us for revision. These remanded provisions are the subject of
today's action.
Today's proposal incorporates multiple compliance criteria
applicable at different times for protection of individuals and in
circumstances involving human intrusion into the repository. Compliance
will be judged against a standard of 150 microsievert per year (15
millirem per year) committed effective dose equivalent at times up to
10,000 years after disposal and against a standard of 3.5 millisievert
per year (350 millirem per year) committed effective dose equivalent at
times after 10,000 years and up to 1 million years after disposal.
Today's proposal also includes several supporting provisions affecting
DOE's performance projections. DOE will measure the median of the
distribution of doses against the dose standard beyond 10,000 years,
will calculate doses using updated scientific factors, and will
incorporate specific direction on analyzing features, events, and
processes that may affect performance.
Section 801(b) of the EnPA requires the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) to modify its technical requirements for licensing of
the Yucca Mountain repository to be consistent with the standards
promulgated by EPA. NRC did incorporate EPA's Yucca Mountain standards
into its licensing regulations and the regulatory time frame provision
of these was similarly struck down by the Court of Appeals. Once
revised regulatory time frame components of our standards have been
promulgated, NRC must revise its licensing regulations to be consistent
with our revised standards. The Department of Energy (DOE) plans to
submit a license application providing a compliance demonstration. The
NRC will determine whether DOE has demonstrated compliance with NRC's
licensing regulations, which must be consistent with our standards,
prior to granting or denying the necessary licenses to dispose of
radioactive material in Yucca Mountain.
DATES: Comments must be received on or before October 21, 2005.
ADDRESSES: Submit your comments, identified by Docket ID No. OAR-2005-
0083, by one of the following methods:
1. Electronically. If you submit an electronic comment as
prescribed below, EPA recommends that you include your name, mailing
address, and an e-mail address or other contact information in the body
of your comment. Also include this contact information on the outside
of any disk or CD-ROM you submit, and in any cover letter accompanying
the disk or CD-ROM. This ensures that you can be identified as the
submitter of the comment and allows EPA to contact you in case we
cannot read your comment due to technical difficulties or we need
further information on the substance of your comment. EPA's policy is
that we will not edit your comment, and any identifying or contact
information provided in the body of a comment will be included as part
of the comment that is placed in the official public docket, and made
available in EPA's electronic public docket. If EPA cannot read your
comment due to technical difficulties and cannot contact you for
clarification, we may not be able to consider your comment.
i. Federal eRulemaking Portal: https://www.regulations.gov. Follow
the on-line instructions for submitting comments.
ii Agency Web site: EPA's preferred method for receiving comments
is via its website, EDOCKET. EDOCKET is an ``anonymous access'' system,
which means EPA will not know your identity, e-mail address, or other
contact information unless you provide it in the body of your comment.
Go directly to EDOCKET at https://www.epa.gov/edocket, or, from the EPA
Internet Home Page (www.epa.gov), select ``Information Sources'' (in
the left column), then ``Dockets,'' then ``EPA Dockets'' (in the first
paragraph). For either route, then click on ``Quick Search'' (in the
left column). In the search window, type in the docket identification
number OAR-2005-0083. Please be patient, the search could take about 30
seconds. This will bring you to the ``Docket Search Results'' page. At
that point, click on OAR-2005-0083. From the resulting page, you may
submit a comment by clicking on the balloon icon in the ``Submit
Comment'' column and following the subsequent directions.
iii. E-mail: Comments may be sent by electronic mail (e-mail) to a-
and-r-docket@epa.gov, Attention Docket ID No. OAR-2005-0083. In
contrast to EPA's electronic public docket, EPA's e-mail system is not
an ``anonymous access'' system. If you send an e-mail comment directly
to the Docket without going through EPA's electronic public docket,
EPA's e-mail system automatically captures your e-mail address. E-mail
addresses that are automatically captured by EPA's e-mail system are
included as part of the comment that is placed in the official public
docket, and made available in EPA's electronic public docket.
2. Surface Mail. Send your comments to: EPA Docket Center (EPA/DC),
Air and Radiation Docket, Environmental Protection Agency, EPA West,
Mail Code 6102T, 1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW., Washington, DC 20460.
Attention Docket ID No. OAR-2005-0083.
3. Hand Delivery or Courier. Deliver your comments to: Air and
Radiation Docket, EPA Docket Center, (EPA/DC) EPA West, Room B102, 1301
Constitution Ave., NW., Washington, DC, Attention Docket ID No. OAR-
2005-0083. Such deliveries are only
[[Page 49015]]
accepted during the Docket Center's normal hours of operation.
4. Facsimile. Fax your comments to: 202-566-1741, Attention Docket
ID. No. OAR-2005-0083.
Instructions for submitting information to EDOCKET: Direct your
comments and information to Docket ID No. OAR-2005-0083. It is
important to note that EPA's policy is that public comments, whether
submitted electronically or in paper, will be made available for public
viewing in EPA's electronic public docket as EPA receives them and
without change, unless the comment contains copyrighted material, CBI,
or other information whose disclosure is restricted by statute. When
EPA identifies a comment containing copyrighted material, EPA will
provide a reference to that material in the version of the comment that
is placed in EPA's electronic public docket. The entire printed
comment, including the copyrighted material, will be available in the
public docket.
Certain types of information will not be placed in EDOCKET.
Information claimed as CBI and other information whose disclosure is
restricted by statute, which is not included in the official public
docket, will not be available for public viewing in EPA's electronic
public docket. EPA's policy is that copyrighted material will not be
placed in EPA's electronic public docket but will be available only in
printed, paper form in the official public docket. To the extent
feasible, publicly available docket materials will be made available in
EPA's electronic public docket. When a document is selected from the
index list in EPA Dockets, the system will identify whether the
document is available for viewing in EPA's electronic public docket.
Although not all docket materials may be available electronically, you
may still access any of the publicly available docket materials through
the docket facility. EPA intends to work towards providing electronic
access to all of the publicly available docket materials through EPA's
electronic public docket.
The EPA EDOCKET and the federal regulations.gov websites are
``anonymous access'' systems, which means EPA will not know your
identity or contact information unless you provide it in the body of
your comment. If you send an e-mail comment directly to EPA without
going through EDOCKET or regulations.gov, your e-mail address will be
automatically captured and included as part of the comment that is
placed in the public docket and made available on the Internet. If you
submit an electronic comment, EPA recommends that you include your name
and other contact information in the body of your comment and with any
disk or CD-ROM you submit. If EPA cannot read your comment due to
technical difficulties and cannot contact you for clarification, EPA
may not be able to consider your comment. Electronic files should avoid
the use of special characters, any form of encryption, and be free of
any defects or viruses.
Public comments submitted on computer disks that are mailed or
delivered to the docket will be transferred to EPA's electronic public
docket. Public comments that are mailed or delivered to the docket will
be scanned and placed in EPA's electronic public docket. Where
practical, physical objects will be photographed, and the photograph
will be placed in EPA's electronic public docket along with a brief
description written by the docket staff.
For additional information about EPA's electronic public docket
visit EPA Dockets online or see 67 FR 38102, May 31, 2002.
Docket: The official docket is the collection of materials that is
available for public viewing at the Air and Radiation Docket in the EPA
Docket Center (EPA/DC), EPA West, Room B102, 1301 Constitution Ave.,
NW., Washington, DC. The EPA Docket Center Public Reading Room is open
from 8:30 a.m. to 4:30 p.m., Monday through Friday, excluding legal
holidays. The telephone number for the Public Reading Room is 202-566-
1744. The telephone number for the Air and Radiation Docket is 202-566-
1742. As provided in EPA's regulations at 40 CFR part 2, and in
accordance with normal EPA docket procedures, if copies of any docket
materials are requested, a reasonable fee may be charged.
All documents in the docket are listed in the EDOCKET index at
https://www.epa.gov/edocket. Although listed in the index, some
information is not publicly available since it will not be placed in
EDOCKET. That is, although a part of the official docket, EDOCKET does
not include Confidential Business Information (CBI) or other
information whose disclosure is restricted by statute. Information
claimed as CBI and other information whose disclosure is restricted by
statute, which is not included in the official public docket, will not
be available for public viewing in EPA's EDOCKET. In addition, EPA
policy is that copyrighted material will not be placed in EPA's
EDOCKET, but will be available only in printed, paper form in the
official public docket. To the extent feasible, publicly available
docket materials will be made available in EPA's EDOCKET. When a
document is selected from the index list in EDOCKET, the system will
identify whether the document is available for viewing. Although not
all docket materials may be available electronically, you may still
access any of the publicly available docket materials through the
docket facility. EPA intends to work towards providing electronic
access to all of the publicly available docket materials through EPA's
electronic public docket.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ray Clark, Office of Radiation and
Indoor Air, Radiation Protection Division (6608J), U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency, 1200 Pennsylvania Ave., NW., Washington, DC 20460-
0001; telephone number: 202-343-9601; fax number: 202-343-2305; e-mail
address: clark.ray@epa.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. General Information
A. Does This Action Apply to Me?
The DOE is the only entity regulated by these standards. Our
standards affect NRC only because, under Section 801(b) of the EnPA, 42
U.S.C. 10141 n., NRC must modify its licensing requirements, as
necessary, to make them consistent with our final standards. Before it
may accept waste at the Yucca Mountain site, DOE must obtain a license
from NRC. DOE will be subject to NRC's modified regulations, which NRC
will implement through its licensing proceedings.
B. What Should I Consider as I Prepare My Comments for EPA?
1. Submitting CBI. If you submit CBI, clearly mark the part or all
of the information that you claim to be CBI. For CBI information on a
disk or CD-ROM that you mail to EPA, mark the outside of the disk or
CD-ROM as CBI and then identify electronically within the disk or CD-
ROM the specific information that is claimed as CBI. In addition to one
complete version of the comment that includes information claimed as
CBI, a copy of the comment that does not contain the information
claimed as CBI must be submitted for inclusion in the public docket.
Information so marked will not be disclosed except in accordance with
procedures set forth in 40 CFR part 2.
2. Tips for Preparing Your Comments. You may find the following
suggestions helpful for preparing your comments:
1. Explain your views as clearly as possible.
2. Describe any assumptions that you used.
[[Page 49016]]
3. Provide any technical information and/or data you used that
support your views.
4. If you estimate potential burden or costs, explain how you
arrived at your estimate.
5. Provide specific examples to illustrate your concerns.
6. Offer alternatives.
7. Make sure to submit your comments by the comment period deadline
identified.
8. Respond to specific questions from the Agency.
9. To ensure proper receipt by EPA, identify the appropriate docket
identification number in the subject line on the first page of your
response.
C. How Can I View Items in the Docket?
1. Information Files. EPA is working with the Lied Library at the
University of Nevada-Las Vegas (https://www.library.unlv.edu/about/
hours.html#desks) and the Amargosa Valley, Nevada public library
(https://www.amargosavalley.com/Library.html) to provide information
files on this rulemaking. These files are not legal dockets, however
every effort will be made to put the same material in them as in the
official public docket in Washington, DC. The Lied Library information
file is at the Research and Information Desk, Government Publications
Section (702-895-2200). Hours vary based upon the academic calendar, so
we suggest that you call ahead to be certain that the library will be
open at the time you wish to visit (for a recorded message, call 702-
895-2255). The other information file is in the Public Library in
Amargosa Valley, Nevada (phone 775-372-5340). As of the date of
publication, the hours are Monday, Wednesday, and Friday (9 a.m.-5
p.m.); Tuesday and Thursday (9 a.m.-7 p.m.); and Saturday (9 a.m.-1
p.m.). The library is closed on Sunday. These hours can change, so we
suggest that you call ahead to be certain when the library will be
open.
2. Electronic Access. An electronic version of the public docket is
available through EPA's electronic public docket and comment system,
EPA Dockets (EDOCKET). You may use EDOCKET to submit or view comments,
access the index listing of the contents of the official public docket,
and to access those documents in the public docket that are available
electronically. To access the docket either go directly to https://
www.epa.gov/edocket/ or, from the EPA Internet Home Page (www.epa.gov),
select ``Information Sources'' (in the left column), then ``Dockets,''
then ``EPA Dockets'' (in the first paragraph). For either route, then
click on ``Quick Search'' (in the left column). In the search window,
type in the docket identification number OAR-2005-0083. Please be
patient, the search could take about 30 seconds. This will bring you to
the ``Docket Search Results'' page. At that point, click on OAR-2005-
0083. From the resulting page, you may access the docket contents
(e.g., OAR-2005-0083-0002) by clicking on the icon in the ``Rendition''
column.
D. Can I Access Information by Telephone or Via the Internet?
Yes. You may call our toll-free information line (800-331-9477) 24
hours per day. By calling this number, you may listen to a brief update
describing our rulemaking activities for Yucca Mountain, leave a
message requesting that we add your name and address to the Yucca
Mountain mailing list, or request that an EPA staff person return your
call. In addition, we have established an electronic listserv through
which you can receive electronic updates of activities related to this
rulemaking. To subscribe to the listserv, go to https://lists.epa.gov/
read/all_forums. In the alphabetical list, locate ``yucca-updates''
and select ``subscribe'' at the far right of the screen. You will be
asked to provide your e-mail address and choose a password. You also
can find information and documents relevant to this rulemaking on the
World Wide Web at https://www.epa.gov/radiation/yucca. We also recommend
that you examine the preamble and regulatory language for the earlier
proposed and final rules, which appeared in the Federal Register on
August 27, 1999 (64 FR 46976) and June 13, 2001 (66 FR 32074),
respectively.
E. What Documents Are Referenced in Today's Proposal?
We refer to a number of documents that provide supporting
information for our Yucca Mountain standards. All documents relied upon
by EPA in regulatory decisionmaking may be found in our docket (OAR-
2005-0083). Other documents, e.g., statutes, regulations, proposed
rules, are readily available from public sources. The documents below
are referenced most frequently in today's proposal.
Item No. (OAR-2005-0083-xxxx)
0044 ``Safety Indicators in Different Time Frames for the Safety
Assessment of Underground Radioactive Waste Repositories,''
International Atomic Energy Agency
TECDOC-767, 1994
0045 ``Regulatory Decision Making in the Presence of Uncertainty in
the Context of Disposal of Long Lived Radioactive Wastes,''
International Atomic Energy Agency
TECDOC-975, 1997
0046 ``The Handling of Timescales in Assessing Post-Closure Safety:
Lessons Learnt from the April 2002 Workshop in Paris, France,'' Nuclear
Energy Agency (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development),
2004
0051 ``Geological Disposal of Radioactive Waste,'' International
Atomic Energy Agency Draft Safety Requirements (DS154), April 2005
0061 ``Principles and Standards for Disposal of Long-Lived
Radioactive Wastes,'' Neil Chapman and Charles McCombie, Elsevier
Press, 2003
0062 ``An International Peer Review of the Yucca Mountain Project
TSPA-SR,'' Joint Report by the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency and the
International Atomic Energy Agency, OECD, 2002
0076 Technical Bases for Yucca Mountain Standards (the NAS Report),
National Research Council, National Academy Press, 1995
0077 ``Assessment of Variations in Radiation Exposure in the United
States,'' EPA Technical Support Document, July 2005
0085 ``Assumptions, Conservatisms, and Uncertainties in Yucca
Mountain Performance Assessments,'' EPA Technical Support Document,
July 2005
0086 DOE Final Environmental Impact Statement, DOE/EIS-0250,
February 2002
Acronyms and Abbreviations
We use many acronyms and abbreviations in this document. These
include:
BID--background information document
CED--committed effective dose
CEDE--committed effective dose equivalent
DOE--U.S. Department of Energy
DOE/VA--DOE's Viability Assessment
EIS--Environmental Impact Statement
EnPA--Energy Policy Act of 1992
EPA--U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
FEIS--Final Environmental Impact Statement
FEPs--features, events, and processes
FR--Federal Register
GCD--greater confinement disposal
HLW--high-level radioactive waste
HSK--Swiss Federal Nuclear Safety Inspectorate
IAEA--International Atomic Energy Agency
[[Page 49017]]
ICRP--International Commission on Radiological Protection
KASAM--Swedish National Council for Nuclear Waste
LLW--low-level radioactive waste
MCL--maximum contaminant level
MTHM--metric tons of heavy metal
NAPA--National Academy of Public Administration
NAS--National Academy of Sciences
NEA--Nuclear Energy Agency
NEI--Nuclear Energy Institute
NRC--U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NRDC--Natural Resources Defense Council
NTS--Nevada Test Site
NTTAA--National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act
NWPA--Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982
NWPAA--Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1987
OECD--Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OMB--Office of Management and Budget
RMEI--reasonably maximally exposed individual
SSI--Swedish Radiation Protection Authority
SNF--spent nuclear fuel
SR--Site recommendation
TRU--transuranic
TSPA--Total System Performance Assessment
UK--United Kingdom
UMRA--Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995
U.S.C.--United States Code
WIPP LWA--Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Land Withdrawal Act of 1992
Outline of Today's Action
I. What is the History of Today's Action?
A. Promulgation of 40 CFR part 197 in 2001
1. What are the Elements of EPA's 2001 Standards?
a. What is the Standard for Storage of the Waste? (Subpart A,
Sec. Sec. 197.1 through 197.5)
b. What Are the Standards for Disposal? (Subpart B, Sec. Sec.
197.11 through 197.36)
i. What is the Standard for Protection of Individuals?
(Sec. Sec. 197.20 through 197.21)
aa. Who Represents the Exposed Population?
bb. How Far Into the Future Must Performance be Assessed?
ii. What is the Standard for Human Intrusion? (Sec. Sec. 197.25
through 197.26)
iii. What are the Standards to Protect Ground Water? (Sec. Sec.
197.30 through 197.31)
c. What is ``Reasonable Expectation''? (Sec. 197.14)
B. Legal Challenges to 40 CFR part 197
1. Challenges by the State of Nevada and Natural Resources
Defense Council
2. Challenge by the Nuclear Energy Institute
C. Ruling by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit
1. What Did the Court of Appeals Rule on the Issue of Compliance
Period?
a. What Were NAS's Findings (``Conclusions'') and
Recommendations on the Issue of Compliance Period?
2. What Did the Court of Appeals Rule on Other Issues Related to
EPA's Standards?
II. How Will EPA Address the Decision by the Court of Appeals?
A. How Will Elements of the Disposal Standards be Affected?
1. Individual-Protection Standard
2. Human-Intrusion Standard
3. Ground-Water Protection Standards
4. Reasonable Expectation
5. Effects of Uncertainty
B. How Does the Application of ``Reasonable Expectation''
Influence Today's Proposal?
C. How Is EPA Proposing to Revise the Individual-Protection
Standard (Sec. 197.20) to Address Peak Dose?
1. Multiple Dose Standards Applicable to Different Compliance
Periods
2. What Other Options Did EPA Consider?
a. Maintain the 10,000-year Standard Alone Without Addressing
Peak Dose
b. Dose Standard To Apply at Peak Dose Alone
c. Peak Dose Standard Varying Over Time
d. Standard Expressed as a Dose Target, Rather Than Limit
e. Standard Expressed as a Statistical Distribution
3. What Dose Level is EPA Proposing for Peak Dose?
4. What Other Peak Dose Levels Did EPA Consider?
a. Maintain the 15 mrem/yr Standard at Peak Dose
b. 100 mrem/yr Standard at Peak Dose
c. Peak Dose Standard Based on Regional Background Radiation
Levels
5. How Will NRC Judge Compliance?
6. How Will DOE Calculate the Dose?
D. How Will Today's Proposal Affect the Way DOE Conducts
Performance Assessments?
1. Performance Assessments Up To 10,000 Years After Disposal
2. Performance Assessments for Periods Longer Than 10,000 Years
After Disposal
a. Consideration of Likely, Unlikely, and Very Unlikely FEPs
b. Consideration of Seismic FEPs
c. Consideration of Igneous (Volcanic) FEPs
d. Consideration of Climatological FEPs
E. How Is EPA Proposing To Revise the Human-Intrusion Standard
(Sec. 197.25) To Address Peak Dose?
F. Summary of Today's Proposal by Section
III. Statutory and Executive Order Reviews
A. Executive Order 12866: Regulatory Planning and Review
B. Paperwork Reduction Act
C. Regulatory Flexibility Act
D. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
E. Executive Order 13132: Federalism
F. Executive Order 13175: Consultation and Coordination with
Indian Tribal Governments
G. Executive Order 13045: Protection of Children from
Environmental Health & Safety Risks
H. Executive Order 13211: Actions that Significantly Affect
Energy Supply, Distribution, or Use
I. National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act
I. What Is the History of Today's Action?
Radioactive wastes result from the use of nuclear fuel and other
radioactive materials. Today, we are proposing to revise certain
standards pertaining to spent nuclear fuel (SNF), high-level
radioactive waste (HLW), and other radioactive waste (we refer to these
items collectively as ``radioactive materials'' or ``waste'') that may
be stored or disposed of in the Yucca Mountain repository. (When we
discuss storage or disposal in this document in reference to Yucca
Mountain, we note that no decision has been made regarding the
acceptability of Yucca Mountain for storage or disposal as of the date
of this publication. To save space and to avoid excessive repetition,
we will not describe Yucca Mountain as a ``potential'' repository;
however, we intend this meaning to apply.) Pursuant to Section 801(a)
of the Energy Policy Act of 1992 (EnPA, Pub. L. 102-486), these
standards apply only to facilities at Yucca Mountain.
Once nuclear reactions have consumed a certain percentage of the
uranium or other fissionable material in nuclear reactor fuel, the fuel
no longer is useful for its intended purpose. It then is known as
``spent'' nuclear fuel (SNF). It is possible to recover specific
radionuclides from SNF through ``reprocessing,'' which is a process
that dissolves the SNF, thus separating the radionuclides from one
another. Radionuclides not recovered through reprocessing become part
of the acidic liquid wastes that the Department of Energy (DOE) plans
to convert into various types of solid materials. High-level waste
(HLW) is the highly radioactive liquid or solid wastes that result from
reprocessing SNF. The SNF that does not undergo reprocessing prior to
disposal remains inside the fuel assembly and becomes the final waste
form.
In the U.S., SNF and HLW have been produced since the 1940s, mainly
as a result of commercial power production and defense activities.
Since the inception of the nuclear age, the proper disposal of these
wastes has been the responsibility of the Federal government. The
Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (NWPA, 42 U.S.C. Chapter 108)
formalizes the current Federal
[[Page 49018]]
program for the disposal of SNF and HLW by:
(1) Making DOE responsible for siting, building, and operating an
underground geologic repository for the disposal of SNF and HLW;
(2) Directing us to set generally applicable environmental
radiation protection standards based on authority established under
other laws \1\; and
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ These laws include the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended
(42 U.S.C. 2011-2296) and Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970 (5
U.S.C. Appendix 1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(3) Requiring the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to implement
our standards by revising its licensing requirements for SNF and HLW
repositories to be consistent with our standards.
This general division of responsibilities continues for the Yucca
Mountain repository. Thus, today we are proposing to establish or
revise specific aspects of our public health protection standards at 40
CFR part 197 (which are, pursuant to EnPA Section 801(a), applicable
only to Yucca Mountain, rather than generally applicable). The NRC will
issue implementing regulations for these standards. The DOE plans to
submit a license application to NRC. The NRC then will determine
whether DOE has met NRC's regulations and whether to grant or deny a
license for Yucca Mountain.
In 1985, we established generic standards for the management,
storage, and disposal of SNF, HLW, and transuranic (TRU) radioactive
waste (see 40 CFR part 191, 50 FR 38066, September 19, 1985), which
were intended to apply to any facilities utilized for the storage or
disposal of these wastes, including Yucca Mountain. In 1987, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit remanded the disposal standards
in 40 CFR part 191 (NRDC v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1258 (1st Cir. 1987)). As
discussed below, we later amended and reissued these standards to
address issues that the court raised. Also in 1987, the Nuclear Waste
Policy Amendments Act (NWPAA, Pub. L. 100-203) amended the NWPA by,
among other actions, selecting Yucca Mountain, Nevada, as the only
potential site that DOE should characterize for a long-term geologic
repository. In October 1992, the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Land
Withdrawal Act (WIPP LWA, Pub. L. 102-579) and the EnPA became law.
These statutes changed our obligations concerning radiation standards
for the Yucca Mountain candidate repository. The WIPP LWA:
(1) Reinstated the 40 CFR part 191 disposal standards, except those
portions that were the specific subject of the remand by the First
Circuit;
(2) Required us to issue standards to replace the portion of the
challenged standards remanded by the court; and
(3) Exempted the Yucca Mountain site from the 40 CFR part 191
disposal standards.
We issued the amended 40 CFR part 191 disposal standards, which
addressed the judicial remand, on December 20, 1993 (58 FR 66398). The
EnPA, enacted in 1992, set forth our responsibilities as they relate to
Yucca Mountain. In the EnPA, Congress directed us to set public health
and safety radiation standards for Yucca Mountain. Specifically,
section 801(a)(1) of the EnPA directed us to ``promulgate, by rule,
public health and safety standards for the protection of the public
from releases from radioactive materials stored or disposed of in the
repository at the Yucca Mountain site.'' Section 801(a)(2) directed us
to contract with the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) to conduct a
study to provide us with its findings and recommendations on reasonable
standards for protection of public health and safety from releases from
the Yucca Mountain disposal system. Moreover, it provided that our
standards shall be the only such standards applicable to the Yucca
Mountain site and are to be based upon and consistent with NAS's
findings and recommendations. On August 1, 1995, NAS released its
report, ``Technical Bases for Yucca Mountain Standards'' (the NAS
Report) (Docket No. OAR-2005-0083-0076).
A. Promulgation of 40 CFR Part 197 in 2001
Following the direction in the EnPA, we developed standards
specifically applicable to releases from radioactive material stored or
disposed of in the Yucca Mountain repository. In doing so, we gave
special weight to both the NAS Report and our generic standards in 40
CFR part 191, and also considered other relevant information,
precedents, and analyses.
We evaluated 40 CFR part 191 because those standards were developed
to apply to any site selected for storage and disposal of SNF and HLW,
and would have applied to Yucca Mountain had Congress not directed
otherwise. Thus, we believed that 40 CFR part 191 already included the
major components of standards needed for any specific site, such as
Yucca Mountain. However, we recognized that all the components would
not necessarily be directly transferable to the situation at Yucca
Mountain, and that some modification might be necessary. We also
considered that some components of the generic standards would not be
carried into site-specific standards, simply because not all of the
conditions found among all sites are present at each site. See 66 FR
32076-32078, June 13, 2001 (Docket No. OAR-2005-0083-0042), for a more
detailed discussion of the role of 40 CFR part 191 in developing 40 CFR
part 197.
We also considered the findings and recommendations of the NAS in
developing standards for Yucca Mountain. In some cases, provisions of
40 CFR part 191 were already consistent with NAS's analysis (e.g.,
level of protection for the individual). In other cases, we used the
NAS Report to modify or draw out parts of 40 CFR part 191 to apply more
directly to Yucca Mountain (e.g., the stylized drilling scenario for
human intrusion). See the NAS Report for a complete description of
findings and recommendations.
Because our standards are intended to apply specifically to the
Yucca Mountain disposal system, in a number of areas we tailored our
approach to consider the characteristics of the site and the local
populations. Yucca Mountain is in southwestern Nevada approximately 100
miles northwest of Las Vegas. The eastern part of the site is on the
Nevada Test Site (NTS). The northwestern part of the site is on the
Nellis Air Force Range. The southwestern part of the site is on Bureau
of Land Management land. The area has a desert climate with topography
typical of the Basin and Range province. Yucca Mountain is made of
layers of ashfalls from volcanic eruptions that happened more than 10
million years ago. There are two major aquifers beneath Yucca Mountain.
Regional ground water in the vicinity of Yucca Mountain is believed to
flow generally in a south-southeasterly direction. The DOE plans to
build the repository about 300 meters below the surface and about 300
to 500 meters above the water table. For more detailed descriptions of
Yucca Mountain's geologic and hydrologic characteristics, and the
disposal system, please see chapter 7 of the 2001 BID (Docket No. OAR-
2005-0083-0050) and the preamble to the proposed rule (64 FR 46979-
46980, August 27, 1999, Docket No. OAR-2005-0083-0041).
We proposed standards for Yucca Mountain on August 27, 1999 (64 FR
46976). In response to our proposal, we received more than 800 public
comments and conducted four public hearings. After evaluating public
comments, we issued final standards (66 FR 32074, June 13, 2001). See
the Response to Comments document from that rulemaking for more
discussion of
[[Page 49019]]
comments (Docket No. OAR-2005-0083-0043).
1. What Are the Elements of EPA's 2001 Standards?
We are issuing today's proposal to respond to a ruling by the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (``the Court'')
that vacated portions of 40 CFR part 197. Sections I.B (``Legal
Challenges to 40 CFR part 197'') and I.C (``Ruling by U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit'') discuss aspects of the
legal challenges on which the Court ruled. This section summarizes some
of the key provisions and concepts in 40 CFR part 197 to provide a
context to better understand the basis for the legal actions and
today's proposed action, which is described in Section II of this
document (``How Will EPA Address the Decision by the Court of
Appeals?'').
The standards issued in 2001 as 40 CFR part 197 included the
following:
A standard to protect the public during storage operations
at the Yucca Mountain site;
An individual-protection standard to protect the public
after disposal from releases from the undisturbed repository;
A human-intrusion standard to protect the public after
disposal from releases caused by a drilling penetration into the
repository;
A set of standards to protect ground water from
radionuclide contamination caused by releases from the repository after
disposal;
The requirement that compliance with the disposal
standards be shown for 10,000 years;
The requirement that DOE continue its projections for the
individual-protection and human-intrusion standards beyond 10,000 years
to the time of peak (maximum) dose, and place those projections in the
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS);
The concept of the Reasonably Maximally Exposed Individual
(RMEI), defined as a hypothetical person whose lifestyle is
representative of the local population, as the individual against whom
the disposal standards should be assessed; and
The concept of a ``controlled area,'' defined as an area
immediately surrounding the repository whose geology is considered part
of the natural barrier component of the overall disposal system, and
inside of which radioactive releases are not regulated.
We emphasize that today's proposal is narrowly focused to respond
to the Court ruling. Most sections of our 2001 rule are unaffected by
the Court's ruling and are not implicated in today's proposal. We are
requesting and will respond to comments only on those provisions we are
proposing to change today.
a. What Is the Standard for Storage of the Waste? (Subpart A,
Sec. Sec. 197.1 Through 197.5)
Section 801(a)(1) of the EnPA calls for EPA's public health and
safety standards to apply to radioactive materials ``stored or disposed
of in the repository at the Yucca Mountain site.'' The repository is
the excavated portion of the facility constructed underground within
the Yucca Mountain site. The storage standard, therefore, applies to
waste inside the repository, prior to disposal.
The DOE also will handle, and might store, radioactive material
outside the repository prior to subsurface emplacement. Therefore, our
standards will provide public health and safety protection for surface
management and storage activities on the surface of the Yucca Mountain
site and in the Yucca Mountain repository. The combined doses incurred
by any individual in the general environment from these activities must
not exceed 150 [mu]Sv (15 mrem) committed effective dose equivalent per
year (CEDE/yr).
b. What Are the Standards for Disposal? (Subpart B, Sec. Sec. 197.11
Through 197.36)
Subpart B of our 2001 rule consisted of three separate standards
(or sets of standards) that apply after disposal, which are discussed
in more detail in the appropriate sections of this document (e.g.,
Section II.A, ``How Will Elements of the Disposal Standards be
Affected?''). For additional detail, see the preamble to the June 2001
rulemaking (66 FR 32074, June 13, 2001). The disposal standards are:
An individual-protection standard;
A human-intrusion standard; and
Ground-water protection standards.
i. What Is the Standard for Protection of Individuals? (Sec. Sec.
197.20 Through 197.21)
The first standard is an individual-protection standard. It
specifies the maximum dose that a reasonably maximally exposed
individual (RMEI) may receive from releases from the Yucca Mountain
repository.
Our individual-protection standard set a limit of 150 [mu]Sv (15
mrem) CEDE/yr. This limit corresponds to an annual risk of fatal cancer
within the range that NAS suggested as a ``reasonable starting point
for EPA's rulemaking'' (NAS Report p. 5, Docket No. OAR-2005-0083-
0076). The NAS s suggested risk range corresponds to approximately 2 to
20 mrem CEDE/yr.
The standard described above applies for a period of 10,000 years
after disposal, and is to be measured against exposures to the RMEI at
a location outside the controlled area (in the ``accessible
environment'').
aa. Who Represents the Exposed Population?
To determine whether the Yucca Mountain disposal system complies
with our standard, DOE must calculate the dose received by some
individual or group of individuals exposed to releases from the
repository and compare the calculated dose with the limit established
in the standard. The standard specifies, therefore, the representative
individual for whom DOE must make the dose calculation as the RMEI. It
was left to NRC to define the details, beyond those which we specified,
necessary for the dose calculation. NRC has further defined the RMEI as
an adult (10 CFR 63.312(e)) and specified that the average
concentration of radionuclides in well water ingested by the RMEI be
based on a water demand of 3,000 acre-feet per year (10 CFR 63.312(c)).
The Reasonably Maximally Exposed Individual (RMEI)
The approach we chose (the RMEI) embodies the intent of the
internationally-accepted concept to protect those individuals most at
risk from the proposed repository but specifies one or a few site-
specific parameters at their maximum values. The characteristics of the
RMEI are defined from consideration of current population distribution
and ground-water usage, and average food consumption patterns for the
population downgradient from Yucca Mountain in Amargosa Valley, Nevada.
Our RMEI is a theoretical individual representative of a future
population group or community termed ``rural-residential'' (see Chapter
8 of the 2001 BID for a description of this concept, Docket No. OAR-
2005-0083-0050). We assume that the rural-residential RMEI is exposed
through the same general pathways as a subsistence farmer. However,
this RMEI would not be a full-time farmer. Rather, the RMEI might do
personal gardening and earn income from other sources of work in the
area. Under our standard, the RMEI will have food and water intake
rates, diet, and physiology similar to those of individuals living in
Amargosa Valley, Nevada. We assume that all of the drinking water and
some of the food (based upon surveys) consumed by the RMEI is from the
local area. Similarly, we assume that local food production
[[Page 49020]]
will use water contaminated with radionuclides released from the
disposal system. We believe this lifestyle is conservative but similar
to that of most people living in Amargosa Valley today.
Location of the RMEI. The location of the RMEI is a basic part of
the exposure scenario. We require that the RMEI be located in the
accessible environment (i.e., outside the controlled area) above the
highest concentration of radionuclides in the plume of contamination.
Based upon a review of available site-specific information (see Chapter
8 of the 2001 BID, Docket No. OAR-2005-0083-0050), we identified the
southern edge of the Nevada Test Site as the southernmost extent of the
controlled area. The actual compliance point will be determined through
the licensing process. (Even if the RMEI were to be located north of
this line of latitude, the RMEI must still have the characteristics
described in Sec. 197.21.) As discussed in Section I.B (``Legal
Challenges to 40 CFR part 197'') and I.C (``Ruling by the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit''), the location of the
RMEI was a subject of the Court decision, was upheld, and is not a
subject of today's proposal.
bb. How Far Into the Future Must Performance Be Assessed?
In 2001, we established a compliance period of 10,000 years. Under
the 2001 standards, the peak dose within 10,000 years after disposal
would be required to comply with the individual-protection standard. In
addition, we required calculation of the peak dose beyond 10,000 years,
but within the period of geologic stability. We required DOE to include
the results and bases of the additional analyses in the EIS for Yucca
Mountain as an indicator of the future performance of the disposal
system. The rule did not, however, require that DOE meet a specific
dose limit after 10,000 years. The compliance period was a subject of
the Court decision and is the primary subject of today's proposal.
ii. What Is the Standard for Human Intrusion? (Sec. Sec. 197.25
Through 197.26)
We adopted NAS's suggested starting point for a human-intrusion
scenario. As NAS recommended, our standard required a single-borehole
intrusion scenario based upon Yucca Mountain-specific conditions. The
intended purpose of analyzing this scenario ``* * * is to examine the
site- and design-related aspects of repository performance under an
assumed intrusion scenario to inform a qualitative judgment'' (NAS
Report p. 111). The assessment would result in a calculated RMEI dose
arriving through the pathway created by the assumed borehole (with no
other releases included). Consistent with the NAS Report, we also
required ``that the conditional risk as a result of the assumed
intrusion scenario should be no greater than the risk levels that would
be acceptable for the undisturbed-repository case'' (NAS Report p.
113). We interpreted NAS's term ``undisturbed'' to mean that the Yucca
Mountain disposal system is not disturbed by human intrusion but that
other processes or events that are likely to occur could disturb the
system.
The DOE is not required to use probabilistic performance assessment
for the human-intrusion analysis, as it is for the individual-
protection standard. However, if it chooses to do so, we required that
the human-intrusion analysis of disposal system performance use the
same methods and RMEI characteristics for the performance assessment as
those required for the individual-protection standard, with the
exception that the human-intrusion analysis would exclude unlikely
natural features, events, and processes (FEPs).
The DOE must determine when the intrusion would occur based upon
the earliest time that current technology and practices could lead to
waste package penetration without the drillers noticing the canister
penetration. In general, we believe that the time frame for the
drilling intrusion should be within the period that a small percentage
of the waste packages have failed but before significant migration of
radionuclides from the engineered barrier system has occurred because,
based upon our understanding of drilling practices, this period would
be about the earliest time that a driller would not recognize an impact
with a waste package.
The compliance standard for human intrusion parallels that for the
individual-protection scenario. If the intrusion were to occur at or
earlier than 10,000 years after disposal, DOE must demonstrate a
reasonable expectation that annual exposures incurred by the RMEI
within 10,000 years as a result of the intrusion event would not exceed
150 [mu]Sv (15 mrem) CEDE. However, if the intrusion occurred after
10,000 years, or when earlier intrusions result in exposures projected
to occur after 10,000 years, DOE would not have to compare its results
against a numerical standard, but would have to include those results
in its EIS.
iii. What Are the Standards To Protect Ground Water? (Sec. Sec. 197.30
Through 197.31)
We established separate ground-water standards as a means to
protect the aquifer as both a resource for current users and a
potential resource for larger numbers of future users either near the
repository or farther away in communities comprised of a substantially
larger number of people than presently exist in the vicinity of Yucca
Mountain. The standards DOE must meet are equivalent to the
radionuclide Maximum Contaminant Levels (MCLs) established for drinking
water.
To implement the ground-water protection standards in Sec. 197.30,
we required that DOE use the concept of a ``representative volume'' of
ground water (Sec. 197.31). Under this approach, DOE must project the
concentration of radionuclides or the resultant doses within a
``representative volume'' of ground water for comparison against the
standards. We selected a value of 3,000 acre-ft/yr as a ``cautious, but
reasonable'' figure for the representative volume. Section 197.31 also
describes two methods by which DOE may calculate radionuclide
concentrations in ground water. See the preamble to the 2001 rulemaking
for more discussion of the representative volume and approaches for
calculating radionuclide concentrations for compliance purposes.
As with the individual-protection standard, compliance with the
ground-water protection standards must be determined at the point of
highest concentration in the plume of contamination in the accessible
environment. The controlled area was defined in the same way as for the
individual-protection standard. The ground-water protection standards
were a subject of the Court decision, were upheld, and are not a
subject of today's proposal.
c. What Is ``Reasonable Expectation''? (Sec. 197.14)
An important provision of our standards is the establishment of the
principle of ``reasonable expectation'' to guide implementation of our
standards and provide context for evaluating projections against the
numerical compliance standards discussed above. It is a critical
element in implementing our standards, but its importance might easily
be overlooked or misunderstood. We use the concept of ``reasonable
expectation'' in these standards to reflect our intent regarding the
level of ``proof'' necessary for NRC to determine whether the projected
performance of
[[Page 49021]]
the Yucca Mountain disposal system complies with the standards (see
Sec. Sec. 197.20, 197.25, and 197.30). In issuing our 2001 standards,
we noted that this term is meant to convey our position that
unequivocal numerical proof of compliance is neither necessary nor
likely to be obtained for geologic disposal systems. We believe
unequivocal proof is not possible because of the extremely long time
periods involved and because disposal system performance assessments
require extrapolations of conditions and the actions of processes that
govern disposal system performance over those long time periods.
The primary means for demonstrating compliance with the standards
is the use of computer modeling to project the performance of the
disposal system under the range of expected conditions. These modeling
calculations involve the extrapolation of site conditions and the
interactions of important processes over long time periods,
extrapolations that involve inherent uncertainties in the necessarily
limited amount of information that can be collected through field and
laboratory studies and the unavoidable uncertainties involved in
simulating the complex and time-variable processes and events involved
in long-term disposal system performance. Overly conservative
assumptions made in developing performance scenarios can bias the
analyses in the direction of unrealistically extreme situations, which
in reality may be highly improbable, and can deflect attention from
questions critical to developing an adequate understanding of the
expected features, events, and processes (``Assumptions, Conservatisms,
and Uncertainties in Yucca Mountain Performance Assessments,'' Sections
11 and 12, July 2005, Docket No. OAR-2005-0083-0085). The reasonable
expectation approach focuses attention on understanding the
uncertainties in projecting disposal system performance so that
regulatory decision making will be done with a full understanding of
the uncertainties involved. Thus, realistic analyses are preferred over
conservative and bounding assumptions, to the extent practical.
B. Legal Challenges to 40 CFR Part 197
Various aspects of our standards were challenged in lawsuits filed
with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in
July 2001. Oral arguments were conducted on January 14, 2004. These
challenges and the outcome are described in the following sections.
1. Challenges by the State of Nevada and Natural Resources Defense
Council
The State of Nevada, the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC),
and several other environmental and public interest groups challenged
several aspects of our final standards on the grounds that they were
insufficiently protective and had not been adequately justified.
Specifically, they claimed that:
EPA's promulgation of standards that apply for 10,000
years after disposal violates the EnPA because such standards are not
``based upon and consistent with'' the findings and recommendations of
the NAS. NAS recommended standards that would apply to the time of
maximum risk and stated that there is ``no scientific basis for
limiting the time period of the individual-risk standard to 10,000
years or any other value.''
The size of the controlled area defined by EPA, which
represents the maximum extent of the disposal system and inside which
DOE need not demonstrate compliance with the EPA standards, rests on
inappropriate assumptions regarding the ability of people to live
closer to the repository and violates the Safe Drinking Water Act
provisions against endangering sources of drinking water.
EPA's definition of ``disposal'' in 40 CFR 197.12 deviates
from the definition in the NWPA by inserting the qualifying phrase
``for as long as reasonably possible,'' suggesting that the Yucca
Mountain disposal system would be held to a lesser standard of
protection because it would not have to provide ``permanent
isolation.''
2. Challenge by the Nuclear Energy Institute
The Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) is a trade organization
representing nuclear power producers, who collect a surcharge from
ratepayers for the Nuclear Waste Fund (established by the NWPA, see 42
U.S.C. 10222). NEI challenged the ground-water protection provisions in
40 CFR 197.30 on several grounds, including that:
They conflict with the direction in the EnPA that EPA
issue standards ``based upon and consistent with the findings and
recommendations of'' NAS and that EPA's ``standards shall prescribe the
maximum annual effective dose equivalent * * * from releases * * * from
radioactive materials stored or disposed of in the repository.'' NEI
argued that EPA's ground-water standards: (1) were in a form other than
effective dose equivalent (EDE); (2) were not recommended by NAS, which
stated that such standards were not ``necessary to limit risks to
individuals'' (NAS Report p. 121); and (3) were not limited to releases
from the repository because they require that DOE consider natural
background when determining compliance.
The science underlying the ground-water standards uses the
outdated ``critical organ'' methodology, which results in inconsistent
risk estimates and is inconsistent with other radiation-protection
standards.
EPA justified its ground-water standards on cost grounds
without conducting a thorough cost-benefit analysis; NEI believes such
an analysis would show that the ground-water standards provide no
benefit to public health but will increase the cost and slow the
construction of the repository.
EPA is inappropriately applying drinking water standards,
which were derived to apply to customers of public water supplies
(i.e., ``at the tap'') to ground water.
C. Ruling by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit
Oral arguments for the challenges described above were heard on
January 14, 2004. The challenges to EPA's standards were consolidated
with challenges to NRC's licensing requirements, DOE's siting
guidelines, and the Presidential recommendation of the Yucca Mountain
site and the subsequent Congressional resolution. The Court's ruling
was handed down on July 9, 2004. The Court upheld EPA's Yucca Mountain
rule in all respects, save for the regulatory compliance period.
1. What Did the Court of Appeals Rule on the Issue of Compliance
Period?
The Court upheld the challenge to EPA's 10,000-year compliance
period, ruling that EPA's action was not ``based upon and consistent
with'' the NAS Report, and that EPA had not sufficiently justified its
decision to apply compliance standards only to the first 10,000 years
after disposal on policy grounds. Nuclear Energy Institute v.
Environmental Protection Agency, 373 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (NEI)
(Docket No. OAR-2005-0083-0080). On that point, the Court stated that:
NAS's conclusion that EPA ``might choose to establish consistent
policies'' is of little importance * * * And although our case law
makes clear that a phrase like ``based upon and consistent with''
does not require EPA to hew rigidly to NAS's findings, EnPA Section
801(a) cannot reasonably be read to allow a regulation wholly
inconsistent with NAS recommendations. (NEI, 373 F.3d at 30.)
Similarly, the Court rejected EPA's reasoning that the requirement
of 40
[[Page 49022]]
CFR 197.35 that DOE project performance to the time of peak dose and
place those projections in the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS)
addressed the intent of the NAS recommendation by ensuring that
assessments would not be arbitrarily cut off at some earlier time:
Although EPA's addition of this provision might well represent a
nod to NAS, it hardly makes the agency's regulation consistent with
the Academy's findings. NAS recommended that the compliance period
extend to the time of peak risk, yet EPA's rule requires only that
DOE calculate peak doses and expressly provides that ``[n]o
regulatory standard applies to the results of this analysis.'' (Id.
at 31, emphasis in original)
While the Court suggested that under different circumstances the
Agency's standard might have been upheld, it nevertheless rejected the
Agency's limitation of the compliance period to 10,000 years:
In sum, because EPA's chosen compliance period sharply differs
from NAS's findings and recommendations, it represents an
unreasonable construction of section 801(a) of the Energy Policy
Act. Although EnPA's ``based upon and consistent with'' mandate
leaves EPA with some flexibility in crafting standards in light of
NAS's findings, EPA may not stretch this flexibility to cover
standards that are inconsistent with the NAS Report. Had EPA begun
with the Academy's recommendation to base the compliance period on
peak dosage and then made adjustments to accommodate policy
considerations not considered by NAS, this might be a very different
case. But as the foregoing discussion demonstrates, EPA wholly
rejected the Academy's recommendations. We will thus vacate part 197
to the extent that it requires DOE to show compliance for only
10,000 years following disposal. (Id. at 31.)
Finally, the Court concluded that ``we vacate 40 CFR part 197 to
the extent that it incorporates a 10,000-year compliance period'' * * *
(Id. at 100.) The Court did not address the protectiveness of the 150
Sv/yr (15 mrem/yr) dose standard applied over the 10,000-year
compliance period, nor was the protectiveness of the standard
challenged. It ruled only that the compliance period could not be found
consistent with or based upon the NAS findings and recommendations, and
therefore was contrary to the plain language of the EnPA.
a. What Were NAS's Findings (``Conclusions'') and Recommendations on
the Issue of Compliance Period?
As the Court noted, NAS stated that it had found ``no scientific
basis for limiting the time period of the individual-risk standard to
10,000 years or any other value,'' and that ``compliance assessment is
feasible * * * on the time scale of the long-term stability of the
fundamental geologic regime--a time scale that is on the order of 10\6\
years at Yucca Mountain.'' As a result, and given that ``at least some
potentially important exposures might not occur until after several
hundred thousand years * * * we recommend that compliance assessment be
conducted for the time when the greatest risk occurs'' (NAS Report pp.
6-7).
However, NAS also stated ``although the selection of a time period
of applicability has scientific elements, it also has policy aspects
that we have not addressed. For example, EPA might choose to establish
consistent policies for managing risks from disposal of both long-lived
hazardous nonradioactive materials and radioactive materials' (NAS
Report p. 56).
2. What Did the Court of Appeals Rule on Other Issues Related to EPA's
Standards?
The Court did not sustain any of the other challenges lodged by
Nevada, NRDC, or NEI. Instead, the Court found that:
In defining the controlled area, EPA's conclusions
regarding the likely extent of the future population and their
exposures were reasonable. Further, the provisions of the Safe Drinking
Water Act do not apply at Yucca Mountain (by virtue of the EnPA
statement that EPA's standards ``shall be the only standards applicable
to the Yucca Mountain site''). (NEI, 373 F. 3d at 32-38.)
EPA is not bound to follow the NWPA definition of
``disposal'' because the enabling authority for this action is the
EnPA, which does not require that NWPA definitions be used and does not
itself define ``disposal.'' Therefore, EPA acted reasonably ``in
filling that statutory gap.'' (Id. at 38-39.)
EPA's interpretation of the EnPA as permitting separate
ground-water standards is reasonable because: (1) The EnPA does not
restrict EPA to establish only EDE standards, but requires that EPA
``establish a set of health and safety standards, at least one of which
must include an EDE-based, individual-protection standard''; (2) NAS
made no ``finding or recommendation'' either for or against a ground-
water standard, so consistency with NAS is not at issue; and (3) ``Part
197 * * * does not regulate background radiation * * * the rule
requires only that DOE take background levels into account when
measuring permissible releases of radionuclides from the repository.
Therefore, part 197 could not possibly run afoul of EnPA's focus on
released radiation.'' (Id. at 43-48.)
NEI's arbitrary and capricious arguments in NEI were the
same as the arguments that NEI had raised in a challenge to EPA's
radionuclide MCLs under the Safe Drinking Water Act, which the Court
had rejected only one year previously in City of Waukesha v. EPA. (Id.
at 48-49.)
EPA ``unremarkably'' concluded that ground-water
protection standards represent sound pollution prevention policy and
will encourage a more robust repository design. This reasoning
prevailed with the Court on both the cost-effectiveness and ``at the
tap'' challenges. (Id. at 49-50.)
II. How Will EPA Address the Decision by the Court of Appeals?
As promulgated, 40 CFR part 197 contai