Washington, DC Metropolitan Area Special Flight Rules Area, 45250-45262 [05-15375]

Agencies

• Federal Aviation Administration
• DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

[Federal Register Volume 70, Number 149 (Thursday, August 4, 2005)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 45250-45262]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 05-15375]



[[Page 45249]]

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Part V





Department of Transportation





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Federal Aviation Administration



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14 CFR Part 93



Washington, DC Metropolitan Area Special Flight Rules Area; Proposed 
Rule

Federal Register / Vol. 70 , No. 149 / Thursday, August 4, 2005 / 
Proposed Rules

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 93

[Docket No. FAA-2003-17005; Notice No. 05-07]
RIN 2120-AI17


Washington, DC Metropolitan Area Special Flight Rules Area

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

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SUMMARY: The FAA proposes to codify current flight restrictions for 
certain aircraft operations in the Washington, DC Metropolitan Area. 
This action is necessary because of the ongoing threat of terrorist 
attacks. The FAA intends by this action to help the Department of 
Homeland Security and the Department of Defense protect national assets 
in the National Capital region.

DATES: Send your comments on or before November 2, 2005.

ADDRESSES: You may send comments that do not include national security 
or sensitive security information identified by Docket Number FAA-2003-
17005 using any of the following methods:
     DOT Docket Web Site: Go to https://dms.dot.gov and follow 
the instructions for sending your comments electronically.
     Government-wide Rulemaking Web Site: Go to https://
www.regulations.gov and follow the instructions for sending your 
comments electronically.
     Mail: Docket Management Facility; U.S. Department of 
Transportation, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Nassif Building, Room PL-401, 
Washington, DC 20590-001.
     Fax: 1-202-493-2251.
     Hand Delivery: Room PL-401 on the plaza level of the 
Nassif Building, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Washington, DC, between 9 
a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.
    For more information on the rulemaking process or instructions on 
submitting comments that include national security or sensitive 
security information, see the SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section of this 
document.
    Privacy: Subject to review for national security or sensitive 
security information, we will post all comments we receive, without 
change, to https://dms.dot.gov, including any personal information you 
provide. For more information, see the Privacy Act discussion in the 
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section of this document.
    Docket: To read background documents or comments received, go to 
https://dms.dot.gov at any time or to Room PL-401 on the plaza level of 
the Nassif Building, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Washington, DC, between 9 
a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ellen Crum, Airspace and Rules, Office 
of System Operations and Safety, Federal Aviation Administration, 800 
Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20591; telephone (202) 267-
8783.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited

    The FAA invites interested persons to participate in this 
rulemaking by submitting written comments, data, or views. (See also 
``Sensitive Security Information'' below.) We also invite comments 
relating to the economic, environmental, energy, or federalism impacts 
that might result from adopting the proposals in this document. The 
most helpful comments reference a specific portion of the proposal, 
explain the reason for any recommended change, and include supporting 
data. We ask that you send us two copies of written comments.
    We will file in the docket all comments we receive, subject to 
review for national security or sensitive security information as 
indicated above, as well as a report summarizing each substantive 
public contact with FAA personnel concerning this proposed rulemaking. 
The docket is available for public inspection before and after the 
comment closing date. If you wish to review the docket in person, go to 
the address in the ADDRESSES section of this preamble between 9 a.m. 
and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. You may 
also review the docket using the Internet at the Web address in the 
ADDRESSES section.
    Privacy Act: Using the search function of our docket Web site, 
anyone can find and read the comments received into any of our dockets, 
including the name of the individual sending the comment (or signing 
the comment on behalf of an association, business, labor union, etc.). 
You may review DOT's complete Privacy Act Statement in the Federal 
Register published on April 11, 2000 (65 FR 19477-78) or you may visit 
https://dms.dot.gov.
    Before acting on this proposal, we will consider all comments we 
receive on or before the closing date for comments. We will consider 
comments filed late if it is possible to do so without incurring 
expense or delay. We may change this proposal in light of the comments 
we receive.
    If you want the FAA to acknowledge receipt of your comments on this 
proposal, include with your comments a pre-addressed, stamped postcard 
on which the docket number appears. We will stamp the date on the 
postcard and mail it to you.

Sensitive Security Information

    Do not file in the docket information that you consider to be 
sensitive security information. Send or deliver this information 
(identified as docket number FAA-2003-17005) directly to Edith V. 
Parish, Acting Manager, Airspace and Rules, Office of System Operations 
and Safety, Federal Aviation Administration, 800 Independence Avenue, 
SW., Washington, DC 20591, telephone (202) 267-8783. You must mark 
information that you consider security-sensitive.
    Under 14 CFR 11.35 (a), we will review comments as we receive them, 
before they are placed in the docket. If a comment contains sensitive 
security information, we remove it before placing the comment in the 
general docket.

Availability of This Action

    You can get an electronic copy using the Internet by:
    (1) Searching the Department of Transportation's electronic Docket 
Management System (DMS) Web page (https://dms.dot.gov/search);
    (2) Visiting the FAA's Web page at https://www.faa.gov; or
    (3) Accessing the Government Printing Office's Web page at https://
www.gpoaccess.gov/fr/.
    You can also get a copy by submitting a request to the Federal 
Aviation Administration, Office of Rulemaking, ARM-1, 800 Independence 
Avenue SW., Washington, DC 20591, or by calling (202) 267-9680. Be sure 
to identify the docket number, notice number, or amendment number of 
this rulemaking.

Statutory Authority

    The FAA Administrator has broad authority to regulate the safe and 
efficient use of the navigable airspace (49 U.S.C. 40103). The 
Administrator is also authorized to issue air traffic rules and 
regulations to govern the flight of aircraft, the navigation, 
protection, and identification of aircraft for the protection of 
persons and property on the ground, and for the efficient use of the 
navigable airspace. Additionally, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 40103(b)(3) the 
Administrator has the authority, in consultation with the Secretary of

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Defense, to ``establish security provisions that will encourage and 
allow maximum use of the navigable airspace by civil aircraft 
consistent with national security.'' Such provisions may include 
establishing airspace areas the Administrator decides are necessary in 
the interest of national defense; and by regulation or order, 
restricting or prohibiting flight of civil aircraft that the 
Administrator cannot identify, locate and control with available 
facilities in those areas. See 49 U.S.C. 40103(b). The Administrator 
also has broad statutory authority to issue regulations to promote safe 
flight of civil aircraft in air commerce, when the Administrator finds 
that such regulations are necessary for safety in air commerce and 
national security. See 49 U.S.C. 44701(a)(5). The FAA must consider, as 
a matter of policy, maintaining and enhancing safety and security in 
air commerce as its highest priorities (49 U.S.C. 40101(d)).

Background

    After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, which resulted in 
the loss of human life at the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and in 
southwestern Pennsylvania, the FAA immediately curtailed all aircraft 
operations within the National Airspace System (NAS), except certain 
military, law enforcement, and emergency related aircraft operations.
    On September 13, 2001, the FAA took action to allow additional 
aircraft operations in some areas of the NAS. However, the FAA 
maintained flight restrictions over certain cities and sensitive sites. 
Even after specific temporary flight restrictions over a particular 
city or site were rescinded, some flight restrictions were occasionally 
reinstated in response to specific and general intelligence information 
regarding terrorist threats. Most of these flight restrictions were 
issued pursuant to the Code of Federal Regulations in 14 CFR 91.139, 
Emergency Air Traffic Rules; 14 CFR 91.137, Temporary Flight 
Restrictions in the Vicinity of Disaster/Hazard Areas; or 14 CFR part 
99, Security Control of Air Traffic. These flight restrictions were 
issued via the U.S. Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) System.
    While many aspects of the initial flight restrictions were 
cancelled, in the Washington, DC Metropolitan Area the FAA continued to 
impose several temporary flight restrictions at the request of the 
Departments of Homeland Security (DHS) and Defense (DoD) to assist them 
in their newly assigned counter-terrorism mission.
    On February 19, 2002, the FAA issued Special Federal Aviation 
Regulation (SFAR) No. 94, Enhanced Security Procedures for Operations 
at Certain Airports in the Washington, DC Metropolitan Area Special 
Flight Rules Area (67 FR 7538; Feb. 19, 2002). SFAR 94, which expired 
on February 13, 2005, required any person operating an aircraft to or 
from College Park Airport, Potomac Airfield, or Washington Executive/
Hyde Field to conduct those operations in accordance with security 
procedures approved by the Administrator. The SFAR was a general 
operating rule containing both flight communication requirements and 
airport security requirements. It applied to any person operating an 
aircraft to or from one of the specified airports and affected all 
aircraft operations at these airports, including those conducted under 
14 CFR part 91, those for which an air carrier or an operating 
certificate may be issued under 14 CFR part 119 (for operations 
conducted under 14 CFR part 121 or 135), and those which may be 
conducted under part 125, 129, 133, or 137.
    Procedures addressing airport security previously contained in SFAR 
94 are now included in a regulation promulgated on February 10, 2005 by 
the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), which is now 
responsible for airport security procedures (70 FR 7150; Feb. 10, 
2005). The flight communication requirements are included in this NPRM. 
They include flight plan filing, two-way radio communication, and 
transponder requirements.

Request To Permanently Codify Temporary Flight Restrictions Over the 
Washington, DC, Metropolitan Area

    Because of its status as home to all three branches of the Federal 
government, as well as numerous Federal buildings, foreign embassies, 
multi-national institutions, and national monuments, the Washington, DC 
Metropolitan Area continues to be an obvious high value target for 
terrorists.
    Despite recent successes in the war on terrorism, the DHS believes 
that the threat of extremists launching an attack using aircraft 
remains high. Although there is no information suggesting an imminent 
plan by terrorists to use airplanes to attack targets in the 
Washington, DC Metropolitan Area, the success of the September 11, 2001 
attack on the Pentagon and reports demonstrating terrorist groups' 
enduring interest in aviation-related attacks indicate the need for 
continued vigilance in aviation security.
    For example, the April 2003 arrest of Waleed bin Attash and the 
subsequent discovery of a plot to crash an explosive-laden small 
aircraft into the U.S. Consulate in Karachi, Pakistan illustrates 
terrorist groups' continued interest in using aircraft to attack U.S. 
interests. Other information--such as documents found in Zacarias 
Moussaoui's possession, which outlined crop duster operations--suggests 
that terrorist groups may have been considering other domestic aviation 
attack plans in addition to the September 11, 2001 attacks. As of mid-
June 2003, Islamic extremists may have been planning suicide hijackings 
against government, military, and/or economic targets along the east 
coast of the United States.
    In addition, press reports on the debriefings of detained terrorist 
leader Khalid Shaykh Muhammad not only hint at the complexity of 
planning involved in the September 11, 2001 attacks, but also suggest 
the group was likely planning follow-on operations inside the United 
States, possibly including inside the Washington, DC Metropolitan Area.
    While the DHS has no specific information that terrorist groups are 
currently planning to use general aviation (GA) aircraft to perpetrate 
attacks against the U.S., it remains concerned that (in light of 
completed and ongoing security enhancements for commercial aircraft and 
airports) terrorists may turn to GA as an alternative method for 
conducting operations.
    The DHS believes that Al-Qa'ida is the group most likely to use GA 
to attack targets in the U.S. Several of its operatives--including some 
of the September 11 hijackers--have trained on small aircraft. Indeed, 
according to the testimony before Congress of the then-Director of 
Central Intelligence, George Tenet, September 11 mastermind Khalid 
Shaykh Muhammad originally proposed using multiple small aircraft 
packed with explosives to conduct the attacks. Usama Bin Laden 
reportedly suggested the use of larger aircraft instead. Even earlier, 
Muhammad and Ramzi Yousef--both involved in the 1995 Manila Air plot--
considered the notion of crashing an airplane into CIA Headquarters.
     Based on this and other information, the DHS believes that 
GA aircraft may be vulnerable to targeting by terrorists for misuse.
    In February 2003, FAA, in consultation with DHS and other Federal 
agencies, implemented a system of airspace control measures to protect 
against a potential threat to the

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Washington, DC Metropolitan Area. The dimensions of this protected 
airspace were determined after considering such factors as the speed of 
likely suspect aircraft, minimum launch time and the speed of intercept 
aircraft. After extensive coordination among Federal agencies, two 
airspace areas were implemented. The outer area, which closely mimics 
the current Washington Tri-area Class B airspace, is called an Air 
Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) and requires identification of all 
flight operations within the airspace in order to ensure the security 
of protected ground assets. The inner area, called a Flight Restricted 
Zone (FRZ), is approximately a 15 NM radius around the Washington VHF 
omni-directional range/distance measuring equipment (DCA VOR/DME) where 
more stringent access procedures are applied. Most kinds of flight 
operations are prohibited in this area, and under this proposal such 
operations would continue to be prohibited in this area. Part 121 
operations are presently permitted in this airspace and, under this 
proposal, would continue to be permitted in the FRZ airspace. DoD, law 
enforcement and aeromedical flights are permitted in this airspace and 
would continue to be permitted in this airspace as long as the flight 
crew remains in contact with air traffic control (ATC) and operates the 
aircraft transponder on an air traffic control-assigned beacon code. If 
adopted, the airspace presently known as the DC ``ADIZ'' would be 
redesignated as the Washington, DC Metropolitan Area Special Flight 
Rules Area (DC SFRA). The DC SFRA would encompass the same airspace as 
the ADIZ and include the area known as the FRZ.
    This airspace structure and associated procedures associated with 
the ADIZ and FRZ have been in place for about 2 years. The agencies 
responsible for intercepting intruders within the Washington, DC 
Metropolitan Area (the DoD and agencies of the DHS) believe that the 
existing airspace dimensions and procedures are the minimum acceptable 
to successfully accomplish their missions and should be retained on a 
permanent basis.
    This airspace structure is also an essential component of the DoD 
and DHS air security plan. The DoD and DHS believe that by establishing 
a National Defense airspace area over the Washington, DC Metropolitan 
Area, they would have sufficient time to successfully conduct 
countermeasures to ensure the safety of protectees in the event that a 
potentially hostile aircraft enters the airspace area.
    It is with this in mind that the Departments of Defense and 
Homeland Security requested that the FAA Administrator take action to 
codify permanently current aviation flight restrictions over the 
Washington, DC Metropolitan Area to support their continuing mission to 
protect national assets in the National Capital Region.

General Discussion of the Proposal

    After the events of September 11, 2001, Congress and the President 
tasked government agencies to increase the protection of the United 
States and its interests. Congress established the TSA and tasked it 
with protecting the security of our nation's transportation 
infrastructure. Additionally, Congress established the Department of 
Homeland Security, in order to centralize the administration of the 
country's security efforts.
    For the past two years, the FAA has been working closely with the 
DoD and DHS to draft security contingency plans to protect the American 
public, national assets, and operations in the National Airspace 
System. Some of the measures taken by the FAA include additional 
cockpit security for certain air carrier aircraft and temporary flight 
restrictions over special events (often at stadiums) that attract large 
numbers of people and may be seen as potential targets by terrorists.
    Since the seat of our nation's government is in Washington, DC, 
flight restrictions were established immediately after September 11, 
2001, and most remain in place. Establishing specific airspace for 
security reasons in the Washington, DC area is not a new practice. In 
1938, by Executive Order 7910, the President reserved and set apart 
airspace for national defense, the public safety and other governmental 
purposes. Those airspace reservations were subsequently codified in 14 
CFR part 73 as ``prohibited areas.'' Over the years, the size and 
dimensions of one of these areas, Prohibited Area 56 (P-56), which is 
the airspace over and near the White House, has changed in response to 
world events. In accordance with 14 CFR 73.83, no person may operate an 
aircraft within a prohibited area unless authorization has been granted 
by the using agency. The action proposed in this notice does not modify 
P-56.
    The FAA is aware that the flight restrictions imposed over the 
Washington DC Metropolitan Area have impacted, and will continue to 
impact some pilots in the area. However, government security officials 
believe that the proposed DC SFRA would enhance and strengthen the 
ability of DoD and DHS to protect the President, Cabinet members, the 
Congress and other assets in the capital region.
    According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the threat 
of extremists launching an attack using aircraft still exists. Numerous 
reports continue to be received that demonstrate Al-Qa'ida's enduring 
interest in aviation-related attacks. Thus, there is a continued need 
for aviation security vigilance. Intelligence reports indicate that 
terrorists continue to be interested in using general aviation aircraft 
as part of another attack on the U.S. or facilitation of activities 
since general aviation aircraft are readily available and relatively 
inexpensive. Also, though security measures at general aviation 
airports have improved, they are less stringent than those in place at 
many commercial airports. Overall and even though general aviation 
aircraft are generally smaller than those used in the 9/11 attack, the 
destructive potential of a small aircraft loaded with explosives may be 
significant. It should be noted that almost 70% of U.S. general 
aviation is comprised of aircraft that are relatively small. Aircraft 
in this segment of the industry range from homebuilt craft to large 
airliners. In addition, there are thousands of general aviation 
airports in the United States with varying degrees of security 
procedures implemented.
    We believe that as part of ensuring the security of the people, 
property and institutions in the Nation's capital, and surrounding 
area, it is essential to know the intended route of flight of the 
aircraft, to have the aircraft squawk a discrete transponder code, and 
to have automatic altitude reporting equipment on board the aircraft 
that transmits to ATC. Government officials believe that some types of 
aircraft operations (i.e., those conducted under parts 91, 101, 103, 
105, 125, 133, 135 and 137) should continue to be prohibited within 15 
miles of the DCA VOR/DME, unless specifically authorized by the FAA in 
consultation with the DoD and DHS. Generally speaking, pre-departure 
security procedures and onboard security equipment for such operations 
are substantially less demanding than those security procedures and 
safeguards currently in place for part 121 aircraft operations. 
Therefore, the FAA is proposing the following action which, in part, 
restricts flight in certain areas and requires pilots operating in 
designated areas to file flight plans, communicate with appropriate air 
traffic control facilities, and display an ATC-assigned transponder 
code. This proposed action is one of many being undertaken by 
government agencies that

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are intended to enhance security in the Washington DC Metropolitan 
area.
    By this proposed action the Federal Government would more 
explicitly classify the airspace over the Washington DC Metropolitan 
Area (the DC SFRA) as ``National Defense Airspace.'' Any person who 
knowingly or willfully violates the rules concerning operations in 
National Defense Airspace is subject to certain criminal penalties. See 
49 U.S.C. 46307. It is hoped that codification of these airspace 
restrictions and the classification of this airspace as ``National 
Defense Airspace'' will reduce, through pilot education, the number of 
careless and inadvertent encroachments of the airspace by some pilots. 
Reducing the number of unauthorized airspace penetrations will reduce 
the number of times that the U.S. Government aircraft have to intercept 
unauthorized aircraft. The government also believes this rule will 
reduce the risks that the Government might have to fire on an aircraft 
that proceeds dangerously close to certain locations in the Washington 
DC Metropolitan Area.
    In addition, in response to Congressional mandate, the 
Transportation Security Administration issued an interim final rule on 
July 19, 2005 to restore access to Reagan National Airport for certain 
aircraft operations (70 FR 41586; July 19, 2005). The rule will become 
effective on August 18, 2005. The final rule will reflect changes to 
the airspace restrictions based on that rule, as well as other changes 
that might result from other unforeseen security concerns.

Section-by-Section Discussion of the Proposed 14 CFR Part 93 Subpart B

Section 93.31--What Is the Purpose of This Subpart and Who Would Be 
Affected?

    This section, if adopted, would inform the public that this subpart 
was issued to enhance security efforts in the Washington, DC 
Metropolitan Area and deter anyone who might use an aircraft for 
terrorist activity. It would further inform readers that it establishes 
a National Defense Airspace Area over the Washington, DC, Metropolitan 
Area. This area would be known as the Washington DC Metropolitan Area 
Special Flight Rules Area, which would be defined in proposed Sec.  
93.35. This would include flights in the Washington, DC, Metropolitan 
Area Flight Restricted Zone (FRZ), which is also defined in proposed 
Sec.  93.35. This subpart would affect anyone who operates an aircraft 
in the DC SFRA.

Section 93.33--What Could Happen if You Fail To Comply With the Rules 
of This Subpart?

    This proposed section informs readers that if they do not comply 
with this rule or any special security instruction announced by a 
Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) that affects this rule, then the government 
may do any or all of the following:
    (1) Direct deadly force toward their aircraft. This could happen if 
it is determined that the aircraft poses an imminent security threat.
    (2) Pursue criminal charges. Criminal prosecutions could be 
pursued, in the right case with the appropriate evidence, because this 
airspace is being established, in part, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 40103(b) 
as National Defense Airspace.\1\ This would not be the first time that 
the Administrator, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, has 
acted pursuant to the authority under 49 U.S.C. 40103(b). For example, 
the FAA considers certain Prohibited Areas to be National Defense 
Airspace and certain temporary flight restrictions (TFRs) sites in the 
same vein, because those prohibited areas and those TFRs were 
established, in part, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 40103 in consultation with 
the Secretary of Defense.
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    \1\ Section 46307. Violation of national defense airspace. A 
person that knowingly or willfully violates section 40103(b)(3) of 
this title or a regulation prescribed or order issued under section 
40103(b)(3) shall be fined under title 18, imprisoned for not more 
than one year, or both.
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    (3) Take administrative action, including imposing civil penalties 
and suspend or revoke airmen certificates. Paragraph (c) simply 
summarizes the FAA's long-standing and long-recognized statutory 
authority to take administrative enforcement action against those who 
violate FAA regulations (See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. 44709 and 49 U.S.C. 
Chapter 463 (Penalties)).

Section 93.35--Definitions

    This proposed section contains definitions applicable to this rule. 
Specifically, this section provides the definition for the proposed 
airspace known as the Washington, DC, Metropolitan Area Special Flight 
Rules Area (SFRA) and the airspace contained within the Washington DC 
Metropolitan Area Flight Restricted Zone (FRZ). The SFRA is currently 
defined by a NOTAM, and known as the Washington DC ADIZ. Both the SFRA 
airspace and the FRZ airspace (which is part of SFRA airspace) are 
categorized as ``National Defense Airspace.'' This proposed section 
also defines the term ``fringe airports'' to identify certain airports 
located near the outer boundary of the SFRA where specific egress-only 
procedures may be applied.

Section 93.37--General Requirements for Operating in the Washington, 
DC, Metropolitan Area SFRA

    This proposed section establishes that if you conduct any type of 
flight in the Washington, DC, SFRA, you will be subject to:
    (1) All of the requirements in this part;
    (2) All special instructions issued by the FAA in the interest of 
national security; and
    (3) All other FAA requirements in 14 CFR.
    Generally, any special instructions would be issued as NOTAMs 
pursuant to Sec.  99.7 and would be temporary, but could be issued in 
any manner the FAA considers appropriate.

Section 93.39--Specific Requirements for Operating in the Washington, 
DC, Metropolitan Area SFRA, Including the FRZ

    On February 10, 2003, the FAA issued NOTAM 3/2126 that established 
the Washington DC Metropolitan Area ADIZ. NOTAM 3/2126 contains flight 
restrictions and procedures for aircraft operations within the area, 
including transponder equipment, two-way radio communication and filing 
a flight plan. In this action we propose to establish an area 
(Washington DC SFRA) with specific procedures and pilot and equipment 
requirements. The proposed procedures reflect those currently in place 
via NOTAM for that airspace currently known as the Washington DC 
Metropolitan Area Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ).

Section 93.41--Aircraft Operations Prohibited in the Washington, DC, 
Metropolitan Area Flight Restricted Zone (FRZ)

    This section proposes to codify prohibitions on certain kinds of 
aircraft operations in the Washington DC Metropolitan Area FRZ. The FRZ 
evolved from flight restrictions originally imposed by NOTAM on 
December 19, 2001. On February 10, 2003, the FRZ (which covers 
approximately a 15 nautical mile radius of the Washington DC VOR/DME) 
was introduced to describe an area wherein all flight operations 
conducted under parts 91, 101, 103, 105, 125, 133, 135, and 137 are 
prohibited unless specifically authorized by the FAA, in consultation 
with DHS.

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Section 93.43--Requirements for Aircraft Operations to or From College 
Park Airport; Potomac Airfield; or Washington Executive/Hyde Field 
Airports

    This proposed section contains portions of the procedures 
previously found in SFAR No. 94, and it also contains air traffic 
procedures that are in place via NOTAM.
    SFAR 94 contained both flight communication requirements and 
airport security requirements. The flight communication requirements 
are included in this NPRM. They include flight plan filing, two-way 
radio communication, and transponder requirements. Procedures 
addressing airport security previously contained in SFAR 94 are now 
regulated by the TSA. See ``Background'' above.

Section 93.45--Special Ingress/Egress Procedures for Bay Bridge and 
Kentmorr Airports

    This section proposes to permanently codify ingress/egress 
procedures for certain airports within the Washington, DC Metropolitan 
Area Special Flight Rules Area but not in the FRZ. This proposed 
section details ingress/egress procedures for pilots operating to/from 
the Bay Bridge and Kentmorr Airports. Specifically, the procedures 
would allow aircraft arriving at or departing from either of these 
airports to operate directly to or from the airport, along a specified 
route, at a specified altitude, without filing a flight plan or 
contacting air traffic control, provided they are displaying the 
appropriate ATC-assigned transponder code (1227 for Bay Bridge Airport 
and 1233 for Kentmorr Airport).

Section 93.47--Special Egress Procedures for Fringe Airports

    This section proposes egress-only procedures for those pilots 
departing the Airlie, Albrecht, Harris, Martin, Martin State, Meadows, 
Mylander, Stewart, St. John, Tilghman Whipp, Upperville, and Wolf 
airports. Pilots departing from these airports would display ATC 
transponder code 1205 and monitor the appropriate ATC frequency for the 
area. They would be expected to exit the SFRA by the most direct route. 
Also, these pilots would not have to establish two-way communications 
with ATC unless requested, and would not have to file a flight plan.
    It should be noted that these procedures are being proposed to 
provide relief to certain pilot operations in the SFRA. Any pilot 
deviating from these procedures will trigger a U.S. government 
response.

Section 93.49--Airport Security Procedures

    This section proposes to prohibit any person from operating an 
aircraft at the three subject Maryland airports unless those airports 
have a TSA-approved airport security program.

Paperwork Reduction Act

    This proposal contains the following new information collection 
requirements. As required by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 
U.S.C. 3507(d)), the FAA has submitted the information requirements 
associated with this proposal to the Office of Management and Budget 
for its review. This information is currently being collected under the 
NOTAM issued pursuant to 14 CFR 99.7.
    Estimated Burden: The FAA expects that this proposed rule would 
impose additional reporting and recordkeeping requirements on airports 
and pilots. It would have the following impacts:
     For the airports impacted by SFAR 94, the FAA estimates 
that it would take 1,497.50 hours to process flight plans, costing 
$47,111 annually.
     For the other airports affected by this rulemaking, the 
FAA estimates that it would take 6,466.28 hours to process the 
additional flight plans, costing $203,429 annually.

The total impact to file these flight plans averages $250,540, taking 
7,963.78 hours annually.
    The regulation would increase paperwork for the Federal government, 
as there would be an additional air traffic burden dealing with pilot 
deviations, tracks of interest, and litigation, taking an average of 
129,197.33 hours, costing $10,913,253 annually. In addition, FAA 
employees would have to process the additional flight plans; for the 
airports impacted by SFAR 94, this would take 1,497.50 hours, costing 
$70,847, and for all other airports in the SFRA, this would take 
6,466.28 hours, costing $203,429 annually. The total impact on the 
Federal government would be 137,161.10 hours, costing $11,187,529 
annually.
    The agency is soliciting comments to--
    (1) Evaluate whether the proposed information requirement is 
necessary for the proper performance of the functions of the agency, 
including whether the information will have practical utility;
    (2) Evaluate the accuracy of the agency's estimate of the burden;
    (3) Enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the information to 
be collected; and
    (4) Minimize the burden of the collection of information on those 
who are to respond, including through the use of appropriate automated, 
electronic, mechanical, or other technological collection techniques or 
other forms of information technology.
    Individuals and organizations may submit comments on the 
information collection requirement by October 3, 2005, and should 
direct them to the address listed in the ADDRESSES section of this 
document. Comments also should be submitted to the Office of 
Information and Regulatory Affairs, OMB, New Executive Building, Room 
10202, 725 17th Street, NW., Washington, DC 20053, Attention: Desk 
Officer for FAA.
    According to the 1995 amendments to the Paperwork Reduction Act (5 
CFR 1320.8(b)(2)(vi)), an agency may not collect or sponsor the 
collection of information, nor may it impose an information collection 
requirement unless it displays a currently valid OMB control number. 
The OMB control number for this information collection will be 
published in the Federal Register, after the Office of Management and 
Budget approves it.

International Compatibility

    In keeping with U.S. obligations under the Convention on 
International Civil Aviation, it is FAA policy to comply with 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Standards and 
Recommended Practices to the maximum extent practicable. The FAA has 
determined that there are no ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices 
that correspond to these proposed regulations.

Regulatory Evaluation Summary

    Changes to Federal regulations must undergo several economic 
analyses. First, Executive Order 12866 directs that each Federal agency 
shall propose or adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned determination 
that the benefits of the intended regulation justify its costs. Second, 
the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 requires agencies to analyze the 
economic impact of regulatory changes on small entities. Third, the 
Trade Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 2531-2533) prohibits agencies from 
setting standards that create unnecessary obstacles to the foreign 
commerce of the United States. In developing U.S. standards, this Trade 
Act requires agencies to consider international standards and, where 
appropriate, to be the basis of U.S. standards. Fourth, the Unfunded 
Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Public Law 104-4) requires agencies to 
prepare a written assessment of the costs, benefits, and other effects 
of proposed or final rules that include a

[[Page 45255]]

Federal mandate likely to result in the expenditure by State, local, or 
tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector, of 
$120.7 million or more annually (adjusted for inflation).
    In conducting these analyses, the FAA has determined this proposed 
rule: (1) Would have benefits that justify its costs, is a 
``significant regulatory action'' as defined in section 3(f) of 
Executive Order 12866, and is ``significant'' as defined in DOT's 
Regulatory Policies and Procedures; (2) may have a significant economic 
impact on a substantial number of small entities; (3) would have no 
affect on international trade; and does not impose an unfunded mandate 
on state, local, or tribal governments, or on the private sector. These 
analyses, available in the docket, are summarized below.

Who Is Potentially Affected by This Rulemaking

Private Sector
    All aircraft would have to be transponder equipped when entering 
the proposed DC SFRA and maintain two-way communications while flying 
in the proposed area. Pilots operating in accordance with visual flight 
rules (VFR) would have to file flight plans to fly within the proposed 
DC SFRA.
    There are approximately 150 airports in the proposed DC ADIZ. Given 
the additional requirements that general aviation pilots face, the FAA 
is concerned that many of these airports would have fewer operations. 
In some cases, some of these pilots may elect to use alternate nearby 
airports outside of the proposed DC SFRA.
Government
    The FAA has experienced additional burdens in maintaining the 
requested security requirements within the DC ADIZ/FRZ since September 
11, 2001. In particular, this includes additional work for the air 
traffic control facilities of Potomac Consolidated Terminal Radar 
Approach Control (TRACON) and Leesburg Automated Flight Service Station 
(AFSS) as well as adjacent air traffic control towers and AFSS's.
    One of the airports affected by the flight restrictions imposed 
since September 11, 2001 is the College Park Airport. This airport is 
owned and partially funded by two Maryland Counties, Montgomery and 
Prince George's.

Our Cost Assumptions and Sources of Information

    In this analysis, the FAA estimated future costs for a 10-year 
period, from 2004 through 2013. As required by the Office of Management 
and Budget, the present value of this stream of costs was calculated 
using a discount factor of 7 percent. All costs in this analysis are in 
2002 dollars.
    The analysis examined costs associated with the proposed DC SFRA.
Impact to Air Traffic
    The FAA calculated the number of additional air traffic staff by 
looking at air traffic controller availability during the average 
workweek and during the year. Staffing demands in the future are 
calculated by using annual growth rates of 1.2% for the TRACONs and 
0.5% for the AFSSs. In addition, personnel compensation and benefits 
for a certified professional controller are estimated at $140,000 and 
for an automated flight service station specialist are estimated at 
$90,000.
Airports Impacted by the Former SFAR 94--College Park, Potomac, and 
Washington Executive/Hyde
    For the three airports impacted by the former SFAR 94, the FAA also 
used the following assumptions:
     The cost of either a pilot's or an aircraft occupant's 
time is $31.46 per hour.
     The per hour cost of operating a piston driven, four seat 
aircraft is $64.75.
     The average load factor for a four seat aircraft is 43.7 
percent or 1.75 occupants.
     An airport manager's hourly wage, based on each airport's 
actual cost and revenue streams, is $45 per hour at College Park, $42 
per hour at Potomac, and $40 per hour at Washington Executive/Hyde.
     To account for financial losses not explicitly captured by 
the analysis, twenty percent of lost revenue is added to the estimated 
cost of operational restrictions for all three airports.
     To compensate for the lack of financial data for 
Washington Executive Airport/Hyde Field, the average estimated cost of 
certain operational restrictions for the two other airports (College 
Park and Potomac) is used to estimate the revenue losses.
     The data for the days that each airport was open and 
operating in 2002 was annualized to help estimate total operations and 
revenues. This data summed to about 6\1/2\ months for the College Park 
and Potomac airports and 4 months for Washington Executive Airport/Hyde 
Field.
     Hourly costs to the Federal Government include airport 
inspector (FG-14, $56.48) and flight service station specialist 
($47.37) and to the state government law enforcement agency employee 
($47.80).
     Revenue is used as the financial indicator of economic 
costs in lieu of unavailable data on lost profits.
     Local purchases include procurements made by the airport 
and its tenants and airport sales to tenants, visitors, and local 
organizations.
     For ground delays, the hourly value of passenger time per 
operation is $55.06. The average ground delay varied per airport.
     For in-flight delays, the hourly cost of an in-flight 
delay is $119.81. The average flight delay varied per airport.
    In addition, the FAA made the following assumptions concerning the 
number of operations and revenue at these three airports:
     The number of operations, which was annualized from 2002 
data, would remain constant at all three airports for the ten years 
examined by this analysis. In a recent Interim Final Rule, the TSA has 
allowed transient operations into these airports. However, FAA does not 
know how many additional aircraft will fly into or out of these 
airports. Unless a pilot plans on using one of these airports on a 
regular basis, they probably would not want to go through the vetting 
process. Thus, the FAA believes that the number of additional new 
operations would be minimal.
     Given the additional security vetting required by TSA, the 
FAA believes that these pilots who fly into any of these three airports 
would do so only if they believe that it is to their advantage to do 
so. In other words, the FAA recognizes that these pilots would enjoy an 
unquantifiable benefit.
     The FAA does not believe that the recent TSA rule would 
increase the total number of flights within the SFRA. So while the 
actual number of flights to the Maryland-3 and to the other airports 
within the SFRA may change, the total number of flights within the SFRA 
would not. While the costs estimated and projected for the Maryland-3 
and the other airports may change, the total costs related to these 
operations within the SFRA (in-flight delays, on-the-ground delays, and 
flight plan processing) would not change.
     Annual revenue, which was also annualized from 2002 data, 
would remain constant at all three airports for the ten years examined 
by this analysis. The FAA recognizes that additional transient flights 
have the potential to boost revenue to each airport, but believes that 
any potential increase would be small.

[[Page 45256]]

Other Costs Associated With the Proposed DC SFRA
     The FAA assumes that the additional number of flight plans 
filed in 2004 would be 123,800, growing to 135,000 in 2013; these 
numbers are net of those needed to be filed for the three airports 
impacted by the former SFAR 94.
     As above, for ground delays, the hourly value of passenger 
time per operation is $55.06, while for in-flight delays; the hourly 
cost per operation is $119.81.

Benefits of This Rulemaking

    This proposed rule is intended to enhance DoD/DHS security measures 
to deter airborne terrorist attacks. The primary benefit of the 
proposal would be enhanced protection for a significant number of 
government assets and infrastructure in the National Capital Region. 
The security provisions and flight restrictions contained in this rule 
are an integral part of the effort to identify and defeat the threat 
posed by terrorists.
    Given the myriad of possible scenarios, the cost of an act of 
terrorism against a nationally prominent target or critical government 
infrastructure is extremely difficult to quantify. They can include 
areas such as the direct and indirect costs of the September 11 attacks 
as well as a reduction in D.C. tourism. Due to the sensitive nature of 
this information, many of the specifics of these effects will not be 
discussed in this document. However, the FAA acknowledges that these 
costs would be very high.
    The FAA acknowledges that there would be non-quantifiable benefits. 
The separation of air traffic is predicated on knowing the intentions 
of aircraft operating within the controller's airspace. The proposed DC 
SFRA would require two way communication, flight plans and operable 
transponders for pilots to operate in the area. This would allow the 
government to know the pilots' intentions, to monitor the aircraft 
altitude, and to communicate with each pilot. Knowing this information 
would enhance safety and security.
    In addition, the FAA believes that this rule will reduce the number 
of times that the U.S. Government might have to intercept unauthorized 
aircraft. The current restrictions are contained in NOTAMs, which are 
not as widely disseminated or understood as Federal regulations. As the 
public becomes more aware of these airspace restrictions, the FAA 
believes the number of careless and inadvertent encroachments of the 
airspace will be reduced. The FAA does not have any data on the 
possible reduction in the number of times that the U.S. Government 
might have to intercept unauthorized aircraft, but believes that a 
better educated flying public would make fewer critical flying errors.

Costs of This Rulemaking

    The analysis examined costs associated with the proposed DC SFRA.

The Impact to Air Traffic

    The FAA has borne additional burdens in maintaining the requested 
airspace restrictions within the existing Washington, DC ADIZ/FRZ. To 
calculate the costs associated with the proposed DC SFRA, the FAA made 
a comparison using the baseline months of July 2001, 2002, and 2003. 
Based on the additional workload for 2003, controller staffing has been 
increased; total increased staffing costs, over ten years, sum to 
$62.12 million ($43.83 million, discounted). The total number of 
controllers would increase from 39 in 2004 to 43 in 2013.
    There are other costs due to additional activities, all centered at 
the Potomac TRACON. These other costs include additional pilot 
deviations, additional tracks of interest, increased litigation, and 
costs associated with creating and operating a National Security 
Special Operations Unit. This increased workload sums to $122.15 
million ($71.28 million, discounted) over ten years.
    Total ten-year costs, to handle the additional air traffic burden, 
sum to $184.27 million ($128.70 million, discounted).
Costs to the Airports Impacted by the Former SFAR 94--College Park, 
Potomac, and Washington Executive/Hyde
    SFAR 94, enacted February 13, 2002, authorized general aviation 
operations at College Park Airport, Potomac Airfield, and Washington 
Hyde Field, provided that stringent requirements were met. In February 
2003, the FAA, in concert with TSA, extended the SFAR 94 for an 
additional two years. In February 2005, TSA extended the security 
aspects of these procedures under 49 CFR part 1562; the airspace 
restrictions and communications provisions in NOTAM 3/0853 remain under 
FAA authority. This rulemaking would codify these airspace restrictions 
and communications provisions.
    The FAA was able to obtain limited historical financial and 
operational data for College Park and Potomac Field Airports for part 
of their first year under the SFAR. Additional data restrictions, 
however, limited the analysis of the rule's impact on the Washington 
Executive Airport/Hyde Field. Thus, the FAA was required to make 
additional assumptions in doing the analysis for this airport.
College Park Airport
    The College Park Airport opened in 1909 and is the oldest 
continuously operating airport in the world. With the exception of 
about 100 annual air taxi operations, the College Park Airport serves 
private pilots who use their aircraft for pleasure and business. The 
estimate of annual losses to College Park Airport associated with 
complying with the current DC ADIZ/FRZ operational restrictions is 
$1.62 million. This annualized revenue loss has been increased by a 
factor of 20% to account for revenue losses not included in the 
analysis. The annual airspace restriction costs to the pilots using the 
College Park Airport sum to $171,900 and are based on the ground and 
in-flight delays as well as the time to file flight plans. Complying 
with the airspace and communication requirements in the proposed DC 
SFRA would cost the College Park Airport an estimated $1.80 million 
annually.
Potomac Airfield
    The Potomac Airfield is a small privately owned airport located in 
Fort Washington, Maryland. Based on information from the first 8 months 
of 2002, and assuming that these revenues derived during the period 
stay the same, the FAA estimates the revenue loss to be $1.36 million. 
This annualized revenue loss has been increased by a factor of 20% to 
account for revenue losses not included in the analysis. Thus the FAA 
estimates annual losses of $1.63 million for the time examined by this 
analysis. The annual airspace restriction costs to the pilots using the 
Potomac Airfield Airport sum to $368,500 and are based on the ground 
and in-flight delays as well as the time to file flight plans. 
Complying with the requirements in the proposed DC SFRA would cost the 
Potomac Airfield Airport an estimated $2.00 million annually.
Washington Executive/Hyde Field Airport
    Washington Executive/Hyde Field Airport is a small privately owned 
airport located in Clinton, Maryland. The airport largely serves the 
needs of private pilots who occasionally fly for business reasons. This 
airport was closed longer than the other two; operations resumed at 
Hyde Field on March 2, 2002. However, on May 17, 2002, the airport was 
closed again

[[Page 45257]]

because of a security violation. The airport reopened on September 28, 
2002. This annualized revenue loss has been increased by a factor of 
20% to account for revenue losses not included in the analysis. This 
resulted in the estimate of annual losses associated with complying 
with the operational restrictions in the former SFAR 94 for this 
airport to be $1.60 million.
    The annual airspace restriction costs to the pilots using the 
Washington Executive Airport/Hyde Field sum to $596,500 and are based 
on the ground and in-flight delays as well as the time to file flight 
plans. Complying with the requirements in the proposed DC SFRA would 
cost the Washington Executive/Hyde Field Airport an estimated $2.19 
million annually.
Other Costs Related to the Above Three Airports
    Flight service station specialists would need to process the flight 
plans; annual costs sum to approximately $70,800. Annual costs for the 
ten-year extension of the provisions of the proposed DC SFRA sum to 
$6.06 million. Over ten years, these costs sum to $60.64 million 
($42.59, discounted).
Other Costs Related to the Proposed DC SFRA
    There are approximately 150 airports/heliports within the proposed 
DC SFRA. The costs for three of these airports (College Park, Potomac, 
and Washington Executive/Hyde) have already been discussed above. 
However, there are additional costs, both for pilots and airports 
within the proposed DC SFRA.
    Costs for pilots--The proposal would implement new requirements for 
all pilots. The proposal would require all operators to file flight 
plans. Pilots operating VFR would have to file flight plans to operate 
within the proposed DC SFRA; these are new costs. The FAA estimates an 
additional 123,800 flight plans would need to be filed annually in 
2004, growing to 135,000 in 2013. Ten year costs due to flight delays 
and the time to file flight plans sum to $48.63 million. In addition, 
flight service station specialists would need to process the flight 
plans; ten-year costs sum to approximately $3.06 million. Total costs 
for these additional flight plans sum to $51.70 million ($36.12 
million, discounted) over ten years. The FAA invites comments on:
     The total number of additional flight plans,
     The filing time due to ground and in-flight delays and 
related costs, and
     The net results of pilots circumventing the DC SFRA.
    The FAA requests that all comments be accompanied by documentation.
    Costs for small airports--There are approximately 150 airports/
heliports in the proposed DC SFRA, most of which do not keep operations 
records. Given the additional requirements that general aviation pilots 
face, the FAA notes that many of these airports would have fewer 
operations, resulting in a loss of revenue. In some cases, some of 
these pilots would fly to alternate airports outside the proposed DC 
SFRA, resulting in an increase in operations and revenue for these 
alternate airports. The FAA does not have data as to the change in 
operations and revenue in the airports both within and just outside the 
proposed DC SFRA since February 2001. Accordingly, the FAA invites 
comments from both small airports and general aviation pilots on the 
effect of the DC SFRA on these airports. The FAA requests that all 
comments be accompanied by documentation.

Total Costs

    Total quantifiable costs sum to $296.60 million ($207.41 million, 
discounted) over ten years.

Regulatory Flexibility Determination

    For this proposed rule, the small entity group is considered to be 
small general aviation airports (North American Industry Classification 
System [NAICS] 488119--Airport Operations and Terminal Services). The 
small entity size standards criteria involving airports defines a small 
airport as one that is independently owned with annual revenues of less 
than $5 million or owned by a small governmental jurisdiction with a 
population less than 50,000. In addition, all privately owned, public-
use airports are considered small. All the small airports, both public-
use and private-use, in the proposed Washington, DC SFRA need to be 
examined in this regulatory flexibility analysis.
    The FAA only has revenue (both pre- and post-DC ADIZ) and 
compliance cost data for the three airports within the FRZ, and so can 
only do a regulatory flexibility analysis on these airports, based on 
the effects of the SFRA. Because the proposal would have a significant 
impact on two of the three airports impacted by the former SFAR 94 that 
would trigger the need for a regulatory flexibility analysis if the 
proposed rule were only dealing with the former SFAR 94 and the current 
combination of TSA's 49 CFR part 1562 and FAA's NOTAM 3/0853. However, 
there are approximately 150 airports within the SFRA that are affected 
by other provisions of the proposed rule, and the FAA does not know if 
these other provisions would have a significant impact on a substantial 
number of all those airports. Accordingly, the FAA prepared a 
regulatory flexibility analysis, as it believes it important to show 
the potential impact on these entities for the sake of completeness and 
to engender comments.
    Hence, the focus of the following analysis will not be the proposed 
rule, but rather, a subsection of the proposed rule--the impact of the 
former SFAR 94. The FAA requests comments containing revenue (both pre- 
and post-DC ADIZ) and compliance cost data for these other airports 
within the existing Washington, DC SFRA/FRZ as well as any other 
pertinent information of the potential burden of this proposal on small 
airports. The FAA requests that such data be accompanied with full 
documentation.
    As discussed above, three airports are directly affected. The 
College Park Airport is owned and partially funded by two Maryland 
Counties, Montgomery and Prince George's. The 2000 census discloses 
that the combined population of the two counties is approximately 1.7 
million. As such, the College Park Airport is not a small entity. Both 
the Potomac Airfield Airport and Washington Executive Airport/Hyde 
Field are privately owned and considered small in this analysis.
    Small general aviation airports are not required to have security 
programs; only those airports that have scheduled service are required 
to have such a program. Air carrier airports are funded from tax 
revenues and generally have greater aviation traffic activity than 
general aviation airports and airports without scheduled service. By 
and large, Potomac Airfield and Hyde Field are not supported from tax 
revenues, as the revenues that sustain the two airports are derived 
solely from the pilots who use the airports; however, these airports 
received Airport Improvement Project (AIP) funds for the costs of 
operating and for security enhancements due to the special provisions 
in the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA). The provision 
lasted for one year, in 2002. Potomac Airfield Airport received about 
$150,100, while Washington Executive Airport/Hyde Field received 
$342,300. Neither airport can count on these AIP funds to sustain them 
in the future.
    The estimated annual cost of compliance, based on known costs and 
revenues for the Washington Executive Airport is $291,600 and the 
burden on the Potomac Airfield Airport is $221,400; they increase to 
$334,000 and

[[Page 45258]]

$252,900 when the anticipated airport revenue losses are increased by 
20%, as discussed above. These costs are considered burdensome because 
they are well in excess of one percent of the median annual revenue of 
small airport operators (one percent of the annual median revenue for 
small operators is $28,000). If these were the only small airports 
within the proposed DC SFRA, the FAA would determine that the rule 
would have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of 
small entities. Without similar information from the other small 
airports, the FAA is unable to make such a determination, but, as 
mentioned above, the FAA believes it is important to show the potential 
impact on these entities for the sake of completeness. Accordingly, it 
conducted a regulatory flexibility analysis only on a subsection of the 
proposed rule--those airports impacted by the former SFAR 94.

Regulatory Flexibility Analysis

    Under section 603 (b) of the RFA (as amended), each regulatory 
flexibility analysis is required to address the following points: (1) 
Reasons the FAA considered the rule, (2) the objectives and legal basis 
of the rule, (3) the kind and number of small entities to which the 
rule will apply, (4) the reporting, record keeping, and other 
compliance requirements of the rule, and (5) all Federal rules that may 
duplicate, overlap, or conflict with the rule. The FAA will perform an 
analysis for the two small airports impacted by this rule, because the 
rule will make SFAR 94 permanent.
    Reasons the FAA considered the rule: The catastrophic events of 
September 11, 2001 introduced the awareness that terrorists will use 
civil aviation aircraft as a missile or, potentially, as carriers of 
biological, chemical, radioactive and/or conventional weaponry against 
civilian targets. This proposed rule recognizes that the terrorist 
threat is changing and growing and that extraordinary steps must be 
taken to safeguard the Washington, DC Metropolitan Area.
    The objectives and legal basis for the rule: The objective of the 
rule is to combine all the airspace restrictions within the Washington, 
DC Metropolitan Area into one regulation. This effort is to assist DHS 
and DoD in their efforts to enhance security protection of vital 
national assets located within the National Capital Region. The 
statutory authority for these rules can be found in 49 U.S.C. 40103 and 
44701(a)(5). The FAA must consider, as a matter of policy, maintaining 
and enhancing safety and security in air commerce as its highest 
priorities (49 U.S.C. 40101 (d)).
    The kind and number of small entities to which the rule will apply: 
As noted above, the FAA only has enough data on two small airports, 
Potomac and Washington Executive/Hyde to perform this analysis; 
however, the proposed rule potentially applies to all pilots, 
regardless of where they are based, if they operate within the proposed 
DC SFRA. Private pilots operate their aircraft for business and 
pleasure at these airports.
    All Federal rules that may duplicate, overlap, or conflict with the 
rule: The FAA is unaware of any Federal rules that duplicate, overlap, 
or conflict with this rule.

Other Considerations

    Affordability analysis: The extent to which a small airport can 
``afford'' the cost of compliance is directly related to the 
availability of income and earnings. The small airports subject to this 
rule generate income to sustain their operations from landing fees, 
tie-down charges, rent and other compensation paid by airport tenants, 
fuel sales, flight school instruction, sightseeing rides, aircraft 
rentals, and miscellaneous local sales. All of these sources of income 
are influenced directly by the number of operations at the airport. The 
reduction in operations experienced by the airports as a consequence of 
the flight restrictions in place before and after the former SFAR 94 
became effective is significant. Even if there is an increase in 
operations as a result of the recent TSA rule, the FAA believes that 
this increase would be minimal, leading to the same conclusion that the 
overall reduction in operations is significant.
    The decrease in operations corresponds directly to the decline in 
working capital at the airports. Working capital is defined as the 
excess of current assets over current liabilities. The financial 
strength and viability of a business entity is substantially influenced 
by its working capital position and its ability to meet its short-term 
liabilities. As fixed-base operators and pilots have relocated to other 
airfields, revenues have continued to decline. Besides laying off 
staff, without other sources of revenue, the airports are unable to 
implement offsetting cost-saving efficiencies that could ameliorate the 
loss of income.
    At this time, there is no comprehensive source of information 
available that would account for a total financial picture of these 
airports. There is also no information about the airports' ability to 
obtain credit. The only evidence is limited to the fact that the 
airport and its tenants generated revenues in previous years and were 
able to pay their taxes. As such, it can be assumed that these small 
entities were generating sufficient revenues to meet tax and other 
obligations; however, the costs of complying with the former SFAR 94 
are very high relative to the current revenues reported by the 
airports. As discussed for both airports, the security costs alone are 
more than 20% of the projected revenues, $63,800 out of total airport 
revenue of $259,000 at Potomac and $79,500 out of total airport revenue 
of $291,300 at Washington Executive Airport/Hyde Field.
    The financial impact of the flight restrictions in place before the 
effective date of the former SFAR 94 is significant relative to the 
size of these airports. The reopening of the airports has not improved 
the financial posture of the airports. The May 17, 2002, temporary 
closing again of Washington Executive Airport/Hyde Field