Announcement of a Public Meeting To Discuss Selected Topics for the Review of Emergency Preparedness (EP) Regulations and Guidance for Commercial Nuclear Power Plants, 43721-43725 [E5-4011]
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Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 144 / Thursday, July 28, 2005 / Notices
fire hazards that could affect the pinch
points. Although it is unlikely that a fire
will affect the pinch points, if such
damage were to occur and the CREVS
was to be made inoperable, means to
achieve safe shutdown remain available.
First, the operators could shed loads to
reduce the heat load in the Control
Room so that Control Room
abandonment is not required. Secondly,
if Control Room abandonment is
required, the alternate shutdown panel
is available to shutdown the plant. The
licensee performed a risk analysis of
these configurations which is described
above.
The risk analysis in the February 25,
2005, submittal is generally consistent
with the NRC’s fire protection
significance determination process
(Inspection Manual Chapter 0609,
Appendix F). The results of the analysis
are consistent with a change that would
be acceptable when compared to the
acceptance criteria described in
Regulatory Guide 1.174, ‘‘An Approach
for Using Probabilistic Risk Assessment
in Risk-Informed Decisions on PlantSpecific Changes to the Licensing
Basis,’’ Revision 1.
The evaluation that FENOC prepared
assesses the impact of the change. This
evaluation uses a combination of riskinsights and deterministic methods to
show that sufficient safety margins are
maintained.
The NRC staff examined the licensee’s
rationale to support the exemption
request and concluded that adequate
defense-in-depth and safety margins
exist. Although fixed suppression is not
installed in the area, the configuration
of the area makes it unlikely that the
cables of interest will be damaged by a
fire in the area. Also, if the cables of
interest are damaged, adequate
assurance remains to demonstrate that
the plant can be brought to a safe
shutdown condition.
Based upon the above, the NRC staff
concludes that application of the
regulation is not necessary to achieve
the underlying purpose of the rule.
Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that
pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii), the
requested exemption is acceptable.
5.0 Conclusion
Accordingly, the Commission has
determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR
50.12(a), the exemption is authorized by
law, will not present an undue risk to
the public health and safety, and is
consistent with the common defense
and security. Also, special
circumstances are present. Therefore,
the Commission hereby grants FENOC
an exemption from the requirements of
10 CFR part 50, appendix R, section
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III.G.3 to install a fixed fire suppression
system in Fire Area HH for DBNPS and
to install fire detection in the
approximately 4 percent of Fire Area
HH (i.e., Rooms 603A and 603B) not
currently covered by a fire detection
system. This exemption is based on the
limited combustibles located in the fire
area (including no storage of
combustibles in Rooms 603A and 603B),
the limited ignition sources in the fire
area, administrative controls on both
transient combustibles and hot work,
the configuration of Room 603 that
avoids in-situ combustible liquids from
affecting the cables of interest, the fire
detection and manual suppression
capability available, and the availability
of alternate means to achieve shutdown
if a fire were to occur and cause damage
to the cables of interest.
Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the
Commission has determined that the
granting of this exemption will not have
a significant effect on the quality of the
human environment (70 FR 42112).
This exemption is effective upon
issuance.
Dated in Rockville, Maryland, this 21 day
of July 2005.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Ledyard B. Marsh,
Director, Division of Licensing Project
Management, Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation.
[FR Doc. E5–4012 Filed 7–27–05; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590–01–P
[Docket No. 55–22685; ASLBP No. 05–840–
01–SP]
In the Matter of David H. Hawes;
Establishment of Atomic Safety and
Licensing Board
Pursuant to delegation by the
Commission dated December 29, 1972,
published in the Federal Register, 37 FR
28,710 (1972), and the Commission’s
regulations, see 10 CFR 2.104, 2.300,
2.303, 2.309, 2.311, 2.318, and 2.321,
notice is hereby given that an Atomic
Safety and Licensing Board is being
established to preside over the following
proceeding:
David H. Hawes (Reactor Operator
License for Vogtle Electric Generating
Plant)
This proceeding concerns a request
for hearing submitted on June 28, 2005,
by David H. Hawes in response to a June
20, 2005, NRC staff letter proposing the
denial of his application for a reactor
operator license for the Vogtle Electric
Generating Plant. According to the staff
Frm 00043
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letter, the basis for the proposed denial
action was Mr. Hawe’s failure to obtain
a passing grade on the May 27, 2005,
written examination portion of his
reactor operator license application for
the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant.
The Board is comprised of the
following administrative judges:
Ann M. Young, Chair, U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, Washington,
DC 20555–0001.
Michael C. Farrar, U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, Washington,
DC 20555–0001.
Dr. Peter S. Lam, U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, Washington,
DC 20555–0001.
All correspondence, documents, and
other materials shall be filed with the
administrative judges in accordance
with 10 CFR 2.302.
Issued in Rockville, Maryland, this 22nd
day of July, 2005.
G. Paul Bollwerk, III,
Chief Administrative Judge, Atomic Safety
and Licensing Board Panel.
[FR Doc. E5–4010 Filed 7–27–05; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590–01–P
NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION
Announcement of a Public Meeting To
Discuss Selected Topics for the
Review of Emergency Preparedness
(EP) Regulations and Guidance for
Commercial Nuclear Power Plants
Nuclear Regulatory
Commission.
ACTION: Notice of meeting.
AGENCY:
NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION
PO 00000
43721
SUMMARY: The Nuclear Regulatory
Commission’s (NRC’s) reassessment of
emergency preparedness following
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks
concluded that the planning basis for
emergency preparedness (EP) remains
valid. However, as part of our
continuing EP review, some
enhancements are being considered to
EP regulations and guidance due to the
terrorist acts of 9/11; technological
advances; the need for clarification
based upon more than 20 years of
experience; lessons learned during drills
and exercises; and responses to actual
events.
Therefore, the NRC will hold a one
and one-half-day public meeting to
obtain stakeholder input on selected
topics for the review of EP regulations
and guidance for commercial nuclear
power plants and to discuss EP-related
issues that arose during an NRC/FEMA
workshop at the 2005 National
Radiological Emergency Preparedness
(NREP) Conference.
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Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 144 / Thursday, July 28, 2005 / Notices
Wednesday, August 31, 2005,
8:30 a.m. to 5 p.m. and Thursday,
September 1, 2005, 8 to 12:30 p.m.
ADDRESSES: Bethesda North Marriott
Hotel and Conference Center, 5701
Marinelli Road, North Bethesda,
Maryland 20852. (Go to https://
www.BethesdaNorthMarriott.com for
additional hotel information.)
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Robert Moody, Mail Stop O6H2, Office
of Nuclear Security and Incident
Response, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Washington, DC 20555–
0001; telephone 1–800–368–5642,
extension 1737; or e-mail rem2@nrc.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Meeting Purpose: The purpose of the
meeting is to discuss selected topics for
the review of EP regulations and
guidance for commercial nuclear power
plants and to obtain stakeholder input.
The selected topics also include EPrelated issues that arose during the 2005
NREP Conference, NRC/Federal
Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) workshop. In addition to the
comments provided by attendees during
the discussion of the above topics, the
NRC is accepting written comments.
Meeting Overview: The first day of the
meeting will cover topics pertaining to
potential changes to EP regulations and
guidance for commercial nuclear power
plants. This portion of the meeting will
be conducted as a roundtable discussion
among participants who have been
invited to represent the broad spectrum
of interests in the area of EP. The
spectrum includes representatives from
State, local, and Tribal governments,
Department of Homeland Security
(DHS)/FEMA, NRC, advocacy groups,
and the nuclear industry. The meeting
is open to the public, and all attendees,
including State, local, and tribal
governments not represented at the
roundtable, will have an opportunity to
offer comments and ask questions at
selected points throughout the meeting.
Any questions regarding the roundtable
discussion should be directed to the
meeting facilitator, Francis ‘‘Chip’’
Cameron by phone at 301–415–1642 or
e-mail fxc@nr.gov.
The second day of the meeting will
include a discussion of unanswered
comments and questions captured
during an NRC/FEMA workshop at the
2005 National Radiological Emergency
Preparedness Conference (NREP).
During the workshop, Emergency
Preparedness Directorate (EPD) staff
captured all unanswered comments and
questions brought forth by stakeholders
in a ‘‘Parking Lot.’’ Since the NREP
Conference, the staff has worked with
FEMA to develop responses to the
DATES:
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‘‘Parking Lot’’ comments and questions.
This part of the meeting is to discuss the
NRC/FEMA responses to the NREP
‘‘Parking Lot’’ comments and questions
in a town hall-type setting. All attendees
are encouraged to participate in the
discussion.
The public meeting notice and
agenda, as well as the responses to the
‘‘Parking Lot’’ comments and questions
from the NREP Conference, can be
found on the Internet at: https://
www.nrc.gov/public-involve/publicmeetings/epreview2005.html.
Updated Meeting Information: The
NRC encourages all participants to
check frequently the following Web site
for the most current information on the
meeting. New information will be added
to this Web site periodically: https://
www.nrc.gov/public-involve/publicmeetings/epreview2005.html.
Submitting Comments: Comments
related to the review of EP regulations
and guidance may be sent to Mr. Robert
Moody, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, One White Flint North,
Mail Stop O6H2, 11555 Rockville Pike,
Rockville, MD 20852. Comments may
also be hand-delivered to the NRC at the
above address from 7:30 a.m. to 4:15
p.m. during Federal workdays. To be
considered, written comments must be
received at the NRC by the close of
business on Monday, October 17, 2005.
Comments provided during the
roundtable discussions will be captured
in the meeting transcript, and along
with any written comments, will be
evaluated by the NRC staff.
Electronic comments may be
submitted via the following Web site:
https://www.nrc.gov/public-involve/
public-meetings/epreview2005.html.
Electronic comments must be sent no
later than the close of business on
October 17, 2005.
Meeting Transcript: A transcript of the
meeting should be available
electronically on or about September 15,
2005, and accessible on the Internet at:
https://www.nrc.gov/public-involve/
public-meetings/epreview2005.html.
Primary EP Regulations: To facilitate
discussion and comment, the primary
EP regulations within the scope of
review are as follows: 10 CFR 50.47; 10
CFR 50.54(q); Appendix E to 10 CFR 50.
These regulations are available on the
NRC EP Web site at: https://
www.nrc.gov/what-we-do/emergpreparedness/regs-guidancecomm.html.
Primary EP Guidance Documents: A
list of the primary EP guidance
documents that are within the scope of
the review are as follows and are also
available on the NRC EP Web site at:
https://www.nrc.gov/what-we-do/emerg-
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preparedness/regs-guidancecomm.html.
1. NUREG–0654/FEMA–REP–1,
‘‘Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation
of Radiological Emergency Response
Plans and Preparedness in Support of
Nuclear Power Plants’’.
2. NUREG–0654/FEMA–REP–1,
Supplement 3, ‘‘Criteria for Protective
Action Recommendations for Severe
Accidents’’.
The following EP guidance
documents are also within the scope of
the review. However, they are currently
only available electronically in NRC’s
Agencywide Documents Access and
Management System (ADAMS): (Note:
ADAMS is the NRC’s online document
management system at https://
www.nrc.gov).
1. NUREG–0696, ‘‘Functional Criteria
for Emergency Response Facilities’’
(ADAMS number ML051390358).
2. NUREG–0737, Supplement 1,
‘‘Clarification of TMI Action Plan
Requirements’’ (ADAMS number
ML051390367).
Brief History: Since 1958, applicants
for nuclear power plant operating
licensees have been required to have
procedures for coping with a
radiological emergency. In 1970, the
Commission approved new emergency
preparedness (EP) requirements in
Appendix E to title 10 of the Code of
Federal Regulations (CFR) part 50. The
few public comments received on the
proposed regulations applauded the
Commission for its effort to strengthen
radiological EP requirements.
The responsibility for carrying out the
plans in the event of an accident
remained in the hands of local and State
governments. In 1973, the Commission
issued guidance to local and State
governments, including a checklist of
154 items that should be considered in
their plans. In 1977, in response to
advice from the Advisory Committee on
Reactor Safety, the Commission
published Regulatory Guide 1.101,
‘‘Emergency Planning and Preparedness
for Nuclear Power Reactors,’’ which
gave nuclear plant licensees more
detailed information on what should be
included in emergency plans. Also,
about this time, the Conference of
(State) Radiation Control Program
Directors asked the Commission to make
a determination of the most severe
accident basis for which radiological
emergency response plans should be
developed by offsite agencies. In
response, the Commission and the
Environmental Protection Agency
formed a task force. The NRC/EPA task
force submitted a report in December
1978, NUREG–0396, ‘‘Planning Basis for
the Development of State and Local
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Government Radiological Emergency
Response Plans in Support of Light
Water Nuclear Power Plants.’’ Among
other recommendations, this report
recommended that for planning
purposes, a plume exposure pathway
emergency planning zone (EPZ) of about
a 10-mile radius and the ingestion
exposure pathway EPZ about a 50-mile
radius.
Emergency response planning
received close scrutiny by Congress and
the Commission in the wake of the
Three Mile Island (TMI) accident.
Congressional oversight committees
quickly made it clear that they wanted
the Commission to upgrade emergency
response planning. The final regulations
related to TMI were issued in August
1980, when 10 CFR 50.47 was issued
and Appendix E to 10 CFR part 50 was
revised. Since that time,
implementation of the regulations and
guidance, technological advances, and
lessons learned from actual events and
drills and exercises have revealed areas
for potential enhancements and
increased clarity. In addition, the staff
has undertaken a number of studies to
improve the state of knowledge in the
area of radiological EP.
The most important event in shaping
the course of nuclear power since the
Three Mile Island Accident in 1979 was
the coordinated attack of terrorists on
this nation on September 11, 2001. To
enhance the interfaces among safety,
security and emergency preparedness,
the NRC created a new office, Office of
Nuclear Security and Incident Response
(NSIR), and subsequently an Emergency
Preparedness Directorate within NSIR,
to address the implications of 9/11 on
nuclear power plants. NSIR has worked
hard to develop improved security and
preparedness for nuclear power plants
over the past few years. In addition,
following the events of September 11,
2001, the NRC staff conducted a formal
evaluation of the emergency planning
basis in view of the threat environment
that has existed since the terrorist
attacks. This evaluation addressed all
aspects of nuclear power plant
emergency preparedness requirements.
In doing so, the evaluation determined
that emergency preparedness at nuclear
power plants remains strong, but
identified several areas for
enhancement. These areas for
enhancement are the subjects for the
first half-day of the meeting.
Review of EP Regulations and
Guidance: The NRC staff is conducting
a review of EP regulations and guidance
to determine where enhancements are
needed. The staff will summarize the
results of its review, including
comments from stakeholders, in a paper
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to the NRC Commissioners. The paper
will include a framework of potential
changes to EP guidance and, if
necessary, to EP regulations, along with
next steps, prioritization, and resource
estimates. This effort will be conducted
in cooperation with FEMA. Federal EP
regulations state that NRC and FEMA
will provide an opportunity for the
other agency to review and comment on
guidance prior to adoption as formal
agency guidance.
Questions to Promote Discussion: The
following questions have been
developed to promote attendee
discussion, to obtain attendee input,
and to be considered by attendees to
help focus their input in each area. Due
to their generic nature, they may be
applicable to any of the agenda topics.
Other questions to promote discussion
appear after the summary for each
agenda item later in this notice.
1. How can Federal, State, local and
tribal governments best respond to
protect public health and safety to a
rapidly developing security event that
has already been broadcast in the
media?
2. What approaches work best to
minimize the impact of enhanced rules
and/or guidance on local and State
government?
3. What enhancements to EP
regulations and guidance would help
you to more effectively and efficiently
implement them in a post-9/11 threat
environment?
4. What EP regulations and guidance
should be enhanced based upon
advances in technology?
Agenda Items—Enhancements in
Response to the Post 9/11 Threat
Environment (Onsite):
1. Security-Based Emergency
Classification Levels (ECLs) and
Emergency Action Levels (EALs)
As a result of improvements in
Federal agencies’ information sharing
and assessment capabilities, securitybased emergency declarations could be
accomplished in a more anticipatory
manner than the current declarations for
security events. Therefore, the NRC is
considering modifications to securitybased ECL definitions and EAL
thresholds in an effort to recognize
those improvements.
Suggested question to promote
discussion: How will public health and
safety be enhanced by having securitybased ECLs and EALs?
2. Prompt NRC Notification
In the post-9/11 environment, there is
the potential for coordinated attacks on
multiple facilities. Prompt notification
of the NRC is particularly important
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during a security event to support
subsequent notifications made by the
NRC to other licensees and initiate the
Federal response in accordance with the
National Response Plan. The NRC is
considering modifications to require an
abbreviated notification to the NRC
Operations Center as soon as possible
after the discovery of an imminent or
actual threat against the facility, but not
later than 15 minutes from discovery.
Suggested questions to promote
discussion: (1) What public health and
safety benefits can be derived from an
early notification of a security event to
a central location, such as the NRC
Operations Center? (2) How should
early notifications of security events be
sequenced to best protect public health
and safety?
3. Onsite Protective Actions
While actions, such as site assembly,
personnel accountability, site
evacuation, etc., are appropriate for
some emergencies, other actions may be
more appropriate for a terrorist attack,
particularly an aircraft attack. Licensees
have made protective measure changes
in response to the NRC Order of
February 25, 2002, but certain securitybased scenarios could warrant
consideration of other onsite protective
measures. The NRC is considering a
range of protection measures for site
workers to address this threat.
Suggested question to promote
discussion: What is the most effective
way to implement offsite protective
actions, such as site evacuation of nonresponder personnel or accounting for
personnel following release from the
site, during a terrorist threat or strike?
4. Emergency Response Organization
(ERO) Augmentation
The ERO is expected to be staged in
a manner that supports rapid response
to limit or mitigate site damage or the
potential for an offsite radiological
release. Some licensees have chosen not
to activate elements of the ERO during
a security-based event until the site is
secured. It is prudent to fully activate
emergency response organization
members for off-normal hours events to
promptly staff alternative facilities.
During normal working hours, licensees
should consider deployment of onsite
emergency response organization
personnel to an alternative facility near
the site.
Suggested question to promote
discussion: During a terrorist event,
would there be impediments that would
preclude effective recall to the site of
station emergency response personnel
during a terrorist event, and how could
they be overcome?
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5. Drill and Exercise Program
Current assessments indicate that
licensee measures are available to
mitigate the effects of terrorist acts.
Consequently, such acts would not
create an accident that causes a larger
release or one that occurs more quickly
than those already addressed by the EP
planning basis. However, the condition
of the plant after such an event could be
very different from the usual condition
practiced in more conventional nuclear
power plant emergency preparedness
(EP) drills and exercises. In light of the
foregoing and of the post-9/11 threat
environment, licensees should exercise
and test security-based EP capabilities
as an integral part of the licensee’s
emergency response capabilities.
Suggested question to promote
discussion: How can security-based
drills and exercises be most effective in
training, practicing and assessing
coordinated response roles and
responsibilities?
Additional Information Related to the
Onsite Agenda Items: NRC Bulletin
2005–02, ‘‘Emergency Preparedness and
Response Actions for Security-based
Events,’’ dated July 18, 2005, provides
additional information to help attendees
understand the above topics. This
document is available in ADAMS at
number ML051740058 or on the Internet
at: https://www.nrc.gov/public-involve/
public-meetings/epreview2005.html.
Agenda Items—Enhancements in
Response to the Post 9/11 Threat
Environment (Offsite):
6. Enhanced Offsite Protective Action
Recommendations (PARs)
The current PAR guidance contained
in Supplement 3, ‘‘Criteria for Protective
Action Recommendations for Severe
Accidents,’’ to NUREG–0654/FEMA–
REP–1 (see the NRC website) specifies
that the licensee should issue a PAR
based on plant conditions that involve
actual or projected severe core damage
or loss of control of the facility (i.e., at
a general emergency). In the event of an
emergency classification based on a
security event, the NRC is soliciting
comments regarding the receipt of a
PAR from a licensee at the site area
emergency or possibly at the alert
classification level.
Suggested questions to promote
discussion: (1) What value to public
health and safety would a
recommendation to ‘‘go indoors and
monitor the emergency alert system’’ at
a site area emergency classification
provide during a security event? (2)
What benefits or possible consequences
would occur for stakeholders, if such a
recommendation were made during a
security event?
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7. Abbreviated Notifications to Offsite
Response Organizations (OROs)
The regulations in Appendix E to 10
CFR part 50 (to see the regulations go to
https://www.nrc.gov/what-we-do/emergpreparedness/regs-guidancecomm.html) require the licensee to have
the capability to notify responsible ORO
personnel within 15 minutes after
declaring an emergency. While licensees
and OROs are proficient with
notification transmission and receipt,
the notification process itself takes
several minutes for the licensee to fill
out the form, obtain authorization, and
notify the OROs, perform repeat backs,
and verify the notification. The NRC is
soliciting offsite officials’ comments on
the receipt of an abbreviated initial
notification to enhance emergency
response in the case of a rapidly
developing security event.
Suggested questions to promote
discussion: (1) What public health and
safety benefit would be derived from an
abbreviated notification to the ORO
during a security event? (2) How could
such an abbreviated notification be
effectively implemented during an
onsite security event?
8. Backup Power to Siren Systems
FEMA is in the process of revising its
guidance documents to reflect the
technological advances that have taken
place since they were originally
published. By congressional direction,
this guidance will require that all
warning systems be operable in the
absence of alternating current (AC)
supply power. FEMA–REP–10, ‘‘Guide
for Evaluation of Alert and Notification
Systems for Nuclear Power Plants,’’ is
currently under revision. Once the
revised guidance becomes available, the
NRC will be considering regulatory
approaches to implement the revised
guidance and effect necessary Alert and
Notification System (ANS) upgrades.
Suggested question to promote
discussion: Should the NRC require that
the ANS be operable in the absence of
AC power, or are there backup alerting
methods that can reliably alert the
public in a timely manner under
reasonably anticipated conditions that
would be an adequate substitution for
backup power?
Agenda Item—Protective Action
Recommendation Guidance:
Planning Standard 10 CFR
50.47(b)(10) (to review the Planning
Standard go to https://www.nrc.gov/
what-we-do/emerg-preparedness/regsguidance-comm.html) requires that a
range of protective actions be developed
for the protection of the public.
Guidance related to the implementation
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of a range of protective actions is
provided in Supplement 3 to NUREG–
0654/FEMA–REP–1 (see the NRC Web
site above) and EPA–400–R–92–001 (see
https://www.nrc.gov/what-we-do/emergpreparedness/related-information.html).
While each guidance document contains
the same basic protective action
concepts of evacuation, shelter, and, as
a supplement, potassium iodide, the
NRC is considering changes to clarify
the responsibilities of the licensee to
recommend PARs, and State, local, and
Tribal officials to make the final
decision regarding, which protective
action(s) is/are implemented. The NRC
is also considering the need to more
clearly define sheltering. In addition,
the NRC is considering the need to
enhance guidance related to the
updating and use of evacuation time
estimates.
Suggested questions to promote
discussion: (1) How can the
responsibilities of the licensee and
State, local, and Tribal officials be
clarified relative to protective actions to
protect public health and safety? (2)
How can sheltering (for discussions on
sheltering see EPA–400–R–92–001,
‘‘Manual of Protective Action Guides
and Protective Actions for Nuclear
Incidents’’ can be found on the NRC
Web site at: https://www.nrc.gov/whatwe-do/emerg-preparedness/relatedinformation.html) be more clearly
defined? (3) How can guidance related
to the updating and use of evacuation
time estimates be enhanced?
Additional Information Related to
Protective Actions: The following
information and electronic addresses are
provided to help attendees better
understand the topic related to
protective actions:
1. NRC Regulatory Issue Summary
2004–13, ‘‘Consideration of Sheltering
in Licensee’s Range of Protective Action
Recommendations,’’ August 2, 2004
(ADAMS number ML041210046)
2. NRC Regulatory Issue Summary
2004–13, Supplement 1, ‘‘Consideration
of Sheltering in Licensee’s Range of
Protective Action Recommendations,’’
March 10, 2005 (ADAMS number
ML050340531)
3. NRC Regulatory Issue Summary
2005–08, ‘‘Endorsement of Nuclear
Energy Institute (NEI) Guidance ‘Range
of Protective Actions for Nuclear Power
Plant Accidents’,’’ June 6, 2005
(ADAMS number ML050870432)
Background Information for the NREP
Parking Lot Issues: On April 11, 2005,
at the National Radiological Emergency
Preparedness Conference, NRC and
FEMA conducted a workshop with
State/local/tribal stakeholders, along
with licensee representatives. The
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workshop, ‘‘Emergency Preparedness
Enhancements in the Post-9/11
Environment,’’ covered a broad range of
EP topics, including proposed 9/11related enhancements regarding offsite
preparedness/response. The workshop
was attended by stakeholders nationwide.
During the workshop, EPD staff
recorded all comments and questions
brought forth by stakeholders in a
‘‘Parking Lot.’’ NRC and FEMA
promised stakeholders that they would
provide responses to these comments
and questions. Since NREP, the staff has
worked with FEMA to develop
responses to the ‘‘Parking Lot’’
comments and questions. This part of
the meeting is intended to discuss the
NRC/FEMA responses to the NREP
‘‘Parking Lot’’ comments and questions,
that will be included on the following
Web site on or about August 1: https://
www.nrc.gov/public-involve/publicmeetings/epreview2005.html.
Dated in Rockville, Maryland, the 22nd
day of July 2005.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Nader L. Mamish,
Director, Emergency Preparedness
Directorate, Division of Preparedness and
Response, Office of Nuclear Security and
Incident Response.
[FR Doc. E5–4011 Filed 7–27–05; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590–01–P
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION
Proposed Collection; Comment
Request
Upon written request, copies available
from: Securities and Exchange
Commission, Office of Filings and
Information Services, Washington, DC
20549.
Extension:
Rule 17Ab2–1, SEC File No. 270–203, OMB
Control No. 3235–0195.
Form CA–1, SEC File No. 270–203, OMB
Control No. 3235–0195.
Notice is hereby given that, pursuant
to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995
(44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.), the Securities
and Exchange Commission
(‘‘Commission’’) is soliciting comments
on the collection of information
summarized below. The Commission
plans to submit this existing collection
of information to the Office of
Management and Budget for extension
and approval.
• Rule 17Ab2–1 and Form CA–1:
Registration of Clearing Agencies
Rule 17Ab2–1 and Form CA–1 require
clearing agencies to register with the
VerDate jul<14>2003
13:40 Jul 27, 2005
Jkt 205001
Commission and to meet certain
requirements with regard to, among
other things, a clearing agency’s
organization, capacities, and rules. The
information is collected from the
clearing agency upon the initial
application for registration on Form
CA–1. Thereafter, information is
collected by amendment to the initial
Form CA–1 when material changes in
circumstances necessitate modification
of the information previously provided
to the Commission.
The Commission uses the information
disclosed on Form CA–1 to (i)
determine whether an applicant meets
the standards for registration set forth in
Section 17A of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 (‘‘Exchange Act’’), (ii)
enforce compliance with the Exchange
Act’s registration requirement, and (iii)
provide information about specific
registered clearing agencies for
compliance and investigatory purposes.
Without Rule 17Ab2–1, the Commission
could not perform these duties as
statutorily required.
There are currently approximately ten
registered clearing agencies and five
clearing agencies that have been granted
an exemption from registration. The
Commission staff estimates that each
initial Form CA–1 requires
approximately 130 hours to complete
and submit for approval. Hours required
for amendments to Form CA–1 that
must be submitted to the Commission in
connection with material changes to the
initial CA–1 can vary, depending upon
the nature and extent of the amendment.
Since the Commission only receives an
average of one submission per year, the
aggregate annual burden associated with
compliance with Rule 17Ab2–1 and
Form CA–1 is 130 hours. Based upon
the staff’s experience, the average cost to
clearing agencies of preparing and filing
the initial Form CA–1 is estimated to be
$18,000.
Written comments are invited on: (a)
Whether the proposed collection of
information is necessary for the proper
performance of the functions of the
agency, including whether the
information will have practical utility;
(b) the accuracy of the agency’s estimate
of the burden of the collection of
information; (c) ways to enhance the
quality, utility, and clarity of the
information collected; and (d) ways to
minimize the burden of the collection of
information on respondents, including
through the use of automated collection
techniques or other forms of information
technology. Consideration will be given
to comments and suggestions submitted
in writing within 60 days of this
publication.
PO 00000
Frm 00047
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
43725
Please direct your written comments
to R. Corey Booth, Director/Chief
Information Officer, Securities and
Exchange Commission, 100 F Street,
NE., Washington, DC 20549.
Dated: July 13, 2005.
Margaret H. McFarland,
Deputy Secretary.
[FR Doc. E5–4016 Filed 7–27–05; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8010–01–P
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION
Sunshine Act Meeting
Notice is hereby given, pursuant to
the provisions of the Government in the
Sunshine Act, Pub. L. 94–409, that the
Securities and Exchange Commission
will hold the following meeting during
the week of August 1, 2005:
A closed meeting will be held on
Thursday, August 4, 2005, at 2 p.m.
Commissioners, Counsel to the
Commissioners, the Secretary to the
Commission, and recording secretaries
will attend the closed meeting. Certain
staff members who have an interest in
the matters may also be present.
The General Counsel of the
Commission, or his designee, has
certified that, in his opinion, one or
more of the exemptions set forth in 5
U.S.C. 552b(c)(3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8),
(9)(B), and (10) and 17 CFR 200.402(a)
(3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), 9(ii) and (10)
permit consideration of the scheduled
matters at the closed meeting.
Commissioner Goldschmid, as duty
officer, voted to consider the items
listed for the closed meeting in a closed
session.
The subject matters of the closed
meeting scheduled for Thursday,
August 4, 2005, will be:
Regulatory matter regarding a financial
institution;
Formal orders of investigations;
Institution and settlement of injunctive
actions;
Institution and settlement of
administrative proceedings of an
enforcement nature; and
Adjudicatory matter.
At times, changes in Commission
priorities require alterations in the
scheduling of meeting items.
For further information and to
ascertain what, if any, matters have been
added, deleted or postponed, please
contact:
The Office of the Secretary at (202)
551–5400.
E:\FR\FM\28JYN1.SGM
28JYN1
]]>Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 70, Number 144 (Thursday, July 28, 2005)]
[Notices]
[Pages 43721-43725]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E5-4011]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Announcement of a Public Meeting To Discuss Selected Topics for
the Review of Emergency Preparedness (EP) Regulations and Guidance for
Commercial Nuclear Power Plants
AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Notice of meeting.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC's) reassessment of
emergency preparedness following September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks
concluded that the planning basis for emergency preparedness (EP)
remains valid. However, as part of our continuing EP review, some
enhancements are being considered to EP regulations and guidance due to
the terrorist acts of 9/11; technological advances; the need for
clarification based upon more than 20 years of experience; lessons
learned during drills and exercises; and responses to actual events.
Therefore, the NRC will hold a one and one-half-day public meeting
to obtain stakeholder input on selected topics for the review of EP
regulations and guidance for commercial nuclear power plants and to
discuss EP-related issues that arose during an NRC/FEMA workshop at the
2005 National Radiological Emergency Preparedness (NREP) Conference.
[[Page 43722]]
DATES: Wednesday, August 31, 2005, 8:30 a.m. to 5 p.m. and Thursday,
September 1, 2005, 8 to 12:30 p.m.
ADDRESSES: Bethesda North Marriott Hotel and Conference Center, 5701
Marinelli Road, North Bethesda, Maryland 20852. (Go to https://
www.BethesdaNorthMarriott.com for additional hotel information.)
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Robert Moody, Mail Stop O6H2, Office
of Nuclear Security and Incident Response, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; telephone 1-800-368-5642,
extension 1737; or e-mail rem2@nrc.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Meeting Purpose: The purpose of the meeting is to discuss selected
topics for the review of EP regulations and guidance for commercial
nuclear power plants and to obtain stakeholder input. The selected
topics also include EP-related issues that arose during the 2005 NREP
Conference, NRC/Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) workshop. In
addition to the comments provided by attendees during the discussion of
the above topics, the NRC is accepting written comments.
Meeting Overview: The first day of the meeting will cover topics
pertaining to potential changes to EP regulations and guidance for
commercial nuclear power plants. This portion of the meeting will be
conducted as a roundtable discussion among participants who have been
invited to represent the broad spectrum of interests in the area of EP.
The spectrum includes representatives from State, local, and Tribal
governments, Department of Homeland Security (DHS)/FEMA, NRC, advocacy
groups, and the nuclear industry. The meeting is open to the public,
and all attendees, including State, local, and tribal governments not
represented at the roundtable, will have an opportunity to offer
comments and ask questions at selected points throughout the meeting.
Any questions regarding the roundtable discussion should be directed to
the meeting facilitator, Francis ``Chip'' Cameron by phone at 301-415-
1642 or e-mail fxc@nr.gov.
The second day of the meeting will include a discussion of
unanswered comments and questions captured during an NRC/FEMA workshop
at the 2005 National Radiological Emergency Preparedness Conference
(NREP). During the workshop, Emergency Preparedness Directorate (EPD)
staff captured all unanswered comments and questions brought forth by
stakeholders in a ``Parking Lot.'' Since the NREP Conference, the staff
has worked with FEMA to develop responses to the ``Parking Lot''
comments and questions. This part of the meeting is to discuss the NRC/
FEMA responses to the NREP ``Parking Lot'' comments and questions in a
town hall-type setting. All attendees are encouraged to participate in
the discussion.
The public meeting notice and agenda, as well as the responses to
the ``Parking Lot'' comments and questions from the NREP Conference,
can be found on the Internet at: https://www.nrc.gov/public-involve/
public-meetings/epreview2005.html.
Updated Meeting Information: The NRC encourages all participants to
check frequently the following Web site for the most current
information on the meeting. New information will be added to this Web
site periodically: https://www.nrc.gov/public-involve/public-meetings/
epreview2005.html.
Submitting Comments: Comments related to the review of EP
regulations and guidance may be sent to Mr. Robert Moody, U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, One White Flint North, Mail Stop O6H2, 11555
Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD 20852. Comments may also be hand-
delivered to the NRC at the above address from 7:30 a.m. to 4:15 p.m.
during Federal workdays. To be considered, written comments must be
received at the NRC by the close of business on Monday, October 17,
2005. Comments provided during the roundtable discussions will be
captured in the meeting transcript, and along with any written
comments, will be evaluated by the NRC staff.
Electronic comments may be submitted via the following Web site:
https://www.nrc.gov/public-involve/public-meetings/epreview2005.html.
Electronic comments must be sent no later than the close of business on
October 17, 2005.
Meeting Transcript: A transcript of the meeting should be available
electronically on or about September 15, 2005, and accessible on the
Internet at: https://www.nrc.gov/public-involve/public-meetings/
epreview2005.html.
Primary EP Regulations: To facilitate discussion and comment, the
primary EP regulations within the scope of review are as follows: 10
CFR 50.47; 10 CFR 50.54(q); Appendix E to 10 CFR 50.
These regulations are available on the NRC EP Web site at: https://
www.nrc.gov/what-we-do/emerg-preparedness/regs-guidance-comm.html.
Primary EP Guidance Documents: A list of the primary EP guidance
documents that are within the scope of the review are as follows and
are also available on the NRC EP Web site at: https://www.nrc.gov/what-
we-do/emerg-preparedness/regs-guidance-comm.html.
1. NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, ``Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation
of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of
Nuclear Power Plants''.
2. NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Supplement 3, ``Criteria for Protective
Action Recommendations for Severe Accidents''.
The following EP guidance documents are also within the scope of
the review. However, they are currently only available electronically
in NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS):
(Note: ADAMS is the NRC's online document management system at https://
www.nrc.gov).
1. NUREG-0696, ``Functional Criteria for Emergency Response
Facilities'' (ADAMS number ML051390358).
2. NUREG-0737, Supplement 1, ``Clarification of TMI Action Plan
Requirements'' (ADAMS number ML051390367).
Brief History: Since 1958, applicants for nuclear power plant
operating licensees have been required to have procedures for coping
with a radiological emergency. In 1970, the Commission approved new
emergency preparedness (EP) requirements in Appendix E to title 10 of
the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) part 50. The few public comments
received on the proposed regulations applauded the Commission for its
effort to strengthen radiological EP requirements.
The responsibility for carrying out the plans in the event of an
accident remained in the hands of local and State governments. In 1973,
the Commission issued guidance to local and State governments,
including a checklist of 154 items that should be considered in their
plans. In 1977, in response to advice from the Advisory Committee on
Reactor Safety, the Commission published Regulatory Guide 1.101,
``Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Nuclear Power Reactors,''
which gave nuclear plant licensees more detailed information on what
should be included in emergency plans. Also, about this time, the
Conference of (State) Radiation Control Program Directors asked the
Commission to make a determination of the most severe accident basis
for which radiological emergency response plans should be developed by
offsite agencies. In response, the Commission and the Environmental
Protection Agency formed a task force. The NRC/EPA task force submitted
a report in December 1978, NUREG-0396, ``Planning Basis for the
Development of State and Local
[[Page 43723]]
Government Radiological Emergency Response Plans in Support of Light
Water Nuclear Power Plants.'' Among other recommendations, this report
recommended that for planning purposes, a plume exposure pathway
emergency planning zone (EPZ) of about a 10-mile radius and the
ingestion exposure pathway EPZ about a 50-mile radius.
Emergency response planning received close scrutiny by Congress and
the Commission in the wake of the Three Mile Island (TMI) accident.
Congressional oversight committees quickly made it clear that they
wanted the Commission to upgrade emergency response planning. The final
regulations related to TMI were issued in August 1980, when 10 CFR
50.47 was issued and Appendix E to 10 CFR part 50 was revised. Since
that time, implementation of the regulations and guidance,
technological advances, and lessons learned from actual events and
drills and exercises have revealed areas for potential enhancements and
increased clarity. In addition, the staff has undertaken a number of
studies to improve the state of knowledge in the area of radiological
EP.
The most important event in shaping the course of nuclear power
since the Three Mile Island Accident in 1979 was the coordinated attack
of terrorists on this nation on September 11, 2001. To enhance the
interfaces among safety, security and emergency preparedness, the NRC
created a new office, Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response
(NSIR), and subsequently an Emergency Preparedness Directorate within
NSIR, to address the implications of 9/11 on nuclear power plants. NSIR
has worked hard to develop improved security and preparedness for
nuclear power plants over the past few years. In addition, following
the events of September 11, 2001, the NRC staff conducted a formal
evaluation of the emergency planning basis in view of the threat
environment that has existed since the terrorist attacks. This
evaluation addressed all aspects of nuclear power plant emergency
preparedness requirements. In doing so, the evaluation determined that
emergency preparedness at nuclear power plants remains strong, but
identified several areas for enhancement. These areas for enhancement
are the subjects for the first half-day of the meeting.
Review of EP Regulations and Guidance: The NRC staff is conducting
a review of EP regulations and guidance to determine where enhancements
are needed. The staff will summarize the results of its review,
including comments from stakeholders, in a paper to the NRC
Commissioners. The paper will include a framework of potential changes
to EP guidance and, if necessary, to EP regulations, along with next
steps, prioritization, and resource estimates. This effort will be
conducted in cooperation with FEMA. Federal EP regulations state that
NRC and FEMA will provide an opportunity for the other agency to review
and comment on guidance prior to adoption as formal agency guidance.
Questions to Promote Discussion: The following questions have been
developed to promote attendee discussion, to obtain attendee input, and
to be considered by attendees to help focus their input in each area.
Due to their generic nature, they may be applicable to any of the
agenda topics. Other questions to promote discussion appear after the
summary for each agenda item later in this notice.
1. How can Federal, State, local and tribal governments best
respond to protect public health and safety to a rapidly developing
security event that has already been broadcast in the media?
2. What approaches work best to minimize the impact of enhanced
rules and/or guidance on local and State government?
3. What enhancements to EP regulations and guidance would help you
to more effectively and efficiently implement them in a post-9/11
threat environment?
4. What EP regulations and guidance should be enhanced based upon
advances in technology?
Agenda Items--Enhancements in Response to the Post 9/11 Threat
Environment (Onsite):
1. Security-Based Emergency Classification Levels (ECLs) and Emergency
Action Levels (EALs)
As a result of improvements in Federal agencies' information
sharing and assessment capabilities, security-based emergency
declarations could be accomplished in a more anticipatory manner than
the current declarations for security events. Therefore, the NRC is
considering modifications to security-based ECL definitions and EAL
thresholds in an effort to recognize those improvements.
Suggested question to promote discussion: How will public health
and safety be enhanced by having security-based ECLs and EALs?
2. Prompt NRC Notification
In the post-9/11 environment, there is the potential for
coordinated attacks on multiple facilities. Prompt notification of the
NRC is particularly important during a security event to support
subsequent notifications made by the NRC to other licensees and
initiate the Federal response in accordance with the National Response
Plan. The NRC is considering modifications to require an abbreviated
notification to the NRC Operations Center as soon as possible after the
discovery of an imminent or actual threat against the facility, but not
later than 15 minutes from discovery.
Suggested questions to promote discussion: (1) What public health
and safety benefits can be derived from an early notification of a
security event to a central location, such as the NRC Operations
Center? (2) How should early notifications of security events be
sequenced to best protect public health and safety?
3. Onsite Protective Actions
While actions, such as site assembly, personnel accountability,
site evacuation, etc., are appropriate for some emergencies, other
actions may be more appropriate for a terrorist attack, particularly an
aircraft attack. Licensees have made protective measure changes in
response to the NRC Order of February 25, 2002, but certain security-
based scenarios could warrant consideration of other onsite protective
measures. The NRC is considering a range of protection measures for
site workers to address this threat.
Suggested question to promote discussion: What is the most
effective way to implement offsite protective actions, such as site
evacuation of non-responder personnel or accounting for personnel
following release from the site, during a terrorist threat or strike?
4. Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Augmentation
The ERO is expected to be staged in a manner that supports rapid
response to limit or mitigate site damage or the potential for an
offsite radiological release. Some licensees have chosen not to
activate elements of the ERO during a security-based event until the
site is secured. It is prudent to fully activate emergency response
organization members for off-normal hours events to promptly staff
alternative facilities. During normal working hours, licensees should
consider deployment of onsite emergency response organization personnel
to an alternative facility near the site.
Suggested question to promote discussion: During a terrorist event,
would there be impediments that would preclude effective recall to the
site of station emergency response personnel during a terrorist event,
and how could they be overcome?
[[Page 43724]]
5. Drill and Exercise Program
Current assessments indicate that licensee measures are available
to mitigate the effects of terrorist acts. Consequently, such acts
would not create an accident that causes a larger release or one that
occurs more quickly than those already addressed by the EP planning
basis. However, the condition of the plant after such an event could be
very different from the usual condition practiced in more conventional
nuclear power plant emergency preparedness (EP) drills and exercises.
In light of the foregoing and of the post-9/11 threat environment,
licensees should exercise and test security-based EP capabilities as an
integral part of the licensee's emergency response capabilities.
Suggested question to promote discussion: How can security-based
drills and exercises be most effective in training, practicing and
assessing coordinated response roles and responsibilities?
Additional Information Related to the Onsite Agenda Items: NRC
Bulletin 2005-02, ``Emergency Preparedness and Response Actions for
Security-based Events,'' dated July 18, 2005, provides additional
information to help attendees understand the above topics. This
document is available in ADAMS at number ML051740058 or on the Internet
at: https://www.nrc.gov/public-involve/public-meetings/
epreview2005.html.
Agenda Items--Enhancements in Response to the Post 9/11 Threat
Environment (Offsite):
6. Enhanced Offsite Protective Action Recommendations (PARs)
The current PAR guidance contained in Supplement 3, ``Criteria for
Protective Action Recommendations for Severe Accidents,'' to NUREG-
0654/FEMA-REP-1 (see the NRC website) specifies that the licensee
should issue a PAR based on plant conditions that involve actual or
projected severe core damage or loss of control of the facility (i.e.,
at a general emergency). In the event of an emergency classification
based on a security event, the NRC is soliciting comments regarding the
receipt of a PAR from a licensee at the site area emergency or possibly
at the alert classification level.
Suggested questions to promote discussion: (1) What value to public
health and safety would a recommendation to ``go indoors and monitor
the emergency alert system'' at a site area emergency classification
provide during a security event? (2) What benefits or possible
consequences would occur for stakeholders, if such a recommendation
were made during a security event?
7. Abbreviated Notifications to Offsite Response Organizations (OROs)
The regulations in Appendix E to 10 CFR part 50 (to see the
regulations go to https://www.nrc.gov/what-we-do/emerg-preparedness/
regs-guidance-comm.html) require the licensee to have the capability to
notify responsible ORO personnel within 15 minutes after declaring an
emergency. While licensees and OROs are proficient with notification
transmission and receipt, the notification process itself takes several
minutes for the licensee to fill out the form, obtain authorization,
and notify the OROs, perform repeat backs, and verify the notification.
The NRC is soliciting offsite officials' comments on the receipt of an
abbreviated initial notification to enhance emergency response in the
case of a rapidly developing security event.
Suggested questions to promote discussion: (1) What public health
and safety benefit would be derived from an abbreviated notification to
the ORO during a security event? (2) How could such an abbreviated
notification be effectively implemented during an onsite security
event?
8. Backup Power to Siren Systems
FEMA is in the process of revising its guidance documents to
reflect the technological advances that have taken place since they
were originally published. By congressional direction, this guidance
will require that all warning systems be operable in the absence of
alternating current (AC) supply power. FEMA-REP-10, ``Guide for
Evaluation of Alert and Notification Systems for Nuclear Power
Plants,'' is currently under revision. Once the revised guidance
becomes available, the NRC will be considering regulatory approaches to
implement the revised guidance and effect necessary Alert and
Notification System (ANS) upgrades.
Suggested question to promote discussion: Should the NRC require
that the ANS be operable in the absence of AC power, or are there
backup alerting methods that can reliably alert the public in a timely
manner under reasonably anticipated conditions that would be an
adequate substitution for backup power?
Agenda Item--Protective Action Recommendation Guidance:
Planning Standard 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10) (to review the Planning
Standard go to https://www.nrc.gov/what-we-do/emerg-preparedness/regs-
guidance-comm.html) requires that a range of protective actions be
developed for the protection of the public. Guidance related to the
implementation of a range of protective actions is provided in
Supplement 3 to NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1 (see the NRC Web site above) and
EPA-400-R-92-001 (see https://www.nrc.gov/what-we-do/emerg-preparedness/
related-information.html). While each guidance document contains the
same basic protective action concepts of evacuation, shelter, and, as a
supplement, potassium iodide, the NRC is considering changes to clarify
the responsibilities of the licensee to recommend PARs, and State,
local, and Tribal officials to make the final decision regarding, which
protective action(s) is/are implemented. The NRC is also considering
the need to more clearly define sheltering. In addition, the NRC is
considering the need to enhance guidance related to the updating and
use of evacuation time estimates.
Suggested questions to promote discussion: (1) How can the
responsibilities of the licensee and State, local, and Tribal officials
be clarified relative to protective actions to protect public health
and safety? (2) How can sheltering (for discussions on sheltering see
EPA-400-R-92-001, ``Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective
Actions for Nuclear Incidents'' can be found on the NRC Web site at:
https://www.nrc.gov/what-we-do/emerg-preparedness/related-
information.html) be more clearly defined? (3) How can guidance related
to the updating and use of evacuation time estimates be enhanced?
Additional Information Related to Protective Actions: The following
information and electronic addresses are provided to help attendees
better understand the topic related to protective actions:
1. NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2004-13, ``Consideration of
Sheltering in Licensee's Range of Protective Action Recommendations,''
August 2, 2004 (ADAMS number ML041210046)
2. NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2004-13, Supplement 1,
``Consideration of Sheltering in Licensee's Range of Protective Action
Recommendations,'' March 10, 2005 (ADAMS number ML050340531)
3. NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2005-08, ``Endorsement of Nuclear
Energy Institute (NEI) Guidance `Range of Protective Actions for
Nuclear Power Plant Accidents','' June 6, 2005 (ADAMS number
ML050870432)
Background Information for the NREP Parking Lot Issues: On April
11, 2005, at the National Radiological Emergency Preparedness
Conference, NRC and FEMA conducted a workshop with State/local/tribal
stakeholders, along with licensee representatives. The
[[Page 43725]]
workshop, ``Emergency Preparedness Enhancements in the Post-9/11
Environment,'' covered a broad range of EP topics, including proposed
9/11-related enhancements regarding offsite preparedness/response. The
workshop was attended by stakeholders nation-wide.
During the workshop, EPD staff recorded all comments and questions
brought forth by stakeholders in a ``Parking Lot.'' NRC and FEMA
promised stakeholders that they would provide responses to these
comments and questions. Since NREP, the staff has worked with FEMA to
develop responses to the ``Parking Lot'' comments and questions. This
part of the meeting is intended to discuss the NRC/FEMA responses to
the NREP ``Parking Lot'' comments and questions, that will be included
on the following Web site on or about August 1: https://www.nrc.gov/
public-involve/public-meetings/epreview2005.html.
Dated in Rockville, Maryland, the 22nd day of July 2005.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Nader L. Mamish,
Director, Emergency Preparedness Directorate, Division of Preparedness
and Response, Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response.
[FR Doc. E5-4011 Filed 7-27-05; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P
