Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport: Enhanced Security Procedures for Certain Operations, 41586-41603 [05-14269]

Agencies

• DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
• Transportation Security Administration

[Federal Register Volume 70, Number 137 (Tuesday, July 19, 2005)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 41586-41603]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 05-14269]



[[Page 41585]]

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Part V





Department of Homeland Security





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Transportation Security Administration



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49 CFR Parts 1520, 1540, and 1562



Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport: Enhanced Security Procedures 
for Certain Operations; Interim Final Rule

Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 137 / Tuesday, July 19, 2005 / Rules 
and Regulations

[[Page 41586]]


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DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Transportation Security Administration

49 CFR Parts 1520, 1540, and 1562

[Docket No. TSA-2005-21866; Amendment Nos. 1520-3, 1540-6, 1562-1]
RIN 1652-AA49


Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport: Enhanced Security 
Procedures for Certain Operations

AGENCY: Transportation Security Administration (TSA), Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS).

ACTION: Interim final rule; request for comments.

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SUMMARY: Since September 11, 2001, general aviation aircraft operations 
have been prohibited at Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport 
(DCA). The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is issuing this 
interim final rule (IFR) to restore access to DCA for certain aircraft 
operations while maintaining the security of critical Federal 
Government and other assets in the Washington, DC metropolitan area. 
This IFR applies to all passenger aircraft operations into or out of 
DCA, except U.S. air carrier operations operating under a full security 
program required by 49 CFR part 1544 and foreign air carrier operations 
operating under 49 CFR 1546.101(a) or (b). The IFR establishes security 
procedures for aircraft operators and gateway airport operators, and 
security requirements relating to crewmembers, passengers, and armed 
security officers onboard aircraft operating into or out of DCA. 
Although this IFR is effective on August 18, 2005, an aircraft operator 
may not conduct operations into or out of DCA until it is determined by 
TSA to be in compliance with the security requirements set forth in 
this IFR.

DATES: This rule is effective August 18, 2005. Submit comments by 
September 19, 2005.

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments, identified by the TSA docket number 
to this rulemaking, using any one of the following methods:
    Comments Filed Electronically: You may submit comments through the 
docket Web site at https://dms.dot.gov. Please be aware that anyone is 
able to search the electronic form of all comments received into any of 
our dockets by the name of the individual submitting the comment (or 
signing the comment, if submitted on behalf of an association, 
business, labor union, etc.). You may review the applicable Privacy Act 
Statement published in the Federal Register on April 11, 2000 (65 FR 
19477), or you may visit https://dms.dot.gov.
    Comments Submitted by Mail, Fax, or In Person: Address or deliver 
your written, signed comments to the Docket Management System, U.S. 
Department of Transportation, Room Plaza 401, 400 Seventh Street, SW., 
Washington, DC 20590-0001; Fax: 202-493-2251.
    Comments that include trade secrets, confidential commercial or 
financial information, or sensitive security information (SSI) should 
not be submitted to the public regulatory docket. Please submit such 
comments separately from other comments on the rule. Comments 
containing trade secrets, confidential commercial or financial 
information, or SSI should be appropriately marked as containing such 
information and submitted by mail to the individual(s) listed in FOR 
FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT.
    Reviewing Comments in the Docket: You may review the public docket 
containing comments on this interim final rule in person in the Docket 
Office between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal 
holidays. The Docket Office is located on the plaza level of the NASSIF 
Building at the Department of Transportation address above. Also, you 
may review public dockets on the Internet at https://dms.dot.gov.
    See SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION for format and other information 
about comment submissions.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For policy questions, Robert Rottman, 
Office of Aviation Security Policy, Transportation Security 
Administration Headquarters, East Building, Floor 3, 601 12th Street, 
Arlington, VA 22202; telephone: (571) 227-2289; e-mail: 
Robert.Rottman@dhs.gov.
    For questions related to Sensitive Security Information (SSI), 
Keith L. Moore, Director, SSI Program Office, Office of the Chief of 
Staff, Transportation Security Administration Headquarters, East 
Building, Floor 7, 601 12th Street, Arlington, VA 22202; telephone: 
(571) 227-3513; e-mail: Keith.Moore1@dhs.gov.
    For legal questions, Scott Houston, Office of Chief Counsel, 
Transportation Security Administration Headquarters, East Building, 
Floor 12, 601 12th Street, Arlington, VA 22202; telephone: (571) 227-
3653; e-mail: Scott.Houston@dhs.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited

    This IFR is being adopted without prior notice and prior public 
comment. However, to the maximum extent possible, operating components 
within DHS provide an opportunity for public comment on regulations 
issued without prior notice. Accordingly, TSA invites interested 
persons to participate in this rulemaking by submitting written 
comments, data, or views. TSA also invites comments relating to the 
economic, environmental, energy, or federalism impacts that might 
result from this rulemaking. See ADDRESSES above for information on 
where to submit comments.
    Comments that include trade secrets, confidential commercial or 
financial information, or SSI should not be submitted to the public 
regulatory docket. Please submit such comments separately from other 
comments on the rule. Comments containing this type of information 
should be appropriately marked and submitted by mail to the 
individual(s) listed in FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section. Upon 
receipt of such comments, TSA will not place the comments in the public 
docket and will handle them in accordance with applicable safeguards 
and restrictions on access. TSA will hold them in a separate file to 
which the public does not have access, and place a note in the public 
docket that TSA has received such materials from the commenter. If TSA 
receives a request to examine or copy this information, TSA will treat 
it as any other request under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (5 
U.S.C. 552) and the Department of Homeland Security's FOIA regulation 
found in 6 CFR part 5.
    With each comment, please include your name and address, identify 
the docket number at the beginning of your comments, and give the 
reason for each comment. The most helpful comments reference a specific 
portion of the rule, explain the reason for any recommended change, and 
include supporting data. You may submit comments and material 
electronically, in person, by mail, or fax as provided under ADDRESSES, 
but please submit your comments and material by only one means. If you 
submit comments by mail or delivery, submit them in two copies, in an 
unbound format, no larger than 8.5 by 11 inches, suitable for copying 
and electronic filing.
    If you want TSA to acknowledge receipt of your comments on this 
rulemaking, include with your comments a self-addressed, stamped 
postcard on which the docket number

[[Page 41587]]

appears. We will stamp the date on the postcard and mail it to you.
    Except for comments containing confidential information and SSI, we 
will file in the public docket all comments we receive, as well as a 
report summarizing each substantive public contact with TSA personnel 
concerning this rulemaking. The docket is available for public 
inspection before and after the comment closing date.
    We will consider all comments we receive on or before the closing 
date for comments. We will consider comments filed late to the extent 
practicable. We may change this rule in light of the comments we 
receive.

Availability of Rulemaking Document

    You may obtain an electronic copy using the Internet by--
    (1) Searching the Department of Transportation's electronic Docket 
Management System (DMS) Web page (https://dms.dot.gov/search);
    (2) Accessing the Government Printing Office's Web page at https://
www.gpoaccess.gov/fr/; or
    (3) Visiting the TSA's Law and Policy Web page at https://
www.tsa.gov/public/index.jsp.
    In addition, copies are available by writing or calling any of the 
individuals in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section. Make sure 
to identify the docket number of this rulemaking.

Small Entity Inquiries

    The Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA) of 
1996 requires TSA to comply with small entity requests for information 
or advice about compliance with statutes and regulations within TSA's 
jurisdiction. Any small entity that has a question regarding this 
document may contact the persons listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION 
CONTACT section for information or advice. You can get further 
information regarding SBREFA on the Small Business Administration's Web 
page at https://www.sba.gov/advo/laws/law_lib.html.

Good Cause for Issuing Rule Without Prior Notice and Comment

    TSA is issuing this IFR without prior notice and opportunity to 
comment pursuant to its authority under section 4(a) of the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) (5 U.S.C. 553(b)). This provision 
authorizes the agency to issue a rule without prior notice and 
opportunity to comment when the agency for good cause finds that those 
procedures are ``impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public 
interest.''
    General aviation and charter operations that are not under full 
security programs have been prohibited from arriving at or departing 
from DCA since September 11, 2001. However, regularly scheduled, 
commercial air carrier operations that had been prohibited at DCA after 
September 11, 2001, have been restored through issuance of Notices to 
Airmen (NOTAMs) by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). The 
operators that have not been able to resume flights into and out of DCA 
have suffered economic hardship. Because the interim final rule 
establishes a voluntary program that will lift the suspension of 
general aviation operations for a segment of affected parties, thereby 
removing an existing restriction on their activities, TSA believes 
there will be little, if any, objection from these parties to immediate 
implementation of the interim final rule. Moreover, the economic 
hardship of the operators would be unnecessarily extended by a notice 
and comment rulemaking. Therefore, delaying implementation until after 
a notice and public comment period is unnecessary. If some affected 
parties believe that changes in the interim final rule are warranted, 
they will have the opportunity to comment on the rule, while other 
affected parties that are able take advantage of the benefits of the 
rule may do so without further delay. Therefore, in recognition of the 
need to begin to restore general aviation operations in a manner that 
will neither give rise to security risks, nor prolong the economic 
hardship to affected parties, TSA finds good cause to forgo prior 
notice and public comment in issuing the interim final rule.
    As previously noted, TSA requests comment on all aspects of this 
rule and will modify the rule if warranted.

Abbreviations of Terms Used In This Document

ADIZ--Air Defense Identification Zone
ASOP--Armed Security Officer Program
ATSA--Aviation and Transportation Security Act
CHRC--Criminal history records check
DASSP--DCA Access Standard Security Program
DCA--Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport
DHS--Department of Homeland Security
FAA--Federal Aviation Administration
FAM--Federal Air Marshal
FAMS--Federal Air Marshal Service
FBI--Federal Bureau of Investigation
FBO--fixed base operator
FRZ--Flight Restricted Zone
LEOSA--Law Enforcement Officers Safety Act
NOTAM--Notice to Airmen
PCSSP--Private Charter Standard Security Program
SSI--Sensitive Security Information
TFR--Temporary Flight Restriction
TFSSP--Twelve-Five Standard Security Program
TSA--Transportation Security Administration

I. Background

A. Operations at DCA

    After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks against four U.S. 
commercial aircraft resulting in the tragic loss of human life at the 
World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and in southwest Pennsylvania, the 
FAA immediately prohibited all aircraft operations within the 
territorial airspace of the U.S., with the exception of certain 
military, law enforcement, and emergency related aircraft operations. 
This general prohibition was lifted in part on September 13, 2001. In 
the Washington, DC metropolitan area, however, aircraft operations 
remained prohibited at all civil airports within a 25 nautical mile 
radius of the Washington DC Very High Frequency Omnidirectional Range/
Distance Measuring Equipment (VOR/DME). This action was accomplished 
via the U.S. NOTAM system.\1\
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    \1\ NOTAMs are used by the FAA to notify pilots of important 
information, including airspace restrictions. The FAA issued several 
NOTAMs regarding the restricted airspace over the Washington, DC, 
metropolitan area. The current NOTAM restricting aircraft operations 
in the Washington, DC, Flight Restricted Zone is NOTAM 3/2126.
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    Limited commercial air carrier operations were permitted to resume 
at DCA on October 4, 2001, and through a series of emergency air 
traffic rules issued by the FAA under 14 CFR 91.139 and NOTAMs that 
followed, other restrictions were eliminated. Currently operations to 
and from DCA by aircraft operators that hold a certificate under 14 CFR 
part 121 and operate under a full security program approved by TSA in 
accordance with 49 CFR 1544.101(a), or a foreign air carrier security 
program approved by TSA in accordance with 49 CFR 1546.101(a) or (b), 
are permitted under NOTAM 3/2126. Generally these are regularly 
scheduled, commercial, passenger operations. General aviation 
operations and other operations that are not under one of these 
security programs under part 1544 or 1546 are prohibited.
    As a result of this prohibition, many operators and the businesses 
they serve have experienced economic hardship. According to estimates 
prepared by the DCA Fixed Based Operator,\2\

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approximately 660 general aviation and charter flights occurred per 
week prior to September 11, 2001. The majority of these were corporate 
aircraft accommodating business travelers in the Washington, DC, area.
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    \2\ A Fixed Base Operator is an airport-based commercial 
enterprise that provides support services to aircraft operators, 
such as maintenance, overnight parking, fueling, and deicing.
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    It is important to resume these operations at DCA to permit these 
operators, their customers, and affected local businesses to recover 
from the adverse economic impacts brought on by the events of September 
11, 2001. However, DCA is located in close proximity to critical 
Federal Government assets, infrastructure, and functions. Any aircraft 
arriving at or departing from DCA will fly very near several 
significant government office buildings and national monuments. It 
would take very little time for such aircraft to inflict serious damage 
to any number of buildings in Washington, DC, and the surrounding area. 
Such an event could occur so quickly that it may not be possible to 
prevent. Therefore it is necessary to balance the economic interests of 
operators against the legitimate governmental security risks that 
exist.
    After discussions with the United States Secret Service, the 
Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS), the Department of Defense, the 
Homeland Security Council, and other Federal agencies, it has been 
determined that the national security concerns surrounding operations 
at DCA can be addressed effectively by requiring operators to comply 
with the security procedures set forth in this IFR. Applying these 
procedures to operations arriving at and departing from DCA will help 
to protect the critical national assets in the Washington, DC area from 
an airborne terrorist act. TSA has consulted with the associations that 
represent the operators subject to this rule, and they understand the 
need for special procedures at DCA. These operators are prepared to 
undertake special security procedures in order to recommence operations 
at DCA.

B. Statutory Background

    On November 19, 2001, Congress enacted the Aviation and 
Transportation Security Act (ATSA),\3\ which created TSA, and 
transferred civil aviation security functions from the FAA to TSA. TSA 
transferred the bulk of FAA's civil aviation security regulations (in 
Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations) to TSA (in Title 49, Code of 
Federal Regulations) in a separate rulemaking (see docket number TSA-
2002-11602, 67 FR 8340, February 22, 2002).
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    \3\ Pub. L. 107-71, November 19, 2001, 115 Stat. 597.
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    On December 12, 2003, Congress enacted the Vision 100-Century of 
Aviation Reauthorization Act.\4\ Section 823 of Vision 100 requires the 
Secretary of Homeland Security to develop a security plan to permit 
general aviation aircraft to resume operations into and out of DCA.
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    \4\ Pub. L. 108-176, December 12, 2003, 117 Stat. 2490.
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II. Summary of the Interim Final Rule

    For affected aircraft operators to fly into and out of DCA, they 
must designate a security coordinator and adopt a DCA Access Standard 
Security Program (DASSP). As part of the DASSP, they must ensure that 
all flight crewmembers have undergone a fingerprint-based criminal 
history records check (CHRC). Once aircraft operators have complied 
with those requirements, they will be eligible to apply to the FAA for 
a reservation, and to TSA for authorization, to operate specific 
flights into and out of DCA.
    To receive authorization for a flight, aircraft operators must have 
name-based threat assessments conducted by TSA on their flight 
crewmembers and passengers. They must carry an armed security officer 
who also must have a threat assessment conducted by TSA, as well as 
specialized training and authorization from TSA. The operators must 
have their last point of departure from a Fixed Base Operator (FBO)\5\ 
that holds a security program issued by TSA at an airport designated by 
TSA (referred to in the IFR as a ``gateway airport''). At each gateway 
airport, TSA will inspect the aircraft and will screen the passengers, 
their carry-on property, and property carried in the cargo hold of the 
aircraft, before it departs for DCA. The aircraft operator must also 
comply with all applicable FAA rules, including those rules for 
operating in the Flight Restricted Zone (FRZ).\6\
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    \5\ An FBO is an airport-based commercial enterprise that 
provides support services to aircraft operators, such as 
maintenance, overnight parking, fueling, and de-icing.
    \6\ The FRZ is an airspace ring centered on the Washington DC 
VOR/DME with a radius of approximately 15 nautical miles. In order 
to enter and operate in FRZ airspace, an operator must comply with 
certain access and security procedures implemented by FAA and TSA.
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    The aircraft operator must reimburse TSA for any costs associated 
with carrying out this subpart. These costs include $15 for the threat 
assessment TSA will conduct for each passenger and crewmember whose 
information the aircraft operator submits to TSA as part of the flight 
approval process, and $296 per round trip into and out of DCA to cover 
the costs of using TSA screening personnel and equipment at DCA and the 
gateway airports.

III. Discussion of the Interim Final Rule

A. Scope and Definitions

    This IFR creates a new subpart B in part 1562 of Title 49 of the 
Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). Subpart B applies to FBOs located at 
DCA and the gateway airports. It also applies to all aircraft 
operations into or out of DCA that are conducted under subpart B. The 
IFR also applies to passengers, crewmembers, and armed security 
officers onboard aircraft operations operated in accordance with the 
IFR. Finally, the IFR applies to individuals designated as security 
coordinators by aircraft operators in accordance with the IFR.
    Section 1562.21(b) provides that each person operating an aircraft 
into or out of DCA must comply with this subpart, with certain 
exceptions. The exceptions include (1) military, law enforcement, or 
medivac aircraft operating into or out of DCA; (2) Federal and State 
Government aircraft operating under an airspace waiver approved by TSA 
and authorized by FAA; \7\ (3) all-cargo aircraft operations; and (4) 
passenger aircraft operations conducted under a full security program 
approved by TSA in accordance with 49 CFR 1544.101(a) or a foreign air 
carrier security program approved by TSA in accordance with 49 CFR 
1546.101(a) or (b).
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    \7\ TSA will continue to coordinate with FAA, which authorizes 
waivers into and out of DCA for these and other certain operations, 
including Elected Official Operations, Government Operations, and 
Special Operations, in accordance with established policy.
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    This IFR does not apply to operations into or out of any airports 
other than DCA and gateway airports. Similarly, this IFR does not alter 
or suspend other regulations that TSA has issued or may issue that 
apply to aircraft operations. Further, this IFR does not affect the 
FAA's rules for operating into DCA, such as its rules relating to the 
allocation of reservations under the High Density Rule (14 CFR part 93, 
subpart K) and the Perimeter Rule (14 CFR 93.253), which prohibits a 
nonstop commercial aircraft operation to DCA from an airport that is 
more than 1,250 miles away from DCA.\8\
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    \8\ Due to slot control restrictions under the High Density Rule 
and the need to limit traffic volume in the FRZ for security 
purposes, it is expected that unscheduled aircraft operations into 
and out of DCA will be capped at 4 per hour for 12 hours a day, for 
a total of 48 operations daily.
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    The IFR specifies that any aircraft operation into or out of DCA 
under the IFR must be conducted in accordance

[[Page 41589]]

with the DASSP and any other TSA-approved security program that covers 
that operation. If any requirements of the DASSP conflict with the 
requirements of another TSA-approved security program, such as a 
Twelve-Five Standard Security Program (TFSSP) or Private Charter 
Standard Security Program (PCSSP), the aircraft operation into or out 
of DCA must be conducted in accordance with the requirements of the 
DASSP.
    For purposes of the IFR, the following definitions apply:
    ``Armed Security Officer Program'' is defined as the security 
program approved by TSA, in coordination with the FAMS, for armed 
security officers authorized to carry a firearm in accordance with the 
IFR.
    ``Crewmember'' is defined as a person assigned to perform duty in 
an aircraft during flight time. This includes pilots and flight 
attendants, but does not include armed security officers authorized to 
carry a firearm in accordance with the IFR.
    ``DCA'' is defined as Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport.
    ``DASSP'' (DCA Access Standard Security Program) is defined as the 
aircraft operator security program approved by TSA under part 1562 for 
aircraft operations into and out of DCA.
    ``FBO'' is defined as a fixed base operator that has been approved 
by TSA under part 1562 to serve as a last point of departure for 
flights into or out of DCA. The approved FBOs are located at either DCA 
or one of the gateway airports.
    ``FBO Security Program'' is defined as the security program 
approved by TSA under part 1562 for FBOs to serve flights into or out 
of DCA.
    ``Flightcrew member'' is defined as a pilot, flight engineer, or 
flight navigator assigned to duty in an aircraft during flight time. 
This is the same definition provided under 49 CFR 1540.5.
    ``Gateway airport'' is defined as an airport that has been approved 
by TSA as a last point of departure for flights into DCA. More 
information on the gateway airports is provided below.
    ``Passenger'' is defined as any person other than a flightcrew 
member on an aircraft. A ``passenger'' includes armed security officers 
authorized to carry a firearm in accordance with the rule.

B. Aircraft Operator Requirements

    To operate into or out of DCA under part 1562, an aircraft operator 
must comply with the following requirements.
1. Security Coordinators
    The aircraft operator must designate an individual as a security 
coordinator responsible for implementing the DASSP and other security 
requirements under the IFR. The aircraft operator must provide TSA with 
the security coordinator's contact information and availability in 
accordance with the DASSP.
    The security coordinator must undergo a fingerprint-based criminal 
history records check (CHRC) that does not disclose that he or she has 
a disqualifying criminal offense as described in 49 CFR 1544.229(d).\9\ 
The IFR provides that this requirement is met if a security coordinator 
has already undergone a fingerprint-based CHRC in accordance with 49 
CFR 1542.209, 1544.229, or 1544.230, with his or her current employer. 
The security coordinator also must undergo a security threat assessment 
performed by TSA.
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    \9\ These are the same disqualifying crimes used for TSA 
screeners, individuals with unescorted access to secured areas of an 
airport, and crewmembers employed by an aircraft operator operating 
under a TFSSP or PCSSP.
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    To initiate the CHRC, the security coordinator must submit his or 
her fingerprints and required information to a fingerprint collector 
approved by TSA. The collector will forward the information to TSA, and 
TSA will forward the information to the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI). The FBI will conduct the CHRC and send the results to TSA, and 
TSA will adjudicate the results to verify that the security coordinator 
does not have a disqualifying criminal offense described in 49 CFR 
1544.229(d). This process is similar to the process used for aircraft 
operators with a Twelve-Five Standard Security Program (TFSSP) or a 
Private Charter Standard Security Program (PCSSP).
    If TSA informs the security coordinator that the CHRC discloses a 
disqualifying offense, he or she may seek to correct the record in 
accordance with the procedures set forth in 49 CFR 1544.229(h) and (i) 
regarding notification and correction of records. These procedures 
require an aircraft operator to notify an applicant when the 
applicant's FBI record discloses information that would disqualify the 
applicant, and provide the applicant with a copy of the FBI record if 
the applicant requests it. The applicant may contact the local 
jurisdiction responsible for the information in the record and the FBI 
to complete or correct the information, provided that the applicant 
notifies the aircraft operator in writing, within 30 days of receiving 
notification that the applicant's FBI record discloses a disqualifying 
criminal offense, of his or her intent to correct the record. TSA notes 
that the procedures set forth in 49 CFR 1544.229(h) and (i) apply to 
the aircraft operator. Since TSA will be adjudicating the CHRC results 
for security coordinators under this IFR, TSA will perform the 
functions required of aircraft operators by 49 CFR 1544.229(h) and (i).
    For purposes of the security threat assessment, the security 
coordinator must submit to TSA: his or her (1) legal name, including 
first, middle, and last; any applicable suffix, and any other names 
used; (2) current mailing address, including residential address if 
different than current mailing address; (3) date and place of birth; 
(4) citizenship status and date of naturalization if the individual is 
a naturalized citizen of the United States; and (5) alien registration 
number, if applicable. The security operator also may voluntarily 
provide his or her social security number. Using that information, TSA 
will conduct a security threat assessment and inform the aircraft 
operator of the results. If TSA determines that the security 
coordinator may pose a security threat, the aircraft operator may not 
designate the individual as a security coordinator. Failure to provide 
the social security number may result in delays in processing the 
application. Failure to provide the other information may result in the 
applicant being denied the request to serve as a security coordinator.
2. DCA Access Standard Security Program (DASSP)
    The aircraft operator must adopt and carry out the DASSP. To 
receive the DASSP, an aircraft operator must contact TSA through TSA's 
Office of Aviation Programs and request the DASSP. TSA will verify that 
the aircraft operator is a valid operator and then provide the aircraft 
operator with a non-disclosure agreement that the aircraft operator 
must sign, as the DASSP contains sensitive security information (SSI) 
that must be protected in accordance with TSA's SSI regulation at 49 
CFR part 1520. TSA then will provide the DASSP to the aircraft 
operator. Once the aircraft operator implements the requirements of the 
DASSP, the aircraft operator must notify TSA. TSA will then inspect the 
aircraft operator to ensure that the program requirements have been 
implemented in accordance with the DASSP. Upon a satisfactory 
inspection, the aircraft operator will be eligible to apply to TSA

[[Page 41590]]

for approval to operate flights into and out of DCA in accordance with 
the requirements in the IFR, explained in further detail below.
3. Flightcrew Members
    The aircraft operator must ensure that each flightcrew member \10\ 
who will be assigned to an aircraft operating into or out of DCA 
complies with the requirements of the IFR. Each flightcrew member must 
undergo a fingerprint-based CHRC, using the same process and list of 
disqualifying criminal offenses used for the designated security 
coordinator. If a flightcrew member is informed that the CHRC discloses 
a disqualifying offense, he or she also may seek to correct the record 
in the same manner as the designated security coordinator. The IFR 
provides that the CHRC requirement is met if a flightcrew member has 
already undergone a fingerprint-based CHRC in accordance with 49 CFR 
1542.209, 1544.229, or 1544.230, with his or her current employer.
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    \10\ These requirements do not apply to cabin crewmembers.
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    Each flightcrew member also must undergo a check of their FAA 
record. A flightcrew member may not have a record on file with the FAA 
of a violation of: (1) A prohibited area designated under 14 CFR part 
73; (2) a flight restriction established under 14 CFR 91.141 (flight 
restrictions in the proximity of the President and certain other 
parties); (3) special security instructions issued under 14 CFR 99.7 
(air defense identification zone or defense area); (4) a restricted 
area designated under 14 CFR part 73; (5) emergency air traffic rules 
issued under 14 CFR 91.139 (emergency conditions); (6) a temporary 
flight restriction designated under 14 CFR 91.137 (vicinity of a 
disaster or hazard area), 91.138 (national disaster area in the State 
of Hawaii), or 91.145 (management of aircraft operations in the 
vicinity of aerial demonstrations and major sporting events); or (7) an 
area designated under 14 CFR 91.143 (flight limitations in the 
proximity of space flight operations). These violations also are 
considered disqualifying for pilots who apply for approval to operate 
to and from the Maryland Three Airports, which are located in the 
FRZ.\11\
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    \11\ See 70 FR 7150, February 10, 2005.
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4. Flight Approvals
    The aircraft operator must apply for and receive a reservation from 
the FAA and authorization from TSA for each flight into and out of 
DCA.\12\ The aircraft operator first must apply to the FAA for 
assignment of a tentative reservation to operate into and/or out of 
DCA. The FAA will produce a tentative reservation based on air traffic 
scheduling and other relevant factors.
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    \12\ As noted above, we expect that the total number of takeoff 
and landing reservations at DCA under the IFR will be limited to 48 
per day.
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    Then the aircraft operator must apply for TSA authorization for the 
flight by submitting to TSA the following information at least 24 hours 
prior to aircraft departure: (1) For each passenger and crewmember 
(both flightcrew and cabin crew) on the aircraft: legal name, including 
first, middle, and last; any applicable suffix, and any other names 
used; current mailing address, including residential address if 
different than current mailing address; date and place of birth;; 
citizenship status and date of naturalization if the individual is a 
naturalized citizen of the United States; and alien registration 
number, if applicable; (2) the registration number of the aircraft; (3) 
the flight plan; and (4) any other information required by TSA.\13\ TSA 
will conduct a name-based security threat assessment for each passenger 
and crewmember. If TSA notifies the aircraft operator that a passenger 
or crewmember may pose a security threat, the aircraft operator must 
ensure that the passenger or crewmember does not board the aircraft. 
TSA's ability to conduct a security threat assessment will be 
facilitated by the use of social security numbers and asks that 
passengers and crew consider voluntarily submitting social security 
numbers to TSA. Failure to provide the social security number may 
result in delays in processing the application. Failure to provide the 
other information may result in the applicant being denied the request 
to be a passenger or crewmember.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \13\ The aircraft operator is required to submit the required 
information for each passenger and crewmember only once per round 
trip flight. If any passengers or crewmembers are added on the 
flight out of DCA, the aircraft operator must submit the required 
information for those individuals at least 24 hours prior to the 
aircraft departing DCA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    If TSA authorizes the flight, TSA will transmit its authorization 
to the FAA for assignment of a final reservation to operate into or out 
of DCA. Once FAA assigns the reservation, TSA will notify the aircraft 
operator.
    The IFR specifies that TSA may, at its discretion, cancel any or 
all flight approvals at any time without prior notice to the aircraft 
operator. For example, if the threat level in the Washington, D.C., 
area or in the vicinity of any of the gateway airports is set at ORANGE 
or RED, TSA is likely to cancel any and all flight approvals into and 
out of DCA. The IFR also specifies that TSA may, at its discretion, 
permit a flight to or from DCA to deviate from the requirements of the 
IFR, if TSA finds that such action would not be detrimental to 
transportation security or the safe operation of the aircraft. TSA will 
consult with the U.S. Secret Service, FAMS, Department of Defense, FAA, 
and other relevant government agencies prior to approving a flight to 
deviate from the requirements of the IFR. Finally, the IFR provides 
that TSA may, at its discretion, require any flight into or out of DCA 
under this subpart to comply with additional security measures. For 
instance, for certain operations, such as those with a large number of 
persons on board, TSA may require additional armed security officers 
onboard the aircraft.
5. Operating Requirements
    For each flight into and out of DCA, an aircraft operator must 
comply with the following operating requirements specified in the IFR. 
The aircraft operator must ensure that each flight into DCA departs 
from a gateway airport and makes no intermediate stops before arrival 
at DCA. More information on the gateway airports is provided below.
    The aircraft operator must ensure that the aircraft has been 
searched in accordance with the DASSP, and that each passenger and 
crewmember and all accessible property and property in inaccessible 
cargo holds on the aircraft has been screened in accordance with the 
DASSP prior to boarding the aircraft. TSA personnel will conduct the 
aircraft searches and screening of passengers, crewmembers, and 
property. The aircraft operator must ensure that each passenger and 
crewmember on the aircraft provides TSA screening personnel with a 
valid government-issued picture identification. If the aircraft is 
equipped with a cockpit door, the aircraft operator must ensure that 
the door is closed and locked at all times during the operation of the 
aircraft to or from DCA, unless FAA regulations require the door to 
remain open.\14\ The aircraft operator must notify the National Capital 
Region Coordination Center prior to departure of the aircraft from a 
gateway airport or DCA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \14\ TSA notes that FAA regulations require that some cockpit 
doors remain open during takeoff and landing for safety reasons.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The aircraft operator must ensure that each aircraft operating into 
or out of DCA has onboard at least one armed security officer who meets 
the

[[Page 41591]]

requirements specified in the IFR, which are discussed in greater 
detail below. For some flights, such as flights with a large number of 
passengers, TSA may require more than one armed security officer to be 
onboard the aircraft. In addition, if TSA or the FAMS requires that the 
aircraft have one or more Federal Air Marshals (FAMs) on board, the 
aircraft operator must allow the FAM(s) onboard, at no cost to the 
Federal Government.
    The aircraft operator must ensure that the aircraft operates under 
instrument flight rules only. Finally, the aircraft operator must 
ensure that each passenger complies with any security measures mandated 
by TSA, and that no prohibited items are onboard the aircraft. TSA 
intends to use the same list of prohibited items that is currently used 
for regularly-scheduled commercial aircraft operations. In addition, as 
explained in greater detail below, TSA rules for aviation security, 
including the rules prohibiting interference with security measures and 
screening personnel and requiring individuals to submit to screening 
and inspection, will apply to passengers and crewmembers on aircraft 
operated into and out of DCA in accordance with the IFR.
6. Costs
    The aircraft operator must pay any costs and fees required under 
this part. As explained in greater detail below, the aircraft operator 
must pay a $15 threat assessment fee for each passenger and crewmember 
whose information the aircraft operator submits to TSA as part of the 
flight approval process. In addition, the aircraft operator must 
reimburse TSA for additional costs TSA will incur in carrying out the 
requirements of the IFR.
    On October 1, 2003, Congress enacted legislation directing TSA to 
collect reasonable fees to cover the costs of providing credentialing 
and background investigations in the transportation field.\15\ Section 
520 of the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2004 
(2004 Appropriations Act) authorizes TSA to collect fees to pay for the 
following costs: Conducting or obtaining a criminal history records 
check (CHRC); reviewing available law enforcement databases, commercial 
databases, and records of other governmental and international 
agencies; reviewing and adjudicating requests for waivers and appeals 
of TSA decisions; and any other costs related to performing the 
background records check or providing the credential. Section 520 of 
the 2004 Appropriations Act mandates that any fee collected be 
available for expenditure only to pay for the costs incurred in 
providing services in connection with performing the background check 
or providing the credential. The fees collected shall remain available 
until expended.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \15\ Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2004, 
Section 520, Pub. L. 108-90, October 1, 2003, 117 Stat. 1156 (6 
U.S.C. 469) (2004 Appropriations Act).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Under the IFR, each aircraft operator must remit to TSA a fee of 
$15 per person to defray the costs of the security threat assessment 
performed for passengers (including any armed security officers) and 
crewmembers on each flight operated into or out of DCA. The aircraft 
operator is required to pay this fee each time the aircraft operator 
submits the manifest to TSA for the required security threat 
assessments. In addition, each aircraft operator must reimburse TSA for 
the costs TSA incurs in carrying out the requirements of the IFR.

Population

    The number of security threat assessments performed as a result of 
this IFR is drawn from general aviation industry data as well as TSA 
operational assumptions. The total figure is roughly equivalent to the 
product of two separate estimates: Total Round Trips Through DCA is the 
number of available general aviation slots divided by half (4 slots/
hour x 12 hours/day x 365 days/year)/2 departures/round trip = 8,760), 
taking into account that round trips account for two allocated slots. 
This analysis assumes 100 percent capacity utilization of the available 
48 daily slots, a premise based on pre-September 11, 2001, general 
aviation flight throughput of approximately 30,000 annual round trips 
through DCA. The second component is Average Persons Per Flight. Based 
on National Business Aviation Association (NBAA) analysis of pre-
September 11, 2001, general aviation traffic at the airport, TSA has 
estimated that the Average Persons Per Flight is 6 persons (2 
crewmembers and 4 passengers).\16\ The product of these two numbers is 
52,560 (8,760 round trips * 6 persons per flight).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \16\ According to the NBAA, over 90% of pre-September 11, 2001 
general aviation traffic at DCA was corporate. A similar ratio is 
assumed for the current rollout.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Operational Assumptions

    To develop its cost estimate, TSA has assumed the following 
procedures for general aviation flight authorizations and security 
threat assessments:
    Step 1: An aircraft operator approved by TSA under the DASSP will 
apply to the FAA for assignment of a tentative reservation to operate 
into and (typically) out of DCA. FAA will produce a tentative 
reservation based on air traffic scheduling availability and other 
relevant factors.
    Step 2: The aircraft operator will apply to TSA for a flight 
approval and submit the names and other required information of all 
crewmembers and passengers.
    Step 3: TSA will conduct name-checks against multiple government 
watch lists and other terrorist threat sources.
    Step 4: Once TSA clears the crewmembers and passengers and approves 
the flight, TSA will transmit its approval to FAA for assignment of a 
final reservation to operate into and/or out of DCA.
    Step 5: Once FAA assigns the final reservation, TSA will notify the 
aircraft operator.
    Step 6: TSA will coordinate the aircraft operator's flight schedule 
with appropriate TSA field screening and inspection operations to 
perform physical screening at FBO operations at DCA or other gateway 
airports as required.

Cost Components

    The following major cost components have been identified as 
required to perform the security threat assessment and requisite flight 
authorization functions. Each major component's cost estimates and 
supporting rationale and/or sources behind the estimate are discussed 
in detail below:
     Flight authorization automated system development 
(``Systems Costs'')
     Federal authorization staff costs (``Program Staff 
Costs'')
     Security threat assessment process costs (``Name Check 
Costs'')

Systems Costs

    To support up to 48 flights per day into and out of DCA (and all 
requisite information management of flight and applicant information), 
a Commercial Off-the-Shelf (COTS) software application will be 
required. Currently, TSA performs a similar processing function for 
other types of flight authorizations that cumulatively average some 
400+ flight authorizations per week, or almost 23,000 flight 
authorizations per year. At present, TSA employs 9 full time employees 
(FTEs) to perform this labor-intensive process.
    Rather than requiring significant numbers of additional personnel 
to handle the workload under this IFR, TSA intends to purchase an 
existing COTS application to automate much of the current flight 
authorization function

[[Page 41592]]

at TSA, including operations into and out of DCA. Such a system is 
already operational and in use at the FAA. At a high level, the 
automated functionality and thus efficiency gained from such a system 
will be the following:
     Automation of applicant name, other biographical 
information, and flight information submission and transmission (rather 
than via fax and manual key entry of current waiver process).
     Automated applicant information submission to TSA's 
security threat assessment operations (versus fax/manual list 
management).
     Automated information exchange, including electronic 
signature for clearance documents and flight slotting, between TSA and 
FAA (versus current manual courier of documents daily between the two 
agencies).
     Automated tracking of flight volume/metrics, applicants 
and other performance metrics reporting capabilities as required.
    TSA realizes that such a system will vastly improve not only the 
contemplated process for flight authorizations into and out of DCA, but 
also the efficiency and thus cost of the existing process for other 
flight authorizations. TSA notes that Section 520 of the Department of 
Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2004, Pub. L. 107-90, 117 Stat. 
1137 (Oct. 1, 2003) directs TSA to recover its costs related to 
providing a credential or performing background checks. As the flight 
authorization services are inextricably linked to providing the 
security threat assessments under this program, TSA is including the 
cost of providing these services in the threat assessment fee.
    TSA intends to charge aircraft operators operating into and out of 
DCA in accordance with the IFR only for those system costs equal to the 
proportion of total expected flight authorizations between the DCA 
program and all other flight authorization programs. TSA estimates that 
the acquisition, installation, and maintenance of a similar COTS 
application would total some $4.1 million over a 5-year system and 
program lifecycle period. Thus, as the total annual flight 
authorization volume for general aviation operations at DCA is some 
8,760 or 28 percent of the total annual expected volume of some 31,600 
flight authorizations only 28 percent of the total 5-year system costs 
will be recovered in the fees charged under this IFR. The remaining 72 
percent of system cost will become the responsibility of the existing 
flight authorization programs.
    TSA will also incur several one-time technical ``setup'' costs, 
including an estimated $100,000 to develop system interfaces with TSA 
systems for the security threat assessment, $100,000 application 
installation and hosting setup charges, and an estimated $100,000 for 
online fee payment functionality via the Federal Government's required 
electronic payment system for web-based payments, www.pay.gov.

Program Staff Costs

    Even with the reduction in manual labor TSA should realize with the 
automated flight authorization COTS system, TSA still estimates that 4 
full time employees (FTEs) will be required to perform those functions 
that will not be automated. These functions are generally those that 
still require ``live'' communication and human judgment. This estimate 
also assumes that the 24-hour security threat assessment response time 
will necessitate some staffing during all 24 hours per day, 7 days per 
week. TSA has assumed annual staff cost for salary, benefits, and 
overhead of $100,000 per employee.

Name Check Costs

    TSA incurs both labor, system, and infrastructure/overhead costs 
each time it performs a name-based check against the multiple 
governmental watch lists and other terrorist threat sources. For the 
small portion of those names that are ``hits'' (names that match any of 
the various watch lists), TSA must perform identity verification and 
occasionally coordinate interagency law enforcement/apprehension 
activities. Based on TSA's operational history with other similar 
populations applying for clearance, and what it estimates the DCA 
general aviation population to require in terms of identity 
verification and other vetting operations, a $2 per applicant security 
threat assessment cost has been derived. This fee is included in the 
$15 security threat assessment fee described below.

                                        Table 1.--5-Year Lifecycle Costs
                                            [Program operating year]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                       Year 1       Year 2       Year 3       Year 4       Year 5       Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Number of security threat          52,560       52,560       52,560       52,560       52,560      262,800
 assessments......................
Fixed Costs:
    Automated Flight Authorization     $713,070     $106,961     $106,961     $106,961     $106,961   $1,140,912
     System.......................
    TSA Interface.................      100,000            0            0            0            0      100,000
    Payment Interface.............      100,000            0            0            0            0      100,000
    System Hosting Set-Up Costs...      100,000            0            0            0            0      100,000
Scheduling Staff..................      400,000      400,000      400,000      400,000      400,000    2,000,000
                                   --------------
        Total Fixed Costs.........    1,513,070      506,961      506,961      506,961      506,961    3,440,912
Variable Costs:
    Name Checks...................      105,120      105,120      105,120      105,120      105,120      525,600
                                   --------------
        Total Costs...............    1,518,190      612,081      612,081      612,081      612,081    3,966,512
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Fee Summary

    Based on the costs and populations estimated above, TSA has 
calculated a fee of $15 per person for the security threat assessments 
and requisite flight authorization services costs. To calculate the 
fee, TSA has amortized the fixed costs of the security threat 
assessments over five years as this is generally accepted business 
practice for software and other infrastructure depreciation. The 
equation used to determine the fee is $3,440,912 (fixed costs) + 
$525,600 (variable costs over 5 years)/262,800 (5-year population of 
applicants) = $15 per person.
    Pursuant to the Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990, DHS and TSA 
are required to review these fees no less than every two years.\17\ 
Upon review, if

[[Page 41593]]

it is found that the fees are either too high (that is, total fees 
exceed the total cost to provide the services) or too low (that is, 
total fees do not cover the total costs to provide the services), TSA 
may propose changes to the fees. In addition, as DHS and TSA identify 
and implement additional efficiencies across numerous threat assessment 
and credentialing programs, any resulting cost savings will be 
incorporated into the fee levels accordingly.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \17\ 31 U.S.C. 3512.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition to the $15 per person fee, the IFR requires each 
aircraft operator to pay TSA for the costs TSA expends in carrying out 
this subpart. These costs include the costs of using screening 
personnel and equipment at DCA and the gateway airports. These costs 
are currently estimated at $296 per round trip into and out of DCA. TSA 
may revise these reimbursement cost figures if TSA determines that its 
estimated costs are too high or too low, and the reimbursable amounts 
may be modified periodically to reflect the most current costs of 
services provided.
    All fees and reimbursement must be remitted to TSA in a form and 
manner approved by TSA, and TSA will not issue any refunds, unless a 
fee or reimbursement was paid in error. TSA will provide specific fee 
remittance instructions prior to enactment of the IFR. The IFR 
specifies that if an aircraft operator does not remit to TSA the fees 
and reimbursement required under the IFR, TSA may decline to process 
any requests for flight authorizations from the aircraft operator.
    TSA notes that the aircraft operator or flightcrew member may also 
be required to pay a fee to any fingerprint collector for the 
fingerprint collection for crewmembers as well as the fee charged by 
the FBI for conducting a CHRC. In addition, the aircraft operator is 
responsible for paying to have a TSA qualified armed security officer 
onboard the aircraft.
7. Protection of Sensitive Security Information
    The aircraft operator must restrict the distribution, disclosure, 
and availability of sensitive security information (SSI), as defined in 
49 CFR part 1520, to persons with a need to know, and refer all 
requests for SSI by other persons to TSA. The IFR amends part 1520 to 
specify that the DASSP is SSI and that aircraft operators who receive 
the DASSP are covered persons under part 1520. Thus, aircraft operators 
subject to the IFR will be subject to the SSI protection requirements 
in part 1520. As explained further below, the IFR also amends part 1520 
to cover FBOs and armed security officers subject to part 1562.
8. Other Security Procedures
    The aircraft operator must comply with any additional security 
procedures required by TSA through order, Security Directive, or other 
means.
    TSA notes that the following sections of 49 CFR part 1540 apply to 
persons involved with this program: Sec.  1540.103, which prohibits 
certain fraud and intentional falsification; Sec.  1540.105, which 
forbids certain interference with security measures; Sec.  1540.107, 
which requires individuals to submit to screening and inspection; and 
Sec.  1540.109, which prohibits persons from interfering with screening 
personnel. These sections apply throughout the TSA rules for aviation 
security (49 CFR chapter XII, subchapter C), and therefore now apply in 
the context of the requirements of part 1562.
    In addition, this IFR amends Sec.  1540.111 to apply to passengers 
on aircraft operated into and out of DCA under the DASSP. That section 
currently prohibits passengers from carrying weapons, explosives, and 
incendiaries on certain scheduled and charter flights, and is being 
expanded to also apply to passengers on aircraft operated into and out 
of DCA in accordance with the IFR and the DASSP.
9. Compliance
    The IFR requires an aircraft operator to permit TSA to conduct any 
inspections or tests, including copying records, to determine 
compliance with the IFR and the DASSP. The IFR also requires an 
aircraft operator, at the request of TSA, to provide evidence of 
compliance with the IFR and the DASSP, including copies of records.
    The IFR specifies that noncompliance with the IFR or the DASSP may 
result in the cancellation of any and all of an aircraft operator's 
flight approvals and other enforcement action, as appropriate.

B. Fixed Base Operator Requirements

    Each fixed base operator (FBO) from which flights into DCA operate 
under the IFR must adopt and carry out the FBO Security Program. TSA 
will provide the FBO Security Program to each participating FBO at DCA 
and the gateway airports. The gateway airports are: (1) Seattle-Tacoma, 
Washington; (2) Boston Logan, Massachusetts; (3) Houston Hobby, Texas; 
(4) White Plains, New York; (5) LaGuardia, New York; (6) Chicago 
Midway, Illinois; (7) Minneapolis-St. Paul, Minnesota; (8) West Palm 
Beach, Florida; (9) San Francisco, California; (10) Teterboro, New 
Jersey; (11) Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; and (12) Lexington, Kentucky. 
TSA may revise or expand this list if necessary or appropriate.
    TSA identified these airports as last points of departure for DCA 
based on volume and geographical reasons. Eight of the airports 
represent those that serviced the largest number of general aviation 
operations into DCA prior to September 11, 2001. Those airports are 
predominately centered in the northeast corridor where most DCA bound 
flights occur. The other airports are commercial service airports 
located throughout the U.S. that are in close proximity to general 
aviation airports that served DCA prior to September 11, 2001.
    The FBO must designate a security coordinator who meets the same 
requirements as designated aircraft operator security coordinators. The 
security coordinator will be responsible for implementing the FBO 
Security Program and other security requirements required by the IFR. 
The FBO must provide TSA with the security coordinator's contact 
information and availability in accordance with the FBO Security 
Program.
    The FBO must support the screening of persons and property, and the 
search of aircraft, in accordance with the requirements of the FBO 
Security Program.
    The FBO must restrict the distribution, disclosure, and 
availability of SSI, as defined in 49 CFR part 1520, to persons with a 
need to know, and refer all requests for SSI by other persons to TSA. 
The IFR amends part 1520 to specify that the FBO Security Program is 
SSI and that FBOs that receive the FBO Security Program are covered 
persons under part 1520. Thus, FBOs subject to the IFR will be subject 
to the SSI protection requirements in part 1520.
    The FBO must permit TSA to conduct any inspections or tests, 
including copying records, to determine compliance with this part and 
the FBO Security Program. In addition, at the request of TSA, the FBO 
must provide evidence of compliance with this part and the FBO Security 
Program, including copies of records.

C. Armed Security Officer Requirements

    The IFR specifies the following requirements for security officers 
authorized to be armed onboard an aircraft operating into or out of DCA 
under a DASSP. Each armed security officer must comply with an Armed

[[Page 41594]]

Security Officer Program (ASOP) issued by TSA.
    The armed security officer must be qualified to carry a firearm in 
accordance with the IFR. To be qualified, an armed security officer 
must be an active law enforcement officer, a retired law enforcement 
officer, or another individual who meets the requirements specified in 
the IFR.
    A qualified active law enforcement officer is an employee of a 
governmental agency who: (1) Is authorized by law to engage in or 
supervise the prevention, detection, investigation, or prosecution of, 
or the incarceration of any person for, any violation of law; (2) has 
statutory powers of arrest; (3) is authorized by the agency to carry a 
firearm; (4) is not the subject of any disciplinary action by the 
agency; (5) is not under the influence of alcohol or another 
intoxicating or hallucinatory drug or substance; and (6) is not 
prohibited by Federal law from receiving a firearm.
    A qualified retired law enforcement officer is an individual who: 
(1) retired in good standing from service with a public agency as a law 
enforcement officer, other than for reasons of mental instability; (2) 
before such retirement, was authorized by law to engage in or supervise 
the prevention, detection, investigation, or prosecution of, or the 
incarceration of any person for, any violation of law, and had 
statutory powers of arrest; (3) before such retirement, was regularly 
employed as a law enforcement officer for an aggregate of 15 years or 
more, or retired from service with such agency, after completing any 
applicable probationary period of such service, due to a service-
connected disability, as determined by such agency; (4) has a non-
forfeitable right to benefits under the retirement plan of the agency; 
(5) is not under the influence of alcohol or another intoxicating or 
hallucinatory drug or substance; and (6) is not prohibited by Federal 
law from receiving a firearm.
    These requirements are consistent with the requirements specified 
for law enforcement officers and retired law enforcement officers under 
the Law Enforcement Officers Safety Act of 2004 (LEOSA).\18\ LEOSA 
allows qualified law enforcement officers and qualified retired law 
enforcement officers to carry firearms in State and municipal 
jurisdictions beyond their own, but does not eliminate all restrictions 
that prohibit carrying firearms in certain areas or places, such as 
State or local government buildings and parks. Likewise, this law does 
not supersede or affect Federal laws and regulations that restrict 
carriage of firearms in certain places, including 49 U.S.C. 46505 
(criminal offense for carrying a weapon on aircraft) and the 
requirement to comply with all applicable provisions of 49 CFR 1544.219 
(Carriage of Accessible Weapons) for a law enforcement officer to carry 
a firearm aboard a commercial aircraft. TSA notes that not all relevant 
jurisdictions have implemented the requirements of LEOSA, so some law 
enforcement officers and retired law enforcement officers may not yet 
be qualified under LEOSA. However, the requirements in this IFR are 
consistent with the requirements in LEOSA.
--