Special Conditions; Raytheon Model King Air H-90 (T-44A) Protection of Systems for High Intensity Radiated Fields (HIRF), 37654-37656 [05-12879]
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37654
Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 125 / Thursday, June 30, 2005 / Rules and Regulations
Another commenter stated that ‘‘in most
instances the money for the event has
already been raised. Therefore, the
candidate or officeholder’s appearance
and speech [are] not a solicitation.’’
Another commenter noted that most
of these fundraising events are smalldollar events targeted at grass roots
volunteers where donations are usually
less than $100, and do not include
corporations or single-interest groups.
An additional commenter stated that
‘‘Congress knew that state and local
party committees request officeholders
speak at party events to increase
attendance and the party’s yield from
the event. It was also aware that
speeches at these events are unlikely of
themselves to foster the quid pro quo
contributions that the law seeks to
curb.’’ Thus, many of these events
already comply with amount limitations
and source prohibitions for solicitation
under section 441i(e)(1)(B). In contrast,
other commenters asserted that there
was a potential for abuse if Federal
candidates and officeholders make
phone calls from the event asking
donors for non-Federal funds, or gather
together a group of wealthy donors and
label it a ‘‘State party fundraising event’’
in order to benefit from the exemption
in section 300.64. However, in response
to Commission questioning at the
hearing, no commenter could point to
any reports of such activity in the past
election cycle. If the Commission
detects evidence of abuse in the future,
the Commission has the authority to
revisit the regulation and take action as
appropriate, including an approach
targeted to the specific types of
problems that are actually found to
occur.
Additional Issues
1. Other Fundraising Events
In the NPRM, the Commission sought
public comment regarding certain
advisory opinions issued by the
Commission permitting attendance and
participation by Federal officeholders
and candidates at events where nonFederal funds would be raised for State
and local candidates or organizations,
subject to various restrictions and
disclaimer requirements. See NPRM at
9015; Advisory Opinions 2003–03,
2003–05, and 2003–36. Some
commenters stated that the analysis in
those advisory opinions was correct and
consistent with BCRA’s exceptions
permitting Federal officeholders and
candidates to raise money for State and
local elections within Federal limits and
prohibitions under section 441i(e)(1)(B).
One commenter noted that these
advisory opinions were based on the
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15:12 Jun 29, 2005
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Commission’s regulation at 11 CFR
300.62, which was not challenged in the
Shays litigation and need not be
reexamined here. Another commenter
urged the Commission to incorporate
the holdings of these advisory opinions
into its regulations so that Federal
officeholders and candidates could
continue to rely on them. One
commenter also suggested that any
additional restrictions beyond the
disclaimers required in these advisory
opinions would raise constitutional
concerns. In contrast, other commenters
asserted that these advisory opinions
were incorrect and that the Commission
should supersede them with a
regulation that completely bars
attendance at soft money fundraising
events that are not hosted by a State
party. The Commission does not believe
it is necessary to initiate a rulemaking
to address the issues in Advisory
Opinions 2003–03, 2003–05, and 2003–
36 at this time.
2. Levin Funds
The Commission also sought
comment on how it should interpret 2
U.S.C. 441i(b)(2), (e)(1), and (e)(3) in
light of language from Shays stating that
Levin funds are ‘‘funds ‘subject to
[FECA’s] limitations, prohibitions, and
reporting requirements.’ ’’ See NPRM at
9016. Most comments regarding this
inquiry opposed any interpretation of
these provisions that would allow
Federal officeholders and candidates to
solicit Levin funds without restriction,
with some commenters noting that the
Commission has consistently referred to
Levin funds as non-Federal funds,
including in recent final rules published
in 2005. However, one commenter
stated that Federal officeholders and
candidates should be allowed to raise
Levin funds. This issue of interpretation
was relevant only to the alternative
approach proposed in the NPRM.
Because the Commission has decided to
retain its rule in section 300.64 with a
revised Explanation and Justification,
the Commission need not further
address this question of statutory
interpretation.
Dated: June 23, 2005.
Scott E. Thomas,
Chairman, Federal Election Commission.
[FR Doc. 05–12863 Filed 6–29–05; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6715–01–P
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 23
[Docket No. CE230, Special Condition 23–
170–SC]
Special Conditions; Raytheon Model
King Air H–90 (T–44A) Protection of
Systems for High Intensity Radiated
Fields (HIRF)
Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Final special conditions; request
for comments.
AGENCY:
SUMMARY: These special conditions are
issued to ARINC Inc., 1632 S. Murray
Blvd., Colorado Springs, CO 80916 for a
Supplemental Type Certificate for the
Raytheon Model King Air H–90 (T–44A)
airplane. These airplanes will have
novel and unusual design features when
compared to the state of technology
envisaged in the applicable
airworthiness standards. The novel and
unusual design features include the
installation of the Rockwell Collins Pro
Line 21 Avionics System. This system
includes Electronic Flight Instrument
Systems (EFIS), electronic displays,
digital Air Data Computers (ADC), and
supporting equipment. The applicable
regulations do not contain adequate or
appropriate airworthiness standards for
the protection of these systems from the
effects of high intensity radiated fields
(HIRF). These special conditions
contain the additional safety standards
that the Administrator considers
necessary to establish a level of safety
equivalent to the airworthiness
standards applicable to these airplanes.
DATES: The effective date of these
special conditions is June 22, 2005.
Comments must be received on or
before August 1, 2005.
ADDRESSES: Comments may be mailed
in duplicate to: Federal Aviation
Administration, Regional Counsel,
ACE–7, Attention: Rules Docket Clerk,
Docket No. CE230, Room 506, 901
Locust, Kansas City, Missouri 64106. All
comments must be marked: Docket No.
CE230. Comments may be inspected in
the Rules Docket weekdays, except
Federal holidays, between 7:30 a.m. and
4 p.m.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Wes
Ryan, Aerospace Engineer, Standards
Office (ACE–110), Small Airplane
Directorate, Aircraft Certification
Service, Federal Aviation
Administration, 901 Locust, Room 301,
Kansas City, Missouri 64106; telephone
(816) 329–4127.
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37655
Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 125 / Thursday, June 30, 2005 / Rules and Regulations
The FAA
has determined that notice and
opportunity for prior public comment
hereon are impracticable because these
procedures would significantly delay
issuance of the approval and thus
delivery of the affected aircraft. In
addition, the substance of these special
conditions has been subject to the
public comment process in several prior
instances with no substantive comments
received. The FAA, therefore, finds that
good cause exists for making these
special conditions effective upon
issuance.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Comments Invited
Interested persons are invited to
submit such written data, views, or
arguments, as they may desire.
Communications should identify the
regulatory docket or notice number and
be submitted in duplicate to the address
specified above. All communications
received on or before the closing date
for comments will be considered by the
Administrator. The special conditions
may be changed in light of the
comments received. All comments
received will be available in the Rules
Docket for examination by interested
persons, both before and after the
closing date for comments. A report
summarizing each substantive public
contact with FAA personnel concerning
this rulemaking will be filed in the
docket. Commenters wishing the FAA to
acknowledge receipt of their comments
submitted in response to this notice
must include a self-addressed, stamped
postcard on which the following
statement is made: ‘‘Comments to
Docket No. CE230.’’ The postcard will
be date stamped and returned to the
commenter.
Background
On June 7, 2005, ARINC Inc. 1632 S.
Murray Blvd., Colorado Springs, CO
80916, notified the Denver ACO of a
Designated Alteration Station (DAS)
project for a new Supplemental Type
Certificate for the Raytheon Model H90
(T–44A) airplanes. The Raytheon
Models of concern are approved under
TC No. 3A20. The proposed
modification incorporates a novel or
unusual design features, including a
dual EFIS system, digital air data
computers, and other equipment
associated with the Rockwell Collins
Pro Line 21 Avionics System. These
systems may be vulnerable to HIRF
external to the airplane.
Type Certification Basis
Under the provisions of 14 CFR part
21, § 21.101, ARINC, Inc. must show
that the Raytheon Model H90 (T–44A)
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15:12 Jun 29, 2005
Jkt 205001
airplanes meet the following provisions,
or the applicable regulations in effect on
the date of application for the STC: For
those areas modified or impacted by the
installation, ARINC will use 14 CFR part
23 Amendments 23–1 through 23–55.
This includes applying the concepts of
23.1301, 23.1302, 23.1309, 23.1311,
23.1321, 23.1322, 23.1331, 23.1335,
23.1351, 23.1357, 23.1359, 23.1361,
23.1365, 23.1367, 23.1381, 23.1431,
23.1529, 23.1541, 23.1543, 23.1581 at
amendment 55, and the special
conditions adopted by this rulemaking
action. For systems that are not
modified or impacted by the
installation, the original certification
basis listed on TC No. 3A20 are still
applicable.
Discussion
If the Administrator finds that the
applicable airworthiness standards do
not contain adequate or appropriate
safety standards because of novel or
unusual design features of an airplane,
special conditions are prescribed under
the provisions of § 21.16.
Special conditions, as appropriate, as
defined in § 11.19, are issued in
accordance with § 11.38 after public
notice and become part of the type
certification basis in accordance with
§ 21.101.
Special conditions are initially
applicable to the models for which they
are issued. Should the applicant apply
for a supplemental type certificate to
modify any other model already
included on the same type certificate to
incorporate the same novel or unusual
design feature, the special conditions
would also apply to the other model
under the provisions of § 21.101.
Novel or Unusual Design Features
ARINC, Inc. plans to incorporate
certain novel and unusual design
features into an airplane for which the
airworthiness standards do not contain
adequate or appropriate safety standards
for protection from the effects of HIRF.
These features include the addition of a
digital Air Data computer, which may
be susceptible to the HIRF environment,
that were not envisaged by the existing
regulations for this type of airplane.
Protection of Systems from High
Intensity Radiated Fields (HIRF): Recent
advances in technology have given rise
to the application in aircraft designs of
advanced electrical and electronic
systems that perform functions required
for continued safe flight and landing.
Due to the use of sensitive solid-state
advanced components in analog and
digital electronics circuits, these
advanced systems are readily responsive
to the transient effects of induced
PO 00000
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electrical current and voltage caused by
the HIRF. The HIRF can degrade
electronic systems performance by
damaging components or upsetting
system functions.
Furthermore, the HIRF environment
has undergone a transformation that was
not foreseen when the current
requirements were developed. Higher
energy levels are radiated from
transmitters that are used for radar,
radio, and television. Also, the number
of transmitters has increased
significantly. There is also uncertainty
concerning the effectiveness of airframe
shielding for HIRF. Furthermore,
coupling to cockpit-installed equipment
through the cockpit window apertures is
undefined.
The combined effect of the
technological advances in airplane
design and the changing environment
has resulted in an increased level of
vulnerability of electrical and electronic
systems required for the continued safe
flight and landing of the airplane.
Effective measures against the effects of
exposure to HIRF must be provided by
the design and installation of these
systems. The accepted maximum energy
levels in which civilian airplane system
installations must be capable of
operating safely are based on surveys
and analysis of existing radio frequency
emitters. These special conditions
require that the airplane be evaluated
under these energy levels for the
protection of the electronic system and
its associated wiring harness. These
external threat levels, which are lower
than previous required values, are
believed to represent the worst case to
which an airplane would be exposed in
the operating environment.
These special conditions require
qualification of systems that perform
critical functions, as installed in aircraft,
to the defined HIRF environment in
paragraph 1 or, as an option to a fixed
value using laboratory tests, in
paragraph 2, as follows:
(1) The applicant may demonstrate
that the operation and operational
capability of the installed electrical and
electronic systems that perform critical
functions are not adversely affected
when the aircraft is exposed to the HIRF
environment defined below:
Frequency
Field Strength
(volts per meter)
Peak
10 kHz–100 kHz
100 kHz–500
kHz ................
500 kHz–2 MHz
2 MHz–30 MHz
30 MHz–70 MHz
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30JNR1
Average
50
50
50
50
100
50
50
50
100
50
37656
Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 125 / Thursday, June 30, 2005 / Rules and Regulations
Applicability
As discussed above, these special
conditions are applicable to Raytheon
Average
Model H90 (T–44A) airplanes. Should
ARINC, Inc. apply at a later date for a
50 supplemental type certificate to modify
any other model on the same type
100 certificate to incorporate the same novel
or unusual design feature, the special
100
conditions would apply to that model as
50 well under the provisions of § 21.101.
Field Strength
(volts per meter)
Frequency
Peak
70 MHz–100
MHz ...............
100 MHz–200
MHz ...............
200 MHz–400
MHz ...............
400 MHz–700
MHz ...............
700 MHz–1 GHz
1 GHz–2 GHz ...
2 GHz–4 GHz ...
4 GHz–6 GHz ...
6 GHz–8 GHz ...
8 GHz–12 GHz
12 GHz–18 GHz
18 GHz–40 GHz
50
100
100
700
700
2000
3000
3000
1000
3000
2000
600
100
200
200
200
200
300
200
200
The field strengths are expressed in terms
of peak root-mean-square (rms) values.
or,
(2) The applicant may demonstrate by
a system test and analysis that the
electrical and electronic systems that
perform critical functions can withstand
a minimum threat of 100 volts per
meter, electrical field strength, from 10
kHz to 18 GHz. When using this test to
show compliance with the HIRF
requirements, no credit is given for
signal attenuation due to installation.
A preliminary hazard analysis must
be performed by the applicant, for
approval by the FAA, to identify either
electrical or electronic systems that
perform critical functions. The term
‘‘critical’’ means those functions, whose
failure would contribute to, or cause, a
failure condition that would prevent the
continued safe flight and landing of the
airplane. The systems identified by the
hazard analysis that perform critical
functions are candidates for the
application of HIRF requirements. A
system may perform both critical and
non-critical functions. Primary
electronic flight display systems, and
their associated components, perform
critical functions such as attitude,
altitude, and airspeed indication. The
HIRF requirements apply only to critical
functions.
Compliance with HIRF requirements
may be demonstrated by tests, analysis,
models, similarity with existing
systems, or any combination of these.
Service experience alone is not
acceptable since normal flight
operations may not include an exposure
to the HIRF environment. Reliance on a
system with similar design features for
redundancy as a means of protection
against the effects of external HIRF is
generally insufficient since all elements
of a redundant system are likely to be
exposed to the fields concurrently.
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15:12 Jun 29, 2005
Jkt 205001
Conclusion
This action affects only certain novel
or unusual design features on one model
of airplane. It is not a rule of general
applicability and affects only the
applicant who applied to the FAA for
approval of these features on the
airplane.
The substance of these special
conditions has been subjected to the
notice and comment period in several
prior instances and has been derived
without substantive change from those
previously issued. It is unlikely that
prior public comment would result in a
significant change from the substance
contained herein. For this reason, and
because a delay would significantly
affect the certification of the airplane,
which is imminent, the FAA has
determined that prior public notice and
comment are unnecessary and
impracticable, and good cause exists for
adopting these special conditions upon
issuance. The FAA is requesting
comments to allow interested persons to
submit views that may not have been
submitted in response to the prior
opportunities for comment described
above.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 23
Aircraft, Aviation safety, Signs and
symbols.
that performs critical functions must be
designed and installed to ensure that the
operations, and operational capabilities
of these systems to perform critical
functions, are not adversely affected
when the airplane is exposed to high
intensity radiated electromagnetic fields
external to the airplane.
2. For the purpose of these special
conditions, the following definition
applies: Critical Functions: Functions
whose failure would contribute to, or
cause, a failure condition that would
prevent the continued safe flight and
landing of the airplane.
Issued in Kansas City, Missouri, on June
22, 2005.
John R. Colomy,
Acting Manager, Small Airplane Directorate,
Aircraft Certification Service.
[FR Doc. 05–12879 Filed 6–29–05; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–13–P
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 23
[Docket No. 228, Special Condition 23–167–
SC]
Special Conditions; Diamond Aircraft
Industries, EFIS and Full Authority
Digital Engine Control (FADEC) on the
Diamond DA–42; Protection of
Systems for High Intensity Radiated
Fields (HIRF)
Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Final special conditions; request
for comments.
AGENCY:
SUMMARY: These special conditions are
issued to Diamond Aircraft Industries
GmbH, N.A. Otto-Strasse 5, A–2700
Wiener Neistadt, Austria; telephone: 43
Citation
2622 26 700; facsimile: 43 2622 26 780,
I The authority citation for these special
as part of the FAA Type Validation of
conditions is as follows:
the Diamond Aircraft Industries Model
DA–42. This airplane will have novel
PART 23—[AMENDED]
and unusual design features when
compared to the state of technology
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113 and
44701; 14 CFR 21.16 and 21.101; and 14 CFR envisaged in the applicable
airworthiness standards. These novel
11.38 and 11.19.
and unusual design features include the
The Special Conditions
installation of a Garmin Model G–1000
electronic flight instrument system
I Accordingly, pursuant to the authority
(EFIS) display, and digital engine
delegated to me by the Administrator,
controls. The applicable regulations do
the following special conditions are
not contain adequate or appropriate
issued as part of the type certification
basis for the Raytheon Model 90 (T–44A) airworthiness standards for the
airplanes modified by ARINC, Inc. to add protection of these systems from the
effects of high intensity radiated fields
the Rockwell Collins Pro Line 21
(HIRF). These special conditions
Avionics System.
contain the additional safety standards
1. Protection of Electrical and
that the Administrator considers
Electronic Systems from High Intensity
necessary to establish a level of safety
Radiated Fields (HIRF). Each system
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30JNR1
]]>Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 70, Number 125 (Thursday, June 30, 2005)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 37654-37656]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 05-12879]
=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 23
[Docket No. CE230, Special Condition 23-170-SC]
Special Conditions; Raytheon Model King Air H-90 (T-44A)
Protection of Systems for High Intensity Radiated Fields (HIRF)
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Final special conditions; request for comments.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: These special conditions are issued to ARINC Inc., 1632 S.
Murray Blvd., Colorado Springs, CO 80916 for a Supplemental Type
Certificate for the Raytheon Model King Air H-90 (T-44A) airplane.
These airplanes will have novel and unusual design features when
compared to the state of technology envisaged in the applicable
airworthiness standards. The novel and unusual design features include
the installation of the Rockwell Collins Pro Line 21 Avionics System.
This system includes Electronic Flight Instrument Systems (EFIS),
electronic displays, digital Air Data Computers (ADC), and supporting
equipment. The applicable regulations do not contain adequate or
appropriate airworthiness standards for the protection of these systems
from the effects of high intensity radiated fields (HIRF). These
special conditions contain the additional safety standards that the
Administrator considers necessary to establish a level of safety
equivalent to the airworthiness standards applicable to these
airplanes.
DATES: The effective date of these special conditions is June 22, 2005.
Comments must be received on or before August 1, 2005.
ADDRESSES: Comments may be mailed in duplicate to: Federal Aviation
Administration, Regional Counsel, ACE-7, Attention: Rules Docket Clerk,
Docket No. CE230, Room 506, 901 Locust, Kansas City, Missouri 64106.
All comments must be marked: Docket No. CE230. Comments may be
inspected in the Rules Docket weekdays, except Federal holidays,
between 7:30 a.m. and 4 p.m.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Wes Ryan, Aerospace Engineer,
Standards Office (ACE-110), Small Airplane Directorate, Aircraft
Certification Service, Federal Aviation Administration, 901 Locust,
Room 301, Kansas City, Missouri 64106; telephone (816) 329-4127.
[[Page 37655]]
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The FAA has determined that notice and
opportunity for prior public comment hereon are impracticable because
these procedures would significantly delay issuance of the approval and
thus delivery of the affected aircraft. In addition, the substance of
these special conditions has been subject to the public comment process
in several prior instances with no substantive comments received. The
FAA, therefore, finds that good cause exists for making these special
conditions effective upon issuance.
Comments Invited
Interested persons are invited to submit such written data, views,
or arguments, as they may desire. Communications should identify the
regulatory docket or notice number and be submitted in duplicate to the
address specified above. All communications received on or before the
closing date for comments will be considered by the Administrator. The
special conditions may be changed in light of the comments received.
All comments received will be available in the Rules Docket for
examination by interested persons, both before and after the closing
date for comments. A report summarizing each substantive public contact
with FAA personnel concerning this rulemaking will be filed in the
docket. Commenters wishing the FAA to acknowledge receipt of their
comments submitted in response to this notice must include a self-
addressed, stamped postcard on which the following statement is made:
``Comments to Docket No. CE230.'' The postcard will be date stamped and
returned to the commenter.
Background
On June 7, 2005, ARINC Inc. 1632 S. Murray Blvd., Colorado Springs,
CO 80916, notified the Denver ACO of a Designated Alteration Station
(DAS) project for a new Supplemental Type Certificate for the Raytheon
Model H90 (T-44A) airplanes. The Raytheon Models of concern are
approved under TC No. 3A20. The proposed modification incorporates a
novel or unusual design features, including a dual EFIS system, digital
air data computers, and other equipment associated with the Rockwell
Collins Pro Line 21 Avionics System. These systems may be vulnerable to
HIRF external to the airplane.
Type Certification Basis
Under the provisions of 14 CFR part 21, Sec. 21.101, ARINC, Inc.
must show that the Raytheon Model H90 (T-44A) airplanes meet the
following provisions, or the applicable regulations in effect on the
date of application for the STC: For those areas modified or impacted
by the installation, ARINC will use 14 CFR part 23 Amendments 23-1
through 23-55. This includes applying the concepts of 23.1301, 23.1302,
23.1309, 23.1311, 23.1321, 23.1322, 23.1331, 23.1335, 23.1351, 23.1357,
23.1359, 23.1361, 23.1365, 23.1367, 23.1381, 23.1431, 23.1529, 23.1541,
23.1543, 23.1581 at amendment 55, and the special conditions adopted by
this rulemaking action. For systems that are not modified or impacted
by the installation, the original certification basis listed on TC No.
3A20 are still applicable.
Discussion
If the Administrator finds that the applicable airworthiness
standards do not contain adequate or appropriate safety standards
because of novel or unusual design features of an airplane, special
conditions are prescribed under the provisions of Sec. 21.16.
Special conditions, as appropriate, as defined in Sec. 11.19, are
issued in accordance with Sec. 11.38 after public notice and become
part of the type certification basis in accordance with Sec. 21.101.
Special conditions are initially applicable to the models for which
they are issued. Should the applicant apply for a supplemental type
certificate to modify any other model already included on the same type
certificate to incorporate the same novel or unusual design feature,
the special conditions would also apply to the other model under the
provisions of Sec. 21.101.
Novel or Unusual Design Features
ARINC, Inc. plans to incorporate certain novel and unusual design
features into an airplane for which the airworthiness standards do not
contain adequate or appropriate safety standards for protection from
the effects of HIRF. These features include the addition of a digital
Air Data computer, which may be susceptible to the HIRF environment,
that were not envisaged by the existing regulations for this type of
airplane.
Protection of Systems from High Intensity Radiated Fields (HIRF):
Recent advances in technology have given rise to the application in
aircraft designs of advanced electrical and electronic systems that
perform functions required for continued safe flight and landing. Due
to the use of sensitive solid-state advanced components in analog and
digital electronics circuits, these advanced systems are readily
responsive to the transient effects of induced electrical current and
voltage caused by the HIRF. The HIRF can degrade electronic systems
performance by damaging components or upsetting system functions.
Furthermore, the HIRF environment has undergone a transformation
that was not foreseen when the current requirements were developed.
Higher energy levels are radiated from transmitters that are used for
radar, radio, and television. Also, the number of transmitters has
increased significantly. There is also uncertainty concerning the
effectiveness of airframe shielding for HIRF. Furthermore, coupling to
cockpit-installed equipment through the cockpit window apertures is
undefined.
The combined effect of the technological advances in airplane
design and the changing environment has resulted in an increased level
of vulnerability of electrical and electronic systems required for the
continued safe flight and landing of the airplane. Effective measures
against the effects of exposure to HIRF must be provided by the design
and installation of these systems. The accepted maximum energy levels
in which civilian airplane system installations must be capable of
operating safely are based on surveys and analysis of existing radio
frequency emitters. These special conditions require that the airplane
be evaluated under these energy levels for the protection of the
electronic system and its associated wiring harness. These external
threat levels, which are lower than previous required values, are
believed to represent the worst case to which an airplane would be
exposed in the operating environment.
These special conditions require qualification of systems that
perform critical functions, as installed in aircraft, to the defined
HIRF environment in paragraph 1 or, as an option to a fixed value using
laboratory tests, in paragraph 2, as follows:
(1) The applicant may demonstrate that the operation and
operational capability of the installed electrical and electronic
systems that perform critical functions are not adversely affected when
the aircraft is exposed to the HIRF environment defined below:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Field Strength (volts
per meter)
Frequency -------------------------
Peak Average
------------------------------------------------------------------------
10 kHz-100 kHz................................ 50 50
100 kHz-500 kHz............................... 50 50
500 kHz-2 MHz................................. 50 50
2 MHz-30 MHz.................................. 100 100
30 MHz-70 MHz................................. 50 50
[[Page 37656]]
70 MHz-100 MHz................................ 50 50
100 MHz-200 MHz............................... 100 100
200 MHz-400 MHz............................... 100 100
400 MHz-700 MHz............................... 700 50
700 MHz-1 GHz................................. 700 100
1 GHz-2 GHz................................... 2000 200
2 GHz-4 GHz................................... 3000 200
4 GHz-6 GHz................................... 3000 200
6 GHz-8 GHz................................... 1000 200
8 GHz-12 GHz.................................. 3000 300
12 GHz-18 GHz................................. 2000 200
18 GHz-40 GHz................................. 600 200
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The field strengths are expressed in terms of peak root-mean-square
(rms) values.
or,
(2) The applicant may demonstrate by a system test and analysis
that the electrical and electronic systems that perform critical
functions can withstand a minimum threat of 100 volts per meter,
electrical field strength, from 10 kHz to 18 GHz. When using this test
to show compliance with the HIRF requirements, no credit is given for
signal attenuation due to installation.
A preliminary hazard analysis must be performed by the applicant,
for approval by the FAA, to identify either electrical or electronic
systems that perform critical functions. The term ``critical'' means
those functions, whose failure would contribute to, or cause, a failure
condition that would prevent the continued safe flight and landing of
the airplane. The systems identified by the hazard analysis that
perform critical functions are candidates for the application of HIRF
requirements. A system may perform both critical and non-critical
functions. Primary electronic flight display systems, and their
associated components, perform critical functions such as attitude,
altitude, and airspeed indication. The HIRF requirements apply only to
critical functions.
Compliance with HIRF requirements may be demonstrated by tests,
analysis, models, similarity with existing systems, or any combination
of these. Service experience alone is not acceptable since normal
flight operations may not include an exposure to the HIRF environment.
Reliance on a system with similar design features for redundancy as a
means of protection against the effects of external HIRF is generally
insufficient since all elements of a redundant system are likely to be
exposed to the fields concurrently.
Applicability
As discussed above, these special conditions are applicable to
Raytheon Model H90 (T-44A) airplanes. Should ARINC, Inc. apply at a
later date for a supplemental type certificate to modify any other
model on the same type certificate to incorporate the same novel or
unusual design feature, the special conditions would apply to that
model as well under the provisions of Sec. 21.101.
Conclusion
This action affects only certain novel or unusual design features
on one model of airplane. It is not a rule of general applicability and
affects only the applicant who applied to the FAA for approval of these
features on the airplane.
The substance of these special conditions has been subjected to the
notice and comment period in several prior instances and has been
derived without substantive change from those previously issued. It is
unlikely that prior public comment would result in a significant change
from the substance contained herein. For this reason, and because a
delay would significantly affect the certification of the airplane,
which is imminent, the FAA has determined that prior public notice and
comment are unnecessary and impracticable, and good cause exists for
adopting these special conditions upon issuance. The FAA is requesting
comments to allow interested persons to submit views that may not have
been submitted in response to the prior opportunities for comment
described above.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 23
Aircraft, Aviation safety, Signs and symbols.
Citation
0
The authority citation for these special conditions is as follows:
PART 23--[AMENDED]
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113 and 44701; 14 CFR 21.16 and
21.101; and 14 CFR 11.38 and 11.19.
The Special Conditions
0
Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the
Administrator, the following special conditions are issued as part of
the type certification basis for the Raytheon Model 90 (T-44A)
airplanes modified by ARINC, Inc. to add the Rockwell Collins Pro Line
21 Avionics System.
1. Protection of Electrical and Electronic Systems from High
Intensity Radiated Fields (HIRF). Each system that performs critical
functions must be designed and installed to ensure that the operations,
and operational capabilities of these systems to perform critical
functions, are not adversely affected when the airplane is exposed to
high intensity radiated electromagnetic fields external to the
airplane.
2. For the purpose of these special conditions, the following
definition applies: Critical Functions: Functions whose failure would
contribute to, or cause, a failure condition that would prevent the
continued safe flight and landing of the airplane.
Issued in Kansas City, Missouri, on June 22, 2005.
John R. Colomy,
Acting Manager, Small Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification
Service.
[FR Doc. 05-12879 Filed 6-29-05; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P
