Pipeline Safety: Strapping Table Calibration for Pipeline Breakout Tank Operators, 17509 [05-6729]

Download as PDF Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 65 / Wednesday, April 6, 2005 / Notices [FR Doc. 05–6803 Filed 4–5–05; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 4910–60–M DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration Pipeline Safety: Strapping Table Calibration for Pipeline Breakout Tank Operators Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), DOT. ACTION: Notice; issuance of advisory bulletin. AGENCY: This advisory notice alerts pipeline operators of all hazardous liquid pipeline facility systems about the need to validate the accuracy of breakout tank strapping tables. Under certain circumstances, strapping table errors can potentially lead to dangerous conditions. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Joy Kadnar by phone at (202) 366–0568, by fax at (202) 366–4566, or by e-mail, joy.kadnar@dot.gov. General information about the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration’s Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS) programs may be obtained by accessing the home page at https:// ops.dot.gov. SUMMARY: SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: I. Background A breakout tank exploded and subsequently ignited in Glenpool, Oklahoma on April 7, 2003. The accident involved an 80,000-barrel breakout tank that exploded and burned as it was being filled with diesel. The resulting fire burned for over 20 hours and damaged two other nearby breakout tanks. While there were no injuries or fatalities, the cost of the accident exceeded two million dollars, residents adjacent to the accident site were evacuated, and area schools were closed for two days. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) conducted an investigation into the accident and subsequently published a Pipeline Accident Report titled ‘‘Storage Tank Explosion and Fire in Glenpool, Oklahoma.’’ In its findings adopted on October 13, 2004, the NTSB issued a recommendation to OPS to issue an advisory bulletin to liquid pipeline operators to validate the accuracy of their tank strapping tables. The breakout tank that exploded contained an internal floating roof system equipped with pontoons that VerDate jul<14>2003 18:17 Apr 05, 2005 Jkt 205001 float on top of the product at a certain level. The tank also had legs that supported the roof whenever the product was drained and the volume of liquid in the tank decreased to the level at which the roof no longer floated. Additionally, the tank had two Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition System (SCADA) alarms to alert controllers when the volume was nearing the level at which the roof would no longer float. The alarm set points were based on the landed height of the floating roof assumed in the operator’s strapping table. NTSB determined that based on the height measurement of the floating roof documented on the construction inspection report, and based on measurements investigators made after the accident, the strapping table was incorrect. Specifically, the distance from the bottom of the pontoon to the datum plate was found to be higher than indicated on the pre-accident strapping table. The surface of the charged diesel was within approximately two inches of the pontoons at the time of the explosion. This, according to NTSB, is the most likely time for a static discharge to occur. Based on this finding, as well as other contributing factors, the NTSB determined that an incorrect measurement on the strapping table contributed to the cause(s) of the accident. II. Advisory Bulletin ADB–05–02 To: Owners and Operators of All Pipeline Facilities Who Rely on Strapping Tables to Determine Volume Based on Measured Height For Product Level. Subject: Validation of Strapping Tables to Reduce the Likelihood of Errors That May Lead to Dangerous Conditions in Breakout Tanks. Purpose: To advise owners and operators of all hazardous liquid pipeline facilities about the need to validate strapping tables. Advisory: Strapping Tables are commonly used to determine the commodity volume based on product level within breakout tanks. If the strapping table is incorrect, operators may expose themselves and the community to unnecessary risks. OPS seeks to advise operators that they should review and, if necessary, revise their breakout tank operating procedures to minimize risk. The strapping tables should be validated to reduce the potential for errors that may lead to dangerous conditions, such as static discharge inside a tank after a floating roof has been either intentionally or unintentionally landed. Pipeline operators, therefore, may need PO 00000 Frm 00108 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 17509 to adjust the measurements on their strapping tables to ensure accuracy. Issued in Washington, DC, on March 18, 2005. Theodore L. Willke, Deputy Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety. [FR Doc. 05–6729 Filed 4–5–05; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 4910–60–P DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration [Docket No. RSPA–04–19914; Notice 1] Pipeline Safety: Petition for Waiver; Enstar Natural Gas Company Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT). ACTION: Notice; Petition for Waiver. AGENCY: SUMMARY: Enstar Natural Gas Company (Enstar) has petitioned the Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS) for a waiver of the pipeline safety regulation that prohibits tracer wire from being wrapped around the pipe. DATES: Persons interested in submitting written comments on the waiver request described in this Notice must do so by May 6, 2005. Late filed comments will be considered so far as practicable. ADDRESSES: You may submit written comments by mailing or delivering an original and two copies to the Dockets Facility, U.S. Department of Transportation, Room PL–401, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Washington, DC 20590–0001. The Dockets Facility is open from 10 a.m. to 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except on Federal holidays when the facility is closed. Alternatively, you may submit written comments to the docket electronically at the following Web address: https:// dms.dot.gov. All written comments should identify the docket and notice numbers stated in the heading of this notice. Anyone who wants confirmation of mailed comments must include a self-addressed stamped postcard. To file written comments electronically, after logging on to https://dms.dot.gov, click on ‘‘Comment/ Submissions.’’ You can also read comments and other material in the docket. General information about the Federal pipeline safety program is available at https://ops.dot.gov. Anyone is able to search the electronic form of all comments received into any of our dockets by the name of the individual submitting the E:\FR\FM\06APN1.SGM 06APN1

Agencies

[Federal Register Volume 70, Number 65 (Wednesday, April 6, 2005)]
[Notices]
[Page 17509]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 05-6729]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration


Pipeline Safety: Strapping Table Calibration for Pipeline 
Breakout Tank Operators

AGENCY: Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), Pipeline and Hazardous 
Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), DOT.

ACTION: Notice; issuance of advisory bulletin.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: This advisory notice alerts pipeline operators of all 
hazardous liquid pipeline facility systems about the need to validate 
the accuracy of breakout tank strapping tables. Under certain 
circumstances, strapping table errors can potentially lead to dangerous 
conditions.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Joy Kadnar by phone at (202) 366-0568, 
by fax at (202) 366-4566, or by e-mail, joy.kadnar@dot.gov. General 
information about the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety 
Administration's Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS) programs may be 
obtained by accessing the home page at https://ops.dot.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Background

    A breakout tank exploded and subsequently ignited in Glenpool, 
Oklahoma on April 7, 2003. The accident involved an 80,000-barrel 
breakout tank that exploded and burned as it was being filled with 
diesel. The resulting fire burned for over 20 hours and damaged two 
other nearby breakout tanks. While there were no injuries or 
fatalities, the cost of the accident exceeded two million dollars, 
residents adjacent to the accident site were evacuated, and area 
schools were closed for two days.
    The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) conducted an 
investigation into the accident and subsequently published a Pipeline 
Accident Report titled ``Storage Tank Explosion and Fire in Glenpool, 
Oklahoma.'' In its findings adopted on October 13, 2004, the NTSB 
issued a recommendation to OPS to issue an advisory bulletin to liquid 
pipeline operators to validate the accuracy of their tank strapping 
tables.
    The breakout tank that exploded contained an internal floating roof 
system equipped with pontoons that float on top of the product at a 
certain level. The tank also had legs that supported the roof whenever 
the product was drained and the volume of liquid in the tank decreased 
to the level at which the roof no longer floated. Additionally, the 
tank had two Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition System (SCADA) 
alarms to alert controllers when the volume was nearing the level at 
which the roof would no longer float. The alarm set points were based 
on the landed height of the floating roof assumed in the operator's 
strapping table.
    NTSB determined that based on the height measurement of the 
floating roof documented on the construction inspection report, and 
based on measurements investigators made after the accident, the 
strapping table was incorrect. Specifically, the distance from the 
bottom of the pontoon to the datum plate was found to be higher than 
indicated on the pre-accident strapping table. The surface of the 
charged diesel was within approximately two inches of the pontoons at 
the time of the explosion. This, according to NTSB, is the most likely 
time for a static discharge to occur. Based on this finding, as well as 
other contributing factors, the NTSB determined that an incorrect 
measurement on the strapping table contributed to the cause(s) of the 
accident.

II. Advisory Bulletin ADB-05-02

    To: Owners and Operators of All Pipeline Facilities Who Rely on 
Strapping Tables to Determine Volume Based on Measured Height For 
Product Level.
    Subject: Validation of Strapping Tables to Reduce the Likelihood of 
Errors That May Lead to Dangerous Conditions in Breakout Tanks.
    Purpose: To advise owners and operators of all hazardous liquid 
pipeline facilities about the need to validate strapping tables.
    Advisory: Strapping Tables are commonly used to determine the 
commodity volume based on product level within breakout tanks. If the 
strapping table is incorrect, operators may expose themselves and the 
community to unnecessary risks.
    OPS seeks to advise operators that they should review and, if 
necessary, revise their breakout tank operating procedures to minimize 
risk. The strapping tables should be validated to reduce the potential 
for errors that may lead to dangerous conditions, such as static 
discharge inside a tank after a floating roof has been either 
intentionally or unintentionally landed. Pipeline operators, therefore, 
may need to adjust the measurements on their strapping tables to ensure 
accuracy.

    Issued in Washington, DC, on March 18, 2005.
Theodore L. Willke,
Deputy Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety.
[FR Doc. 05-6729 Filed 4-5-05; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-60-P