Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station; Notice of Issuance of Director's Decision Under 10 CFR 2.206, 13051-13052 [05-5277]
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Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 51 / Thursday, March 17, 2005 / Notices
design-basis accident radiological
consequence analyses, MSIV leakage
was added to the overall containment
integrated leakage rate, as measured by
the Type A test specified in 10 CFR 50,
Appendix J, Option B. By Amendment
Nos. 181 and 213 issued on February 1,
1996, for BSEP Units 1 and 2,
respectively, the licensee was
authorized to use the Option B
provisions of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix
J.
Based on the Safety Evaluation
supporting Amendment Nos. 221 and
246 issued on May 30, 2002, the NRC
has accepted that MSIV leakage for
design-basis accident analyses has been
accounted for separately from the
overall leakage associated with the
primary containment boundary and
overall doses meet appropriate
regulatory limits. As such, the
requirement of 10 CFR 50, Appendix J,
Option B, Section III.A that MSIV
leakage be included as part of the Type
A test results is not necessary to achieve
the underlying purpose of the rule; that
is, ensuring the actual radiological
consequences of design-basis accidents
remain below those analyzed as
demonstrated through the measured
containment leakage test.
3.0 Discussion
Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12, the
Commission may, upon application by
any interested person or upon its own
initiative, grant exemptions from the
requirements of 10 CFR Part 50 when (1)
the exemptions are authorized by law,
will not present an undue risk to public
health and safety, and are consistent
with the common defense and security,
and (2) when special circumstances are
present. Special circumstances are
present whenever, according to 10 CFR
Part 50.12(a)(2)(ii), ‘‘Application of the
regulation in the particular
circumstances would not serve the
underlying purpose of the rule or is not
necessary to achieve the underlying
purpose of the rule. * * *’’
The underlying purpose of the rule
that implements Appendix J (i.e., 10
CFR 50.54(o)) is to assure that
containment leaktight integrity is
maintained (a) as tight as reasonably
achievable, and (b) sufficiently tight so
as to limit effluent release to values
bounded by the analyses of radiological
consequences of design-basis accidents.
The revised design-basis radiological
consequences analyses address these
pathways as individual factors,
exclusive of the primary containment
leakage. The staff has determined that
the intent of the rule is not
compromised by the proposed action,
and that 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii) applies.
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14:51 Mar 16, 2005
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4.0 Conclusion
Accordingly, the Commission has
determined that pursuant to 10 CFR Part
50.12(a)(1), an exemption is authorized
by law and will not present an undue
risk to the public health and safety, is
consistent with the common defense
and security, and that there are special
circumstances present, as specified in
10 CFR 50.12(a)(2). An exemption is
hereby granted to CP&L, BSEP Units 1
and 2 from the requirements of Sections
III.A and III.B of Option B of Appendix
J to 10 CFR Part 50. The exemption
allows exclusion of MSIV leakage from
the overall integrated leak rate test
measurement.
Based on the foregoing, the separation
of the main steam pathways from the
other containment leakage pathways is
warranted because a separate
radiological consequence term has been
provided for these pathways. The
revised design-basis radiological
consequences analyses address these
pathways as individual factors,
exclusive of the primary containment
leakage. Therefore, the NRC staff finds
the proposed exemption from Appendix
J, to separate MSIV leakage from other
containment leakage, to be acceptable.
Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the
Commission has determined that the
granting of this exemption will have no
significant impact on the quality of the
human environment (70 FR 11034).
This exemption is effective upon
issuance.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 9th day
of March 2005.
Ledyard B. Marsh,
Director, Division of Licensing Project
Management, Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation.
[FR Doc. 05–5276 Filed 3–16–05; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590–01–P
NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION
[Docket No. 50–271; License No. DPR–28]
Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power
Station; Notice of Issuance of
Director’s Decision Under 10 CFR
2.206
Notice is hereby given that the
Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) has issued a
Director’s Decision on an April 23,
2004, petition by the New England
Coalition, hereinafter referred to as the
‘‘Petitioner.’’ The petition was
supplemented on September 10, 2004.
PO 00000
Frm 00045
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
13051
The petition concerns the operation of
the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power
Station (Vermont Yankee).
The basis for the April 23, 2004,
petition, was the absence of two pieces
of fuel rods in the spent fuel pool (SFP)
at Vermont Yankee from their
documented location. The Petitioner
stated that Entergy Nuclear Operations,
Inc. (Entergy or the licensee) had lost
control of the spent fuel inventory at
Vermont Yankee. The Petitioner would
have no confidence that Entergy did not
put leaking fuel rods or suspected
leaking fuel assemblies back into the
reactor core during the April 2004
refueling outage until Entergy accounted
for all special nuclear material (SNM).
The New England Coalition contends
that operation with leaking fuel in the
reactor core would be potentially unsafe
and in violation of Federal regulations.
On May 5 and September 22, 2004,
the Petitioner and the licensee met with
the staff’s Petition Review Board (PRB).
These meetings gave the Petitioner and
the licensee an opportunity to provide
additional information and to clarify
issues raised in the petition.
The NRC sent a copy of the proposed
Director’s Decision to the Petitioner and
to the licensee for comment on
December 27, 2004. The Petitioner
responded with comments on January
25, 2005. The comments and the NRC
staff’s responses are included in the
Director’s Decision. The staff did not
receive any comments from the licensee.
The Director of the Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation denies the
Petitioner’s request that the NRC make
Entergy do an accurate and NRCverified inventory of the location,
disposition, and condition of all
irradiated fuel, including fuel currently
loaded in the reactor, and order Entergy
to halt all fuel movement at Vermont
Yankee until the inventory is
completed. The reasons for this decision
are explained in the Director’s Decision
pursuant to Title 10 of Code of Federal
Regulations (10 CFR), Section 2.206
(DD–05–01), the complete text of which
is available in ADAMS for inspection at
the Commission’s Public Document
Room at One White Flint North, Public
File Area O1 F21, 11555 Rockville Pike
(first floor), Rockville, Maryland, and
from the ADAMS Public Library
component of the NRC’s Web site, http:/
/www.nrc.gov/reading-rm.html (the
Public Electronic Reading Room).
The Petitioner’s request that all fuel
movement be stopped is moot. All fuel
movement for the April 2004 refueling
outage had been completed before the
NRC received the petition. The licensee
has completed a documented inventory
to confirm the total number of fuel
E:\FR\FM\17MRN1.SGM
17MRN1
13052
Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 51 / Thursday, March 17, 2005 / Notices
assemblies and their locations and the
locations of the individual rods. The
licensee successfully located the two
fuel rod pieces in the SFP and did core
verifications. The NRC therefore
concludes that as of July 13, 2004,
Entergy has been in full compliance
with regulatory requirements to account
for all SNM in its possession. Therefore
the Petitioner’s request has in effect
been granted. The licensee took the
requested actions voluntarily obviating
the need for an order. Furthermore, the
licensee has updated its inventory of
SNM, so there is no need for the NRC
to prohibit fuel movement.
The Petitioner claimed to have no
confidence that Entergy did not put
leaking fuel or suspected leaking fuel
assemblies back into the reactor core
during the last refueling outage. The
NRC inspectors verified that no leaking
fuel assemblies were reloaded in the
reactor core. The NRC has concluded
that Entergy is now in compliance with
regulatory requirements to account for
all SNM. However in the special
inspection report issued on December 2,
2004, the inspectors identified an
apparent violation of 10 CFR 74.19,
‘‘Material Control and Accounting of
Special Nuclear MaterialRecordkeeping,’’ related to the two
spent fuel rod pieces. The NRC is
considering escalated enforcement
action for this finding.
A copy of the Director’s Decision will
be filed with the Secretary of the
Commission for the Commission’s
review in accordance with 10 CFR 2.206
of the Commission’s regulations. As
provided for by this regulation, the
Director’s Decision will constitute the
final action of the Commission 25 days
after the date of the decision, unless the
Commission, on its own motion,
institutes a review of the Director’s
Decision in that time.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 10th day
of March 2005.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
J.E. Dyer,
Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation.
[FR Doc. 05–5277 Filed 3–16–05; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590–01–P
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Jkt 205001
NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION
[Docket No. 72–17]
Notice of Issuance of Environmental
Assessment and Finding of No
Significant Impact Regarding a
Proposed Exemption; Portland General
Electric Company; Trojan Independent
Spent Fuel Storage Installation
Nuclear Regulatory
Commission.
AGENCY:
Issuance of environmental
assessment and finding of no significant
impact.
ACTION:
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Christopher M. Regan, Senior Project
Manager, Spent Fuel Project Office,
Office of Nuclear Material Safety and
Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Washington, DC 20555.
Telephone: (301) 415–8500; fax number:
(301) 415–8555; e-mail: cmr1@nrc.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Background
Portland General Electric Company
(PGE) is the licensee and holder of
License No. SNM–2509 for the Trojan
Independent Spent Fuel Storage
Installation (Trojan ISFSI). In addition,
PGE holds License No. NPF–1, pursuant
to 10 CFR part 50, for the Trojan
Nuclear Plant (TNP). The licensee will
complete decommissioning of the
Trojan Nuclear Plant and intends to
terminate its part 50 license for the
Trojan Nuclear Plant. The Trojan ISFSI
contains the spent fuel removed from
the Trojan Nuclear Plant.
Currently, the licensee provides
financial assurance for the Trojan ISFSI
pursuant to 10 CFR 72.30(c)(5), which
allows a part 50 license holder to use
the financial assurance provisions of
part 50 to provide financial assurance
for an ISFSI. The licensee maintains an
external sinking fund for
decommissioning funds pursuant to 10
CFR 50.75(e). However, when its part 50
license is terminated, it will no longer
meet the condition of 10 CFR 72.30(c)(5)
that allows it to use its existing external
sinking fund to provide financial
assurance for its ISFSI.
On April 29, 2004, PGE filed a request
for NRC approval of a partial exemption
from the provision of 10 CFR 72.30(c)(5)
that requires an ISFSI licensee to
additionally hold a part 50 license in
order to use an external sinking fund as
the exclusive means of financial
assurance for decommissioning costs of
an ISFSI.
PO 00000
Frm 00046
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
II. Environmental Assessment
Identification of Proposed Action:
Pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR
72.7, PGE requested a partial exemption
from the financial assurance
requirements of 10 CFR 72.30(c)(5). The
exemption request was ‘‘partial’’
because it would apply only to the
requirement that the ISFSI licensee also
hold a part 50 license to use an external
sinking fund as its exclusive method of
providing financial assurance for its
ISFSI. The licensee will continue to
provide financial assurance conforming
to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.75(e)
and (h), although it reserved the right to
change to another method as provided
in other sections of 10 CFR 72.30(c). The
licensee pointed out that the wording of
10 CFR 72.30(c)(5) allowed an ‘‘electric
utility’’ to use an external sinking fund
as the exclusive method of providing
financial assurance when its part 72
ISFSI license was first issued. However,
the rule was amended effective on
December 24, 2003, which resulted in
the change of the condition from
‘‘electric utility’’ to ‘‘a Part 50 licensee.’’
PGE stated that it will remain an electric
utility after the termination of its part 50
license, hence it will continue to meet
the intent of the rule as originally
issued.
The proposed action before the
Commission is whether to grant this
exemption pursuant to 10 CFR 72.7.
Need for the Proposed Action: The
applicant is undertaking
decommissioning activities associated
with the Trojan Nuclear Plant and has
informed the NRC of its intent to
terminate the TNP operating license
(License No. NPF–1), issued pursuant to
10 CFR part 50. PGE’s 2003 Annual
Financial Statement (Form 10–K,
submitted to the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) on March
19, 2004) stated that PGE will collect
$14 million annually, until 2011, from
its customers to pay for
decommissioning. Those collections
will occur whether or not the exemption
is granted. However, if the exemption is
not granted, PGE will incur higher costs
due to the expense of providing a
second independent financial assurance
instrument, which would lead to
unnecessary additional costs. Therefore,
the exemption is in the public interest.
If PGE were to adhere to the financial
assurance requirements of 10 CFR 72.30,
without the granting of the partial
exemption, an unnecessary financial
burden and associated increased overall
operating costs would be borne by the
applicant. In addition, granting of the
partial exemption to the requirements of
10 CFR 72.30(c)(5) will facilitate
E:\FR\FM\17MRN1.SGM
17MRN1
]]>Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 70, Number 51 (Thursday, March 17, 2005)]
[Notices]
[Pages 13051-13052]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 05-5277]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket No. 50-271; License No. DPR-28]
Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power
Station; Notice of Issuance of Director's Decision Under 10 CFR 2.206
Notice is hereby given that the Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has issued a
Director's Decision on an April 23, 2004, petition by the New England
Coalition, hereinafter referred to as the ``Petitioner.'' The petition
was supplemented on September 10, 2004. The petition concerns the
operation of the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station (Vermont Yankee).
The basis for the April 23, 2004, petition, was the absence of two
pieces of fuel rods in the spent fuel pool (SFP) at Vermont Yankee from
their documented location. The Petitioner stated that Entergy Nuclear
Operations, Inc. (Entergy or the licensee) had lost control of the
spent fuel inventory at Vermont Yankee. The Petitioner would have no
confidence that Entergy did not put leaking fuel rods or suspected
leaking fuel assemblies back into the reactor core during the April
2004 refueling outage until Entergy accounted for all special nuclear
material (SNM). The New England Coalition contends that operation with
leaking fuel in the reactor core would be potentially unsafe and in
violation of Federal regulations.
On May 5 and September 22, 2004, the Petitioner and the licensee
met with the staff's Petition Review Board (PRB). These meetings gave
the Petitioner and the licensee an opportunity to provide additional
information and to clarify issues raised in the petition.
The NRC sent a copy of the proposed Director's Decision to the
Petitioner and to the licensee for comment on December 27, 2004. The
Petitioner responded with comments on January 25, 2005. The comments
and the NRC staff's responses are included in the Director's Decision.
The staff did not receive any comments from the licensee.
The Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation denies the
Petitioner's request that the NRC make Entergy do an accurate and NRC-
verified inventory of the location, disposition, and condition of all
irradiated fuel, including fuel currently loaded in the reactor, and
order Entergy to halt all fuel movement at Vermont Yankee until the
inventory is completed. The reasons for this decision are explained in
the Director's Decision pursuant to Title 10 of Code of Federal
Regulations (10 CFR), Section 2.206 (DD-05-01), the complete text of
which is available in ADAMS for inspection at the Commission's Public
Document Room at One White Flint North, Public File Area O1 F21, 11555
Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland, and from the ADAMS
Public Library component of the NRC's Web site, https://www.nrc.gov/
reading-rm.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
The Petitioner's request that all fuel movement be stopped is moot.
All fuel movement for the April 2004 refueling outage had been
completed before the NRC received the petition. The licensee has
completed a documented inventory to confirm the total number of fuel
[[Page 13052]]
assemblies and their locations and the locations of the individual
rods. The licensee successfully located the two fuel rod pieces in the
SFP and did core verifications. The NRC therefore concludes that as of
July 13, 2004, Entergy has been in full compliance with regulatory
requirements to account for all SNM in its possession. Therefore the
Petitioner's request has in effect been granted. The licensee took the
requested actions voluntarily obviating the need for an order.
Furthermore, the licensee has updated its inventory of SNM, so there is
no need for the NRC to prohibit fuel movement.
The Petitioner claimed to have no confidence that Entergy did not
put leaking fuel or suspected leaking fuel assemblies back into the
reactor core during the last refueling outage. The NRC inspectors
verified that no leaking fuel assemblies were reloaded in the reactor
core. The NRC has concluded that Entergy is now in compliance with
regulatory requirements to account for all SNM. However in the special
inspection report issued on December 2, 2004, the inspectors identified
an apparent violation of 10 CFR 74.19, ``Material Control and
Accounting of Special Nuclear Material-Recordkeeping,'' related to the
two spent fuel rod pieces. The NRC is considering escalated enforcement
action for this finding.
A copy of the Director's Decision will be filed with the Secretary
of the Commission for the Commission's review in accordance with 10 CFR
2.206 of the Commission's regulations. As provided for by this
regulation, the Director's Decision will constitute the final action of
the Commission 25 days after the date of the decision, unless the
Commission, on its own motion, institutes a review of the Director's
Decision in that time.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 10th day of March 2005.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
J.E. Dyer,
Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 05-5277 Filed 3-16-05; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P
