Fire Protection Program-Post-Fire Operator Manual Actions Draft Regulatory Guide: Issuance, Availability, 10901-10917 [05-4314]

Agencies

• NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Federal Register Volume 70, Number 43 (Monday, March 7, 2005)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 10901-10917]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 05-4314]


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Proposed Rules
                                                Federal Register
________________________________________________________________________

This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER contains notices to the public of 
the proposed issuance of rules and regulations. The purpose of these 
notices is to give interested persons an opportunity to participate in 
the rule making prior to the adoption of the final rules.

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Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 43 / Monday, March 7, 2005 / Proposed 
Rules

[[Page 10901]]



NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

10 CFR Part 50

RIN 3150 AH-54


Fire Protection Program--Post-Fire Operator Manual Actions Draft 
Regulatory Guide: Issuance, Availability

AGENCY: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Proposed rule and Issuance of Draft Regulatory Guide.

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SUMMARY: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) proposes to amend its 
fire protection regulations for nuclear power facilities operating 
prior to January 1, 1979. The amendment would allow nuclear power plant 
licensees to use manual actions by plant operators as an alternative 
method to achieve hot shutdown conditions in the event of fires in 
certain plant areas, provided that the actions are evaluated against 
specified criteria and determined to be acceptable and that fire 
detectors and an automatic fire suppression system are provided in the 
fire area. The Commission believes that the proposed action would 
provide realistically conservative regulatory acceptance criteria for 
operator manual actions to achieve and maintain hot shutdown condition.
    The NRC is also proposing and requesting comments on a draft 
regulatory guide to support this proposed rulemaking. The NRC has 
developed the Regulatory Guide Series to describe and make available to 
the public such information as methods that are acceptable to the NRC 
staff for implementing specific parts of the NRC's regulations, 
techniques that the staff uses in evaluating specific problems or 
postulated accidents, and data that the staff needs in its review of 
applications for permits and licenses.
    The draft regulatory guide, entitled ``Demonstrating the 
Feasibility and Reliability of Operator Manual Actions in Response to 
Fire,'' is temporarily identified by its task number, DG-1136, which 
should be mentioned in all related correspondence. This proposed 
regulatory guide offers guidance for NRC licensees and applicants to 
use in implementing the feasibility and reliability criteria that the 
staff developed for post-fire operator manual actions.

DATES: Submit comments on the proposed rule and the draft regulatory 
guide by May 23, 2005. Submit comments specific to the information 
collection aspects of this rule by April 6, 2005. Comments received 
after these dates will be considered if it is practical to do so, but 
assurance of consideration cannot be given to comments received after 
these dates.

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments on the proposed rule by any one of 
the following methods. Please include the following number RIN 3150 AH-
54 and/or DG-1136 in the subject line of your comments. Comments on the 
rulemakings or the draft regulatory guide submitted in writing or in 
electronic form will be made available for public inspection. Because 
your comments will not be edited to remove any identifying or contact 
information, the NRC cautions you against including any information in 
your submission that you do not want publicly disclosed.
    Mail comments to: Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
Washington, DC 20555-0001, ATTN: Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff.
    E-mail comments to: SECY@nrc.gov. If you do not receive a reply e-
mail confirming that we have received your comments, contact us 
directly at (301) 415-1966. You may also submit comments via the NRC's 
rulemaking Web site at https://ruleforum.llnl.gov. This site provides 
the capability to upload comments as files (any format), if your web 
browser supports that function.
    Address questions about our rulemaking website to Carol Gallagher 
(301) 415-5905; e-mail cag@nrc.gov. Comments can also be submitted via 
the Federal Rulemaking Portal https://www.regulations.gov.
    Hand deliver comments to: 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 
20852, between 7:30 am and 4:15 pm Federal workdays. (Telephone (301) 
415-1966).
    Fax comments to: Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission at 
(301) 415-1101.
    Publicly available documents related to this rulemaking may be 
viewed electronically on the public computers located at the NRC's 
Public Document Room (PDR), O1 F21, One White Flint North, 11555 
Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland. The PDR reproduction contractor 
will copy documents for a fee. Selected documents, including comments, 
may be viewed and downloaded electronically via the NRC rulemaking Web 
site at https://ruleforum.llnl.gov.
    Publicly available documents created or received at the NRC after 
November 1, 1999, are available electronically at the NRC's Electronic 
Reading Room at https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. From this 
site, the public can gain entry into the NRC's Agencywide Documents 
Access and Management System (ADAMS), which provides text and image 
files of NRC's public documents. Electronic copies of Draft Regulatory 
Guide DG-1136 are available in ADAMS at https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/
adams.html, under Accession ML050350359. Note, however, that 
the NRC has temporarily suspended public access to ADAMS so that the 
agency can complete security reviews of publicly available documents 
and remove potentially sensitive information. Please check the NRC's 
Web site for updates concerning the resumption of public access to 
ADAMS. If you do not have access to ADAMS or if there are problems in 
accessing the documents located in ADAMS, contact the NRC Public 
Document Room (PDR) Reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737 or 
by email to pdr@nrc.gov. Electronic copies of Draft Regulatory Guide 
DG-1136 are also available through the NRC's public Web site under 
Draft Regulatory Guides in the Regulatory Guides document collection of 
the NRC's Electronic Reading Room at https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-
collections/.
    You may submit comments on the information collections by the 
methods indicated in the Paperwork Reduction Act Statement.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: David T. Diec, 301-415-2834, 
dtd@nrc.gov or Alexander Klein, 301-415-3477, ark1@nrc.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

[[Page 10902]]

I. Background
II. Rulemaking Initiation
III. Proposed Action
    A. Operator Manual Actions Alternative
    B. Addition of Paragraph III.P, Operator Manual Actions 
Acceptance Criteria
    C. Response to Stakeholder Comments on Operator Manual Action 
Acceptance Criteria
IV. Interim Enforcement Discretion Policy
V. Section-by-Section Analysis of Substantive Changes
VI. Plain Language
VII. Voluntary Consensus Standards
VIII. Finding of No Significant Environmental Impact: Environmental 
Assessment
IX. Paperwork Reduction Act Statement
X. Regulatory Analysis
XI. Regulatory Flexibility Certification
XII. Backfit Analysis

I. Background

    Section 50.48, Fire protection, requires each operating power plant 
to have a fire protection plan that satisfies Criterion 3 of Appendix A 
to 10 CFR part 50. Criterion 3 requires structures, systems, and 
components important to safety to be designed and located to minimize, 
consistent with other safety requirements, the probability and effect 
of fires and explosions. The specific fire protection requirements for 
safe shutdown capability of a plant are further discussed in paragraph 
G of Section III of Appendix R to 10 CFR part 50. The more specific 
Sec.  50.48 and Appendix R requirements were added following a 
significant fire that occurred in 1975 at the Browns Ferry Nuclear 
Plant. The fire damaged control, instrumentation, and power cables for 
redundant trains of equipment necessary for safe shutdown.
    In response to the fire, an NRC investigation found that the 
independence of redundant equipment at Browns Ferry was negated by a 
lack of adequate separation between cables for redundant trains of 
safety equipment. The investigators subsequently recommended that a 
suitable combination of electrical isolation, physical distance, fire 
barriers, and sprinkler systems should be used to maintain the 
independence of redundant safety equipment. In response to these 
recommendations, the NRC interacted with stakeholders for several years 
to identify and implement necessary plant fire protection improvements. 
In 1980, NRC promulgated Sec.  50.48 to establish fire protection 
requirements and Appendix R to 10 CFR part 50 for certain generic fire 
protection program issues, including paragraph III.G, fire protection 
of safe shutdown capability. The requirements for separation of cables 
and equipment associated with redundant hot shutdown trains were 
promulgated in paragraph III.G.2.
    Paragraph III.G.2 of Appendix R requires that cables and equipment 
of redundant trains of safety systems in the same fire area be 
separated by either:
    a. A 3-hour fire barrier, or
    b. A horizontal distance of more than 20 feet with no intervening 
combustibles in conjunction with fire detectors and an automatic fire 
suppression system, or
    c. A 1-hour fire barrier combined with fire detectors and an 
automatic fire suppression system.
    Appendix R applies to only those licensees who received operating 
licenses before January 1, 1979. Plants licensed after January 1, 1979, 
are not required to meet Appendix R. These plants were licensed to meet 
Branch Technical Position CMEB 9.5-1, ``Guidelines for Fire Protection 
for Nuclear Power Plants,'' that contains criteria similar to the 
Appendix R requirements. Specific licensing basis information for these 
plants is usually contained in license conditions issued at time of 
licensing.
    Because the rule was to apply to facilities which were already 
built, the NRC knew that compliance with various parts of Appendix R 
might be difficult at some facilities. Accordingly, the NRC included a 
provision which allowed licensees to submit alternative acceptable 
methods for protecting redundant equipment for NRC review and approval 
through an exemption process. During implementation of the Appendix R 
requirements, the NRC reviewed and approved a large number of 
exemptions for 60 licensees who proposed alternative acceptable methods 
of compliance in various areas, including numerous exemptions from 
paragraph III.G.2.
    In the early 1990s, generic problems arose with Thermolag \1\ fire 
barriers, which many licensees were using to comply with paragraph 
III.G.2 of Appendix R. Licensees were ultimately required to replace 
Thermolag material with other fire barriers. Several years later, fire 
protection inspectors began to notice that many licensees had not 
upgraded or replaced Thermolag fire barrier material (or had not 
otherwise provided the required separation distance between redundant 
safety trains) used to satisfy the paragraph III.G.2 criteria. Some 
licensees compensated by relying on operator manual actions \2\ which 
were not reviewed and approved by the NRC through the Sec.  50.12 
exemption process. Currently, operator manual actions are not an 
alternative specified in paragraph III.G.2 of Appendix R. However, such 
actions may be an acceptable means of achieving hot shutdown in the 
event of a fire under certain conditions.
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    \1\ Thermolag is a brand-name for a particular type of material 
used to construct fire barriers typically for protecting electrical 
conduits and cable trays. In the early 1990's, issues arose 
regarding the testing and qualification process used for this 
material. It was determined that barriers made of this material 
would not provide protection for the required periods of time.
    \2\ Operator manual actions are an integrated set of actions 
needed to ensure that a redundant train of systems necessary to 
achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions located within the same 
fire area outside the primary containment is free of fire damage.
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    In 2002, the NRC met with nuclear power plant licensees and 
informed them that the use of unapproved manual actions was not in 
compliance with paragraph III.G.2. During a meeting on June 20, 2002, 
the Nuclear Energy Institute representative stated that there was 
widespread use of operator manual actions throughout the industry based 
on the industry's understanding of past practice and existing NRC 
guidance. The industry representative also stated that licensees' use 
of unapproved manual actions had become prevalent even before the 
concerns arose with Thermolag material. Subsequent to the public 
meeting, the NRC developed criteria for inspectors to use in assessing 
the safety significance of violations resulting from licensee use of 
unapproved operator manual actions. The criteria were based on past 
practice and experience by NRC inspectors when reviewing operator 
manual actions used to comply with Appendix R, paragraph III.G.3, on 
alternate reactor shutdown capability. Licensees were familiar with 
these criteria through their interactions with the NRC staff during the 
implementation of the NRC inspection process. These criteria were 
issued in the revision to Inspection Procedure 71111.05 in March 2003. 
While unapproved operator manual actions are still violations, those 
actions that meet the interim criteria are viewed to have low or no 
safety significance.

II. Rulemaking Initiation

    Instead of continuing the current practice of requiring all 
noncompliant licensees to submit individual exemption requests for 
staff review to determine if their operator manual actions are 
acceptable, the Commission believes that amending Appendix R to 10 CFR 
part 50 would be the most orderly and efficient way to provide an 
option for licensees to utilize acceptable operator manual actions in 
lieu of the separation or barrier requirements in paragraph III.G.2. In 
this way the NRC

[[Page 10903]]

would codify conservative acceptance criteria for licensees to use in 
evaluating operator manual actions to ensure that the actions were both 
feasible and reliable. These criteria would maintain safety by ensuring 
that licensees perform thorough evaluations of the operator manual 
actions comparable to evaluations a licensee would provide to NRC for 
review and approval of an exemption request.
    The NRC staff developed a rulemaking plan (SECY-03-0100) and the 
Commission approved the staff plan on September 12, 2003. The rule 
change would revise 10 CFR part 50, Appendix R, paragraph III.G.2 to 
allow licensees to implement acceptable operator manual actions after 
documenting that the actions met the regulatory acceptance criteria. 
Through the established Reactor Oversight Process (ROP), the NRC will 
continue to inspect licensees' methodologies for achieving and 
maintaining hot shutdown conditions in accordance with the requirements 
set forth in paragraph III.G.2 of Appendix R to 10 CFR part 50. The NRC 
fire protection inspectors will verify that the licensees' operator 
manual actions met the NRC acceptance criteria and will evaluate the 
licensees' analyses, procedures and training, implementation, and 
demonstration of operator manual actions to ensure the licensees have 
adequately demonstrated the feasibility and reliability of manual 
actions.

III. Proposed Action

    The Commission proposes to allow the use of operator manual actions 
coincident with fire detectors and an automatic fire suppression system 
as an additional alternative method for compliance with paragraphs 
III.G.2(a), (b) or (c) of Appendix R.\3\ The Commission has determined 
that implementing any one of the alternatives in paragraph III.G.2 will 
provide reasonable assurance that at least one method for achieving and 
maintaining the hot shutdown condition will remain available during and 
after a postulated fire anywhere in the plant. The Commission proposes 
to add a new paragraph G.2.c-1 and a paragraph P to section III of 
Appendix R to 10 CFR part 50. The new paragraph G.2.c-1 would establish 
operator manual actions, in conjunction with fire detectors and an 
automatic fire suppression system, as a fourth compliance option with 
paragraphs III.G.2(a), (b) or (c), provided that the operator manual 
actions satisfy the acceptance criteria in the new paragraph P. The new 
paragraph P would define operator manual actions and set forth the 
required acceptance criteria which must be met before a licensee could 
use operator manual actions outside the containment to comply with 
paragraph III.G.2 of Appendix R. Compliance with these acceptance 
criteria is necessary to provide reasonable assurance of the 
feasibility and the reliability of the operator manual actions.
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    \3\ The requirements in Appendix R are applicable only to 
licensees who received operating licenses before January 1, 1979. 
Post-January 1, 1979, licensees were licensed to meet GDC-3, Sec.  
50.48(a), and Branch Technical Position CMEB 9.5-1, which contain 
criteria that are similar to the Appendix R requirements. Post-
January 1, 1979 licensees who use operator manual actions without 
NRC approval may or may not be in compliance with applicable fire 
protection requirements. Compliance depends on the specific 
licensing commitments (usually specified in license conditions for 
these licensees), the change control process, and how the change was 
justified and analyzed to demonstrate that the operator manual 
actions are feasible and reliable and thus do not adversely affect 
the ability to achieve or maintain safe shutdown.
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A. Operator Manual Actions Alternative

    The Commission proposes to add a new paragraph c-1 to paragraph 
III.G.2 of 10 CFR part 50 to codify the use of operator manual actions 
in conjunction with fire detectors and an automatic fire suppression 
system, as an additional alternative compliance method. Implementing 
any of the alternatives in paragraph III.G.2 will provide reasonable 
assurance that at least one method for achieving and maintaining the 
reactor in a hot shutdown condition will remain available during and 
after a postulated fire. The basis for this determination is provided 
below.
    The Commission's fire protection requirements constitute a defense-
in-depth approach to protect safe shutdown functions. The overall 
objectives of the NRC's fire protection regulations are to minimize the 
potential for fires and explosions; to rapidly detect, control, and 
extinguish fires that do occur; and to ensure that the fires will not 
prevent the accomplishment of necessary safe shutdown functions and 
will not significantly increase the risk of radioactive releases to the 
environment. The NRC has concluded if these objectives are met, there 
is reasonable assurance that a licensed facility is providing adequate 
protection of public health and safety. These objectives are met by a 
set of NRC requirements for control of combustible materials and 
ignition sources, fire detection and suppression systems, fire brigade 
procedures and training, and physical separation of cables and 
equipment of redundant trains of safe shutdown equipment.
    The physical separation requirements in paragraph III.G.2 of 
Appendix R are one component of the NRC's overall fire protection 
objectives. In paragraph III.G.2, the NRC specified three different 
methods for providing separation of cables and equipment of redundant 
trains of equipment located in the same fire area. These three options 
for compliance with paragraph III.G.2 offer sufficient but varying 
levels of protection. In general, the 3-hour passive fire barrier is 
judged to offer more protection than either of the other options (i.e., 
the 1-hour passive fire barrier or 20 feet of horizontal separation 
with no intervening combustibles, in combination with fire detectors 
and an automatic fire suppression system installed in the fire area). 
The NRC published a final rule in the Federal Register on November 19, 
1980 (45 FR 76602) stating that redundant trains of safe shutdown 
systems are best protected by 3-hour passive fire barriers that provide 
ample time for manual fire suppression activities to control any fire. 
The proposed operator manual action offers protection comparable to the 
latter two options, both of which require the additional layer of 
defense-in-depth protection provided by having fire detection and 
automatic suppression capability. The basis for automatic suppression 
capability in III.G.2 is found in the final rule published on November 
19, 1980 (45 FR 76602), which stated, ``The use of 1-hour barrier in 
conjunction with automatic fire suppression and detection capability * 
* * is based on the following considerations. Automatic suppression is 
required to ensure prompt, effective application of a suppressant to a 
fire that could endanger safe shutdown capability.'' The prompt, 
effective application of a suppressant to a fire also applies to 
III.G.2.b with 20 feet of horizontal separation with no intervening 
combustibles. Accordingly, the NRC proposes to allow use of operator 
manual actions only in conjunction with fire detectors and an automatic 
fire suppression system.
    In issuing the current Appendix R, paragraph III.G.2, requirements 
on physical separation of safe shutdown systems, the Commission 
recognized that strict compliance with the III.G.2 criteria might be 
difficult for certain licensees at existing facilities. At that time, 
the Commission was aware that other fire protection alternatives might 
exist that could provide adequate fire protection at these facilities. 
For this reason, the Commission included an

[[Page 10904]]

exemption provision in Sec.  50.48 \4\ to allow licensees to propose 
alternative fire protection methods to the Commission for review and 
approval. Under the exemption process, the Commission has used its fire 
protection engineering experience and judgment to review and grant (or 
in some cases deny) exemptions to licensees who, because of plant 
physical limitations, sought to implement operator manual actions in 
lieu of complying with the paragraph III.G.2 separation requirements.
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    \4\ The exemption provision no longer exists in 10 CFR 50.48. It 
has been subsumed by the exemption provisions in 10 CFR 50.12, which 
apply to all sections of 10 CFR part 50.
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    The NRC recognized in the SECY-03-0100 rulemaking plan that 
``[r]eplacing a passive, rated, fire barrier * * * with human 
performance activities can increase risk. For some simple operator 
manual actions, the risk increase associated with human performance may 
be minimal. For other actions, unless the operator manual actions are 
feasible, the risk increase could be significant * * * However, if the 
operator manual actions are feasible, the overall risk increase is 
minimal.''
    On the basis of inspection experience, the NRC has concluded that 
certain manual actions can be accomplished and provide an adequate 
level of safety to satisfy the underlying purpose of the fire 
protection rule for the areas set forth in paragraph III.G.2. In 
addition, the NRC has reviewed and granted certain exemption requests 
for the use of manual actions in lieu of the separation criteria of 
paragraph III.G.2. This experience demonstrates that properly analyzed 
and implemented manual actions provide an adequate level of assurance 
that a nuclear power plant could achieve and maintain hot shutdown 
conditions.
    Due to misunderstanding of acceptable past practice and existing 
fire protection guidance that led licensees to implement unapproved 
operator manual actions, the NRC may be faced with a large number of 
operator manual action exemption requests from licensees. To provide a 
more efficient and effective process and to ensure more uniform and 
consistent regulatory treatment of these cases, the NRC is proposing to 
codify conservative, state-of-the-art acceptance criteria for licensees 
to use in evaluating operator manual actions to ensure that they are 
both feasible and reliable. The NRC believes that codifying this 
alternative in the rule will be more efficient than using the exemption 
process, and will provide for enhanced safety by allowing resources to 
be focused on safety rather than administrative compliance.
    Something that is ``feasible'' is ``capable of being accomplished 
or brought about; possible.'' Something that is ``reliable'' will 
``yield the same or compatible results in different experiments or 
statistical trials; dependably repeatable.'' To credit operator manual 
actions under paragraph III.G.2 for outside containment, the licensee 
must prove to the satisfaction of the NRC not only that the actions can 
be successfully accomplished, but also that they can be accomplished 
repeatedly by all personnel who are required to perform the actions. 
Together, proof that the operator manual actions are both feasible and 
reliable provides the level of reasonable assurance necessary for 
credited operator manual actions to be in compliance with paragraph 
III.G.2.
    If shown to be feasible and reliable, operator manual actions are 
likely to be successfully achieved, and any potential increases in risk 
to the public due to their use will be minimal. Requiring the operator 
manual actions to meet conservative acceptance criteria provides the 
NRC with reasonable assurance that such operator manual actions can be 
accomplished to safely shut down the plant in the event of a fire. 
These criteria maintain safety by ensuring that licensees perform 
thorough evaluations of the required operator manual actions and pre-
plan equipment needs. NRC fire protection inspectors will verify that 
licensees' documented operator manual actions meet the NRC acceptance 
criteria through the existing triennial inspection process. The use of 
operator manual actions does not diminish the other defense-in-depth 
objectives of the NRC fire protection program (i.e., the requirements 
that minimize the potential for fires and explosions and those which 
provide for rapid controlling and extinguishing of fires that do 
occur). To support the objective for rapidly controlling and 
extinguishing fires, the NRC is requiring fire detectors and an 
automatic fire suppression system as part of the new operator manual 
actions option. Accordingly, the NRC has determined that the proposed 
rulemaking provides reasonable assurance that the public health and 
safety are protected, consistent with the assurance provided by 
compliance with the current three options in paragraphs III.G.2(a), (b) 
or (c).

B. Addition of Paragraph III.P, Operator Manual Actions Acceptance 
Criteria

    The proposed paragraph III.P specifies the required acceptance 
criteria which must be met before a licensee may utilize operator 
manual actions to comply with paragraph III.G.2 of Appendix R. A 
detailed discussion of each criterion is provided further in this 
Statement of Consideration. These criteria are as follows:

III.P Operator Manual Actions

    1. For purposes of this section, operator manual actions means the 
integrated set of actions needed to ensure that a redundant train of 
systems necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions 
located within the same area outside the primary containment is free of 
fire damage.
    2. A licensee relying on operator manual actions must meet all of 
the following acceptance criteria:
    (a) Analysis. The licensee shall prepare an analysis for each 
operator manual action which demonstrates its feasibility and 
reliability.
    (1) The analysis must contain a postulated fire timeline showing 
that there is sufficient time to travel to action locations and perform 
actions required to achieve and maintain the plant in a hot shutdown 
condition under the environmental conditions expected to be encountered 
without jeopardizing the health and safety of the operator performing 
the manual actions. The fire timeline shall extend from the time of 
initial fire detection until the time when the ability to achieve and 
maintain hot shutdown is reached, and shall include a time margin that 
reasonably accounts for all important variables, including (i) 
differences between the analyzed and actual conditions and (ii) human 
performance uncertainties that may be encountered.
    (2) The analysis must address the functionality of equipment or 
cables that could be adversely affected by the fire or its effects but 
still used to achieve and maintain hot shutdown.
    (3) The analysis must identify all equipment required to accomplish 
the operator manual action within the postulated timeline, including 
(but not limited to) (i) all indications necessary to identify the need 
for the operator manual actions, enable their performance, and verify 
their successful accomplishment, and (ii) any necessary communications, 
portable, and life support equipment.
    (b) Procedures and training. Plant procedures must include each 
operator manual action required to achieve and maintain hot shutdown. 
Each operator

[[Page 10905]]

must be appropriately trained on those procedures.
    (c) Implementation. The licensee shall ensure that all systems and 
equipment needed to accomplish each operator manual action are 
available and readily accessible consistent with the analysis required 
by paragraph 2(a). The number of operating shift personnel required to 
perform the operator manual actions shall be on site at all times.
    (d) Demonstration. Periodically, the licensee shall conduct 
demonstrations using an established crew of operators to demonstrate 
that operator manual actions required to achieve and maintain the plant 
in a hot shutdown condition can be accomplished consistent with the 
analysis in paragraph 2(a) of this section. The licensee may not rely 
upon any operator manual action until it has been demonstrated to be 
consistent with the analysis. The licensee shall take prompt corrective 
action if any subsequent periodic demonstration indicates that the 
operator manual actions can no longer be accomplished consistent with 
the analysis.
    These acceptance criteria for operator manual actions are intended 
to assure the safe shutdown goals and objectives for operating reactors 
as required in 10 CFR 50.48. The primary objective for safe shutdown is 
to maintain fuel integrity (i.e., fuel design limits are not exceeded). 
For alternative or dedicated shutdown capability, the reactor coolant 
system process variables should be maintained within those predicted 
for a loss of normal ac power and fission product boundary integrity 
should not be affected.
    The applications of these acceptance criteria are as follows. 
First, the criteria are the means by which the NRC will establish 
standards that provide a reasonable level of assurance that operator 
manual actions will be satisfactorily and reliably performed to bring 
the plant to a hot shutdown condition, thus protecting public health 
and safety. Second, a standard set of acceptance criteria will permit 
both the licensees and NRC to establish consistency as to what operator 
manual actions will be allowed. Third, the criteria will provide the 
parameters which both the licensees and NRC will use to conduct 
evaluations and inspections in a thorough manner. The supporting basis 
for each criterion is discussed in detail below.
    The acceptance criteria in the proposed rule are structured to 
ensure both feasibility and reliability of the operator manual actions. 
To credit operator manual actions, the licensee must prove not only 
that the actions can be successfully accomplished (are feasible), but 
also that they can be done so repeatedly (are reliable). Central to the 
approach is the preparation of an analysis that determines what actions 
must be taken in order to reach a hot shutdown condition. This analysis 
would also identify the time available (timeline) for successful 
performance of such actions. A demonstration of the accomplished 
operator manual actions within the established timeline verifies the 
feasibility of such actions. In order to also achieve reliability of 
the actions, the Commission is proposing a criterion for a time margin 
needed to complete the actions because of potential variations in fire 
characteristics, plant conditions, and human performance that the 
demonstration cannot adequately address. This concept is further 
described in the sections below.
Timeline Analysis
    The Commission will require that a licensee perform an analysis to 
determine the feasibility and reliability of operator manual actions. 
As part of the analysis, there shall be a fire timeline, which extends 
from the initial fire detection to the achievement of maintainable hot 
shutdown conditions, to define the time boundaries of the analysis for 
the fire scenario in which the operator manual actions will be 
performed. The analysis must identify all actions that must be 
completed, the equipment needed, the number of people needed, the 
communications equipment required, and the time available to perform 
the actions before unsafe plant conditions occur (i.e., before 
exceeding safe shutdown goals and objectives). The proposed rule has 
more specific requirements on each of these aspects that are discussed 
in subsequent sections of this notice. The Commission will require a 
licensee to show that a sufficient amount of extra time would be 
available for the required operator manual actions and that the process 
for determining the time available for such actions adequately 
addressed the potential variations in fire characteristics, plant 
conditions, and human performance. This concept is referred to in this 
statement as a ``time margin.''
    Proper demonstration requires that the licensee meet all operator 
manual action acceptance criteria other than Time Margin (this is 
evaluated after all other criteria, including requirements in section 
2(d), have been met) and show that at least one randomly-selected, 
established crew can successfully perform the actions within an 
acceptable time frame. For example, if there are questions about 
whether operators can reach the locations where they must perform the 
manual actions, these questions should be addressed to the extent 
practicable during the demonstration. However, successful demonstration 
does not fully determine reliability for the operator manual actions.
    Additional factors must be considered to show that the actions can 
be performed reliably under the variety of conditions that could occur 
during a fire. For example, factors that the licensee may not be able 
to recreate in the demonstrations could cause further delay under real 
fire conditions (i.e., the demonstration would likely fall short of 
actual fire situations). Furthermore, typical and expected variability 
among individuals and crews could lead to variations in operator 
performance. Finally, variations in the characteristics of the fire and 
related plant conditions could alter the time available for the 
operator actions.
    In order to ensure that a particular action could be performed 
reliably, licensees must show that a sufficient amount of extra time 
(i.e., a time margin) would be available for the action and that the 
process for determining the time available for the action adequately 
addressed the potential variations in fire characteristics and plant 
conditions. The time margin ensures that operator manual actions can be 
performed reliably: (1) Through well-thought out demonstrations that 
the actions are feasible, (2) by ensuring that there is extra time 
available for given actions with respect to the fire scenario, and (3) 
by adequately addressing all other related acceptance criteria.
    The analysis should include realistically conservative scenarios, 
and such variables as environment and human performance uncertainties 
should be considered in the time margin. For example, a licensee may 
perform a worst case demonstration that requires the operator to wear a 
self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA), if there is a reasonable 
expectation that the operators will need to pass through a zone 
containing smoke in order to reach the location where the operator 
manual action is to be carried out.
    Use of a time margin is an appropriate safety factor for ensuring 
realistically reliable operator manual actions. The rule would require 
the time margin to account for all important variables, including 
differences between the analyzed and actual conditions and for human 
performance uncertainties that may be encountered.
    The factors necessitating the time margin are:

[[Page 10906]]

    1. The time margin should account for what the licensee is not 
likely to be able to recreate in the demonstration that could cause 
further delay (i.e., where the demonstration falls short).
    2. The time margin should account for the variability of fire and 
related plant conditions.
    3. The time margin should account for the variability in human 
performance among individuals and between different crews and for the 
effects of human-centered factors that could become relevant during 
fire scenarios.
    These factors are important considerations for the time margin for 
the following reasons:
    1. They address likely limitations of the demonstration.
    2. The demonstration can replicate only a subset of all possible 
fires and resulting variability in fire and plant conditions.
    3. Some degree of human performance variability is to be expected, 
some of which could further delay the times to perform the desired 
actions during real fire situations.
    In order to establish a standard to show time margin, it was 
necessary to establish a time margin (or margins) for fire-related 
operator manual actions to ensure that they would be reliably 
successful. In other words, if the licensee can meet all of the 
operator manual action acceptance criteria, which include demonstrating 
that at least one randomly-selected, established crew can successfully 
perform the actions, and show that the actions can be performed within 
an acceptable time frame that allows for adequate time margin to cover 
potential variations in plant conditions and human performance, then 
the operator manual action rule would be met. For example, as long as 
it can be shown that there is an ``X-percent'' time margin to perform 
the particular operator manual action, plant damage or an undesirable 
plant condition will still be avoided and all of the other criteria 
have been met, then there is confidence to conclude that the action 
will be performed reliably.
    The establishment of an appropriate time margin requires a 
supported technical basis. While the best technical basis for a time 
margin would be empirical data from which it could be derived, a 
database search was unable to find relevant data that could be used 
directly for or generalized to the operator manual actions of interest. 
To further develop this concept, the NRC convened an initial expert 
panel to identify a time margin for inclusion in this proposed rule 
statement for further stakeholder consideration and feedback.
    The expert panel members concluded that a time margin factor of at 
least 2 would ensure that the operator manual actions in response to 
fire are sufficiently reliable. For example, if the operator manual 
action can be shown typically to take less than 15 minutes, then at 
least 30 minutes (15x2) should be available to achieve and maintain hot 
shutdown. A time margin factor of at least 2 is assumed to absorb 
delays that might be caused by the following set of factors (1) the 
need to recover from or respond to unexpected difficulties or random 
problems associated with instruments or other equipment, or 
communication devices; (2) environmental and other effects that are not 
easily replicated in a demonstration, such as radiation, smoke, toxic 
gas effects, and increased noise levels; (3) limitations of the 
demonstration to account for all possible fire locations that may lend 
the need for such operator manual actions; (4) inability to show or 
duplicate the operator manual actions because of safety considerations 
while at power; and (5) individual operator performance factors, such 
as physical size and strength, cognitive differences, time pressure, 
and emotional responses. In addition, the time margin includes adequate 
time for personnel to recover from any initial errors in conducting the 
actions. The time margin concept could alternatively consist of a range 
of multiplicative values. For example, instead of a single 
multiplicative value of 2, perhaps a range of multiplicative values 
(e.g., 2-4 times) could determine adequate time margin. This may be 
appropriate where additional factors were identified that may influence 
the timeline. These factors may be those unknown and not considered by 
the expert elicitation panel and which may result in a lower or higher 
multiplicative factor. The Commission can also foresee situations where 
a licensee may be able to define a different multiplicative value for 
different scenarios. For example, an operator manual action consisting 
of a single action by one plant operator could have a different 
multiplicative value than a scenario that involves more than one plant 
operator or where several sequential actions are necessary.
    As with the discussion of the range of multiplicative values above, 
the time margin concept may have to include a minimum additive time 
(predetermined minimum amount of time added to the demonstrated time) 
necessary for certain situations. For example, the time in the 
demonstration is shown to be short (e.g., <5 minutes for a single 
operator manual action), a single multiplicative value of 2 is applied 
resulting in an additional time of <5 minutes. There may be situations 
where the resulting <5 minutes of margin may not be adequate to address 
the factors that may cause a delay as identified above. In such 
situations it may be more appropriate to apply a minimum additive time 
(e.g., 10 minutes) to account for factors that may cause a delay with 
the operator manual action.
Request for Comment 1: (Time Margin)
    The Commission requests opinions specifically on the time margin 
aspects because of stakeholder interest in this subject and the 
Commission's desire to consider all stakeholders' input for this 
important criterion.
    Specifically, the Commission asks the following questions:
    (A) Considering the factors for time margin discussed above 
(including the conditional dependence on a worst-case demonstration 
meeting all the other acceptance criteria), should the time margin 
consist of a single multiplicative factor (e.g., 2 times), or a range 
of multiplicative factors (e.g., 2-4 times)? Please provide a technical 
basis for your proposed time frames or factors.
    (B) If a range is appropriate, what should the range be and what 
parameters or variables should be considered in determining which part 
of the range is applicable in a given situation? Please provide a basis 
for your proposed time frames or factors.
    (C) Should there be a minimum additive time (e.g., 10 minutes) for 
situations where the time in the demonstration is so short that a 
multiplicative factor would not properly account for the required time 
margin (e.g., a time in the demonstration of < 5 minutes). Please 
provide a basis for your proposed time frames or factors.
    (D) Are there other means of establishing margin (e.g., through 
consideration of conservative assumptions in the thermal hydraulic 
timeline)? Please provide a technical basis.
Environmental Factors
    Paragraph 2(a)(1) of the proposed criteria requires that the fire 
timeline include a time margin that accounts for differences between 
the analyzed and actual conditions. Adverse environmental factors are 
one area of concern that must be considered because they affect the 
operator's mental or physical performance. The environmental factors 
must be weighed with respect to the location where the operator manual 
actions will be performed, as well as the access and egress routes to 
and from this location.

[[Page 10907]]

Operators' performance may be impeded by their inability to reach the 
required location and by the difficulty of performing the action in the 
conditions existing at the required location. The environment along the 
egress route after completion of the operator manual action must also 
be considered to ensure personnel health and safety throughout. These 
environmental factors are considered in the analysis via preparation 
and planning thereby ensuring there is sufficient time to travel to the 
location(s) and perform the action(s) required to achieve and maintain 
the plant in a hot shutdown condition.
Equipment Performance
    Paragraph 2(a)(2) of the criteria requires the analysis to address 
the functionality of equipment or cables that could be adversely 
affected by the fire but still used to achieve and maintain hot 
shutdown. For example, operators may rely upon valves to achieve and 
maintain hot shutdown conditions. If the functionality of the valves is 
adversely affected by the fire then it may degrade or prevent the 
performance of the required operator manual actions. As identified in 
Information Notice 92-18 for motor-operated valves, bypassing thermal 
overload protection devices (discussed in Regulatory Guide 1.106, 
``Thermal Overload Protection for Electric Motors on Motor Operated 
Valves'' Rev. 1, ML 003740323) could jeopardize completion of the 
safety function or cause degradation of other safety systems due to 
sustained abnormal circuit currents that can arise from fire-induced 
``hot shorts.'' Even if these overload protection devices are not 
bypassed, hot shorts can cause loss of power to motor-operated valves 
by tripping the devices. If an operator manual action requires the 
manual manipulation of a depowered motor-operated valve, such fire-
induced damage could make the manipulation physically impossible. 
Therefore, if equipment to be used during operator manual actions could 
be affected by fire, the licensee must determine that the functionality 
of that equipment will not be adversely affected.
    Plant systems, structures and components (SSCs) are used to achieve 
and maintain hot shutdown conditions. SSCs often require active 
intervention, through either automatic or manual means, to perform 
their required function. The analysis of the fire timeline must 
identify all such SSCs needed to achieve maintainable hot shutdown 
conditions from the time of initial fire detection, particularly those 
that require operator manual actions to perform their hot shutdown 
function and explain how active equipment will be operated. Diagnostic 
indications relevant to the SSCs' safety function may be critical to 
specific operator manual actions and interaction with this equipment. 
Diagnostic indications are the alerting, information, control, and 
feedback capability provided through instrumentation. They also provide 
sufficient information that determines if and when these interfaces 
must be effected. These indications would typically be needed to: (1) 
Enable the operators to determine which manual actions are appropriate 
for the fire scenario; (2) direct the personnel as to the proper 
performance of the operator manual actions; and (3) provide the 
necessary feedback to the operators verifying that the manual actions 
have had their expected results. Diagnostic indications are considered 
in the analysis via identification of the SSCs necessary to accomplish 
the operator manual action and evaluation of their availability under 
the fire and environmental conditions expected. Guidance on identifying 
needed indication is provided as in paragraph c.2 of the draft 
regulatory guide DG-1136, ``Guidance for Demonstrating the Feasibility 
and Reliability of Operator Manual Actions in Response to Fire.''
Communications Equipment
    Paragraph 2(a)(3)(ii) of the proposed criteria requires the 
analysis to identify all communications equipment necessary to 
accomplish the operator manual actions. Communications equipment may be 
needed to provide feedback between operators in the main control room 
and personnel out in the plant to ensure that any activities requiring 
coordination between them are clearly understood and correctly 
accomplished. The unpredictability of fires can force staff to deviate 
from planned activities, hence the need to consider constant and 
effective communications. Communications may be needed in the 
performance of sequential operator manual actions (where one action 
must be completed before another can be started) and provide 
verification that procedural steps have been accomplished, especially 
those that must be conducted at remote locations. Communications must 
be considered in the analysis by identifying the necessary 
communications equipment and ensuring their availability to the plant 
operators for the time needed to achieve and maintain hot shutdown. For 
example, if portable radios are to be used for communications then the 
analysis should list the equipment and confirm that the equipment can 
be used in the plant areas (i.e., capable of receiving and transmitting 
in the necessary plant areas) and are available for the time required 
(e.g., battery power life has been considered for the time period 
necessary). Such communications should be identified and addressed as 
per paragraph c.2 of the draft regulatory guide DG-1136, ``Guidance for 
Demonstrating the Feasibility and Reliability of Operator Manual 
Actions in Response to Fire.''
Portable Equipment
    Paragraph 2(a)(3)(ii) of the proposed criteria requires the 
analysis to identify all portable equipment necessary to accomplish the 
operator manual actions. Portable equipment, especially tools such as 
keys to open locked areas, ladders to reach high locations, torque 
devices to turn valve handwheels, and electrical breaker rackout tools, 
can be essential to access and manipulate SSCs to successfully 
accomplish required operator manual actions. Similarly, life support 
equipment, such as self-contained breathing apparatuses (SCBA), may 
need to be worn to permit access to and egress from the locations where 
the operator manual actions must be performed since the routes could be 
negatively affected by fire effects, such as smoke, that propagate 
beyond the fire-involved area. Portable equipment must be considered in 
the analysis by identifying necessary equipment and ensuring their 
availability to the plant operators during the time needed to achieve 
and maintain hot shutdown. For example, if SCBA is necessary then the 
analysis should list the equipment and confirm that the equipment can 
be used in the plant areas (i.e., access and egress to tight areas are 
not impeded by the use of SCBA) and are available for the time required 
(e.g., portable bottle air supply provides sufficient time to perform 
the action). Such equipment should be identified and addressed as per 
paragraph c.2 of the draft regulatory guide DG-1136, ``Guidance for 
Demonstrating the Feasibility and Reliability of Operator Manual 
Actions in Response to Fire.''
Procedures and Training
    Paragraph 2(b) of the proposed criteria requires that all manual 
actions be included in plant procedures, and that each operator 
receives training on these manual actions. The role of written plant 
procedures in the successful performance of operator manual actions is 
three-fold: (1) Assist the operators in correctly diagnosing the type 
of plant event that the fire may trigger, usually

[[Page 10908]]

in conjunction with indications, thereby permitting them to select the 
appropriate operator manual actions (or prescribe actions to be taken 
should a fire occur in a given fire area); (2) direct the operators to 
the appropriate preventive and mitigative manual actions to place and 
maintain the plant in a stable hot shutdown condition; and (3) minimize 
the potential confusion that can arise from fire-induced conflicting 
signals, including spurious actuations, thereby minimizing the 
likelihood of personnel error during the required operator manual 
actions. Written procedures should contain the steps to be performed, 
how the operator manual actions are performed and the tools and 
equipment needed to successfully perform the actions.
    Training on these procedures serves three supporting functions: (1) 
Establishes familiarity with the procedures, equipment, and potential 
(simulated) conditions in an actual event; (2) provides the level of 
knowledge and understanding necessary for the personnel performing the 
operator manual actions to be well-prepared to handle departures from 
the expected sequence of events; and (3) provides the personnel with 
the opportunity to practice their response without exposure to adverse 
conditions, thereby enhancing confidence that they can reliably perform 
their duties in an actual event. Determining that operators are 
appropriately trained on procedures entails establishing, implementing, 
and maintaining a training program that incorporates the instructional 
requirements necessary to provide qualified operators to perform the 
manual actions. Licensees are already required to establish training 
programs for licensed operator and nuclear plant personnel under 10 CFR 
55.59 and 50.120, respectively. The procedures and training provided to 
operators and nuclear plant personnel will ensure that the supporting 
functions and roles discussed above can be met. Such procedures and 
training should be identified and addressed as in paragraph c.2 of the 
draft regulatory guide DG-1136, ``Guidance for Demonstrating the 
Feasibility and Reliability of Operator Manual Actions in Response to 
Fire.'' The Commission expects plant procedures to be available at or 
near the locations where the operator manual actions are to occur so 
that they are easily accessible to the operators.
Implementation and Staffing
    Paragraph 2(c) of the proposed criteria requires that equipment and 
personnel necessary for feasible and reliable operator manual actions 
must be readily available and accessible. The equipment is available 
when its functionality is not adversely affected by the fire or its 
effects. Accessible means that the personnel should be able to find and 
reach the locations of the components and be able to manipulate the 
components. Accessibility and availability of equipment must be 
considered in the analysis by identifying necessary equipment, ensuring 
operators are knowledgeable of equipment locations, determining that 
accessibility of such equipment, and that the equipment will not be 
adversely affected by a fire or its effects. For example, operators may 
rely upon valves to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions. If 
the functionality of the valves is adversely affected by the fire or if 
the valves are not accessible for manipulation then the functionality 
of such valves may be degraded, thereby preventing the performance of 
the required operator manual actions.
    The intent of the staffing requirement is to ensure that qualified 
personnel will be on site at all times such that hot shutdown 
conditions can be achieved and maintained in the event of a fire. An 
individual expected to perform the operator manual actions must not 
have collateral duties, such as fire fighting or security, during the 
evolution of the fire scenario. This individual should be exclusively 
available for the performance of required operator manual actions. 
Therefore, operating shift staffing levels should include enough 
personnel on watch for the performance of any operator manual actions 
that could arise as a result of a fire. The fire brigade would not be 
expected to perform actions other than those associated with fire 
fighting. Otherwise, the potential for interfering with either their 
fire fighting activities or the operator manual actions could exist, 
such that successful performance of one or the other, or both, could be 
impaired. For example, during a fire, an individual who is part of the 
five-person fire brigade could not perform the required operator manual 
actions because that individual is expected to participate in the fire 
fighting efforts.
Demonstration
    The concepts of feasibility and reliability were examined under 
Criterion 2(a) of section III.P in connection with the fire timeline 
and time margin. Demonstration and time margin development complement 
each other. Paragraph 2(d) of the proposed criteria requires 
demonstration in order to establish the feasibility of operator manual 
actions. The demonstration criterion provides reasonable assurance that 
the operator manual actions can be performed in the analyzed time 
period for a range of conceivable fire situations.
    The use of such demonstrations is supported, for instance, by 
NUREG-1764, ``Guidance for the Review of Changes to Human Actions'' and 
NUREG-0711 ``Human Factors Engineering Program Review Model,'' cited in 
NUREG-0800, Section 18.0 Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety 
Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants. NUREG-1764 states that ``* * 
* [a] walk-through of the human actions under realistic conditions 
should be performed * * * The scenario used should include any 
complicating factors that are expected to affect the crews['] ability 
to perform the human actions * * *'' NUREG-0711 states that ``* * * an 
integrated system design (i.e., hardware, software, and personnel 
elements) is evaluated using performance-based tests * * * Plant 
personnel should perform operational events using a simulator or other 
suitable representation of the system to determine its adequacy to 
support safety operations * * *''
    There are several important elements to the demonstration 
criterion. First, licensees may take credit for operator manual actions 
only after a successful demonstration. To continue taking credit for 
operator manual actions, licensees must complete demonstrations such 
that all operating crews successfully perform the coordinated sets of 
operator manual actions taken as a result of a fire in a specific fire 
area. Periodic demonstrations, at a frequency consistent with that 
established by the licensee in compliance with 10 CFR 50.120, provide 
valuable training and experience for licensee personnel and also serve 
to verify that plant configuration and conditions (access, egress, 
etc.) have not changed over time such that the operator manual actions 
can no longer be accomplished in accordance with the analysis performed 
pursuant to paragraph III.P.2(a). Should a licensee be unable to 
successfully complete a subsequent demonstration, the Commission 
expects prompt corrective action to retrain the operators, or to modify 
the operator manual actions, or modify the plant conditions so that the 
demonstration yields successful results.
    Second, the demonstration verifies an action can be completed 
within the analyzed fire timeline. This can be done utilizing an 
established crew of operators to show in the demonstration that 
operator manual actions can be accomplished to achieve and maintain

[[Page 10909]]

hot shutdown for the entire fire scenario. This serves as a benchmark 
for the development of a time margin, which is an application of the 
reliability concept. Another means of establishing time margin is 
through consideration of conservative assumptions in the thermal-
hydraulic timeline (e.g., end-state).
    Third, the demonstration must be completed by an established crew. 
An established crew is a group of operators that normally work as a 
team during any one shift. Conducting the demonstration with an 
established crew instead of a crew assembled just for the demonstration 
will provide a more valid basis for the fire timeline determination, as 
well as provide the established crew with the training necessary to 
work as a team.
    Fourth, operator manual actions may not be credited until those 
actions have been shown in the demonstrations to be feasible by 
satisfying all the acceptance criteria. The demonstration should ensure 
that all relevant aspects of the criteria are met and that important 
characteristics of those criteria are included in the demonstration to 
the extent possible. For example, environmental conditions must be 
considered and should be simulated where possible. This may include, 
but is not limited to, such considerations as expected lighting levels, 
protective clothing, and noise levels. This is important because it 
validates the demonstration by conducting it under conditions that are 
as realistic as possible.
    Fifth, prompt corrective actions are required if any demonstration 
determines that the operator manual action may not be accomplished 
consistent with the analysis. Prompt corrective actions should be 
implemented at the first available opportunity consistent with the 
guidelines of Generic Letter 91-18, Revision 1, Information to 
Licensees Regarding NRC Inspection Manual Section on Resolution of 
Degraded and Nonconforming Conditions.
    As with training, the demonstration provides the crew with 
practical experience. All elements of the fire scenario, including the 
use of equipment and procedures, adequacy of staffing levels, and 
response to indications, should be integrated into the demonstration to 
develop this benchmark. In this way, any complexities, such as the 
number of required operator manual actions and their dependence upon 
one another, are evaluated and identified for appropriate consideration 
in the development of the time margin. Failure of an initial 
demonstration to show that the operator manual actions can be 
accomplished consistent with the analysis indicates that the manual 
actions are not feasible. In such cases, the licensee could modify the 
actions (e.g., different access/egress routes, redeployment of critical 
equipment by placing it at the location where the operator manual 
actions will be performed vs. carrying it to that location), retrain 
the crew, such that a new demonstration satisfies the analysis, or the 
licensee could conclude that operator manual actions are not feasible 
and opt to comply with paragraph III.G.2.

C. Response to Stakeholder Comments on Operator Manual Action 
Acceptance Criteria

    As part of the development of this proposed rule, the NRC 
considered stakeholder comments that provided additional insights. A 
number of stakeholder comments were made in response to the draft 
acceptance criteria intended for use in the interim enforcement 
discretion policy published for comment (68 FR 66501 and 69730) and in 
a subsequent public meeting on June 23, 2004. The comments on these 
criteria involved the demonstration using the same personnel/crews who 
are required to perform the manual actions during the fire; the 
application of plant procedures; the application of a fire detection 
and suppression system; and the application of operator manual actions 
criteria in all provisions of paragraph III.G.
Demonstration Criterion
    A number of public comments indicated that the requirement for the 
demonstration to use ``the same personnel/crews who will be required to 
perform the actions during the fire'' is unnecessarily restrictive. The 
Commission agrees that requiring all crews to demonstrate performance 
under all conditions is unnecessarily restrictive. The intent is to 
prov