Revisions to Cockpit Voice Recorder and Digital Flight Data Recorder Regulations, 9752-9775 [05-3726]

Agencies

• Federal Aviation Administration
• DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

[Federal Register Volume 70, Number 38 (Monday, February 28, 2005)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 9752-9775]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 05-3726]



[[Page 9751]]

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Part IV





Department of Transportation





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Federal Aviation Administration



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14 CFR Part 23, 25, et. al.



Revisions to Cockpit Voice Recorder and Digital Flight Data Recorder 
Regulations; Proposed Rule

Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 38 / Monday, February 28, 2005 / 
Proposed Rules

[[Page 9752]]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Parts 23, 25, 27, 29, 91, 121, 125, 129, and 135

[Docket No. FAA-2005-20245; Notice No. 23-56, 25-118, 27-41, 29-48, 91-
286, 121-308, 125-47, 129-40 and 135-95]
RIN 2120-AH88


Revisions to Cockpit Voice Recorder and Digital Flight Data 
Recorder Regulations

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

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SUMMARY: The FAA proposes to amend the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) and 
digital flight data recorder (DFDR) regulations for certain air 
carriers, operators, and aircraft manufacturers. This proposed rule 
would increase the duration of CVR and flight data recorder (FDR) 
recordings; increase the data recording rate of certain DFDR 
parameters; require physical separation of the DFDR and CVR; improve 
the reliability of the power supply to both the CVR and DFDR; and if 
data-link communication equipment is installed, require that all data-
link communications received on an aircraft be recorded. This proposal 
is based on recommendations issued by the National Transportation 
Safety Board (NTSB) following the investigations of several accidents 
and incidents, and includes other revisions that the FAA has determined 
are necessary. The proposed improvements to the CVR and DFDR systems 
are intended to improve the quality and quantity of information 
recorded and increase the potential for retaining important information 
needed during accident and incident investigations.

DATES: Send your comments on or before April 29, 2005.

ADDRESSES: You may send comments [identified by Docket Number FAA-2005-
20245] using any of the following methods:
     DOT Docket Web site: Go to https://dms.dot.gov and follow 
the instructions for sending your comments electronically.
     Government-wide rulemaking Web site: Go to https://
www.regulations.gov and follow the instructions for sending your 
comments electronically.
     Mail: Docket Management Facility; U.S. Department of 
Transportation, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Nassif Building, Room PL-401, 
Washington, DC 20590-001.
     Fax: 1-202-493-2251.
     Hand Delivery: Room PL-401 on the plaza level of the 
Nassif Building, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Washington, DC, between 9 
a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.
    For more information on the rulemaking process, see the 
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section of this document.
    Privacy: We will post all comments we receive, without change, to 
https://dms.dot.gov, including any personal information you provide. For 
more information, see the Privacy Act discussion in the SUPPLEMENTARY 
INFORMATION section of this document.
    Docket: To read background documents or comments received, go to 
https://dms.dot.gov at any time or to Room PL-401 on the plaza level of 
the Nassif Building, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Washington, DC, between 9 
a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Timothy W. Shaver, Avionics Systems 
Branch, Aircraft Certification Service, AIR-130, Federal Aviation 
Administration, 800 Independence Avenue SW., Washington, DC 20591; 
telephone (202) 385-4686; facsimile (202) 385-4651; e-mail 
tim.shaver@faa.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited

    The FAA invites interested persons to participate in this 
rulemaking by submitting written comments, data, or views. We also 
invite comments relating to the economic, environmental, energy, or 
federalism impacts that might result from adopting the proposals in 
this document. The most helpful comments reference a specific portion 
of the proposal, explain the reason for any recommended change, and 
include supporting data. We ask that you send us two copies of written 
comments.
    We will file in the docket all comments we receive, as well as a 
report summarizing each substantive public contact with FAA personnel 
concerning this proposed rulemaking. The docket is available for public 
inspection before and after the comment closing date. If you wish to 
review the docket in person, go to the address in the ADDRESSES section 
of this preamble between 9:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m., Monday through 
Friday, except Federal holidays. You may also review the docket using 
the Internet at the web address in the ADDRESSES section.
    Privacy Act: Using the search function of our docket web site, 
anyone can find and read the comments received into any of our dockets, 
including the name of the individual sending the comment (or signing 
the comment on behalf of an association, business, labor union, etc.). 
You may review DOT's complete Privacy Act Statement in the Federal 
Register published on April 11, 2000 (65 FR 19477-78) or you may visit 
https://dms.dot.gov.
    Before acting on this proposal, we will consider all comments we 
receive on or before the closing date for comments. We will consider 
comments filed late if it is possible to do so without incurring 
expense or delay. We may change this proposal in light of the comments 
we receive.
    If you want the FAA to acknowledge receipt of your comments on this 
proposal, include with your comments a pre-addressed, stamped postcard 
on which the docket number appears. We will stamp the date on the 
postcard and mail it to you.

Availability of Rulemaking Documents

    You can get an electronic copy using the Internet by:
    (1) Searching the Department of Transportation's electronic Docket 
Management System (DMS) web page (https://dms.dot.gov/search);
    (2) Visiting the Office of Rulemaking's web page at https://
www.faa.gov/avr/arm/index.cfm; or
    (3) Accessing the Government Printing Office's web page at https://
www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs/aces/aces140.html.
    You can also get a copy by submitting a request to the Federal 
Aviation Administration, Office of Rulemaking, ARM-1, 800 Independence 
Avenue SW., Washington, DC 20591, or by calling (202) 267-9680. Make 
sure to identify the docket number, notice number, or amendment number 
of this rulemaking.

Background

Statement of the Problem

    The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has indicated 
through several recommendations that its investigation of a variety of 
aircraft accidents and incidents has been hampered by the limited 
duration of cockpit voice recorder (CVR) recordings and the loss of 
power to both CVRs and digital flight data recorders (DFDR). These 
shortcomings have been cited during investigation of the following 
accidents or incidents: Alaska Airlines, Inc. (Alaska), flight 261 on 
January 31, 2000; EgyptAir flight 990 on October 31, 1999; Delta Air 
Lines, Inc. (Delta), flight 2461 on December 15, 1998; Swissair

[[Page 9753]]

flight 111 on September 2, 1998; SilkAir flight 185 on December 19, 
1997; ValuJet Airlines (ValuJet) flight 592 on May 11, 1996; Trans 
World Airlines, Inc. (TWA), flight 800 on July 17, 1996; and ValuJet 
flight 597 on June 8, 1995. The NTSB has stated that measures taken to 
determine the cause of the above-referenced accidents and incidents 
have been limited by the lack of data needed to help identify events 
that occurred.
    The NTSB and other investigative authorities have identified areas 
of concern with CVRs and flight data recorders (FDRs), which are used 
to record specific information needed by investigative authorities to 
determine the cause of accidents and incidents. The NTSB issued five 
safety recommendations for improvements to the flight recorder systems 
on all aircraft required to carry a CVR and an FDR. The specific NTSB 
recommendations are discussed later in this notice.

Summary of Accidents and Incidents

Alaska Flight 261
    On January 31, 2000, Alaska flight 261, a Boeing MD-83, was on a 
scheduled international passenger flight from Puerto Vallarta, Mexico, 
to San Francisco, CA. The airplane crashed into the Pacific Ocean near 
Point Mugu, CA, and was destroyed. None of the 5 crewmembers or 83 
passengers survived. The FDR captured the entire 2 hours and 43 minutes 
of the flight, as well as information from previous flights; the CVR 
captured approximately 31 minutes of flightcrew member conversations. 
At the beginning of the CVR recording, the flightcrew were already 
discussing an existing problem with the airplane's stabilizer trim.
EgyptAir Flight 990
    On October 31, 1999, EgyptAir flight 990, a Boeing 767-366-ER, was 
on a scheduled international flight from New York, NY, to Cairo, Egypt. 
At about 1:50 a.m. Eastern Standard Time, the airplane crashed into the 
Atlantic Ocean approximately 60 miles south of Nantucket Island, MA. 
The airplane was destroyed and none of the 217 passengers or 
crewmembers survived. Power to the CVR and DFDR was lost when the 
engines were shut down.
Delta Flight 2461
    On December 15, 1998, Delta flight 2461, a Boeing 737-232, was on a 
scheduled domestic passenger/cargo flight from Boston, MA, to Orlando, 
FL. On approach for landing at Orlando International Airport, the 
airplane experienced a total loss of electrical power. The airplane 
sustained minor damage and none of the 5 crewmembers or 51 passengers 
reported any injuries. The CVR and DFDR stopped recording when 
electrical power was lost. The FDR indicated the airplane was 
descending through 2,700 feet when the data stopped. The next recorded 
data showed the airplane on the ground. The time gap between the data 
recorded during the descent and the data recorded on the ground is 
unknown. The NTSB determined that (1) the No. 1 and No. 2 generator 
control units experienced identical failures (the point-of-regulation 
fuses had blown, and the automatic test equipment revealed a blocking 
diode had shorted in the battery power supply input circuit); (2) the 
battery electrolyte levels were low or nonexistent in all cells and the 
battery voltage was below minimum serviceable limits; and (3) the 
cockpit direct current voltmeter indicated approximately 2.0 volts over 
its full scale deflection.
Swissair Flight 111
    On September 2, 1998, Swissair flight 111, a McDonnell Douglas MD-
11, was on a scheduled international flight from New York, NY, to 
Geneva, Switzerland. Approximately 53 minutes after takeoff, as the 
airplane was cruising at 33,000 feet, the flightcrew noticed an unusual 
smell in the cockpit. Within 3\1/2\ minutes, the flightcrew noticed 
visible smoke in the cockpit, declared an emergency, and was cleared to 
proceed to Halifax, Nova Scotia. Approximately 20 minutes after the 
flightcrew first noticed the unusual smell and approximately 7 minutes 
after the emergency declaration, the airplane struck the water near 
Peggy's Cove, Nova Scotia. The airplane was destroyed and none of the 
215 passengers or 14 crewmembers survived. The Transportation Safety 
Board of Canada investigated the accident; the NTSB assisted under the 
provisions of Annex 13 to the International Civil Aviation Organization 
(ICAO) as the investigative authority of the state of manufacture of 
the airplane. The investigation revealed heat damage consistent with a 
fire in the ceiling area forward and aft of the cockpit bulkhead. The 
CVR and the DFDR stopped recording while the airplane was at 
approximately 10,000 feet, about 6 minutes before the airplane hit the 
water.
SilkAir Flight 185
    On December 19, 1997, SilkAir flight 185, a Boeing 737 (B-737), 
entered a rapid descent from 35,000 feet that ended with a high-speed 
impact in the Sumatran River near Palembang, Indonesia. The airplane 
was destroyed and none of the 104 passengers or crewmembers survived. 
The Government of Indonesia conducted the investigation, and the NTSB 
participated. The investigation determined that both recorders stopped 
before the airplane entered the rapid descent.
TWA Flight 800
    On July 17, 1996, TWA flight 800, a Boeing 747-100, was on a 
scheduled passenger flight from New York, NY, to Paris, France. At 8:45 
p.m. Eastern Standard Time, approximately 13 minutes into the flight, 
the airplane exploded as it was climbing through 13,700 feet. The 
airplane was destroyed and none of the 212 passengers or 18 crewmembers 
survived. The NTSB determined the CVR and FDR stopped working at the 
time of the explosion, which was 40 to 50 seconds before the airplane 
hit the water. The NTSB has determined that the probable cause of the 
TWA flight 800 accident was an explosion of the center wing fuel tank 
(CWT) resulting from ignition of the flammable fuel/air mixture in the 
tank. The source of ignition energy for the explosion could not be 
determined with certainty, but of the sources evaluated by the 
investigation, the most likely was a short circuit outside the CWT that 
allowed excessive voltage to enter the tank through electrical wiring 
associated with the fuel quantity indication system.
ValuJet Flight 592
    On May 11, 1996, ValuJet flight 592, a DC-9-32, was on a scheduled 
flight from Miami, FL, to Atlanta, GA. Shortly after departing Miami, 
the flightcrew reported smoke and fire and began a return to Miami. The 
airplane crashed into the Everglades approximately 10 minutes after 
takeoff from Miami. The airplane was destroyed and none of the 111 
passengers or crewmembers survived. The CVR and FDR stopped working 
approximately 40 to 50 seconds before the airplane crashed.
ValuJet Flight 597
    On June 8, 1995, as ValuJet flight 597, a DC-9-32, began its 
takeoff roll at Hartsfield Atlanta International Airport, a loud bang 
was heard by the occupants and the right engine fire warning light 
illuminated. The crewmembers of another airplane informed ValuJet 
flight 597 that its right engine was on fire and the takeoff was 
rejected. Shrapnel from the right engine penetrated the fuselage and 
the right engine main fuel line and a cabin fire erupted. Two flight

[[Page 9754]]

attendants and 5 passengers were injured; none of the remaining 55 
passengers or flightcrew were injured. The NTSB determined that the 
probable cause was the failure of maintenance and inspection personnel 
to perform a proper inspection of a 7th stage high compressor disc in 
the engine, thus allowing a detectable crack to grow to a length at 
which the disc ruptured. The noise level in the cockpit was so high 
that the voices of the flightcrew could not be heard on the CVR.

Summary of Revisions to the Flight Data Recorder Regulations

    The NTSB issued three safety recommendations (Nos. A-95-25, A-95-
26, and A-95-27) during the investigation into the crash of US Air, 
Inc. (US Air), flight 427 that dealt specifically with upgrades to the 
FDRs for B-727s, B-737s, Lockheed L-1011s, and all airplanes operating 
under Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) part 121, 125, or 
135. In response to these recommendations, the FAA revised the DFDR 
requirements for all airplanes (Revisions to Digital Flight Data 
Recorder Rules; Final Rule (62 FR 38362, July 17, 1997)). The 1997 rule 
requires upgrades to the FDR capabilities in most transport airplanes, 
and requires additional information to be recorded that is intended to 
enable more thorough accident and incident investigations and to enable 
the industry to predict certain trends and make necessary modifications 
before an accident or incident occurs. The revised 1997 DFDR 
regulations specify that up to 88 parameters be recorded on FDRs, with 
the exact number depending on the date of airplane manufacture. For 
turbine-powered transport category airplanes manufactured on or before 
October 11, 1991, and not equipped with a flight data acquisition unit 
(FDAU), the regulations require 18 specified parameters to be recorded 
by August 20, 2001. For airplanes manufactured on or before October 11, 
1991, equipped with a FDAU, the regulations require 22 parameters to be 
recorded by August 20, 2001. For airplanes manufactured after October 
11, 1991, the regulations require 34 parameters to be recorded by 
August 20, 2001; for airplanes manufactured after August 18, 2000, the 
regulations require 57 parameters to be recorded; and for airplanes 
manufactured after August 19, 2002, the regulations require 88 
parameters to be recorded.
    In its March 1999 final report on the crash of US Air flight 427, 
the NTSB concluded that the 1997 rule for upgrading the DFDRs on 
existing airplanes is not sufficient because it does not require 
specific flight control information to be recorded. The NTSB issued 
recommendation Nos. A-99-28 and A-99-29 specific to B-737 model 
airplanes. The recommendations require all B-737s to record pitch trim, 
trailing and leading edge flap positions, thrust reverser position, yaw 
damper command, yaw damper status (on/off), standby rudder status (on/
off), and control wheel, control column, and rudder pedal forces. In 
response to these recommendations, the FAA proposed further revisions 
to the DFDR regulations in notice No. 99-19, Revisions to Digital 
Flight Data Recorder Regulations for Boeing 737 Airplanes and for Part 
145 Operations; Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (64 FR 63140, November 
18, 1999). In addition to the requirements under the 1997 rule, the B-
737 rule would require all B-737 airplanes manufactured after the date 
of the B-737 final rule to record parameters (a)(1) through (a)(22) and 
(a)(88) and new parameters (a)(89), (a)(90), and (a)(91) (yaw damper 
status, yaw damper command, and standby rudder status, respectively). 
All B-737 airplanes manufactured on or before the date of the B-737 
final rule would be required to record the applicable parameters based 
on the 1997 rule and parameters (a)(1) through (a)(22) and (a)(88) 
through (a)(91) at the first heavy maintenance check after 2 years 
after the date of the B-737 final rule, but no later than 4 years after 
the date of the B-737 final rule.

NTSB Recommendations

    In response to the 1995 ValuJet flight 597 incident, the 1996 
crashes of ValuJet flight 592 and TWA flight 800, the 1997 crash of 
SilkAir flight 185, and the 1998 crash of Swissair flight 111, the NTSB 
submitted the following recommendations to the FAA regarding further 
upgrades to the CVR and FDR.
    Recommendation No. A-96-89. Within two years, require all aircraft 
required to have a CVR to be retrofitted with a CVR that receives, on 
dedicated channels, (1) uninterrupted input from the boom or mask 
microphone and headphones of each crewmember; and (2) uninterrupted 
input from an area microphone. During these recordings, a sidetone must 
be produced only when the transmitter or interphone is selected. 
Finally, all audio signals received by hand-held microphones must be 
recorded on the respective flight crewmember's channel when keyed to 
the ``ON'' position.
    Recommendation No. A-96-171. Require that all newly manufactured 
CVRs intended for use on airplanes have a minimum recording duration of 
2 hours.
    Recommendation No. A-99-16. By January 1, 2005, retrofit all 
airplanes that are required to carry a CVR and an FDR with a CVR that 
(1) meets the standards of the Technical Standard Order on Cockpit 
Voice Recorder Systems, TSO-C123a,\1\ or later revision; (2) is capable 
of recording the last 2 hours of audio; and (3) is fitted with a 10-
minute independent power source that is located with the CVR and that 
automatically engages and provides 10 minutes of operation whenever 
power to the recorder ceases, either by normal shutdown or by a loss of 
power to the bus.
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    \1\ The TSO for CVR systems provides, for example, test 
procedures, fire test requirements, and software development and 
design standards.
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    Recommendation No. A-99-17. Require all aircraft manufactured after 
January 1, 2003, that are required to carry a CVR and a DFDR, to be 
equipped with two combination (CVR/DFDR) recording systems. One system 
should be located as close to the cockpit as practicable and the other 
as far aft as practicable. Both recording systems should be capable of 
recording all mandatory data parameters covering the previous 25 hours 
of operation and all cockpit audio and controller-pilot data-link 
communications for the previous 2 hours of operation. The system 
located near the cockpit should be provided with an independent power 
source that engages automatically and provides 10 minutes of operation 
whenever normal aircraft power ceases. The aft system should be powered 
by the bus that provides the maximum reliability for operation without 
jeopardizing service to essential or emergency loads. The system near 
the cockpit should be powered by the bus that provides the second 
highest reliability for operation without jeopardizing service to 
essential or emergency loads.
    Recommendation No. A-99-18. Amend Sec.  25.1457 (CVR) and Sec.  
25.1459 (FDR) to require that CVRs, FDRs, and redundant combination 
CVR/DFDR units be powered from separate generator buses with the 
highest reliability.

FAA Response to NTSB Recommendations

    The FAA agrees with recommendation Nos. A-96-89, A-96-171, A-99-18, 
and parts of A-99-16 and A-99-17, and has initiated this proposed 
rulemaking in response to those recommendations. In the NTSB's March 9, 
1999, Safety Recommendation letter to the FAA regarding

[[Page 9755]]

recommendation Nos. A-99-16, A-99-17, and A-99-18, it stated that the 
Swissair flight 111 and SilkAir flight 185 accident investigations were 
two in a long history of accident and incident investigations that were 
hindered by the loss of flight recorder data. The FAA concludes that 
although the airplanes involved in those accidents, and EgyptAir flight 
990, were not U.S.-registered airplanes and the proposed rule would not 
apply to them, the circumstances surrounding those accidents were 
unrelated to the registry of the airplanes, and that many of the same 
model airplanes are U.S. registered and could experience similar 
problems. The FAA also notes that the same issues are of interest to 
ICAO, and the FAA anticipates that these proposed changes would be 
incorporated into ICAO standards, making them applicable to airplanes 
registered worldwide.

General Discussion of the Proposal

    The usual format for discussing proposed changes was found to be 
confusing because this proposal includes revisions to the certification 
rules and the operating rules. Accordingly, this preamble will discuss 
the proposed changes by topic, and then by the certification rules and 
the operating rules. In this way, the operators of specific aircraft 
can more readily reference the proposed changes that affect them. In 
addition, we will not repeat these discussions of the proposals in each 
section.
    Each proposed change is applicable to aircraft currently operating 
(a retrofit) or to newly manufactured aircraft. The aircraft retrofits 
apply to all aircraft currently operating or that are manufactured 
before [insert date 2 years from the effective date of the final rule]. 
These aircraft would have 4 years from the date of the final rule to 
comply. Aircraft that are manufactured on or after [insert date 2 years 
from the effective date of the final rule], would have to comply at the 
time of manufacture. Any differences from these time periods will be 
noted.

Cockpit Voice Recorder Duration

    The FAA is proposing that all CVRs be able to retain the last 2 
hours of cockpit audio. As stated by the NTSB, the need for this 
information has made itself evident several times when CVR recordings 
begin while the flightcrew is already discussing a problem that arose 
before the 30 minutes now required to be recorded. The FAA notes that 
in part 91, the current CVR recording requirement is only 15 minutes. 
The Transportation Safety Board of Canada also cited the short duration 
of CVR recordings as a hindrance to the investigation of Swissair 
flight 111 and stated that the recording length is predicated on 1960s 
technology.
    In addition to the 2-hour recording length, the proposed rule would 
require this information be retained using a recorder that meets the 
standards of TSO-C123a, or later revision. It is the FAA's intent to 
eliminate magnetic tape recorders because of their vulnerability to 
damage and decreased reliability given the state of current voice 
recording technology. The FAA notes that some operators are voluntarily 
replacing older magnetic tape CVRs with those that use a solid-state 
recording mechanism because of the high costs and technical problems 
associated with maintaining outdated equipment, including the 
difficulties in finding replacement magnetic tape.
    The changes to the CVR recording duration are proposed as 
amendments to the operating rules, where the requirements currently are 
found. These changes are proposed as a retrofit and a new manufacture 
requirement.

Cockpit Voice Recorder Backup Power

    Power interruptions have resulted in CVR information not being 
captured during the last minutes of several recent accidents, including 
Swissair flight 111, ValuJet flight 592, TWA flight 800, Delta flight 
2461, and EgyptAir flight 990. The NTSB noted that power failures may 
have resulted in the loss of significant information that may have been 
recordable and retrievable.
    The proposed rule would require a 10-minute independent backup 
power source for the CVR. The CVR would automatically be switched to 
this 10-minute independent power source in the event all power to the 
CVR is interrupted. The FAA notes that this interruption may be from 
normal shutdown or any other loss of power to the electrical power bus. 
No specific power source--such as a battery or a capacitor--is 
identified in this notice. Manufacturers may develop the 10-minute 
independent power source as best suits the needs of an individual 
aircraft installation and issues of safety and reliability. This 10-
minute independent power source is proposed as a new manufacture 
requirement for airplanes and rotorcraft.

Cockpit Voice Recorder and Flight Data Recorder Wiring

    The NTSB noted in its investigation of the Swissair flight 111 
accident that in an effort to locate the source of smoke in the 
cockpit, the flightcrew disabled the electrical bus that powered both 
the CVR and the DFDR on the airplane. The FAA notes that disabling the 
bus was part of the emergency checklist procedures. The NTSB is 
concerned that both recorders were powered by the same bus.
    The FAA considered several wiring options before proposing the one 
included in this notice. One option the FAA considered was whether the 
flightcrew should have the ability to disable the recorders during 
emergency checklist procedures. The FAA also gave lengthy consideration 
to the various wiring schemes and numerous emergency procedures already 
in place on airplanes of varying types in the fleet.
    The proposed rule would require that all newly manufactured 
aircraft have a CVR and an FDR installed that receives its electrical 
power from the bus that provides the maximum reliability for operation 
of the recorder without jeopardizing service to essential or emergency 
loads. The recorder also must remain powered for as long as possible 
without jeopardizing emergency operation of the aircraft.
    The FAA notes that the current regulations are performance-based; 
they do not specify which bus must power which equipment. The FAA chose 
the new proposed language to indicate that it is still up to the 
manufacturer to determine the wiring pattern that is best to fulfill 
the goal of the recorders being the last items to lose power before 
only emergency or essential equipment is powered. The FAA understands 
that, in some cases, the buses that power essential or emergency loads 
have sufficient power to also power the recording systems. The FAA 
considers this the ideal situation; however, the safety of the aircraft 
is paramount, and the electrical circuitry for essential loads should 
not be compromised. The requirement for this wiring change is found in 
the proposed revisions to the certification rules.
    The FAA points out that the NTSB's recommendation requiring the 
power supply for specific equipment was predicated on its companion 
recommendation regarding the installation of two complete recording 
systems. Because the FAA is not proposing a dual recorder system (see 
the discussion below under Dual Recording Systems), the wiring patterns 
suggested by the NTSB are not readily adaptable. In addition, because 
the FAA finds that the CVR wiring requirement is best served by a 
performance-based rule, the proposal does not specify that any 
equipment gets wired to the essential bus, battery bus, or first or 
second most essential bus. The FAA notes that it considered all of 
these

[[Page 9756]]

possibilities in deciding to continue using a performance-based rule.
    The FAA specifically requests comments on the clarity of the 
proposed rule language. The FAA encourages commenters to submit 
alternative language that meets the goals specified if it would be more 
readily understood by the industry.
    A related wiring issue for the CVRs and DFDRs concerns the 
possibility of a single electrical failure disabling both recorder 
systems. Accordingly, the proposed changes to the certification rules 
specify that the aircraft must be designed so that no single electrical 
failure will disable both the CVR and DFDR. This requirement is 
proposed for newly manufactured aircraft only.

Separate Containers

    The current CVR and DFDR regulations do not specify that the two 
recorders must be in separate containers. The FAA has always maintained 
this position and has not approved any installation that replaces two 
recorders in separate boxes with a single unit that has combined 
recorder functions. To codify this policy, the FAA is proposing that, 
for airplanes, the CVR and DFDR must be installed in separate 
containers, each meeting the crashworthiness requirements already in 
the regulations. This proposal is not expected to result in any change 
or cost to operators or manufacturers. Since there is no cost or change 
in policy, this requirement is proposed to be effective at the time of 
the final rule.
    If developed, the FAA will allow combination units to be installed 
in rotorcraft because of weight and size constraints in these aircraft. 
If a single combination unit is installed, however, it would still be 
required to meet the proposed airworthiness requirements for 
reliability, single electrical failures, and an independent power 
source for CVRs. This language is included in the proposed 
certification rules for rotorcraft and states that if a single 
combination unit is installed, it must meet all of the requirements of 
that section. An operator that wishes to change to a single unit 
installation would be required to retrofit its rotorcraft to include 
the new power and wiring requirements as well. No single unit 
installation will be approved without meeting these requirements 
regardless of the age of the aircraft or its original date of 
certification.

Increased DFDR Recording Rates

    The quality of data recovered from FDRs is critical to determining 
the cause of aircraft accidents. Recent advances in flight data 
recorder technology have centered around increasing the number of 
parameters recorded, improving the recording medium, and improving the 
reliability, maintainability, survivability, and recoverability of 
recorded data; however, the required data recording rates have lagged 
behind available technology. A number of parameters currently are 
required to be recorded at a rate of 1 or 2 Hertz (Hz), but flight 
tests demonstrate that sensing and recording equipment can support data 
rates ranging from 20 Hz to 100 Hz. Therefore, based on recommendations 
by the National Research Council (recommendation 3-3, ``Aviation Safety 
and Pilot Control; Understanding and Preventing Unfavorable Pilot-
Vehicle Interactions,'' 1997) and the NTSB, the FAA is proposing that 
certain parameters of force and displacement inputs to the primary 
flight controls by the pilots and associated primary flight control 
surface deflections be recorded at a rate of at least 16 Hz.
    Similarly, higher data rates are considered feasible for rotorcraft 
flight controls. In accordance with European Organisation for Civil 
Aviation Equipment (EUROCAE) document ED-112 (Minimum Operational 
Performance Specification for Crash Protected Airborne Recorder 
Systems) dated March 2003, the FAA is proposing increased recording 
rates for newly manufactured rotorcraft.

Data-Link Communication

    Traditional communication in the U.S. national airspace system is 
by voice. As the aeronautical community works to provide communication 
systems that enhance safety, efficiency, and capacity, a key element is 
the introduction of data-link communication. Data-link communication 
provides text message exchanges between aircraft, air traffic service 
facilities, air traffic controllers, and pilots. Data-link 
communication can act as an alternative to voice communication, and as 
a replacement when voice communication is not adequate to meet the 
performance needed for the information exchanged.
    Data-link communication is playing an increasing role in attaining 
such objectives as reduced separation and user-preferred routings, and 
is being integrated into aircraft flight management equipment. As the 
scope of data-link communication use increases, it becomes more crucial 
that accident and incident investigators be given a full picture of the 
flight deck dynamics, flightcrew workload, and flightcrew use of 
avionics that are initiated by the actual data transmitted to and 
received by the flightcrew.
    Using data-link communication, an air traffic controller can 
directly transmit textual instructions, clearances, and other safety 
related information to an aircraft. As text communication replaces 
voice communication, the need arises to define the text message sets 
being used and to record the actual text messages received on an 
aircraft that provide instructions to or simply increase the workload 
of the flightcrew.
    The proposed rule would require that, if data-link communication 
equipment is installed, all data-link communication messages received 
on an aircraft be recorded. The FAA considered proposing the recording 
of only those messages that affect the speed, heading, and altitude of 
an aircraft, but was unable to clearly describe this smaller set of 
data messages. Although not every data-link communication received may 
be critical to accident investigation, the FAA's assessment of data-
link communication equipment indicates that the burden is almost the 
same whether 25 percent or 100 percent of incoming messages are 
recorded. The bulk of the cost of recording comes from the requirement 
to record at least one message, because that requirement forces the 
equipment and wiring to be established. Selecting certain messages to 
be recorded merely makes the recordation more complicated and could 
result in extensive, inconsistent review of text message sets during 
certification. The NTSB also has suggested to the FAA that the 
recordation of all data-link communication would give it a better 
picture of the flightcrew workload during the time leading up to an 
accident or incident.
    The FAA is requesting specific comments concerning the number of 
data-link communication messages that are required to be recorded. 
Commenters are requested to propose clearly defined sets of messages 
that they believe will satisfy the goal of recording important flight 
deck communications, and an indication of the cost comparison between 
the recordation requirement proposed here and any suggested by the 
commenters.
    The proposed rule indicates that the data-link communications are 
to be sent using an approved message set. No specific data-link 
communication message set is proposed in order to avoid unnecessary 
restriction of future systems. The FAA intends to approve standardized 
message sets such as those found in ICAO Annex 10, volume III, section 
3, document 9705, ``Manual of Technical Provisions for the Aeronautical 
Telecommunications Network (ATN),'' section 2.3.4,

[[Page 9757]]

Controller Pilot Data Link Communication Application: Formal 
Definitions of Messages; or those established using RTCA, Inc., 
Document No. RTCA/DO-219, ``Minimum Operational Performance Standards 
for ATC Two-Way Data Link Communications,'' appendix A (August 27, 
1993). The FAA does not intend to encourage the creation of 
individualized data message sets. The proliferation of individual 
message sets would most likely complicate accident investigation 
unnecessarily. As newer systems develop and the current standards are 
modified and improved, the FAA does not want the rule to become quickly 
outdated by defining a current standard. Accordingly, the notice is 
written as a performance standard for recording, with the individual 
message set to be approved at certification to allow the most recent 
developments to be included. Further discussion of allowable message 
sets would be presented in advisory material that would be issued at 
the time of the final rule.
    The proposed rule also requires that the data-link communication 
messages be sent to the recorder from the communications unit that 
translates the signal into a usable format. In most cases, this is the 
flight management system or communications management unit. No specific 
term is being used because no particular system is being required. The 
FAA anticipates that this recorded signal would be the same as the one 
sent to the cockpit display.
    The FAA understands that there are three places that data-link 
communication messages could be picked up for recording--as the 
incoming radio signal enters the aircraft, as the data is transmitted 
from the communications unit to the cockpit display, or as the data is 
displayed on the cockpit display. The FAA chose the second option for 
several reasons. First, radio signals entering the aircraft contain 
extraneous information that is not relevant to accident or incident 
investigation. Moreover, these signals need to be translated from a 
radio signal to a text message. Second, the FAA is unable to propose a 
practical, feasible method of capturing ``what the pilot sees'' off of 
the actual cockpit display. Last, there is no developed technology for 
reliable recording of this information. In short, the FAA is trying to 
minimize the burden on manufacturers in wiring and additional 
equipment, and to minimize the burden on the FAA and any eventual 
investigators by not capturing more data than is needed. The 
communications unit signal is already being generated and would allow 
investigators to see the incoming data message and any acknowledgement 
or response by the flightcrew. If the proposed rule language is not 
clear, the FAA requests comments as to the best way to describe this 
signal and its relationship to generic communications equipment.
    The goal of data-link communication recording is to record enough 
of the information to enable the following items to be determined, 
either by direct recordation or formal deduction of the recorded 
information:
     The content of data-link communication messages as 
displayed on the flight deck. The precise content need not be recorded 
if the content can be deduced, such as the message element number, any 
variable of that message element, and timing information.
     The message priority assignment.
     The number of messages in uplink/downlink queues.
     The content of all messages generated by the flightcrew.
     The time each downlink message is generated, that is, when 
the flightcrew selects ``send.''
     The time any message was available for display to the 
flightcrew.
     The time any message was actually displayed by the 
flightcrew.
    Two hours of data-link communications would be required to be 
recorded, as is proposed for all cockpit voice communications. Weather 
radar is not considered part of a data-link communication message set 
and need not be recorded.
Data-Link Communication Recording Applicability
    The proposed data-link communication recording requirements would 
apply to all aircraft manufactured on or after [insert date 2 years 
from the effective date of the final rule], on which data-link 
communication equipment is installed. The FAA is not proposing that 
data-link communication equipment be required on any aircraft; the 
requirement is to record it if the equipment is installed. Similarly, 
any aircraft on which data-link communication equipment is voluntarily 
installed on or after [insert date 2 years from the effective date of 
the final rule], as a retrofit would also be required to record all 
data-link communications as of the date of installation.
    These proposed effective dates were recommended by the NTSB. The 
current data-link communication equipment being used does not use the 
same message sets, and often includes information extraneous to the 
operation of the aircraft. The FAA anticipates that both the means and 
the messages that are to be recorded will be better defined once this 
rule is in place and data message sets are approved.

Dual Recording Systems

    The FAA is not proposing the installation of two complete recording 
systems (two CVRs and two DFDRs) in each aircraft, as recommended by 
the NTSB. After a careful analysis of the benefits of having two 
systems, the FAA is unable to justify the excessive cost that would be 
incurred in the installation of two complete systems. The NTSB has not 
cited any instance in which at least one of the two recorders present 
has not been recovered. In addition, the FAA finds that in the case of 
an accident so catastrophic that neither recorder survives, a second 
set of recorders located in the front of the aircraft would probably 
not survive either. The FAA specifically requests commenters to present 
any arguments and cost data on the desirability of requiring two 
combination CVR/DFDR recording systems. The FAA does not anticipate 
that dual recording systems would be implemented in a final rule, but 
that any information provided may be considered for future rulemaking 
action.
    The FAA finds much greater evidence of benefit in changes to wiring 
systems that could prevent inadvertent shutdown of power sources, and 
for an independent power supply for CVRs, and has included those 
provisions in this proposed rule for newly manufactured airplanes and 
rotorcraft. Accident investigations indicate that in some instances 
(Swissair flight 111, ValuJet flight 592, Delta flight 2461, and 
Egyptair flight 990), valuable voice and background sounds may have 
been recorded if the CVR had remained powered. Because the airplane 
involved in TWA flight 800 broke up in flight and there was no 
electrical connection between the cockpit and the CVR installed in the 
tail section, it is doubtful that useful information would have been 
obtained even if there had been a 10-minute independent power source 
installed.
    The FAA is not proposing a retrofit of a 10-minute independent 
power supply for CVRs. We are not able to justify the significant costs 
of the development and installation of such equipment for in-service 
aircraft. The FAA is also not proposing a 10-minute independent power 
source for FDRs. The FAA has found that in the event of a substantial 
loss of power to the aircraft, there would be no data coming from 
unpowered

[[Page 9758]]

sensors; therefore, there would be nothing for a powered FDR to record.
    The FAA has recently become aware of potential security benefits of 
a deployable flight recorder system (one that can be jettisoned from 
the aircraft). We envision that such a system would be an additional 
set of recorders (flight data and cockpit voice recorders) that could 
be ejected from the airplane in the event of an emergency. The FAA does 
not anticipate that a deployable system would be implemented in a final 
rule, but information provided by commenters may be considered for 
future rulemaking action.
    This proposed rule does not include any provisions for such a 
deployable system. Significant information regarding such a system 
would be needed before the agency could assess the costs and benefits 
of such devices. The agency is interested in receiving such 
information, including the benefits of a deployable recorder system, 
how it might work, how it would be installed on an aircraft for 
deployment, the deployment methodology (manual or automatic), changes 
to aircraft design and certification, and especially the costs for 
development, installation and maintenance of a hardened, crash 
survivable, and easily recoverable system.
    Please submit all comments and information regarding the 
feasibility and specifications for a deployable recording system to the 
docket for this rulemaking.

Recordation of Cockpit Communication or Audio Signals

    The FAA is proposing to require certain aircraft required to have a 
cockpit voice recorder and a flight data recorder to include the 
interphone requirements of Sec.  23.1457(a)(3) through (a)(5) or Sec.  
25.1457(a)(3) through (a)(5), as applicable. Transport category 
airplanes would be required to be retrofit and all airplanes and 
rotorcraft manufactured on or after [insert date 2 years from the 
effective date of the final rule], would be required to comply at the 
time of manufacture.

Changes to the Aircraft Certification Regulations

Part 23 Airplanes

Cockpit Voice Recorders
    All airplanes certificated under part 23 that are required to have 
a CVR and an FDR would be required to have their CVRs in a box separate 
from the FDR. This requirement merely codifies the current policy of 
the FAA and would be effective at adoption of the final rule. This 
would be added in proposed Sec.  23.1457(d)(6).
    For all part 23 airplanes manufactured on or after [insert date 2 
years from the effective date of the final rule], four new proposed 
requirements would be added to Sec.  23.1457. First, the CVR would be 
required to record data-link communications when such equipment is 
installed on the airplane (proposed Sec.  23.1457(a)(6)). Second, the 
CVR would be required to receive its electrical power from the bus that 
provides the maximum reliability for operation without jeopardizing 
service to essential or emergency loads (proposed Sec.  23.1457(d)(1)). 
Third, the CVR would be required to be installed so that no single 
electrical failure could disable both the CVR and the DFDR (proposed 
Sec.  23.1457(d)(4)). Last, for all airplanes required to have a CVR 
and an FDR, a 10-minute independent power source would be required to 
which the CVR is switched automatically. Based on the NTSB 
recommendation, the independent power source is not proposed for 
aircraft that are required to have only a cockpit voice recorder under 
Sec.  135.151.
Digital Flight Data Recorders
    For part 23 airplanes, the DFDR requirements of Sec.  23.1459 would 
be changed as follows. All airplanes certificated under part 23 would 
be required to have their DFDRs in a box separate from the CVR 
(proposed Sec.  23.1459(a)(7)). This requirement merely codifies the 
current FAA policy and would be effective at adoption of the final 
rule.
    For all part 23 airplanes manufactured on or after [insert date 2 
years from the effective date of the final rule], there are two new 
requirements being proposed as additions to Sec.  23.1459. First, the 
DFDR would be required to receive its electrical power from the bus 
that provides the maximum reliability for operation without 
jeopardizing service to essential or emergency loads (proposed Sec.  
23.1459(a)(3)). Second, the DFDR would be required to be installed so 
that no single electrical failure could disable both the CVR and the 
DFDR, (proposed Sec.  23.1459(a)(6)). These requirements are discussed 
separately in this preamble.

Part 25 Airplanes

Cockpit Voice Recorder
    For part 25 airplanes, the CVR requirements of Sec.  25.1457 will 
be changed as follows. All airplanes certificated under part 25 that 
are required to have a CVR and an FDR would be required to have their 
CVRs in a box separate from the FDR (proposed Sec.  25.1457(d)(6)). 
This requirement merely codifies the current FAA policy and would be 
effective at adoption of the final rule.
    For all part 25 airplanes manufactured on or after [insert date 2 
years from the effective date of the final rule], there are four new 
requirements being proposed as additions to Sec.  25.1457. First, the 
CVR would be required to record data-link communications when such 
equipment is installed on the airplane (proposed Sec.  25.1457(a)(6)). 
Second, the CVR would be required to receive its electrical power from 
the bus that provides the maximum reliability for operation without 
jeopardizing service to essential or emergency loads (proposed Sec.  
25.1457(d)(1)). Third, the CVR would be required to be installed so 
that no single electrical failure could disable both the CVR and the 
DFDR (proposed Sec.  25.1457(d)(4)). Last, for all airplanes required 
to have a CVR and an FDR, a 10-minute independent power source would be 
required, to which the CVR is switched automatically. These 
requirements are discussed separately in this preamble.
Digital Flight Data Recorders
    For part 25 airplanes, the DFDR requirements of Sec.  25.1459 would 
be changed as follows. All airplanes certificated under part 25 would 
be required to have their DFDRs in a box separate from the CVR 
(proposed Sec.  25.1459(a)(8)). This requirement merely codifies the 
current FAA policy and would be effective at adoption of the final 
rule.
    For all part 25 airplanes manufactured on or after [insert date 2 
years from the effective date of the final rule], two new proposed 
requirements would be added to Sec.  25.1459. First, the DFDR would be 
required to receive its electrical power from the bus that provides the 
maximum reliability for operation without jeopardizing service to 
essential or emergency loads (proposed Sec.  25.1459(a)(3)). Second, 
the DFDR would be required to be installed so that no single electrical 
failure could disable both the CVR and the DFDR (proposed Sec.  
25.1459(a)(7)). These requirements are discussed separately in this 
preamble.

Part 27 or Part 29 Rotorcraft

Cockpit Voice Recorder
    For part 27 or part 29 rotorcraft, the CVR requirements of 
Sec. Sec.  27.1457 and 29.1457 would be changed as follows. For all 
rotorcraft certificated under part 27 or part 29 required to have a CVR 
and an FDR, one combination unit could be installed (proposed

[[Page 9759]]

Sec. Sec.  27.1457(h) and 29.1457(h)). This requirement codifies the 
current FAA policy and would be effective at adoption of the final 
rule.
    For all part 27 or part 29 rotorcraft manufactured on or after 
[insert date 2 years from the effective date of the final rule], four 
new proposed requirements would be added to Sec. Sec.  27.1457 and 
29.1457. First, the CVR would be required to have the ability to record 
data-link communications when such equipment is installed on the 
rotorcraft (proposed Sec. Sec.  27.1457(a)(6) and 29.1457(a)(6)). 
Second, the CVR would be required to receive its electrical power from 
the bus that provides the maximum reliability for operation without 
jeopardizing service to essential or emergency loads (proposed 
Sec. Sec.  27.1457(d)(1) and 29.1457(d)(1)). Third, if the CVR and DFDR 
are installed in separate boxes, then the CVR would be required to be 
installed so that no single electrical failure could disable both the 
CVR and the DFDR when both are installed (proposed Sec. Sec.  
27.1457(d)(4) and 29.1457(d)(4)). Fourth, all rotorcraft certificated 
under part 27 or part 29 required to have a CVR and an FDR would be 
required to include a 10-minute independent power source for the CVR to 
which it is switched automatically (proposed Sec. Sec.  27.1457(d)(5) 
and 29.1457(d)(5)). These requirements are discussed separately in this 
preamble.
Digital Flight Data Recorders
    For part 27 or part 29 rotorcraft, the DFDR requirements of 
Sec. Sec.  27.1459 and 29.1459 would be changed as follows. For all 
rotorcraft certificated under part 27 or part 29 that must have both a 
CVR and a DFDR, one combination unit could be installed (proposed 
Sec. Sec.  27.1459(e) and 29.1459(e)). This requirement codifies the 
current FAA policy and would be effective at adoption of the final 
rule.
    For all part 27 and part 29 rotorcraft manufactured on or after 
[insert date 2 years from the effective date of the final rule], two 
new proposed requirements would be added to Sec. Sec.  27.1459 and 
29.1459. First, the DFDR would be required to receive its electrical 
power from the bus that provides the maximum reliability for operation 
without jeopardizing service to essential or emergency loads (proposed 
Sec. Sec.  27.1459(a)(3) and 29.1459(a)(3)). These requirements are 
discussed separately in this preamble. Second, if the CVR and the DFDR 
are installed in separate boxes, then the DFDR would be required to be 
installed so that no single electrical failure could disable both the 
CVR and the DFDR (proposed Sec. Sec.  27.1459(a)(6) and 29.1459(a)(6)).

Changes to the Aircraft Operating Regulations

Cockpit Voice Recorders--Aircraft Retrofit Requirements

    Each of the following proposed requirements would be in addition to 
all current regulations. The proposed language uses the word ``also'' 
to indicate that the current regulations for the CVR are not 
eliminated.
    The retrofit proposal would require, for all airplanes, 2 hours of 
cockpit voice communication to be recorded using a CVR that meets the 
standards of TSO-C123a, or later revision. Current regulations require 
that 15 minutes to 30 minutes of cockpit voice communication be 
recorded and do not specify the recording medium. The new operating 
requirements are proposed in Sec. Sec.  91.609(i)(2), 121.359(i)(2), 
125.227(g)(2), and 135.151(f)(2).
    For all airplanes currently in service that are required to have 
both a CVR nd an FDR, this proposal would be a retrofit requirement and 
would require compliance no later than [insert date 4 years from the 
effective date of the final rule].
    These enhancements would also be required on all aircraft 
(including rotorcraft) manufactured on or after [insert date 2 years 
from the effective date of the final rule].
    The proposal also would require that the CVR be operated 
continuously from the start of the use of the checklist before starting 
the engines for the purpose of flight, to completion of the final 
checklist at the termination of the flight. The current operating rules 
contain a mixture of requirements concerning the time the CVR must be 
operated. This language would be adopted in each of the operating parts 
to make the requirement the same, regardless of the operating rules 
under which an aircraft is operated.
    This ``checklist-to-checklist'' requirement would be effective at 
adoption of the final rule. The FAA finds that this requirement can 
easily be incorporated into aircraft operations without a time for 
retrofit, because it requires only a new checklist be used. This 
requirement would be added in Sec. Sec.  91.609(e)(2), 121.359(i)(3) 
and (j)(3), 125.227(g)(3) and (h)(3), and 135.151(a)(2), (b)(2), and 
(g)(1)(ii).
    For transport category airplanes, these proposed retrofit times 
also would apply to the inclusion of current Sec.  25.1457(a)(3), 
(a)(4), and (a)(5), which address the recording of cockpit interphone 
communications. These three paragraphs already exist in part 25 and 
concern which voice communications must be recorded. This requirement 
would make the rule the same for all transport category airplanes, 
regardless of the part under which they operate. The proposed 
requirements would be added to Sec. Sec.  91.609(i)(3), 121.359(i)(4), 
125.227(g)(1), and 135.151(f)(3).
    Part 129 airplanes registered in the United States currently do not 
have a cockpit voice recorder requirement. These requirements would be 
added in proposed new Sec.  129.22. In addition, Sec.  129.1 would be 
amended to add new Sec.  129.22 as a requirement.

Cockpit Voice Recorders--Newly Manufactured Aircraft Requirements

    The CVR requirements would be upgraded for all aircraft 
manufactured on or after [insert date 2 years from the effective date 
of the final rule]. The operating rules differ in their CVR 
requirements and require different amendment language to account for 
the current requirements. The intent is to have the same requirements 
across the board for all newly manufactured aircraft. In some cases, 
proposed changes to the rule appear less detailed because certain parts 
of the current regulations already contain some of the requirements. 
Accordingly, the following discussion explains the proposed changes by 
operating rule part. Each of the following proposed requirements is in 
addition to all current regulations. The proposed language uses the 
word ``also'' to indicate that the current regulations for the CVR are 
not eliminated.
    Proposed Sec.  91.609(j) would require that CVRs in newly 
manufactured aircraft (aircraft manufactured on or after [insert date 2 
years from the effective date of the final rule]) meet all of the 
requirements of Sec. Sec.  23.1457, 25.1457, 27.1457, or 29.1457, 
depending on the type of aircraft. This proposed section would 
incorporate all of the current and proposed requirements for CVRs, 
including the recording of 2 hours of cockpit voice communications 
using a recorder that meets the standards of TSO-C123a, or later 
revision.
    Proposed Sec.  121.359(j) would require that the CVRs in all newly 
manufactured turbine engine-powered airplanes meet the requirements of 
Sec. Sec.  23.1457 or 25.1457. These are the provisions for data-link 
communication recording, electrical power source, single electrical 
failure, 10-minute independent power source, and separate containers 
that were discussed previously. Cockpit voice recorders also

[[Page 9760]]

would have to record for 2 hours using a recorder that meets the 
standards of TSO-C123a, or later revision. The interphone requirements, 
previously applicable only to transport category airplanes and the 
checklist-to-checklist requirement, would also be required.
    Proposed Sec.  125.227(h) would require that all CVRs in all newly 
manufactured turbine engine-powered airplanes meet all of the 
requirements of Sec.  25.1457(a)(3) through (a)(6), (d)(1), (d)(4), 
(d)(5), and (d)(6), as proposed. These are the provisions for 
interphone recording, data-link communications recording, electrical 
power source, single electrical failure, 10-minute independent power 
source, and separate containers. New paragraph (h) also proposes the 
requirement for 2 hours of recording using a CVR that meets the 
standards of TSO-C123a, or later revision, and the checklist-to-
checklist requirement as discussed previously.
    Proposed Sec.  129.22 would apply all to all U.S.-registered 
aircraft operated in common carriage by a foreign person or air 
carrier. These aircraft would be required to have a cockpit voice 
recorder installed that meets the standards of TSO-C123a, or later 
revision. The cockpit voice recorders would also be required to record 
the information that would be required to be recorded if that aircraft 
were operated under part 121, 125, or 135 and be installed by the 
compliance times for those parts, as applicable to the aircraft.
    Proposed Sec.  135.151(g)(1) would apply to newly manufactured 
multiengine turbine-powered airplanes or rotorcraft that have a 
passenger seating configuration of six or more seats, for which two 
pilots are required, and that is required to have a FDR. This paragraph 
contains the proposed new manufacture requirement for aircraft that 
would otherwise be covered by Sec.  135.151(a). The proposed 
requirements are broken down as follows:
    For part 23 airplanes, the CVRs would be required to meet all of 
the requirements of Sec.  23.1457, as proposed. These are the 
provisions for data-link communications recording, electrical power 
source, single electrical failure, 10-minute independent power source, 
and separate containers. The interphone requirements of Sec.  
23.1457(a)(3) through (a)(5) would also be included.
    For part 25 airplanes, the CVRs would be required to meet all of 
the requirements of Sec.  25.1457, as proposed. These are the 
provisions for interphone recording, data-link communications 
recording, electrical power source, single electrical failure, 10-
minute independent power source, and separate containers.
    For part 27 rotorcraft, the CVRs would be required to meet the 
requirements of Sec.  27.1457(a)(6), (d)(1), (d)(4), (d)(5), and (h). 
These are the provisions for data-link communications recording, 
electrical power source, single electrical failure, 10-minute 
independent power source, and combination units.
    For part 29 rotorcraft, the CVRs would be required to meet the 
requirements of Sec.  29.1457(a)(6), (d)(1), (d)(4), (d)(5), and (h). 
These are the provisions for data-link communications recording, 
electrical power source, single electrical failure, 10-minute 
independent power source, and combination units.
    Proposed Sec.  135.151(g)(1) also includes the proposed requirement 
for 2 hours of recording using a CVR that meets the standards of TSO-
C123a, or later revision, and the proposed checklist-to-checklist 
requirement as discussed above, for all aircraft required to have a CVR 
regardless of certification basis.
    Proposed Sec.  135.151(g)(2) would apply to newly manufactured 
multiengine turbine-powered airplanes or rotorcraft that have a 
passenger seating configuration of 20 or more seats and that are 
required to have an FDR under Sec.  135.152. This paragraph contains 
the proposed new manufacture requirement for aircraft that would 
otherwise be covered by Sec.  135.151(b), with the addition of 
rotorcraft of this size. The proposed requirements are broken down as 
follows:
    For part 23 airplanes, the CVRs would be required to meet all of 
the requirements of Sec.  23.1457, as proposed. These are the 
provisions for interphone recording, data-link communications 
recording, electrical power source, single electrical failure, 10-
minute independent power source, and separate containers.
    For part 25 airplanes, the CVRs would be required to meet all of 
the requirements of Sec.  25.1457. These are the provisions for 
interphone recording, data-link communications recording, electrical 
power source, single electrical failure, 10-minute independent power 
source, and separate containers.
    For part 27 rotorcraft, the CVRs would be required to meet the 
requirements of Sec.  27.1457(a)(6), (d)(1), (d)(4), (d)(5), and (h). 
These are the provisions for data-link communications recording, 
electrical power source, single electrical failure, 10-minute 
independent power source, and combination units.
    For part 29 rotorcraft, the CVRs would be required to meet the 
requirements of Sec.  29.1457(a)(6), (d)(1), (d)(4), (d)(5), and (h). 
These are the provisions for data-link communications recording, 
electrical power source, single electrical failure, 10-minute 
independent power source, and combination units.
    Proposed Sec.  135.151(g)(2) also include