Duke Energy Corporation; Concerning the Application for Irradiation of Mixed Oxide Lead Test Assemblies at Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2, Supplement No. 1 to Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact, 8849-8851 [05-3397]
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Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 35 / Wednesday, February 23, 2005 / Notices
BILLING CODE 4510–30–C
NUCLEAR REGULATORY
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Agency Information Collection
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SUMMARY: The NRC has recently
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informs potential respondents that an
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annual responses: 7,330 (10 for NRC
VerDate jul<14>2003
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Form 628 and 7,320 for NRC Form 629
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PO 00000
Frm 00088
Fmt 4703
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Dated in Rockville, Maryland, this 14th
day of February, 2005.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Brenda Jo. Shelton,
NRC Clearance Officer, Office of Information
Services.
[FR Doc. 05–3399 Filed 2–22–05; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590–01–P
NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION
[Docket Nos. 50–413 and 50–414]
Duke Energy Corporation; Concerning
the Application for Irradiation of Mixed
Oxide Lead Test Assemblies at
Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and
2, Supplement No. 1 to Environmental
Assessment and Finding of No
Significant Impact
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC) is considering issuance of
amendments to the Facility Operating
Licenses to permit the use of mixed
oxide (MOX) lead test assemblies
(LTAs) in one of the two Catawba units
and is considering the granting of
exemptions from (1) the requirements of
Title 10 of the Code of Federal
Regulations (10 CFR) Section 50.44(a),
10 CFR 50.46(a)(1) and 10 CFR part 50,
Appendix K with respect to the use of
M5TM fuel rod cladding; (2) 10 CFR
50.46(a)(1) and Appendix K to part 50
with respect to the use of MOX fuel; and
(3) certain physical security
requirements of 10 CFR parts 11 and 73
that are usually required at fuel
fabrication facilities for the protection of
strategic quantities of special nuclear
material. A similar request for an
exemption from the requirements of 10
CFR 50.44(a) with respect to the use of
M5TM fuel rod cladding is not being
granted since 10 CFR 50.44 has been
changed and an exemption is no longer
necessary. The amended licenses and
exemptions would apply to Renewed
Facility Operating License Nos. NPF–35
and NPF–52, issued to Duke Energy
Corporation (Duke, the licensee), for
operation of the Catawba Nuclear
E:\FR\FM\23FEN1.SGM
23FEN1
EN23FE05.019
[FR Doc. 05–3420 Filed 2–22–05; 8:45 am]
8849
8850
Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 35 / Wednesday, February 23, 2005 / Notices
Station (Catawba), Units 1 and 2,
located in York County, South Carolina.
Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.21, the NRC
issued an environmental assessment
(EA) and finding of no significant
impact (FONSI) on this matter by letter
dated August 10, 2004, and also
published it in the Federal Register on
August 17, 2004 (69 FR 51112)
(Reference 1). However, in letters dated
August 31, September 20, October 29,
and December 10, 2004, (References 2,
3, 5 and 6) the licensee stated that
certain radiological dose consequence
information provided in previous
submittals was based on out-of-date
input values for design basis accident
doses with low enriched uranium (LEU)
fuel and provided additional
information describing the updated
licensing basis dose consequences for
the analyzed accidents. Since the EA
that was published in the Federal
Register on August 17, 2004, was based,
in part, on the outdated information, the
NRC staff is issuing this Supplement to
the EA to address the updated
information. The dose consequence
analyses that were affected by this
change are (a) the control room doses for
the loss-of-coolant accident analysis
(LOCA), the locked rotor analysis (LRA)
and the rod ejection analysis (REA), (b)
the exclusion area boundary (EAB)
doses for the LRA and REA, and (c) the
low-population zone (LPZ) doses for the
LRA, the REA and the LOCA. Section
5.6, ‘‘Design Basis Accident
Consequences,’’ is the section of the EA
that is affected by this change. This
Supplement provides an update of the
affected portions of Section 5.6 that
supercedes and replaces the comparable
portions of Section 5.6 of the EA
published on August 17, 2004, to
address the information provided in the
licensee’s letters dated August 31,
September 20, October 29, and
December 10, 2004, and reaffirms the
NRC’s conclusions for the EA and the
FONSI.
5.6 Design-Basis Accident
Consequences (DBAs)
Duke has evaluated the radiological
consequences of several categories of
postulated DBAs involving MOX LTAs
including the category of at-power
accidents involving fuel damage to a
significant portion of the entire core.
These accidents range from the LRA that
is calculated to damage 9.5 percent of
the fuel assemblies (FAs) in the core (18
FAs) for Unit 1 and 5.0 percent (10 FAs)
for Unit 2, the REA that is calculated to
damage 50 percent of the core (97 FAs)
for either unit, to the large break LOCA
that is calculated to damage the full core
(193 FAs). Accordingly, considering the
VerDate jul<14>2003
16:28 Feb 22, 2005
Jkt 205001
proportion that four MOX LTAs
represents of the number of fuel
assemblies that are calculated to be
damaged by each DBA, the calculated
EAB thyroid dose increases that are
attributable to the use of MOX are: for
the LRA, 14.1 percent for Unit 1 and
25.4 percent for Unit 2; for the REA,
2.62 percent for each unit; and, for the
LOCA, 1.32 percent.
The analysis of public doses for the
EAB and LPZ resulting from this class
of accidents considered by Duke is
discussed below. In addition, the NRC
staff has evaluated the radiological
consequences of affected DBAs on
personnel in the control room.
5.6.2 At-Power Accidents
The current licensing basis analyses
assume that all FAs (193) are affected by
a LOCA. For the LRA, 9.5 percent of the
Unit 1 core is assumed to be affected
and 5.0 percent of the Unit 2 core is
assumed to be affected; for the REA, 50
percent of the core is assumed to be
affected. For these events, Duke assumes
that the four MOX LTAs are in the
affected fuel population displacing four
LEU assemblies. Because the dose is
directly proportional to the fuel
assembly inventory and gap fractions,
the impact on the previously analyzed
accident doses is based on quantifying
the change in fission product release
due to replacing up to four LEU fuel
assemblies with the MOX LTAs.
Although the consequences of these
accidents could be determined by
updating the current licensing basis
analyses, Duke elected to perform a
comparative evaluation, which the NRC
staff has independently verified.
Duke selected the thyroid dose due to
Iodine–131 (I–131) as the evaluation
benchmark because the thyroid dose is
typically more limiting than the whole
body dose in that there is less margin
between calculated thyroid doses and
its associated dose criterion. Also, I–131
is generally the most significant
contributor to thyroid dose due to its
abundance and long decay half-life.
Duke has determined that the I–131
inventory in a MOX LTA is 9 percent
greater than that of an equivalent LEU
fuel assembly.
Loss-of-Coolant Accident
For the LOCA, the four MOX LTAs
represent 2.1 percent of the 193
assemblies in the core and the potential
increase in the iodine release and the
thyroid dose would be 1.32 percent. The
resulting doses are 90.2 rem at the EAB
and 12.9 rem at the LPZ. These doses
are below the 300 rem dose reference
value of 10 CFR 100.11, ‘‘Determination
of exclusion area, low population zone,
PO 00000
Frm 00089
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
and population center distance,’’ and
are not considered to be significant.
Locked-Rotor Accident
For the LRA in Unit 1, the four MOX
LTAs represent 22 percent of the 18
affected assemblies in the core. The
potential increase in the iodine release
and the thyroid dose is 14.1 percent for
Unit 1. The resulting doses are 26.9 rem
at the EAB, and 4.6 rem at the LPZ.
These doses are below the 300 rem dose
reference value of 10 CFR 100.11, and
are not considered to be significant.
For the LRA in Unit 2, the four MOX
LTAs represent 40 percent of the 10
affected assemblies in the core. The
potential increase in the iodine release
and the thyroid dose is 25.4 percent for
Unit 2. The resulting thryoid doses are
27.8 rem at the EAB, and 4.5 rem at the
LPZ. These doses are below the 300 rem
dose criterion of 10 CFR 100.11, and are
not considered to be significant.
Rod-Ejection Accident
For the REA in Unit 1, the four MOX
LTAs represent 4.1 percent of the 97
assemblies in the core assumed to be
involved in the postulated accident and
the potential increase in the iodine
release and the resulting thyroid dose
would be 2.62 percent. The resulting
calculated thyroid doses are 22.3 rem at
the EAB, and 17.8 rem at the LPZ. These
doses are below the 300 rem dose
criterion of 10 CFR 100.11, and are not
considered to be significant.
For the REA in Unit 2, the four MOX
LTAs represent 4.1 percent of the 97
assemblies in the core assumed to be
involved in the postulated accident and
the potential increase in the iodine
release and the resulting thyroid dose
would be 2.62 percent. Even though the
percentage of iodine released from the
fuel is the same for Units 1 and 2 (2.62
percent), the release of radioiodine to
the environment is greater for Unit 2
due to differences in the design of the
steam generators, thus resulting in a
higher dose than calculated for Unit 1.
The resulting calculated thyroid doses
are 31.5 rem at the EAB, and 19.8 rem
at the LPZ. These doses are below the
300 rem dose criterion of 10 CFR
100.11, and are not considered to be
significant.
5.6.3 Control Room Dose
Control room dose is the only
occupational dose that has been
previously considered for DBA
conditions. The at-power accident with
the most severe consequences for the
control room personnel is the LOCA; the
control room doses from postulated
locked-rotor or rod-ejection accidents
are bounded by the calculated control
E:\FR\FM\23FEN1.SGM
23FEN1
Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 35 / Wednesday, February 23, 2005 / Notices
room dose from the LOCA. Duke
determined that the resulting control
room thyroid dose after a postulated
LOCA considering the use of four MOX
fuel LTAs would be 13 rem. This is
below the NRC staff’s 30 rem acceptance
criterion and is not considered to be
significant.
5.6.4 Conclusion
The DBA with the greatest
consequences at the EAB (a LOCA)
would result in a calculated offsite dose
of 90.2 rem to the thyroid. The DBA
with the greatest consequences at the
LPZ (a REA) would result in calculated
offsite doses of 17.8 and 19.8 rem to the
thyroid for Units 1 and 2, respectively.
These doses remain below the 300 rem
reference value to the thyroid specified
in 10 CFR 100.11 for offsite releases.
The calculated change in dose
consequences at the EAB and at the LPZ
that could be attributable to the use of
the four MOX fuel LTAs is not
significant.
The DBA with the greatest
consequences to the control room
personnel, a LOCA, would result in a
calculated dose of 13 rem to the thyroid.
This dose remains below the 30 rem
acceptance criterion. The calculated
change in dose consequences for control
room personnel that could be
attributable to the use of the four MOX
fuel LTAs is not significant.
The NRC staff concludes that the
environmental impact resulting from
incremental increases in EAB, LPZ, and
control room dose following postulated
DBAs that could occur as a result of the
irradiation of four MOX LTAs does not
represent a significant environmental
impact.
11.0 Agencies and Persons Consulted
Related to the publication of the EA
in August 2004, (Reference 1), on July
30, 2004, the NRC staff consulted with
the South Carolina State official, Mr.
Mike Gandy of the Department of Health
and Environmental Controls, regarding
the environmental impact of the
proposed action. The State official had
no comments. Related to the issuance of
this Supplement to the EA, on February
8, 2005, the NRC staff consulted with
the South Carolina State official, Mr.
Mike Gandy, of the Department of
Health and Environmental Controls,
regarding the environmental impact of
the proposed action. The State official
had no comment.
12.0 References
1. NRC letter to Duke, Catawba
Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2—
Environmental Assessment and Finding
of No Significant Impact Related to the
VerDate jul<14>2003
16:28 Feb 22, 2005
Jkt 205001
Use of Mixed Oxide Lead Test
Assemblies (TAC Nos. MB7863,
MMB7864, MC0824, MC0825), dated
August 10, 2004 (ADAMS
ML042230368). Also published in the
Federal Register on August 17, 2004, 69
FR 51112.
2. Duke letter to NRC, Dose Inputs,
August 31, 2004 (ADAMS
ML042660144).
3. Duke letter to NRC, Revised Dose
Evaluations, September 20, 2004
(ADAMS ML042890343).
4. NRC Letter to Duke, Requesting
Additional Information, October 7, 2004
(ADAMS ML042860050).
5. Duke letter to NRC, Response to
Request for Additional Information on
Revised Dose Evaluations, October 29,
2004 (ADAMS ML043150030).
6. Duke letter to NRC, Additional
Information on Revised Dose
Evaluations, December 10, 2004
(ADAMS ML043560170).
13.0 Finding of No Significant Impact
On the basis of the EA and
Supplement No. 1 to the EA, the NRC
reaffirms its conclusion that the
proposed action will not have a
significant effect on the quality of the
human environment. Accordingly, the
NRC has determined not to prepare an
environmental impact statement for the
proposed action.
For further details with respect to the
proposed action, see the licensee’s letter
dated February 27, 2003, and
subsequent letters dated September 15,
September 23, October 1 (two letters),
October 3 (two letters), November 3 and
4, December 10, 2003, and February 2
(two letters), March 1 (three letters),
March 9 (two letters), March 16 (two
letters), March 26, March 31, April 13,
April 16, May 13, June 17, August 31,
September 20, October 4, October 29,
and December 10, 2004. Documents may
be examined, and/or copied for a fee, at
the NRC’s Public Document Room
(PDR), located at One White Flint North,
Public File Area O1 F21, 11555
Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville,
Maryland. Publicly available records
will be accessible electronically from
the Agencywide Documents Access and
Management System (ADAMS) Public
Electronic Reading Room on the Internet
at the NRC Web site, https://
www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html.
Persons who do not have access to
ADAMS or who encounter problems in
accessing the documents located in
ADAMS, should contact the NRC PDR
Reference staff by telephone at 1–800–
397–4209 or (301) 415–4737, or by email to pdr@nrc.gov.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 14th day
of February, 2005.
PO 00000
Frm 00090
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
8851
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Edwin M. Hackett,
Project Director, Project Directorate II,
Division of Licensing Project Management,
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 05–3397 Filed 2–22–05; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590–01–P
NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION
[Docket No. 50–336]
Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc.;
Millstone Power Station, Unit No. 2;
Exemption
1.0
Background
Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc.
(DNC or the licensee) is the holder of
Facility Operating License No. DPR–65,
which authorizes operation of the
Millstone Power Station, Unit No. 2
(MP2). The license provides, among
other things, that the facility is subject
to all rules, regulations, and orders of
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC, the Commission) now or hereafter
in effect.
The facility consists of a pressurized
water reactor located in New London
County, Connecticut.
2.0
Request/Action
By letter dated November 5, 2004, as
supplemented by letters dated January 6
and January 25, 2005, the licensee
submitted a request for an exemption
from the requirements of title 10 of the
Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR)
section 50.68(b)(1) for loading,
unloading, and handling of the
components of the Transnuclear (TN)
NUHOMS-32PT dry cask storage
system at MP2.
Section 50.68(b)(1) of 10 CFR sets
forth the following requirement that
must be met, in lieu of a monitoring
system capable of detecting criticality
events.
Plant procedures shall prohibit the
handling and storage at any one time of more
fuel assemblies than have been determined to
be safely subcritical under the most adverse
moderation conditions feasible by unborated
water.
The licensee is unable to satisfy the
above requirement for handling the 10
CFR part 72 licensed contents of the TN
NUHOMS-32PT system. Section
50.12(a) allows licensees to apply for an
exemption from the requirements of 10
CFR part 50 if the regulation is not
necessary to achieve the underlying
purpose of the rule and other conditions
are met. The licensee stated in the
application that compliance with 10
CFR 50.68(b)(1) is not necessary for
E:\FR\FM\23FEN1.SGM
23FEN1
Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 70, Number 35 (Wednesday, February 23, 2005)]
[Notices]
[Pages 8849-8851]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 05-3397]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket Nos. 50-413 and 50-414]
Duke Energy Corporation; Concerning the Application for
Irradiation of Mixed Oxide Lead Test Assemblies at Catawba Nuclear
Station, Units 1 and 2, Supplement No. 1 to Environmental Assessment
and Finding of No Significant Impact
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is considering issuance of
amendments to the Facility Operating Licenses to permit the use of
mixed oxide (MOX) lead test assemblies (LTAs) in one of the two Catawba
units and is considering the granting of exemptions from (1) the
requirements of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR)
Section 50.44(a), 10 CFR 50.46(a)(1) and 10 CFR part 50, Appendix K
with respect to the use of M5TM fuel rod cladding; (2) 10
CFR 50.46(a)(1) and Appendix K to part 50 with respect to the use of
MOX fuel; and (3) certain physical security requirements of 10 CFR
parts 11 and 73 that are usually required at fuel fabrication
facilities for the protection of strategic quantities of special
nuclear material. A similar request for an exemption from the
requirements of 10 CFR 50.44(a) with respect to the use of
M5TM fuel rod cladding is not being granted since 10 CFR
50.44 has been changed and an exemption is no longer necessary. The
amended licenses and exemptions would apply to Renewed Facility
Operating License Nos. NPF-35 and NPF-52, issued to Duke Energy
Corporation (Duke, the licensee), for operation of the Catawba Nuclear
[[Page 8850]]
Station (Catawba), Units 1 and 2, located in York County, South
Carolina.
Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.21, the NRC issued an environmental
assessment (EA) and finding of no significant impact (FONSI) on this
matter by letter dated August 10, 2004, and also published it in the
Federal Register on August 17, 2004 (69 FR 51112) (Reference 1).
However, in letters dated August 31, September 20, October 29, and
December 10, 2004, (References 2, 3, 5 and 6) the licensee stated that
certain radiological dose consequence information provided in previous
submittals was based on out-of-date input values for design basis
accident doses with low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel and provided
additional information describing the updated licensing basis dose
consequences for the analyzed accidents. Since the EA that was
published in the Federal Register on August 17, 2004, was based, in
part, on the outdated information, the NRC staff is issuing this
Supplement to the EA to address the updated information. The dose
consequence analyses that were affected by this change are (a) the
control room doses for the loss-of-coolant accident analysis (LOCA),
the locked rotor analysis (LRA) and the rod ejection analysis (REA),
(b) the exclusion area boundary (EAB) doses for the LRA and REA, and
(c) the low-population zone (LPZ) doses for the LRA, the REA and the
LOCA. Section 5.6, ``Design Basis Accident Consequences,'' is the
section of the EA that is affected by this change. This Supplement
provides an update of the affected portions of Section 5.6 that
supercedes and replaces the comparable portions of Section 5.6 of the
EA published on August 17, 2004, to address the information provided in
the licensee's letters dated August 31, September 20, October 29, and
December 10, 2004, and reaffirms the NRC's conclusions for the EA and
the FONSI.
5.6 Design-Basis Accident Consequences (DBAs)
Duke has evaluated the radiological consequences of several
categories of postulated DBAs involving MOX LTAs including the category
of at-power accidents involving fuel damage to a significant portion of
the entire core. These accidents range from the LRA that is calculated
to damage 9.5 percent of the fuel assemblies (FAs) in the core (18 FAs)
for Unit 1 and 5.0 percent (10 FAs) for Unit 2, the REA that is
calculated to damage 50 percent of the core (97 FAs) for either unit,
to the large break LOCA that is calculated to damage the full core (193
FAs). Accordingly, considering the proportion that four MOX LTAs
represents of the number of fuel assemblies that are calculated to be
damaged by each DBA, the calculated EAB thyroid dose increases that are
attributable to the use of MOX are: for the LRA, 14.1 percent for Unit
1 and 25.4 percent for Unit 2; for the REA, 2.62 percent for each unit;
and, for the LOCA, 1.32 percent.
The analysis of public doses for the EAB and LPZ resulting from
this class of accidents considered by Duke is discussed below. In
addition, the NRC staff has evaluated the radiological consequences of
affected DBAs on personnel in the control room.
5.6.2 At-Power Accidents
The current licensing basis analyses assume that all FAs (193) are
affected by a LOCA. For the LRA, 9.5 percent of the Unit 1 core is
assumed to be affected and 5.0 percent of the Unit 2 core is assumed to
be affected; for the REA, 50 percent of the core is assumed to be
affected. For these events, Duke assumes that the four MOX LTAs are in
the affected fuel population displacing four LEU assemblies. Because
the dose is directly proportional to the fuel assembly inventory and
gap fractions, the impact on the previously analyzed accident doses is
based on quantifying the change in fission product release due to
replacing up to four LEU fuel assemblies with the MOX LTAs. Although
the consequences of these accidents could be determined by updating the
current licensing basis analyses, Duke elected to perform a comparative
evaluation, which the NRC staff has independently verified.
Duke selected the thyroid dose due to Iodine-131 (I-131) as the
evaluation benchmark because the thyroid dose is typically more
limiting than the whole body dose in that there is less margin between
calculated thyroid doses and its associated dose criterion. Also, I-131
is generally the most significant contributor to thyroid dose due to
its abundance and long decay half-life. Duke has determined that the I-
131 inventory in a MOX LTA is 9 percent greater than that of an
equivalent LEU fuel assembly.
Loss-of-Coolant Accident
For the LOCA, the four MOX LTAs represent 2.1 percent of the 193
assemblies in the core and the potential increase in the iodine release
and the thyroid dose would be 1.32 percent. The resulting doses are
90.2 rem at the EAB and 12.9 rem at the LPZ. These doses are below the
300 rem dose reference value of 10 CFR 100.11, ``Determination of
exclusion area, low population zone, and population center distance,''
and are not considered to be significant.
Locked-Rotor Accident
For the LRA in Unit 1, the four MOX LTAs represent 22 percent of
the 18 affected assemblies in the core. The potential increase in the
iodine release and the thyroid dose is 14.1 percent for Unit 1. The
resulting doses are 26.9 rem at the EAB, and 4.6 rem at the LPZ. These
doses are below the 300 rem dose reference value of 10 CFR 100.11, and
are not considered to be significant.
For the LRA in Unit 2, the four MOX LTAs represent 40 percent of
the 10 affected assemblies in the core. The potential increase in the
iodine release and the thyroid dose is 25.4 percent for Unit 2. The
resulting thryoid doses are 27.8 rem at the EAB, and 4.5 rem at the
LPZ. These doses are below the 300 rem dose criterion of 10 CFR 100.11,
and are not considered to be significant.
Rod-Ejection Accident
For the REA in Unit 1, the four MOX LTAs represent 4.1 percent of
the 97 assemblies in the core assumed to be involved in the postulated
accident and the potential increase in the iodine release and the
resulting thyroid dose would be 2.62 percent. The resulting calculated
thyroid doses are 22.3 rem at the EAB, and 17.8 rem at the LPZ. These
doses are below the 300 rem dose criterion of 10 CFR 100.11, and are
not considered to be significant.
For the REA in Unit 2, the four MOX LTAs represent 4.1 percent of
the 97 assemblies in the core assumed to be involved in the postulated
accident and the potential increase in the iodine release and the
resulting thyroid dose would be 2.62 percent. Even though the
percentage of iodine released from the fuel is the same for Units 1 and
2 (2.62 percent), the release of radioiodine to the environment is
greater for Unit 2 due to differences in the design of the steam
generators, thus resulting in a higher dose than calculated for Unit 1.
The resulting calculated thyroid doses are 31.5 rem at the EAB, and
19.8 rem at the LPZ. These doses are below the 300 rem dose criterion
of 10 CFR 100.11, and are not considered to be significant.
5.6.3 Control Room Dose
Control room dose is the only occupational dose that has been
previously considered for DBA conditions. The at-power accident with
the most severe consequences for the control room personnel is the
LOCA; the control room doses from postulated locked-rotor or rod-
ejection accidents are bounded by the calculated control
[[Page 8851]]
room dose from the LOCA. Duke determined that the resulting control
room thyroid dose after a postulated LOCA considering the use of four
MOX fuel LTAs would be 13 rem. This is below the NRC staff's 30 rem
acceptance criterion and is not considered to be significant.
5.6.4 Conclusion
The DBA with the greatest consequences at the EAB (a LOCA) would
result in a calculated offsite dose of 90.2 rem to the thyroid. The DBA
with the greatest consequences at the LPZ (a REA) would result in
calculated offsite doses of 17.8 and 19.8 rem to the thyroid for Units
1 and 2, respectively. These doses remain below the 300 rem reference
value to the thyroid specified in 10 CFR 100.11 for offsite releases.
The calculated change in dose consequences at the EAB and at the LPZ
that could be attributable to the use of the four MOX fuel LTAs is not
significant.
The DBA with the greatest consequences to the control room
personnel, a LOCA, would result in a calculated dose of 13 rem to the
thyroid. This dose remains below the 30 rem acceptance criterion. The
calculated change in dose consequences for control room personnel that
could be attributable to the use of the four MOX fuel LTAs is not
significant.
The NRC staff concludes that the environmental impact resulting
from incremental increases in EAB, LPZ, and control room dose following
postulated DBAs that could occur as a result of the irradiation of four
MOX LTAs does not represent a significant environmental impact.
11.0 Agencies and Persons Consulted
Related to the publication of the EA in August 2004, (Reference 1),
on July 30, 2004, the NRC staff consulted with the South Carolina State
official, Mr. Mike Gandy of the Department of Health and Environmental
Controls, regarding the environmental impact of the proposed action.
The State official had no comments. Related to the issuance of this
Supplement to the EA, on February 8, 2005, the NRC staff consulted with
the South Carolina State official, Mr. Mike Gandy, of the Department of
Health and Environmental Controls, regarding the environmental impact
of the proposed action. The State official had no comment.
12.0 References
1. NRC letter to Duke, Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2--
Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact Related
to the Use of Mixed Oxide Lead Test Assemblies (TAC Nos. MB7863,
MMB7864, MC0824, MC0825), dated August 10, 2004 (ADAMS ML042230368).
Also published in the Federal Register on August 17, 2004, 69 FR 51112.
2. Duke letter to NRC, Dose Inputs, August 31, 2004 (ADAMS
ML042660144).
3. Duke letter to NRC, Revised Dose Evaluations, September 20, 2004
(ADAMS ML042890343).
4. NRC Letter to Duke, Requesting Additional Information, October
7, 2004 (ADAMS ML042860050).
5. Duke letter to NRC, Response to Request for Additional
Information on Revised Dose Evaluations, October 29, 2004 (ADAMS
ML043150030).
6. Duke letter to NRC, Additional Information on Revised Dose
Evaluations, December 10, 2004 (ADAMS ML043560170).
13.0 Finding of No Significant Impact
On the basis of the EA and Supplement No. 1 to the EA, the NRC
reaffirms its conclusion that the proposed action will not have a
significant effect on the quality of the human environment.
Accordingly, the NRC has determined not to prepare an environmental
impact statement for the proposed action.
For further details with respect to the proposed action, see the
licensee's letter dated February 27, 2003, and subsequent letters dated
September 15, September 23, October 1 (two letters), October 3 (two
letters), November 3 and 4, December 10, 2003, and February 2 (two
letters), March 1 (three letters), March 9 (two letters), March 16 (two
letters), March 26, March 31, April 13, April 16, May 13, June 17,
August 31, September 20, October 4, October 29, and December 10, 2004.
Documents may be examined, and/or copied for a fee, at the NRC's Public
Document Room (PDR), located at One White Flint North, Public File Area
O1 F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland.
Publicly available records will be accessible electronically from the
Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Public
Electronic Reading Room on the Internet at the NRC Web site, https://
www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. Persons who do not have access to
ADAMS or who encounter problems in accessing the documents located in
ADAMS, should contact the NRC PDR Reference staff by telephone at 1-
800-397-4209 or (301) 415-4737, or by e-mail to pdr@nrc.gov.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 14th day of February, 2005.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Edwin M. Hackett,
Project Director, Project Directorate II, Division of Licensing Project
Management, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 05-3397 Filed 2-22-05; 8:45 am]
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