Pipeline Safety: Response Plans for Onshore Transportation-Related Oil Pipelines, 8734-8748 [05-3257]

Agencies

• Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
• DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

[Federal Register Volume 70, Number 35 (Wednesday, February 23, 2005)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 8734-8748]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 05-3257]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration

49 CFR Part 194

[Docket No. RSPA-03-16560; Amdt. No. 194-4]
RIN 2137-AC30


Pipeline Safety: Response Plans for Onshore Transportation-
Related Oil Pipelines

AGENCY: Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), 
Department of Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: On January 5, 1993, the U.S. Department of Transportation, 
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, Office of 
Pipeline Safety (OPS) issued an interim final rule establishing oil 
spill response planning requirements for onshore oil pipelines (49 CFR 
Part 194). These regulations were issued pursuant to section 1321(j)(5) 
of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA), as amended by the 
Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90). OPS is now adopting the interim 
rule as a final rule. This final rule makes minor amendments to some of 
the regulations in response to the written public comments received 
after issuance of the interim final rule and at a public meeting held 
in 1997 in New Orleans, LA. The amendments also reflect the experience 
that OPS has gained in implementing the rule; leading spill response 
exercises; and, responding to actual spills and harmonizes certain OPS 
requirements with related oil spill response regulations developed by 
the U.S. Coast Guard. The amendments are generally technical in nature 
and do not involve additional costs to pipeline operators or the 
public.

DATES: This rule is effective March 25, 2005.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: L.E. Herrick, (202) 366-5523, U.S 
Department of Transportation, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety 
Administration, Room 2103, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Washington, DC 
20590-0001, on the contents of this final rule, or the Dockets 
Facility, https://dms.dot.gov, (202) 366-1918, U.S. Department of 
Transportation, Room PL-401, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Washington, DC 
20590-0001, for copies of this final rule or other information in the 
docket. General information about OPS programs is on our Internet home 
page at https://ops.dot.gov. For information on OPA 90, first click on 
the ``Initiatives,'' then on ``OPA Initiatives.''

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

    Section 1321(j)(5) of the FWPCA (33 U.S.C. 1251 et seq.), as 
amended by OPA 90 (Pub. L. 101-380, 104 Stat. 484), requires an 
operator of an onshore pipeline facility to prepare and submit an oil 
spill response plan when, because of its location, the facility could 
reasonably be expected to cause substantial harm to the environment if 
it were to discharge oil into navigable waters or adjoining shorelines.
    On January 5, 1993, OPS published an interim final rule (58 FR 244) 
that created part 194 of Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations. 
The interim final rule implemented the requirements of OPA 90 and 
required all onshore oil pipeline operators to submit response plans 
for pipelines located where they could reasonably be expected to cause 
substantial harm or significant and substantial harm to the environment 
by discharging oil.
    Under part 194, each response plan must include a core plan that 
provides an information summary (e.g., operator address; description of 
response zones; contact information for designated spill response 
manager), and additional detail on immediate notification procedures; 
spill detection and mitigation procedures; the applicable response 
organization; response activities and response resources; government 
agencies that will provide support; training procedures; equipment 
testing; drill types, schedules, and procedures; and plan review and 
update procedures. In addition, each response plan must be consistent 
with the National Contingency Plan (NCP) (40 CFR part 300) and each 
applicable Area Contingency Plan (ACP).
    Part 194 also requires each operator to identify and ensure, by 
contract or other approved means, the resources necessary to respond, 
to the maximum extent practicable, to a worst case discharge (including 
a discharge resulting from fire or explosion), and to mitigate or 
prevent a substantial threat of a worst case discharge.
    Furthermore, the part 194 requires each operator to conduct 
specialized training for its personnel, particularly those responsible 
for reporting and responding to spills. Each response plan also must 
address equipment testing and provide for periodic unannounced drills. 
Operators must participate in any unannounced drills conducted by 
Federal officials, including activation of the appropriate oil spill 
removal organization and spill management team identified in the 
response plan. Since 1993 OPS has led over 100 exercises.
    Pipeline facilities subject to part 194 include those that 
transport any of the following products: crude oil; refined petroleum 
products (e.g., gasoline, diesel fuel, heating and fuel oils, kerosene, 
and jet fuel); vegetable and animal oil; sludge; oil refuse; and/or oil 
mixed with wastes other than dredged spoil. To date, 367 onshore 
pipeline facilities have submitted response plans in compliance with 
the interim final rule that established part 194.
    There are two categories of onshore pipeline response plans, those 
involving pipelines capable of causing ``substantial'' harm to the 
environment and those capable of causing ``significant and 
substantial'' harm to the environment. OPA 90 does not define 
substantial harm or significant

[[Page 8735]]

and substantial harm. The OPA 90 Conference Report (H.R. Conf. Report 
No. 653, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 101, reprinted in 1990 U.S. Code Cong. 
& Admin. News 779) states that nationwide criteria should be developed 
to determine those facilities which could reasonably be expected to 
cause ``substantial harm'' and are therefore required to submit 
response plans (OPA Conference Report, p. 829). It discussed oil 
storage capacity, environmentally sensitive areas, and drinking water 
supplies as relevant factors, and cautioned that facility age and oil 
storage capacity should not be the only criteria. The report states 
that the criteria should result in a broad requirement for facility 
owners and operators to prepare and submit plans, but that only a 
subset of these plans (i.e., those addressing significant and 
substantial harm) will be reviewed and approved (OPA Conference Report, 
p. 829). The criteria for this subset are set forth in 49 CFR 
194.103(c).
    In order to gain a further understanding on implementing the 
regulation and on potential revisions to the part 194, OPS conducted a 
public meeting on January 29, 1997, in New Orleans, LA, to receive 
comments from interested parties. A copy of the transcript of the 
public meeting is in the docket for this rulemaking.
    In 1999, major pipeline spills occurred in Simpsonville, SC; 
Atchison, KS; and Knoxville, TN. In 2000, a major pipeline spill 
occurred in Aquasco, MD. These spills illustrated the importance of 
spill prevention and response planning; adequate response equipment and 
workers; and, the mastery and effective use of incident command 
systems.
    Investigations and analyses of major pipeline incidents by the 
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) and OPS have emphasized the 
importance of protecting people and the environment, particularly in 
densely populated areas and in areas that are unusually sensitive to 
environmental damage. This final rule incorporates lessons OPS has 
learned from reviewing these plans, leading oil spill exercises, and, 
responding to oil spills, as well as the comments received. The 
following is a summary of the clarifications and minor changes made by 
this final rule to the response planning regulations:
    (1) Clarifies definition of ``adverse weather'' and makes it more 
consistent with the U.S. Coast Guard definition;
    (2) Deletes four definitions as obsolete because they are not used 
in the rule;
    (3) Deletes expired and no longer significant dates from Sec. Sec.  
194.7(a), (b), (c) and 194.119(e);
    (4) Clarifies wording in Sec.  194.101(a) to address which 
operators are required to submit response plans;
    (5) Specifies the secondary containment credits for use of 
secondary containment and other spill prevention measures when 
calculating the worst case discharge based on breakout tank capacity in 
Sec.  194.105(b)(3);
    (6) Clarifies the ``substantial threat'' term and requirement in 
Sec.  194.107(a) and allows operators to incorporate by reference 
certain procedures from the operator's maintenance and emergencies 
manuals, required under 49 CFR 195.402, to meet the requirement;
    (7) Deletes Sec.  194.107(b) to eliminate English language 
requirements;
    (8) Revised Sec.  194.107(c) to provide additional guidance on 
consistency of response plans with the NCP and ACPs;
    (9) Revises Sec.  194.107(d)(1)(ix) to clarify that the drill 
requirements can be met by following PREP or developing a functionally 
equivalent program;
    (10) Add new Sec.  194.107(d)(3) to clarify requirements for an 
operator's Incident Command System (ICS);
    (11) Revises Sec. Sec.  194.109(b)(2) and 194.113(b)(2) to allow 
operators the additional flexibility to use either the name or the 
title of the qualified individual. The revised sections also clarify 
the requirement for operators to list the name or title of an alternate 
qualified individual;
    (12) Revises Sec.  194.111(a) to allow operators to keep response 
plans where they are most likely to need them;
    (13) Revises Sec. Sec.  194.119(d) and (f) to clarify the authority 
of OPS to make a final determination where a Federal on-scene 
coordinator (FOSC) has concerns about the operator's response 
capability; to clarify that OPS may consider FOSC comments on response 
techniques, protecting fish, wildlife and sensitive environments and on 
consistency with the NCP; and to clarify that OPS remains the approving 
authority for the response plan;
    (14) Revises Sec.  194.121(a) to clarify that the resubmission of 
plans to OPS on a five-year cycle is from the date of submission or 
from the date of last approval; and
    (15) Augments the guidelines in Appendix A with three, web-based 
government references. Because these changes are minor and technical in 
nature, and generally reflect existing industry practice, no additional 
burden will be placed on operators or the public.

Discussion of Comments

    A summary of the written comments OPS received in connection with 
the issuance of the interim rule is available in the docket. OPS 
received additional comments in response to a notice of public meeting 
and request for comments held in January 1997 in New Orleans. A 
transcript of the public meeting is also in the docket.
    The comments were generally supportive of the need for oil spill 
response planning requirements although many suggested modifications to 
the existing provisions in various sections. OPS reviewed these 
comments and the records of the public meeting and used them in 
developing this final rule.

Section 194.1, Purpose

    No comments were received on Sec.  194.1 and the section is 
unchanged.

Section 194.3, Applicability

    Several commenters requested that OPS clarify those pipelines that 
are considered to transport oil under 49 CFR part 194. The commenters 
questioned the applicability of the response planning regulations to 
commodities such as natural gas and unstabilized condensate from 
natural gas wells.
Response
    OPS believes a clarification is unnecessary. The FWPCA (33 U.S.C. 
1321) does not specify substances considered to be oil. Rather, the 
FWPCA broadly defines oil and Federal agencies rely on the broad 
definition to determine substances that are regulated under the Act. 
The existing definition of ``oil'' in Sec.  194.5 is consistent with 
this broad definition. Because the definition does not include highly 
volatile liquids (HVL), natural gas liquids (NGL), liquefied natural 
gas (LNG), or liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), OPS believes that it is 
clear that they are not considered to be oil under 49 CFR part 194.

Section 194.5, Definitions

Coastal Zone/Inland Zone/Inland Area/Response Area
    Several commenters noted that the terms Coastal zone, Inland area, 
Inland zone, and Response area are defined, but that these terms are 
not used in the regulations.
Response
    OPS agrees and is removing these definitions as obsolete.
Adverse Weather
    Some commenters stated that OPS should provide more specific 
guidelines or criteria on what constitutes adverse weather, noting that 
the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) and the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) have specific

[[Page 8736]]

criteria for significant wave height within the area in which recovery 
equipment and booms are expected to operate.
Response
    In the interests of interagency consistency, OPS is adopting, in 
modified form, the USCG definition of adverse weather in 33 CFR 
154.1020.
Contract or Other Approved Means
    OPS received comments discussing the definition of contract or 
other approved means for insuring that the operator will have oil spill 
response resources. Some commenters said the definition was too 
restrictive.
Response
    OPS disagrees and believes that the existing definition is 
consistent with the intent of the law. A fundamental requirement in 
response planning is to establish the operator's ability to have the 
personnel and equipment to respond to a discharge of oil or a 
substantial threat of a discharge of oil on to the navigable waters. 
Requiring an operator to have a written or other legally binding 
agreement between the operator and a response contractor or other spill 
response organization identifying is consistent with this intent.
Environmentally Sensitive Areas
    OPS received several comments on the definition of environmentally 
sensitive areas. Commenters suggested that the term should be revised 
to reflect the specific areas that would be especially sensitive to oil 
discharges. Some commenters stated that the definition should be 
limited to areas where spills are likely to create significant long-
term environmental harm. Others suggested that the definition should be 
consistent with the National Contingency Plan (NCP).
Response
    In the years since Part 194 was established, all of the Area 
Contingency Plans (ACPs) have been published. The Area Contingency 
Plans include detailed information about resources in the area. OPS 
believes that the NCP and ACPs provide sufficient guidance to operators 
on environmentally sensitive areas. Because the definition is 
consistent with the ACP's and the NCP, OPS is not making any changes 
based on these comments.
High-Volume Areas
    OPS received several comments stating that the existing definition 
of high-volume areas (HVAs) did not make clear whether high volume 
areas must have both high river velocity and heavy vessel traffic or 
only one of the listed criteria. One commenter stated that the interim 
final rule did not have enough information for an operator to determine 
what constitutes an HVA and suggested that the current definition be 
modified to allow operators to use their discretion. One commenter 
suggested that the concept was inappropriate because it was developed 
for vessel response plans and assumed that the risk of a spill was 
greater in busy ports with more vessel traffic. Another commenter 
suggested that the concept of HVA does not relate to the likelihood of 
a discharge.
Response
    OPS believes the list of specific high-volume rivers in Appendix B 
of 49 CFR Part 194 provides sufficient guidance to pipeline operators. 
The list includes areas that not only have high vessel traffic and high 
river velocity but also have concentrations of pipelines. The list 
differs from the USCG list of high volume port areas in 33 CFR 154.1020 
because the OPS list also includes the concentrations of pipelines.
Major River
    OPS received three comments on the definition of ``major river.'' 
Two commenters stated that OPS should list major rivers in an appendix 
to the rule rather than refer to a list in a book. One of the 
commenters noted that the referenced book was not readily available.
Response
    OPS agrees. We are deleting the definition of major river. A 
listing of major rivers can be found in Appendix B, High Volume Areas.
Maximum Extent Practicable
    One commenter noted that the definition of ``maximum extent 
practicable'' should consider the economics involved and the intent of 
Congress to create a system in which the private sector provided most 
of the response resources.
Response
    The definition in this rule is similar to the definition in the 
USCG and EPA's response planning rules. By maintaining the definition 
from the interim final rule, we are being consistent with the response 
planning regulations of other Federal agencies. No change is made to 
this definition.
Navigable Waters
    One commenter suggested that the definition of ``navigable waters'' 
was too broad and would result in an increase in pipeline operational 
and administrative costs, including costs to the Federal Government 
associated with implementing these regulations. There was also concern 
that the broad definition of ``navigable waters'' in Part 194 would be 
applied to 49 CFR Part 195.412(b), requiring costly inspection and 
increased risk to pipeline personnel associated with inspecting 
pipeline crossings in navigable waterways.
    Two commenters said that waters used for recreation should not be 
included in the definition. One commenter suggested that referring to 
waters with vessel traffic leads to a belief that a risk exists only 
where watercraft and pipelines are both present. The commenter also 
stated that part 194 should not attempt to address all areas of risk 
but only those where pipelines and vessels coexist. The commenters 
stated that the full intent of OPA 90 can be met by eliminating the 
definition of ``navigable waters'' and by focusing on areas where the 
environment or public drinking water supply can be damaged.
    Two commenters stated that OPS should publish a list of navigable 
waters or major streams. One commenter stated that the definition was 
inconsistent with the preamble language and the definition was 
ambiguous because of the use of the terminology ``recreation'' and 
``waters from which fish or shell fish are taken and sold.'' They 
suggested using the USCG definition in 33 CFR 2.05-25 because that 
definition is tied to the FWPCA and the regulated community is familiar 
with that definition. One commenter stated that the terms 
``recreation'' and ``fisheries'' should be removed or considered under 
the definition of sensitive areas.
Response
    The definition of navigable waters in part 194 is a slightly 
modified version of the EPA definition in the NCP at 40 CFR 300.5 and 
40 CFR part 110. OPS believes that the regulated community understands 
this definition because it is based on the FWPCA definition of 
navigable waters at 33 U.S.C. 1362. OPS will not develop a list of 
navigable waters because it is well established that Congress intended 
to broadly define navigable waters in the FWPCA. In addition, the OPA 
90 Conference Report reflects the intent of Congress that facilities 
near sensitive areas such as public drinking water supplies generally 
should not be omitted from spill response planning requirements 
(Conference Report 101-653, p. 829). Accordingly, OPS has decided to 
retain the current definition.

[[Page 8737]]

Oil
    Several commenters suggested that the definition of ``oil'' be 
limited to crude oil and petroleum products that could be recovered. 
These commenters further suggested excluding petroleum or petroleum 
products classified as HVLs, NGLs, LNG, or LPG. One commenter suggested 
that the definition should remain largely unchanged. Another commenter 
stated that the current definition does not include all the products 
that Congress intended to fall within the OPA 90 definition.
    Several commenters stated that highly volatile liquids such as 
propane and butane should not be considered oil. Another commenter 
stated that the definition should be clarified to exclude trace amounts 
of condensate in gas pipelines. Another commenter stated that OPS 
should not use the USCG definition and resulting list of substances 
considered to be oils because the variety of products shipped by barge 
is much greater than oil products transported by pipeline.
Response
    In February 1995, the USCG prepared a list of substances considered 
oil for response planning. Because HVLs, NGLs, LNG, and LPG are absent 
from the USCG's list, OPS concluded that these substances are not 
considered oil under the FWPCA. OPS also believes that in the course of 
implementing the provisions of part 194, operators gained an 
understanding of the substances considered to be oil under the rule. 
OPS is not changing this definition.
Oil Spill Removal Organization
    OPS received three comments on the definition of the term ``oil 
spill removal organization'' (OSRO). One commenter stated that the 
terminology may imply that OPS is referring to USCG-classified OSROs. 
Another commenter suggested that because many small contractors have 
response resources, the definition should be revised to include only 
those entities engaged exclusively in spill response. Another stated 
that the definition should be amended to include companies that will 
use their own resources, and that the definition should refer to ``for 
profit, nonprofit, and in-house resources.''
Response
    OPS is retaining the definition because it is sufficiently flexible 
to apply to different types of organizations that may be called on to 
respond to a discharge of oil. Narrowing the definition could exclude 
organizations that can help respond effectively.
Pipeline
    Three commenters addressed the definition of ``pipeline.'' One 
commenter stated that the definition of pipeline in these regulations 
should encompass all parts of an onshore pipeline facility OPS 
regulates.
Response
    OPS believes that this definition is sufficiently inclusive. The 
current definition of pipeline includes all parts of an onshore 
pipeline facility through which oil moves including, but not limited 
to, line pipe, valves, and other appurtenances connected to line pipe, 
pumping units, fabricated assemblies associated with pumping units, 
metering and delivery stations and fabricated assemblies therein, and 
breakout tanks. OPS notes that some tanks are used as breakout tanks 
even though the pipelines transporting oil to and from the tanks have 
different operators. These tanks are still subject to part 194 under a 
1971 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between EPA and DOT (36 FR 
24080; December 18, 1971). Therefore, OPS is not changing the 
definition of ``pipeline''.
Qualified Individual
    Two commenters stated that the definition of ``qualified 
individual'' should be identical to that in 33 CFR 154.1026.
Response
    OPS is not revising the definition of qualified individual to be 
identical to the 33 CFR.154.1026 because the current definition meets 
the intent of the statute. However, OPS is revising Sec.  194.113(b)(2) 
to allow the operator to identify one qualified individual and one 
alternate qualified individual either by title or by name, and list 
their 24-hour telephone numbers.
Response Zones
    OPS received several comments on the definition of ``response 
zones.'' One commenter endorsed the response zone concept, which he 
said was an excellent method of tracking responsibilities and 
resources. Another commenter said that geographic response plans are 
valuable because they can contain specific response activities and 
strategies throughout the geographic area. One commenter suggested that 
a response zone should be defined in terms of response needs and that 
the linear distance should be limited to 500 miles. Another commenter 
suggested that a response zone should be defined by response strategy 
(the type of response necessary to contain and cleanup the spill). 
Another commenter suggested that the response zone should be defined by 
using the time requirements established in the response planning 
regulations for mobilizing response resources. One commenter suggested 
that the definition was satisfactory as currently provided in the 
regulation. Another commenter noted that he had prepared facility-
specific response plans for three different Federal agencies and 
requested that OPS consider allowing a facility to prepare an overall 
geographic response plan that would facilitate the preparation of 
shorter response plans specific to the personnel and characteristics of 
each region. Another commenter endorsed the value of response zones and 
expressed support for the Integrated Contingency Plan (ICP) format to 
plan for multiple facilities within a given geographic area or under a 
single qualified individual but asked for additional flexibility in 
determining the need for multiple response zones.
Response
    OPS intent is to give operators as much flexibility as possible in 
developing facility response plans. This approach is reflected in the 
current definition of a response zone. ``Response zone means a 
geographic area either along a length of pipeline or including multiple 
pipelines, containing one or more adjacent line sections, for which the 
operator must plan for the deployment of, and provide, spill response 
capabilities. The size of the zone is determined by the operator after 
considering available capability, resources, and geographic 
characteristics.'' Although OPS appreciates the logic associated with 
the preparation of purely geographic plans, OPS believes that the 
flexibility provided by the definition has proven to be effective in 
plan development. Therefore, OPS is not revising the definition of 
response zone.
Worst Case Discharge
    OPS received comments on the definition of ``worst case 
discharge.'' These comments are summarized in the discussions on Sec.  
194.105.

Section 194.7, Operating Restrictions and Interim Operating 
Authorization

    No comments were received on Sec.  194.7. However, the February 18 
and August 18, 1993, dates listed are no longer significant. As an 
administrative measure, OPS is removing dates from the section.

[[Page 8738]]

Section 194.101, Operators Required To Submit Plans

    OPS received numerous comments seeking clarification on which oil 
pipelines were subject to part 194's response planning requirements. 
One commenter contended that the current language in Sec.  194.101(a) 
was confusing and subject to misinterpretation. OPS received nine 
comments on the exceptions from plan preparation in paragraph (b) for 
small and distant pipelines. Two of these commenters expressed concern 
about the distant pipeline exception, stating that if containment can 
not be accomplished within four hours for larger lines and twelve hours 
for smaller lines, the result is likely to be contamination of 
environmentally sensitive areas and public drinking water supplies 
obtained from ground water sources--regardless of the distance.
    One commenter suggested that OPS define one of the criterion 
associated with the exception in paragraph (b)(1), the term ``proximity 
to navigable waters''. Another commenter suggested that OPS eliminate 
the proximity criterion because under the current definition of 
navigable waters, almost any small pipeline will be in proximity to 
navigable waters.
    One commenter disagreed with the 1,000 barrel discharge within five 
years criterion and suggested eliminating it because a discharge of 
1,000 barrels could cause significant and substantial harm to the 
environment. Another commenter took issue with using historical spill 
records as a criterion. He contended that the absence of large spills 
over five or ten years is not a good measure of the risk of future 
spills given the age of some pipeline systems. One commenter 
recommended that Sec.  194.101(b)(1)(ii) be revised to grant an 
exception to a pipeline that has not had two or more releases greater 
than 50 barrels resulting in polluting any stream, river, lake, 
reservoir, or similar body of water that violated applicable water 
quality standards. Other commenters suggested that inspection and 
repair records be included as criteria for exemption from preparing a 
response plan.
Response
    OPS agrees that the scope of the exceptions for small and distant 
pipelines is very limited. With regard to small pipelines, the OPA 90 
Conference Report states that the basic requirement to prepare and 
submit response plans should be broadly applied because under certain 
circumstances ``even discharges from small facilities can result in 
considerable damage to the environment'' (Conference Report 101-653, p. 
829). Regardless of their size, the only pipelines that are unlikely to 
cause substantial harm to navigable waters, adjoining shorelines, 
public drinking water supplies, and other environmentally sensitive 
areas in the event of a worst case discharge are pipelines that are not 
in proximity to these areas. In practice, this means that the small 
pipeline exception can only apply if the small pipeline is also a 
distant pipeline. With regard to distant pipelines, the OPA 90 
Conference Report pointed out that even ``unregulated, low pressure 
pipelines have leaked significant quantities of oil into our Nation's 
waterways.'' Locations that appear to be distant from open waters may 
be in proximity to various water resources including drinking water 
supplies and other sensitive areas and as a result, are likely to cause 
substantial harm in the event of a worst case discharge. Therefore, 
consistent with the intent of the statute, the small and distant 
pipeline exceptions must be narrowly construed and virtually all 
onshore oil pipelines are considered at least ``substantial harm'' 
facilities for purposes of part 194. Accordingly, all onshore oil 
pipeline operators, with the rare exception of those who can prove that 
their pipelines meet the strict criteria in Sec.  194.101(b)(1) and 
(2), are required to prepare and submit oil spill response plans to 
OPS/OPS in accordance with Sec.  194.119(a).
    Although OPS modified paragraph (a) to clarify this point, OPS does 
not anticipate additional plan submissions because OPS believes all 
affected operators have already submitted response plans.
FOSC Requests
    OPS received 11 comments on the handling of a Federal on-scene 
coordinator's (FOSC) request that OPS require a response plan be 
prepared and submitted for a pipeline or line section that would 
otherwise be exempt from 49 CFR part 194. These comments are addressed 
in connection with the discussion on submission and approval procedures 
in Sec.  194.119 below.

Section 194.103, Significant and Substantial Harm: Operator's Statement

    Although, as discussed above, all onshore oil pipeline operators 
are expected to develop and submit response plans, under OPA 90 only 
those plans for pipeline facilities that pose both a significant and 
substantial threat of harm to the environment require OPS approval. 
Under Sec.  194.103(a), if an operator expects any line section in a 
response zone to cause both significant and substantial harm, then the 
operator must submit a statement with its response plan listing the 
significant and substantial harm line sections. This statement by the 
operator facilitates our identification of those plans requiring OPS 
approval. The OPA 90 Conference Report directed the RSPA Administrator 
to establish criteria by which those plans requiring prior approval 
would be selected. Report language discussed oil storage capacity, 
environmentally sensitive areas, and drinking water supplies as 
relevant factors, and cautioned that facility age and oil storage 
capacity should not be the only criteria. The significant and 
substantial harm criteria are currently set forth in Sec.  
194.103(c)(1) through (5). Several commenters took issue with various 
aspects of these criteria.
Historical Spill Data
    With respect to Sec.  194.103(c)(1) and (2), we received four 
comments on the use of historical spill data in determining significant 
and substantial harm. One commenter recommended that references to 
historical incidents contained in Sec.  194.103(c)(1) and (2) be 
omitted because they have little bearing on spill harm or consequence. 
Another commenter noted that some consideration should be given to the 
type of corrective action taken as a result of previous spills.
Response
    In our view, however, historical spill data is an appropriate 
factor for us to consider when deciding which response plans are 
appropriate for the approval process, because it aids in focusing our 
limited resources on reviewing those plans associated with facilities 
where known risks may be present.
Electric Resistance Welded Pipe
    With respect to Sec.  194.103(c)(3), one commenter contended that 
there was no scientific basis for establishing significant and 
substantial harm on the basis of the presence of electric resistance 
welded (ERW) pipe manufactured prior to 1970, operating at certain 
stress levels.
Response
    OPS disagrees. Our accident statistics clearly show that at certain 
stress levels, ERW pipe manufactured before 1970 is inherently 
susceptible to fracture and preferential corrosion. Two studies, along 
with our accident data for liquid and natural gas transmission 
pipelines, show that failures in older ERW pipes greatly outnumber 
those in ERW pipe produced after 1970. Since 1970, pipe

[[Page 8739]]

manufacturers have changed to high frequency current for fusion heat 
and improved quality control for ERW pipes. These changes led to a 
significant decrease in the number of ERW pipe seam failures. This 
decrease is so significant that it cannot be attributed to any factors 
other than the change to high frequency current and quality control 
improvements. Therefore, we are retaining this criterion.
Buffer Zone Dimensions
    Six comments were received regarding the criterion in Sec.  
194.103(c)(4) and (5) establishing ``significant and substantial harm'' 
to include a line section located within certain linear distances from 
drinking water intakes and environmentally sensitive areas. Three of 
the comments concerned the role of this criterion in the significant 
and substantial harm determination. One commenter asserted that 
drinking water intakes and environmentally sensitive areas should be 
equally protected, noting that the OPA 90 Conference Report made no 
distinction between the two and requires that both be protected in the 
event of a spill. This commenter recommended that an operator of any 
oil pipeline located within 5 miles of an environmentally sensitive 
area be required to prepare and submit a response plan. One commenter 
contended that the distances from drinking water intakes and 
environmentally sensitive areas should only be relevant when the line 
section crosses a major river or waterway. Another commenter noted that 
an oil discharge from a pipeline can also affect ground waters and that 
this should be taken into account in determining the level of harm that 
could reasonably be expected in the event of a discharge and taken into 
account for determining which plans should require approval.
Response
    In our view, the clear intent of OPA 90 requires us to recognize 
the potential harmful effects of oil discharges on environmentally 
sensitive areas and drinking water sources. The fact that most 
pipelines are located underground, and contamination of ground waters 
can ultimately impact surface waters and adjoining areas indicates that 
a response plan must contain response strategies to protect drinking 
water sources and environmentally sensitive areas. Moreover, the FWPCA 
requires these areas be identified in the relevant ACP(s) and response 
plans be consistent with these ACPs. Accordingly, we are retaining the 
linear distance criteria in Sec.  194.103(c)(4) and (5). Overall, we 
believe that the Sec.  194.103(c) criteria for determining whether a 
line section can be expected to cause significant and substantial harm, 
are appropriate at this time. We may consider revising these criteria 
in the future if experience indicates that such a change is needed. We 
reserve the right to check all pipeline facility response plans for 
completeness, regardless of the level of harm the operator designates.
Treatment of Response Zones
    Under Sec.  194.103(b), if an operator expects a line section in a 
response zone to cause significant and substantial harm, then the 
entire response zone must be treated as if it could cause significant 
and substantial harm. Two comments were received stating that Sec.  
194.103(b) should be revised. The commenters contended that pipeline 
operators should not be burdened with planning for areas within a 
response zone but relatively distant from the pipeline sections capable 
of causing significant and substantial harm. Two other commenters 
questioned the criterion. They suggested that only the line section 
that met the criterion, rather than the zone, be so designated.
Response
    OPS disagrees that a revision is warranted. Response zones are 
based on geographic and regional considerations including topography, 
hydrology, climate, and population. OPS requires operators to submit a 
response plan for each pipeline, not for each line section and requires 
a separate appendix for each response zone. OPS expects operators to 
fully analyze the potential impact of a spill throughout each response 
zone.

Section 194.105, Worst Case Discharge

Secondary Containment Credits
    RSP/OPS received numerous comments on the practice of reducing the 
worst case discharge calculation from breakout tanks that have 
secondary containment dikes, and other prevention measures.
    One commenter stated that Washington State does not allow operators 
to take credit for secondary containment and that the worst case 
discharge calculation is only to establish a planning volume. Another 
commenter stated that it was inappropriate to allow for a reduction of 
the maximum drainage volume calculation because a review of incidents 
associated with storage tanks shows it is not uncommon to experience at 
least a partial failure of containment systems.
    Commenters also suggested varying amounts of credit for secondary 
containment, some up to 100 percent, depending on the spill prevention 
measures an operator has in place. Others opposed predetermined 
credits, arguing instead that operators should use site-specific risk 
assessment methods to establish the appropriate containment credit.
Response
    In 49 CFR 194.105(b)(3), the rule allows operators to reduce the 
calculated worst case discharge from a breakout tank due to secondary 
containment. Reductions in the calculated worst case discharge are 
referred to as credits. The interim final rule is not specific as to 
how much credit an operator is allowed.
    In 40 CFR Part 112, EPA allows up to 20 percent secondary 
containment credit in certain cases for tanks under its jurisdiction. 
Since 1994, our policy has allowed operators to claim up to a 50 
percent secondary containment credit in calculating their worst case 
discharge for facilities with breakout tanks. The 50 percent credit 
policy was based on examining tank accident statistics and a 1992 
position paper from the American Petroleum Institute.
    Under certain circumstances, we approved claims for credit of up to 
75 percent where operators were able to demonstrate that more spill 
prevention measures were in place. OPS believes, based on our analysis, 
that routine spill prevention credits higher than 75 percent are not 
justified.
    OPS reviewed incidents from 1987 to 1999 involving spills from 
breakout tanks. During that period, 189 breakout tank spills were 
reported. Of the 179,606 barrels of oil spilled, 139,015 barrels of oil 
were recovered. A variety of factors may have contributed to the amount 
of oil lost, including oil volatility and whether there was a fire. 
However, over 12 years, only 77 percent of the oil spilled from 
breakout tanks was recovered. In addition, although secondary 
containment at breakout tanks generally prevented loss of the entire 
tank volume, there are documented cases of accidents in which the 
secondary containment system partially failed.
    OPS's goal is to focus breakout tank operators' efforts on 
prevention, so that there are fewer spills. OPS believes that if the 
credits for preventing spills from breakout tanks are too small, 
operators may shift their planning emphasis from higher-risk areas 
along their rights-of-way, to tank farms that may pose smaller 
environmental risks.
    Accordingly, the following table which specifies the amount of 
prevention credit an operator can

[[Page 8740]]

routinely claim has been incorporated as a new subparagraph (b)(4).

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                Credit
      Prevention measure                  Standard            (percent)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Secondary containment > 100%..  NFPA 30....................           50
Built/repaired to API           API RP 620/650/653.........           10
 standards.
Overfill protection standards.  API RP 2350................           10
Testing/cathodic protection...  API RP 650/651/653.........            5
Maximum allowable credit......  ...........................           75
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    OPS will entertain higher credits only on a case-by-case basis upon 
petition for waiver by a pipeline operator.
Supervisory Control
    A commenter suggested OPS consider giving pipelines equipped with a 
supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems with a leak 
detection capability containment credits on a tiered basis, noting that 
since the use of SCADA systems was not mandatory, tiered credits would 
promote the use of such systems.
Response
    OPS is not granting specific credit for reducing worst case 
discharge based on the use of SCADA systems because these systems are 
highly variable in their leak detection capabilities. In addition, the 
SCADA systems are for data collection and system control rather than 
part of a secondary containment system. However, we have seen 
significant improvement in these systems since they were first 
introduced. Operator's may now use leak detection systems enhancements 
as a mitigative measure in their integrity management programs and we 
may revisit the issue of granting response planning credits pending 
further advances in leak detection.
Weather
    OPS received several comments on the role of weather in calculating 
the worst case discharge. One commenter noted that weather conditions 
would have a great effect on response capability. Other commenters 
noted that although the basic method for calculating worst case 
discharge was satisfactory, the rule should also include specific 
guidelines for planning for discharges that occur in adverse weather, 
at night, or that result from natural disasters, such as hurricanes and 
earthquakes.
Response
    The current definition of worst case discharge requires 
consideration of adverse weather conditions. Although we have not 
specified how these effects must be weighed, operators are required to 
consider the weather history for the area surrounding the pipeline and 
the effects of adverse weather on the time needed to shut down a 
pipeline. OPS does not find a benefit by adding the new or additional 
terminology.
Maximum Drainage Volume/Maximum Shutdown Response Time
    OPS received several comments on maximum drainage volume and 
maximum shutdown response time calculations. These calculations are 
based on historic discharge date or, in the absence of such historic 
data, the operator's best estimate, multiplied by the maximum flow 
rate. One commenter requested definitions for ``maximum shutdown 
response time'' and ``maximum drainage volume'' be inserted into part 
194.
Response
    OPS believes the existing rule has clear procedures for calculating 
worst case discharge volumes from line sections and the text explains 
that worst case means the largest volume. OPS does not find a benefit 
by adding the new or additional terminology.

Section 194.107, General Response Plan Requirements

    OPS received several comments requesting clarification on the 
requirement for each response plan to identify resources for responding 
to a worst case discharge or a substantial threat of a worst case 
discharge. Commenters noted an NTSB report on the 1994 San Jacinto 
Flood recommended that OPS require liquid pipeline operators to address 
substantial threats in their facility response plans.
Response
    On January 24, 1997, OPS issued a Pipeline Safety Alert Notice (ALN 
97-01) to remind the regulated community of the importance of planning 
not only for a worst case discharge but also for a substantial threat 
of a worst case discharge. Although OPS does not require response 
planning for less than a worst case discharge, an operator may 
nevertheless benefit from planning responses to smaller discharges 
because they are more likely to occur, and may require different types 
and quantities of response equipment. OPS is revising Sec.  194.107(a) 
as a result of these comments.
    In order to minimize the burden on the regulated community, 
operators may incorporate by reference, procedures developed under 49 
CFR 195.402 to address these requirements. Operators may refer to the 
appropriate section of their operations and maintenance manuals 
required under Sec.  195.405(a). Operators need not submit their entire 
procedural manuals developed under Sec.  195.402. However, OPS reserves 
the right to request a copy of the relevant portion of the procedural 
manual as part of the response plan review.
Other Than English
    OPS received one comment requesting that criteria be specified for 
determining when it is necessary to develop a response plan in a 
language other than English.
Response
    The intent of this provision is to ensure that personnel 
implementing response plans are able to read the plan. If the personnel 
implementing a plan can read in English, there is no need to produce 
the plan in more than one language. If a plan were written in more than 
one language, only the English version would need to be submitted to 
us. OPS has not received any plan in a language other than English and 
expects that response plans will continue to be submitted in English. 
OPS is deleting Sec.  194.107(b) because it is not necessary.
Consistent With NCP/ACP
    We received several comments and many operator requests for 
clarification on how an operator can certify that a plan is consistent 
with NCP and applicable ACPs.
Response
    In the course of OPS' iterative plan review process we identified 
detailed information for determining consistency with the NCP and 
applicable ACPs. We are modifying the text of paragraph (c)

[[Page 8741]]

and adding a redesignated paragraph (b) to reflect this information.
    As a minimum, to be consistent with the NCP a facility response 
plan must: (1) Demonstrate an operator's clear understanding of the 
function of the Federal response structure, for example, the plan must 
contain a procedures to notify the National Response Center and set 
forth the relationship between the role of the operator's response 
organization and the role of the FOSC in pollution response; (2) 
establish provisions to ensure the safety at the response site; and (3) 
identify the procedures to obtain any required Federal and State 
permissions for using alternative response strategies, such as in-situ 
burning and dispersants as provided for in the applicable ACPs.
    At a minimum, to be consistent with the applicable ACP, the plan 
must: (1) Address the removal of a worst case discharge and the 
mitigation or prevention of a substantial threat of a worst case 
discharge; (2) identify environmentally and economically sensitive 
areas; (3) describe the responsibilities of the operator and of 
Federal, State and local agencies in removing a discharge and in 
mitigating or preventing a substantial threat of a discharge; and (4) 
establish the procedures for obtaining an expedited decision on use of 
dispersants or other chemicals.
Drills and Exercises
    OPS received several comments on Sec.  194.107(d)(1)(ix) covering 
drills and exercises; and on ``Guidelines for Developing and Evaluating 
an Oil Spill Response Exercise: A Handbook for Preparedness for 
Response Exercises (PREP),'' which was developed to support operator 
compliance with this paragraph. Two commenters wrote that Sec.  
194.107(d)(1)(ix) should specifically refer to the PREP guidelines. Two 
commenters requested that more guidance documents be made available, 
especially on how to conduct an exercise program. One commenter 
requested guidance on conducting exercises for multi-zone response 
plans.
Response
    OPS is not making the PREP guidelines mandatory. However, OPS is 
revising Sec.  194.107(d)(1)(ix) and redesignating this as new 
paragraph (c) to clarify that an operator will satisfy the requirement 
for drills by following PREP guidelines. An operator choosing not to 
follow PREP guidelines must have a drill program that is equivalent to 
PREP. The operator must describe the drill program in the response plan 
and OPS will determine if the program is equivalent to PREP. This 
revision is consistent with the USCG exercise requirements in 33 CFR 
Part 154. OPS is also providing response plan guidelines in Appendix A 
by adding a reference to the PREP guidelines.
Integrated Contingency Plan
    OPS received two comments on using the National Response Team's 
Integrated Contingency Plan (ICP) format published in the Federal 
Register on June 5, 1996 (61 FR 28642). (See discussion under Sec.  
194.119 for more comments on ICP format. One commenter stated that OPS 
should reword or reorganize the format of a response plan to be more 
consistent with ICP guidelines. He suggested that Sec.  194.107(d) be 
revised to use the ICP concepts of response plan, core plan, and 
appendices rather than addressing each zone independently. Another 
commenter encouraged consistency with the ICP and stated that a format 
similar to the ICP should simplify the demand on facilities.
Response
    OPS strongly endorses using the ICP format to organize a response 
plan. OPS believes the ICP is a highly functional document that can be 
used in a variety of emergencies to meet several agencies' 
requirements, including Part 194. Although the ICP format is the 
preferred method of response planning to meet federal spill contingency 
planning regulations using the ICP format is not mandatory because OPS 
believes an operator should have the flexibility to organize their 
response in the manner which best fits their operational situation. 
Operators using the ICP format must include a cross-reference in their 
response plan. OPS does not find a benefit by adding the new or 
additional terminology.
National Interagency Incident Management System
    A commenter suggested that OPS adopt the National Interagency 
Incident Management System (NIIMS) and require operators to be trained 
in NIIMS. The NCP (40 CFR 300.150) requires that response actions 
comply with the Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA) 
provisions for worker health and safety in 29 CFR 1910.120(q)(3). The 
OSHA rule requires implementing an incident command system (ICS), which 
is further explained in Section 6, Appendix C of 29 CFR 1910.120.
Response
    As part of the requirement to be consistent with the NCP and the 
ACPs, OPS requires operators to use incident command systems (ICS), 
including unified command system procedures for spill response. OSHA 
previously required training in the ICS appropriate to the role the 
participant plays. OPS does not require training in ICS.
    OPS fully endorses NIIMS (now called the National Incident 
Management System (NIMS), but will accept other ICSs if they adequately 
address the following five functional areas: finance, logistics, 
operations, planning, and command. More information on NIMS is 
available on the USCG's Web site, https://www.uscg.mil/USCG.shtm. OPS is 
adding a new Sec.  194.107(c)(3) to clarify a facility response plan 
must include a description of the operator's response management system 
including the five functional areas. The plan must also demonstrate the 
operator's response management system uses common terminology and has a 
manageable span of control, a clearly defined chain of command, and 
sufficient trained personnel to fill each position.
    Section 194.107(d)(2), which lists the information required in a 
response zone appendix, has also been modified to reflect the change 
from Sec.  194.107(d) to Sec.  194.107(c). Although not the subject of 
a specific comment, RSPA is also clarifing that an operator submitting 
a response plan for a single response zone does not have to have a core 
plan and a response zone appendix. The operator of a single response 
zone onshore pipeline shall have a single summary in the plan that 
contains the required information in Sec.  194.113.

Section 194.109, Submission of State Response Plans

    OPS received four comments on submitting State response plans and 
on the plan's format. One commenter requested that OPS retain the 
provisions that allow operators to submit a response plan originally 
developed to meet State requirements. The commenter requested that OPS 
allow a State plan to be submitted to us even before the State approves 
the plan. Another commenter endorsed using approved State plans and 
commended our efforts to streamline the response planning requirements. 
One commenter noted that State agencies may complain that a plan is too 
large, and requested that OPS consider this criticism when streamlining 
the plan process. Another commenter stated that all plans should be 
required to follow the same format to ensure consistency, ease of 
review and ease of use. He noted that when a pipeline operator submits 
a State response plan, the supplementary

[[Page 8742]]

information should follow a consistent format.
Response
    OPS is retaining Sec.  194.109 and will continue to accept a 
response plan prepared for a State when the State plan has equivalent 
or greater environmental protection, in order to provide maximum 
flexibility to operators in preparing response plans. Although not the 
subject of a specific comment, OPS is also revising Sec.  194.109(b)(2) 
to be consistent with the change to Sec.  194.113(b)(2).

Section 194.111, Response Plan Retention

    OPS received several comments on retaining response plans. One 
commenter noted that the requirement to retain a copy of the plan at 
the operator's headquarters is confusing because there are many 
different levels of headquarters offices. He suggested that a plan be 
retained at a designated office of record for the affected facilities 
and at designated locations where the plan will be activated. One 
commenter noted that EPA required a plan at the nearest field office. 
Two commenters noted that it was unnecessary to keep a plan at a pump 
station because many pump stations were unmanned. One commenter 
suggested that the regulations be amended to require a plan only at a 
manned pump station or pipeline facility. Another commenter agreed, 
adding that requiring a plan at unmanned locations where response 
activity might take place would be impractical and burdensome. Three 
commenters suggested that a core plan and appendices be kept at the 
location from which operator personnel would be dispatched. Another 
commenter stated that the qualified individual should not be required 
to have a copy of a plan if copies are available at the locations 
listed in Sec.  194.111(a). One commenter questioned the need for a 
qualified individual to have a copy of the entire plan when the 
qualified individual is responsible for only a portion of the facility.
Response
    OPS is revising Sec.  194.111 by deleting Sec.  194.111(a) and its 
subsections (1),(2), and (3). We are replacing these with a new 
subsection (a) requirement for operators to maintain relevant portions 
of their response plans at headquarters and at other locations from 
which response activities may be conducted, such as in field offices, 
supervisors' vehicles or spill response trailers. This change will 
allow operators the discretion to determine the most appropriate 
locations for copies of the plan.

Section 194.113, Information Summary

    OPS received 10 comments on the information summary required in 
Sec.  194.113. One commenter noted that Sec.  194.113(a)(2) should be 
revised to eliminate the listing of one or more line sections meeting 
the requirements for significant and substantial harm. Instead, he 
suggested replacing it with a list and description of the response 
zones, including all counties and States that each zone encompasses and 
the level of harm the operator's pipeline poses in that zone.
    Two commenters suggested that Sec.  194.113(b)(1) be revised to 
remove the requirement that the response zone appendix contain the 
information summary sheet for the core plan. Another commenter took 
issue with the statement in the preamble to the interim final rule, on 
the need for an operator to provide a duplicate copy of the information 
summary sheet from the core plan with each response zone appendix.
    Three commenters requested that Sec.  194.113(b)(2) be revised to 
require only the title of the qualified individual, so that the 
operator would not have to update the plan when personnel changed. Two 
commenters stated that the plan should list the name and telephone 
number of an alternate qualified individual in addition to those of the 
qualified individual. Another commenter stated that naming specific 
individuals, along with their phone numbers, contractors, and employees 
would do little to enhance the pipeline operator's response capability.
Response
    OPS believes that the information summary concerns expressed by the 
commenters are largely resolved through the iterative process of plan 
review and generally do not require further clarification or change. 
OPS agrees that the summary should require only the title of the 
qualified individual, so that the operator would not have to update the 
plan when personnel change. The plan should also list the name and 
telephone number of an alternate qualified individual in addition to 
those of the qualified individual. We are revising Sec. Sec.  
194.113(b)(2) accordingly.

Section 194.115, Response Resources

    OPS received 22 comments on Sec.  194.115. Several comments 
concerned the tiering of response resources. Tiering is the concept of 
having a certain amount of personnel and response equipment on-scene 
within a specified amount of time. Each increment of time, with its 
associated level of resources, is called a tier.
    Current regulations require operators to identify in their spill 
response plan the resources that are available to respond for three 
tiers, that is, within 12, 36, and 60 hours, respectively. For high 
volume areas, the response times for the three tiers are 6, 30, and 54 
hours, respectively. Five commenters endorsed the concept of tiers, 
including the concept of high volume areas. Another commenter noted 
that the tier requirements should be planning standards rather than 
performance standards, because on the day of a discharge circumstances 
may be different. Another commenter noted that the tiered approach 
should represent the minimum amount of resources that would be 
acceptable.
    Several commenters offered alternative response times, such as Tier 
1, 12 to 24 hours; Tier 2, 30 to 48 hours; and Tier 3, 60 to 80 hours. 
Another commenter stated that the preamble to the interim final rule 
offered an example of the tiered approach but that the regulatory text 
in Sec.  194.115 did not have criteria. He suggested that Sec.  194.115 
should clearly explain our approach. Another commenter suggested that 
operators should have the discretion to identify personnel and 
equipment to meet the tiered response for the worst case discharge.
    Another commenter noted that operators in remote areas need a 
different strategy because the areas may not be adequately protected 
under the regulation. One commenter noted that ACPs should be used as a 
reference in establishing the amount and type of response resources. He 
said that using ACPs for this task is appropriate because the ACPs 
would be kept up-to-date and consistency with ACPs is required. Another 
commenter responded to a statement in the interim final rule preamble 
on limitations for particular response zones including limitations on 
the types of equipment suitable for response in ACPs.
    Another commenter noted that the regulations do not identify the 
level of capability that OPS would consider sufficient within the 
tiers. As a result, operators and response contractors may not be clear 
on what is required of them. One commenter noted that although the 
preamble to the interim final rule says that many of the 
recommendations of the USCG Response Planning Negotiated Rulemaking 
Committee were adopted, OPS departed from the Committee's 
recommendations on response times and response equipment. Several 
commenters stated that OPS

[[Page 8743]]

should adopt the tiered concept and specify the amount of response 
equipment required under each tier from the USCG's or the EPA's 
response planning regulations.
    Two commenters addressed the subject of caps on the amount of 
required equipment that must be under contract, as developed in the 
USCG's Response Planning Negotiated Rulemaking and used in the USCG and 
the EPA's response plan rules. Both commenters endorsed the concept but 
one suggested doubling the caps in the USCG's regulations. The other 
commenter suggested that because resources may be insufficient in many 
areas of the country, OPS should specify caps for response resources 
that must be under contract.
    OPS received several comments on specific equipment requirements 
under Sec.  194.115. One commenter questioned how OPS defines 
sufficient resources and asked us to define reasonable levels of 
resources for each of the three tiers. OPS received four comments 
calling for adopting standards for measuring the adequacy of an 
operator's response equipment. One commenter noted that adopting 
requirements parallel to the USCG's and EPA's would be appropriate. 
Another commenter said that the USCG's and EPA's guidance on response 
resources were inappropriate because they were developed for industries 
regulated by those agencies. Some industry representatives suggested 
that operators should have the discretion to identify personnel and 
equipment to meet the tiered response for the worst case discharge. 
They oppose adopting the USCG's response planning standards, because 
they believe it would result in conflicting and confusing requirements.
Response
    In the interim final rule, OPS referred to the USCG Navigation and 
Vessel Inspection Circular (NAVIC) No. 7-92, Appendix A, as a method an 
operator could use to determine the type and amount of response 
resources needed to respond to a worst case discharge. OPS also noted 
in the interim final rule that many pipeline operators deal with 
diverse spill risks and response considerations, which is reflected by 
the comments above. OPS does not believe it is necessary to specify the 
amount of response resources instead of allowing operators to determine 
and demonstrate sufficient response resources in their response plans.
    The NAVIC included guidance on the tiers of response resources, 
defined environments in which response equipment must be capable of 
operating, and accounted for the physical effects of the environment on 
types of oil. The NAVIC set specific minimum amounts of equipment, and 
specified times of arrival at the scene of a worst case discharge for 
which an operator mus