Maryland Three Airports: Enhanced Security Procedures for Operations at Certain Airports in the Washington, DC, Metropolitan Area Flight Restricted Zone, 7150-7163 [05-2630]
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Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 27 / Thursday, February 10, 2005 / Rules and Regulations
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY
Transportation Security Administration
49 CFR Part 1562
[Docket No. TSA–2005–20118]
RIN 1652–AA39
Maryland Three Airports: Enhanced
Security Procedures for Operations at
Certain Airports in the Washington,
DC, Metropolitan Area Flight Restricted
Zone
Transportation Security
Administration (TSA), Department of
Homeland Security.
ACTION: Interim final rule; request for
comments.
AGENCY:
SUMMARY: This action transfers
responsibility for ground security
requirements and procedures at three
Maryland airports that are located
within the Washington, DC,
Metropolitan Area Flight Restricted
Zone, and for individuals operating
aircraft to and from these airports, from
the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) to TSA. These requirements and
procedures were previously issued by
the FAA, in coordination with TSA, in
Special Federal Aviation Regulation
(SFAR) 94. TSA is assuming
responsibility for these requirements
and procedures because TSA and FAA
agree that they are best handled under
TSA’s authority over transportation
security. These requirements and
procedures will continue to enhance the
security of the critical infrastructure and
Federal government assets in the
Washington, DC, Metropolitan Area.
DATES: Effective Date: This rule is
effective February 13, 2005.
Comment Date: Comments must be
received by April 11, 2005.
ADDRESSES: You may submit comments,
identified by the TSA docket number to
this rulemaking, using any one of the
following methods:
Comments Filed Electronically: You
may submit comments through the
docket Web site at https://dms.dot.gov.
Please be aware that anyone is able to
search the electronic form of all
comments received into any of our
dockets by the name of the individual
submitting the comment (or signing the
comment, if submitted on behalf of an
association, business, labor union, etc.).
You may review the applicable Privacy
Act Statement published in the Federal
Register on April 11, 2000 (65 FR
19477), or you may visit https://
dms.dot.gov.
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Comments Submitted by Mail, Fax, or
In Person: Address or deliver your
written, signed comments to the Docket
Management System, U.S. Department
of Transportation, Room Plaza 401, 400
Seventh Street, SW., Washington, DC
20590–0001; Fax: 202–493–2251.
Comments that include trade secrets,
confidential commercial or financial
information, or sensitive security
information (SSI) should not be
submitted to the public regulatory
docket. Please submit such comments
separately from other comments on the
rule. Comments containing trade
secrets, confidential commercial or
financial information, or SSI should be
appropriately marked as containing
such information and submitted by mail
to the individual(s) listed in FOR
FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT.
Reviewing Comments in the Docket:
You may review the public docket
containing comments on this interim
final rule in person in the Docket Office
between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday
through Friday, except Federal holidays.
The Docket Office is located on the
plaza level of the NASSIF Building at
the Department of Transportation
address above. Also, you may review
public dockets on the Internet at
https://dms.dot.gov.
See SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION for
format and other information about
comment submissions.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For
policy questions: Robert Rottman, Office
of Aviation Security Policy,
Transportation Security Administration
Headquarters, East Building, Floor 11,
601 South 12th Street, Arlington, VA
22202; telephone: 571–227–2289; email: Robert.Rottman@dhs.gov.
For technical questions: Dirk Ahle,
Aviation Operations, Transportation
Security Administration Headquarters,
East Building, Floor 9, 601 South 12th
Street, Arlington, VA 22202; telephone:
571–227–1504; e-mail:
Dirk.Ahle@dhs.gov.
For legal questions: Dion Casey,
Office of Chief Counsel, Transportation
Security Administration Headquarters,
East Building, Floor 12, TSA–2, 601
South 12th Street, Arlington, VA 22202;
telephone: 571–227–2663; e-mail:
Dion.Casey@dhs.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Comments Invited
This interim final rule is being
adopted without prior notice and prior
public comment. However, to the
maximum extent possible, operating
administrations within DHS will
provide an opportunity for public
comment on regulations issued without
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prior notice. Accordingly, TSA invites
interested persons to participate in this
rulemaking by submitting written
comments, data, or views. We also
invite comments relating to the
economic, environmental, energy, or
federalism impacts that might result
from this rulemaking. See ADDRESSES
above for information on where to
submit comments.
Comments that include trade secrets,
confidential commercial or financial
information, or SSI should not be
submitted to the public regulatory
docket. Please submit such comments
separately from other comments on the
rule. Comments containing this type of
information should be appropriately
marked and submitted by mail to the
individual(s) listed in FOR FURTHER
INFORMATION CONTACT section. Upon
receipt of such comments, TSA will not
place the comments in the public docket
and will handle them in accordance
with applicable safeguards and
restrictions on access. TSA will hold
them in a separate file to which the
public does not have access, and place
a note in the public docket that TSA has
received such materials from the
commenter. If TSA receives a request to
examine or copy this information, TSA
will treat it as any other request under
the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)
(5 U.S.C. 552) and the Department of
Homeland Security’s FOIA regulation
found in 6 CFR part 5.
With each comment, please include
your name and address, identify the
docket number at the beginning of your
comments, and give the reason for each
comment. The most helpful comments
reference a specific portion of the rule,
explain the reason for any
recommended change, and include
supporting data. You may submit
comments and material electronically,
in person, by mail, or fax as provided
under ADDRESSES, but please submit
your comments and material by only
one means. If you submit comments by
mail or delivery, submit them in two
copies, in an unbound format, no larger
than 8.5 by 11 inches, suitable for
copying and electronic filing.
If you want the TSA to acknowledge
receipt of your comments on this
rulemaking, include with your
comments a self-addressed, stamped
postcard on which the docket number
appears. We will stamp the date on the
postcard and mail it to you.
Except for comments containing
confidential information and SSI, we
will file in the public docket all
comments we receive, as well as a
report summarizing each substantive
public contact with TSA personnel
concerning this rulemaking. The docket
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is available for public inspection before
and after the comment closing date.
We will consider all comments we
receive on or before the closing date for
comments. We will consider comments
filed late to the extent practicable. We
may change this rule in light of the
comments we receive.
Availability of Rulemaking Document
You may obtain an electronic copy
using the Internet by—
(1) Searching the Department of
Transportation’s electronic Docket
Management System (DMS) Web page
(https://dms.dot.gov/search);
(2) Accessing the Government
Printing Office’s Web page at https://
www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs/aces/
aces140.html; or
(3) Visiting the TSA’s Law and Policy
Web page at https://www.tsa.dot.gov/
public/index.jsp.
In addition, copies are available by
writing or calling any of the individuals
in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION
CONTACT section. Make sure to identify
the docket number of this rulemaking.
Small Entity Inquiries
The Small Business Regulatory
Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA) of
1996 requires TSA to comply with small
entity requests for information or advice
about compliance with statutes and
regulations within TSA’s jurisdiction.
Any small entity that has a question
regarding this document may contact
the persons listed in the FOR FURTHER
INFORMATION CONTACT section for
information or advice. You can get
further information regarding SBREFA
on the Small Business Administration’s
Web page at https://www.sba.gov/advo/
laws/law_lib.html.
Good Cause for Immediate Adoption
TSA is issuing this interim final rule
without prior notice and opportunity to
comment pursuant to its authority
under section 4(a) of the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA) (5 U.S.C. 553(b)).
This provision authorizes the agency to
issue a rule without notice and
opportunity to comment when the
agency for good cause finds that those
procedures are ‘‘impracticable,
unnecessary, or contrary to the public
interest.’’ TSA finds that notice and
public comment to this interim final
rule are impracticable, unnecessary, and
contrary to the public interest for the
following reasons.
First, after the September 11, 2001
attacks, three airports in Maryland—
College Park Airport, Potomac Airfield,
and Washington Executive/Hyde Field
(the Maryland Three Airports)—were
closed for a sustained period because of
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their proximity to important National
Capitol Region assets and because of the
restrictions on aircraft operations in the
airspace that overlies those airports. The
airports were not permitted to reopen
until the FAA, in coordination with
TSA, issued SFAR 94 on February 19,
2002 (67 FR 7538). According to
comments that the FAA received, this
sustained closure placed significant
financial burdens on the Maryland
Three Airports. SFAR 94 is set to expire
on February 13, 2005. If TSA does not
issue this IFR immediately, the
Maryland Three Airports may be
required to close again until TSA
completes this rulemaking. Such a
closure could cause the Maryland Three
Airports significant financial burdens
that are not necessary from a security
perspective.
Second, in this interim final rule TSA
is largely adopting the security
measures and procedures that were
required under SFAR 94. The Maryland
Three Airport operators, and pilots who
operate to and from those airports, have
been operating under the SFAR 94
requirements since February 19, 2002.
In addition, because TSA is largely
adopting the SFAR 94 requirements, the
airport security procedures that were
approved under SFAR 94 for each of the
Maryland Three Airports will be
approved by TSA under this interim
final rule. Thus, TSA believes that the
interim final rule will not present any
surprises or impose any additional
burdens on the Maryland Three Airport
operators or the pilots who operate to
and from those airports. In fact, in
response to comments on SFAR 94 and
FAA Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) 3/
0853, this interim final rule relaxes one
of the major burdens imposed under
NOTAM 3/0853—the requirement that
aircraft approved to operate to or from
any of the Maryland Three Airports be
based at one of those airports—without
relaxing security. Under this interim
final rule, TSA may permit transient
aircraft to operate to or from any of the
Maryland Three Airports if the pilot
complies with the requirements of the
interim final rule. This change will
reduce costs without relaxing security.
Finally, TSA notes that the FAA first
issued these requirements as SFAR 94
on February 19, 2002. SFAR 94 was set
to expire one year from that date. The
FAA requested and received public
comments on SFAR 94. On February 14,
2003, the FAA published a final rule
extending the expiration date of SFAR
94 for an additional two years (68 FR
7684). In the 2003 final rule, the FAA,
in coordination with TSA, responded to
the public comments that it received
after the publication of SFAR 94 in
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2002. The FAA did not receive any
additional comments after publishing
the final rule extending the expiration
date of SFAR 94 in 2003. Consequently,
TSA believes that the issues involved in
this rulemaking have already been
addressed through the prior FAA
rulemakings.
For these reasons, TSA finds that
notice and public comment to this
interim final rule are impracticable,
unnecessary, and contrary to the public
interest. However, TSA is inviting
public comments on all aspects of the
interim final rule. If, based upon
information provided in public
comments, TSA determines that
changes to the interim final rule are
necessary to address transportation
security more effectively, or in a less
burdensome but equally effective
manner, the agency will not hesitate to
make such changes.
Abbreviations and Terms Used in This
Document
ADIZ—Air Defense Identification Zone
ATC—Air Traffic Control
ATSA—Aviation and Transportation
Security Act
CFR—Code of Federal Regulations
CHRC—Criminal History Records Check
CIA—Central Intelligence Agency
DHS—Department of Homeland
Security
DOD—Department of Defense
DOT—Department of Transportation
FAA—Federal Aviation Administration
FBI—Federal Bureau of Investigation
FRZ—Flight Restricted Zone
GA—General Aviation
IFR—Instrument Flight Rules
NM—Nautical Mile
NOTAM—Notice to Airmen
PIN—Personal Identification Number
SFAR—Special Federal Aviation
Regulation
TFR—Temporary Flight Restriction
TSA—Transportation Security
Administration
VFR—Visual Flight Rules
VOR/DME—Very High Frequency
Omnidirectional Range/Distance
Measuring Equipment
Background
After the September 11, 2001, terrorist
attacks against four U.S. commercial
aircraft resulting in the tragic loss of
human life at the World Trade Center,
the Pentagon, and in southwest
Pennsylvania, the FAA immediately
prohibited all aircraft operations within
the territorial airspace of the U.S., with
the exception of certain military, law
enforcement, and emergency related
aircraft operations. This general
prohibition was lifted in part on
September 13, 2001. In the Washington,
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DC, Metropolitan Area, however,
aircraft operations remained prohibited
at all civil airports within a 25 nautical
mile (NM) radius of the Washington
Very High Frequency Omnidirectional
Range/Distance Measuring Equipment
(VOR/DME). This action was
accomplished via the U.S. NOTAM
system. The FAA issued several
NOTAMs under 14 CFR 91.139,
Emergency Air Traffic Rules, and
implemented temporary flight
restrictions (TFRs) under 14 CFR
91.137, Temporary Flight Restrictions in
the Vicinity of Disaster/Hazard Areas.
On October 4, 2001, limited air carrier
operations were permitted to resume at
Ronald Reagan Washington National
Airport (DCA).
On October 5, 2001, the FAA issued
NOTAM 1/0989, which authorized
instrument flight rules (IFR) operations
and limited visual flight rules (VFR)
operations within an 18 to 25 NM radius
from the DCA VOR/DME in accordance
with emergency air traffic rules issued
under 14 CFR 91.139. Exception to the
restrictions affecting aircraft operations
under 14 CFR part 91 (part 91
operations) in the Washington, DC, area
issued since September 11, 2001, were
made to permit the repositioning of
aircraft from airports within the area of
the TFR and to permit certain
operations conducted under waivers
issued by the FAA.
On December 19, 2001, the FAA
cancelled NOTAM 1/0989 and issued
NOTAM 1/3354 that, in part, set forth
special security instructions under 14
CFR 99.7 and created a new TFR for the
Washington, DC, area. NOTAM 1/3354
also created TFRs in the Boston and
New York City areas. That action
significantly decreased the size of the
area subject to the earlier prohibitions
on part 91 operations in the
Washington, DC, area and permitted
operations at Freeway (W00), Maryland
(2W5), and Suburban (W18) airports.
As security concerns were resolved,
most general aviation (GA) operations
resumed with varying degrees of
restriction. However, due to their
proximity to important National Capitol
Region assets, the Maryland Three
Airports remained closed for a sustained
period following the September 11
attacks because of the restrictions on
aircraft operations in the airspace that
overlies those airports. In addition, most
part 91 operations in the airspace that
overlies the Maryland Three Airports
remained prohibited under NOTAM 1/
3354.
On February 14, 2002, the FAA
cancelled NOTAM 1/3354 and issued
NOTAM 2/1257, which provided flight
plan filing procedures and air traffic
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control (ATC) arrival and departure
procedures for pilots operating from the
Maryland Three Airports in accordance
with SFAR 94. The FAA updated and
reissued NOTAM 2/1257 as NOTAM 2/
2720 on December 10, 2002. NOTAM 2/
2720 permitted pilots vetted at any one
of the Maryland Three Airports to fly
into any of the Maryland Three
Airports. NOTAM 3/0853 replaced
NOTAM 2/2720 on February 1, 2003.
NOTAM 3/0853 remains in effect as of
the date of this interim final rule.
Aviation and Transportation Security
Act
The events of September 11, 2001, led
Congress to enact the Aviation and
Transportation Security Act (ATSA),
which created TSA.1 ATSA required
TSA to assume many of the civil
aviation security responsibilities that
the FAA maintained prior to that date.
On February 22, 2002, TSA published a
final rule transferring the bulk of the
FAA’s civil aviation security regulations
to TSA and adding new standards
required by ATSA.2
FAA and TSA Authority
The FAA has broad authority to
regulate the safe and efficient use of the
navigable airspace.3 The FAA is also
authorized to issue air traffic rules and
regulations to govern the flight of
aircraft, the navigation, protection, and
identification of aircraft for the
protection of persons and property on
the ground, and for the efficient use of
the navigable airspace. Additionally,
pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 40103(b)(3), the
FAA has the authority, in consultation
with the Department of Defense (DOD),
to ‘‘establish security provisions that
will encourage and allow maximum use
of the navigable airspace by civil aircraft
consistent with national security.’’ Such
provisions may include establishing
airspace areas the FAA decides are
necessary in the interest of national
defense; and by regulation or order,
restricting or prohibiting flight of civil
aircraft that the FAA cannot identify,
locate, and control with available
facilities in those areas. The FAA has
broad statutory authority to issue
regulations in the interests of safety in
air commerce and national security.4
TSA has broad authority over civil
aviation security.5 TSA is responsible
for developing policies, strategies, and
plans for dealing with threats to
transportation security, as well as other
1 Pub. L. 107–71, November 19, 2001, 115 Stat.
597.
2 67 FR 8340, February 22, 2002.
3 See 49 U.S.C. 40103(a).
4 See 49 U.S.C. 44701(a)(5).
5 See 49 U.S.C. 114(d)(1).
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plans related to transportation security,
including coordinating countermeasures
with appropriate departments, agencies,
and instrumentalities of the U.S.
government.6 TSA is also authorized to
work in conjunction with the FAA with
respect to any actions or activities that
may affect aviation safety.7
The FAA retains authority over
airspace, including the authority to
issue airspace restrictions. FAA issued
SFAR 94 under that authority. However,
because some of the requirements in
SFAR 94 deal primarily with security
(including background checks for pilots
operating to or from the Maryland Three
Airports and security procedures for the
airports), and because TSA’s primary
mission is civil aviation security, the
FAA and TSA have determined that
ground security procedures (including
security threat assessments for pilots
and airport security coordinators) for
the Maryland Three Airports are best
handled under TSA’s authority. TSA
also notes that TSA inspectors have
conducted inspections of Maryland
Three Airports for compliance with the
airports’ approved security procedures.
For these reasons, the ground security
requirements and procedures for the
Maryland Three Airports as well as the
security threat assessments for
individuals operating aircraft to and
from those airports are being placed in
TSA regulations. The airspace security
restrictions in NOTAM 3/0853 remain
under FAA authority.
SFAR 94
The FAA issued SFAR 94 as a final
rule on February 19, 2002.8 SFAR 94
defined the restricted airspace over the
Washington, DC, Metropolitan Area and
established rules for all pilots operating
aircraft to or from any of the Maryland
Three Airports. It also established
security procedures for the Maryland
Three Airports. SFAR 94 had a one-year
effective period and was set to expire on
February 13, 2003. However, the FAA,
in consultation with TSA and other
Federal agencies, reissued SFAR 94 on
February 14, 2003, with an expiration
date of February 13, 2005.9
Security Justification for the Interim
Final Rule
Because of its status as home to all
three branches of the Federal
government, as well as numerous
Federal buildings, foreign embassies,
multinational institutions, and national
monuments of iconic significance, the
6 See
49 U.S.C. 114(f)(3) and (4).
49 U.S.C. 114(f)(13).
8 67 FR 7537.
9 68 FR 7683.
7 See
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Washington, DC, Metropolitan Area
continues to be an obvious high priority
target for terrorists.
Although there is no information
suggesting an imminent plan by
terrorists to use airplanes to attack
targets in the Washington, DC,
Metropolitan Area, the success of the
September 11, 2001, attack on the
Pentagon and reports demonstrating
terrorist groups’ enduring interest in
aviation-related attacks indicate the
need for continued vigilance in aviation
security.
For example, the April 2004 arrest of
Waleed bin Attash and the subsequent
discovery of a plot to crash an
explosive-laden small aircraft into the
U.S. Consulate in Karachi, Pakistan,
illustrates terrorist groups’ continued
interest in using aircraft to attack U.S.
interests. Other information—such as
documents found in Zacarias
Moussaoui’s possession that outlined
crop duster operations—suggests that
terrorist groups may have been
considering other domestic aviation
attack plans in addition to the
September 11, 2001, attacks.
In addition, recent press reporting on
the debriefings of detained terrorist
leader Khalid Shaykh Muhammad not
only hints at the complexity of planning
involved in the September 11, 2001,
attacks but also suggests the group was
likely planning follow-on operations
inside the United States, possibly
including inside the Washington, DC,
Metropolitan Area.
While DHS has no specific
information that terrorist groups are
currently planning to use GA aircraft to
perpetrate attacks against the U.S., it
remains concerned that (in light of
completed and ongoing security
enhancements for commercial aircraft
and airports) terrorists may turn to GA
as an alternative method for conducting
operations.10
To protect against a potential threat to
the Washington, DC, Metropolitan Area,
10 TSA has taken several actions to enhance GA
security. For example, TSA, in partnership with GA
associations, implemented a GA Hotline (1–866–GA
SECURE) that is tied to an Airport Watch Program.
This provides a mechanism to enable any GA pilot
to report suspicious activity at his or her airport to
one central Federal Government focal point. The
Hotline, which is operated by the National
Response Center and managed by the U.S. Coast
Guard, became operational on December 2, 2002.
The Airport Watch program has extended the
Neighborhood Watch concept to airports. Pilots,
airport workers, and aircraft maintainers are asked
to call the Hotline to report any suspicious activity.
In addition, TSA has released guidelines to provide
GA airport owners, operators, and users with a set
of Federally-endorsed security enhancements and
methods for determining implementation. The
guidelines are available on the TSA Web site at
https://www.tsa.gov/public/interapp/editorial/
editorial_1113.xml.
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FAA, in consultation with TSA and
other Federal agencies, implemented a
system of concentric airspace rings and
complementary airspace control
measures via NOTAM 3/0853 in
February 2003. The dimensions of this
protected airspace were determined
after considering such factors as the
average speed of likely suspect aircraft
and minimum launch time and speed of
intercept aircraft. After extensive
coordination among Federal agencies,
the dimensions for this protected
airspace were established along with the
requirements to enter and operate in the
airspace. The outer lateral boundary is
the same as the outer lateral boundary
for the Tri-Area Class B airspace in the
Washington-Baltimore area. This outer
boundary is, at certain places, more than
40 nautical miles from the Washington
Monument. The Government
conditioned entry into this airspace on
the identification of all aircraft operators
within the airspace in order to ensure
the security of protected ground assets.
This airspace is called an Air Defense
Identification Zone (ADIZ). Within the
ADIZ airspace is an inner ring, called a
Flight Restricted Zone (FRZ), which has
a radius of approximately 15 NM
centered on the Washington (DCA)
VOR/DME. In order to enter and operate
in FRZ airspace, more stringent access
and security procedures are applied.
The Maryland Three Airports are
located within the FRZ. Therefore,
aircraft operating to or from one of the
Maryland Three Airports must be
subject to special rules. TSA notes that
under SFAR 94 and NOTAM 3/0853,
aircraft operations permitted in the FRZ
are limited to U.S. Armed Forces, law
enforcement, aeromedical services, air
carriers that operate under 14 CFR part
121, and certain types of general
aviation aircraft operations that receive
an FAA waiver after the waiver
applications are reviewed and cleared
by TSA. The pilots of these operations
have successfully completed a threat
assessment prior to operating in the
FRZ.
Discussion of the Interim Final Rule
TSA is adopting most of the security
requirements and procedures that are
currently in SFAR 94. TSA requests
comment on each of the requirements
discussed below. In the interim final
rule, TSA has reorganized the paragraph
structure of the requirements in SFAR
94 to help clarify the requirements.
In keeping with SFAR 94, the interim
final rule applies to the three Maryland
airports (College Park Airport (CGS),
Potomac Airfield (VKX), and
Washington Executive/Hyde Field
(W32)) that are located within the
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airspace designated as the Washington,
DC, Metropolitan Area FRZ, as defined
in FAA NOTAM or regulations. These
airports are referred to as the Maryland
Three Airports. The interim final rule
also applies to individuals who operate
an aircraft to or from those airports.
Airport Operator Requirements
SFAR 94 required each Maryland
Three Airport operator to adopt security
procedures that met minimum
requirements in SFAR 94 and were
approved by the FAA Administrator.
This interim final rule carries over that
requirement, except that the airport
security procedures must be approved
by TSA. The minimum-security
procedures are discussed in greater
detail below. TSA notes that because the
agency is making only minor revisions
to the SFAR 94 requirements, the airport
security procedures that were approved
by FAA under SFAR 94 for each of the
Maryland Three Airports will be
approved by TSA under this interim
final rule.
The interim final rule requires the
airport operator to maintain at the
airport a copy of the airport’s TSAapproved security procedures, and to
permit officials authorized by TSA to
inspect the airport, the airport’s TSAapproved security procedures, and any
other documents required under the
interim final rule. These requirements
will help increase awareness of, and
compliance with, the airport’s approved
security procedures, as well as facilitate
the proper administration and oversight
of the security procedures at each
airport. SFAR 94 contained a similar
provision at paragraph 4(a)(7).
The interim final rule also requires
the airport operator to maintain at the
airport a copy of each FAA NOTAM and
rule that affects security procedures at
the Maryland Three Airports. SFAR 94
did not contain this requirement. TSA is
adding this requirement to help increase
pilots’ awareness of, and compliance
with, the FAA’s requirements for
operating in the FRZ.
In addition, the interim final rule
requires the airport operator to appoint
an airport employee as the airport
security coordinator. The airport
security coordinator will be responsible
for ensuring that the airport’s security
procedures are implemented and
followed. The airport security
coordinator must be approved by TSA.
To obtain TSA approval, an airport
security coordinator is required to
undergo the same security threat
assessment and criminal history records
check as pilots who are approved to
operate to or from a Maryland Three
Airport. Accordingly, the airport
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security coordinator is required to
present to TSA his or her name, social
security number, date of birth, address,
phone number, and fingerprints. These
requirements, though not contained
specifically in SFAR 94, were contained
in the airport security procedures
approved by TSA and FAA under SFAR
94.
The interim final rule imposes on
airport security coordinators who are
approved by TSA a continuing
obligation to meet these requirements. If
TSA determines that an airport security
coordinator poses a threat to national or
transportation security, or a threat of
terrorism, after TSA has approved the
airport security coordinator, TSA may
withdraw its approval of the airport
security coordinator. In addition, if an
airport security coordinator is convicted
or found not guilty by reason of insanity
of any of the listed disqualifying crimes
after receiving TSA approval, the airport
security coordinator must report the
conviction or finding of not guilty by
reason of insanity within 24 hours of the
decision. TSA may withdraw its
approval of the airport security
coordinator as a result of the conviction
or finding of not guilty by reason of
insanity.
TSA intends to issue a form that
airport security coordinators can use to
submit all of this information to TSA.11
TSA notes that airport security
coordinators who were approved under
SFAR 94 may continue in their capacity
as airport security coordinators without
resubmitting to TSA the information
described above.
Security Procedures
To be approved by TSA, an airport’s
security procedures must meet the
minimum requirements set forth in the
interim final rule. As noted above, TSA
is making only minor revisions to the
minimum requirements established in
SFAR 94. Therefore, the airport security
procedures that were approved by FAA
under SFAR 94 for each of the Maryland
Three Airports will be approved by TSA
under the interim final rule. TSA
requests comment on these minimum
requirements. The minimum
requirements are as follows.
First, as required under SFAR 94 at
paragraph 4(a)(1), the interim final rule
requires an airport’s security procedures
to contain basic airport information,
outline the hours of operation, and
identify the airport security coordinator
who is responsible for ensuring that the
security procedures are implemented
and followed. Such information will
11 This form will be issued in accordance with the
requirements of the Paperwork Reduction Act.
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help ensure accountability for
compliance with the security
procedures at each airport. The interim
final rule also requires the airport
security coordinator to present to TSA,
in a form and manner acceptable to
TSA, his or her name, social security
number, date of birth, and fingerprints,
and to successfully complete a TSA
terrorist threat assessment, including a
criminal history records check, that is
the same as the threat assessment pilots
will have to successfully complete to be
approved to operate to or from any of
the Maryland Three Airports. Airport
security coordinators who were
approved under SFAR 94 will continue
to be approved under the interim final
rule.
Second, the interim final rule requires
an airport’s security procedures to
contain a current record of the
individuals and aircraft authorized to
operate to or from the airport. This will
help ensure that only individuals who
have been properly vetted by TSA
operate aircraft to or from the Maryland
Three Airports. SFAR 94 contained
similar provisions at paragraphs 4(a)(2)
and (3).
Third, the interim final rule requires
an airport’s security procedures to
contain procedures to monitor the
security of aircraft at the airport during
operational and non-operational hours,
and to alert aircraft owners and
operators, the airport operator, and TSA
of unsecured aircraft. Such procedures
will help prevent aircraft located at the
airport from being stolen and used for
unauthorized purposes. SFAR 94
contained this provision at paragraph
4(b)(5).
Fourth, as required under paragraph
4(b)(6) of SFAR 94, the interim final rule
requires an airport’s security procedures
to contain procedures to ensure that
security awareness procedures are
implemented and maintained at the
airport. Such procedures will help
ensure that airport employees and pilots
operating to and from the airport are
aware of, and comply with, the security
procedures in place at the airport, and
that they are able to recognize
suspicious behavior or activity at the
airport.
Fifth, the interim final rule requires
an airport’s security procedures to
contain TSA-approved procedures for
approving pilots who violate the
Washington, DC, Metropolitan Area
Flight Restricted Zone and are forced to
land at an airport. For example, if a pilot
who was not vetted by TSA to take off
or land at one of the Maryland Three
Airports did so, the security procedures
would be used to allow the pilot to take
off from the airport after he or she had
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been vetted by TSA.12 The interim final
rule requires that the pilot comply with
all applicable FAA and TSA aircraft
operator requirements before he or she
is permitted by FAA to take off from the
airport. Thus, the interim final rule
requires the airport’s security
procedures to contain the requirements
that the pilot would have to satisfy
before he or she could receive a limited
TSA approval. SFAR 94 contained a
similar provision at paragraph 4(b)(4).
That provision required airport security
procedures to contain airport arrival and
departure route descriptions, air traffic
control clearance procedures, flight plan
requirements, communications
procedures, and procedures for
transponder use.
Finally, the interim final rule requires
an airport’s security procedures to
contain any additional procedures
necessary to provide for the security of
aircraft operations to or from the airport.
This will allow TSA to work with each
of the Maryland Three Airports to
implement any additional security
procedures that may be necessary to
enhance secure aircraft operations at a
particular airport, and allow TSA to
amend an airport’s security procedures
in response to threat information or
elevated threat levels. SFAR 94
contained this provision at paragraph
4(b)(9).
TSA notes that it may need to be able
to quickly amend a particular airport’s
security procedures in response to
threat information, an elevation in the
threat level, noncompliance with the
security procedures, or other
circumstances. Thus, the interim final
rule provides that airport security
procedures approved by TSA remain in
effect unless TSA determines that
operations at the airport have not been
conducted in accordance with the
approved security procedures, or the
airport’s security procedures must be
amended to provide for the security of
aircraft operations to or from the airport.
SFAR 94 contained a similar provision
at paragraph 4(b) providing that an
airport’s security procedures remain in
effect unless TSA determines that
operations at the airport have not been
conducted in accordance with the
security procedures.
12 TSA recognizes that a pilot who violates the
Flight Restricted Zone would not receive TSA
approval to operate to or from any of the Maryland
Three Airports because the pilot would have a
record of an airspace violation under the interim
final rule. However, TSA notes that the approval
granted under this provision would be for a onetime operation for the pilot to take off from the
airport and leave the Flight Restricted Zone. The
approval granted under this provision would not
allow the pilot to continuously operate to or from
the Maryland Three Airports.
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Pilot Requirements
The interim final rule prohibits a pilot
from operating an aircraft to or from any
of the Maryland Three Airports unless
he or she is approved by TSA. To
receive TSA approval, a pilot must meet
the following requirements. As with the
airport operator requirements, TSA is
making only minor revisions to
requirements that are currently in effect
under SFAR 94. TSA also notes that
pilots who were approved to operate to
or from any of the Maryland Three
Airports under SFAR 94 may continue
to operate using the PIN issued to them
by TSA. Such pilots do not have to
reapply for TSA approval under the
interim final rule.
First, the interim final rule requires a
pilot to present to TSA13 the following:
(1) The pilot’s name, social security
number, date of birth, address, and
phone number; (2) the pilot’s current
and valid airman certificate; (2) the
pilot’s current medical certificate; (3)
one form of Government issued picture
identification of the pilot; (4) the pilot’s
fingerprints, in a form and manner
acceptable to TSA; and (5) a list
containing the make, model, and
registration number of each aircraft that
the pilot intends to operate to or from
the airport. These requirements will
help establish a pilot’s identification
and permit TSA to conduct the required
security threat assessment as well as
check the pilot’s FAA record. SFAR 94
contained a similar provision at
paragraph 3(b)(1).14 TSA intends to
issue a form that pilots can use to
submit all of this information to TSA.15
Second, the interim final rule requires
pilots to submit their fingerprints to
TSA in a form and manner acceptable
to TSA. Paragraph 3(b)(2) of SFAR 94
required pilots to successfully complete
a background check by a law
enforcement agency, which could
include submission of fingerprints and
the conduct of a criminal history
records check. Under SFAR 94,
individuals who sought approval to
operate to or from one of the Maryland
Three Airports were required to submit
their fingerprints at Ronald Reagan
13 The airport security procedures approved by
TSA and FAA under SFAR 94 required the airport
operator to collect this information from pilots. TSA
intends to continue that collection process under
the interim final rule. In addition, TSA intends to
issue a form that pilots can use to submit this
information to the airport operator, who will submit
the form to TSA.
14 Although SFAR 94 did not specifically require
pilots to submit their name, date of birth, or social
security number, the airport security procedures
approved by TSA and FAA under SFAR 94 did
require pilots to submit that information.
15 This form will be issued in accordance with the
requirements of the Paperwork Reduction Act.
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Washington National Airport (DCA) and
pay the appropriate fee to the entity
collecting the fingerprints as well as a
fee to the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) for processing the
fingerprints. TSA did not charge any
additional fee. TSA intends to continue
using this process under the interim
final rule.
Third, the interim final rule requires
pilots to successfully undergo a terrorist
threat assessment. This may include a
check of terrorist watchlists and other
databases relevant to determining
whether a pilot poses a security threat
or that confirm a pilot’s identity. A pilot
will not receive TSA approval under
this analysis if TSA determines or
suspects the individual of posing a
threat to national or transportation
security, or a threat of terrorism. The
interim final rule imposes on pilots who
are approved by TSA a continuing
obligation to meet this requirement. If a
pilot who is approved to operate to or
from any of the Maryland Three
Airports is determined by TSA to pose
a threat to national or transportation
security, or a threat of terrorism, TSA
may withdraw its approval of the pilot.
Fourth, pilots are required to undergo
a criminal history records check. A pilot
may not be approved by TSA if he or
she has been convicted or found not
guilty by reason of insanity, in any
jurisdiction, during the ten years prior
to the date of the pilot’s request to
operate to or from any of the Maryland
Three Airports, or while authorized to
do so, of any crime specified in 49 CFR
1542.209 or 1572.103. These crimes are:
(1) Forgery of certificates, false marking
of aircraft, and other aircraft registration
violation; (2) interference with air
navigation; (3) improper transportation
of a hazardous material; (4) aircraft
piracy; (5) interference with flight crew
members or flight attendants; (6)
commission of certain crimes aboard
aircraft in flight; (7) carrying a weapon
or explosive aboard aircraft; (8)
conveying false information or threats;
(9) aircraft piracy outside the special
aircraft jurisdiction of the U.S.; (10)
lighting violations involving
transporting controlled substances; (11)
unlawful entry into an aircraft or airport
area that serves air carrier or foreign air
carriers contrary to established security
requirements; (12) destruction of an
aircraft or aircraft facility; (13) murder;
(14) assault with intent to murder; (15)
espionage; (16) sedition; (17)
kidnapping or hostage taking; (18)
treason; (19) rape or aggravated sexual
abuse; (20) unlawful possession, use,
sale, distribution, manufacture,
purchase, receipt, transfer, shipping,
transporting, import, export, storage of,
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or dealing in an explosive, explosive
device, firearm, or other weapon; (21)
extortion; (22) armed or felony unarmed
robbery; (23) distribution of, or intent to
distribute, a controlled substance; (24)
felony arson; (25) a felony involving a
threat; (26) a felony involving: willful
destruction of property; importation or
manufacture of a controlled substance;
burglary; theft; dishonesty, fraud, or
misrepresentation; possession or
distribution of stolen property;
aggravated assault; bribery; or illegal
possession of a controlled substance
punishable by a maximum term of
imprisonment of more than one year;
(27) violence at international airports;
(28) a crime listed in 18 U.S.C. Chapter
113B—Terrorism, or a State law that is
comparable; (29) a crime involving a
transportation security incident; (30)
immigration violations; (31) violations
of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. 1961, et
seq., or a State law that is comparable;
or (32) conspiracy or attempt to commit
any of these criminal acts.
With the exception of four of the
crimes listed above, these are the same
crimes that were considered
disqualifying under paragraph 3(b)(4) of
SFAR 94. TSA also notes that these
crimes are considered disqualifying
under 49 CFR 1544.229 for TSA security
screeners and under § 1542.209 for
individuals with unescorted access
authority to a security identification
display area (SIDA). TSA understands
the unique nature of GA and that in
many instances those security measures
in place for commercial aviation would
not be appropriate for GA facilities.
However, the unique nature and
security concerns surrounding the
national capital region require
additional security enhancements, such
as requirements for disqualifying
offenses similar to those used for
individuals with SIDA access, that are
more robust than those at other GA
airports.
TSA is adding the disqualifying
crimes listed in 49 CFR 1572.103. In
developing that list of crimes, TSA
consulted with the Department of
Justice and Department of
Transportation to include those offenses
that are reasonably indicative of an
individual’s predisposition to engage in
violent or deceptive behavior that may
be predictive of a security threat. TSA
notes that there is considerable overlap
in the crimes listed in 49 CFR 1572.103
and 1542.209. The additional crimes
listed in 49 CFR 1572.103 are the crimes
listed above in (28), (29), (30), and (31),
as well as the addition of the following
language to the crimes listed in (20):
‘‘explosive device’’ and ‘‘purchase,
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receipt, transfer, shipping, transporting,
import, export, storage of, and dealing
in’’.
The listed crimes would be
considered grounds for disqualification
whether civilian or military authorities
prosecute them. If a pilot has been
convicted within the ten years
preceding the individual’s request to
operate to or from any of the Maryland
Three Airports, the pilot will be
disqualified.16
The interim final rule also imposes on
pilots who are approved by TSA a
continuing obligation to meet this
requirement. If a pilot is convicted or
found not guilty by reason of insanity of
any of the listed disqualifying crimes
after receiving TSA approval, the pilot
must report the conviction or finding of
not guilty by reason of insanity within
24 hours of the decision. TSA may
withdraw its approval of the pilot as a
result of the conviction or finding of not
guilty by reason of insanity. Paragraph
3(b)(4) of SFAR 94 required that pilots
not be convicted or found not guilty by
reason of insanity of any of the
disqualifying crimes ‘‘while authorized
to operate to or from the airport.’’
TSA invites comment from all
interested parties concerning this list of
disqualifying crimes. TSA must balance
its responsibility to ensure the security
of the critical infrastructure and Federal
government assets in the Washington,
DC, Metropolitan Area against the
knowledge that individuals may
participate in criminal acts but
subsequently become trusted citizens.
TSA wishes to minimize the adverse
impact this interim final rule may have
on individuals who have committed
criminal offenses and served their
sentences, without compromising the
security of the infrastructure and assets
in the nation’s capitol.
Fifth, a pilot is required to receive a
briefing acceptable to FAA and TSA that
describes procedures for operating to
and from the airport. These procedures
will be contained in the airport’s
approved security procedures. SFAR 94
contained this requirement at paragraph
3(b)(3). Pilots comply with the
requirement by viewing a videotaped
FAA/TSA briefing. In the near term,
TSA intends to continue to use that
videotape for compliance with the TSA
rule. However, in the future TSA
intends to update that videotape or
provide an alternate briefing. This
requirement will help ensure that
individuals are aware of, and comply
with, the proper procedures for
16 Pilots who were vetted in accordance with the
requirements of SFAR 94 will not be required to
reapply for approval under the interim final rule.
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operating to and from the airport, and
will help prevent inadvertent violations
of those procedures.
Sixth, a pilot is required to undergo
a check of his or her FAA record for
certain violations. A pilot will not
receive TSA approval if, in TSA’s
discretion, he or she has a record of a
violation of: (1) A prohibited area
designated under 14 CFR part 73; (2) a
flight restriction established under 14
CFR 91.141; (3) special security
instructions issued under 14 CFR 99.7;
(4) a restricted area designated under 14
CFR part 73; (5) emergency air traffic
rules issued under 14 CFR 91.139; (6) a
temporary flight restriction designated
under 14 CFR 91.137, 91.138, or 91.145;
or (7) an area designated under 14 CFR
91.143. In view of the critical need to
protect the critical infrastructure and
national assets in the Washington, DC,
Metropolitan Area, TSA will not
approve pilots who have a record of
violating restricted airspace.17 SFAR 94
contained a similar provision at
paragraph 3(b)(5).
TSA notes that there may be special
circumstances in which TSA may
approve an individual who has a record
of a violation of restricted airspace. TSA
will review such circumstances on a
case-by-case basis.
The interim final rule imposes upon
pilots who are approved by TSA a
continuing obligation to meet this
requirement. If a pilot who is approved
by TSA to operate to or from the
Maryland Three Airports commits any
of the violations described above, the
pilot must notify TSA within 24 hours
of the violation. TSA, in its discretion,
may withdraw its approval of the pilot
as a result of the violation. TSA notes
that this obligation is slightly different
from the requirement for a pilot who is
applying for access to the Maryland
Three Airports. In reviewing a pilot’s
application for access to the Maryland
Three Airports, TSA will consider only
final FAA determinations of violations
to be disqualifying. However, if a pilot
who has received TSA approval to
operate to or from the Maryland Three
Airports subsequently commits any of
the violations described above, TSA, in
its discretion, may withdraw its
approval without waiting for a final
FAA determination. This is necessary to
ensure that TSA can immediately
withdraw its approval of a pilot who
commits one or more serious airspace
violations.
17 TSA will consider only final FAA
determinations of a violation of restricted airspace,
not any pending enforcement actions. TSA will
consider an FAA determination to be final if the
matter has been fully and finally adjudicated or the
time for filing an appeal has expired.
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The interim final rule also requires
pilots who have received TSA approval
to operate to and from the Maryland
Three Airports to adhere to the
following security measures.
First, the interim final rule requires a
pilot to protect from unauthorized
disclosure any identification
information issued by TSA for the
conduct of operations to or from the
airport. SFAR 94 contained a similar
provision at paragraph 3(b)(7). Under
SFAR 94, TSA would issue a personal
identification number (PIN) to each
individual approved to operate to or
from any of the Maryland Three
Airports. TSA will continue to do so
under this interim final rule. This
requirement will help allow for the
ready identification of individuals who
have met the background check
requirements and been approved for
operations to or from any of the
Maryland Three Airports.
Second, the interim final rule requires
a pilot to secure the aircraft after
returning to the airport from any flight.
This requirement will help prevent
aircraft from being stolen and used for
terrorist and other criminal purposes.
SFAR 94 contained this provision at
paragraph 3(b)(14).
Finally, a pilot is required to comply
with any other requirements for
operating to or from the airport
specified by the FAA or TSA. For
example, in the event the national threat
level is elevated to Orange, TSA may
coordinate with local law enforcement
officers to positively identify a pilot
operating from one of the Maryland
Three Airports by checking his or her
identification or pilot’s certificate before
permitting the individual to take off.
SFAR 94 contained a similar provision
at paragraphs 3(b)(15) and (16).
The interim final rule allows a pilot
who is approved by TSA to operate an
aircraft to or from one of the Maryland
Three Airports to operate an aircraft to
any of the Maryland Three Airports,
provided that the pilot: (1) Files an IFR
or VFR flight plan with Leesburg
Automated Flight Service Station; (2)
obtains an ATC clearance with a
discrete transponder code; and (3)
follows any arrival/departure
procedures required by the FAA. This
was also permitted under SFAR 94.
TSA notes that under SFAR 94 and
NOTAM 3/0853, only pilots and aircraft
that were based at one of the Maryland
Three Airports were permitted to
operate to or from the Maryland Three
Airports. Transient aircraft were not
permitted to operate to or from any of
the Maryland Three Airports. Based on
comments to SFAR 94, TSA has
determined that this restriction may be
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relaxed without degrading security.
Therefore, under the interim final rule,
TSA may approve transient aircraft to
operate to or from any of the Maryland
Three Airports if the pilot complies
with all of the requirements described
above, including submitting his or her
fingerprints at DCA and successfully
completing the TSA security threat
assessment and terrorist threat analysis.
The interim final rule permits U.S.
armed forces, law enforcement, and
aeromedical services aircraft to operate
to or from any of the Maryland Three
Airports, provided that the pilot
operating the aircraft complies with any
procedures specified by FAA or TSA.
These requirements include complying
with the ATC procedures and aircraft
equipment requirements specified in
applicable FAA regulations, and
complying with any other requirements
for operating to or from the airport
specified by TSA or FAA.
Below is a table comparing the
requirements contained in SFAR 94
with the requirements in this interim
final rule and the requirements that
remain in NOTAM 3/0853 or may be
included in any NOTAM or rule that the
FAA issues to replace NOTAM 3/0853.
As noted above, the requirements in this
interim final rule are intended to
replace the security requirements in
SFAR 94, which will expire on February
13, 2005. The requirements in NOTAM
3/0853 will remain in effect until the
FAA removes them or replaces them
with another NOTAM or a rule.
AIRPORT OPERATOR REQUIREMENTS
SFAR 94
TSA interim final rule
Identify and provide contact information for the
manager responsible for ensuring that security procedures are implemented and maintained. 4(a)(1).
Identify aircraft eligible to be authorized for operations to or from the airport, and maintain a
current record of those persons authorized to
conduct operations to or from the airport and
the aircraft in which the person is authorized
to conduct those operations. 4(a)(2) and (3).
Maintain airport arrival and departure route descriptions, air traffic control clearance procedures, communications procedures, and procedures for transponder use. 4(a)(4).
Appoint an airport employee as the airport security coordinator and provide contact information for him or her. § 1562.3(a)(1) and
(c)(1).
Maintain a current record of the individuals
and aircraft authorized to operate to or from
the airport. § 1562.3(c)(2).
Maintain procedures to monitor the security of
aircraft at the airport during operational and
non-operational hours and to alert aircraft
owners and operators, airport operators, and
the FAA of unsecured aircraft. 4(a)(5).
Maintain procedures to ensure that security
awareness procedures are implemented and
maintained at the airport. 4(a)(6).
Ensure that a copy of the approved security
procedures is maintained at the airport and
can be made available for inspection upon
FAA request, and provide FAA with the
means necessary to make any inspection to
determine compliance with the approved security procedures. 4(a)(7) and (8).
Maintain any additional procedures necessary
to provide for the security of aircraft operations to or from the airport. 4(a)(9).
NOTAM 3/0853
Maintain procedures for limited approval of pilots who violate the Washington, DC, Metropolitan Area Flight Restricted Zone and
are forced to land at the airport.
§ 1562.3(c)(5).
Maintain procedures to monitor the security of
aircraft at the airport during operational and
non-operational hours and to alert the aircraft owner(s) and operator(s), the airport
operator, and TSA of unsecured aircraft.
§ 1562.3(c)(3).
Implement and maintain security awareness
procedures at the airport. § 1562.3(c)(4).
Maintain at the airport a copy of the airport’s
TSA-approved security procedures and permit officials authorized by TSA to inspect
the security procedures. § 1562.3(a)(3) and
(5).
Maintain any additional procedures required
by TSA to provide for the security of aircraft
operations to or from the airport.
§ 1562.3(c)(6).
PILOT REQUIREMENTS
SFAR 94
TSA interim final rule
Prior to obtaining authorization to operate to or
from the airport, present to FAA: (1) Current
and valid airman certificate; (2) current medical certificate; (3) one form of Government
issued picture identification; and (4) the
make, model, and registration number of
each aircraft the pilot intends to operate to or
from the airport. 3(b)(1). Note that the airport
security procedures approved by TSA and
FAA under SFAR 94 required pilots to submit
to FAA their: name, social security number,
date of birth, address, phone number, and
fingerprints.
To obtain TSA approval to operate to or from
the airport, present to TSA: (1) Name; (2)
social security number; (3) date of birth; (4)
address; (5) phone number; (6) current and
valid airman certificate or student pilot certificate; (7) current medical certificate; (8)
one form of Government issued picture
identification; (9) the make, model, and registration number of each aircraft the pilot intends to operate to or from the airport; and
(10) fingerprints. § 1562.3(e)(1).
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PILOT REQUIREMENTS—Continued
SFAR 94
TSA interim final rule
Successfully complete a background check by
a law enforcement agency, which may include submission of fingerprints and the conduct of a criminal history records check.
3(b)(2).
Attend a briefing acceptable to FAA that describes procedures for operating to or from
the airport. 3(b)(3).
Not have been convicted or found not guilty by
reason of insanity, in any jurisdiction, during
the 10 years prior to being authorized to operate to or from the airport, or while authorized to operate to or from the airport, of
those crimes specified in 14 CFR 108.229(d).
3(b)(4).
Not have a record on file with the FAA of: (1) a
violation of a prohibited area designated
under 14 CFR part 73, a flight restriction established under 14 CFR 91.141, or special
security instructions issued under 14 CFR
99.7; or more than one violation of a restricted area designated under 14 CFR part
73, emergency air traffic rules issued under
14 CFR 91.139, a temporary flight restriction
designated under 14 CFR 91.137, 91.138, or
91.145, an area designated under 14 CFR
91.143, or any combination thereof. 3(b)(5).
Be authorized by the FAA to conduct operations to or from the airport. 3(b)(6).
Protect from unauthorized disclosure any identification information issued by FAA for the
conduct of operations to or from the airport.
3(b)(7).
Operate an aircraft that is authorized by FAA
for operations to or from the airport. 3(b)(8).
File an IFR or VFR flight plan telephonically
with Leesburg AFSS prior to departure and
obtain an ATC clearance prior to entering the
FRZ. 3(b)(9).
Operate the aircraft in accordance with an open
IFR or VFR flight plan while in the FRZ, unless otherwise authorized by ATC. 3(b)(10).
Maintain two-way communications with an appropriate ATC facility while in the FRZ.
3(b)(11).
Ensure that the aircraft is equipped with an operable transponder with altitude reporting capability and use an assigned discrete beacon
code while operating in the FRZ. 3(b)(12).
Comply with any instructions issued by ATC for
the flight. 3(b)(13).
Secure the aircraft after returning to the airport
from any flight. 3(b)(14).
Comply with all additional safety and security
requirements
specified
in
applicable
NOTAMs. 3(b)(15). Comply with any TSA or
law enforcement requirements to operate to
or from the airport. 3(b)(16).
Successfully complete a TSA terrorist threat
assessment and a criminal history records
check. § 1562.3(e)(2) and (4).
Waivers
Under the interim final rule, TSA, in
coordination with FAA, the United
States Secret Service, and any other
relevant Federal agency, may permit an
operation to or from any of the
Maryland Three Airports if TSA finds
that such action would be in the public
interest and provide the level of security
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NOTAM 3/0853
Receive a briefing acceptable to TSA and
FAA that describes procedures for operating to or from the airport. § 1562.3(e)(3).
Not have been convicted or found not guilty
by reason of insanity, in any jurisdiction,
during the 10 years prior to applying for authorization to operate to or from the airport,
or while authorized to operate to or from
the airport, of any crime specified in 49
CFR 1542.209 or 1572.103. § 1562.3(e)(4).
Not have a record on file with the FAA of a
violation of: a prohibited area designated
under 14 CFR part 73; a flight restriction
established under 14 CFR 91.141; special
security instructions issued under 14 CFR
99.7; a restricted area designated under 14
CFR part 73; emergency air traffic rules
issued under 14 CFR 91.139; a temporary
flight restriction designated under 14 CFR
91.137, 91.138, or 91.145; or an area designated
under
14
CFR
91.143.
§ 1562.3(e)(5).
Be approved by TSA. § 1562.3(e) ...................
Protect from unauthorized disclosure any
identification information issued by TSA for
the conduct of operations to or from the airport. § 1562.3(f)(1).
......................................................................
......................................................................
......................................................................
......................................................................
......................................................................
......................................................................
Part 2 of NOTAM 3/0853 requires each pilot
to file an IFR or VFR flight plan with Leesburg AFSS for all arrivals and departures
via telephone.
NOTAM 3/0853 contains specific flight plan
procedures pilots must follow while operating in the FRZ.
Part 2 of NOTAM 3/0853 requires pilots to
maintain two-way radio communication with
ATS while in the FRZ.
NOTAM 3/0853 requires aircraft to be
equipped with an operational Mode C transponder, and pilots to remain on their assigned discrete beacon code until they land.
NOTAM 3/0853 requires pilots to fly as assigned by ATC until they leave the FRZ.
Secure the aircraft after returning to the airport from any flight. § 1562.3(f)(2).
Comply with any other requirements for operating to or from the airport specified by TSA
or FAA. § 1562.3(f)(3).
required under the interim final rule.
Any waiver issued will be a temporary
waiver for a single operation, such as an
aircraft that is conducting aerial
photography or an aircraft that is being
moved from one of the Maryland Three
Airports after maintenance. TSA will
not issue any permanent waivers for
continued operations.
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Paperwork Reduction Act
The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995
(PRA) (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.) requires
that a Federal agency consider the
impact of paperwork and other
information collection burdens imposed
on the public and, under the provisions
of PRA section 3507(d), obtain approval
from the Office of Management and
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Budget (OMB) for each collection of
information it conducts, sponsors, or
requires through regulations.
This rulemaking contains information
collection activities subject to the PRA.
The FAA initially required this
collection under SFAR 94 (now 49 CFR
part 1562) and cleared under OMB
control number 2120–0677. The
responsibility for the collection has
been transferred to TSA and assigned
OMB control number 1652–0029.
As protection provided by the PRA, as
amended, an agency may not conduct or
sponsor, and a person is not required to
respond to, a collection of information
unless it displays a currently valid OMB
control number.
In conducting these analyses, TSA has
determined that the interim final rule’s
benefits outweigh its costs. TSA also has
determined that the interim final rule
will impose a significant economic
impact on a substantial number of small
entities. However, TSA believes that the
requirements of a regulatory flexibility
analysis were met in the FAA analysis
of the 2-year extension of SFAR 94. The
interim final rule is not expected to
adversely affect international trade or
impose unfunded mandates costing
more than $100 million in a year on
state, local, or tribal governments or on
the private sector. These analyses,
available in the rulemaking docket, are
summarized below.
Regulatory Analyses
Changes to Federal regulations must
undergo several economic analyses.
First, Executive Order 12866, Regulatory
Planning and Review (58 FR 51735,
October 4, 1993), directs each Federal
agency to propose or adopt a regulation
only upon a reasoned determination
that the benefits of the intended
regulation justify its costs. Second, the
Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (5
U.S.C. 601 et seq., as amended by the
Small Business Regulatory Enforcement
Fairness Act (SBREFA) of 1996) requires
agencies to analyze the economic
impact of regulatory changes on small
entities. Third, the Office of
Management and Budget directs
agencies to assess the effect of
regulatory changes on international
trade. Fourth, the Unfunded Mandates
Reform Act of 1995 (2 U.S.C. 1531–
1538) requires agencies to prepare a
written assessment of the costs, benefits,
and other effects of proposed or final
rules that include a Federal mandate
likely to result in the expenditure by
State, local, or tribal governments, in the
aggregate, or by the private sector, of
$100 million or more annually (adjusted
for inflation.)
Economic Analyses
Executive Order 12866, ‘‘Regulatory
Planning and Review’’ (58 FR 51735,
October 4, 1993), provides for making
determinations whether a regulatory
action is ‘‘significant’’ and therefore
subject to OMB review and to the
requirements of the Executive Order.
This rulemaking is not ‘‘significant’’
under the Executive Order. However,
TSA has prepared a full regulatory
evaluation for this rulemaking, which is
available for review in the docket of this
matter. The results of the evaluation are
summarized here.
Costs
The interim final rule results in costs
for the Maryland Three airports and for
government agencies enforcing the
requirements. Pilots that operate to and
from the airports may also incur costs.
However, TSA believes that the cost of
the security requirements for pilots were
incurred by practically all covered
pilots during the first year of SFAR 94.
Any additional costs imposed will be
only for new pilots attracted to the
airports. TSA believes that because of
the security restrictions, new pilots
attracted to these airports will be
7159
limited to pilots of transient operations,
which will be allowed to return to these
airports as a result of this interim final
rule. TSA believes that given the
security restrictions and three years
experience with local based operations,
transient operations at these airports is
likely to be limited. Therefore, TSA
assumed that minimal to no cost will be
imposed for pilots as a result of the
interim final rule. Therefore, TSA
assumed for this analysis that minimal
to no new costs will be imposed for
pilots as a result of the interim final
rule.
The cost impact of codifying the
requirements and procedures of SFAR
94 result either from costs associated
with the security-related provisions of
TSA, or from the cost of flight
restrictions imposed by the FAA. With
regard to airports, security-related costs
are imposed for: compliance with the
physical security provisions of the
interim final rule; preparation of
security briefings for pilots and
employees; and airport security program
preparation, modification, and
maintenance. Lost revenue as a result of
operational restrictions will also be a
cost for airports.
Although most costs could be
identified as resulting either from TSA
requirements or FAA requirements
without much difficulty, it may be
difficult to determine whether lost
revenue from operational restrictions is
totally the result of closures due to
security restrictions, or the result of
FAA flight restrictions. For that reason,
the annual costs of codifying the
requirements of SFAR 94 are
summarized in two tables. Table ES–1
shows the estimated costs of the rule (in
2002 dollars) with the value of lost
revenue from operational restrictions
included, while Table ES–2 shows the
estimated cost excluding lost revenue.
TABLE ES–1.—COST OF COMPLIANCE FOR SFAR–94 (2002 DOLLARS)
[With cost of operational restrictions]
Cost of
security
requirements
Cost of
operational
restrictions
Total costs
College Park ............................................................................................................................................
Potomac Airfield .......................................................................................................................................
Washington Executive/Hyde ....................................................................................................................
$181,500
63,100
78,600
$1,624,400
1,633,300
1,598,100
$1,805,900
1,696,400
1,678,600
Total airport costs .............................................................................................................................
323,200
4,855,800
5,179,000
Government Agencies .............................................................................................................................
10,200
....................
10,200
Total cost per year ...........................................................................................................................
333,400
4,855,800
5,189,200
Entity
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Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 27 / Thursday, February 10, 2005 / Rules and Regulations
TABLE ES–2.—COST OF COMPLIANCE FOR SFAR–94 (2002 DOLLARS)
[Without cost of operational restrictions]
Cost of
security
requirements
Entity
Total costs
College Park ............................................................................................................................................................
Potomac Airfield .......................................................................................................................................................
Washington Executive/Hyde ....................................................................................................................................
$181,500
63,100
78,600
181,500
63,100
78,600
Total Airport Costs ............................................................................................................................................
323,200
323,200
Government Agencies .............................................................................................................................................
10,200
10,200
Total cost per year ...........................................................................................................................................
333,400
333,400
Lost revenue as a result of operational
restrictions is included as a cost in the
FAA regulatory evaluation of its notice
of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to
codify the airspace restrictions of SFAR
94. To avoid double counting those
costs, the cost of operational restrictions
is not included in the TSA estimates of
total costs in this analysis. Based on the
above, TSA estimated first year cost of
compliance of the interim final rule at
$0.3 million, and the 10-year
undiscounted cost at $3.3 million. The
present value of those costs is $2.3
million as shown in Table ES–3 below.
TABLE ES–3.—TOTAL COST OF COMPLIANCE OF INTERIM FINAL RULE SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
College
Park
Year
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
Potomac
Airfield
Washington
Executive
Government
Total annual
costs
7% discount
factor
Net present
value
.........................................................
.........................................................
.........................................................
.........................................................
.........................................................
.........................................................
.........................................................
.........................................................
.........................................................
.........................................................
$181,500
181,500
181,500
181,500
181,500
181,500
181,500
181,500
181,500
181,500
$63,100
63,100
63,100
63,100
63,100
63,100
63,100
63,100
63,100
63,100
$78,600
78,600
78,600
78,600
78,600
78,600
78,600
78,600
78,600
78,600
$10,200
10,200
10,200
10,200
10,200
10,200
10,200
10,200
10,200
10,200
$333,400
333,400
333,400
333,400
333,400
333,400
333,400
333,400
333,400
333,400
0.9346
0.8734
0.8163
0.7629
0.7130
0.6663
0.6227
0.5820
0.5439
0.5083
$311,600
291,200
272,200
254,400
237,700
222,100
207,600
194,000
181,300
169,500
Total ..................................................
1,815,000
631,000
786,000
102,000
3,334,000
....................
2,341,600
When added to air space-related costs,
as calculated by FAA, of $6.06 million
annually and $60.6 million over 10
years, the total ten-year cost of codifying
SFAR 94 is estimated at $63.9 million.18
Benefits
TSA believes that allowing transient
operations at the airports will reduce
some of the lost revenue shown in Table
ES–1 as a result of this interim final
rule. However, the primary benefit of
the rule will be enhanced protection for
a significant number of vital government
assets in the National Capital Region,
while keeping the airports operational.
Without these measures, the Maryland
Three Airports would have to be closed
due to the FAA requirements. The
security provisions contained in this
rule are an integral part of the effort to
identify and defeat the threat posed by
members of foreign terrorist groups to
vital U.S. assets and security. The TSA
18 The FAA estimate is based on information in
the FAA regulatory evaluation of the codification of
airspace requirements of SFAR 94.
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believes that the rule will reduce the
risk that an airborne strike initiated
from an airport moments away from
vital national assets will occur. The TSA
recognizes that such an impact may not
cause substantial damage to property or
a large structure; however, it could
potentially result in an undetermined
number of fatalities and injuries and
reduced tourism. The resulting tragedy
would adversely impact the regional
economies. Thus, TSA has concluded
that the benefits associated with the
interim final rule vastly exceed the
costs.
Regulatory Flexibility Act Assessment
The Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA)
of 1980, as amended, requires Federal
agencies to consider the impact of
regulatory actions on small entities. To
that end, the RFA requires agencies to
perform a review to determine whether
a proposed or final rule will have ‘‘a
significant economic impact on a
substantial number of small entities.’’
Section 603(a) of the RFA requires that
agencies prepare and make available for
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public comment an initial regulatory
flexibility analysis (IRFA) for
rulemakings subject to the notice and
comment requirements of the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA).
Section 604(a) of the RFA requires a
final regulatory flexibility analysis
(FRFA) for final rules issued
subsequently.
TSA is issuing this interim final rule
without prior notice and opportunity to
comment pursuant to its authority
under section 4(a) of the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA) (5 U.S.C. 553(b)).
This provision authorizes the agency to
issue a rule without notice and
opportunity to comment when the
agency for good cause finds that those
procedures are ‘‘impracticable,
unnecessary, or contrary to the public
interest.’’ TSA finds that notice and
public comment to the interim final rule
are impracticable, unnecessary, and
contrary to the public interest for the
following reasons.
The Maryland Three Airport
operators, and pilots who operate to and
from those airports, have been operating
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under the SFAR 94 requirements since
February 19, 2002. TSA is largely
adopting the security measures and
procedures that were required under
SFAR 94. As a result, TSA believes that
the interim final rule will not present
any surprises or impose any additional
burdens on the Maryland Three Airport
operators or the pilots who operate to
and from those airports. SFAR 94,
however, is set to expire on February 13,
2005. Consequently, if TSA does not
issue this interim final rule
immediately, The Maryland Three
Airports may be required to close until
TSA completes this rulemaking.
The FAA issued SFAR 94 without
prior notice and public comment, but
did consider and respond to comments
in its two-year extension of SFAR 94.
The FAA also performed a Regulatory
Flexibility Analysis, which addressed
the following requirements of an IRFA:
1. Reasons why the rule was
considered. In the wake of the
catastrophic events of September 11,
2001, there was an awareness of the
need to take steps to safeguard critical
national assets and counter the
increased threat level, while restoring
operations at the Maryland Three
Airports, which are located within a few
minutes of vital civilian and military
control centers.
2. Objective. To restore operations at
the affected airports, while attempting
to counter the threat of a possible
terrorist airborne attack on vital national
assets located within the National
Capital Region. The legal basis is found
in 49 U.S.C. 44901 and 49 U.S.C.
40101(d).
3. Description and number of small
entities regulated. The IFR regulates two
small (based on the SBA Office of Size
Standards criteria of less than $6.0
million in annual receipts) privatelyowned general aviation airports
(Potomac Airfield and Washington
Executive Airport). In total, three
airports are regulated, but the third is
owned by two governmental
jurisdictions with a combined
population of 1.7 million (well above
the 50,000 SBA threshold population for
small governmental jurisdictions), and
thus was not considered a small entity
for the analysis.
4. Compliance requirements. The
FAA analysis discussed the airspace
flight restrictions imposed and the cost
of compliance and lost revenue as a
result. In addition, the analysis
described the security requirements to
maintain a security program and to
modify and submit security procedures
to TSA upon request. The cost of flight
restrictions, lost revenue, and security
procedures is estimated at $290,700
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annually for Washington Executive
Airport and $220,700 for the Potomac
Airfield Airport; 19 these costs increase
to $333,100 and $252,200, respectively
when the anticipated airport revenue
losses are increased by 20 percent, as
discussed in the full regulatory
evaluation. The analysis further
described the estimated time and cost
requirements for modifying and
submitting security procedures to TSA
at 16 hours and $672 for Potomac, and
15 hours and $600 for Washington
Executive.
5. Duplication/Overlap. The FAA is
unaware of any Federal rules that
duplicate, overlap, or were in conflict
with SFAR 94.
The FAA Regulatory Flexibility
Analysis also discussed the following
alternatives: (1) Rescind the rule; (2)
Maintain the status quo (SFAR 94); and
(3) Close the airports permanently. Of
those alternatives, maintaining the
status quo (SFAR 94) is preferred
because rescinding the rule would
increase the vulnerability and diminish
the level of protection now in place,
while closing the airports permanently
causes the greatest financial burden on
the airports.
The FAA analysis also addressed the
additional elements required for the
FRFA. As required in the FRFA, FAA
summarized and addressed significant
issues raised by public comments, in
addition to providing a summarized
assessment of those issues. Further, in
response to one of those issues raised as
an alternative, this IFR relaxes one of
the major burdens imposed—the
requirement that aircraft approved to
operate to or from any of the Maryland
Three Airports be based at one of those
airports. As a result, through this IFR,
TSA may permit transient aircraft to
operate to or from any of the Maryland
Three Airports if the pilot complies
with the requirements of the interim
final rule. TSA believes that this change
19 The full regulatory evaluation shows revenue
losses and security costs broken down between
actual airport costs and those incurred by other
airport entities. The costs applicable here are only
those incurred by the airports. For Potomac,
revenue losses are $157,600 (Table 6 in full
regulatory evaluation) and security costs are
$63,100 (Table 7), summing to $220,700. For
Washington Executive/Hyde, revenue losses are
estimated at $212,100 and are calculated by
summing $69,200 (Table 10) with the average of
airport-only costs (excluding fuel and landing fees)
from Tables 2 (College Park) and 6 (Potomac). The
revenue losses from those two tables are $209,300
and $76,500, respectively, resulting in an average of
$142,900 (($209,300 + $76,500 = $285,800) (÷ 2 =
$142,900). Therefore, total revenue losses for
Washington Executive are estimated at $212,100
($69,200 + $142,900 = $212,100). With security
costs at $78,600 (Table 11), the cost of compliance
sums to $290,700 for Washington Executive
($212,100 + $78,600 = $290,700).
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7161
will reduce the burden on the airports
without relaxing security.
For the reasons stated above, TSA
believes that the requirements of both
the IRFA and the FRFA have already
been satisfied.
International Trade Impact Assessment
The Trade Agreement Act of 1979
prohibits Federal agencies from
engaging in any standards or related
activities that create unnecessary
obstacles to the foreign commerce of the
United States. Legitimate domestic
objectives, such as safety, are not
considered unnecessary obstacles. The
statute also requires consideration of
international standards and where
appropriate, that they be the basis for
U.S. standards. In addition, consistent
with the Administration’s belief in the
general superiority and desirability of
free trade, it is the policy of to remove
or diminish to the extent feasible,
barriers to international trade, including
both barriers affecting the export of
American goods and services to foreign
countries and barriers affecting the
import of foreign goods and services
into the United States.
In accordance with the above statute
and policy, the TSA has assessed the
potential effect of this interim final rule
and has determined that it will have
only a domestic impact and therefore no
affect on any trade-sensitive activity.
Unfunded Mandates Assessment
Section 202 of the Unfunded
Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA)
requires Federal agencies to prepare a
written assessment of the costs, benefits,
and other effects of proposed or final
rules that include a Federal mandate
likely to result in the expenditure by
State, local, or tribal governments, in the
aggregate, or by the private sector, of
more than $100 million in any one year
(adjusted for inflation with base year of
1995). Before promulgating a rule for
which a written statement is needed,
section 205 of the UMRA generally
requires TSA to identify and consider a
reasonable number of regulatory
alternatives and adopt the least costly,
most cost-effective, or least burdensome
alternative that achieves the objective of
the rule. The provisions of section 205
do not apply when they are inconsistent
with applicable law. Moreover, section
205 allows TSA to adopt an alternative
other than the least costly, most costeffective, or least burdensome
alternative if the agency publishes with
the final rule an explanation why that
alternative was not adopted.
This interim final rule will not result
in the expenditure by State, local, or
tribal governments, in the aggregate, or
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by the private sector, of more than $100
million annually. Thus, TSA has not
prepared a written assessment under the
UMRA.
Executive Order 13132, Federalism
Executive Order 13132 requires TSA
to develop an accountable process to
ensure ‘‘meaningful and timely input by
State and local officials in the
development of regulatory policies that
have federalism implications.’’ ‘‘Policies
that have federalism implications’’ is
defined in the Executive Order to
include regulations that have
‘‘substantial direct effects on the States,
on the relationship between the national
government and the States, or on the
distribution of power and
responsibilities among the various
levels of government.’’ Under the
Executive Order, TSA may construe a
Federal statute to preempt State law
only where, among other things, the
exercise of State authority conflicts with
the exercise of Federal authority under
the Federal statute.
This interim final rule will not have
substantial direct effects on the States,
on the relationship between the national
government and the States, or on the
distribution of power and
responsibilities among the various
levels of government. Thus, TSA has
determined that this interim final rule
will not have sufficient Federalism
implications to warrant the preparation
of a Federal Assessment.
PART 1562—GENERAL AVIATION
Subpart A—Maryland Three Airports:
Enhanced Security Procedures for
Operations at Certain Airports in the
Washington, DC, Metropolitan Area
Flight Restricted Zone
Sec.
1562.1
1562.3
Scope and definitions.
Operating requirements.
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 114, 40113.
§ 1562.1
Scope and definitions.
(a) Scope. This subpart applies to the
following airports, and individuals who
operate an aircraft to or from those
airports, that are located within the
airspace designated as the Washington,
DC, Metropolitan Area Flight Restricted
Zone by the Federal Aviation
Administration:
(1) College Park Airport (CGS);
(2) Potomac Airfield (VKX); and
(3) Washington Executive/Hyde Field
(W32).
(b) Definitions. For purposes of this
section:
Airport security coordinator means
the official at a Maryland Three Airport
who is responsible for ensuring that the
airport’s security procedures are
implemented and followed.
Maryland Three Airport means any of
the airports specified in paragraph (a) of
this section.
§ 1562.3
Operating requirements.
(a) Airport operator requirements.
Each operator of a Maryland Three
National Environmental Policy Act
Airport must:
TSA has reviewed this action for
(1) Appoint an airport employee as
purposes of the National Environmental
the airport security coordinator;
Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C. 4321–
(2) Maintain and carry out security
4347) and has determined that this
procedures approved by TSA;
action will not have a significant effect
(3) Maintain at the airport a copy of
on the human environment.
the airport’s TSA-approved security
Energy Impact
procedures;
(4) Maintain at the airport a copy of
TSA has assessed the energy impact
each Federal Aviation Administration
of this rule in accordance with the
Notice to Airmen and rule that affects
Energy Policy and Conservation Act
(EPCA), Public Law 94–163, as amended security procedures at the Maryland
Three Airports; and
(42 U.S.C. 6362). TSA has tentatively
(5) Permit officials authorized by TSA
determined that this interim final rule
to inspect—
will not be a major regulatory action
(i) The airport;
under the provisions of the EPCA.
(ii) The airport’s TSA-approved
List of Subjects in 49 CFR Part 1562
security procedures; and
Airports, Flight restricted zone,
(iii) Any other documents required
General aviation, Security threat
under this section.
assessment.
(b) Airport security coordinator
requirements. Each airport security
The Amendments
coordinator for a Maryland Three
Airport must be approved by TSA. To
I For the reasons set forth in the
obtain TSA approval, an airport security
preamble, the Transportation Security
coordinator must:
Administration amends Chapter XII,
(1) Present to TSA, in a form and
subchapter C, of Title 49, Code of Federal
manner acceptable to TSA, his or her—
Regulations, by adding a new part 1562
(i) Name;
to read as follows:
VerDate jul<14>2003
16:23 Feb 09, 2005
Jkt 205001
PO 00000
Frm 00014
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
(ii) Social Security Number;
(iii) Date of birth;
(iv) Address;
(v) Phone number; and
(vi) Fingerprints.
(2) Successfully complete a TSA
terrorist threat assessment; and
(3) Not have been convicted or found
not guilty by reason of insanity, in any
jurisdiction, during the 10 years prior to
applying for authorization to operate to
or from the airport, or while authorized
to operate to or from the airport, of any
crime specified in 49 CFR 1542.209 or
1572.103.
(c) Security procedures. To be
approved by TSA, an airport’s security
procedures, at a minimum, must:
(1) Identify and provide contact
information for the airport’s airport
security coordinator.
(2) Contain a current record of the
individuals and aircraft authorized to
operate to or from the airport.
(3) Contain procedures to—
(i) Monitor the security of aircraft at
the airport during operational and nonoperational hours; and
(ii) Alert the aircraft owner(s) and
operator(s), the airport operator, and
TSA of unsecured aircraft.
(4) Contain procedures to implement
and maintain security awareness
procedures at the airport.
(5) Contain procedures for limited
approval of pilots who violate the
Washington, DC, Metropolitan Area
Flight Restricted Zone and are forced to
land at the airport.
(6) Contain any additional procedures
required by TSA to provide for the
security of aircraft operations to or from
the airport.
(d) Amendments to security
procedures. Airport security procedures
approved by TSA remain in effect
unless TSA determines that—
(1) Operations at the airport have not
been conducted in accordance with
those procedures; or
(2) The procedures must be amended
to provide for the security of aircraft
operations to or from the airport.
(e) Pilot requirements for TSA
approval. Except as specified in
paragraph (g) of this section, each pilot
of an aircraft operating to or from any
of the Maryland Three Airports must be
approved by TSA. To obtain TSA
approval, a pilot must:
(1) Present to TSA—
(i) The pilot’s name;
(ii) The pilot’s Social Security
Number;
(iii) The pilot’s date of birth;
(iv) The pilot’s address;
(v) The pilot’s phone number;
(vi) The pilot’s current and valid
airman certificate or current student
pilot certificate;
E:\FR\FM\10FER2.SGM
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Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 27 / Thursday, February 10, 2005 / Rules and Regulations
(vii) The pilot’s current medical
certificate;
(viii) One form of Government-issued
picture identification of the pilot;
(ix) The pilot’s fingerprints, in a form
and manner acceptable to TSA; and
(x) A list containing the make, model,
and registration number of each aircraft
that the pilot intends to operate to or
from the airport.
(2) Successfully complete a TSA
terrorist threat assessment.
(3) Receive a briefing acceptable to
TSA and the Federal Aviation
Administration that describes
procedures for operating to and from the
airport.
(4) Not have been convicted or found
not guilty by reason of insanity, in any
jurisdiction, during the 10 years prior to
applying for authorization to operate to
or from the airport, or while authorized
to operate to or from the airport, of any
crime specified in 49 CFR 1542.209 or
1572.103.
(5) Not, in TSA’s discretion, have a
record on file with the Federal Aviation
Administration of a violation of—
(i) A prohibited area designated under
14 CFR part 73;
(ii) A flight restriction established
under 14 CFR 91.141;
(iii) Special security instructions
issued under 14 CFR 99.7;
(iv) A restricted area designated under
14 CFR part 73;
(v) Emergency air traffic rules issued
under 14 CFR 91.139;
(vi) A temporary flight restriction
designated under 14 CFR 91.137,
91.138, or 91.145; or
(vii) An area designated under 14 CFR
91.143.
(f) Additional pilot requirements.
Except as specified in paragraph (g) of
this section, each pilot of an aircraft
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16:23 Feb 09, 2005
Jkt 205001
operating to or from any of the
Maryland Three Airports must:
(1) Protect from unauthorized
disclosure any identification
information issued by TSA or the
Federal Aviation Administration for the
conduct of operations to or from the
airport.
(2) Secure the aircraft after returning
to the airport from any flight.
(3) Comply with any other
requirements for operating to or from
the airport specified by TSA or the
Federal Aviation Administration.
(g) Operations to any of the Maryland
Three Airports. A pilot who is approved
by TSA in accordance with paragraph
(d) of this section may operate an
aircraft to any of the Maryland Three
Airports, provided that the pilot—
(1) Files an instrument flight rules or
visual flight rules flight plan with
Leesburg Automated Flight Service
Station;
(2) Obtains an Air Traffic Control
clearance with a discrete transponder
code; and
(3) Follows any arrival/departure
procedures required by the Federal
Aviation Administration.
(h) U.S. Armed forces, law
enforcement, and aeromedical services
aircraft. An individual may operate a
U.S. Armed Forces, law enforcement, or
aeromedical services aircraft on an
authorized mission to or from any of the
Maryland Three Airports provided that
the individual complies with any
requirements for operating to or from
the airport specified by TSA or the
Federal Aviation Administration.
(i) Continuing responsibilities. (1) If
an airport security coordinator, or a
pilot who is approved to operate to or
from any of the Maryland Three
Airports, is convicted or found not
PO 00000
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Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
7163
guilty by reason of insanity, in any
jurisdiction, of any crime specified in 49
CFR 1542.209 or 1572.103, the airport
security coordinator or pilot must notify
TSA within 24 hours of the conviction
or finding of not guilty by reason of
insanity. TSA may withdraw its
approval of the airport security
coordinator or pilot as a result of the
conviction or finding of not guilty by
reason of insanity.
(2) If a pilot who is approved to
operate to or from any of the Maryland
Three Airports commits any of the
violations described in paragraph (e)(5)
of this section, the pilot must notify
TSA within 24 hours of the violation.
TSA, in its discretion, may withdraw its
approval of the pilot as a result of the
violation.
(3) If an airport security coordinator,
or a pilot who is approved to operate to
or from any of the Maryland Three
Airports, is determined by TSA to pose
a threat to national or transportation
security, or a threat of terrorism, TSA
may withdraw its approval of the airport
security coordinator or pilot.
(j) Waivers. TSA, in coordination with
the Federal Aviation Administration,
the United States Secret Service, and
any other relevant agency, may permit
an operation to or from any of the
Maryland Three Airports, in deviation
from the provisions of this section, if
TSA finds that such action—
(1) Is in the public interest; and
(2) Provides the level of security
required by this section.
Issued in Arlington, Virginia, on February
4, 2005.
David M. Stone,
Assistant Secretary.
[FR Doc. 05–2630 Filed 2–9–05; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–62–P
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]]>Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 70, Number 27 (Thursday, February 10, 2005)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 7150-7163]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 05-2630]
[[Page 7149]]
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Part III
Department of Homeland Security
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Transportation Security Administration
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49 CFR Part 1562
Maryland Three Airports: Enhanced Security Procedures for Operations at
Certain Airports in the Washington, DC, Metropolitan Area Flight
Restricted Zone; Interim Final Rule
Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 27 / Thursday, February 10, 2005 /
Rules and Regulations
[[Page 7150]]
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DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Transportation Security Administration
49 CFR Part 1562
[Docket No. TSA-2005-20118]
RIN 1652-AA39
Maryland Three Airports: Enhanced Security Procedures for
Operations at Certain Airports in the Washington, DC, Metropolitan Area
Flight Restricted Zone
AGENCY: Transportation Security Administration (TSA), Department of
Homeland Security.
ACTION: Interim final rule; request for comments.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: This action transfers responsibility for ground security
requirements and procedures at three Maryland airports that are located
within the Washington, DC, Metropolitan Area Flight Restricted Zone,
and for individuals operating aircraft to and from these airports, from
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to TSA. These requirements
and procedures were previously issued by the FAA, in coordination with
TSA, in Special Federal Aviation Regulation (SFAR) 94. TSA is assuming
responsibility for these requirements and procedures because TSA and
FAA agree that they are best handled under TSA's authority over
transportation security. These requirements and procedures will
continue to enhance the security of the critical infrastructure and
Federal government assets in the Washington, DC, Metropolitan Area.
DATES: Effective Date: This rule is effective February 13, 2005.
Comment Date: Comments must be received by April 11, 2005.
ADDRESSES: You may submit comments, identified by the TSA docket number
to this rulemaking, using any one of the following methods:
Comments Filed Electronically: You may submit comments through the
docket Web site at https://dms.dot.gov. Please be aware that anyone is
able to search the electronic form of all comments received into any of
our dockets by the name of the individual submitting the comment (or
signing the comment, if submitted on behalf of an association,
business, labor union, etc.). You may review the applicable Privacy Act
Statement published in the Federal Register on April 11, 2000 (65 FR
19477), or you may visit https://dms.dot.gov.
Comments Submitted by Mail, Fax, or In Person: Address or deliver
your written, signed comments to the Docket Management System, U.S.
Department of Transportation, Room Plaza 401, 400 Seventh Street, SW.,
Washington, DC 20590-0001; Fax: 202-493-2251.
Comments that include trade secrets, confidential commercial or
financial information, or sensitive security information (SSI) should
not be submitted to the public regulatory docket. Please submit such
comments separately from other comments on the rule. Comments
containing trade secrets, confidential commercial or financial
information, or SSI should be appropriately marked as containing such
information and submitted by mail to the individual(s) listed in FOR
FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT.
Reviewing Comments in the Docket: You may review the public docket
containing comments on this interim final rule in person in the Docket
Office between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal
holidays. The Docket Office is located on the plaza level of the NASSIF
Building at the Department of Transportation address above. Also, you
may review public dockets on the Internet at https://dms.dot.gov.
See SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION for format and other information
about comment submissions.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For policy questions: Robert Rottman,
Office of Aviation Security Policy, Transportation Security
Administration Headquarters, East Building, Floor 11, 601 South 12th
Street, Arlington, VA 22202; telephone: 571-227-2289; e-mail:
Robert.Rottman@dhs.gov.
For technical questions: Dirk Ahle, Aviation Operations,
Transportation Security Administration Headquarters, East Building,
Floor 9, 601 South 12th Street, Arlington, VA 22202; telephone: 571-
227-1504; e-mail: Dirk.Ahle@dhs.gov.
For legal questions: Dion Casey, Office of Chief Counsel,
Transportation Security Administration Headquarters, East Building,
Floor 12, TSA-2, 601 South 12th Street, Arlington, VA 22202; telephone:
571-227-2663; e-mail: Dion.Casey@dhs.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Comments Invited
This interim final rule is being adopted without prior notice and
prior public comment. However, to the maximum extent possible,
operating administrations within DHS will provide an opportunity for
public comment on regulations issued without prior notice. Accordingly,
TSA invites interested persons to participate in this rulemaking by
submitting written comments, data, or views. We also invite comments
relating to the economic, environmental, energy, or federalism impacts
that might result from this rulemaking. See ADDRESSES above for
information on where to submit comments.
Comments that include trade secrets, confidential commercial or
financial information, or SSI should not be submitted to the public
regulatory docket. Please submit such comments separately from other
comments on the rule. Comments containing this type of information
should be appropriately marked and submitted by mail to the
individual(s) listed in FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section. Upon
receipt of such comments, TSA will not place the comments in the public
docket and will handle them in accordance with applicable safeguards
and restrictions on access. TSA will hold them in a separate file to
which the public does not have access, and place a note in the public
docket that TSA has received such materials from the commenter. If TSA
receives a request to examine or copy this information, TSA will treat
it as any other request under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (5
U.S.C. 552) and the Department of Homeland Security's FOIA regulation
found in 6 CFR part 5.
With each comment, please include your name and address, identify
the docket number at the beginning of your comments, and give the
reason for each comment. The most helpful comments reference a specific
portion of the rule, explain the reason for any recommended change, and
include supporting data. You may submit comments and material
electronically, in person, by mail, or fax as provided under ADDRESSES,
but please submit your comments and material by only one means. If you
submit comments by mail or delivery, submit them in two copies, in an
unbound format, no larger than 8.5 by 11 inches, suitable for copying
and electronic filing.
If you want the TSA to acknowledge receipt of your comments on this
rulemaking, include with your comments a self-addressed, stamped
postcard on which the docket number appears. We will stamp the date on
the postcard and mail it to you.
Except for comments containing confidential information and SSI, we
will file in the public docket all comments we receive, as well as a
report summarizing each substantive public contact with TSA personnel
concerning this rulemaking. The docket
[[Page 7151]]
is available for public inspection before and after the comment closing
date.
We will consider all comments we receive on or before the closing
date for comments. We will consider comments filed late to the extent
practicable. We may change this rule in light of the comments we
receive.
Availability of Rulemaking Document
You may obtain an electronic copy using the Internet by--
(1) Searching the Department of Transportation's electronic Docket
Management System (DMS) Web page (https://dms.dot.gov/search);
(2) Accessing the Government Printing Office's Web page at https://
www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs/aces/aces140.html; or
(3) Visiting the TSA's Law and Policy Web page at https://
www.tsa.dot.gov/public/index.jsp.
In addition, copies are available by writing or calling any of the
individuals in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section. Make sure
to identify the docket number of this rulemaking.
Small Entity Inquiries
The Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA) of
1996 requires TSA to comply with small entity requests for information
or advice about compliance with statutes and regulations within TSA's
jurisdiction. Any small entity that has a question regarding this
document may contact the persons listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION
CONTACT section for information or advice. You can get further
information regarding SBREFA on the Small Business Administration's Web
page at https://www.sba.gov/advo/laws/law_lib.html.
Good Cause for Immediate Adoption
TSA is issuing this interim final rule without prior notice and
opportunity to comment pursuant to its authority under section 4(a) of
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) (5 U.S.C. 553(b)). This
provision authorizes the agency to issue a rule without notice and
opportunity to comment when the agency for good cause finds that those
procedures are ``impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public
interest.'' TSA finds that notice and public comment to this interim
final rule are impracticable, unnecessary, and contrary to the public
interest for the following reasons.
First, after the September 11, 2001 attacks, three airports in
Maryland--College Park Airport, Potomac Airfield, and Washington
Executive/Hyde Field (the Maryland Three Airports)--were closed for a
sustained period because of their proximity to important National
Capitol Region assets and because of the restrictions on aircraft
operations in the airspace that overlies those airports. The airports
were not permitted to reopen until the FAA, in coordination with TSA,
issued SFAR 94 on February 19, 2002 (67 FR 7538). According to comments
that the FAA received, this sustained closure placed significant
financial burdens on the Maryland Three Airports. SFAR 94 is set to
expire on February 13, 2005. If TSA does not issue this IFR
immediately, the Maryland Three Airports may be required to close again
until TSA completes this rulemaking. Such a closure could cause the
Maryland Three Airports significant financial burdens that are not
necessary from a security perspective.
Second, in this interim final rule TSA is largely adopting the
security measures and procedures that were required under SFAR 94. The
Maryland Three Airport operators, and pilots who operate to and from
those airports, have been operating under the SFAR 94 requirements
since February 19, 2002. In addition, because TSA is largely adopting
the SFAR 94 requirements, the airport security procedures that were
approved under SFAR 94 for each of the Maryland Three Airports will be
approved by TSA under this interim final rule. Thus, TSA believes that
the interim final rule will not present any surprises or impose any
additional burdens on the Maryland Three Airport operators or the
pilots who operate to and from those airports. In fact, in response to
comments on SFAR 94 and FAA Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) 3/0853, this
interim final rule relaxes one of the major burdens imposed under NOTAM
3/0853--the requirement that aircraft approved to operate to or from
any of the Maryland Three Airports be based at one of those airports--
without relaxing security. Under this interim final rule, TSA may
permit transient aircraft to operate to or from any of the Maryland
Three Airports if the pilot complies with the requirements of the
interim final rule. This change will reduce costs without relaxing
security.
Finally, TSA notes that the FAA first issued these requirements as
SFAR 94 on February 19, 2002. SFAR 94 was set to expire one year from
that date. The FAA requested and received public comments on SFAR 94.
On February 14, 2003, the FAA published a final rule extending the
expiration date of SFAR 94 for an additional two years (68 FR 7684). In
the 2003 final rule, the FAA, in coordination with TSA, responded to
the public comments that it received after the publication of SFAR 94
in 2002. The FAA did not receive any additional comments after
publishing the final rule extending the expiration date of SFAR 94 in
2003. Consequently, TSA believes that the issues involved in this
rulemaking have already been addressed through the prior FAA
rulemakings.
For these reasons, TSA finds that notice and public comment to this
interim final rule are impracticable, unnecessary, and contrary to the
public interest. However, TSA is inviting public comments on all
aspects of the interim final rule. If, based upon information provided
in public comments, TSA determines that changes to the interim final
rule are necessary to address transportation security more effectively,
or in a less burdensome but equally effective manner, the agency will
not hesitate to make such changes.
Abbreviations and Terms Used in This Document
ADIZ--Air Defense Identification Zone
ATC--Air Traffic Control
ATSA--Aviation and Transportation Security Act
CFR--Code of Federal Regulations
CHRC--Criminal History Records Check
CIA--Central Intelligence Agency
DHS--Department of Homeland Security
DOD--Department of Defense
DOT--Department of Transportation
FAA--Federal Aviation Administration
FBI--Federal Bureau of Investigation
FRZ--Flight Restricted Zone
GA--General Aviation
IFR--Instrument Flight Rules
NM--Nautical Mile
NOTAM--Notice to Airmen
PIN--Personal Identification Number
SFAR--Special Federal Aviation Regulation
TFR--Temporary Flight Restriction
TSA--Transportation Security Administration
VFR--Visual Flight Rules
VOR/DME--Very High Frequency Omnidirectional Range/Distance Measuring
Equipment
Background
After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks against four U.S.
commercial aircraft resulting in the tragic loss of human life at the
World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and in southwest Pennsylvania, the
FAA immediately prohibited all aircraft operations within the
territorial airspace of the U.S., with the exception of certain
military, law enforcement, and emergency related aircraft operations.
This general prohibition was lifted in part on September 13, 2001. In
the Washington,
[[Page 7152]]
DC, Metropolitan Area, however, aircraft operations remained prohibited
at all civil airports within a 25 nautical mile (NM) radius of the
Washington Very High Frequency Omnidirectional Range/Distance Measuring
Equipment (VOR/DME). This action was accomplished via the U.S. NOTAM
system. The FAA issued several NOTAMs under 14 CFR 91.139, Emergency
Air Traffic Rules, and implemented temporary flight restrictions (TFRs)
under 14 CFR 91.137, Temporary Flight Restrictions in the Vicinity of
Disaster/Hazard Areas.
On October 4, 2001, limited air carrier operations were permitted
to resume at Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA).
On October 5, 2001, the FAA issued NOTAM 1/0989, which authorized
instrument flight rules (IFR) operations and limited visual flight
rules (VFR) operations within an 18 to 25 NM radius from the DCA VOR/
DME in accordance with emergency air traffic rules issued under 14 CFR
91.139. Exception to the restrictions affecting aircraft operations
under 14 CFR part 91 (part 91 operations) in the Washington, DC, area
issued since September 11, 2001, were made to permit the repositioning
of aircraft from airports within the area of the TFR and to permit
certain operations conducted under waivers issued by the FAA.
On December 19, 2001, the FAA cancelled NOTAM 1/0989 and issued
NOTAM 1/3354 that, in part, set forth special security instructions
under 14 CFR 99.7 and created a new TFR for the Washington, DC, area.
NOTAM 1/3354 also created TFRs in the Boston and New York City areas.
That action significantly decreased the size of the area subject to the
earlier prohibitions on part 91 operations in the Washington, DC, area
and permitted operations at Freeway (W00), Maryland (2W5), and Suburban
(W18) airports.
As security concerns were resolved, most general aviation (GA)
operations resumed with varying degrees of restriction. However, due to
their proximity to important National Capitol Region assets, the
Maryland Three Airports remained closed for a sustained period
following the September 11 attacks because of the restrictions on
aircraft operations in the airspace that overlies those airports. In
addition, most part 91 operations in the airspace that overlies the
Maryland Three Airports remained prohibited under NOTAM 1/3354.
On February 14, 2002, the FAA cancelled NOTAM 1/3354 and issued
NOTAM 2/1257, which provided flight plan filing procedures and air
traffic control (ATC) arrival and departure procedures for pilots
operating from the Maryland Three Airports in accordance with SFAR 94.
The FAA updated and reissued NOTAM 2/1257 as NOTAM 2/2720 on December
10, 2002. NOTAM 2/2720 permitted pilots vetted at any one of the
Maryland Three Airports to fly into any of the Maryland Three Airports.
NOTAM 3/0853 replaced NOTAM 2/2720 on February 1, 2003. NOTAM 3/0853
remains in effect as of the date of this interim final rule.
Aviation and Transportation Security Act
The events of September 11, 2001, led Congress to enact the
Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA), which created TSA.\1\
ATSA required TSA to assume many of the civil aviation security
responsibilities that the FAA maintained prior to that date. On
February 22, 2002, TSA published a final rule transferring the bulk of
the FAA's civil aviation security regulations to TSA and adding new
standards required by ATSA.\2\
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\1\ Pub. L. 107-71, November 19, 2001, 115 Stat. 597.
\2\ 67 FR 8340, February 22, 2002.
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FAA and TSA Authority
The FAA has broad authority to regulate the safe and efficient use
of the navigable airspace.\3\ The FAA is also authorized to issue air
traffic rules and regulations to govern the flight of aircraft, the
navigation, protection, and identification of aircraft for the
protection of persons and property on the ground, and for the efficient
use of the navigable airspace. Additionally, pursuant to 49 U.S.C.
40103(b)(3), the FAA has the authority, in consultation with the
Department of Defense (DOD), to ``establish security provisions that
will encourage and allow maximum use of the navigable airspace by civil
aircraft consistent with national security.'' Such provisions may
include establishing airspace areas the FAA decides are necessary in
the interest of national defense; and by regulation or order,
restricting or prohibiting flight of civil aircraft that the FAA cannot
identify, locate, and control with available facilities in those areas.
The FAA has broad statutory authority to issue regulations in the
interests of safety in air commerce and national security.\4\
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\3\ See 49 U.S.C. 40103(a).
\4\ See 49 U.S.C. 44701(a)(5).
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TSA has broad authority over civil aviation security.\5\ TSA is
responsible for developing policies, strategies, and plans for dealing
with threats to transportation security, as well as other plans related
to transportation security, including coordinating countermeasures with
appropriate departments, agencies, and instrumentalities of the U.S.
government.\6\ TSA is also authorized to work in conjunction with the
FAA with respect to any actions or activities that may affect aviation
safety.\7\
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\5\ See 49 U.S.C. 114(d)(1).
\6\ See 49 U.S.C. 114(f)(3) and (4).
\7\ See 49 U.S.C. 114(f)(13).
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The FAA retains authority over airspace, including the authority to
issue airspace restrictions. FAA issued SFAR 94 under that authority.
However, because some of the requirements in SFAR 94 deal primarily
with security (including background checks for pilots operating to or
from the Maryland Three Airports and security procedures for the
airports), and because TSA's primary mission is civil aviation
security, the FAA and TSA have determined that ground security
procedures (including security threat assessments for pilots and
airport security coordinators) for the Maryland Three Airports are best
handled under TSA's authority. TSA also notes that TSA inspectors have
conducted inspections of Maryland Three Airports for compliance with
the airports' approved security procedures. For these reasons, the
ground security requirements and procedures for the Maryland Three
Airports as well as the security threat assessments for individuals
operating aircraft to and from those airports are being placed in TSA
regulations. The airspace security restrictions in NOTAM 3/0853 remain
under FAA authority.
SFAR 94
The FAA issued SFAR 94 as a final rule on February 19, 2002.\8\
SFAR 94 defined the restricted airspace over the Washington, DC,
Metropolitan Area and established rules for all pilots operating
aircraft to or from any of the Maryland Three Airports. It also
established security procedures for the Maryland Three Airports. SFAR
94 had a one-year effective period and was set to expire on February
13, 2003. However, the FAA, in consultation with TSA and other Federal
agencies, reissued SFAR 94 on February 14, 2003, with an expiration
date of February 13, 2005.\9\
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\8\ 67 FR 7537.
\9\ 68 FR 7683.
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Security Justification for the Interim Final Rule
Because of its status as home to all three branches of the Federal
government, as well as numerous Federal buildings, foreign embassies,
multinational institutions, and national monuments of iconic
significance, the
[[Page 7153]]
Washington, DC, Metropolitan Area continues to be an obvious high
priority target for terrorists.
Although there is no information suggesting an imminent plan by
terrorists to use airplanes to attack targets in the Washington, DC,
Metropolitan Area, the success of the September 11, 2001, attack on the
Pentagon and reports demonstrating terrorist groups' enduring interest
in aviation-related attacks indicate the need for continued vigilance
in aviation security.
For example, the April 2004 arrest of Waleed bin Attash and the
subsequent discovery of a plot to crash an explosive-laden small
aircraft into the U.S. Consulate in Karachi, Pakistan, illustrates
terrorist groups' continued interest in using aircraft to attack U.S.
interests. Other information--such as documents found in Zacarias
Moussaoui's possession that outlined crop duster operations--suggests
that terrorist groups may have been considering other domestic aviation
attack plans in addition to the September 11, 2001, attacks.
In addition, recent press reporting on the debriefings of detained
terrorist leader Khalid Shaykh Muhammad not only hints at the
complexity of planning involved in the September 11, 2001, attacks but
also suggests the group was likely planning follow-on operations inside
the United States, possibly including inside the Washington, DC,
Metropolitan Area.
While DHS has no specific information that terrorist groups are
currently planning to use GA aircraft to perpetrate attacks against the
U.S., it remains concerned that (in light of completed and ongoing
security enhancements for commercial aircraft and airports) terrorists
may turn to GA as an alternative method for conducting operations.\10\
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\10\ TSA has taken several actions to enhance GA security. For
example, TSA, in partnership with GA associations, implemented a GA
Hotline (1-866-GA SECURE) that is tied to an Airport Watch Program.
This provides a mechanism to enable any GA pilot to report
suspicious activity at his or her airport to one central Federal
Government focal point. The Hotline, which is operated by the
National Response Center and managed by the U.S. Coast Guard, became
operational on December 2, 2002. The Airport Watch program has
extended the Neighborhood Watch concept to airports. Pilots, airport
workers, and aircraft maintainers are asked to call the Hotline to
report any suspicious activity. In addition, TSA has released
guidelines to provide GA airport owners, operators, and users with a
set of Federally-endorsed security enhancements and methods for
determining implementation. The guidelines are available on the TSA
Web site at https://www.tsa.gov/public/interapp/editorial/editorial_
1113.xml.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To protect against a potential threat to the Washington, DC,
Metropolitan Area, FAA, in consultation with TSA and other Federal
agencies, implemented a system of concentric airspace rings and
complementary airspace control measures via NOTAM 3/0853 in February
2003. The dimensions of this protected airspace were determined after
considering such factors as the average speed of likely suspect
aircraft and minimum launch time and speed of intercept aircraft. After
extensive coordination among Federal agencies, the dimensions for this
protected airspace were established along with the requirements to
enter and operate in the airspace. The outer lateral boundary is the
same as the outer lateral boundary for the Tri-Area Class B airspace in
the Washington-Baltimore area. This outer boundary is, at certain
places, more than 40 nautical miles from the Washington Monument. The
Government conditioned entry into this airspace on the identification
of all aircraft operators within the airspace in order to ensure the
security of protected ground assets. This airspace is called an Air
Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ). Within the ADIZ airspace is an
inner ring, called a Flight Restricted Zone (FRZ), which has a radius
of approximately 15 NM centered on the Washington (DCA) VOR/DME. In
order to enter and operate in FRZ airspace, more stringent access and
security procedures are applied.
The Maryland Three Airports are located within the FRZ. Therefore,
aircraft operating to or from one of the Maryland Three Airports must
be subject to special rules. TSA notes that under SFAR 94 and NOTAM 3/
0853, aircraft operations permitted in the FRZ are limited to U.S.
Armed Forces, law enforcement, aeromedical services, air carriers that
operate under 14 CFR part 121, and certain types of general aviation
aircraft operations that receive an FAA waiver after the waiver
applications are reviewed and cleared by TSA. The pilots of these
operations have successfully completed a threat assessment prior to
operating in the FRZ.
Discussion of the Interim Final Rule
TSA is adopting most of the security requirements and procedures
that are currently in SFAR 94. TSA requests comment on each of the
requirements discussed below. In the interim final rule, TSA has
reorganized the paragraph structure of the requirements in SFAR 94 to
help clarify the requirements.
In keeping with SFAR 94, the interim final rule applies to the
three Maryland airports (College Park Airport (CGS), Potomac Airfield
(VKX), and Washington Executive/Hyde Field (W32)) that are located
within the airspace designated as the Washington, DC, Metropolitan Area
FRZ, as defined in FAA NOTAM or regulations. These airports are
referred to as the Maryland Three Airports. The interim final rule also
applies to individuals who operate an aircraft to or from those
airports.
Airport Operator Requirements
SFAR 94 required each Maryland Three Airport operator to adopt
security procedures that met minimum requirements in SFAR 94 and were
approved by the FAA Administrator. This interim final rule carries over
that requirement, except that the airport security procedures must be
approved by TSA. The minimum-security procedures are discussed in
greater detail below. TSA notes that because the agency is making only
minor revisions to the SFAR 94 requirements, the airport security
procedures that were approved by FAA under SFAR 94 for each of the
Maryland Three Airports will be approved by TSA under this interim
final rule.
The interim final rule requires the airport operator to maintain at
the airport a copy of the airport's TSA-approved security procedures,
and to permit officials authorized by TSA to inspect the airport, the
airport's TSA-approved security procedures, and any other documents
required under the interim final rule. These requirements will help
increase awareness of, and compliance with, the airport's approved
security procedures, as well as facilitate the proper administration
and oversight of the security procedures at each airport. SFAR 94
contained a similar provision at paragraph 4(a)(7).
The interim final rule also requires the airport operator to
maintain at the airport a copy of each FAA NOTAM and rule that affects
security procedures at the Maryland Three Airports. SFAR 94 did not
contain this requirement. TSA is adding this requirement to help
increase pilots' awareness of, and compliance with, the FAA's
requirements for operating in the FRZ.
In addition, the interim final rule requires the airport operator
to appoint an airport employee as the airport security coordinator. The
airport security coordinator will be responsible for ensuring that the
airport's security procedures are implemented and followed. The airport
security coordinator must be approved by TSA. To obtain TSA approval,
an airport security coordinator is required to undergo the same
security threat assessment and criminal history records check as pilots
who are approved to operate to or from a Maryland Three Airport.
Accordingly, the airport
[[Page 7154]]
security coordinator is required to present to TSA his or her name,
social security number, date of birth, address, phone number, and
fingerprints. These requirements, though not contained specifically in
SFAR 94, were contained in the airport security procedures approved by
TSA and FAA under SFAR 94.
The interim final rule imposes on airport security coordinators who
are approved by TSA a continuing obligation to meet these requirements.
If TSA determines that an airport security coordinator poses a threat
to national or transportation security, or a threat of terrorism, after
TSA has approved the airport security coordinator, TSA may withdraw its
approval of the airport security coordinator. In addition, if an
airport security coordinator is convicted or found not guilty by reason
of insanity of any of the listed disqualifying crimes after receiving
TSA approval, the airport security coordinator must report the
conviction or finding of not guilty by reason of insanity within 24
hours of the decision. TSA may withdraw its approval of the airport
security coordinator as a result of the conviction or finding of not
guilty by reason of insanity.
TSA intends to issue a form that airport security coordinators can
use to submit all of this information to TSA.\11\ TSA notes that
airport security coordinators who were approved under SFAR 94 may
continue in their capacity as airport security coordinators without
resubmitting to TSA the information described above.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ This form will be issued in accordance with the
requirements of the Paperwork Reduction Act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Security Procedures
To be approved by TSA, an airport's security procedures must meet
the minimum requirements set forth in the interim final rule. As noted
above, TSA is making only minor revisions to the minimum requirements
established in SFAR 94. Therefore, the airport security procedures that
were approved by FAA under SFAR 94 for each of the Maryland Three
Airports will be approved by TSA under the interim final rule. TSA
requests comment on these minimum requirements. The minimum
requirements are as follows.
First, as required under SFAR 94 at paragraph 4(a)(1), the interim
final rule requires an airport's security procedures to contain basic
airport information, outline the hours of operation, and identify the
airport security coordinator who is responsible for ensuring that the
security procedures are implemented and followed. Such information will
help ensure accountability for compliance with the security procedures
at each airport. The interim final rule also requires the airport
security coordinator to present to TSA, in a form and manner acceptable
to TSA, his or her name, social security number, date of birth, and
fingerprints, and to successfully complete a TSA terrorist threat
assessment, including a criminal history records check, that is the
same as the threat assessment pilots will have to successfully complete
to be approved to operate to or from any of the Maryland Three
Airports. Airport security coordinators who were approved under SFAR 94
will continue to be approved under the interim final rule.
Second, the interim final rule requires an airport's security
procedures to contain a current record of the individuals and aircraft
authorized to operate to or from the airport. This will help ensure
that only individuals who have been properly vetted by TSA operate
aircraft to or from the Maryland Three Airports. SFAR 94 contained
similar provisions at paragraphs 4(a)(2) and (3).
Third, the interim final rule requires an airport's security
procedures to contain procedures to monitor the security of aircraft at
the airport during operational and non-operational hours, and to alert
aircraft owners and operators, the airport operator, and TSA of
unsecured aircraft. Such procedures will help prevent aircraft located
at the airport from being stolen and used for unauthorized purposes.
SFAR 94 contained this provision at paragraph 4(b)(5).
Fourth, as required under paragraph 4(b)(6) of SFAR 94, the interim
final rule requires an airport's security procedures to contain
procedures to ensure that security awareness procedures are implemented
and maintained at the airport. Such procedures will help ensure that
airport employees and pilots operating to and from the airport are
aware of, and comply with, the security procedures in place at the
airport, and that they are able to recognize suspicious behavior or
activity at the airport.
Fifth, the interim final rule requires an airport's security
procedures to contain TSA-approved procedures for approving pilots who
violate the Washington, DC, Metropolitan Area Flight Restricted Zone
and are forced to land at an airport. For example, if a pilot who was
not vetted by TSA to take off or land at one of the Maryland Three
Airports did so, the security procedures would be used to allow the
pilot to take off from the airport after he or she had been vetted by
TSA.\12\ The interim final rule requires that the pilot comply with all
applicable FAA and TSA aircraft operator requirements before he or she
is permitted by FAA to take off from the airport. Thus, the interim
final rule requires the airport's security procedures to contain the
requirements that the pilot would have to satisfy before he or she
could receive a limited TSA approval. SFAR 94 contained a similar
provision at paragraph 4(b)(4). That provision required airport
security procedures to contain airport arrival and departure route
descriptions, air traffic control clearance procedures, flight plan
requirements, communications procedures, and procedures for transponder
use.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ TSA recognizes that a pilot who violates the Flight
Restricted Zone would not receive TSA approval to operate to or from
any of the Maryland Three Airports because the pilot would have a
record of an airspace violation under the interim final rule.
However, TSA notes that the approval granted under this provision
would be for a one-time operation for the pilot to take off from the
airport and leave the Flight Restricted Zone. The approval granted
under this provision would not allow the pilot to continuously
operate to or from the Maryland Three Airports.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, the interim final rule requires an airport's security
procedures to contain any additional procedures necessary to provide
for the security of aircraft operations to or from the airport. This
will allow TSA to work with each of the Maryland Three Airports to
implement any additional security procedures that may be necessary to
enhance secure aircraft operations at a particular airport, and allow
TSA to amend an airport's security procedures in response to threat
information or elevated threat levels. SFAR 94 contained this provision
at paragraph 4(b)(9).
TSA notes that it may need to be able to quickly amend a particular
airport's security procedures in response to threat information, an
elevation in the threat level, noncompliance with the security
procedures, or other circumstances. Thus, the interim final rule
provides that airport security procedures approved by TSA remain in
effect unless TSA determines that operations at the airport have not
been conducted in accordance with the approved security procedures, or
the airport's security procedures must be amended to provide for the
security of aircraft operations to or from the airport. SFAR 94
contained a similar provision at paragraph 4(b) providing that an
airport's security procedures remain in effect unless TSA determines
that operations at the airport have not been conducted in accordance
with the security procedures.
[[Page 7155]]
Pilot Requirements
The interim final rule prohibits a pilot from operating an aircraft
to or from any of the Maryland Three Airports unless he or she is
approved by TSA. To receive TSA approval, a pilot must meet the
following requirements. As with the airport operator requirements, TSA
is making only minor revisions to requirements that are currently in
effect under SFAR 94. TSA also notes that pilots who were approved to
operate to or from any of the Maryland Three Airports under SFAR 94 may
continue to operate using the PIN issued to them by TSA. Such pilots do
not have to reapply for TSA approval under the interim final rule.
First, the interim final rule requires a pilot to present to
TSA\13\ the following: (1) The pilot's name, social security number,
date of birth, address, and phone number; (2) the pilot's current and
valid airman certificate; (2) the pilot's current medical certificate;
(3) one form of Government issued picture identification of the pilot;
(4) the pilot's fingerprints, in a form and manner acceptable to TSA;
and (5) a list containing the make, model, and registration number of
each aircraft that the pilot intends to operate to or from the airport.
These requirements will help establish a pilot's identification and
permit TSA to conduct the required security threat assessment as well
as check the pilot's FAA record. SFAR 94 contained a similar provision
at paragraph 3(b)(1).\14\ TSA intends to issue a form that pilots can
use to submit all of this information to TSA.\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ The airport security procedures approved by TSA and FAA
under SFAR 94 required the airport operator to collect this
information from pilots. TSA intends to continue that collection
process under the interim final rule. In addition, TSA intends to
issue a form that pilots can use to submit this information to the
airport operator, who will submit the form to TSA.
\14\ Although SFAR 94 did not specifically require pilots to
submit their name, date of birth, or social security number, the
airport security procedures approved by TSA and FAA under SFAR 94
did require pilots to submit that information.
\15\ This form will be issued in accordance with the
requirements of the Paperwork Reduction Act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Second, the interim final rule requires pilots to submit their
fingerprints to TSA in a form and manner acceptable to TSA. Paragraph
3(b)(2) of SFAR 94 required pilots to successfully complete a
background check by a law enforcement agency, which could include
submission of fingerprints and the conduct of a criminal history
records check. Under SFAR 94, individuals who sought approval to
operate to or from one of the Maryland Three Airports were required to
submit their fingerprints at Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport
(DCA) and pay the appropriate fee to the entity collecting the
fingerprints as well as a fee to the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) for processing the fingerprints. TSA did not charge any
additional fee. TSA intends to continue using this process under the
interim final rule.
Third, the interim final rule requires pilots to successfully
undergo a terrorist threat assessment. This may include a check of
terrorist watchlists and other databases relevant to determining
whether a pilot poses a security threat or that confirm a pilot's
identity. A pilot will not receive TSA approval under this analysis if
TSA determines or suspects the individual of posing a threat to
national or transportation security, or a threat of terrorism. The
interim final rule imposes on pilots who are approved by TSA a
continuing obligation to meet this requirement. If a pilot who is
approved to operate to or from any of the Maryland Three Airports is
determined by TSA to pose a threat to national or transportation
security, or a threat of terrorism, TSA may withdraw its approval of
the pilot.
Fourth, pilots are required to undergo a criminal history records
check. A pilot may not be approved by TSA if he or she has been
convicted or found not guilty by reason of insanity, in any
jurisdiction, during the ten years prior to the date of the pilot's
request to operate to or from any of the Maryland Three Airports, or
while authorized to do so, of any crime specified in 49 CFR 1542.209 or
1572.103. These crimes are: (1) Forgery of certificates, false marking
of aircraft, and other aircraft registration violation; (2)
interference with air navigation; (3) improper transportation of a
hazardous material; (4) aircraft piracy; (5) interference with flight
crew members or flight attendants; (6) commission of certain crimes
aboard aircraft in flight; (7) carrying a weapon or explosive aboard
aircraft; (8) conveying false information or threats; (9) aircraft
piracy outside the special aircraft jurisdiction of the U.S.; (10)
lighting violations involving transporting controlled substances; (11)
unlawful entry into an aircraft or airport area that serves air carrier
or foreign air carriers contrary to established security requirements;
(12) destruction of an aircraft or aircraft facility; (13) murder; (14)
assault with intent to murder; (15) espionage; (16) sedition; (17)
kidnapping or hostage taking; (18) treason; (19) rape or aggravated
sexual abuse; (20) unlawful possession, use, sale, distribution,
manufacture, purchase, receipt, transfer, shipping, transporting,
import, export, storage of, or dealing in an explosive, explosive
device, firearm, or other weapon; (21) extortion; (22) armed or felony
unarmed robbery; (23) distribution of, or intent to distribute, a
controlled substance; (24) felony arson; (25) a felony involving a
threat; (26) a felony involving: willful destruction of property;
importation or manufacture of a controlled substance; burglary; theft;
dishonesty, fraud, or misrepresentation; possession or distribution of
stolen property; aggravated assault; bribery; or illegal possession of
a controlled substance punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of
more than one year; (27) violence at international airports; (28) a
crime listed in 18 U.S.C. Chapter 113B--Terrorism, or a State law that
is comparable; (29) a crime involving a transportation security
incident; (30) immigration violations; (31) violations of the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. 1961, et seq., or a
State law that is comparable; or (32) conspiracy or attempt to commit
any of these criminal acts.
With the exception of four of the crimes listed above, these are
the same crimes that were considered disqualifying under paragraph
3(b)(4) of SFAR 94. TSA also notes that these crimes are considered
disqualifying under 49 CFR 1544.229 for TSA security screeners and
under Sec. 1542.209 for individuals with unescorted access authority
to a security identification display area (SIDA). TSA understands the
unique nature of GA and that in many instances those security measures
in place for commercial aviation would not be appropriate for GA
facilities. However, the unique nature and security concerns
surrounding the national capital region require additional security
enhancements, such as requirements for disqualifying offenses similar
to those used for individuals with SIDA access, that are more robust
than those at other GA airports.
TSA is adding the disqualifying crimes listed in 49 CFR 1572.103.
In developing that list of crimes, TSA consulted with the Department of
Justice and Department of Transportation to include those offenses that
are reasonably indicative of an individual's predisposition to engage
in violent or deceptive behavior that may be predictive of a security
threat. TSA notes that there is considerable overlap in the crimes
listed in 49 CFR 1572.103 and 1542.209. The additional crimes listed in
49 CFR 1572.103 are the crimes listed above in (28), (29), (30), and
(31), as well as the addition of the following language to the crimes
listed in (20): ``explosive device'' and ``purchase,
[[Page 7156]]
receipt, transfer, shipping, transporting, import, export, storage of,
and dealing in''.
The listed crimes would be considered grounds for disqualification
whether civilian or military authorities prosecute them. If a pilot has
been convicted within the ten years preceding the individual's request
to operate to or from any of the Maryland Three Airports, the pilot
will be disqualified.\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ Pilots who were vetted in accordance with the requirements
of SFAR 94 will not be required to reapply for approval under the
interim final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The interim final rule also imposes on pilots who are approved by
TSA a continuing obligation to meet this requirement. If a pilot is
convicted or found not guilty by reason of insanity of any of the
listed disqualifying crimes after receiving TSA approval, the pilot
must report the conviction or finding of not guilty by reason of
insanity within 24 hours of the decision. TSA may withdraw its approval
of the pilot as a result of the conviction or finding of not guilty by
reason of insanity. Paragraph 3(b)(4) of SFAR 94 required that pilots
not be convicted or found not guilty by reason of insanity of any of
the disqualifying crimes ``while authorized to operate to or from the
airport.''
TSA invites comment from all interested parties concerning this
list of disqualifying crimes. TSA must balance its responsibility to
ensure the security of the critical infrastructure and Federal
government assets in the Washington, DC, Metropolitan Area against the
knowledge that individuals may participate in criminal acts but
subsequently become trusted citizens. TSA wishes to minimize the
adverse impact this interim final rule may have on individuals who have
committed criminal offenses and served their sentences, without
compromising the security of the infrastructure and assets in the
nation's capitol.
Fifth, a pilot is required to receive a briefing acceptable to FAA
and TSA that describes procedures for operating to and from the
airport. These procedures will be contained in the airport's approved
security procedures. SFAR 94 contained this requirement at paragraph
3(b)(3). Pilots comply with the requirement by viewing a videotaped
FAA/TSA briefing. In the near term, TSA intends to continue to use that
videotape for compliance with the TSA rule. However, in the future TSA
intends to update that videotape or provide an alternate briefing. This
requirement will help ensure that individuals are aware of, and comply
with, the proper procedures for operating to and from the airport, and
will help prevent inadvertent violations of those procedures.
Sixth, a pilot is required to undergo a check of his or her FAA
record for certain violations. A pilot will not receive TSA approval
if, in TSA's discretion, he or she has a record of a violation of: (1)
A prohibited area designated under 14 CFR part 73; (2) a flight
restriction established under 14 CFR 91.141; (3) special security
instructions issued under 14 CFR 99.7; (4) a restricted area designated
under 14 CFR part 73; (5) emergency air traffic rules issued under 14
CFR 91.139; (6) a temporary flight restriction designated under 14 CFR
91.137, 91.138, or 91.145; or (7) an area designated under 14 CFR
91.143. In view of the critical need to protect the critical
infrastructure and national assets in the Washington, DC, Metropolitan
Area, TSA will not approve pilots who have a record of violating
restricted airspace.\17\ SFAR 94 contained a similar provision at
paragraph 3(b)(5).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ TSA will consider only final FAA determinations of a
violation of restricted airspace, not any pending enforcement
actions. TSA will consider an FAA determination to be final if the
matter has been fully and finally adjudicated or the time for filing
an appeal has expired.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
TSA notes that there may be special circumstances in which TSA may
approve an individual who has a record of a violation of restricted
airspace. TSA will review such circumstances on a case-by-case basis.
The interim final rule imposes upon pilots who are approved by TSA
a continuing obligation to meet this requirement. If a pilot who is
approved by TSA to operate to or from the Maryland Three Airports
commits any of the violations described above, the pilot must notify
TSA within 24 hours of the violation. TSA, in its discretion, may
withdraw its approval of the pilot as a result of the violation. TSA
notes that this obligation is slightly different from the requirement
for a pilot who is applying for access to the Maryland Three Airports.
In reviewing a pilot's application for access to the Maryland Three
Airports, TSA will consider only final FAA determinations of violations
to be disqualifying. However, if a pilot who has received TSA approval
to operate to or from the Maryland Three Airports subsequently commits
any of the violations described above, TSA, in its discretion, may
withdraw its approval without waiting for a final FAA determination.
This is necessary to ensure that TSA can immediately withdraw its
approval of a pilot who commits one or more serious airspace
violations.
The interim final rule also requires pilots who have received TSA
approval to operate to and from the Maryland Three Airports to adhere
to the following security measures.
First, the interim final rule requires a pilot to protect from
unauthorized disclosure any identification information issued by TSA
for the conduct of operations to or from the airport. SFAR 94 contained
a similar provision at paragraph 3(b)(7). Under SFAR 94, TSA would
issue a personal identification number (PIN) to each individual
approved to operate to or from any of the Maryland Three Airports. TSA
will continue to do so under this interim final rule. This requirement
will help allow for the ready identification of individuals who have
met the background check requirements and been approved for operations
to or from any of the Maryland Three Airports.
Second, the interim final rule requires a pilot to secure the
aircraft after returning to the airport from any flight. This
requirement will help prevent aircraft from being stolen and used for
terrorist and other criminal purposes. SFAR 94 contained this provision
at paragraph 3(b)(14).
Finally, a pilot is required to comply with any other requirements
for operating to or from the airport specified by the FAA or TSA. For
example, in the event the national threat level is elevated to Orange,
TSA may coordinate with local law enforcement officers to positively
identify a pilot operating from one of the Maryland Three Airports by
checking his or her identification or pilot's certificate before
permitting the individual to take off. SFAR 94 contained a similar
provision at paragraphs 3(b)(15) and (16).
The interim final rule allows a pilot who is approved by TSA to
operate an aircraft to or from one of the Maryland Three Airports to
operate an aircraft to any of the Maryland Three Airports, provided
that the pilot: (1) Files an IFR or VFR flight plan with Leesburg
Automated Flight Service Station; (2) obtains an ATC clearance with a
discrete transponder code; and (3) follows any arrival/departure
procedures required by the FAA. This was also permitted under SFAR 94.
TSA notes that under SFAR 94 and NOTAM 3/0853, only pilots and
aircraft that were based at one of the Maryland Three Airports were
permitted to operate to or from the Maryland Three Airports. Transient
aircraft were not permitted to operate to or from any of the Maryland
Three Airports. Based on comments to SFAR 94, TSA has determined that
this restriction may be
[[Page 7157]]
relaxed without degrading security. Therefore, under the interim final
rule, TSA may approve transient aircraft to operate to or from any of
the Maryland Three Airports if the pilot complies with all of the
requirements described above, including submitting his or her
fingerprints at DCA and successfully completing the TSA security threat
assessment and terrorist threat analysis.
The interim final rule permits U.S. armed forces, law enforcement,
and aeromedical services aircraft to operate to or from any of the
Maryland Three Airports, provided that the pilot operating the aircraft
complies with any procedures specified by FAA or TSA. These
requirements include complying with the ATC procedures and aircraft
equipment requirements specified in applicable FAA regulations, and
complying with any other requirements for operating to or from the
airport specified by TSA or FAA.
Below is a table comparing the requirements contained in SFAR 94
with the requirements in this interim final rule and the requirements
that remain in NOTAM 3/0853 or may be included in any NOTAM or rule
that the FAA issues to replace NOTAM 3/0853. As noted above, the
requirements in this interim final rule are intended to replace the
security requirements in SFAR 94, which will expire on February 13,
2005. The requirements in NOTAM 3/0853 will remain in effect until the
FAA removes them or replaces them with another NOTAM or a rule.
Airport Operator Requirements
------------------------------------------------------------------------
TSA interim final
SFAR 94 rule NOTAM 3/0853
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Identify and provide contact Appoint an airport ....................
information for the manager employee as the
responsible for ensuring airport security
that security procedures coordinator and
are implemented and provide contact
maintained. 4(a)(1). information for him
or her. Sec.
1562.3(a)(1) and
(c)(1).
Identify aircraft eligible Maintain a current ....................
to be authorized for record of the
operations to or from the individuals and
airport, and maintain a aircraft authorized
current record of those to operate to or
persons authorized to from the airport.
conduct operations to or Sec. 1562.3(c)(2).
from the airport and the
aircraft in which the
person is authorized to
conduct those operations.
4(a)(2) and (3).
Maintain airport arrival and Maintain procedures ....................
departure route for limited
descriptions, air traffic approval of pilots
control clearance who violate the
procedures, communications Washington, DC,
procedures, and procedures Metropolitan Area
for transponder use. Flight Restricted
4(a)(4). Zone and are forced
to land at the
airport. Sec.
1562.3(c)(5).
Maintain procedures to Maintain procedures ....................
monitor the security of to monitor the
aircraft at the airport security of
during operational and non- aircraft at the
operational hours and to airport during
alert aircraft owners and operational and non-
operators, airport operational hours
operators, and the FAA of and to alert the
unsecured aircraft. 4(a)(5). aircraft owner(s)
and operator(s),
the airport
operator, and TSA
of unsecured
aircraft. Sec.
1562.3(c)(3).
Maintain procedures to Implement and ....................
ensure that security maintain security
awareness procedures are awareness
implemented and maintained procedures at the
at the airport. 4(a)(6). airport. Sec.
1562.3(c)(4).
Ensure that a copy of the Maintain at the ....................
approved security airport a copy of
procedures is maintained at the airport's TSA-
the airport and can be made approved security
available for inspection procedures and
upon FAA request, and permit officials
provide FAA with the means authorized by TSA
necessary to make any to inspect the
inspection to determine security
compliance with the procedures. Sec.
approved security 1562.3(a)(3) and
procedures. 4(a)(7) and (8). (5).
Maintain any additional Maintain any ....................
procedures necessary to additional
provide for the security of procedures required
aircraft operations to or by TSA to provide
from the airport. 4(a)(9). for the security of
aircraft operations
to or from the
airport. Sec.
1562.3(c)(6).
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pilot Requirements
------------------------------------------------------------------------
TSA interim final
SFAR 94 rule NOTAM 3/0853
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Prior to obtaining To obtain TSA ....................
authorization to operate to approval to operate
or from the airport, to or from the
present to FAA: (1) Current airport, present to
and valid airman TSA: (1) Name; (2)
certificate; (2) current social security
medical certificate; (3) number; (3) date of
one form of Government birth; (4) address;
issued picture (5) phone number;
identification; and (4) the (6) current and
make, model, and valid airman
registration number of each certificate or
aircraft the pilot intends student pilot
to operate to or from the certificate; (7)
airport. 3(b)(1). Note that current medical
the airport security certificate; (8)
procedures approved by TSA one form of
and FAA under SFAR 94 Government issued
required pilots to submit picture
to FAA their: name, social identification; (9)
security number, date of the make, model,
birth, address, phone and registration
number, and fingerprints. number of each
aircraft the pilot
intends to operate
to or from the
airport; and (10)
fingerprints. Sec.
1562.3(e)(1).
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Successfully complete a Successfully ....................
background check by a law complete a TSA
enforcement agency, which terrorist threat
may include submission of assessment and a
fingerprints and the criminal history
conduct of a criminal records check. Sec.
history records check. 1562.3(e)(2) and
3(b)(2). (4).
Attend a briefing acceptable Receive a briefing ....................
to FAA that describes acceptable to TSA
procedures for operating to and FAA that
or from the airport. describes
3(b)(3). procedures for
operating to or
from the airport.
Sec. 1562.3(e)(3).
Not have been convicted or Not have been ....................
found not guilty by reason convicted or found
of insanity, in any not guilty by
jurisdiction, during the 10 reason of insanity,
years prior to being in any
authorized to operate to or jurisdiction,
from the airport, or while during the 10 years
authorized to operate to or prior to applying
from the airport, of those for authorization
crimes specified in 14 CFR to operate to or
108.229(d). 3(b)(4). from the airport,
or while authorized
to operate to or
from the airport,
of any crime
specified in 49 CFR
1542.209 or
1572.103. Sec.
1562.3(e)(4).
Not have a record on file Not have a record on ....................
with the FAA of: (1) a file with the FAA
violation of a prohibited of a violation of:
area designated under 14 a prohibited area
CFR part 73, a flight designated under 14
restriction established CFR part 73; a
under 14 CFR 91.141, or flight restriction
special security established under
instructions issued under 14 CFR 91.141;
14 CFR 99.7; or more than specia
