Maryland Three Airports: Enhanced Security Procedures for Operations at Certain Airports in the Washington, DC, Metropolitan Area Flight Restricted Zone, 7150-7163 [05-2630]

Download as PDF 7150 Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 27 / Thursday, February 10, 2005 / Rules and Regulations DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY Transportation Security Administration 49 CFR Part 1562 [Docket No. TSA–2005–20118] RIN 1652–AA39 Maryland Three Airports: Enhanced Security Procedures for Operations at Certain Airports in the Washington, DC, Metropolitan Area Flight Restricted Zone Transportation Security Administration (TSA), Department of Homeland Security. ACTION: Interim final rule; request for comments. AGENCY: SUMMARY: This action transfers responsibility for ground security requirements and procedures at three Maryland airports that are located within the Washington, DC, Metropolitan Area Flight Restricted Zone, and for individuals operating aircraft to and from these airports, from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to TSA. These requirements and procedures were previously issued by the FAA, in coordination with TSA, in Special Federal Aviation Regulation (SFAR) 94. TSA is assuming responsibility for these requirements and procedures because TSA and FAA agree that they are best handled under TSA’s authority over transportation security. These requirements and procedures will continue to enhance the security of the critical infrastructure and Federal government assets in the Washington, DC, Metropolitan Area. DATES: Effective Date: This rule is effective February 13, 2005. Comment Date: Comments must be received by April 11, 2005. ADDRESSES: You may submit comments, identified by the TSA docket number to this rulemaking, using any one of the following methods: Comments Filed Electronically: You may submit comments through the docket Web site at http://dms.dot.gov. Please be aware that anyone is able to search the electronic form of all comments received into any of our dockets by the name of the individual submitting the comment (or signing the comment, if submitted on behalf of an association, business, labor union, etc.). You may review the applicable Privacy Act Statement published in the Federal Register on April 11, 2000 (65 FR 19477), or you may visit http:// dms.dot.gov. VerDate jul<14>2003 16:23 Feb 09, 2005 Jkt 205001 Comments Submitted by Mail, Fax, or In Person: Address or deliver your written, signed comments to the Docket Management System, U.S. Department of Transportation, Room Plaza 401, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Washington, DC 20590–0001; Fax: 202–493–2251. Comments that include trade secrets, confidential commercial or financial information, or sensitive security information (SSI) should not be submitted to the public regulatory docket. Please submit such comments separately from other comments on the rule. Comments containing trade secrets, confidential commercial or financial information, or SSI should be appropriately marked as containing such information and submitted by mail to the individual(s) listed in FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT. Reviewing Comments in the Docket: You may review the public docket containing comments on this interim final rule in person in the Docket Office between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The Docket Office is located on the plaza level of the NASSIF Building at the Department of Transportation address above. Also, you may review public dockets on the Internet at http://dms.dot.gov. See SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION for format and other information about comment submissions. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For policy questions: Robert Rottman, Office of Aviation Security Policy, Transportation Security Administration Headquarters, East Building, Floor 11, 601 South 12th Street, Arlington, VA 22202; telephone: 571–227–2289; email: Robert.Rottman@dhs.gov. For technical questions: Dirk Ahle, Aviation Operations, Transportation Security Administration Headquarters, East Building, Floor 9, 601 South 12th Street, Arlington, VA 22202; telephone: 571–227–1504; e-mail: Dirk.Ahle@dhs.gov. For legal questions: Dion Casey, Office of Chief Counsel, Transportation Security Administration Headquarters, East Building, Floor 12, TSA–2, 601 South 12th Street, Arlington, VA 22202; telephone: 571–227–2663; e-mail: Dion.Casey@dhs.gov. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Comments Invited This interim final rule is being adopted without prior notice and prior public comment. However, to the maximum extent possible, operating administrations within DHS will provide an opportunity for public comment on regulations issued without PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 prior notice. Accordingly, TSA invites interested persons to participate in this rulemaking by submitting written comments, data, or views. We also invite comments relating to the economic, environmental, energy, or federalism impacts that might result from this rulemaking. See ADDRESSES above for information on where to submit comments. Comments that include trade secrets, confidential commercial or financial information, or SSI should not be submitted to the public regulatory docket. Please submit such comments separately from other comments on the rule. Comments containing this type of information should be appropriately marked and submitted by mail to the individual(s) listed in FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section. Upon receipt of such comments, TSA will not place the comments in the public docket and will handle them in accordance with applicable safeguards and restrictions on access. TSA will hold them in a separate file to which the public does not have access, and place a note in the public docket that TSA has received such materials from the commenter. If TSA receives a request to examine or copy this information, TSA will treat it as any other request under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (5 U.S.C. 552) and the Department of Homeland Security’s FOIA regulation found in 6 CFR part 5. With each comment, please include your name and address, identify the docket number at the beginning of your comments, and give the reason for each comment. The most helpful comments reference a specific portion of the rule, explain the reason for any recommended change, and include supporting data. You may submit comments and material electronically, in person, by mail, or fax as provided under ADDRESSES, but please submit your comments and material by only one means. If you submit comments by mail or delivery, submit them in two copies, in an unbound format, no larger than 8.5 by 11 inches, suitable for copying and electronic filing. If you want the TSA to acknowledge receipt of your comments on this rulemaking, include with your comments a self-addressed, stamped postcard on which the docket number appears. We will stamp the date on the postcard and mail it to you. Except for comments containing confidential information and SSI, we will file in the public docket all comments we receive, as well as a report summarizing each substantive public contact with TSA personnel concerning this rulemaking. The docket E:\FR\FM\10FER2.SGM 10FER2 Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 27 / Thursday, February 10, 2005 / Rules and Regulations is available for public inspection before and after the comment closing date. We will consider all comments we receive on or before the closing date for comments. We will consider comments filed late to the extent practicable. We may change this rule in light of the comments we receive. Availability of Rulemaking Document You may obtain an electronic copy using the Internet by— (1) Searching the Department of Transportation’s electronic Docket Management System (DMS) Web page (http://dms.dot.gov/search); (2) Accessing the Government Printing Office’s Web page at http:// www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs/aces/ aces140.html; or (3) Visiting the TSA’s Law and Policy Web page at http://www.tsa.dot.gov/ public/index.jsp. In addition, copies are available by writing or calling any of the individuals in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section. Make sure to identify the docket number of this rulemaking. Small Entity Inquiries The Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA) of 1996 requires TSA to comply with small entity requests for information or advice about compliance with statutes and regulations within TSA’s jurisdiction. Any small entity that has a question regarding this document may contact the persons listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section for information or advice. You can get further information regarding SBREFA on the Small Business Administration’s Web page at http://www.sba.gov/advo/ laws/law_lib.html. Good Cause for Immediate Adoption TSA is issuing this interim final rule without prior notice and opportunity to comment pursuant to its authority under section 4(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) (5 U.S.C. 553(b)). This provision authorizes the agency to issue a rule without notice and opportunity to comment when the agency for good cause finds that those procedures are ‘‘impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest.’’ TSA finds that notice and public comment to this interim final rule are impracticable, unnecessary, and contrary to the public interest for the following reasons. First, after the September 11, 2001 attacks, three airports in Maryland— College Park Airport, Potomac Airfield, and Washington Executive/Hyde Field (the Maryland Three Airports)—were closed for a sustained period because of VerDate jul<14>2003 16:23 Feb 09, 2005 Jkt 205001 their proximity to important National Capitol Region assets and because of the restrictions on aircraft operations in the airspace that overlies those airports. The airports were not permitted to reopen until the FAA, in coordination with TSA, issued SFAR 94 on February 19, 2002 (67 FR 7538). According to comments that the FAA received, this sustained closure placed significant financial burdens on the Maryland Three Airports. SFAR 94 is set to expire on February 13, 2005. If TSA does not issue this IFR immediately, the Maryland Three Airports may be required to close again until TSA completes this rulemaking. Such a closure could cause the Maryland Three Airports significant financial burdens that are not necessary from a security perspective. Second, in this interim final rule TSA is largely adopting the security measures and procedures that were required under SFAR 94. The Maryland Three Airport operators, and pilots who operate to and from those airports, have been operating under the SFAR 94 requirements since February 19, 2002. In addition, because TSA is largely adopting the SFAR 94 requirements, the airport security procedures that were approved under SFAR 94 for each of the Maryland Three Airports will be approved by TSA under this interim final rule. Thus, TSA believes that the interim final rule will not present any surprises or impose any additional burdens on the Maryland Three Airport operators or the pilots who operate to and from those airports. In fact, in response to comments on SFAR 94 and FAA Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) 3/ 0853, this interim final rule relaxes one of the major burdens imposed under NOTAM 3/0853—the requirement that aircraft approved to operate to or from any of the Maryland Three Airports be based at one of those airports—without relaxing security. Under this interim final rule, TSA may permit transient aircraft to operate to or from any of the Maryland Three Airports if the pilot complies with the requirements of the interim final rule. This change will reduce costs without relaxing security. Finally, TSA notes that the FAA first issued these requirements as SFAR 94 on February 19, 2002. SFAR 94 was set to expire one year from that date. The FAA requested and received public comments on SFAR 94. On February 14, 2003, the FAA published a final rule extending the expiration date of SFAR 94 for an additional two years (68 FR 7684). In the 2003 final rule, the FAA, in coordination with TSA, responded to the public comments that it received after the publication of SFAR 94 in PO 00000 Frm 00003 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 7151 2002. The FAA did not receive any additional comments after publishing the final rule extending the expiration date of SFAR 94 in 2003. Consequently, TSA believes that the issues involved in this rulemaking have already been addressed through the prior FAA rulemakings. For these reasons, TSA finds that notice and public comment to this interim final rule are impracticable, unnecessary, and contrary to the public interest. However, TSA is inviting public comments on all aspects of the interim final rule. If, based upon information provided in public comments, TSA determines that changes to the interim final rule are necessary to address transportation security more effectively, or in a less burdensome but equally effective manner, the agency will not hesitate to make such changes. Abbreviations and Terms Used in This Document ADIZ—Air Defense Identification Zone ATC—Air Traffic Control ATSA—Aviation and Transportation Security Act CFR—Code of Federal Regulations CHRC—Criminal History Records Check CIA—Central Intelligence Agency DHS—Department of Homeland Security DOD—Department of Defense DOT—Department of Transportation FAA—Federal Aviation Administration FBI—Federal Bureau of Investigation FRZ—Flight Restricted Zone GA—General Aviation IFR—Instrument Flight Rules NM—Nautical Mile NOTAM—Notice to Airmen PIN—Personal Identification Number SFAR—Special Federal Aviation Regulation TFR—Temporary Flight Restriction TSA—Transportation Security Administration VFR—Visual Flight Rules VOR/DME—Very High Frequency Omnidirectional Range/Distance Measuring Equipment Background After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks against four U.S. commercial aircraft resulting in the tragic loss of human life at the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and in southwest Pennsylvania, the FAA immediately prohibited all aircraft operations within the territorial airspace of the U.S., with the exception of certain military, law enforcement, and emergency related aircraft operations. This general prohibition was lifted in part on September 13, 2001. In the Washington, E:\FR\FM\10FER2.SGM 10FER2 7152 Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 27 / Thursday, February 10, 2005 / Rules and Regulations DC, Metropolitan Area, however, aircraft operations remained prohibited at all civil airports within a 25 nautical mile (NM) radius of the Washington Very High Frequency Omnidirectional Range/Distance Measuring Equipment (VOR/DME). This action was accomplished via the U.S. NOTAM system. The FAA issued several NOTAMs under 14 CFR 91.139, Emergency Air Traffic Rules, and implemented temporary flight restrictions (TFRs) under 14 CFR 91.137, Temporary Flight Restrictions in the Vicinity of Disaster/Hazard Areas. On October 4, 2001, limited air carrier operations were permitted to resume at Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA). On October 5, 2001, the FAA issued NOTAM 1/0989, which authorized instrument flight rules (IFR) operations and limited visual flight rules (VFR) operations within an 18 to 25 NM radius from the DCA VOR/DME in accordance with emergency air traffic rules issued under 14 CFR 91.139. Exception to the restrictions affecting aircraft operations under 14 CFR part 91 (part 91 operations) in the Washington, DC, area issued since September 11, 2001, were made to permit the repositioning of aircraft from airports within the area of the TFR and to permit certain operations conducted under waivers issued by the FAA. On December 19, 2001, the FAA cancelled NOTAM 1/0989 and issued NOTAM 1/3354 that, in part, set forth special security instructions under 14 CFR 99.7 and created a new TFR for the Washington, DC, area. NOTAM 1/3354 also created TFRs in the Boston and New York City areas. That action significantly decreased the size of the area subject to the earlier prohibitions on part 91 operations in the Washington, DC, area and permitted operations at Freeway (W00), Maryland (2W5), and Suburban (W18) airports. As security concerns were resolved, most general aviation (GA) operations resumed with varying degrees of restriction. However, due to their proximity to important National Capitol Region assets, the Maryland Three Airports remained closed for a sustained period following the September 11 attacks because of the restrictions on aircraft operations in the airspace that overlies those airports. In addition, most part 91 operations in the airspace that overlies the Maryland Three Airports remained prohibited under NOTAM 1/ 3354. On February 14, 2002, the FAA cancelled NOTAM 1/3354 and issued NOTAM 2/1257, which provided flight plan filing procedures and air traffic VerDate jul<14>2003 16:23 Feb 09, 2005 Jkt 205001 control (ATC) arrival and departure procedures for pilots operating from the Maryland Three Airports in accordance with SFAR 94. The FAA updated and reissued NOTAM 2/1257 as NOTAM 2/ 2720 on December 10, 2002. NOTAM 2/ 2720 permitted pilots vetted at any one of the Maryland Three Airports to fly into any of the Maryland Three Airports. NOTAM 3/0853 replaced NOTAM 2/2720 on February 1, 2003. NOTAM 3/0853 remains in effect as of the date of this interim final rule. Aviation and Transportation Security Act The events of September 11, 2001, led Congress to enact the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA), which created TSA.1 ATSA required TSA to assume many of the civil aviation security responsibilities that the FAA maintained prior to that date. On February 22, 2002, TSA published a final rule transferring the bulk of the FAA’s civil aviation security regulations to TSA and adding new standards required by ATSA.2 FAA and TSA Authority The FAA has broad authority to regulate the safe and efficient use of the navigable airspace.3 The FAA is also authorized to issue air traffic rules and regulations to govern the flight of aircraft, the navigation, protection, and identification of aircraft for the protection of persons and property on the ground, and for the efficient use of the navigable airspace. Additionally, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 40103(b)(3), the FAA has the authority, in consultation with the Department of Defense (DOD), to ‘‘establish security provisions that will encourage and allow maximum use of the navigable airspace by civil aircraft consistent with national security.’’ Such provisions may include establishing airspace areas the FAA decides are necessary in the interest of national defense; and by regulation or order, restricting or prohibiting flight of civil aircraft that the FAA cannot identify, locate, and control with available facilities in those areas. The FAA has broad statutory authority to issue regulations in the interests of safety in air commerce and national security.4 TSA has broad authority over civil aviation security.5 TSA is responsible for developing policies, strategies, and plans for dealing with threats to transportation security, as well as other 1 Pub. L. 107–71, November 19, 2001, 115 Stat. 597. 2 67 FR 8340, February 22, 2002. 3 See 49 U.S.C. 40103(a). 4 See 49 U.S.C. 44701(a)(5). 5 See 49 U.S.C. 114(d)(1). PO 00000 Frm 00004 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 plans related to transportation security, including coordinating countermeasures with appropriate departments, agencies, and instrumentalities of the U.S. government.6 TSA is also authorized to work in conjunction with the FAA with respect to any actions or activities that may affect aviation safety.7 The FAA retains authority over airspace, including the authority to issue airspace restrictions. FAA issued SFAR 94 under that authority. However, because some of the requirements in SFAR 94 deal primarily with security (including background checks for pilots operating to or from the Maryland Three Airports and security procedures for the airports), and because TSA’s primary mission is civil aviation security, the FAA and TSA have determined that ground security procedures (including security threat assessments for pilots and airport security coordinators) for the Maryland Three Airports are best handled under TSA’s authority. TSA also notes that TSA inspectors have conducted inspections of Maryland Three Airports for compliance with the airports’ approved security procedures. For these reasons, the ground security requirements and procedures for the Maryland Three Airports as well as the security threat assessments for individuals operating aircraft to and from those airports are being placed in TSA regulations. The airspace security restrictions in NOTAM 3/0853 remain under FAA authority. SFAR 94 The FAA issued SFAR 94 as a final rule on February 19, 2002.8 SFAR 94 defined the restricted airspace over the Washington, DC, Metropolitan Area and established rules for all pilots operating aircraft to or from any of the Maryland Three Airports. It also established security procedures for the Maryland Three Airports. SFAR 94 had a one-year effective period and was set to expire on February 13, 2003. However, the FAA, in consultation with TSA and other Federal agencies, reissued SFAR 94 on February 14, 2003, with an expiration date of February 13, 2005.9 Security Justification for the Interim Final Rule Because of its status as home to all three branches of the Federal government, as well as numerous Federal buildings, foreign embassies, multinational institutions, and national monuments of iconic significance, the 6 See 49 U.S.C. 114(f)(3) and (4). 49 U.S.C. 114(f)(13). 8 67 FR 7537. 9 68 FR 7683. 7 See E:\FR\FM\10FER2.SGM 10FER2 Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 27 / Thursday, February 10, 2005 / Rules and Regulations Washington, DC, Metropolitan Area continues to be an obvious high priority target for terrorists. Although there is no information suggesting an imminent plan by terrorists to use airplanes to attack targets in the Washington, DC, Metropolitan Area, the success of the September 11, 2001, attack on the Pentagon and reports demonstrating terrorist groups’ enduring interest in aviation-related attacks indicate the need for continued vigilance in aviation security. For example, the April 2004 arrest of Waleed bin Attash and the subsequent discovery of a plot to crash an explosive-laden small aircraft into the U.S. Consulate in Karachi, Pakistan, illustrates terrorist groups’ continued interest in using aircraft to attack U.S. interests. Other information—such as documents found in Zacarias Moussaoui’s possession that outlined crop duster operations—suggests that terrorist groups may have been considering other domestic aviation attack plans in addition to the September 11, 2001, attacks. In addition, recent press reporting on the debriefings of detained terrorist leader Khalid Shaykh Muhammad not only hints at the complexity of planning involved in the September 11, 2001, attacks but also suggests the group was likely planning follow-on operations inside the United States, possibly including inside the Washington, DC, Metropolitan Area. While DHS has no specific information that terrorist groups are currently planning to use GA aircraft to perpetrate attacks against the U.S., it remains concerned that (in light of completed and ongoing security enhancements for commercial aircraft and airports) terrorists may turn to GA as an alternative method for conducting operations.10 To protect against a potential threat to the Washington, DC, Metropolitan Area, 10 TSA has taken several actions to enhance GA security. For example, TSA, in partnership with GA associations, implemented a GA Hotline (1–866–GA SECURE) that is tied to an Airport Watch Program. This provides a mechanism to enable any GA pilot to report suspicious activity at his or her airport to one central Federal Government focal point. The Hotline, which is operated by the National Response Center and managed by the U.S. Coast Guard, became operational on December 2, 2002. The Airport Watch program has extended the Neighborhood Watch concept to airports. Pilots, airport workers, and aircraft maintainers are asked to call the Hotline to report any suspicious activity. In addition, TSA has released guidelines to provide GA airport owners, operators, and users with a set of Federally-endorsed security enhancements and methods for determining implementation. The guidelines are available on the TSA Web site at http://www.tsa.gov/public/interapp/editorial/ editorial_1113.xml. VerDate jul<14>2003 16:23 Feb 09, 2005 Jkt 205001 FAA, in consultation with TSA and other Federal agencies, implemented a system of concentric airspace rings and complementary airspace control measures via NOTAM 3/0853 in February 2003. The dimensions of this protected airspace were determined after considering such factors as the average speed of likely suspect aircraft and minimum launch time and speed of intercept aircraft. After extensive coordination among Federal agencies, the dimensions for this protected airspace were established along with the requirements to enter and operate in the airspace. The outer lateral boundary is the same as the outer lateral boundary for the Tri-Area Class B airspace in the Washington-Baltimore area. This outer boundary is, at certain places, more than 40 nautical miles from the Washington Monument. The Government conditioned entry into this airspace on the identification of all aircraft operators within the airspace in order to ensure the security of protected ground assets. This airspace is called an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ). Within the ADIZ airspace is an inner ring, called a Flight Restricted Zone (FRZ), which has a radius of approximately 15 NM centered on the Washington (DCA) VOR/DME. In order to enter and operate in FRZ airspace, more stringent access and security procedures are applied. The Maryland Three Airports are located within the FRZ. Therefore, aircraft operating to or from one of the Maryland Three Airports must be subject to special rules. TSA notes that under SFAR 94 and NOTAM 3/0853, aircraft operations permitted in the FRZ are limited to U.S. Armed Forces, law enforcement, aeromedical services, air carriers that operate under 14 CFR part 121, and certain types of general aviation aircraft operations that receive an FAA waiver after the waiver applications are reviewed and cleared by TSA. The pilots of these operations have successfully completed a threat assessment prior to operating in the FRZ. Discussion of the Interim Final Rule TSA is adopting most of the security requirements and procedures that are currently in SFAR 94. TSA requests comment on each of the requirements discussed below. In the interim final rule, TSA has reorganized the paragraph structure of the requirements in SFAR 94 to help clarify the requirements. In keeping with SFAR 94, the interim final rule applies to the three Maryland airports (College Park Airport (CGS), Potomac Airfield (VKX), and Washington Executive/Hyde Field (W32)) that are located within the PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 7153 airspace designated as the Washington, DC, Metropolitan Area FRZ, as defined in FAA NOTAM or regulations. These airports are referred to as the Maryland Three Airports. The interim final rule also applies to individuals who operate an aircraft to or from those airports. Airport Operator Requirements SFAR 94 required each Maryland Three Airport operator to adopt security procedures that met minimum requirements in SFAR 94 and were approved by the FAA Administrator. This interim final rule carries over that requirement, except that the airport security procedures must be approved by TSA. The minimum-security procedures are discussed in greater detail below. TSA notes that because the agency is making only minor revisions to the SFAR 94 requirements, the airport security procedures that were approved by FAA under SFAR 94 for each of the Maryland Three Airports will be approved by TSA under this interim final rule. The interim final rule requires the airport operator to maintain at the airport a copy of the airport’s TSAapproved security procedures, and to permit officials authorized by TSA to inspect the airport, the airport’s TSAapproved security procedures, and any other documents required under the interim final rule. These requirements will help increase awareness of, and compliance with, the airport’s approved security procedures, as well as facilitate the proper administration and oversight of the security procedures at each airport. SFAR 94 contained a similar provision at paragraph 4(a)(7). The interim final rule also requires the airport operator to maintain at the airport a copy of each FAA NOTAM and rule that affects security procedures at the Maryland Three Airports. SFAR 94 did not contain this requirement. TSA is adding this requirement to help increase pilots’ awareness of, and compliance with, the FAA’s requirements for operating in the FRZ. In addition, the interim final rule requires the airport operator to appoint an airport employee as the airport security coordinator. The airport security coordinator will be responsible for ensuring that the airport’s security procedures are implemented and followed. The airport security coordinator must be approved by TSA. To obtain TSA approval, an airport security coordinator is required to undergo the same security threat assessment and criminal history records check as pilots who are approved to operate to or from a Maryland Three Airport. Accordingly, the airport E:\FR\FM\10FER2.SGM 10FER2 7154 Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 27 / Thursday, February 10, 2005 / Rules and Regulations security coordinator is required to present to TSA his or her name, social security number, date of birth, address, phone number, and fingerprints. These requirements, though not contained specifically in SFAR 94, were contained in the airport security procedures approved by TSA and FAA under SFAR 94. The interim final rule imposes on airport security coordinators who are approved by TSA a continuing obligation to meet these requirements. If TSA determines that an airport security coordinator poses a threat to national or transportation security, or a threat of terrorism, after TSA has approved the airport security coordinator, TSA may withdraw its approval of the airport security coordinator. In addition, if an airport security coordinator is convicted or found not guilty by reason of insanity of any of the listed disqualifying crimes after receiving TSA approval, the airport security coordinator must report the conviction or finding of not guilty by reason of insanity within 24 hours of the decision. TSA may withdraw its approval of the airport security coordinator as a result of the conviction or finding of not guilty by reason of insanity. TSA intends to issue a form that airport security coordinators can use to submit all of this information to TSA.11 TSA notes that airport security coordinators who were approved under SFAR 94 may continue in their capacity as airport security coordinators without resubmitting to TSA the information described above. Security Procedures To be approved by TSA, an airport’s security procedures must meet the minimum requirements set forth in the interim final rule. As noted above, TSA is making only minor revisions to the minimum requirements established in SFAR 94. Therefore, the airport security procedures that were approved by FAA under SFAR 94 for each of the Maryland Three Airports will be approved by TSA under the interim final rule. TSA requests comment on these minimum requirements. The minimum requirements are as follows. First, as required under SFAR 94 at paragraph 4(a)(1), the interim final rule requires an airport’s security procedures to contain basic airport information, outline the hours of operation, and identify the airport security coordinator who is responsible for ensuring that the security procedures are implemented and followed. Such information will 11 This form will be issued in accordance with the requirements of the Paperwork Reduction Act. VerDate jul<14>2003 16:23 Feb 09, 2005 Jkt 205001 help ensure accountability for compliance with the security procedures at each airport. The interim final rule also requires the airport security coordinator to present to TSA, in a form and manner acceptable to TSA, his or her name, social security number, date of birth, and fingerprints, and to successfully complete a TSA terrorist threat assessment, including a criminal history records check, that is the same as the threat assessment pilots will have to successfully complete to be approved to operate to or from any of the Maryland Three Airports. Airport security coordinators who were approved under SFAR 94 will continue to be approved under the interim final rule. Second, the interim final rule requires an airport’s security procedures to contain a current record of the individuals and aircraft authorized to operate to or from the airport. This will help ensure that only individuals who have been properly vetted by TSA operate aircraft to or from the Maryland Three Airports. SFAR 94 contained similar provisions at paragraphs 4(a)(2) and (3). Third, the interim final rule requires an airport’s security procedures to contain procedures to monitor the security of aircraft at the airport during operational and non-operational hours, and to alert aircraft owners and operators, the airport operator, and TSA of unsecured aircraft. Such procedures will help prevent aircraft located at the airport from being stolen and used for unauthorized purposes. SFAR 94 contained this provision at paragraph 4(b)(5). Fourth, as required under paragraph 4(b)(6) of SFAR 94, the interim final rule requires an airport’s security procedures to contain procedures to ensure that security awareness procedures are implemented and maintained at the airport. Such procedures will help ensure that airport employees and pilots operating to and from the airport are aware of, and comply with, the security procedures in place at the airport, and that they are able to recognize suspicious behavior or activity at the airport. Fifth, the interim final rule requires an airport’s security procedures to contain TSA-approved procedures for approving pilots who violate the Washington, DC, Metropolitan Area Flight Restricted Zone and are forced to land at an airport. For example, if a pilot who was not vetted by TSA to take off or land at one of the Maryland Three Airports did so, the security procedures would be used to allow the pilot to take off from the airport after he or she had PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 been vetted by TSA.12 The interim final rule requires that the pilot comply with all applicable FAA and TSA aircraft operator requirements before he or she is permitted by FAA to take off from the airport. Thus, the interim final rule requires the airport’s security procedures to contain the requirements that the pilot would have to satisfy before he or she could receive a limited TSA approval. SFAR 94 contained a similar provision at paragraph 4(b)(4). That provision required airport security procedures to contain airport arrival and departure route descriptions, air traffic control clearance procedures, flight plan requirements, communications procedures, and procedures for transponder use. Finally, the interim final rule requires an airport’s security procedures to contain any additional procedures necessary to provide for the security of aircraft operations to or from the airport. This will allow TSA to work with each of the Maryland Three Airports to implement any additional security procedures that may be necessary to enhance secure aircraft operations at a particular airport, and allow TSA to amend an airport’s security procedures in response to threat information or elevated threat levels. SFAR 94 contained this provision at paragraph 4(b)(9). TSA notes that it may need to be able to quickly amend a particular airport’s security procedures in response to threat information, an elevation in the threat level, noncompliance with the security procedures, or other circumstances. Thus, the interim final rule provides that airport security procedures approved by TSA remain in effect unless TSA determines that operations at the airport have not been conducted in accordance with the approved security procedures, or the airport’s security procedures must be amended to provide for the security of aircraft operations to or from the airport. SFAR 94 contained a similar provision at paragraph 4(b) providing that an airport’s security procedures remain in effect unless TSA determines that operations at the airport have not been conducted in accordance with the security procedures. 12 TSA recognizes that a pilot who violates the Flight Restricted Zone would not receive TSA approval to operate to or from any of the Maryland Three Airports because the pilot would have a record of an airspace violation under the interim final rule. However, TSA notes that the approval granted under this provision would be for a onetime operation for the pilot to take off from the airport and leave the Flight Restricted Zone. The approval granted under this provision would not allow the pilot to continuously operate to or from the Maryland Three Airports. E:\FR\FM\10FER2.SGM 10FER2 Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 27 / Thursday, February 10, 2005 / Rules and Regulations Pilot Requirements The interim final rule prohibits a pilot from operating an aircraft to or from any of the Maryland Three Airports unless he or she is approved by TSA. To receive TSA approval, a pilot must meet the following requirements. As with the airport operator requirements, TSA is making only minor revisions to requirements that are currently in effect under SFAR 94. TSA also notes that pilots who were approved to operate to or from any of the Maryland Three Airports under SFAR 94 may continue to operate using the PIN issued to them by TSA. Such pilots do not have to reapply for TSA approval under the interim final rule. First, the interim final rule requires a pilot to present to TSA13 the following: (1) The pilot’s name, social security number, date of birth, address, and phone number; (2) the pilot’s current and valid airman certificate; (2) the pilot’s current medical certificate; (3) one form of Government issued picture identification of the pilot; (4) the pilot’s fingerprints, in a form and manner acceptable to TSA; and (5) a list containing the make, model, and registration number of each aircraft that the pilot intends to operate to or from the airport. These requirements will help establish a pilot’s identification and permit TSA to conduct the required security threat assessment as well as check the pilot’s FAA record. SFAR 94 contained a similar provision at paragraph 3(b)(1).14 TSA intends to issue a form that pilots can use to submit all of this information to TSA.15 Second, the interim final rule requires pilots to submit their fingerprints to TSA in a form and manner acceptable to TSA. Paragraph 3(b)(2) of SFAR 94 required pilots to successfully complete a background check by a law enforcement agency, which could include submission of fingerprints and the conduct of a criminal history records check. Under SFAR 94, individuals who sought approval to operate to or from one of the Maryland Three Airports were required to submit their fingerprints at Ronald Reagan 13 The airport security procedures approved by TSA and FAA under SFAR 94 required the airport operator to collect this information from pilots. TSA intends to continue that collection process under the interim final rule. In addition, TSA intends to issue a form that pilots can use to submit this information to the airport operator, who will submit the form to TSA. 14 Although SFAR 94 did not specifically require pilots to submit their name, date of birth, or social security number, the airport security procedures approved by TSA and FAA under SFAR 94 did require pilots to submit that information. 15 This form will be issued in accordance with the requirements of the Paperwork Reduction Act. VerDate jul<14>2003 16:23 Feb 09, 2005 Jkt 205001 Washington National Airport (DCA) and pay the appropriate fee to the entity collecting the fingerprints as well as a fee to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for processing the fingerprints. TSA did not charge any additional fee. TSA intends to continue using this process under the interim final rule. Third, the interim final rule requires pilots to successfully undergo a terrorist threat assessment. This may include a check of terrorist watchlists and other databases relevant to determining whether a pilot poses a security threat or that confirm a pilot’s identity. A pilot will not receive TSA approval under this analysis if TSA determines or suspects the individual of posing a threat to national or transportation security, or a threat of terrorism. The interim final rule imposes on pilots who are approved by TSA a continuing obligation to meet this requirement. If a pilot who is approved to operate to or from any of the Maryland Three Airports is determined by TSA to pose a threat to national or transportation security, or a threat of terrorism, TSA may withdraw its approval of the pilot. Fourth, pilots are required to undergo a criminal history records check. A pilot may not be approved by TSA if he or she has been convicted or found not guilty by reason of insanity, in any jurisdiction, during the ten years prior to the date of the pilot’s request to operate to or from any of the Maryland Three Airports, or while authorized to do so, of any crime specified in 49 CFR 1542.209 or 1572.103. These crimes are: (1) Forgery of certificates, false marking of aircraft, and other aircraft registration violation; (2) interference with air navigation; (3) improper transportation of a hazardous material; (4) aircraft piracy; (5) interference with flight crew members or flight attendants; (6) commission of certain crimes aboard aircraft in flight; (7) carrying a weapon or explosive aboard aircraft; (8) conveying false information or threats; (9) aircraft piracy outside the special aircraft jurisdiction of the U.S.; (10) lighting violations involving transporting controlled substances; (11) unlawful entry into an aircraft or airport area that serves air carrier or foreign air carriers contrary to established security requirements; (12) destruction of an aircraft or aircraft facility; (13) murder; (14) assault with intent to murder; (15) espionage; (16) sedition; (17) kidnapping or hostage taking; (18) treason; (19) rape or aggravated sexual abuse; (20) unlawful possession, use, sale, distribution, manufacture, purchase, receipt, transfer, shipping, transporting, import, export, storage of, PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 7155 or dealing in an explosive, explosive device, firearm, or other weapon; (21) extortion; (22) armed or felony unarmed robbery; (23) distribution of, or intent to distribute, a controlled substance; (24) felony arson; (25) a felony involving a threat; (26) a felony involving: willful destruction of property; importation or manufacture of a controlled substance; burglary; theft; dishonesty, fraud, or misrepresentation; possession or distribution of stolen property; aggravated assault; bribery; or illegal possession of a controlled substance punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of more than one year; (27) violence at international airports; (28) a crime listed in 18 U.S.C. Chapter 113B—Terrorism, or a State law that is comparable; (29) a crime involving a transportation security incident; (30) immigration violations; (31) violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. 1961, et seq., or a State law that is comparable; or (32) conspiracy or attempt to commit any of these criminal acts. With the exception of four of the crimes listed above, these are the same crimes that were considered disqualifying under paragraph 3(b)(4) of SFAR 94. TSA also notes that these crimes are considered disqualifying under 49 CFR 1544.229 for TSA security screeners and under § 1542.209 for individuals with unescorted access authority to a security identification display area (SIDA). TSA understands the unique nature of GA and that in many instances those security measures in place for commercial aviation would not be appropriate for GA facilities. However, the unique nature and security concerns surrounding the national capital region require additional security enhancements, such as requirements for disqualifying offenses similar to those used for individuals with SIDA access, that are more robust than those at other GA airports. TSA is adding the disqualifying crimes listed in 49 CFR 1572.103. In developing that list of crimes, TSA consulted with the Department of Justice and Department of Transportation to include those offenses that are reasonably indicative of an individual’s predisposition to engage in violent or deceptive behavior that may be predictive of a security threat. TSA notes that there is considerable overlap in the crimes listed in 49 CFR 1572.103 and 1542.209. The additional crimes listed in 49 CFR 1572.103 are the crimes listed above in (28), (29), (30), and (31), as well as the addition of the following language to the crimes listed in (20): ‘‘explosive device’’ and ‘‘purchase, E:\FR\FM\10FER2.SGM 10FER2 7156 Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 27 / Thursday, February 10, 2005 / Rules and Regulations receipt, transfer, shipping, transporting, import, export, storage of, and dealing in’’. The listed crimes would be considered grounds for disqualification whether civilian or military authorities prosecute them. If a pilot has been convicted within the ten years preceding the individual’s request to operate to or from any of the Maryland Three Airports, the pilot will be disqualified.16 The interim final rule also imposes on pilots who are approved by TSA a continuing obligation to meet this requirement. If a pilot is convicted or found not guilty by reason of insanity of any of the listed disqualifying crimes after receiving TSA approval, the pilot must report the conviction or finding of not guilty by reason of insanity within 24 hours of the decision. TSA may withdraw its approval of the pilot as a result of the conviction or finding of not guilty by reason of insanity. Paragraph 3(b)(4) of SFAR 94 required that pilots not be convicted or found not guilty by reason of insanity of any of the disqualifying crimes ‘‘while authorized to operate to or from the airport.’’ TSA invites comment from all interested parties concerning this list of disqualifying crimes. TSA must balance its responsibility to ensure the security of the critical infrastructure and Federal government assets in the Washington, DC, Metropolitan Area against the knowledge that individuals may participate in criminal acts but subsequently become trusted citizens. TSA wishes to minimize the adverse impact this interim final rule may have on individuals who have committed criminal offenses and served their sentences, without compromising the security of the infrastructure and assets in the nation’s capitol. Fifth, a pilot is required to receive a briefing acceptable to FAA and TSA that describes procedures for operating to and from the airport. These procedures will be contained in the airport’s approved security procedures. SFAR 94 contained this requirement at paragraph 3(b)(3). Pilots comply with the requirement by viewing a videotaped FAA/TSA briefing. In the near term, TSA intends to continue to use that videotape for compliance with the TSA rule. However, in the future TSA intends to update that videotape or provide an alternate briefing. This requirement will help ensure that individuals are aware of, and comply with, the proper procedures for 16 Pilots who were vetted in accordance with the requirements of SFAR 94 will not be required to reapply for approval under the interim final rule. VerDate jul<14>2003 16:23 Feb 09, 2005 Jkt 205001 operating to and from the airport, and will help prevent inadvertent violations of those procedures. Sixth, a pilot is required to undergo a check of his or her FAA record for certain violations. A pilot will not receive TSA approval if, in TSA’s discretion, he or she has a record of a violation of: (1) A prohibited area designated under 14 CFR part 73; (2) a flight restriction established under 14 CFR 91.141; (3) special security instructions issued under 14 CFR 99.7; (4) a restricted area designated under 14 CFR part 73; (5) emergency air traffic rules issued under 14 CFR 91.139; (6) a temporary flight restriction designated under 14 CFR 91.137, 91.138, or 91.145; or (7) an area designated under 14 CFR 91.143. In view of the critical need to protect the critical infrastructure and national assets in the Washington, DC, Metropolitan Area, TSA will not approve pilots who have a record of violating restricted airspace.17 SFAR 94 contained a similar provision at paragraph 3(b)(5). TSA notes that there may be special circumstances in which TSA may approve an individual who has a record of a violation of restricted airspace. TSA will review such circumstances on a case-by-case basis. The interim final rule imposes upon pilots who are approved by TSA a continuing obligation to meet this requirement. If a pilot who is approved by TSA to operate to or from the Maryland Three Airports commits any of the violations described above, the pilot must notify TSA within 24 hours of the violation. TSA, in its discretion, may withdraw its approval of the pilot as a result of the violation. TSA notes that this obligation is slightly different from the requirement for a pilot who is applying for access to the Maryland Three Airports. In reviewing a pilot’s application for access to the Maryland Three Airports, TSA will consider only final FAA determinations of violations to be disqualifying. However, if a pilot who has received TSA approval to operate to or from the Maryland Three Airports subsequently commits any of the violations described above, TSA, in its discretion, may withdraw its approval without waiting for a final FAA determination. This is necessary to ensure that TSA can immediately withdraw its approval of a pilot who commits one or more serious airspace violations. 17 TSA will consider only final FAA determinations of a violation of restricted airspace, not any pending enforcement actions. TSA will consider an FAA determination to be final if the matter has been fully and finally adjudicated or the time for filing an appeal has expired. PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 The interim final rule also requires pilots who have received TSA approval to operate to and from the Maryland Three Airports to adhere to the following security measures. First, the interim final rule requires a pilot to protect from unauthorized disclosure any identification information issued by TSA for the conduct of operations to or from the airport. SFAR 94 contained a similar provision at paragraph 3(b)(7). Under SFAR 94, TSA would issue a personal identification number (PIN) to each individual approved to operate to or from any of the Maryland Three Airports. TSA will continue to do so under this interim final rule. This requirement will help allow for the ready identification of individuals who have met the background check requirements and been approved for operations to or from any of the Maryland Three Airports. Second, the interim final rule requires a pilot to secure the aircraft after returning to the airport from any flight. This requirement will help prevent aircraft from being stolen and used for terrorist and other criminal purposes. SFAR 94 contained this provision at paragraph 3(b)(14). Finally, a pilot is required to comply with any other requirements for operating to or from the airport specified by the FAA or TSA. For example, in the event the national threat level is elevated to Orange, TSA may coordinate with local law enforcement officers to positively identify a pilot operating from one of the Maryland Three Airports by checking his or her identification or pilot’s certificate before permitting the individual to take off. SFAR 94 contained a similar provision at paragraphs 3(b)(15) and (16). The interim final rule allows a pilot who is approved by TSA to operate an aircraft to or from one of the Maryland Three Airports to operate an aircraft to any of the Maryland Three Airports, provided that the pilot: (1) Files an IFR or VFR flight plan with Leesburg Automated Flight Service Station; (2) obtains an ATC clearance with a discrete transponder code; and (3) follows any arrival/departure procedures required by the FAA. This was also permitted under SFAR 94. TSA notes that under SFAR 94 and NOTAM 3/0853, only pilots and aircraft that were based at one of the Maryland Three Airports were permitted to operate to or from the Maryland Three Airports. Transient aircraft were not permitted to operate to or from any of the Maryland Three Airports. Based on comments to SFAR 94, TSA has determined that this restriction may be E:\FR\FM\10FER2.SGM 10FER2 Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 27 / Thursday, February 10, 2005 / Rules and Regulations relaxed without degrading security. Therefore, under the interim final rule, TSA may approve transient aircraft to operate to or from any of the Maryland Three Airports if the pilot complies with all of the requirements described above, including submitting his or her fingerprints at DCA and successfully completing the TSA security threat assessment and terrorist threat analysis. The interim final rule permits U.S. armed forces, law enforcement, and aeromedical services aircraft to operate to or from any of the Maryland Three Airports, provided that the pilot operating the aircraft complies with any procedures specified by FAA or TSA. These requirements include complying with the ATC procedures and aircraft equipment requirements specified in applicable FAA regulations, and complying with any other requirements for operating to or from the airport specified by TSA or FAA. Below is a table comparing the requirements contained in SFAR 94 with the requirements in this interim final rule and the requirements that remain in NOTAM 3/0853 or may be included in any NOTAM or rule that the FAA issues to replace NOTAM 3/0853. As noted above, the requirements in this interim final rule are intended to replace the security requirements in SFAR 94, which will expire on February 13, 2005. The requirements in NOTAM 3/0853 will remain in effect until the FAA removes them or replaces them with another NOTAM or a rule. AIRPORT OPERATOR REQUIREMENTS SFAR 94 TSA interim final rule Identify and provide contact information for the manager responsible for ensuring that security procedures are implemented and maintained. 4(a)(1). Identify aircraft eligible to be authorized for operations to or from the airport, and maintain a current record of those persons authorized to conduct operations to or from the airport and the aircraft in which the person is authorized to conduct those operations. 4(a)(2) and (3). Maintain airport arrival and departure route descriptions, air traffic control clearance procedures, communications procedures, and procedures for transponder use. 4(a)(4). Appoint an airport employee as the airport security coordinator and provide contact information for him or her. § 1562.3(a)(1) and (c)(1). Maintain a current record of the individuals and aircraft authorized to operate to or from the airport. § 1562.3(c)(2). Maintain procedures to monitor the security of aircraft at the airport during operational and non-operational hours and to alert aircraft owners and operators, airport operators, and the FAA of unsecured aircraft. 4(a)(5). Maintain procedures to ensure that security awareness procedures are implemented and maintained at the airport. 4(a)(6). Ensure that a copy of the approved security procedures is maintained at the airport and can be made available for inspection upon FAA request, and provide FAA with the means necessary to make any inspection to determine compliance with the approved security procedures. 4(a)(7) and (8). Maintain any additional procedures necessary to provide for the security of aircraft operations to or from the airport. 4(a)(9). NOTAM 3/0853 Maintain procedures for limited approval of pilots who violate the Washington, DC, Metropolitan Area Flight Restricted Zone and are forced to land at the airport. § 1562.3(c)(5). Maintain procedures to monitor the security of aircraft at the airport during operational and non-operational hours and to alert the aircraft owner(s) and operator(s), the airport operator, and TSA of unsecured aircraft. § 1562.3(c)(3). Implement and maintain security awareness procedures at the airport. § 1562.3(c)(4). Maintain at the airport a copy of the airport’s TSA-approved security procedures and permit officials authorized by TSA to inspect the security procedures. § 1562.3(a)(3) and (5). Maintain any additional procedures required by TSA to provide for the security of aircraft operations to or from the airport. § 1562.3(c)(6). PILOT REQUIREMENTS SFAR 94 TSA interim final rule Prior to obtaining authorization to operate to or from the airport, present to FAA: (1) Current and valid airman certificate; (2) current medical certificate; (3) one form of Government issued picture identification; and (4) the make, model, and registration number of each aircraft the pilot intends to operate to or from the airport. 3(b)(1). Note that the airport security procedures approved by TSA and FAA under SFAR 94 required pilots to submit to FAA their: name, social security number, date of birth, address, phone number, and fingerprints. To obtain TSA approval to operate to or from the airport, present to TSA: (1) Name; (2) social security number; (3) date of birth; (4) address; (5) phone number; (6) current and valid airman certificate or student pilot certificate; (7) current medical certificate; (8) one form of Government issued picture identification; (9) the make, model, and registration number of each aircraft the pilot intends to operate to or from the airport; and (10) fingerprints. § 1562.3(e)(1). VerDate jul<14>2003 16:23 Feb 09, 2005 Jkt 205001 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 7157 E:\FR\FM\10FER2.SGM NOTAM 3/0853 10FER2 7158 Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 27 / Thursday, February 10, 2005 / Rules and Regulations PILOT REQUIREMENTS—Continued SFAR 94 TSA interim final rule Successfully complete a background check by a law enforcement agency, which may include submission of fingerprints and the conduct of a criminal history records check. 3(b)(2). Attend a briefing acceptable to FAA that describes procedures for operating to or from the airport. 3(b)(3). Not have been convicted or found not guilty by reason of insanity, in any jurisdiction, during the 10 years prior to being authorized to operate to or from the airport, or while authorized to operate to or from the airport, of those crimes specified in 14 CFR 108.229(d). 3(b)(4). Not have a record on file with the FAA of: (1) a violation of a prohibited area designated under 14 CFR part 73, a flight restriction established under 14 CFR 91.141, or special security instructions issued under 14 CFR 99.7; or more than one violation of a restricted area designated under 14 CFR part 73, emergency air traffic rules issued under 14 CFR 91.139, a temporary flight restriction designated under 14 CFR 91.137, 91.138, or 91.145, an area designated under 14 CFR 91.143, or any combination thereof. 3(b)(5). Be authorized by the FAA to conduct operations to or from the airport. 3(b)(6). Protect from unauthorized disclosure any identification information issued by FAA for the conduct of operations to or from the airport. 3(b)(7). Operate an aircraft that is authorized by FAA for operations to or from the airport. 3(b)(8). File an IFR or VFR flight plan telephonically with Leesburg AFSS prior to departure and obtain an ATC clearance prior to entering the FRZ. 3(b)(9). Operate the aircraft in accordance with an open IFR or VFR flight plan while in the FRZ, unless otherwise authorized by ATC. 3(b)(10). Maintain two-way communications with an appropriate ATC facility while in the FRZ. 3(b)(11). Ensure that the aircraft is equipped with an operable transponder with altitude reporting capability and use an assigned discrete beacon code while operating in the FRZ. 3(b)(12). Comply with any instructions issued by ATC for the flight. 3(b)(13). Secure the aircraft after returning to the airport from any flight. 3(b)(14). Comply with all additional safety and security requirements specified in applicable NOTAMs. 3(b)(15). Comply with any TSA or law enforcement requirements to operate to or from the airport. 3(b)(16). Successfully complete a TSA terrorist threat assessment and a criminal history records check. § 1562.3(e)(2) and (4). Waivers Under the interim final rule, TSA, in coordination with FAA, the United States Secret Service, and any other relevant Federal agency, may permit an operation to or from any of the Maryland Three Airports if TSA finds that such action would be in the public interest and provide the level of security VerDate jul<14>2003 16:23 Feb 09, 2005 Jkt 205001 NOTAM 3/0853 Receive a briefing acceptable to TSA and FAA that describes procedures for operating to or from the airport. § 1562.3(e)(3). Not have been convicted or found not guilty by reason of insanity, in any jurisdiction, during the 10 years prior to applying for authorization to operate to or from the airport, or while authorized to operate to or from the airport, of any crime specified in 49 CFR 1542.209 or 1572.103. § 1562.3(e)(4). Not have a record on file with the FAA of a violation of: a prohibited area designated under 14 CFR part 73; a flight restriction established under 14 CFR 91.141; special security instructions issued under 14 CFR 99.7; a restricted area designated under 14 CFR part 73; emergency air traffic rules issued under 14 CFR 91.139; a temporary flight restriction designated under 14 CFR 91.137, 91.138, or 91.145; or an area designated under 14 CFR 91.143. § 1562.3(e)(5). Be approved by TSA. § 1562.3(e) ................... Protect from unauthorized disclosure any identification information issued by TSA for the conduct of operations to or from the airport. § 1562.3(f)(1). ...................................................................... ...................................................................... ...................................................................... ...................................................................... ...................................................................... ...................................................................... Part 2 of NOTAM 3/0853 requires each pilot to file an IFR or VFR flight plan with Leesburg AFSS for all arrivals and departures via telephone. NOTAM 3/0853 contains specific flight plan procedures pilots must follow while operating in the FRZ. Part 2 of NOTAM 3/0853 requires pilots to maintain two-way radio communication with ATS while in the FRZ. NOTAM 3/0853 requires aircraft to be equipped with an operational Mode C transponder, and pilots to remain on their assigned discrete beacon code until they land. NOTAM 3/0853 requires pilots to fly as assigned by ATC until they leave the FRZ. Secure the aircraft after returning to the airport from any flight. § 1562.3(f)(2). Comply with any other requirements for operating to or from the airport specified by TSA or FAA. § 1562.3(f)(3). required under the interim final rule. Any waiver issued will be a temporary waiver for a single operation, such as an aircraft that is conducting aerial photography or an aircraft that is being moved from one of the Maryland Three Airports after maintenance. TSA will not issue any permanent waivers for continued operations. PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 Paperwork Reduction Act The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (PRA) (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.) requires that a Federal agency consider the impact of paperwork and other information collection burdens imposed on the public and, under the provisions of PRA section 3507(d), obtain approval from the Office of Management and E:\FR\FM\10FER2.SGM 10FER2 Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 27 / Thursday, February 10, 2005 / Rules and Regulations Budget (OMB) for each collection of information it conducts, sponsors, or requires through regulations. This rulemaking contains information collection activities subject to the PRA. The FAA initially required this collection under SFAR 94 (now 49 CFR part 1562) and cleared under OMB control number 2120–0677. The responsibility for the collection has been transferred to TSA and assigned OMB control number 1652–0029. As protection provided by the PRA, as amended, an agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a collection of information unless it displays a currently valid OMB control number. In conducting these analyses, TSA has determined that the interim final rule’s benefits outweigh its costs. TSA also has determined that the interim final rule will impose a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. However, TSA believes that the requirements of a regulatory flexibility analysis were met in the FAA analysis of the 2-year extension of SFAR 94. The interim final rule is not expected to adversely affect international trade or impose unfunded mandates costing more than $100 million in a year on state, local, or tribal governments or on the private sector. These analyses, available in the rulemaking docket, are summarized below. Regulatory Analyses Changes to Federal regulations must undergo several economic analyses. First, Executive Order 12866, Regulatory Planning and Review (58 FR 51735, October 4, 1993), directs each Federal agency to propose or adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned determination that the benefits of the intended regulation justify its costs. Second, the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq., as amended by the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA) of 1996) requires agencies to analyze the economic impact of regulatory changes on small entities. Third, the Office of Management and Budget directs agencies to assess the effect of regulatory changes on international trade. Fourth, the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (2 U.S.C. 1531– 1538) requires agencies to prepare a written assessment of the costs, benefits, and other effects of proposed or final rules that include a Federal mandate likely to result in the expenditure by State, local, or tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector, of $100 million or more annually (adjusted for inflation.) Economic Analyses Executive Order 12866, ‘‘Regulatory Planning and Review’’ (58 FR 51735, October 4, 1993), provides for making determinations whether a regulatory action is ‘‘significant’’ and therefore subject to OMB review and to the requirements of the Executive Order. This rulemaking is not ‘‘significant’’ under the Executive Order. However, TSA has prepared a full regulatory evaluation for this rulemaking, which is available for review in the docket of this matter. The results of the evaluation are summarized here. Costs The interim final rule results in costs for the Maryland Three airports and for government agencies enforcing the requirements. Pilots that operate to and from the airports may also incur costs. However, TSA believes that the cost of the security requirements for pilots were incurred by practically all covered pilots during the first year of SFAR 94. Any additional costs imposed will be only for new pilots attracted to the airports. TSA believes that because of the security restrictions, new pilots attracted to these airports will be 7159 limited to pilots of transient operations, which will be allowed to return to these airports as a result of this interim final rule. TSA believes that given the security restrictions and three years experience with local based operations, transient operations at these airports is likely to be limited. Therefore, TSA assumed that minimal to no cost will be imposed for pilots as a result of the interim final rule. Therefore, TSA assumed for this analysis that minimal to no new costs will be imposed for pilots as a result of the interim final rule. The cost impact of codifying the requirements and procedures of SFAR 94 result either from costs associated with the security-related provisions of TSA, or from the cost of flight restrictions imposed by the FAA. With regard to airports, security-related costs are imposed for: compliance with the physical security provisions of the interim final rule; preparation of security briefings for pilots and employees; and airport security program preparation, modification, and maintenance. Lost revenue as a result of operational restrictions will also be a cost for airports. Although most costs could be identified as resulting either from TSA requirements or FAA requirements without much difficulty, it may be difficult to determine whether lost revenue from operational restrictions is totally the result of closures due to security restrictions, or the result of FAA flight restrictions. For that reason, the annual costs of codifying the requirements of SFAR 94 are summarized in two tables. Table ES–1 shows the estimated costs of the rule (in 2002 dollars) with the value of lost revenue from operational restrictions included, while Table ES–2 shows the estimated cost excluding lost revenue. TABLE ES–1.—COST OF COMPLIANCE FOR SFAR–94 (2002 DOLLARS) [With cost of operational restrictions] Cost of security requirements Cost of operational restrictions Total costs College Park ............................................................................................................................................ Potomac Airfield ....................................................................................................................................... Washington Executive/Hyde .................................................................................................................... $181,500 63,100 78,600 $1,624,400 1,633,300 1,598,100 $1,805,900 1,696,400 1,678,600 Total airport costs ............................................................................................................................. 323,200 4,855,800 5,179,000 Government Agencies ............................................................................................................................. 10,200 .................... 10,200 Total cost per year ........................................................................................................................... 333,400 4,855,800 5,189,200 Entity VerDate jul<14>2003 16:23 Feb 09, 2005 Jkt 205001 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 E:\FR\FM\10FER2.SGM 10FER2 7160 Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 27 / Thursday, February 10, 2005 / Rules and Regulations TABLE ES–2.—COST OF COMPLIANCE FOR SFAR–94 (2002 DOLLARS) [Without cost of operational restrictions] Cost of security requirements Entity Total costs College Park ............................................................................................................................................................ Potomac Airfield ....................................................................................................................................................... Washington Executive/Hyde .................................................................................................................................... $181,500 63,100 78,600 181,500 63,100 78,600 Total Airport Costs ............................................................................................................................................ 323,200 323,200 Government Agencies ............................................................................................................................................. 10,200 10,200 Total cost per year ........................................................................................................................................... 333,400 333,400 Lost revenue as a result of operational restrictions is included as a cost in the FAA regulatory evaluation of its notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to codify the airspace restrictions of SFAR 94. To avoid double counting those costs, the cost of operational restrictions is not included in the TSA estimates of total costs in this analysis. Based on the above, TSA estimated first year cost of compliance of the interim final rule at $0.3 million, and the 10-year undiscounted cost at $3.3 million. The present value of those costs is $2.3 million as shown in Table ES–3 below. TABLE ES–3.—TOTAL COST OF COMPLIANCE OF INTERIM FINAL RULE SECURITY REQUIREMENTS College Park Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Potomac Airfield Washington Executive Government Total annual costs 7% discount factor Net present value ......................................................... ......................................................... ......................................................... ......................................................... ......................................................... ......................................................... ......................................................... ......................................................... ......................................................... ......................................................... $181,500 181,500 181,500 181,500 181,500 181,500 181,500 181,500 181,500 181,500 $63,100 63,100 63,100 63,100 63,100 63,100 63,100 63,100 63,100 63,100 $78,600 78,600 78,600 78,600 78,600 78,600 78,600 78,600 78,600 78,600 $10,200 10,200 10,200 10,200 10,200 10,200 10,200 10,200 10,200 10,200 $333,400 333,400 333,400 333,400 333,400 333,400 333,400 333,400 333,400 333,400 0.9346 0.8734 0.8163 0.7629 0.7130 0.6663 0.6227 0.5820 0.5439 0.5083 $311,600 291,200 272,200 254,400 237,700 222,100 207,600 194,000 181,300 169,500 Total .................................................. 1,815,000 631,000 786,000 102,000 3,334,000 .................... 2,341,600 When added to air space-related costs, as calculated by FAA, of $6.06 million annually and $60.6 million over 10 years, the total ten-year cost of codifying SFAR 94 is estimated at $63.9 million.18 Benefits TSA believes that allowing transient operations at the airports will reduce some of the lost revenue shown in Table ES–1 as a result of this interim final rule. However, the primary benefit of the rule will be enhanced protection for a significant number of vital government assets in the National Capital Region, while keeping the airports operational. Without these measures, the Maryland Three Airports would have to be closed due to the FAA requirements. The security provisions contained in this rule are an integral part of the effort to identify and defeat the threat posed by members of foreign terrorist groups to vital U.S. assets and security. The TSA 18 The FAA estimate is based on information in the FAA regulatory evaluation of the codification of airspace requirements of SFAR 94. VerDate jul<14>2003 16:23 Feb 09, 2005 Jkt 205001 believes that the rule will reduce the risk that an airborne strike initiated from an airport moments away from vital national assets will occur. The TSA recognizes that such an impact may not cause substantial damage to property or a large structure; however, it could potentially result in an undetermined number of fatalities and injuries and reduced tourism. The resulting tragedy would adversely impact the regional economies. Thus, TSA has concluded that the benefits associated with the interim final rule vastly exceed the costs. Regulatory Flexibility Act Assessment The Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA) of 1980, as amended, requires Federal agencies to consider the impact of regulatory actions on small entities. To that end, the RFA requires agencies to perform a review to determine whether a proposed or final rule will have ‘‘a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.’’ Section 603(a) of the RFA requires that agencies prepare and make available for PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 public comment an initial regulatory flexibility analysis (IRFA) for rulemakings subject to the notice and comment requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Section 604(a) of the RFA requires a final regulatory flexibility analysis (FRFA) for final rules issued subsequently. TSA is issuing this interim final rule without prior notice and opportunity to comment pursuant to its authority under section 4(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) (5 U.S.C. 553(b)). This provision authorizes the agency to issue a rule without notice and opportunity to comment when the agency for good cause finds that those procedures are ‘‘impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest.’’ TSA finds that notice and public comment to the interim final rule are impracticable, unnecessary, and contrary to the public interest for the following reasons. The Maryland Three Airport operators, and pilots who operate to and from those airports, have been operating E:\FR\FM\10FER2.SGM 10FER2 Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 27 / Thursday, February 10, 2005 / Rules and Regulations under the SFAR 94 requirements since February 19, 2002. TSA is largely adopting the security measures and procedures that were required under SFAR 94. As a result, TSA believes that the interim final rule will not present any surprises or impose any additional burdens on the Maryland Three Airport operators or the pilots who operate to and from those airports. SFAR 94, however, is set to expire on February 13, 2005. Consequently, if TSA does not issue this interim final rule immediately, The Maryland Three Airports may be required to close until TSA completes this rulemaking. The FAA issued SFAR 94 without prior notice and public comment, but did consider and respond to comments in its two-year extension of SFAR 94. The FAA also performed a Regulatory Flexibility Analysis, which addressed the following requirements of an IRFA: 1. Reasons why the rule was considered. In the wake of the catastrophic events of September 11, 2001, there was an awareness of the need to take steps to safeguard critical national assets and counter the increased threat level, while restoring operations at the Maryland Three Airports, which are located within a few minutes of vital civilian and military control centers. 2. Objective. To restore operations at the affected airports, while attempting to counter the threat of a possible terrorist airborne attack on vital national assets located within the National Capital Region. The legal basis is found in 49 U.S.C. 44901 and 49 U.S.C. 40101(d). 3. Description and number of small entities regulated. The IFR regulates two small (based on the SBA Office of Size Standards criteria of less than $6.0 million in annual receipts) privatelyowned general aviation airports (Potomac Airfield and Washington Executive Airport). In total, three airports are regulated, but the third is owned by two governmental jurisdictions with a combined population of 1.7 million (well above the 50,000 SBA threshold population for small governmental jurisdictions), and thus was not considered a small entity for the analysis. 4. Compliance requirements. The FAA analysis discussed the airspace flight restrictions imposed and the cost of compliance and lost revenue as a result. In addition, the analysis described the security requirements to maintain a security program and to modify and submit security procedures to TSA upon request. The cost of flight restrictions, lost revenue, and security procedures is estimated at $290,700 VerDate jul<14>2003 16:23 Feb 09, 2005 Jkt 205001 annually for Washington Executive Airport and $220,700 for the Potomac Airfield Airport; 19 these costs increase to $333,100 and $252,200, respectively when the anticipated airport revenue losses are increased by 20 percent, as discussed in the full regulatory evaluation. The analysis further described the estimated time and cost requirements for modifying and submitting security procedures to TSA at 16 hours and $672 for Potomac, and 15 hours and $600 for Washington Executive. 5. Duplication/Overlap. The FAA is unaware of any Federal rules that duplicate, overlap, or were in conflict with SFAR 94. The FAA Regulatory Flexibility Analysis also discussed the following alternatives: (1) Rescind the rule; (2) Maintain the status quo (SFAR 94); and (3) Close the airports permanently. Of those alternatives, maintaining the status quo (SFAR 94) is preferred because rescinding the rule would increase the vulnerability and diminish the level of protection now in place, while closing the airports permanently causes the greatest financial burden on the airports. The FAA analysis also addressed the additional elements required for the FRFA. As required in the FRFA, FAA summarized and addressed significant issues raised by public comments, in addition to providing a summarized assessment of those issues. Further, in response to one of those issues raised as an alternative, this IFR relaxes one of the major burdens imposed—the requirement that aircraft approved to operate to or from any of the Maryland Three Airports be based at one of those airports. As a result, through this IFR, TSA may permit transient aircraft to operate to or from any of the Maryland Three Airports if the pilot complies with the requirements of the interim final rule. TSA believes that this change 19 The full regulatory evaluation shows revenue losses and security costs broken down between actual airport costs and those incurred by other airport entities. The costs applicable here are only those incurred by the airports. For Potomac, revenue losses are $157,600 (Table 6 in full regulatory evaluation) and security costs are $63,100 (Table 7), summing to $220,700. For Washington Executive/Hyde, revenue losses are estimated at $212,100 and are calculated by summing $69,200 (Table 10) with the average of airport-only costs (excluding fuel and landing fees) from Tables 2 (College Park) and 6 (Potomac). The revenue losses from those two tables are $209,300 and $76,500, respectively, resulting in an average of $142,900 (($209,300 + $76,500 = $285,800) (÷ 2 = $142,900). Therefore, total revenue losses for Washington Executive are estimated at $212,100 ($69,200 + $142,900 = $212,100). With security costs at $78,600 (Table 11), the cost of compliance sums to $290,700 for Washington Executive ($212,100 + $78,600 = $290,700). PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 7161 will reduce the burden on the airports without relaxing security. For the reasons stated above, TSA believes that the requirements of both the IRFA and the FRFA have already been satisfied. International Trade Impact Assessment The Trade Agreement Act of 1979 prohibits Federal agencies from engaging in any standards or related activities that create unnecessary obstacles to the foreign commerce of the United States. Legitimate domestic objectives, such as safety, are not considered unnecessary obstacles. The statute also requires consideration of international standards and where appropriate, that they be the basis for U.S. standards. In addition, consistent with the Administration’s belief in the general superiority and desirability of free trade, it is the policy of to remove or diminish to the extent feasible, barriers to international trade, including both barriers affecting the export of American goods and services to foreign countries and barriers affecting the import of foreign goods and services into the United States. In accordance with the above statute and policy, the TSA has assessed the potential effect of this interim final rule and has determined that it will have only a domestic impact and therefore no affect on any trade-sensitive activity. Unfunded Mandates Assessment Section 202 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA) requires Federal agencies to prepare a written assessment of the costs, benefits, and other effects of proposed or final rules that include a Federal mandate likely to result in the expenditure by State, local, or tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector, of more than $100 million in any one year (adjusted for inflation with base year of 1995). Before promulgating a rule for which a written statement is needed, section 205 of the UMRA generally requires TSA to identify and consider a reasonable number of regulatory alternatives and adopt the least costly, most cost-effective, or least burdensome alternative that achieves the objective of the rule. The provisions of section 205 do not apply when they are inconsistent with applicable law. Moreover, section 205 allows TSA to adopt an alternative other than the least costly, most costeffective, or least burdensome alternative if the agency publishes with the final rule an explanation why that alternative was not adopted. This interim final rule will not result in the expenditure by State, local, or tribal governments, in the aggregate, or E:\FR\FM\10FER2.SGM 10FER2 7162 Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 27 / Thursday, February 10, 2005 / Rules and Regulations by the private sector, of more than $100 million annually. Thus, TSA has not prepared a written assessment under the UMRA. Executive Order 13132, Federalism Executive Order 13132 requires TSA to develop an accountable process to ensure ‘‘meaningful and timely input by State and local officials in the development of regulatory policies that have federalism implications.’’ ‘‘Policies that have federalism implications’’ is defined in the Executive Order to include regulations that have ‘‘substantial direct effects on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.’’ Under the Executive Order, TSA may construe a Federal statute to preempt State law only where, among other things, the exercise of State authority conflicts with the exercise of Federal authority under the Federal statute. This interim final rule will not have substantial direct effects on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government. Thus, TSA has determined that this interim final rule will not have sufficient Federalism implications to warrant the preparation of a Federal Assessment. PART 1562—GENERAL AVIATION Subpart A—Maryland Three Airports: Enhanced Security Procedures for Operations at Certain Airports in the Washington, DC, Metropolitan Area Flight Restricted Zone Sec. 1562.1 1562.3 Scope and definitions. Operating requirements. Authority: 49 U.S.C. 114, 40113. § 1562.1 Scope and definitions. (a) Scope. This subpart applies to the following airports, and individuals who operate an aircraft to or from those airports, that are located within the airspace designated as the Washington, DC, Metropolitan Area Flight Restricted Zone by the Federal Aviation Administration: (1) College Park Airport (CGS); (2) Potomac Airfield (VKX); and (3) Washington Executive/Hyde Field (W32). (b) Definitions. For purposes of this section: Airport security coordinator means the official at a Maryland Three Airport who is responsible for ensuring that the airport’s security procedures are implemented and followed. Maryland Three Airport means any of the airports specified in paragraph (a) of this section. § 1562.3 Operating requirements. (a) Airport operator requirements. Each operator of a Maryland Three National Environmental Policy Act Airport must: TSA has reviewed this action for (1) Appoint an airport employee as purposes of the National Environmental the airport security coordinator; Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C. 4321– (2) Maintain and carry out security 4347) and has determined that this procedures approved by TSA; action will not have a significant effect (3) Maintain at the airport a copy of on the human environment. the airport’s TSA-approved security Energy Impact procedures; (4) Maintain at the airport a copy of TSA has assessed the energy impact each Federal Aviation Administration of this rule in accordance with the Notice to Airmen and rule that affects Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA), Public Law 94–163, as amended security procedures at the Maryland Three Airports; and (42 U.S.C. 6362). TSA has tentatively (5) Permit officials authorized by TSA determined that this interim final rule to inspect— will not be a major regulatory action (i) The airport; under the provisions of the EPCA. (ii) The airport’s TSA-approved List of Subjects in 49 CFR Part 1562 security procedures; and Airports, Flight restricted zone, (iii) Any other documents required General aviation, Security threat under this section. assessment. (b) Airport security coordinator requirements. Each airport security The Amendments coordinator for a Maryland Three Airport must be approved by TSA. To I For the reasons set forth in the obtain TSA approval, an airport security preamble, the Transportation Security coordinator must: Administration amends Chapter XII, (1) Present to TSA, in a form and subchapter C, of Title 49, Code of Federal manner acceptable to TSA, his or her— Regulations, by adding a new part 1562 (i) Name; to read as follows: VerDate jul<14>2003 16:23 Feb 09, 2005 Jkt 205001 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 (ii) Social Security Number; (iii) Date of birth; (iv) Address; (v) Phone number; and (vi) Fingerprints. (2) Successfully complete a TSA terrorist threat assessment; and (3) Not have been convicted or found not guilty by reason of insanity, in any jurisdiction, during the 10 years prior to applying for authorization to operate to or from the airport, or while authorized to operate to or from the airport, of any crime specified in 49 CFR 1542.209 or 1572.103. (c) Security procedures. To be approved by TSA, an airport’s security procedures, at a minimum, must: (1) Identify and provide contact information for the airport’s airport security coordinator. (2) Contain a current record of the individuals and aircraft authorized to operate to or from the airport. (3) Contain procedures to— (i) Monitor the security of aircraft at the airport during operational and nonoperational hours; and (ii) Alert the aircraft owner(s) and operator(s), the airport operator, and TSA of unsecured aircraft. (4) Contain procedures to implement and maintain security awareness procedures at the airport. (5) Contain procedures for limited approval of pilots who violate the Washington, DC, Metropolitan Area Flight Restricted Zone and are forced to land at the airport. (6) Contain any additional procedures required by TSA to provide for the security of aircraft operations to or from the airport. (d) Amendments to security procedures. Airport security procedures approved by TSA remain in effect unless TSA determines that— (1) Operations at the airport have not been conducted in accordance with those procedures; or (2) The procedures must be amended to provide for the security of aircraft operations to or from the airport. (e) Pilot requirements for TSA approval. Except as specified in paragraph (g) of this section, each pilot of an aircraft operating to or from any of the Maryland Three Airports must be approved by TSA. To obtain TSA approval, a pilot must: (1) Present to TSA— (i) The pilot’s name; (ii) The pilot’s Social Security Number; (iii) The pilot’s date of birth; (iv) The pilot’s address; (v) The pilot’s phone number; (vi) The pilot’s current and valid airman certificate or current student pilot certificate; E:\FR\FM\10FER2.SGM 10FER2 Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 27 / Thursday, February 10, 2005 / Rules and Regulations (vii) The pilot’s current medical certificate; (viii) One form of Government-issued picture identification of the pilot; (ix) The pilot’s fingerprints, in a form and manner acceptable to TSA; and (x) A list containing the make, model, and registration number of each aircraft that the pilot intends to operate to or from the airport. (2) Successfully complete a TSA terrorist threat assessment. (3) Receive a briefing acceptable to TSA and the Federal Aviation Administration that describes procedures for operating to and from the airport. (4) Not have been convicted or found not guilty by reason of insanity, in any jurisdiction, during the 10 years prior to applying for authorization to operate to or from the airport, or while authorized to operate to or from the airport, of any crime specified in 49 CFR 1542.209 or 1572.103. (5) Not, in TSA’s discretion, have a record on file with the Federal Aviation Administration of a violation of— (i) A prohibited area designated under 14 CFR part 73; (ii) A flight restriction established under 14 CFR 91.141; (iii) Special security instructions issued under 14 CFR 99.7; (iv) A restricted area designated under 14 CFR part 73; (v) Emergency air traffic rules issued under 14 CFR 91.139; (vi) A temporary flight restriction designated under 14 CFR 91.137, 91.138, or 91.145; or (vii) An area designated under 14 CFR 91.143. (f) Additional pilot requirements. Except as specified in paragraph (g) of this section, each pilot of an aircraft VerDate jul<14>2003 16:23 Feb 09, 2005 Jkt 205001 operating to or from any of the Maryland Three Airports must: (1) Protect from unauthorized disclosure any identification information issued by TSA or the Federal Aviation Administration for the conduct of operations to or from the airport. (2) Secure the aircraft after returning to the airport from any flight. (3) Comply with any other requirements for operating to or from the airport specified by TSA or the Federal Aviation Administration. (g) Operations to any of the Maryland Three Airports. A pilot who is approved by TSA in accordance with paragraph (d) of this section may operate an aircraft to any of the Maryland Three Airports, provided that the pilot— (1) Files an instrument flight rules or visual flight rules flight plan with Leesburg Automated Flight Service Station; (2) Obtains an Air Traffic Control clearance with a discrete transponder code; and (3) Follows any arrival/departure procedures required by the Federal Aviation Administration. (h) U.S. Armed forces, law enforcement, and aeromedical services aircraft. An individual may operate a U.S. Armed Forces, law enforcement, or aeromedical services aircraft on an authorized mission to or from any of the Maryland Three Airports provided that the individual complies with any requirements for operating to or from the airport specified by TSA or the Federal Aviation Administration. (i) Continuing responsibilities. (1) If an airport security coordinator, or a pilot who is approved to operate to or from any of the Maryland Three Airports, is convicted or found not PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 7163 guilty by reason of insanity, in any jurisdiction, of any crime specified in 49 CFR 1542.209 or 1572.103, the airport security coordinator or pilot must notify TSA within 24 hours of the conviction or finding of not guilty by reason of insanity. TSA may withdraw its approval of the airport security coordinator or pilot as a result of the conviction or finding of not guilty by reason of insanity. (2) If a pilot who is approved to operate to or from any of the Maryland Three Airports commits any of the violations described in paragraph (e)(5) of this section, the pilot must notify TSA within 24 hours of the violation. TSA, in its discretion, may withdraw its approval of the pilot as a result of the violation. (3) If an airport security coordinator, or a pilot who is approved to operate to or from any of the Maryland Three Airports, is determined by TSA to pose a threat to national or transportation security, or a threat of terrorism, TSA may withdraw its approval of the airport security coordinator or pilot. (j) Waivers. TSA, in coordination with the Federal Aviation Administration, the United States Secret Service, and any other relevant agency, may permit an operation to or from any of the Maryland Three Airports, in deviation from the provisions of this section, if TSA finds that such action— (1) Is in the public interest; and (2) Provides the level of security required by this section. Issued in Arlington, Virginia, on February 4, 2005. David M. Stone, Assistant Secretary. [FR Doc. 05–2630 Filed 2–9–05; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 4910–62–P E:\FR\FM\10FER2.SGM 10FER2

Agencies

[Federal Register Volume 70, Number 27 (Thursday, February 10, 2005)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 7150-7163]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 05-2630]



[[Page 7149]]

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Part III





Department of Homeland Security





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Transportation Security Administration



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49 CFR Part 1562



Maryland Three Airports: Enhanced Security Procedures for Operations at 
Certain Airports in the Washington, DC, Metropolitan Area Flight 
Restricted Zone; Interim Final Rule

Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 27 / Thursday, February 10, 2005 / 
Rules and Regulations

[[Page 7150]]


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DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Transportation Security Administration

49 CFR Part 1562

[Docket No. TSA-2005-20118]
RIN 1652-AA39


Maryland Three Airports: Enhanced Security Procedures for 
Operations at Certain Airports in the Washington, DC, Metropolitan Area 
Flight Restricted Zone

AGENCY: Transportation Security Administration (TSA), Department of 
Homeland Security.

ACTION: Interim final rule; request for comments.

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SUMMARY: This action transfers responsibility for ground security 
requirements and procedures at three Maryland airports that are located 
within the Washington, DC, Metropolitan Area Flight Restricted Zone, 
and for individuals operating aircraft to and from these airports, from 
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to TSA. These requirements 
and procedures were previously issued by the FAA, in coordination with 
TSA, in Special Federal Aviation Regulation (SFAR) 94. TSA is assuming 
responsibility for these requirements and procedures because TSA and 
FAA agree that they are best handled under TSA's authority over 
transportation security. These requirements and procedures will 
continue to enhance the security of the critical infrastructure and 
Federal government assets in the Washington, DC, Metropolitan Area.

DATES: Effective Date: This rule is effective February 13, 2005.
    Comment Date: Comments must be received by April 11, 2005.

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments, identified by the TSA docket number 
to this rulemaking, using any one of the following methods:
    Comments Filed Electronically: You may submit comments through the 
docket Web site at http://dms.dot.gov. Please be aware that anyone is 
able to search the electronic form of all comments received into any of 
our dockets by the name of the individual submitting the comment (or 
signing the comment, if submitted on behalf of an association, 
business, labor union, etc.). You may review the applicable Privacy Act 
Statement published in the Federal Register on April 11, 2000 (65 FR 
19477), or you may visit http://dms.dot.gov.
    Comments Submitted by Mail, Fax, or In Person: Address or deliver 
your written, signed comments to the Docket Management System, U.S. 
Department of Transportation, Room Plaza 401, 400 Seventh Street, SW., 
Washington, DC 20590-0001; Fax: 202-493-2251.
    Comments that include trade secrets, confidential commercial or 
financial information, or sensitive security information (SSI) should 
not be submitted to the public regulatory docket. Please submit such 
comments separately from other comments on the rule. Comments 
containing trade secrets, confidential commercial or financial 
information, or SSI should be appropriately marked as containing such 
information and submitted by mail to the individual(s) listed in FOR 
FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT.
    Reviewing Comments in the Docket: You may review the public docket 
containing comments on this interim final rule in person in the Docket 
Office between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal 
holidays. The Docket Office is located on the plaza level of the NASSIF 
Building at the Department of Transportation address above. Also, you 
may review public dockets on the Internet at http://dms.dot.gov.
    See SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION for format and other information 
about comment submissions.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For policy questions: Robert Rottman, 
Office of Aviation Security Policy, Transportation Security 
Administration Headquarters, East Building, Floor 11, 601 South 12th 
Street, Arlington, VA 22202; telephone: 571-227-2289; e-mail: 
Robert.Rottman@dhs.gov.
    For technical questions: Dirk Ahle, Aviation Operations, 
Transportation Security Administration Headquarters, East Building, 
Floor 9, 601 South 12th Street, Arlington, VA 22202; telephone: 571-
227-1504; e-mail: Dirk.Ahle@dhs.gov.
    For legal questions: Dion Casey, Office of Chief Counsel, 
Transportation Security Administration Headquarters, East Building, 
Floor 12, TSA-2, 601 South 12th Street, Arlington, VA 22202; telephone: 
571-227-2663; e-mail: Dion.Casey@dhs.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Comments Invited

    This interim final rule is being adopted without prior notice and 
prior public comment. However, to the maximum extent possible, 
operating administrations within DHS will provide an opportunity for 
public comment on regulations issued without prior notice. Accordingly, 
TSA invites interested persons to participate in this rulemaking by 
submitting written comments, data, or views. We also invite comments 
relating to the economic, environmental, energy, or federalism impacts 
that might result from this rulemaking. See ADDRESSES above for 
information on where to submit comments.
    Comments that include trade secrets, confidential commercial or 
financial information, or SSI should not be submitted to the public 
regulatory docket. Please submit such comments separately from other 
comments on the rule. Comments containing this type of information 
should be appropriately marked and submitted by mail to the 
individual(s) listed in FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section. Upon 
receipt of such comments, TSA will not place the comments in the public 
docket and will handle them in accordance with applicable safeguards 
and restrictions on access. TSA will hold them in a separate file to 
which the public does not have access, and place a note in the public 
docket that TSA has received such materials from the commenter. If TSA 
receives a request to examine or copy this information, TSA will treat 
it as any other request under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (5 
U.S.C. 552) and the Department of Homeland Security's FOIA regulation 
found in 6 CFR part 5.
    With each comment, please include your name and address, identify 
the docket number at the beginning of your comments, and give the 
reason for each comment. The most helpful comments reference a specific 
portion of the rule, explain the reason for any recommended change, and 
include supporting data. You may submit comments and material 
electronically, in person, by mail, or fax as provided under ADDRESSES, 
but please submit your comments and material by only one means. If you 
submit comments by mail or delivery, submit them in two copies, in an 
unbound format, no larger than 8.5 by 11 inches, suitable for copying 
and electronic filing.
    If you want the TSA to acknowledge receipt of your comments on this 
rulemaking, include with your comments a self-addressed, stamped 
postcard on which the docket number appears. We will stamp the date on 
the postcard and mail it to you.
    Except for comments containing confidential information and SSI, we 
will file in the public docket all comments we receive, as well as a 
report summarizing each substantive public contact with TSA personnel 
concerning this rulemaking. The docket

[[Page 7151]]

is available for public inspection before and after the comment closing 
date.
    We will consider all comments we receive on or before the closing 
date for comments. We will consider comments filed late to the extent 
practicable. We may change this rule in light of the comments we 
receive.

Availability of Rulemaking Document

    You may obtain an electronic copy using the Internet by--
    (1) Searching the Department of Transportation's electronic Docket 
Management System (DMS) Web page (http://dms.dot.gov/search);
    (2) Accessing the Government Printing Office's Web page at http://
www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs/aces/aces140.html; or
    (3) Visiting the TSA's Law and Policy Web page at http://
www.tsa.dot.gov/public/index.jsp.
    In addition, copies are available by writing or calling any of the 
individuals in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section. Make sure 
to identify the docket number of this rulemaking.

Small Entity Inquiries

    The Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA) of 
1996 requires TSA to comply with small entity requests for information 
or advice about compliance with statutes and regulations within TSA's 
jurisdiction. Any small entity that has a question regarding this 
document may contact the persons listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION 
CONTACT section for information or advice. You can get further 
information regarding SBREFA on the Small Business Administration's Web 
page at http://www.sba.gov/advo/laws/law_lib.html.

Good Cause for Immediate Adoption

    TSA is issuing this interim final rule without prior notice and 
opportunity to comment pursuant to its authority under section 4(a) of 
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) (5 U.S.C. 553(b)). This 
provision authorizes the agency to issue a rule without notice and 
opportunity to comment when the agency for good cause finds that those 
procedures are ``impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public 
interest.'' TSA finds that notice and public comment to this interim 
final rule are impracticable, unnecessary, and contrary to the public 
interest for the following reasons.
    First, after the September 11, 2001 attacks, three airports in 
Maryland--College Park Airport, Potomac Airfield, and Washington 
Executive/Hyde Field (the Maryland Three Airports)--were closed for a 
sustained period because of their proximity to important National 
Capitol Region assets and because of the restrictions on aircraft 
operations in the airspace that overlies those airports. The airports 
were not permitted to reopen until the FAA, in coordination with TSA, 
issued SFAR 94 on February 19, 2002 (67 FR 7538). According to comments 
that the FAA received, this sustained closure placed significant 
financial burdens on the Maryland Three Airports. SFAR 94 is set to 
expire on February 13, 2005. If TSA does not issue this IFR 
immediately, the Maryland Three Airports may be required to close again 
until TSA completes this rulemaking. Such a closure could cause the 
Maryland Three Airports significant financial burdens that are not 
necessary from a security perspective.
    Second, in this interim final rule TSA is largely adopting the 
security measures and procedures that were required under SFAR 94. The 
Maryland Three Airport operators, and pilots who operate to and from 
those airports, have been operating under the SFAR 94 requirements 
since February 19, 2002. In addition, because TSA is largely adopting 
the SFAR 94 requirements, the airport security procedures that were 
approved under SFAR 94 for each of the Maryland Three Airports will be 
approved by TSA under this interim final rule. Thus, TSA believes that 
the interim final rule will not present any surprises or impose any 
additional burdens on the Maryland Three Airport operators or the 
pilots who operate to and from those airports. In fact, in response to 
comments on SFAR 94 and FAA Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) 3/0853, this 
interim final rule relaxes one of the major burdens imposed under NOTAM 
3/0853--the requirement that aircraft approved to operate to or from 
any of the Maryland Three Airports be based at one of those airports--
without relaxing security. Under this interim final rule, TSA may 
permit transient aircraft to operate to or from any of the Maryland 
Three Airports if the pilot complies with the requirements of the 
interim final rule. This change will reduce costs without relaxing 
security.
    Finally, TSA notes that the FAA first issued these requirements as 
SFAR 94 on February 19, 2002. SFAR 94 was set to expire one year from 
that date. The FAA requested and received public comments on SFAR 94. 
On February 14, 2003, the FAA published a final rule extending the 
expiration date of SFAR 94 for an additional two years (68 FR 7684). In 
the 2003 final rule, the FAA, in coordination with TSA, responded to 
the public comments that it received after the publication of SFAR 94 
in 2002. The FAA did not receive any additional comments after 
publishing the final rule extending the expiration date of SFAR 94 in 
2003. Consequently, TSA believes that the issues involved in this 
rulemaking have already been addressed through the prior FAA 
rulemakings.
    For these reasons, TSA finds that notice and public comment to this 
interim final rule are impracticable, unnecessary, and contrary to the 
public interest. However, TSA is inviting public comments on all 
aspects of the interim final rule. If, based upon information provided 
in public comments, TSA determines that changes to the interim final 
rule are necessary to address transportation security more effectively, 
or in a less burdensome but equally effective manner, the agency will 
not hesitate to make such changes.

Abbreviations and Terms Used in This Document

ADIZ--Air Defense Identification Zone
ATC--Air Traffic Control
ATSA--Aviation and Transportation Security Act
CFR--Code of Federal Regulations
CHRC--Criminal History Records Check
CIA--Central Intelligence Agency
DHS--Department of Homeland Security
DOD--Department of Defense
DOT--Department of Transportation
FAA--Federal Aviation Administration
FBI--Federal Bureau of Investigation
FRZ--Flight Restricted Zone
GA--General Aviation
IFR--Instrument Flight Rules
NM--Nautical Mile
NOTAM--Notice to Airmen
PIN--Personal Identification Number
SFAR--Special Federal Aviation Regulation
TFR--Temporary Flight Restriction
TSA--Transportation Security Administration
VFR--Visual Flight Rules
VOR/DME--Very High Frequency Omnidirectional Range/Distance Measuring 
Equipment

Background

    After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks against four U.S. 
commercial aircraft resulting in the tragic loss of human life at the 
World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and in southwest Pennsylvania, the 
FAA immediately prohibited all aircraft operations within the 
territorial airspace of the U.S., with the exception of certain 
military, law enforcement, and emergency related aircraft operations. 
This general prohibition was lifted in part on September 13, 2001. In 
the Washington,

[[Page 7152]]

DC, Metropolitan Area, however, aircraft operations remained prohibited 
at all civil airports within a 25 nautical mile (NM) radius of the 
Washington Very High Frequency Omnidirectional Range/Distance Measuring 
Equipment (VOR/DME). This action was accomplished via the U.S. NOTAM 
system. The FAA issued several NOTAMs under 14 CFR 91.139, Emergency 
Air Traffic Rules, and implemented temporary flight restrictions (TFRs) 
under 14 CFR 91.137, Temporary Flight Restrictions in the Vicinity of 
Disaster/Hazard Areas.
    On October 4, 2001, limited air carrier operations were permitted 
to resume at Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA).
    On October 5, 2001, the FAA issued NOTAM 1/0989, which authorized 
instrument flight rules (IFR) operations and limited visual flight 
rules (VFR) operations within an 18 to 25 NM radius from the DCA VOR/
DME in accordance with emergency air traffic rules issued under 14 CFR 
91.139. Exception to the restrictions affecting aircraft operations 
under 14 CFR part 91 (part 91 operations) in the Washington, DC, area 
issued since September 11, 2001, were made to permit the repositioning 
of aircraft from airports within the area of the TFR and to permit 
certain operations conducted under waivers issued by the FAA.
    On December 19, 2001, the FAA cancelled NOTAM 1/0989 and issued 
NOTAM 1/3354 that, in part, set forth special security instructions 
under 14 CFR 99.7 and created a new TFR for the Washington, DC, area. 
NOTAM 1/3354 also created TFRs in the Boston and New York City areas. 
That action significantly decreased the size of the area subject to the 
earlier prohibitions on part 91 operations in the Washington, DC, area 
and permitted operations at Freeway (W00), Maryland (2W5), and Suburban 
(W18) airports.
    As security concerns were resolved, most general aviation (GA) 
operations resumed with varying degrees of restriction. However, due to 
their proximity to important National Capitol Region assets, the 
Maryland Three Airports remained closed for a sustained period 
following the September 11 attacks because of the restrictions on 
aircraft operations in the airspace that overlies those airports. In 
addition, most part 91 operations in the airspace that overlies the 
Maryland Three Airports remained prohibited under NOTAM 1/3354.
    On February 14, 2002, the FAA cancelled NOTAM 1/3354 and issued 
NOTAM 2/1257, which provided flight plan filing procedures and air 
traffic control (ATC) arrival and departure procedures for pilots 
operating from the Maryland Three Airports in accordance with SFAR 94. 
The FAA updated and reissued NOTAM 2/1257 as NOTAM 2/2720 on December 
10, 2002. NOTAM 2/2720 permitted pilots vetted at any one of the 
Maryland Three Airports to fly into any of the Maryland Three Airports. 
NOTAM 3/0853 replaced NOTAM 2/2720 on February 1, 2003. NOTAM 3/0853 
remains in effect as of the date of this interim final rule.

Aviation and Transportation Security Act

    The events of September 11, 2001, led Congress to enact the 
Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA), which created TSA.\1\ 
ATSA required TSA to assume many of the civil aviation security 
responsibilities that the FAA maintained prior to that date. On 
February 22, 2002, TSA published a final rule transferring the bulk of 
the FAA's civil aviation security regulations to TSA and adding new 
standards required by ATSA.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ Pub. L. 107-71, November 19, 2001, 115 Stat. 597.
    \2\ 67 FR 8340, February 22, 2002.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

FAA and TSA Authority

    The FAA has broad authority to regulate the safe and efficient use 
of the navigable airspace.\3\ The FAA is also authorized to issue air 
traffic rules and regulations to govern the flight of aircraft, the 
navigation, protection, and identification of aircraft for the 
protection of persons and property on the ground, and for the efficient 
use of the navigable airspace. Additionally, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 
40103(b)(3), the FAA has the authority, in consultation with the 
Department of Defense (DOD), to ``establish security provisions that 
will encourage and allow maximum use of the navigable airspace by civil 
aircraft consistent with national security.'' Such provisions may 
include establishing airspace areas the FAA decides are necessary in 
the interest of national defense; and by regulation or order, 
restricting or prohibiting flight of civil aircraft that the FAA cannot 
identify, locate, and control with available facilities in those areas. 
The FAA has broad statutory authority to issue regulations in the 
interests of safety in air commerce and national security.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \3\ See 49 U.S.C. 40103(a).
    \4\ See 49 U.S.C. 44701(a)(5).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    TSA has broad authority over civil aviation security.\5\ TSA is 
responsible for developing policies, strategies, and plans for dealing 
with threats to transportation security, as well as other plans related 
to transportation security, including coordinating countermeasures with 
appropriate departments, agencies, and instrumentalities of the U.S. 
government.\6\ TSA is also authorized to work in conjunction with the 
FAA with respect to any actions or activities that may affect aviation 
safety.\7\
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    \5\ See 49 U.S.C. 114(d)(1).
    \6\ See 49 U.S.C. 114(f)(3) and (4).
    \7\ See 49 U.S.C. 114(f)(13).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The FAA retains authority over airspace, including the authority to 
issue airspace restrictions. FAA issued SFAR 94 under that authority. 
However, because some of the requirements in SFAR 94 deal primarily 
with security (including background checks for pilots operating to or 
from the Maryland Three Airports and security procedures for the 
airports), and because TSA's primary mission is civil aviation 
security, the FAA and TSA have determined that ground security 
procedures (including security threat assessments for pilots and 
airport security coordinators) for the Maryland Three Airports are best 
handled under TSA's authority. TSA also notes that TSA inspectors have 
conducted inspections of Maryland Three Airports for compliance with 
the airports' approved security procedures. For these reasons, the 
ground security requirements and procedures for the Maryland Three 
Airports as well as the security threat assessments for individuals 
operating aircraft to and from those airports are being placed in TSA 
regulations. The airspace security restrictions in NOTAM 3/0853 remain 
under FAA authority.

SFAR 94

    The FAA issued SFAR 94 as a final rule on February 19, 2002.\8\ 
SFAR 94 defined the restricted airspace over the Washington, DC, 
Metropolitan Area and established rules for all pilots operating 
aircraft to or from any of the Maryland Three Airports. It also 
established security procedures for the Maryland Three Airports. SFAR 
94 had a one-year effective period and was set to expire on February 
13, 2003. However, the FAA, in consultation with TSA and other Federal 
agencies, reissued SFAR 94 on February 14, 2003, with an expiration 
date of February 13, 2005.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \8\ 67 FR 7537.
    \9\ 68 FR 7683.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Security Justification for the Interim Final Rule

    Because of its status as home to all three branches of the Federal 
government, as well as numerous Federal buildings, foreign embassies, 
multinational institutions, and national monuments of iconic 
significance, the

[[Page 7153]]

Washington, DC, Metropolitan Area continues to be an obvious high 
priority target for terrorists.
    Although there is no information suggesting an imminent plan by 
terrorists to use airplanes to attack targets in the Washington, DC, 
Metropolitan Area, the success of the September 11, 2001, attack on the 
Pentagon and reports demonstrating terrorist groups' enduring interest 
in aviation-related attacks indicate the need for continued vigilance 
in aviation security.
    For example, the April 2004 arrest of Waleed bin Attash and the 
subsequent discovery of a plot to crash an explosive-laden small 
aircraft into the U.S. Consulate in Karachi, Pakistan, illustrates 
terrorist groups' continued interest in using aircraft to attack U.S. 
interests. Other information--such as documents found in Zacarias 
Moussaoui's possession that outlined crop duster operations--suggests 
that terrorist groups may have been considering other domestic aviation 
attack plans in addition to the September 11, 2001, attacks.
    In addition, recent press reporting on the debriefings of detained 
terrorist leader Khalid Shaykh Muhammad not only hints at the 
complexity of planning involved in the September 11, 2001, attacks but 
also suggests the group was likely planning follow-on operations inside 
the United States, possibly including inside the Washington, DC, 
Metropolitan Area.
    While DHS has no specific information that terrorist groups are 
currently planning to use GA aircraft to perpetrate attacks against the 
U.S., it remains concerned that (in light of completed and ongoing 
security enhancements for commercial aircraft and airports) terrorists 
may turn to GA as an alternative method for conducting operations.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \10\ TSA has taken several actions to enhance GA security. For 
example, TSA, in partnership with GA associations, implemented a GA 
Hotline (1-866-GA SECURE) that is tied to an Airport Watch Program. 
This provides a mechanism to enable any GA pilot to report 
suspicious activity at his or her airport to one central Federal 
Government focal point. The Hotline, which is operated by the 
National Response Center and managed by the U.S. Coast Guard, became 
operational on December 2, 2002. The Airport Watch program has 
extended the Neighborhood Watch concept to airports. Pilots, airport 
workers, and aircraft maintainers are asked to call the Hotline to 
report any suspicious activity. In addition, TSA has released 
guidelines to provide GA airport owners, operators, and users with a 
set of Federally-endorsed security enhancements and methods for 
determining implementation. The guidelines are available on the TSA 
Web site at http://www.tsa.gov/public/interapp/editorial/editorial_
1113.xml.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    To protect against a potential threat to the Washington, DC, 
Metropolitan Area, FAA, in consultation with TSA and other Federal 
agencies, implemented a system of concentric airspace rings and 
complementary airspace control measures via NOTAM 3/0853 in February 
2003. The dimensions of this protected airspace were determined after 
considering such factors as the average speed of likely suspect 
aircraft and minimum launch time and speed of intercept aircraft. After 
extensive coordination among Federal agencies, the dimensions for this 
protected airspace were established along with the requirements to 
enter and operate in the airspace. The outer lateral boundary is the 
same as the outer lateral boundary for the Tri-Area Class B airspace in 
the Washington-Baltimore area. This outer boundary is, at certain 
places, more than 40 nautical miles from the Washington Monument. The 
Government conditioned entry into this airspace on the identification 
of all aircraft operators within the airspace in order to ensure the 
security of protected ground assets. This airspace is called an Air 
Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ). Within the ADIZ airspace is an 
inner ring, called a Flight Restricted Zone (FRZ), which has a radius 
of approximately 15 NM centered on the Washington (DCA) VOR/DME. In 
order to enter and operate in FRZ airspace, more stringent access and 
security procedures are applied.
    The Maryland Three Airports are located within the FRZ. Therefore, 
aircraft operating to or from one of the Maryland Three Airports must 
be subject to special rules. TSA notes that under SFAR 94 and NOTAM 3/
0853, aircraft operations permitted in the FRZ are limited to U.S. 
Armed Forces, law enforcement, aeromedical services, air carriers that 
operate under 14 CFR part 121, and certain types of general aviation 
aircraft operations that receive an FAA waiver after the waiver 
applications are reviewed and cleared by TSA. The pilots of these 
operations have successfully completed a threat assessment prior to 
operating in the FRZ.

Discussion of the Interim Final Rule

    TSA is adopting most of the security requirements and procedures 
that are currently in SFAR 94. TSA requests comment on each of the 
requirements discussed below. In the interim final rule, TSA has 
reorganized the paragraph structure of the requirements in SFAR 94 to 
help clarify the requirements.
    In keeping with SFAR 94, the interim final rule applies to the 
three Maryland airports (College Park Airport (CGS), Potomac Airfield 
(VKX), and Washington Executive/Hyde Field (W32)) that are located 
within the airspace designated as the Washington, DC, Metropolitan Area 
FRZ, as defined in FAA NOTAM or regulations. These airports are 
referred to as the Maryland Three Airports. The interim final rule also 
applies to individuals who operate an aircraft to or from those 
airports.

Airport Operator Requirements

    SFAR 94 required each Maryland Three Airport operator to adopt 
security procedures that met minimum requirements in SFAR 94 and were 
approved by the FAA Administrator. This interim final rule carries over 
that requirement, except that the airport security procedures must be 
approved by TSA. The minimum-security procedures are discussed in 
greater detail below. TSA notes that because the agency is making only 
minor revisions to the SFAR 94 requirements, the airport security 
procedures that were approved by FAA under SFAR 94 for each of the 
Maryland Three Airports will be approved by TSA under this interim 
final rule.
    The interim final rule requires the airport operator to maintain at 
the airport a copy of the airport's TSA-approved security procedures, 
and to permit officials authorized by TSA to inspect the airport, the 
airport's TSA-approved security procedures, and any other documents 
required under the interim final rule. These requirements will help 
increase awareness of, and compliance with, the airport's approved 
security procedures, as well as facilitate the proper administration 
and oversight of the security procedures at each airport. SFAR 94 
contained a similar provision at paragraph 4(a)(7).
    The interim final rule also requires the airport operator to 
maintain at the airport a copy of each FAA NOTAM and rule that affects 
security procedures at the Maryland Three Airports. SFAR 94 did not 
contain this requirement. TSA is adding this requirement to help 
increase pilots' awareness of, and compliance with, the FAA's 
requirements for operating in the FRZ.
    In addition, the interim final rule requires the airport operator 
to appoint an airport employee as the airport security coordinator. The 
airport security coordinator will be responsible for ensuring that the 
airport's security procedures are implemented and followed. The airport 
security coordinator must be approved by TSA. To obtain TSA approval, 
an airport security coordinator is required to undergo the same 
security threat assessment and criminal history records check as pilots 
who are approved to operate to or from a Maryland Three Airport. 
Accordingly, the airport

[[Page 7154]]

security coordinator is required to present to TSA his or her name, 
social security number, date of birth, address, phone number, and 
fingerprints. These requirements, though not contained specifically in 
SFAR 94, were contained in the airport security procedures approved by 
TSA and FAA under SFAR 94.
    The interim final rule imposes on airport security coordinators who 
are approved by TSA a continuing obligation to meet these requirements. 
If TSA determines that an airport security coordinator poses a threat 
to national or transportation security, or a threat of terrorism, after 
TSA has approved the airport security coordinator, TSA may withdraw its 
approval of the airport security coordinator. In addition, if an 
airport security coordinator is convicted or found not guilty by reason 
of insanity of any of the listed disqualifying crimes after receiving 
TSA approval, the airport security coordinator must report the 
conviction or finding of not guilty by reason of insanity within 24 
hours of the decision. TSA may withdraw its approval of the airport 
security coordinator as a result of the conviction or finding of not 
guilty by reason of insanity.
    TSA intends to issue a form that airport security coordinators can 
use to submit all of this information to TSA.\11\ TSA notes that 
airport security coordinators who were approved under SFAR 94 may 
continue in their capacity as airport security coordinators without 
resubmitting to TSA the information described above.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \11\ This form will be issued in accordance with the 
requirements of the Paperwork Reduction Act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Security Procedures

    To be approved by TSA, an airport's security procedures must meet 
the minimum requirements set forth in the interim final rule. As noted 
above, TSA is making only minor revisions to the minimum requirements 
established in SFAR 94. Therefore, the airport security procedures that 
were approved by FAA under SFAR 94 for each of the Maryland Three 
Airports will be approved by TSA under the interim final rule. TSA 
requests comment on these minimum requirements. The minimum 
requirements are as follows.
    First, as required under SFAR 94 at paragraph 4(a)(1), the interim 
final rule requires an airport's security procedures to contain basic 
airport information, outline the hours of operation, and identify the 
airport security coordinator who is responsible for ensuring that the 
security procedures are implemented and followed. Such information will 
help ensure accountability for compliance with the security procedures 
at each airport. The interim final rule also requires the airport 
security coordinator to present to TSA, in a form and manner acceptable 
to TSA, his or her name, social security number, date of birth, and 
fingerprints, and to successfully complete a TSA terrorist threat 
assessment, including a criminal history records check, that is the 
same as the threat assessment pilots will have to successfully complete 
to be approved to operate to or from any of the Maryland Three 
Airports. Airport security coordinators who were approved under SFAR 94 
will continue to be approved under the interim final rule.
    Second, the interim final rule requires an airport's security 
procedures to contain a current record of the individuals and aircraft 
authorized to operate to or from the airport. This will help ensure 
that only individuals who have been properly vetted by TSA operate 
aircraft to or from the Maryland Three Airports. SFAR 94 contained 
similar provisions at paragraphs 4(a)(2) and (3).
    Third, the interim final rule requires an airport's security 
procedures to contain procedures to monitor the security of aircraft at 
the airport during operational and non-operational hours, and to alert 
aircraft owners and operators, the airport operator, and TSA of 
unsecured aircraft. Such procedures will help prevent aircraft located 
at the airport from being stolen and used for unauthorized purposes. 
SFAR 94 contained this provision at paragraph 4(b)(5).
    Fourth, as required under paragraph 4(b)(6) of SFAR 94, the interim 
final rule requires an airport's security procedures to contain 
procedures to ensure that security awareness procedures are implemented 
and maintained at the airport. Such procedures will help ensure that 
airport employees and pilots operating to and from the airport are 
aware of, and comply with, the security procedures in place at the 
airport, and that they are able to recognize suspicious behavior or 
activity at the airport.
    Fifth, the interim final rule requires an airport's security 
procedures to contain TSA-approved procedures for approving pilots who 
violate the Washington, DC, Metropolitan Area Flight Restricted Zone 
and are forced to land at an airport. For example, if a pilot who was 
not vetted by TSA to take off or land at one of the Maryland Three 
Airports did so, the security procedures would be used to allow the 
pilot to take off from the airport after he or she had been vetted by 
TSA.\12\ The interim final rule requires that the pilot comply with all 
applicable FAA and TSA aircraft operator requirements before he or she 
is permitted by FAA to take off from the airport. Thus, the interim 
final rule requires the airport's security procedures to contain the 
requirements that the pilot would have to satisfy before he or she 
could receive a limited TSA approval. SFAR 94 contained a similar 
provision at paragraph 4(b)(4). That provision required airport 
security procedures to contain airport arrival and departure route 
descriptions, air traffic control clearance procedures, flight plan 
requirements, communications procedures, and procedures for transponder 
use.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \12\ TSA recognizes that a pilot who violates the Flight 
Restricted Zone would not receive TSA approval to operate to or from 
any of the Maryland Three Airports because the pilot would have a 
record of an airspace violation under the interim final rule. 
However, TSA notes that the approval granted under this provision 
would be for a one-time operation for the pilot to take off from the 
airport and leave the Flight Restricted Zone. The approval granted 
under this provision would not allow the pilot to continuously 
operate to or from the Maryland Three Airports.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Finally, the interim final rule requires an airport's security 
procedures to contain any additional procedures necessary to provide 
for the security of aircraft operations to or from the airport. This 
will allow TSA to work with each of the Maryland Three Airports to 
implement any additional security procedures that may be necessary to 
enhance secure aircraft operations at a particular airport, and allow 
TSA to amend an airport's security procedures in response to threat 
information or elevated threat levels. SFAR 94 contained this provision 
at paragraph 4(b)(9).
    TSA notes that it may need to be able to quickly amend a particular 
airport's security procedures in response to threat information, an 
elevation in the threat level, noncompliance with the security 
procedures, or other circumstances. Thus, the interim final rule 
provides that airport security procedures approved by TSA remain in 
effect unless TSA determines that operations at the airport have not 
been conducted in accordance with the approved security procedures, or 
the airport's security procedures must be amended to provide for the 
security of aircraft operations to or from the airport. SFAR 94 
contained a similar provision at paragraph 4(b) providing that an 
airport's security procedures remain in effect unless TSA determines 
that operations at the airport have not been conducted in accordance 
with the security procedures.

[[Page 7155]]

Pilot Requirements

    The interim final rule prohibits a pilot from operating an aircraft 
to or from any of the Maryland Three Airports unless he or she is 
approved by TSA. To receive TSA approval, a pilot must meet the 
following requirements. As with the airport operator requirements, TSA 
is making only minor revisions to requirements that are currently in 
effect under SFAR 94. TSA also notes that pilots who were approved to 
operate to or from any of the Maryland Three Airports under SFAR 94 may 
continue to operate using the PIN issued to them by TSA. Such pilots do 
not have to reapply for TSA approval under the interim final rule.
    First, the interim final rule requires a pilot to present to 
TSA\13\ the following: (1) The pilot's name, social security number, 
date of birth, address, and phone number; (2) the pilot's current and 
valid airman certificate; (2) the pilot's current medical certificate; 
(3) one form of Government issued picture identification of the pilot; 
(4) the pilot's fingerprints, in a form and manner acceptable to TSA; 
and (5) a list containing the make, model, and registration number of 
each aircraft that the pilot intends to operate to or from the airport. 
These requirements will help establish a pilot's identification and 
permit TSA to conduct the required security threat assessment as well 
as check the pilot's FAA record. SFAR 94 contained a similar provision 
at paragraph 3(b)(1).\14\ TSA intends to issue a form that pilots can 
use to submit all of this information to TSA.\15\
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    \13\ The airport security procedures approved by TSA and FAA 
under SFAR 94 required the airport operator to collect this 
information from pilots. TSA intends to continue that collection 
process under the interim final rule. In addition, TSA intends to 
issue a form that pilots can use to submit this information to the 
airport operator, who will submit the form to TSA.
    \14\ Although SFAR 94 did not specifically require pilots to 
submit their name, date of birth, or social security number, the 
airport security procedures approved by TSA and FAA under SFAR 94 
did require pilots to submit that information.
    \15\ This form will be issued in accordance with the 
requirements of the Paperwork Reduction Act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Second, the interim final rule requires pilots to submit their 
fingerprints to TSA in a form and manner acceptable to TSA. Paragraph 
3(b)(2) of SFAR 94 required pilots to successfully complete a 
background check by a law enforcement agency, which could include 
submission of fingerprints and the conduct of a criminal history 
records check. Under SFAR 94, individuals who sought approval to 
operate to or from one of the Maryland Three Airports were required to 
submit their fingerprints at Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport 
(DCA) and pay the appropriate fee to the entity collecting the 
fingerprints as well as a fee to the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI) for processing the fingerprints. TSA did not charge any 
additional fee. TSA intends to continue using this process under the 
interim final rule.
    Third, the interim final rule requires pilots to successfully 
undergo a terrorist threat assessment. This may include a check of 
terrorist watchlists and other databases relevant to determining 
whether a pilot poses a security threat or that confirm a pilot's 
identity. A pilot will not receive TSA approval under this analysis if 
TSA determines or suspects the individual of posing a threat to 
national or transportation security, or a threat of terrorism. The 
interim final rule imposes on pilots who are approved by TSA a 
continuing obligation to meet this requirement. If a pilot who is 
approved to operate to or from any of the Maryland Three Airports is 
determined by TSA to pose a threat to national or transportation 
security, or a threat of terrorism, TSA may withdraw its approval of 
the pilot.
    Fourth, pilots are required to undergo a criminal history records 
check. A pilot may not be approved by TSA if he or she has been 
convicted or found not guilty by reason of insanity, in any 
jurisdiction, during the ten years prior to the date of the pilot's 
request to operate to or from any of the Maryland Three Airports, or 
while authorized to do so, of any crime specified in 49 CFR 1542.209 or 
1572.103. These crimes are: (1) Forgery of certificates, false marking 
of aircraft, and other aircraft registration violation; (2) 
interference with air navigation; (3) improper transportation of a 
hazardous material; (4) aircraft piracy; (5) interference with flight 
crew members or flight attendants; (6) commission of certain crimes 
aboard aircraft in flight; (7) carrying a weapon or explosive aboard 
aircraft; (8) conveying false information or threats; (9) aircraft 
piracy outside the special aircraft jurisdiction of the U.S.; (10) 
lighting violations involving transporting controlled substances; (11) 
unlawful entry into an aircraft or airport area that serves air carrier 
or foreign air carriers contrary to established security requirements; 
(12) destruction of an aircraft or aircraft facility; (13) murder; (14) 
assault with intent to murder; (15) espionage; (16) sedition; (17) 
kidnapping or hostage taking; (18) treason; (19) rape or aggravated 
sexual abuse; (20) unlawful possession, use, sale, distribution, 
manufacture, purchase, receipt, transfer, shipping, transporting, 
import, export, storage of, or dealing in an explosive, explosive 
device, firearm, or other weapon; (21) extortion; (22) armed or felony 
unarmed robbery; (23) distribution of, or intent to distribute, a 
controlled substance; (24) felony arson; (25) a felony involving a 
threat; (26) a felony involving: willful destruction of property; 
importation or manufacture of a controlled substance; burglary; theft; 
dishonesty, fraud, or misrepresentation; possession or distribution of 
stolen property; aggravated assault; bribery; or illegal possession of 
a controlled substance punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of 
more than one year; (27) violence at international airports; (28) a 
crime listed in 18 U.S.C. Chapter 113B--Terrorism, or a State law that 
is comparable; (29) a crime involving a transportation security 
incident; (30) immigration violations; (31) violations of the Racketeer 
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. 1961, et seq., or a 
State law that is comparable; or (32) conspiracy or attempt to commit 
any of these criminal acts.
    With the exception of four of the crimes listed above, these are 
the same crimes that were considered disqualifying under paragraph 
3(b)(4) of SFAR 94. TSA also notes that these crimes are considered 
disqualifying under 49 CFR 1544.229 for TSA security screeners and 
under Sec.  1542.209 for individuals with unescorted access authority 
to a security identification display area (SIDA). TSA understands the 
unique nature of GA and that in many instances those security measures 
in place for commercial aviation would not be appropriate for GA 
facilities. However, the unique nature and security concerns 
surrounding the national capital region require additional security 
enhancements, such as requirements for disqualifying offenses similar 
to those used for individuals with SIDA access, that are more robust 
than those at other GA airports.
    TSA is adding the disqualifying crimes listed in 49 CFR 1572.103. 
In developing that list of crimes, TSA consulted with the Department of 
Justice and Department of Transportation to include those offenses that 
are reasonably indicative of an individual's predisposition to engage 
in violent or deceptive behavior that may be predictive of a security 
threat. TSA notes that there is considerable overlap in the crimes 
listed in 49 CFR 1572.103 and 1542.209. The additional crimes listed in 
49 CFR 1572.103 are the crimes listed above in (28), (29), (30), and 
(31), as well as the addition of the following language to the crimes 
listed in (20): ``explosive device'' and ``purchase,

[[Page 7156]]

receipt, transfer, shipping, transporting, import, export, storage of, 
and dealing in''.
    The listed crimes would be considered grounds for disqualification 
whether civilian or military authorities prosecute them. If a pilot has 
been convicted within the ten years preceding the individual's request 
to operate to or from any of the Maryland Three Airports, the pilot 
will be disqualified.\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \16\ Pilots who were vetted in accordance with the requirements 
of SFAR 94 will not be required to reapply for approval under the 
interim final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The interim final rule also imposes on pilots who are approved by 
TSA a continuing obligation to meet this requirement. If a pilot is 
convicted or found not guilty by reason of insanity of any of the 
listed disqualifying crimes after receiving TSA approval, the pilot 
must report the conviction or finding of not guilty by reason of 
insanity within 24 hours of the decision. TSA may withdraw its approval 
of the pilot as a result of the conviction or finding of not guilty by 
reason of insanity. Paragraph 3(b)(4) of SFAR 94 required that pilots 
not be convicted or found not guilty by reason of insanity of any of 
the disqualifying crimes ``while authorized to operate to or from the 
airport.''
    TSA invites comment from all interested parties concerning this 
list of disqualifying crimes. TSA must balance its responsibility to 
ensure the security of the critical infrastructure and Federal 
government assets in the Washington, DC, Metropolitan Area against the 
knowledge that individuals may participate in criminal acts but 
subsequently become trusted citizens. TSA wishes to minimize the 
adverse impact this interim final rule may have on individuals who have 
committed criminal offenses and served their sentences, without 
compromising the security of the infrastructure and assets in the 
nation's capitol.
    Fifth, a pilot is required to receive a briefing acceptable to FAA 
and TSA that describes procedures for operating to and from the 
airport. These procedures will be contained in the airport's approved 
security procedures. SFAR 94 contained this requirement at paragraph 
3(b)(3). Pilots comply with the requirement by viewing a videotaped 
FAA/TSA briefing. In the near term, TSA intends to continue to use that 
videotape for compliance with the TSA rule. However, in the future TSA 
intends to update that videotape or provide an alternate briefing. This 
requirement will help ensure that individuals are aware of, and comply 
with, the proper procedures for operating to and from the airport, and 
will help prevent inadvertent violations of those procedures.
    Sixth, a pilot is required to undergo a check of his or her FAA 
record for certain violations. A pilot will not receive TSA approval 
if, in TSA's discretion, he or she has a record of a violation of: (1) 
A prohibited area designated under 14 CFR part 73; (2) a flight 
restriction established under 14 CFR 91.141; (3) special security 
instructions issued under 14 CFR 99.7; (4) a restricted area designated 
under 14 CFR part 73; (5) emergency air traffic rules issued under 14 
CFR 91.139; (6) a temporary flight restriction designated under 14 CFR 
91.137, 91.138, or 91.145; or (7) an area designated under 14 CFR 
91.143. In view of the critical need to protect the critical 
infrastructure and national assets in the Washington, DC, Metropolitan 
Area, TSA will not approve pilots who have a record of violating 
restricted airspace.\17\ SFAR 94 contained a similar provision at 
paragraph 3(b)(5).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \17\ TSA will consider only final FAA determinations of a 
violation of restricted airspace, not any pending enforcement 
actions. TSA will consider an FAA determination to be final if the 
matter has been fully and finally adjudicated or the time for filing 
an appeal has expired.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    TSA notes that there may be special circumstances in which TSA may 
approve an individual who has a record of a violation of restricted 
airspace. TSA will review such circumstances on a case-by-case basis.
    The interim final rule imposes upon pilots who are approved by TSA 
a continuing obligation to meet this requirement. If a pilot who is 
approved by TSA to operate to or from the Maryland Three Airports 
commits any of the violations described above, the pilot must notify 
TSA within 24 hours of the violation. TSA, in its discretion, may 
withdraw its approval of the pilot as a result of the violation. TSA 
notes that this obligation is slightly different from the requirement 
for a pilot who is applying for access to the Maryland Three Airports. 
In reviewing a pilot's application for access to the Maryland Three 
Airports, TSA will consider only final FAA determinations of violations 
to be disqualifying. However, if a pilot who has received TSA approval 
to operate to or from the Maryland Three Airports subsequently commits 
any of the violations described above, TSA, in its discretion, may 
withdraw its approval without waiting for a final FAA determination. 
This is necessary to ensure that TSA can immediately withdraw its 
approval of a pilot who commits one or more serious airspace 
violations.
    The interim final rule also requires pilots who have received TSA 
approval to operate to and from the Maryland Three Airports to adhere 
to the following security measures.
    First, the interim final rule requires a pilot to protect from 
unauthorized disclosure any identification information issued by TSA 
for the conduct of operations to or from the airport. SFAR 94 contained 
a similar provision at paragraph 3(b)(7). Under SFAR 94, TSA would 
issue a personal identification number (PIN) to each individual 
approved to operate to or from any of the Maryland Three Airports. TSA 
will continue to do so under this interim final rule. This requirement 
will help allow for the ready identification of individuals who have 
met the background check requirements and been approved for operations 
to or from any of the Maryland Three Airports.
    Second, the interim final rule requires a pilot to secure the 
aircraft after returning to the airport from any flight. This 
requirement will help prevent aircraft from being stolen and used for 
terrorist and other criminal purposes. SFAR 94 contained this provision 
at paragraph 3(b)(14).
    Finally, a pilot is required to comply with any other requirements 
for operating to or from the airport specified by the FAA or TSA. For 
example, in the event the national threat level is elevated to Orange, 
TSA may coordinate with local law enforcement officers to positively 
identify a pilot operating from one of the Maryland Three Airports by 
checking his or her identification or pilot's certificate before 
permitting the individual to take off. SFAR 94 contained a similar 
provision at paragraphs 3(b)(15) and (16).
    The interim final rule allows a pilot who is approved by TSA to 
operate an aircraft to or from one of the Maryland Three Airports to 
operate an aircraft to any of the Maryland Three Airports, provided 
that the pilot: (1) Files an IFR or VFR flight plan with Leesburg 
Automated Flight Service Station; (2) obtains an ATC clearance with a 
discrete transponder code; and (3) follows any arrival/departure 
procedures required by the FAA. This was also permitted under SFAR 94.
    TSA notes that under SFAR 94 and NOTAM 3/0853, only pilots and 
aircraft that were based at one of the Maryland Three Airports were 
permitted to operate to or from the Maryland Three Airports. Transient 
aircraft were not permitted to operate to or from any of the Maryland 
Three Airports. Based on comments to SFAR 94, TSA has determined that 
this restriction may be

[[Page 7157]]

relaxed without degrading security. Therefore, under the interim final 
rule, TSA may approve transient aircraft to operate to or from any of 
the Maryland Three Airports if the pilot complies with all of the 
requirements described above, including submitting his or her 
fingerprints at DCA and successfully completing the TSA security threat 
assessment and terrorist threat analysis.
    The interim final rule permits U.S. armed forces, law enforcement, 
and aeromedical services aircraft to operate to or from any of the 
Maryland Three Airports, provided that the pilot operating the aircraft 
complies with any procedures specified by FAA or TSA. These 
requirements include complying with the ATC procedures and aircraft 
equipment requirements specified in applicable FAA regulations, and 
complying with any other requirements for operating to or from the 
airport specified by TSA or FAA.
    Below is a table comparing the requirements contained in SFAR 94 
with the requirements in this interim final rule and the requirements 
that remain in NOTAM 3/0853 or may be included in any NOTAM or rule 
that the FAA issues to replace NOTAM 3/0853. As noted above, the 
requirements in this interim final rule are intended to replace the 
security requirements in SFAR 94, which will expire on February 13, 
2005. The requirements in NOTAM 3/0853 will remain in effect until the 
FAA removes them or replaces them with another NOTAM or a rule.

                      Airport Operator Requirements
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                TSA interim final
           SFAR 94                    rule              NOTAM 3/0853
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Identify and provide contact  Appoint an airport    ....................
 information for the manager   employee as the
 responsible for ensuring      airport security
 that security procedures      coordinator and
 are implemented and           provide contact
 maintained. 4(a)(1).          information for him
                               or her. Sec.
                               1562.3(a)(1) and
                               (c)(1).
Identify aircraft eligible    Maintain a current    ....................
 to be authorized for          record of the
 operations to or from the     individuals and
 airport, and maintain a       aircraft authorized
 current record of those       to operate to or
 persons authorized to         from the airport.
 conduct operations to or      Sec.   1562.3(c)(2).
 from the airport and the
 aircraft in which the
 person is authorized to
 conduct those operations.
 4(a)(2) and (3).
Maintain airport arrival and  Maintain procedures   ....................
 departure route               for limited
 descriptions, air traffic     approval of pilots
 control clearance             who violate the
 procedures, communications    Washington, DC,
 procedures, and procedures    Metropolitan Area
 for transponder use.          Flight Restricted
 4(a)(4).                      Zone and are forced
                               to land at the
                               airport. Sec.
                               1562.3(c)(5).
Maintain procedures to        Maintain procedures   ....................
 monitor the security of       to monitor the
 aircraft at the airport       security of
 during operational and non-   aircraft at the
 operational hours and to      airport during
 alert aircraft owners and     operational and non-
 operators, airport            operational hours
 operators, and the FAA of     and to alert the
 unsecured aircraft. 4(a)(5).  aircraft owner(s)
                               and operator(s),
                               the airport
                               operator, and TSA
                               of unsecured
                               aircraft. Sec.
                               1562.3(c)(3).
Maintain procedures to        Implement and         ....................
 ensure that security          maintain security
 awareness procedures are      awareness
 implemented and maintained    procedures at the
 at the airport. 4(a)(6).      airport. Sec.
                               1562.3(c)(4).
Ensure that a copy of the     Maintain at the       ....................
 approved security             airport a copy of
 procedures is maintained at   the airport's TSA-
 the airport and can be made   approved security
 available for inspection      procedures and
 upon FAA request, and         permit officials
 provide FAA with the means    authorized by TSA
 necessary to make any         to inspect the
 inspection to determine       security
 compliance with the           procedures. Sec.
 approved security             1562.3(a)(3) and
 procedures. 4(a)(7) and (8).  (5).
Maintain any additional       Maintain any          ....................
 procedures necessary to       additional
 provide for the security of   procedures required
 aircraft operations to or     by TSA to provide
 from the airport. 4(a)(9).    for the security of
                               aircraft operations
                               to or from the
                               airport. Sec.
                               1562.3(c)(6).
------------------------------------------------------------------------


                           Pilot Requirements
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                TSA interim final
           SFAR 94                    rule              NOTAM 3/0853
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Prior to obtaining            To obtain TSA         ....................
 authorization to operate to   approval to operate
 or from the airport,          to or from the
 present to FAA: (1) Current   airport, present to
 and valid airman              TSA: (1) Name; (2)
 certificate; (2) current      social security
 medical certificate; (3)      number; (3) date of
 one form of Government        birth; (4) address;
 issued picture                (5) phone number;
 identification; and (4) the   (6) current and
 make, model, and              valid airman
 registration number of each   certificate or
 aircraft the pilot intends    student pilot
 to operate to or from the     certificate; (7)
 airport. 3(b)(1). Note that   current medical
 the airport security          certificate; (8)
 procedures approved by TSA    one form of
 and FAA under SFAR 94         Government issued
 required pilots to submit     picture
 to FAA their: name, social    identification; (9)
 security number, date of      the make, model,
 birth, address, phone         and registration
 number, and fingerprints.     number of each
                               aircraft the pilot
                               intends to operate
                               to or from the
                               airport; and (10)
                               fingerprints. Sec.
                                1562.3(e)(1).

[[Page 7158]]

 
Successfully complete a       Successfully          ....................
 background check by a law     complete a TSA
 enforcement agency, which     terrorist threat
 may include submission of     assessment and a
 fingerprints and the          criminal history
 conduct of a criminal         records check. Sec.
 history records check.          1562.3(e)(2) and
 3(b)(2).                      (4).
Attend a briefing acceptable  Receive a briefing    ....................
 to FAA that describes         acceptable to TSA
 procedures for operating to   and FAA that
 or from the airport.          describes
 3(b)(3).                      procedures for
                               operating to or
                               from the airport.
                               Sec.   1562.3(e)(3).
Not have been convicted or    Not have been         ....................
 found not guilty by reason    convicted or found
 of insanity, in any           not guilty by
 jurisdiction, during the 10   reason of insanity,
 years prior to being          in any
 authorized to operate to or   jurisdiction,
 from the airport, or while    during the 10 years
 authorized to operate to or   prior to applying
 from the airport, of those    for authorization
 crimes specified in 14 CFR    to operate to or
 108.229(d). 3(b)(4).          from the airport,
                               or while authorized
                               to operate to or
                               from the airport,
                               of any crime
                               specified in 49 CFR
                               1542.209 or
                               1572.103. Sec.
                               1562.3(e)(4).
Not have a record on file     Not have a record on  ....................
 with the FAA of: (1) a        file with the FAA
 violation of a prohibited     of a violation of:
 area designated under 14      a prohibited area
 CFR part 73, a flight         designated under 14
 restriction established       CFR part 73; a
 under 14 CFR 91.141, or       flight restriction
 special security              established under
 instructions issued under     14 CFR 91.141;
 14 CFR 99.7; or more than     specia