Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Conditions for Coverage for Organ Procurement Organizations (OPOs), 6086-6137 [05-1695]
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Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 23 / Friday, February 4, 2005 / Proposed Rules
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid
Services
42 CFR Parts 413, 441, 486 and 498
[CMS–3064–P]
RIN: 0938–AK81
Medicare and Medicaid Programs;
Conditions for Coverage for Organ
Procurement Organizations (OPOs)
Centers for Medicare &
Medicaid Services (CMS), HHS.
ACTION: Proposed rule.
AGENCY:
SUMMARY: This proposed rule would
establish new conditions for coverage
for organ procurement organizations
(OPOs), including multiple new
outcome and process performance
measures based on donor potential and
other related factors in each service area
of qualified OPOs. We are proposing
new standards with the goal of
improving OPO performance and
increasing organ donation.
DATES: We will consider comments if
we receive them at the appropriate
address, as provided below, no later
than 5 p.m. on April 5, 2005.
ADDRESSES: In commenting, please refer
to file code CMS–3064–P. Because of
staff and resource limitations, we cannot
accept comments by facsimile (FAX)
transmission.
You may submit comments in one of
three ways (no duplicates please):
You may submit comments in one of
three ways (no duplicates, please):
1. Electronically. You may submit
electronic comments on specific issues
in this regulation to https://
www.cms.hhs.gov/regulations/
ecomments. (Attachments should be in
Microsoft Word, WordPerfect, or Excel;
however, we prefer Microsoft Word.)
2. By mail. You may mail written
comments (one original and two copies)
to the following address ONLY: Centers
for Medicare & Medicaid Services,
Department of Health and Human
Services, Attention: CMS–3064–P, P.O.
Box 8015, Baltimore, MD 21244–8015.
Please allow sufficient time for mailed
comments to be received before the
close of the comment period.
3. By hand or courier. If you prefer,
you may deliver (by hand or courier)
your written comments (one original
and two copies) before the close of the
comment period to one of the following
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comments to the Baltimore address,
please call telephone number (410) 786–
9994 in advance to schedule your
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arrival with one of our staff members.
Room 445–G, Hubert H. Humphrey
Building, 200 Independence Avenue,
SW., Washington, DC 20201; or 7500
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(Because access to the interior of the
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your comments to the addresses
provided at the end of the ‘‘Collection
of Information Requirements’’ section in
this document.
For information on viewing public
comments, see the beginning of the
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Marcia Newton, (410) 786–5265. Diane
Corning, (410) 786–8486.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Submitting Comments: We welcome
comments from the public on all issues
set forth in this rule to assist us in fully
considering issues and developing
policies. You can assist us by
referencing the file code CMS–3064–P
and the specific ‘‘issue identifier’’ that
precedes the section on which you
choose to comment.
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comments received before the close of
the comment period are available for
viewing by the public, including any
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a comment. CMS posts all electronic
comments received before the close of
the comment period on its public Web
site as soon as possible after they have
been received. Hard copy comments
received timely will be available for
public inspection as they are received,
generally beginning approximately 3
weeks after publication of a document,
at the headquarters of the Centers for
Medicare & Medicaid Services, 7500
Security Boulevard, Baltimore,
Maryland 21244, Monday through
Friday of each week from 8:30 a.m. to
4 p.m. To schedule an appointment to
view public comments, phone 1–800–
743–3951.
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I. Background
A. Key Statutory Provisions
The Organ Procurement Organization
Certification Act of 2000 (section 701 of
Pub. L. 106–505) and section 219 of the
Conference Report accompanying the
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2001
(Pub. L. 106–554) contain identical
provisions that amended section
371(b)(1) of the Public Health Service
(PHS) Act (42 U.S.C. 273(b)(1)). The
legislation directs the Secretary to
establish regulations that include four
major requirements. These are to:
1. Increase the re-certification cycle
for OPOs from 2 to at least 4 years.
2. Establish outcome and process
performance measures based on
empirical evidence, obtained through
reasonable efforts, of organ donor
potential and other related factors in
each service area of qualified OPOs.
3. Establish multiple outcome
measures.
4. Establish a process for OPOs to
appeal a de-certification on substantive
and procedural grounds.
The re-certification cycle was
increased from 2 years to 4 years
through an interim final rule with
comment (December 28, 2001, 66 FR
67109), ‘‘Emergency Re-certification for
Coverage for Organ Procurement
Organizations (OPOs).’’ The interim
final rule re-certified all 59 OPOs until
December 31, 2005 and extended their
agreements with us until July 31, 2006.
Thus, the re-certification cycle set forth
in the interim final rule satisfies the first
of the new criteria (that is, certification
not more frequently than once every 4
years.) Our proposed rule addresses the
remaining three requirements.
Section 1138 of the Social Security
Act (the Act) (42 U.S.C. 1320b–8)
provides the statutory qualifications and
requirements that an OPO must meet in
order for organ procurement costs to be
reimbursed in hospitals and critical
access hospitals under the Medicare or
Medicaid programs. Section 1138(b) of
the Act also specifies that an OPO must
operate under a grant made under
section 371(a) of the PHS Act or must
be certified or re-certified by the
Secretary as meeting the standards to be
a qualified OPO. Under these
authorities, we previously established
conditions for coverage for OPOs at 42
CFR 486.301, et seq. (May 2, 1996, 61
FR 19722).
Section 1102 of the Act gives the
Secretary of Health and Human Services
the authority to make and publish such
rules and regulations as may be
necessary to the efficient administration
of the functions with which he is
charged under the Act. This section of
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the Act gives the Secretary broad
authority to establish requirements for
OPOs that are necessary for the efficient
administration of the Medicare program.
B. Why We Are Proposing New OPO
Regulations
OPOs are government contractors that
play a crucial role in ensuring that
scarce transplantable human organs are
provided to seriously ill patients
suffering from end-stage organ failure.
OPOs are responsible for identifying
potential organ donors, informing
families about their donation options,
obtaining consent to donation, screening
potential donors for infectious disease,
clinically managing potential organ
donors to maintain viability of their
organs, placing the maximum number of
organs possible with transplant centers,
arranging for recovery, testing, and
tissue typing of organs, and packaging
and transporting organs to transplant
hospitals. Clearly, OPO performance is
one of the most critical elements of the
nation’s organ transplantation system.
An OPO that is effective in procuring
organs and delivering them safely to
transplant centers will save more lives
than an ineffective OPO. Therefore,
under the broad authority in the statute,
the Secretary has established
performance standards for OPOs so that
they excel in their critical mission.
The need for organ donors is acute
and growing rapidly. While medical
advances have made transplantation a
viable treatment option for many
patients suffering from end-stage organ
failure, the supply of organs has not
kept pace with the number of patients
who need them. Since 1996 when the
current OPO regulations went into effect
through the end of 2002, the number of
patients waiting for organs increased by
nearly 60 percent to more than 80,792,
while the number of deceased donors
grew by only 14 percent. As of June 23,
2003, there were 82,049 patients waiting
for a transplant.
Various studies, including those by
the Harvard School of Public Health, the
Partnership for Organ Donation, and the
Association of Organ Procurement
Organizations (AOPO), have estimated
that approximately 10,500 to 22,000
deaths occurring in the United States
every year could yield suitable donor
organs. (C Christiansen, S Gortmaker, J
William, et al: A Method for Estimating
Solid Organ Donor Potential by Organ
Procurement Region, American Journal
of Public Health, Vol. 88, No. 22,
November, 1998. E Sheey, S Conrad, L
Brigham, et al: Estimating the Number
of Potential Organ Donors in the United
States, The New England Journal of
Medicine, 349:667–74, August 14, 2003.
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E Guadagnoli, C Christiansen, C
Beasley, Potential Organ-Donor Supply
and Efficiency of Organ Procurement
Organizations, Health Care Financing
Review, Vol. 24, No. 24, Summer 2003.)
However, there were only 6,182
deceased donors in 2002 and only
18,244 transplants resulting from those
donations. Based on these estimates,
OPOs are recovering organs from, at
most, only a little more than half the
number of potential donors per year.
The study published in The New
England Journal of Medicine found that
of all potential organ donors reported in
the study, only 42 percent became
donors. Of those families who were
asked to donate, only 39 percent agreed,
and 16 percent of families were never
asked whether they would agree to
donation. The study published in the
Health Care Financing Review found
that of all potential organ donors
reported in the study, only 35 percent
became donors.
Over the years, many research studies
have analyzed factors that impact
donation rates, including health
professionals’ attitudes toward
donation, the setting in which requests
for donation are made, and medical
examiner prohibitions on donation.
Recently, researchers have increasingly
turned their attention to the best
practices of OPOs whose service areas
have high donation rates.
In April 2003, the Health Resources
and Services Administration (HRSA)
began an ongoing ‘‘Organ Donation
Breakthrough Collaborative’’ to bring
best practices in organ donation to
OPOs and hospitals, particularly to
hospitals identified as having the
greatest number of potential donors.
More than three-quarters of the 59 OPOs
are participating in the Collaborative. By
studying the practices of six of the bestperforming OPOs, the Collaborative’s
researchers have already identified
several best practices for OPOs, as well
as strategies for implementing them.
Many of the best practices and
associated strategies are discussed
throughout this preamble to provide
guidance for OPOs in implementing the
requirements of the proposed rule.
Our proposals would fundamentally
change the existing OPO regulations to
emphasize quality and continuous
quality improvement. The changes
would ensure that each OPO utilizes
best practices to improve its efficiency,
effectiveness, and quality. While the
requirements in the proposed rule apply
to all OPOs, we have specifically
targeted the requirements toward OPOs
that may not understand the value of
incorporating best practices into the
structure of their organizations. Thus,
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our overall goal is to improve the
functioning of poor performing OPOs,
rather than simply to terminate them.
In April 2001, the Department of
Health and Human Services (the
Department) launched ‘‘The Secretary’s
Donation Initiative,’’ a multi-pronged
effort to increase all types of donation—
blood, marrow, tissue, and organ. In his
speech launching the Initiative, the
Secretary noted, ‘‘The facts are just
astounding. Someone dies every 96
minutes because there aren’t enough
organs to go around.’’ The five initial
key elements of the Initiative were the
Workplace Partnership for Life, a new
model donor card, a national forum on
donor registries, a national gift of life
medal, and a drivers’ education
donation curriculum. The Department
promised that it would launch
additional elements under the Initiative
in the future. The Organ Donation
Breakthrough Collaborative is the sixth
key element of the Secretary’s Initiative.
The Secretary believes promulgation of
the multiple outcome and process
performance measures in this rule will
improve OPO performance and, as a
result, increase organ donation and
transplantation in the United States.
B. Overview of Key Proposed Provisions
1. Appeals and Competition Processes
In the congressional findings
associated with section 219 of the
Conference Report accompanying the
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2001
(42 U.S.C. 219(a)(2)) Congress found
that the process for OPO re-certification
created a level of uncertainty among
OPOs that interfered with their
effectiveness in increasing organ
donation. Therefore, Congress directed
the Secretary to develop a process for
OPOs to appeal a de-certification on
substantive and procedural grounds.
(See section 219(c)(3) codified at 42
U.S.C. 273(b)(1)(D)(ii)(iv).) Under this
authority, we are proposing a
streamlined appeals process, in which
an OPO facing de-certification could
appeal and receive a decision on its
appeal before its service area is opened
for competition from other OPOs. (See
proposed § 486.314.)
To further reduce the level of
uncertainty identified by Congress, we
propose making certain changes in the
current re-certification process.
Although we would open every OPO’s
service area for competition at the end
of every re-certification cycle as under
the current regulations, we would: (1)
Permit OPOs to compete for open areas
only if they met certain specific
objective criteria; (2) allow competition
only for entire service areas; and (3) use
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clear, objective criteria for determining
which OPO would be designated for the
service area (See proposed § 486.316.)
A more extensive discussion of our
proposal for the appeals and
competition processes, as well as a
description of other competition
processes on which we are requesting
comments, can be found in this
preamble under proposed ‘‘General
Requirements.’’
2. Proposed Multiple Outcome
Performance Measures
When we published the current OPO
regulations in 1996, population was the
only measure readily available to assess
donor potential. Therefore, we
promulgated regulations that judge an
OPO’s performance based on the
population in its service area (for
example, the number of donors per
million population). Subsequently, we
began to investigate alternative methods
for assessing donor potential in order to
develop new outcome measures based
on the organ donation potential in each
OPO’s service area. This preamble
contains a discussion of our analysis of
these alternative methods, as well as an
explanation of the method we propose—
using potential donor data reported by
OPOs to the Organ Procurement and
Transplantation Network (OPTN) based
on information from hospital referral
calls to OPOs. A discussion of the
proposed multiple outcome measures
can be found in this preamble under
‘‘OPO Outcome Performance Measures.’’
The proposed regulatory text can be
found at § 486.318.
The proposed outcome measures
would address two requirements of the
Organ Procurement Organization
Certification Act of 2000 and section
219 of the Consolidated Appropriations
Act, 2001. The first requirement calls for
promulgation of
‘‘outcome* * *performance measures
that are based on empirical evidence
obtained through reasonable efforts of
organ donor potential and other related
factors in each service area of qualified
organ procurement organizations.’’ The
second requirement calls for the use of
‘‘multiple outcome measures as part of
the certification process.’’
3. Proposed Multiple Process
Performance Measures
In addition to proposing multiple
outcome measures, the Organ
Procurement Organization Certification
Act of 2000 and section 219 of the
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2001
require the Secretary to propose
‘‘process performance measures that are
based on empirical evidence obtained
through reasonable efforts of organ
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donor potential and other related factors
in each service area of qualified organ
procurement organizations.’’ In the
congressional findings associated with
section 219 of the Conference Report
accompanying the Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2001 (Pub. L. 106–
554, 42 U.S.C. 219(a)(6)(B)), Congress
urged us to ‘‘improve the overall
certification process’’ by incorporating
process as well as outcome performance
measures. Congress noted that current
OPO regulations do not permit
consideration of outcome and process
performance measures that ‘‘would
more accurately reflect the relative
capability and performance of each
organ procurement organization.’’
Therefore, we propose to establish
outcome and process performancerelated measures based on factors that
affect an OPO’s ability to provide the
maximum number of healthy organs to
transplant centers. The purpose of these
measures is to improve OPO
performance and increase organ
donation by ensuring that OPOs attain
the highest possible level of
effectiveness and quality. The process
performance measures we propose
would require OPOs to develop
performance protocols, monitor their
own performance continuously, and
make changes to improve the quality of
their organizations.
The proposed new process
performance measures are based on
empirical evidence of organ donor
potential and other related factors in
each OPO service area derived from
three bodies of knowledge: (1) Research
into best practices in organ donation, (2)
information about methods of
maximizing organ donation based on
our work with OPOs, and (3) accepted
standards of practice and quality
improvement strategies used by the
larger health care community.
A review of the literature on best
practices in organ donation provides
empirical evidence that certain
characteristics are common to
successful OPOs. These characteristics
include experienced leadership;
efficient mechanisms for tracking
activity; excellent communication with
transplant hospitals; timely, on-site
response to donor referrals; adequate
experienced staff; data-driven decision
making; in-hospital coordinators; and
targeted hospital development
programs. We have incorporated
findings from the literature into the
proposed process performance
measures. Discussions and citations of
individual studies can be found in this
preamble in ‘‘Organ Procurement
Organization Process Performance
Measures.’’
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Our experience with top-performing
OPOs supports the validity of the
literature on best practices. In 1998, we
developed four ‘‘OPO Coordinator’’
positions in the four CMS Regional
Consortia (Midwest, West, South, and
Northeast). The OPO Coordinator
positions are unique; OPOs are the only
Medicare providers or suppliers that
have our staff assigned to work with
them on an ongoing basis to improve
their quality and outcomes. The
Coordinators sponsor seminars, conduct
conferences and workshops, provide
education for OPO staffs, conduct site
visits, meet with OPO directors and
hospital development staffs, recommend
interventions to increase OPO efficiency
and quality, analyze OPO’s voluntary
quality improvement efforts, and act as
liaisons between OPOs and hospitals
and between OPOs and tissue banks to
resolve problems and promote
cooperation. (We would note that for
ease of use, the term ‘‘tissue bank’’
when used in this preamble and in the
proposed regulations text refers to all
types of tissue banks, including those
that recover only corneas and eyes, and
the word ‘‘tissues’’ refers to all types of
tissues, including corneas and eyes.)
The proposed process performance
measures are based heavily on the
Coordinators’ extensive experience with
all 59 OPOs. The Coordinators’
experience with and knowledge about
OPOs provide much of the empirical
evidence that has enabled us to develop
proposed process performance measures
targeted specifically toward increasing
OPO performance and quality.
As stated earlier, some of the
proposed requirements are based on
other factors such as accepted standards
of practice for all health care
organizations. For example, proposed
§ 486.344 would require OPOs to use
accepted standards of practice for
testing donors to prevent transmission
of the human immunodeficiency virus
(HIV) and other infectious diseases.
Proposed § 486.348 is based on quality
assessment and performance
improvement (QAPI) programs that have
been embraced by the health care
community and that have been shown
to increase quality and outcomes of
care.
Therefore, the process performance
measures we propose would satisfy the
second requirement in the Organ
Procurement Organization Certification
Act of 2000 and section 219 of the
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2001
for the Secretary to propose process
performance measures ‘‘based on
empirical evidence, obtained through
reasonable efforts, of organ donor
potential and other related factors in
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each OPO’s service area.’’ These include
the following proposed requirements for
OPOs:
• Have agreements with hospitals and
critical access hospitals that address
responsibilities in regard to the
requirements for hospitals at § 482.45
and for critical access hospitals at
§ 485.643. (§ 486.322.)
• Maintain sufficient qualified staff
(either from the OPO or under contract
or arrangement) to accomplish a number
of different objectives, including
screening referral calls for donor
potential, assessment of potential
donors for medical suitability,
requesting consent, maintaining donors,
placing organs, overseeing organ
recovery, performing death record
reviews, and conducting QAPI
activities. (§ 486.326.)
• Ensure that organ recovery
personnel are qualified and trained.
(§ 486.326.)
• Provide education, training, and
performance evaluations for OPO staff.
(§ 486.326.)
• Obtain informed consent for organ
and tissue donation. (§ 486.342.)
• Develop and follow protocols for
donor evaluation and management and
organ placement and recovery.
(§ 486.344.)
• Have a medical director who is
responsible for implementation of these
protocols, as well as oversight
management of potential donors.
(§ 486.326.)
• Arrange for screening and testing of
the donor for infectious disease and
testing and tissue typing of organs by a
laboratory certified under the Clinical
Laboratory Improvement Amendments
(CLIA) of 1998. (§ 486.344 and
§ 486.346.)
• Collaborate with transplant
programs and have protocols defining
OPO and transplant hospital roles and
responsibilities for donor evaluation,
donor management, organ recovery, and
organ placement. (§ 486.344.)
• Document recipient information,
including blood type and position on
the wait list, before organ recovery.
(§ 486.344.)
• Develop and follow a protocol for
packaging, labeling, handling, and
shipping organs. (§ 486.346.)
• Establish a comprehensive, datadriven, QAPI program designed to
monitor and evaluate performance of all
donation services. (§ 486.348.)
• Perform death record reviews in
hospitals with level I or level II trauma
centers or 150 or more beds. (§ 486.348.)
In addition, we propose a number of
other requirements based on the
Secretary’s authority under section 1102
of the Act to establish requirements
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necessary for the efficient
administration of the Medicare program.
These requirements generally are related
to (1) administrative matters (because
efficient administration by Medicare
contractors such as OPOs supports
efficient administration of the Medicare
program); (2) OPOs’ relationships with
Medicare donor and transplant
hospitals; and (3) data collection,
management, and reporting (because
OPO data are needed by other Medicare
entities, by other agencies within the
Department, and by us for the
certification of OPOs.) These proposed
requirements include:
• Participation in the Organ
Procurement and Transplantation
Network. (§ 486.320.)
• Designated requestor training for
hospital staffs. (§ 486.322.)
• Legal authority of a governing body
for management and provision of OPO
services and development and
implementation of policies and
procedures for administration of the
OPO, the OPO’s QAPI program, and
services furnished under contract or
arrangement. (§ 486.324.)
• Conflict of interest policies for the
governing body, OPO directors, medical
directors, senior management, and
procurement coordinators. (§ 486.324
and § 486.326.)
• Credentialing records for organ
recovery personnel. (§ 486.326.)
• Hospital-specific organ donation
and transplantation data reported to
Secretary and public. (§ 486.328.)
• Information management, including
donor and transplant recipient
information, data retention, and format
of records. (§ 486.330.)
• A system to allocate donated organs
that is consistent with the rules and
requirements of the OPTN. (§ 486.344.)
• Investigation, analysis, and
reporting of adverse events to us.
(§ 486.348.)
Some of the proposed process
performance measurements have a dual
role in that they both satisfy the
requirements of the Organ Procurement
Organization Certification Act of 2000
and section 219 of the Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2001 and are based
on the Secretary’s authority under
section 1102 of the Act. For example,
the requirement for OPOs to provide
designated requestor training for
hospitals can be linked to the Organ
Procurement Organization Certification
Act of 2000 and section 219 of the
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2001
because the requirement is based on
empirical evidence that shows
improved consent rates when the OPO
and hospital collaborate in requesting
consent. (Note that factors in each
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OPO’s service area, such as the OPO’s
relationship with its hospitals, would
determine whether hospitals would
request, and OPOs would need to
provide, designated requestor training).
This proposed requirement also is
necessary to the effective and efficient
administration of the Medicare and
Medicaid programs because under 42
CFR § 482.45, hospitals must ensure that
individuals who discuss donation with
families of potential organ donors are
trained in a course offered or approved
by the OPO.
Finally, section 1138(b)(1)(A) of the
Act requires an OPO to be a ‘‘qualified’’
OPO as described in section 371(b) of
the PHS Act. A number of the
requirements we propose (for example,
arrangements to cooperate with tissue
banks and membership composition and
authority of OPO boards) are based on
requirements for qualified OPOs under
the PHS Act. (See § 486.322 and
§ 486.324.) Proposed requirements that
relate to the PHS Act are noted in the
broader discussion in this preamble
under ‘‘Proposed Process Performance
Measures and Other Requirements.’’
II. Provisions of the Proposed
Regulations
For the reasons discussed above, we
propose to reorganize and revise 42 CFR
part 486, subpart G. Following is a
discussion of the specific requirements
contained in the proposed conditions.
Proposed General Requirements
Basis and Scope (Proposed § 486.301)
Section 486.301 (Basis and scope)
would remain unchanged from the
existing regulations except that we
would add a reference to § 1102 of the
Act, and we would add the term, ‘‘nonrenewal’’ to § 486.301(b)(3) to clarify
that the scope includes non-renewal of
agreements.
Definitions (Proposed § 486.302)
To reflect organizational changes in
the regulations text, to remove obsolete
material, and to provide further clarity
to the regulations, we propose several
amendments and additions to the
definitions.
We propose amending the definition
for ‘‘certification’’ to mean a Secretarial
determination that an OPO meets (or
has met) the requirements at 42 CFR
486.303 and is eligible for designation if
it meets the additional requirements for
designation.
We propose amending the definition
of ‘‘designation’’ to clarify that
designation is the process of assigning
geographic service areas to OPOs. Once
an OPO is certified and assigned a
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geographic service area, organ
procurement costs of the OPO are
eligible for Medicare and Medicaid
payment under § 1138(b)(1)(F) of the
Act.
We propose amending the definition
of ‘‘entire metropolitan statistical area’’
to state that we do not recognize
consolidated metropolitan statistical
areas (CMSAs) when making service
area determinations.
We propose amending the definition
of ‘‘organ’’ to clarify that the definition
includes multivisceral organs only
when they are transplanted with an
intestine.
We propose eliminating ‘‘potential
donor’’ and replacing it with ‘‘organ
donor potential.’’ The definition of
‘‘potential donor’’ in the current
regulations refers to causes and
conditions of death that are ‘‘generally
acceptable’’ for donation of at least one
solid organ.’’ In our definition for
‘‘organ donor potential,’’ we would
include specific parameters for the
cause and conditions of death that
indicate medical suitability for organ
donation. These parameters are
discussed in this preamble under
‘‘Proposed OPO Outcome Measures,’’
section C3. We are particularly
interested in public comments on this
proposed definition.
We propose replacing ‘‘transplant
center’’ with ‘‘transplant hospital’’ and
have standardized the use of ‘‘transplant
hospital’’ throughout this proposed
regulation. A transplant hospital means
a hospital that furnishes organ
transplants and other medical and
surgical specialty services required for
the care of transplant patients. There
may be one or more types of organ
transplant centers operating within the
same transplant hospital.
Additionally, we propose adding
definitions for ‘‘adverse event,’’
‘‘agreement cycle,’’ ‘‘death record
review,’’ ‘‘de-certification,’’ ‘‘designated
requestor,’’ ‘‘donor,’’ ‘‘donor
document,’’ ‘‘potential donor
denominator,’’ and ‘‘re-certification
cycle.’’
We propose a definition for ‘‘adverse
event’’ because we propose requiring an
OPO to report those events to us so that
we can monitor the OPO’s response to
the adverse event. An adverse event
would mean an untoward, undesirable,
and usually unanticipated event that
causes death or serious injury or the risk
thereof.
We propose definitions for
‘‘agreement cycle’’ and ‘‘re-certification
cycle’’ to clarify the difference between
the two. The 4-year CMS/OPO
agreement cycle runs from August 1
through July 31, unless it is extended
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according to § 486.314. The 4-year recertification cycle is based on the
calendar year.
We have included a proposed
definition for ‘‘death record review’’
because we would require OPOs to
perform death record reviews as part of
their QAPI programs.
We have included a definition for
‘‘de-certification’’ to explain that decertification follows our determination
that an OPO no longer meets one or
more conditions for coverage (including,
the outcome measures at § 486.318 and
the process performance measures and
other requirements) or no longer meets
the requirements for certification or
designation. If an OPO’s agreement with
us is terminated or is not renewed, the
OPO is de-certified.
We propose adding a definition for
‘‘designated requestor’’ to explain the
role of designated requestors in the
donation process. We propose a
definition for ‘‘donor’’ to ensure that
OPOs’’ reporting of donor data is
standardized. (The definition of
‘‘donor’’ is not intended to limit
acceptable donors.)
We are proposing a definition for
‘‘donor document’’ because we would
require OPOs to ensure that, in the
absence of a donor document, the
individual or individuals with
responsibility to make the donation
decision are informed of their option to
donate organs or tissues or to decline to
donate.
We propose adding ‘‘potential donor
denominator’’ to the definitions because
we would use this term for the potential
donor data OPOs would report to the
OPTN. Those data would be used as the
basis for the multiple outcome
measures.
These definitions, as we propose to
add or revise them, are contained in the
regulatory text section at the end of this
document.
Requirements for Certification and
Designation
[If you choose to comment on this
section, please include the caption
‘‘Certification and Designation
Requirements’’ at the beginning of your
comments.]
Requirements for Certification
(Proposed § 486.303)
The current regulations do not make
a clear distinction between the
requirements necessary for certification
and the requirements necessary for
designation, nor do they specify that an
OPO must be certified before it is
designated for a service area. Therefore,
we propose adding a new section to
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specify the requirements an OPO must
meet to be certified.
Following are the proposed
requirements. After each proposed
requirement, we have listed the location
of the requirement in the statute or in
current regulations. To be certified, an
OPO must:
(1) Have received a grant under 42
U.S.C. 273(a).
(2) Be a non-profit entity that is
exempt from Federal income taxation
under § 501 of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986. (See § 486.306(a).)
(3) Have accounting and other fiscal
procedures necessary to assure the fiscal
stability of the organization, including
procedures to obtain payment for
kidneys and non-renal organs provided
to transplant hospitals. (See
§ 486.306(b).)
(4) Have an agreement with the
Secretary to be reimbursed under title
XVIII for the procurement of kidneys.
(See section 371(b)(1)(C) of the PHS
Act.)
(5) Have been re-certified as an OPO
under the Medicare program from
January 1, 2002 through December 31,
2005. (See § 486.301(b)(4).)
(6) Have procedures to obtain
payment for non-renal organs provided
to transplant centers. (See
§ 273(b)(1)(E).)
(7) Agree to enter into an agreement
with any hospital in the OPO’s service
area, including a transplant hospital,
that requests an agreement. (See
486.304(b)(8).)
(8) Meet or have met the conditions
for coverage, including the outcome
measures and the process performance
measures and other requirements. (See
§ 486.314. This section states that an
OPO’s agreement with CMS may be
terminated if the OPO does not meet the
two conditions for coverage in the
current regulations, as well as the
requirements for qualifications for
designation found in § 486.306.)
We propose that these threshold
requirements for certification must be
met before an OPO can be designated,
pursuant to our proposed § 486.304.
Requirements for Designation (Proposed
§ 486.304)
Provisions regarding general
requirements for designation as an OPO
currently found in § 486.304 (‘‘General
requirements’’) and requirements at
§ 486.306 (‘‘Qualifications for
designation as an OPO’’) would be
reorganized. Some requirements found
in current § 486.304 have been moved to
proposed § 486.303. Other requirements
judged to be burdensome or
unnecessary have been removed. For
example, we would no longer require
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OPOs to submit a written application for
designation.
Most requirements in the current
§ 486.306 would be incorporated into
other sections of the proposed rule.
Specifically, requirements for OPO
advisory boards and boards of directors
have been moved to proposed § 486.324
(‘‘Administration and governing body’’).
Requirements for agreements with
hospitals, critical access hospitals, and
tissue banks can be found in proposed
§ 486.322 (Relationships with hospitals,
critical access hospitals, and tissue
banks). Requirements for testing of
donors and organs can be found in both
proposed § 486.344 (Donor evaluation
and management and organ placement
and recovery) and proposed § 486.346
(Organ preparation and transport).
Requirements for data reporting have
been moved to proposed § 486.328
(Reporting of data), and requirements
for protecting privacy of data can be
found in proposed § 486.330
(Information management). Finally,
requirements for professional education
can be found in § 486.326 (Human
resources). Our rationale for these
proposed changes is addressed later in
this preamble in our discussion of the
individual sections.
In addition, we propose requiring
OPOs to file a cost report within 5
months following the end of the fiscal
year, rather than the current 3 months.
This would conform the OPO
regulations to § 413.24(f).
OPO Service Area Size Designation and
Documentation Requirements (Proposed
§ 486.306)
The requirements contained in this
section would be re-designated from the
current § 486.307, and many
requirements would remain unchanged.
We would no longer require OPOs to
provide population data to us since
population would no longer be used as
a basis for OPO certification.
We propose retaining the requirement
that an OPO must procure organs from
an average of at least 24 donors per
calendar year. We believe it is important
to retain this requirement to assure that
each OPO has ‘‘a defined service area of
sufficient size to assure maximum
effectiveness in the procurement and
equitable distribution of organs* * *’’
as Congress intended. (See section
371(b)(1)(F) of the PHS Act.) In
addition, we would change the current
requirement for an average of 24 donors
per calendar year in the 2 years before
the year of re-designation to a
requirement for an average of 24 donors
per calendar year in the 4 years before
the year of re-designation because the
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re-certification cycle has been increased
from 2 years to 4 years.
However, we would no longer permit
exceptions to the 24-donor per year rule,
including the exception for an OPO that
serves an entire state. (See
§ 486.307(d)(2)(ii).) When the current
regulations were published in 1996, the
average OPO recovered 77 donors per
year. Because of a decrease in the
number of OPOs and an increase in the
number of donors recovered
nationwide, the average OPO procured
approximately 100 donors in 2002.
Therefore, we believe that an OPO
procuring fewer than 96 donors in a 4year period is too small to operate
efficiently and effectively.
We propose removing language from
the current regulations that refers to
new entities or organizations becoming
OPOs. Section 371(a) of the PHS Act
provides authority for the Secretary to
make grants to qualified OPOs that are
described in subsection (b). However,
given the provision in (b)(1)(D) added
by the OPO Certification Act of 2000
(‘‘notwithstanding any other provision
of law, has met the requirements of this
section and has been certified or recertified by the Secretary within the
previous 4-year period as meeting the
performance standards to be a qualified
organ procurement organization* * *’’),
it appears impossible for the Secretary
to give a grant to an organization that
was not one of the 59 OPOs that was
certified by the Secretary as meeting the
performance standards in the 4-year
period before January 1, 2000.
Therefore, we propose removing the
language at § 486.307(d)(2)(iv) that
requires an entity to show that it can
procure organs from at least 50 potential
donors per year if it was not previously
designated as an OPO. We also propose
removing references related to
designation of or requirements for
entities or organizations that are not
currently OPOs
Additionally, we would remove
obsolete service area size standards for
periods during 1996 and before. We
would change the current requirement
for submission of information about
acute care hospitals that have an
operating room and the equipment and
personnel to retrieve organs to
submission of information about
hospitals that have both a ventilator and
an operating room, since we propose
requiring OPOs to have agreements with
95 percent of those hospitals. (See
discussion in this preamble of
§ 486.322, Relationships with hospitals,
critical access hospitals, and tissue
banks). Finally, we would increase the
designation period from 2 years to 4
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6091
years to conform the designation period
to the re-certification cycle.
Designation of One OPO for Each
Service Area (Proposed § 486.308)
Requirements for the designation of
one OPO for each service area would be
moved from § 486.316 to proposed
§ 486.308. Many requirements would
remain unchanged. However, we
propose replacing the ‘‘tie-breaker
criteria’’ used to designate an OPO
when two or more OPOs apply for the
same area with new criteria found in
proposed § 486.316 (‘‘Re-certification
and competition processes’’). (See
discussion of proposed § 486.316 in this
preamble for a discussion of the
proposed criteria.)
Changes in Ownership or Service Area
(Proposed § 486.310)
The requirements for an OPO
changing ownership or changing its
service area found in § 486.318 would
be moved to proposed § 486.310. Many
requirements would remain unchanged.
However, we propose requiring certain
additional information if there is a
change in ownership of an OPO. The
OPO would be required to provide
information specific to the board
structure of the new organization to
ensure that all required representatives
are included. In addition, the OPO
would be required to submit operating
budgets, financial information, and
other written documentation we
determine to be necessary for
designation to ensure that the OPO
continues to meet the requirements for
designation.
De-Certification (Proposed § 486.312)
[If you choose to comment on this
section, please include the caption ‘‘Decertification’’ at the beginning of your
comments.]
Many of the requirements contained
in § 486.325 (‘‘Termination of agreement
with CMS’’) would be moved to
proposed § 486.312, but the title of the
section would be changed to ‘‘Decertification,’’ to reflect the fact that if
an OPO’s agreement with us ends
(whether through voluntary or
involuntary termination or non-renewal
of the OPO’s agreement), we would decertify the OPO.
The paragraph titled ‘‘Voluntary
termination’’ would remain
substantially unchanged, but the
paragraph would be renamed ‘‘Decertification due to voluntary
termination of agreement.’’
Additionally, we would add language to
indicate that we would de-certify the
OPO as of the effective date of the
voluntary termination. The paragraph
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titled ‘‘Involuntary termination’’ also
would remain substantially unchanged,
but the paragraph would be renamed
‘‘De-certification due to involuntary
termination of agreement.’’
Additionally, we propose adding
language to indicate that we would decertify the OPO as of the effective date
of the involuntary termination.
We propose adding a paragraph titled,
‘‘De-certification due to non-renewal of
agreement,’’ which states that we will
not renew an OPO’s agreement if the
OPO fails to meet the outcome measures
at § 486.318 based on data from the most
recent re-certification cycle or if the
OPO is no longer designated for the
service area. In that case, we would decertify the OPO as of the ending date of
the agreement. We propose removing
the paragraph titled, ‘‘Appeal right,’’
because we propose a new appeals
process in § 486.314.
In proposed § 486.312(d), we have
retained our general policy of providing
an OPO with at least 90 days notice
before a de-certification would be
effective. However, we propose that in
cases of urgent need, notice of decertification would be given at least
three days before de-certification. We
expect that cases where an OPO would
need to be replaced based on urgent
need would be extremely rare.
Nevertheless, in unusual circumstances,
this expedited time frame may be
necessary to protect the public health.
The notice to the OPO would
specifically state the reason for decertification and the effective date. We
propose changing the title of the
paragraph, ‘‘Effects of termination’’ to
‘‘Effects of de-certification.’’ We propose
retaining the paragraph, ‘‘Public
Notice,’’ but we would add language
that states we would give public notice
of involuntary termination or nonrenewal of agreement in local
newspapers in the OPO’s service area.
Finally, we propose eliminating the
paragraph, ‘‘Reinstatement’’ because our
proposed appeals process sets forth the
process we would use for an OPO
whose de-certification was reversed by
a CMS hearing officer. If a hearing
officer upheld a de-certification, we
would not voluntarily reinstate the decertified OPO. Thus the current
language regarding reinstatement would
no longer be needed.
Appeals (Proposed § 486.314)
[If you choose to comment on this
section, please include the caption
‘‘Appeals’’ at the beginning of your
comments.]
Under existing regulations, an
agreement with an OPO could be
involuntarily terminated for failure to
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meet the conditions for coverage, and
any resulting appeals were governed by
regulations at 42 CFR part 498. If an
OPO failed the outcome performance
standards set forth in 486.310, we decertified the OPO as of August 1 of the
year following the end of the recertification cycle. Although the OPO
was given the right to appeal under part
498, it was not possible to complete the
appeals process prior to expiration of
our agreement with the OPO on August
1. Therefore, we opened the OPO’s
service area to competition from other
OPOs as soon as the OPO was notified
about the de-certification. The existing
time frame generally did not permit a
decision to be made on an appeal prior
to a successor OPO taking over the
service area when the de-certified OPO’s
agreement with us expired on August 1.
In order to resolve this problem, we
propose to make changes to the appeals
process and alter the timing of the
competition. Specifically, we would: (1)
Delay competition until an appeal is
completed; (2) expedite appeals by
using a CMS hearing officer; and (3)
extend an OPO’s agreement beyond
August 1 if necessary.
In the OPO Certification Act of 2000,
Congress specified that we must
propose a process whereby an OPO
could appeal a de-certification on
substantive or procedural grounds. (See
section 273(b)(D)(ii)(IV).) Therefore, we
are proposing a process whereby an
OPO facing de-certification due to
involuntary termination or non-renewal
of its agreement with us would be able
to appeal the de-certification on
substantive or procedural grounds and
receive a decision on its appeal before
its service area was opened for
competition from other OPOs. We
believe the proposed appeals process
would be both fair and expeditious.
An OPO would have 30 calendar days
from the date on the notice of decertification to submit an appeal to a
CMS hearing officer. In the appeal, the
OPO would be given the opportunity to
submit evidence to show why it should
not be decertified. Appeals could be
based on substantive and/or procedural
grounds. Within 2 weeks of receipt of
the OPO’s appeal, the CMS hearing
officer would schedule a hearing. The
hearing officer would issue notice of his
or her decision to the OPO by certified
mail within 2 weeks following the date
of the hearing.
In making an appeal on substantive
grounds, an OPO could submit evidence
of factors that negatively impacted organ
donation in its service area and
prevented it from meeting the outcome
or process performance measures or
other requirements. For example, an
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OPO might have evidence that its ability
to obtain consent from families of
potential donors was adversely affected
by certain demographic factors in its
service area, such as the presence of a
significant number of citizens whose
race, ethnicity, religion, or educational
level may be associated with lower rates
of consent to organ donation. As another
example, an OPO might have evidence
that its ability to recover and transport
organs to transplant centers while they
are still viable for transplantation was
hampered by the remote location of
many of its donor hospitals.
Since most OPOs have some factors in
their service areas that work against
organ donation, the failing OPO would
need to demonstrate not only the
specific factors that affected its ability to
meet the outcome measures but also
what it did to attempt to ameliorate the
factors. For example, if an OPO
provided data to show that it has a high
minority population that historically
has had a lower rate of consent to
donation, the OPO would have to
demonstrate what it did to address the
situation (such as conducting targeted
public education) and whether these
efforts were successful.
Evidence submitted by an OPO about
substantive factors could include, but
would not be limited to, research
studies, demographic studies, data from
the OPO’s QAPI program, and
information on the OPO’s public and
professional education and hospital
development activities.
In making an appeal on procedural
grounds, an OPO could, for example,
provide evidence that incorrect data
were used by us to determine whether
the OPO met the outcome measures.
We propose that if the hearing officer
reversed our determination to de-certify
an OPO in a case involving the
involuntary termination of the OPO’s
agreement, we would not de-certify the
OPO. An OPO that was successful in its
appeal would have a right to compete
for this service area for the next cycle.
If the de-certification determination
was upheld by the hearing officer,
Medicare and Medicaid payment would
not be made for organ procurement
services the OPO furnished on or after
the effective date of de-certification. The
unsuccessful OPO would not be
permitted to compete for the service
area, or any other service area.
As stated earlier, OPOs currently have
the right to appeal a de-certification
under part 498, which sets forth
procedures for providers and suppliers
to appeal decisions that affect
participation in the Medicare program.
Since this proposed rule includes an
appeals process for OPOs that is
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separate from the part 498 process, we
propose that if a hearings officer denied
an OPO’s appeal, the OPO would have
no further administrative appeal rights.
Thus, we propose removing OPOs from
the definition of suppliers found at
§ 498.2.
However, we note that section 901 of
the Medicare Prescription Drug,
Improvement, and Modernization Act
(MMA) defines the term ‘‘supplier’’ to
mean ‘‘unless the context otherwise
requires, a physician or other
practitioner, a facility, or other entity
(other than a provider of services) that
furnishes items or services under this
title [title XVIII].’’ Nevertheless, the
unique nature of OPOs and their special
role in the Medicare program
distinguishes them from other suppliers.
Typically, suppliers furnish medical
items and services directly to Medicare
beneficiaries and obtain direct payment
for Medicare-covered items and services
from a Medicare carrier. A supplier may
furnish one or more of the health care
items included within the definition of
‘‘medical and other health services’’ that
are defined in section 1861(s) of the Act
and are included in the scope of the part
B program. (See section 1832 of the
Act.) Many suppliers do not have a
formal participation agreement with the
Secretary. (See section 1842(h) of the
Act.) In contrast, an OPO is required to
have an agreement with the Secretary.
(See 42 U.S.C 273(b)(1)(C).) Moreover,
many, if not most, organ donors are not
Medicare beneficiaries, and many
organs recovered by OPOs are not
transplanted into Medicare
beneficiaries.
Given this framework, and to ensure
that Medicare pays appropriately for its
share of organ acquisition costs, OPOs
have payment rules and methodologies
that differ from the payment rules and
methodologies used for other suppliers.
(See, for example, 42 CFR § 413.200.)
Among other differences, organ
acquisition costs are not paid directly by
a carrier to an OPO. Instead, the OPO is
paid by the transplant hospital, subject
to later adjustment (see 42 CFR
413.200(c)(iv)), and Medicare pays the
transplant hospital for the organ
acquisition costs. If necessary, Medicare
payment to the OPO is adjusted after it
files its yearly cost report; for example,
if the OPO’s costs to recover organs
exceeded the payments it received for
the organs, Medicare covers the
additional costs, based on the
percentage of organs that were
recovered and transplanted into
Medicare beneficiaries. However, for
purposes of the adjustment, all organs
provided by the OPO to Medicareapproved transplant centers are
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considered to be organs that were
transplanted into Medicare
beneficiaries. Since approximately 64
percent to 74 percent of extra-renal
organ transplant centers and
approximately 100 percent of kidney
transplant centers are Medicare
approved, the Medicare program
reimburses OPOs for their excess costs
for most of the organs they recover.
Thus, the legal relationship between an
OPO and the Medicare program is
different from other ‘‘suppliers’’ and
reflects important statutory differences.
The MMA also requires the Secretary
to establish in regulations a provider
and supplier enrollment process that
includes an appeals process. Section
936 of MMA states that suppliers
‘‘whose application to enroll (or, if
applicable, to renew enrollment) under
this title is denied may have a hearing
and judicial review of such denial under
the procedures that apply under
subsection [1866](h)(1)(A) to a provider
of services that is dissatisfied with a
determination by the Secretary.
Although the appeals process we
propose for OPOs differs from the MMA
appeals process, it specifically
addresses the congressional findings
associated with the OPO Certification
Act of 2000 that the uncertainty of the
current re-certification interferes with
the effectiveness of OPOs in raising the
level of donation. This alternative
appeals process is necessary because
there is a limited time period from the
date that the outcome performance
measure data are available to the date
when the OPO contract cycle ends.
Therefore, to achieve the goals of the
2000 legislation, including providing an
equitable process for appeals, OPO
appeals must be expedited and
completed before a replacement OPO is
named in order to avoid disruption in
organ procurement.
Under our proposed rule, if the
hearing officer upheld a de-certification
determination, we would open the
OPO’s service area for competition from
other OPOs. The de-certified OPO
would not be permitted to compete for
the open area, and in most cases, the decertification would be effective as of the
ending date of the OPO’s agreement
with us.
However, if the appeals process did
not leave sufficient time for us to
conduct a competition process for the
open area and provide for a smooth
transition of the service area to the
successor OPO, we could, at our
discretion, extend the OPO’s agreement
with us for a period of time not to
exceed an additional 60 days.
We believe the appeals process we
propose fully satisfies the statutory
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requirement to provide a process for an
OPO to appeal a de-certification on
substantive and procedural grounds.
Although the process is streamlined to
allow an OPO to receive a decision on
its appeal before the effective date of the
de-certification and before its service
area being opened for competition, it
allows ample time for the OPO to
prepare and present evidence of the
substantive or procedural basis for its
appeal. Furthermore, the process allows
sufficient time for a hearing officer to
consider the evidence and make a fair
decision that affords all of the process
that is due to the OPO, while
safeguarding our ability to remove and
replace an OPO that has not performed
well.
Re-Certification and Competition
Processes (Proposed § 486.316)
[If you choose to comment on this
section, please include the caption ‘‘Recertification and competition’’ at the
beginning of your comments.]
Congress stated in the congressional
findings associated with section 219 of
the Consolidated Appropriations Act,
2001 that the OPO re-certification
process ‘‘created a level of uncertainty
that is interfering with the effectiveness
of organ procurement organizations in
raising the level of donation.’’ Under
existing regulations at § 486.310 and
§ 486.316, the service area of every OPO
was opened for competition at the
conclusion of every re-certification
cycle, regardless of whether the OPO
met the outcome performance standards
for the prior re-certification cycle. Any
OPO that met the performance
standards for the prior re-certification
cycle was eligible to compete for an
open service area or a portion of an
open service area.
Under existing OPO regulations, an
OPO that failed to meet the outcome
measures would lose its service area and
be de-certified. Its service area would be
opened for competition from all OPOs
that met the outcome performance
standards. If no OPO that met the
outcome performance standards was
willing to accept responsibility for the
service area, the OPO that failed the
outcome performance measures would
be re-designated for the service area if
it submitted an acceptable corrective
action plan to us.
Under existing regulations, if more
than one OPO that met the performance
standards wanted to take over the
service area or part of the service area
of another OPO, we used six
‘‘tiebreaker’’ criteria to determine which
OPO should be awarded the service
area. The tiebreakers were: (1) Prior
performance, including the previous
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year’s experience in terms of the
number of organs retrieved and wasted
and the average cost per organ; (2)
actual number of donors compared to
the number of potential donors; (3) the
nature of relationships and degree of
involvement with hospitals in the
organization’s service area; (4) bed
capacity associated with the hospitals
with which the organizations have a
working relationship; (5) willingness
and ability to place organs within the
service area; and (6) proximity of the
organization to the donor hospitals.
As stated earlier in this preamble, we
propose opening every OPO’s service
area for competition at the end of every
re-certification cycle as we did under
the existing regulations. However, we
are proposing certain limitations that we
believe would address the uncertainty
in the re-certification process that was
noted by Congress. The limitations
would ensure that: (1) The process can
be completed expeditiously; (2)
disruptions to service areas will be
minimized; and (3) an OPO may
compete for an open area only if it is
likely to be able to improve organ
donation in the service area.
The proposed competition process
would differ somewhat, depending
upon whether a service area was opened
for competition because the incumbent
OPO was de-certified or because of the
wider competition process taking place
at the end of a re-certification cycle.
First, we would permit OPOs to
compete for open areas only if they met
certain specific objective criteria. These
criteria would vary, depending upon
whether the incumbent OPO was or was
not de-certified. Second, we would
allow competition only for entire
service areas. A service area could be
divided only if the incumbent OPO was
de-certified and no OPO wanted to
accept responsibility for the service
area. In such case, we could, at our
discretion, choose a single OPO to take
over the service area or adjust the
service area boundaries of two
contiguous OPOs to incorporate the
open area. Finally, we are proposing to
use specific clear, objective criteria for
determining which OPO would be
selected for a service area.
The chart below shows how the
process would differ. Following the
chart is a more detailed explanation of
our proposal.
Incumbent OPO
decertified?
Incumbent OPO
permitted to compete?
Can service area
be divided?
Criteria OPOs must meet to compete
for open area
Criteria CMS uses to choose OPO
Yes .........................
No .........................
No ..........................
Yes .......................
Yes, at discretion
of CMS.
No .........................
4 out of 5 outcome performance
measures at or above the mean.
4 out of 5 outcome performance
measures at or above the mean.
Conversion rate (actual donors as a
percentage of potential donors) at
least 15 percentage points higher
than incumbent’s conversion rate.
Acceptable plan to increase organ donation in open area.
Acceptable plan to increase organ donation in open area.
Competition When OPO Has Been DeCertified
We propose that if we notify an OPO
that it will be de-certified because its
agreement will be terminated or will not
be renewed and the OPO does not
appeal within the time frame specified
in § 486.314(a) or the OPO appeals but
the de-certification is upheld (see
§ 486.314(c)), we would open the OPO’s
service area for competition from other
OPOs. An OPO’s service area would not
be opened for competition until the
conclusion of the proposed appeals
process.
Only OPOs that meet 4 out of 5
outcome performance measures at or
above the mean for the preceding recertification cycle would be eligible to
compete for the open service area of a
de-certified OPO. The de-certified OPO
would not be permitted to compete for
its service area, or any other service
area. Competing OPOs would be
permitted to compete only for the entire
service area.
By requiring an OPO to have attained
the mean or greater in 4 out of the 5
outcome performance measures in order
to compete for the open area of a decertified OPO, we would limit
competition to OPOs that have
performed significantly better than the
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failing OPO. That is, the overall
performance of an OPO that meets 4 out
of 5 outcome performance measures at
or above the mean would be, at the
least, approximately 25 percentage
points higher overall than the
performance of an OPO that is decertified because it did not meet 4 out
of 5 outcome performance measures at
75 percent of the mean. We propose
establishing the threshold at 100 percent
of the mean for 4 out of 5 outcome
performance measures because we
believe that an OPO whose performance
is at or above the mean would have the
expertise needed to take over a failing
OPO’s service area and improve organ
donation.
OPOs would be permitted to compete
only for entire service areas. We have
found that permitting competition for
partial service areas provides an
incentive for OPOs to attempt to ‘‘raid’’
portions of neighboring service areas for
purely business reasons, with no regard
to whether the OPO can increase organ
donation in those areas. For example,
an OPO may wish to take over counties
in a neighboring service area where
hospitals demonstrate high conversion
rates, which would improve the
competing OPO’s overall outcome
performance measures but lead to no
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actual increase in organ donation. An
OPO with a tissue bank may want a
section of another OPO’s service area
that has particularly high tissue
donation potential in hopes of
expanding its tissue bank into the area.
Because of the problems created by
allowing competition for partial service
areas, we believe it is critically
important to require OPOs to compete
for entire service areas.
If no OPO applied to compete for the
service area of a de-certified OPO, we
could select a single OPO to take over
the entire open area or adjust the service
area boundaries of two or more
contiguous OPOs to incorporate the
open area. CMS would select an OPO
based on the OPO’s success in meeting
the process performance standards
during the preceding re-certification
cycle
Competition When OPO Has Not Been
De-Certified
We propose that all OPO service areas
would be opened for competition at the
end of every re-certification cycle. Once
we determined that an OPO met the
outcome measures at § 486.318 for the
previous re-certification cycle and was
found to be in compliance with the
process performance measures and
other requirements at §§ 486.320
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through 486.348, CMS would open the
OPO’s service area for competition from
other OPOs.
To compete for open areas, OPOs
would be required to meet certain
criteria based on data from the
preceding re-certification cycle. An OPO
would be required to meet the
following: (1) 4 out of 5 outcome
performance measures at or above the
mean; and (2) a conversion rate of
potential donors to actual donors at
least 15 percentage points higher than
the conversion rate of the OPO currently
designated for the service area. (The
conversion rate is the first of the five
outcome performance measures.) OPOs
would be required to compete for an
entire service area. The incumbent OPO
would be permitted to compete for its
own service area.
To illustrate how this process would
work, we provide the following
example:
OPO A’s service area is opened for
competition. The OPO met 4 out of 5
outcome performance measures at or
above the mean for the preceding recertification cycle. Its conversion rate
was 109 percent of the mean. A survey
of the OPO determined that it met all
process performance measures. Two
OPOs would like to compete for OPO
A’s service area. Both OPOs met 4 out
of 5 outcome performance measures at
or above the mean and both met all
process performance measures. OPO B’s
conversion rate was 117 percent of the
mean, and OPO C’s conversion rate was
125 percent of the mean. OPO C is
permitted to compete for OPO A’s open
area because its conversion rate is 16
percentage points higher than OPO A’s
conversion rate. OPO B is not permitted
to compete for the open service area
because its conversion rate is only 8
percentage points higher than OPO A’s
conversion rate. In selecting an OPO for
the service area, we would consider
each OPO’s success in meeting the
process performance measures during
the prior re-certification cycle, as well
as submission of an acceptable plan to
increase organ donation in the open
service area.
We propose that an acceptable plan
would, at a minimum: (1) Be based on
the competing OPO’s experience in its
own service area; (2) include an analysis
of existing barriers to increasing organ
donation in the open area, both internal
(for example, high staff turnover) and
external (for example, language barriers
due to a high number of recent
immigrants in the OPO’s service area);
and (3) provide a detailed description of
specific activities and interventions for
increasing organ donation in the open
area. An OPO’s plan to increase organ
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donation in the open service area would
be used by us to assist in identifying the
most effective organization to maximize
organ donation in the open area.
Given the constraints imposed by
geography, as well as the variation in
OPO performance, resources, and
ability, we believe the process we
propose would result in the selection of
the OPO or OPOs most likely to improve
organ donation rates in an open area.
As stated earlier in this preamble, we
expect that our proposal would permit
the competition process to be completed
expeditiously. Agreements expire on
July 31 of the year following the end of
the re-certification cycle (for example,
the current re-certification cycle ends
December 31, 2005, and our agreements
with OPOs expire July 31, 2006), giving
us only 7 months to complete the many
steps necessary to re-certify OPOs and
renew their agreements with CMS. To
reduce the uncertainty in the recertification process identified by
Congress, it is important that the
competition process be completed as
quickly as possible so that OPOs know
whether they will retain their service
areas for an additional 4 years.
We expect that the OPTN and SRTR
will need a minimum of 2 months to
finalize the OPO outcome performance
measure data after the close of a recertification cycle on December 31. This
would leave at most 5 months for us to
analyze the data, determine whether
each OPO met or did not meet the
requirements for re-certification, notify
OPOs of their status, open service areas
for competition, provide sufficient
opportunity for OPOs competing for a
service area (including the incumbent
OPO) to develop and submit a plan to
increase organ donation, review plans,
designate an OPO for each service area
that is under competition, notify OPOs
of their status, and conduct transitional
activities, as needed.
We believe that our proposed process
would facilitate the timely completion
of the competition for three reasons: (1)
The process we propose is simple and
straightforward; (2) the requirements we
propose for OPOs to compete for an
open area are unambiguous and,
therefore, unlikely to lead to
misunderstandings that could impede
the process; and (3) the requirements for
competition, as well as the prohibition
against dividing service areas, would act
to limit the number of OPOs permitted
to or interested in competing for open
areas.
We propose opening all OPO service
areas at the end of every re-certification
cycle because we believe that healthy
competition between OPOs can lead to
improvements in quality and outcomes,
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as long as there are strict criteria for
selecting the OPOs that are permitted to
compete for open areas.
We have found that completely
unrestrained competition for OPO
service areas can damage collaborative
relationships, impede sharing of best
practices across OPOs, and, as a result,
degrade OPO quality. As a consequence
of the Breakthrough Collaborative,
OPOs have forged an impressive
number of collaborative relationships.
OPOs are eagerly sharing best practices
and providing assistance to fellow OPOs
in solving problems and reducing
barriers to donation. For the first time,
many OPOs are seeing themselves not
just as individual businesses but as
participants in a widespread campaign
to save lives by increasing organ
donation. We believe it is critical that
the competition process we use to recertify OPOs does not damage these
collaborative relationships. Therefore,
we are requesting comments on the
following competition options.
One option would be a highly
restricted competition process in which
only service areas of OPOs that did not
meet the conditions for coverage (that is,
the outcome performance measures at
§ 486.318 or the process performance
measures and other requirements at
§§ 486.320 through 486.348) would be
opened for competition. Any OPO that
met the conditions for coverage would
be re-certified, re-designated for its
service area, and its agreement with
CMS would be renewed for another 4
years. This competition process would
considerably reduce the uncertainty in
the re-certification process that was
identified by Congress. However, this
process would nearly eliminate
desirable competition that we believe
can create an incentive for OPOs to
perform optimally.
We are soliciting comments on
variations of the proposed limited
competition process for OPOs whose
service areas would be opened for
competition at the end of a recertification cycle (with the exception of
OPOs whose service areas would be
opened due to de-certification). Under
these options, all service areas would be
opened for competition, but the criteria
OPOs would be required to meet to
compete for open areas would differ.
Under alternative one, an OPO would be
permitted to compete for an open area
if its conversion rate was a least 15
percentage points higher than the
conversion rate of the OPO currently
designated for the service area. This
alternative would not require that an
OPO meet a minimum outcome
performance measure standard. It
would allow more OPOs to compete for
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open areas. However, this alternative
would allow OPOs whose performance
is below the mean to compete for open
areas.
Alternative two is a limited
competition process similar to the one
we propose in this proposed rule, except
that a competing OPO would be
required to meet 120 percent of the
mean, rather than 100 percent of the
mean, for 4 out of 5 outcome
performance measures. Under this
alternative, an OPO still would be
required to have a conversion rate at
least 15 percentage points higher than
the conversion rate of the OPO
designated for the service area. It is
likely that very few OPOs would be able
to compete for open areas under this
competition process, but the strict
criteria would ensure that only the very
best OPOs could compete for open
areas.
We believe that the limited
competition process we propose, if
implemented, would encourage healthy
competition that improves OPO quality
and functioning and would lead to
increased organ donation and
transplantation. We are requesting
comments on the proposed and
alternative forms of competition in this
proposed rule. Specifically, we are
requesting comments regarding the
effect of competition on increasing
organ donation, especially in service
areas of poorly-performing OPOs, and
on the collaborative relationship among
OPOs.
Proposed OPO Outcome Measures
[If you choose to comment on this
section, please include the caption
‘‘Outcome Measures’’ at the beginning
of your comments.]
Condition: Outcome Measures
(Proposed § 486.318)
A. Current Outcome Performance
Standards
Currently, five quantitative
performance standards are used in
evaluating OPO performance: number of
donors, kidneys procured, kidneys
transplanted, extra-renal organs
procured, and extra-renal organs
transplanted. Each of these outcome
performance standards is calculated per
million population, and OPOs are
ranked accordingly. An OPO must be at
or above 75 percent of the national
mean for at least 4 out of 5 performance
standards in order to be re-certified.
Congress directed that our new
regulations include multiple outcome
measures that are based on empirical
evidence, obtained through reasonable
efforts, of organ donor potential and
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other related factors in each OPO’s
service area. Many factors can affect the
number of potential donors in a service
area, such as a large elderly population,
a low motor vehicle accident rate, or a
high incidence of the Human
Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired
Immune Deficiency Syndrome (HIV/
AIDS). These factors are likely to reduce
the number of potential organ donors,
whereas factors such as a high homicide
rate or a high motor vehicle accident
rate are likely to increase the number of
potential donors.
B. Evaluation of Alternative Methods for
Determining Organ Donor Potential
In a 1997 report, ‘‘Organ Procurement
Organizations: Alternatives Being
Developed to More Accurately Assess
Performance,’’ the U.S. General
Accounting Office (GAO) explored
options for assessing OPO performance
and recommended that CMS consider
developing new outcome measures
based on the number of potential donors
in an OPO’s service area. The report
discusses the feasibility of replacing
population with: (1) The number of
deaths in an OPO’s service area; (2) the
number of deaths adjusted for age and
cause of death; (3) an estimate of the
number of potential donors in an OPO’s
service area determined by statistical
modeling; or (4) the number of potential
donors determined by death record
reviews.
The GAO report noted that both the
number of deaths and the number of
deaths adjusted for age and cause of
death are a better indicator of the
number of potential donors than
population because they eliminate a
large portion of the population that an
OPO cannot consider for organ
donation. However, the GAO pointed
out that there are significant drawbacks
to using either deaths or deaths adjusted
for age and cause of death, including
lack of timely data and the inability to
identify those deaths suitable for use in
organ donation. For example, although
the National Center for Health Statistics
(NCHS) collects death data from States,
Oklahoma, and Puerto Rico do not
report their deaths, and there is an 18
to 24 month lag in the availability of
death data from the NCHS.
The GAO recommended that CMS
investigate the development of two
different models for estimating the
number of potential donors in an OPO
service area. One of these models was
developed by the Harvard School of
Public Health and the Partnership for
Organ Donation, and the other was
developed under the auspices of the
AOPO. Although death record reviews
are acknowledged to be the ‘‘gold
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standard’’ for estimating the number of
potential organ donors (as long as they
are conducted with a standardized
protocol by uniformly trained
reviewers), they are, as the GAO noted,
relatively labor intensive, time
consuming, and expensive. Therefore,
CMS concurred with GAO’s
recommendation to investigate
alternatives for determining donor
potential.
1. Regression Models for Estimating
Donor Potential
Harvard and the Partnership for Organ
Donation developed their model based
on their 1993 study of 89 hospitals in
3 OPO service areas, using regression
analysis to test hospital characteristics
as predictors of the number of potential
organ donors. Their analysis
demonstrated that four hospital
characteristics used together could be
used to predict organ donation
potential: Number of staffed beds,
trauma center certification, medical
school affiliation, and Medicare casemix index (a measure of the complexity
of cases treated in the hospital). The
model was validated using death record
reviews, and a study was conducted to
verify the accuracy of the death record
reviews (an interrator reliability study).
The results of the study were published
in the ‘‘American Journal of Public
Health’’ in November 1998. (C
Christiansen, S Gortmaker, J William, et
al.: A Method for Estimating Solid
Organ Donor Potential by Organ
Procurement Region, American Journal
of Public Health, Vol. 88, No. 22,
November, 1998.)
Like the Harvard/Partnership model,
the AOPO model was developed using
regression analysis to test the validity of
various hospital characteristics as
predictors of donor potential. The
AOPO model estimates the number of
potential donors based on three factors:
Whether the hospital has neurosurgery
services; whether it has an emergency
room; and whether it is a non-profit or
for-profit entity. AOPO developed its
model based on death record reviews in
hospitals in 16 OPO service areas. (The
study began with 30 OPOs, but 14
furnished incomplete data and their
data were not included in many of the
analyses AOPO used to develop its
model.) An interrator reliability study to
determine the accuracy of the OPOs’
death record reviews has not been
conducted.
In 1999, we contracted with the
Harvard School of Public Health to
apply the Harvard/Partnership model in
all OPOs nationwide. In 2000, after
receiving Harvard’s results, we
compared the number of potential
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donors estimated by the Harvard model
with the number of potential donors
estimated by the AOPO model. (Both
Harvard and AOPO used 1998 data.) We
also compared the number of potential
donors estimated by the two models in
the 16 OPOs included in the AOPO
study with the results from reviews of
1998 death records in those 16 OPOs’
service areas conducted as part of the
AOPO study. (Although AOPO has not
conducted an interrator reliability study
to verify the accuracy of the death
record reviews, for purposes of this
analysis, we assumed AOPO’s death
record reviews accurately estimated the
number of potential donors in each
OPO’s service area during 1998.)
When compared to the number of
potential donors determined by AOPO
through death record reviews, neither
the Harvard model nor the AOPO model
consistently predicted the number of
potential donors in individual OPO
service areas. In AOPO’s study of 16
OPOs, estimates ranged from 18.6
percent lower than the number of
potential donors determined by death
record reviews to an estimate that was
47.7 percent higher than the number of
potential donors determined by death
record reviews. The Harvard model’s
estimates ranged from 14.3 percent
lower to 184 percent higher.
The failure of the two models to
accurately estimate the number of
potential donors may be due to many
factors, including the accuracy (or
inaccuracy) of information about
hospital characteristics obtained by the
researchers from a variety of sources,
such as interviews with hospital staffs
and American Hospital Association
(AHA) data. Additionally, there were
differences in criteria for hospitals’
inclusion in the study between the
original Harvard study and the CMScontracted study, as well as differences
between those studies and the AOPO
study.
However, the primary reason the
models produced such imprecise
estimates is that they are based on
regression analysis. Regression analysis
is a method for estimating the statistical
association between a group of
independent (or predictor) variables and
a dependent (or outcome) variable.
Regression analysis can be used to test
a hypothesis by determining how a
change in one or more of the
independent variables affects the value
of the dependent variable. Both the
Harvard and AOPO researchers tested
the effect of a variety of hospital
characteristics, such as number of full
time equivalent positions (an
independent variable) on the number of
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potential donors in a hospital (the
dependent variable).
The development of a regression
model involves: (1) Initial selection of
variables that are believed to have
predictive potential; (2) collecting and
organizing the data on the chosen
variables; (3) testing the correlation
between the variables; (4) choosing
independent variables with a low degree
of correlation between themselves and a
high degree of correlation with the
dependent variable; and (5) validating
the results against results obtained
through a previously tested method (for
example, through death record reviews).
The objective is to develop a model that
uses the least amount of independent
variables necessary to have the greatest
amount of predictive capability and
which uses data that can be updated
routinely from existing sources, such as
AHA data. However, the model cannot
be used indefinitely without
revalidation to determine whether the
independent variables remain
predictive. Thus, in order to use the
Harvard and AOPO regression models
for certification purposes, they would
have to be revalidated periodically
using death record reviews.
Since they are based on regression
analysis, both models produce an
estimate of potential donors with a
range (plus or minus) within which,
statistically, there is a 95 percent
probability that the true number of
potential donors lies. This range is
called the ‘‘confidence interval.’’ The
range of the confidence interval is
determined as illustrated in the
following example. If the number of
potential donors based on regression
analysis is determined to be 100 and the
confidence interval is 46, the range of
the confidence interval is calculated by
subtracting one half of the confidence
interval from the number of potential
donors (that is, one half of 46 is
subtracted from 100 (100–23=77)) and
adding one half of the confidence
interval to the number of potential
donors (that is, one half of 46 is added
to 100 (100+23=123)). Thus, the range of
the confidence interval in this example
would be between 77 and 123, and one
could be 95 percent certain that the
number of potential donors was
between 77 and 123.
The wider the confidence interval, the
less certainty there is that the model
works well as an estimate of the number
of potential donors in a particular OPO’s
service area. Large intervals generally
occur in OPO service areas with a small
number of estimated potential donors or
a small number of hospitals. In fact,
Harvard has stated it does not believe its
model produced an accurate estimate of
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the number of potential donors in eight
OPO service areas that have only a small
number of hospitals.
As an example, Harvard estimated
that one small OPO had 96 potential
donors in 1998, with a confidence
interval width of 120; that is, one can be
95 percent confident that the actual
number of potential donors was
between 36 and 156. Similarly, AOPO
estimated that a small OPO had 57
potential donors with a confidence
interval width of 82; that is, one can be
95 percent confident that the actual
number of potential donors was
between 16 and 98. Obviously, it would
be problematic to use estimates with
such large confidence intervals for
certifying OPOs.
However, even for large OPOs, the
two models produce ranges that are
unacceptably large for certification
purposes. One of the largest of the 16
OPOs in the AOPO study was estimated
to have 395 potential donors with an
interval width of 93, that is, one can be
95 percent certain that the number of
potential donors was between 349 and
442. Harvard estimated that the same
OPO had 740 potential donors, with an
interval width of 312, that is, one can be
95 percent certain that the number of
potential donors was between 583 and
896.
Overall, the Harvard model estimates
a much larger number of potential
donors than the AOPO model for most
individual OPO service areas. The
Harvard model also estimates a much
larger pool of donors nationwide than
the AOPO model—11,700 to 21,800
potential organ donors annually to
AOPO’s 11,000 to 14,000 potential
donors annually. It is certainly possible
to debate the reasons for the disparities
in estimates between the two models
(both nationwide and in individual
service areas). For example, the Harvard
model was tested and validated in only
3 OPO service areas, whereas the AOPO
model was tested and validated in 16
and, thus, may be more accurate.
However, regardless of the reason for
the difference in estimates of the
number of potential donors between the
two models, the central fact remains
that they are unreliable estimates and,
therefore, unacceptable for OPO
certification purposes.
To demonstrate the effect of using
those estimates to rate an OPO’s
performance, we can look at the large
OPO that was estimated by the AOPO
study to have 395 potential donors and
use a hypothetical example to suppose
that in 1998 the OPO had 180 donors,
or a conversion rate (that is, the number
of donors from whom organs are
recovered for the purpose of
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transplantation as a percentage of the
number of potential donors) of
approximately 46 percent. (The average
conversion rate for the 16 OPOs in the
AOPO study was 50 percent.) If,
however, the OPO’s actual number of
potential donors was at the bottom of
the confidence interval (349), its
conversion rate was actually an aboveaverage 52 percent, but if the actual
number of potential donors was at the
top of the confidence interval (442), its
conversion rate was only 41 percent,
which is well below average.
For smaller OPOs, the effect of the
confidence interval is much greater, and
could result in re-certification of a poor
OPO or de-certification of a good OPO.
For example, if we look at the small
OPO estimated by AOPO to have 57
potential donors (with a confidence
interval between 16 and 98 potential
donors) and use a hypothetical example
to suppose that it had 12 donors, its
conversion rate based on its estimated
potential of 57 donors is an abysmal 21
percent, and the OPO would very likely
be de-certified. If the OPO’s potential
were at the top of the confidence
interval (98 potential donors), the OPO
looks even worse—with a conversion
rate of only 12 percent. However, if the
OPO’s potential were at the bottom of
the confidence interval (16 potential
donors), its conversion rate would be an
impressive 75 percent, and the OPO
would be considered a top performer.
Our analysis of the Harvard and
AOPO data showed that in some cases,
as would be expected, the number of
potential donors as determined by
AOPO’s 1998 death record reviews fell
outside the confidence interval
predicted by both models. Consider the
example of one OPO estimated to have
192 potential donors using the AOPO
model (confidence interval 152–232)
and 197 potential donors using the
Harvard model (confidence interval
135–259). According to AOPO’s death
record reviews, the OPO’s actual
number of potential donors was 130.
Using a hypothetical example, we can
suppose that the OPO had 65 donors in
1998. Thus, its conversion rate based on
the AOPO death record reviews would
have been 50 percent—average
according to the AOPO study of 16
OPOs. However, according to the AOPO
model, the OPO’s conversion rate would
have been only 34 percent; and
according to the Harvard model, its
conversion rate would have been 33
percent. With a threshold for recertification established at 75 percent of
the mean 50 percent conversion rate
(37.5 percent), the OPO could have
faced de-certification.
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2. AOPO Recommendations
The AOPO has long been a champion
of replacing population-based outcome
performance standards with measures
based on the number of potential
donors. The goal of AOPO’s death
record review study was to find an
alternative to population that would be
a reasonably accurate measure of the
number of potential donors. However,
in a series of meetings with us to
discuss the results of its death record
review study, the AOPO did not
recommend using either the AOPO or
the Harvard methodologies to estimate
donor potential in individual OPO
service areas.
Instead, in written proposals to us
dated February 28, 2001 and April 25,
2001, the AOPO recommended outcome
measures based on both population and
the number of potential donors as
determined by death record reviews.
AOPO’s recommended outcome
measures would consist of a two-tiered
system for OPO certification that would
rely on population in the first tier and,
for OPOs that failed the first-tier
measures, the number of potential
donors determined by death record
reviews in the second tier.
The AOPO recommended that we
retain the 5 factors currently used to
measure OPO performance, that is,
donors, kidneys procured, kidneys
transplanted, extra-renal organs
procured, and extra-renal organs
transplanted. They recommended that:
(a) In the first tier, OPOs be screened
using the current population-based
performance standards, that is, OPOs
would have to meet 4 out of the 5
current performance standards at 75
percent of the mean (2 performance
standards at 50 percent of the mean for
OPOs operating exclusively in noncontiguous States or territories) to pass
the first tier; (b) an OPO not meeting the
first-tier outcome measures be required
by us to submit data for all deaths
occurring in hospitals in its service area
with 150 beds or more; (c) OPOs be recertified if their death record review
data indicated a conversion rate of at
least 50 percent of the national mean
conversion rate found in the AOPO
study of 30 OPOs (including the 14
OPOs that furnished incomplete data);
and (d) the national conversion rate be
updated every 4 to 5 years.
C. Outcome Measures
1. Problems With Two-Tier Assessment
AOPO’s recommended two-tier
process relies primarily on populationbased measures. In fact, the first tier is
identical to the existing performance
standards, and few, if any, OPOs would
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be assessed using second-tier measures
based on death record reviews.
AOPO has criticized the current
population-based performance
standards because they fail to take into
account factors that negatively impact
the number of potential donors in an
individual OPO’s service area, such as
high rates of HIV/AIDS and low motor
vehicle accident and homicide rates.
They argue that population-based
measures cause some good OPOs to look
like poor performers. However, the
reverse is also true—factors in some
OPO service areas, such as low rates of
HIV/AIDS and high motor vehicle
accident and homicide rates, may create
a relatively high donor potential,
making OPOs whose actual performance
is below average look like good
performers.
The implications of this are clear. The
two-tier method might prevent decertification of good OPOs by giving
OPOs that may be disadvantaged by
population-based measures an
opportunity to prove they are good
performers by submitting results from
death record reviews. However, the twotier method would not prevent recertification of poorly performing OPOs
that may appear to be good performers
using population-based measures.
In the congressional findings
associated with section 219 of the
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2001
(Pub. L. 106–554), Congress directed the
Secretary to develop measures that
‘‘accurately measure performance
differences among the organ
procurement organizations.’’ We do not
believe a two-tier method with the first
tier based on population is a reliably
accurate methodology for assessing OPO
performance, and we do not believe recertification of OPOs should be based
on an inaccurate methodology.
Furthermore, we believe it is incumbent
upon the agency, as both a prudent
purchaser of health care services and a
guardian of the organ donation system
in the United States, to propose an
accurate measure of OPO performance
‘‘based on empirical evidence, obtained
through reasonable efforts, of organ
donor potential and other related factors
in each service area of qualified organ
procurement organizations,’’ as
Congress clearly intended in 42 U.S.C.
273(b)(1)(D)(ii). Such a measure should
enable the Secretary and the public to
distinguish between good OPOs and
poor OPOs.
In addition to its reliance on
population-based measures in the first
tier, another drawback of the two-tier
process proposed by AOPO is that in
order to use death record review results
in the second tier, we initially would
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need to calculate a national conversion
rate to which OPOs could be compared
and then recalculate the conversion rate
periodically—probably every 4 to 5
years. AOPO has suggested that we
determine the national conversion rate
through a sample of death records from
hospitals throughout the United States.
We believe this process would go far
beyond the ‘‘reasonable effort’’ Congress
envisioned for determining donor
potential.
Furthermore, in order to have the
national conversion rate available to us
shortly after the close of a recertification cycle, a national sample
would have to be calculated well in
advance of the end of the re-certification
cycle to allow us sufficient time to find
a contractor and to allow the contractor
sufficient time to design and conduct a
study and analyze the results. However,
if all OPOs passed the first tier at the
conclusion of the re-certification cycle,
CMS would have no need of the
national conversion rate that it had
obtained. We believe there is a simpler,
more accurate, and more reliable
method of measuring an OPO’s
performance according to its donor
potential.
2. OPTN Data as Alternative Data
Source
We propose eliminating the use of
population-based standards and,
instead, basing outcome measures
entirely on organ donor potential. Organ
donor potential (that is, the number of
potential organ donors) would be
determined by data reported by OPOs to
the OPTN, based primarily on referral
calls the OPOs receive from hospitals.
We believe this system would be
simple, straightforward, and easy for
OPOs and the public to understand.
Furthermore, the OPOs already report
data on organ donor potential to the
OPTN.
OPOs report certain data elements to
the OPTN whenever they query the
OPTN’s system to find a match for a
potential donor, and the OPTN has a
sophisticated system in place to capture
this information electronically. As part
of its efforts to monitor the impact of the
hospital CoP (condition of participation)
for organ, tissue, and eye procurement),
the Health Resources and Services
Administration (HRSA) asked the OPTN
in 2001 to begin collecting additional,
hospital-specific data from OPOs,
including the number of referral calls
OPOs receive from hospitals reporting
deaths and imminent deaths, the
number of referrals meeting organ donor
eligibility criteria (that is, the number of
potential donors), and the number of
consents obtained on referrals meeting
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organ donor eligibility criteria. Data are
reported monthly for deaths occurring
during the previous month. The data are
obtained by the OPOs from referral calls
hospitals and critical access hospitals
are required to make to OPOs by the
hospital CoP (see §§ 482.45 and
485.643) and are supplemented by data
gathered by OPOs onsite at their
hospitals. OPOs began reporting the
data to the OPTN in September 2001.
In the first few months of the data
collection, HRSA and the OPTN found
many instances of incomplete data
reporting by the OPOS, particularly the
number of deaths and imminent deaths.
However, the completeness of these data
is improving. OPOs reported
approximately 900,000 deaths and
imminent deaths in 2002 (a known
undercount), which is not far from the
982,914 inpatient hospital deaths
reported by the National Center for
Health Statistics for 2000. The number
of potential donors reported by OPOs
(termed ‘‘eligible deaths’’ by the OPTN
and SRTR) for 2002 is consistent with
estimates of the annual number of
potential donors made by the organ
donation community. HRSA and the
OPTN continue to work with OPOs to
further improve the database. We expect
that if these data are used for
certification purposes, the completeness
of the data will approach 100 percent.
To assess the accuracy of the data
OPOs are reporting to the OPTN, the
SRTR recently analyzed the ability of
‘‘eligible deaths’’ data to predict the
actual number of donors. They
compared ‘‘eligible deaths,’’ as well as
the number of potential donors
estimated by the Harvard model with
the actual number of donors. The
researchers found ‘‘eligible deaths’’ to
be substantially more predictive of
actual donors. The SRTR noted that
more complete data reporting by OPOS
to the OPTN will improve the reliability
of the data. (‘‘New Methods for
Estimating Total Potential (Organ)
Donors in the U.S.’’ J McGowan, M
Guidinger, R Pietroski, D Gaylin, A Ojo,
et al. Abstract presented at American
Transplantation Congress meeting,
Washington DC, May 30–June 4, 2003.)
3. Standardized Definition of Organ
Donor Potential
Our proposed definition is based on
patient age, cause of death, and comorbid conditions that contraindicate
donation. We would use the following
definition of ‘‘organ donor potential’’:
the number of patients whose age is 70
or less meeting death by neurological
criteria, based on generally accepted
practice parameters for determining
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brain death, who do not have any of the
following clinical indications:
• Tuberculosis.
• Creutzfeldt-Jacob disease or any
other prion-induced disease.
• Viral septicemia.
• Rabies.
• Reactive hepatitis B surface antigen.
• Any retro virus infection.
• Active malignant neoplasms, except
primary central nervous system tumors
and basal cell and squamous cell
carcinomas.
• Aplastic anemia.
• Agranulocytosis.
• Active viral and systemic fungal
infections.
• Gangrene of bowel.
• Extreme prematurity.
• Positive serological or viral culture
findings for HIV.
• Chagas Disease.
Although the upper age limit for
donation continues to rise as OPOs and
transplant programs become
increasingly willing to consider
recovering and transplanting ‘‘expanded
criteria’’ organs, almost all organs come
from donors younger than 70. Therefore,
we propose limiting the definition of
‘‘organ donor potential’’ to donors of age
70 and below. We propose limiting the
definition to include only deaths from
neurological causes (that is, brain death)
rather than including non-heartbeating
donation (also called donation after
cardiac death (DCD)). Although DCD is
becoming more common, it remains the
exception; in 2000, there were only 119
non-heartbeating donors, and in 2001,
there were only 167. We are proposing
rule-out criteria that are generally
accepted by the organ donation and
transplantation community as
precluding organ donation because
these co-morbid conditions render an
individual medically unsuitable for
organ donation. However, we are
specifically requesting public comments
regarding our proposed definition.
We propose using a specific term,
‘‘potential donor denominator,’’ for the
data on organ donor potential OPOs
would report to the OPTN. The
potential donor denominator would
indicate the number of individuals in an
OPO’s service area who meet the criteria
for organ donor potential, as defined by
regulations. The term ‘‘potential donor
denominator’’ would differentiate the
data OPOs would report to the OPTN
from data based on other definitions of
‘‘potential donor’’ or ‘‘organ donor
potential’’ used in the OPO community.
Because definitions vary among
OPOs, the universe of potential donors
we would use for OPO certification
could be different from that used by
some OPOs. For example, an OPO that
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has liberal donor criteria (perhaps
including recovery of non-heartbeating
donors) would consider itself to have a
larger number of potential donors than
the number it reports to the OPTN for
the ‘‘potential donor denominator.’’ In
these instances, OPOs would be able to
exceed 100 percent of the standard.
Conversely, an OPO with conservative
donor criteria would consider itself to
have a smaller number of potential
donors than the number it reports to the
OPTN.
Determining whether organs should
be recovered and transplanted is a
medical decision; therefore, our
proposed definition is not intended to
limit the donors or organs an OPO
recovers for transplantation. We are
aware that many OPOs are successfully
recovering transplantable organs from
donors that do not fall within our
proposed definition.
4. OPTN Data
In outlining the limitations of the
current re-certification process,
Congress noted that outcome and
process performance measures should
be considered that would ‘‘more
accurately reflect the relative capability
and performance of each organ
procurement organization.’’ We believe
that basing multiple outcome measures
on potential donor denominator data
reported to the OPTN, as we propose,
would give us, each OPO, the organ
donation and transplantation
community, and the public a clear
picture of OPO capability and
performance and eliminate possible
inaccuracies and inconsistencies
associated with current populationbased standards.
Using potential donor denominator
data reported to the OPTN would have
additional significant advantages.
Congress required the Secretary to
propose standards based on ‘‘empirical
evidence, obtained through reasonable
efforts’’ of organ donor potential. Thus,
we believe that Congress expected that
the outcome measures data would be
verifiable and that the processes used to
obtain and verify the data would be
practical and sensible.
The SRTR has developed a
methodology that is being used to
validate the data OPOs report to the
OPTN. The methodology is based on
readily available data on hospital bed
size and other factors, as well as
hospital death data obtained from the
National Center for Health Statistics. If
data reported by an OPO appear to be
incorrect, the SRTR performs further
analysis, and the data is corrected if
necessary. We are confident that the use
of this methodology would ensure that
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the data used for OPO certification are
accurate.
OPTN data also would be verified by
hospital surveyors when they review
data on hospital deaths and hospital
death records to verify hospital and
critical access hospital compliance with
the CoPs. In addition, since we propose
requiring OPOs to publish hospitalspecific organ donation data annually
(see proposed § 486.328), hospitals
could verify their own data to ensure
OPOs are reporting data accurately to
the OPTN. Certainly, using OPTN data
would be both sensible and practical
because the OPTN already has a system
in place to collect and verify the data,
and all 59 OPOs have the capability to
report the data electronically.
5. Death Record Reviews as Alternative
Data Source
Because death record reviews are
considered by the OPO community to be
the ‘‘gold standard’’ for estimating the
number of potential donors in a
hospital, we considered proposing
outcome measures based entirely on
data derived from OPOs’ reviews of
hospital death records. GAO gave
serious consideration in its 1997 report
to the use of death record reviews
performed by OPOs to determine the
number of potential donors for OPO
certification. However, there are a
number of disadvantages to basing
certification on death record review
data. In fact, the GAO report noted
drawbacks to using OPO-conducted
death record reviews, including the cost
of the reviews and the challenge of
maintaining consistency in the reviews.
Maintaining consistency in
performing death record reviews for
certification purposes would be
difficult, because we would have to
ensure that all 59 OPOs performed the
reviews in the same manner. This
would require development of a
standardized protocol for the reviews, as
well as ongoing, nationwide training for
OPOs in hospital selection, sampling,
record review, and reporting.
Furthermore, it would be difficult for
many OPOs to complete death record
reviews for the final year of the recertification cycle in time for us to use
the data for re-certification. (Note that
while we propose requiring all OPOs to
perform death record reviews as part of
their QAPI programs (see proposed
§ 486.348), death record reviews
performed by OPOs for their own
purposes would not require
standardization across OPOs because
the reviews would be performed solely
to provide data for quality improvement
for each individual OPO.)
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Therefore, in weighing the two
methods of determining the number of
potential donors (data reported by
hospitals to OPOs and by OPOs to the
OPTN or death record reviews
performed by OPOs), we believe that
using OPTN data most clearly fulfills
Congress’s intention in requiring
promulgation of measures based on
‘‘empirical evidence, obtained through
reasonable efforts.’’ OPTN data would
provide an accurate measure of organ
donor potential and OPO performance,
and using OPTN data would be simple
and straightforward because a system is
already in place to report, capture, and
disseminate the data.
We propose that potential donor
denominator data reported to the OPTN
to be used for OPO re-certification
include data for all deaths that occur in
Medicare and Medicaid participating
hospitals in an OPO’s service area,
unless a hospital has received a waiver
to work with a different OPO. At
present, OPOs are reporting data to the
OPTN within 30 days of the end of the
month in which a death occurred, and
we propose requiring that OPOs
continue to report their data within this
time frame. We believe this provides
adequate time for OPOs to report data,
while ensuring that data will be
available to us when needed for
certification purposes. (This proposal
can be found in the proposed condition
for reporting of data at § 486.328(b).)
To ensure accuracy, OPOs would
need to report the potential donor
denominator data consistently, adhering
strictly to the criteria in the proposed
definition for organ donor potential.
Reporting the data ‘‘consistently’’ means
that if the OPO determined at any time,
from the referral of a patient by a
hospital through recovery and testing of
the patient’s organs, that the patient met
any of the rule-out criteria listed in the
definition, the patient would be
eliminated as a potential donor and
would not be reported to the OPTN
under this regulation. If an OPO
determined through death record
reviews or other means that the
potential donor denominator data it
reported to the OPTN was incorrect, the
OPO would be required to report the
corrected data to the OPTN within 30
days of the end of the month in which
the mistake is identified. (This proposed
requirement can be found in the
proposed condition for information
management at § 486.328(b).)
However, while we propose basing
OPO outcome measures on the number
of potential donors as evidenced by
OPTN data, we are specifically
requesting comments on the feasibility
of basing OPO outcome measures on the
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number of potential donors as
determined by death record reviews.
6. Outcome Performance Standards and
Thresholds
With the exception of OPOs operating
exclusively in non-contiguous U.S.
States, territories, possessions, or
commonwealths, we propose an OPO
certification threshold of 75 percent of
the national mean for 4 out of 5 of the
following outcome measures, averaged
over the 4 calendar years before the year
of re-certification: (1) Donors as a
percentage of the potential donor
denominator; (2) number of kidneys
procured, as a percentage of the
potential donor denominator; (3)
number of kidneys transplanted, as a
percentage of the potential donor
denominator; (4) number of extra-renal
organs procured, as a percentage of the
potential donor denominator; and (5)
number of extra-renal organs
transplanted, as a percentage of the
potential donor denominator.
These five OPO performance factors
are the same as those used in the current
outcome performance standards.
However, the outcome performance
measures we propose would be based
on the organ donor potential in an
OPO’s service area, rather than the
population in the service area. We are
proposing the same performance factors
because they represent the totality of
what an OPO does—from identifying
and managing potential donors through
ensuring delivery of healthy organs to
hospitals for transplantation.
An OPO operating exclusively in noncontiguous States, territories,
possessions, or commonwealths would
be required to meet the following
outcome measures at 50 percent or more
of the national mean, averaged over the
4 calendar years before the year of recertification: (1) Number of kidneys
procured, as a percentage of the
potential donor denominator; and (2)
number of kidneys transplanted, as a
percentage of the potential donor
denominator. As in the current
regulations, OPOs operating in noncontiguous areas would be required to
meet measures only for kidneys
procured and kidneys transplanted
because there are few extra-renal
transplant programs located in noncontiguous areas and because the
permissible cold ischemic time for
extra-renal organs is shorter than that
for kidneys, making shipment of extrarenal organs to the continental U.S. for
transplantation problematic.
We believe all 5 proposed outcome
measures are critical for assessing
performance of OPOs located in the
continental United States because, taken
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together, they reflect the entire spectrum
of the donation process for which those
OPOs are responsible. Furthermore,
although it is true that organs recovered
by an OPO for transplantation
sometimes are discarded (or used for
research instead of transplantation) for
reasons beyond the control of the OPO,
OPOs are responsible for the majority of
functions that determine whether an
organ is transplanted (for example
testing, recovery of the organ,
packaging, and transport). Nevertheless,
since there is some disagreement in the
OPO community on this issue, we are
specifically requesting public comments
on the need for each of the five
measures.
Under current regulations, OPOs
report outcome performance data to us
only for pancreata procured for whole
organ transplantation. However,
legislation enacted on October 25, 2004
(Pub. L. 108–362) which amends section
371 of the PHS Act, requires that
pancreata recovered and used for islet
cell transplantation or for research be
counted for purposes of OPO
certification and re-certification.
Therefore, when compiling outcomes
performance measures data and
utilizing the data for re-certification of
OPOs, we will include pancreata
recovered and used for islet cell
transplantation or for research under the
category of extra-renal organs, along
with pancreata recovered and used for
whole organ transplantation. Also,
because researchers and OPOs have
suggested that we encourage OPOs to
recover other organs for research
purposes, we invite comment on
whether all organs recovered for
research should be included in the
outcome measures.
When the current outcome
performance standards were
established, we deliberately set the
threshold for re-certification at a point
we thought would prevent decertification of good OPOs based on
what may have been imprecise
population-based performance
standards. It would seem logical that
along with adopting more precise
outcome measures, we would raise the
threshold for re-certification. However,
since measures based on a potential
donor denominator have never been
used for OPO certification, we are
somewhat reluctant to propose a change
in the threshold for re-certification that
might result in the de-certification of
many OPOs. Nevertheless, we are
specifically requesting public comment
on the following three issues: (1)
Whether OPOs located in the
continental U.S. should be required to
meet more (or less) than 75 percent of
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6101
the national mean and, if so, the
appropriate percentage threshold; (2)
whether OPOs operating in noncontiguous states or territories should be
required to meet more (or less) than 50
percent of the national mean; and (3)
whether OPOs located in the
continental U.S. should be required to
meet all 5 (instead of just 4) measures.
OPO Process Performance Measures
Condition: Participation in Organ
Procurement and Transplantation
Network (Proposed § 486.320)
Current OPO regulations at § 486.308
require OPOs to be members of and
abide by the rules of the OPTN, and we
propose to retain this requirement.
However, we propose eliminating the
requirement for an OPO to become an
OPTN member before becoming
designated by us because the OPTN
requires an OPO to furnish information
demonstrating designation by us to
become a member of the OPTN. (See 42
CFR 121.3(b)(2).) Therefore, we propose
that only after being designated would
an OPO be required to be a member of
the OPTN. In addition, we propose to
eliminate the requirement that OPOs
have a written agreement with the
OPTN because a written agreement is
not part of the OPTN membership
process.
Condition: Relationships With
Hospitals, Critical Access Hospitals, and
Tissue Banks (Proposed § 486.322)
[If you choose to comment on this
section, please include the caption
‘‘Relationships with hospitals’’ or
‘‘Relationships with tissue banks’’ at the
beginning of your comments as
appropriate.]
Good relationships between OPOs
and organizations involved in the
donation process often result in more
efficient operations, such as shared
referral lines for hospitals to use when
calling about deaths and collaboration
between OPOs and tissue banks in
training hospital designated requestors.
Furthermore, collaboration and
cooperation between donation
organizations promotes a positive public
opinion about donation.
All six OPOs whose practices were
studied for the Organ Donation
Breakthrough Collaborative have strong
collaborative relationships with their
hospitals. Donor Alliance in Colorado
has 6 full-time ‘‘donation consultants,’’
who are liaisons to the 100 hospitals in
the OPO’s service area and provide
professional education and feedback. Inhouse coordinators from LifeGift Organ
Donation Center in Houston meet
regularly with hospital medical staff to
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review organ donation cases. The
University of Wisconsin OPO ‘‘views
hospital staff as an extension of OPO
staff, contributing to the achievement of
OPO goals.’’ Their OPO staff encourage
physicians, nurses, and pastoral care
staff to participate in the donation
process and provide support and
guidance.
Collaboration between OPOs and
hospitals is absolutely critical to the
donation process. Good relationships
encourage cooperation from hospital
staffs in making referrals of potential
donors timely, supporting OPOs in
discussing donation with families (or
acting as designated requestors), and
providing support services for
management of potential donors. We
expect that the requirements we propose
will increase communication and
cooperation between OPOs and the
hospitals in their service areas.
The current regulations at § 486.306(g)
require OPOs to have a working
relationship with at least 75 percent of
the Medicare and Medicaid
participating hospitals in their service
areas that have an operating room and
the equipment and personnel for
retrieving organs. Regulations at
§ 486.304(b)(8) require OPOs to have a
working relationship with any hospital
in the service area, including a
transplant hospital that requests a
working relationship. Furthermore, the
hospital and critical access hospital
CoPs for organ, tissue, and eye
procurement require all Medicare and
Medicaid participating hospitals and
critical access hospitals to have and
implement an agreement with an OPO
designated under part 486 that includes
a protocol for referral of all deaths and
imminent deaths. (See §§ 482.45 and
485.643.)
We considered proposing a rule that
would require an OPO to have an
agreement with every hospital and
critical access hospital in its service area
(unless a hospital had a waiver to work
with a different OPO) to ensure that
OPOs do not overlook a single potential
donor. However, the PHS Act requires
only that an OPO have agreements with
a ‘‘substantial majority’’ of hospitals in
its service area that have facilities for
organ donation.
Therefore, we propose maximizing
the number of hospitals with which
OPOs have agreements (consistent with
the PHS Act) by requiring OPOs to have
agreements with 95 percent of the
hospitals and critical access hospitals in
their service areas that have both a
ventilator and an operating room. (Note:
If a hospital received a waiver from us
to work with another OPO, the hospital
would not be counted as part of the
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OPO’s service area.) Since it is
necessary for a hospital to have a
ventilator to maintain a potential donor
and an operating room for recovery of
organs, we believe a requirement for
OPOs to have agreements with 95
percent of hospitals and critical access
hospitals with a ventilator and an
operating room would capture a
‘‘substantial majority’’ of hospitals with
facilities for organ donation.
Our OPO Coordinators have found
that most OPOs ask their hospitals to
sign a ‘‘generic’’ agreement that does not
address each entity’s role in the
donation process and does not define
key terms, such as ‘‘imminent death’’
and ‘‘timely referral.’’ This lack of
specificity can lead to problems; for
example, disagreement between an OPO
and hospital about their respective roles
in discussing donation with families,
differing viewpoints of OPO staff and
hospital physicians regarding what
constitutes ‘‘imminent death,’’ or
disagreements between an OPO and
hospital about the appropriate timing of
referrals to the OPO. However, the
Coordinators have observed that where
OPOs network with their hospitals to
clearly define roles and responsibilities
for the donation process, referral rates
are higher.
Therefore, to avoid problems, promote
collaboration, and assure that OPOs’
agreements with their hospitals support
the overall goal of maximizing organ
donation and transplantation, we
propose requiring that OPOs’
agreements with hospitals and critical
access hospitals must describe the
responsibilities of both the OPO and the
hospital in regard to the hospital
requirements at §§ 482.45 or 485.643, as
appropriate, (for example, how referrals
will be made and how collaboration in
reviewing death records will occur) and
specify the meaning of the terms,
‘‘timely referral’’ and ‘‘imminent death.’’
One of our proposals for OPOs’
relationships with their hospitals is
based on observations made by the
Office of the Inspector General (OIG) in
its August 2000 report on the hospital
CoP. The OIG noted that although
research shows that collaboration
between OPOs and hospitals in
approaching families about organ
donation yields the highest consent
rates, the OIG found that 23 out of 61
OPOs had not provided any training to
hospital staffs. Only 22 OPOs had
trained designated requestors in more
than 10 percent of the hospitals in their
service areas. (A ‘‘designated requestor’’
under the hospital CoP is an individual
who has been trained in a course offered
or approved by the OPO to discuss
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donation with families of potential
donors. See § 482.45(a)(3).)
The OIG estimated that 70 percent of
hospitals had been offered designated
requestor training by their OPOs;
however, staff in only 44 percent of
hospitals had been trained. The OIG
suggested this could be due to ‘‘a
number of practices that indicate OPO
resistance to training and using hospital
staff as designated requestors.’’ They
noted that some OPOs make it difficult
for hospitals staffs to attend training (for
example, holding training sessions
several hundred miles away from
hospitals), and other OPOs establish
programs that lack the flexibility to
respond to the needs of various types of
hospitals and individuals.
Although CMS intended the
designated requestor requirement in the
hospital CoP to lead to more
collaboration between OPOs and
hospitals and increased hospital
involvement in the donation process,
the OIG commented that the
requirement may have had the opposite
effect. That is, since OPOs are reluctant
to train hospital staffs and to involve
them in the donation process, some
hospitals are allowing OPOs to take over
the entire donation process.
Nevertheless, in some OPO service
areas, the OPO handles most or all
requests for donation, and consent rates
are good. In other areas, hospitals
cannot spare staff to attend designated
requestor training, and the hospital and
critical access hospital CoPs makes it
clear that the hospital, not the OPO, has
the right to decide whether an OPO
representative or a hospital designated
requestor will offer the option of
donation. Based on these facts, we do
not believe it would be advisable to
require every OPO to provide
designated requestor training in every
hospital and critical access hospital in
its service area. Instead, we propose
requiring OPOs to offer designated
requestor training on at least an annual
basis for hospital and critical access
hospital staffs. We propose that training
be offered at least annually because
most hospital staff do not discuss
donation with families frequently
enough to maintain their proficiency
unless they receive periodic training.
We urge OPOs to encourage
designated requestor training so that
hospital staff can support and
collaborate with OPO staff in the
donation process. We applaud the
efforts of OPOs like LifeLine of Ohio
that actively promote designated
requestor training in hospitals. In its
‘‘Quest for Excellence’’ in educating
hospitals, LifeLine made it possible for
staff in those hospitals to earn free
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continuing education credits by
completing designated requestor
training, either in the hospital or via the
Internet. In the University of Wisconsin
OPO service area, hospital staff are the
primary requestors. OPO staff conducts
a designated requestor training program
and ongoing training and case reviews
at hospitals to educate hospital staff
about all aspects of organ donation,
including case management.
Before the CoP, hospitals called tissue
banks about potential tissue donors and
called OPOs about potential organ
donors. However, the hospital CoP at
§ 482.45 and critical access hospital CoP
at § 485.643 require hospitals and
critical access hospitals to refer all
deaths and imminent deaths (rather
than just potential organ donors) to an
OPO. The hospital and critical access
hospital CoPs state that in the absence
of alternative arrangements between a
hospital and a tissue bank, the OPO will
determine suitability for tissue
donation. However, after the hospital
CoP went into effect in August 1998,
very few hospitals were willing to have
‘‘alternative arrangements’’ that would
have required them to call tissues banks
about potential tissue donors in
addition to calling an OPO about every
death. Thus, in most areas of the
country, OPOs became the
‘‘gatekeepers’’ for information about
potential tissue donors. Since many
OPOs are in the tissue banking business,
the OPOs’ gatekeeper position created
some tension between a few OPOs and
the independent tissue banks in their
service areas.
We have received complaints both
from tissue banks and OPOs. Tissue
banks have charged that OPOs fail to
notify them about potential tissue
donors in a timely manner, charge
unreasonable referral fees for notifying
them of potential donors, refuse to allow
tissue banks to participate in designated
requestor training sessions OPOs
provide to hospitals, or refuse to use the
tissue banks’ screening and notification
protocols when referring donors.
For their part, OPOs have complained
that some tissue banks have paid no
referral fees since the hospital CoP went
into effect in August 1998. (We require
OPOs to charge tissue banks for their
costs in making referrals so that the
costs are not passed on to the Medicare
program. (See Medicare Provider
Reimbursement Manual, section
2773.1)) In addition, some OPOs have
charged that tissue banks do not
respond timely to the referrals they
receive, resulting in the loss of viable
tissue. Since donor families and the
public often regard all donation as organ
donation, that loss of donation potential
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in a donor for whom consent has
already been obtained may reflect badly
on the OPO, rather than the tissue bank.
Clearly, difficult relationships
between OPOs and the tissue banks in
their service areas waste valuable time
and energy and distract OPOs from their
mission of maximizing organ donation.
Therefore, based on the Secretary’s
authority under section 1102 of the Act
to establish requirements necessary for
the efficient administration of the
Medicare program, as well as the PHS
Act requirement at section 371(b)(3)(I)
for OPOs to ‘‘cooperate’’ with tissue
banks to ensure all usable tissues are
obtained, we are proposing
requirements to ensure that OPOs
maintain collaborative relationships
with the tissue banks in their service
areas. We believe the requirements we
propose would serve to promote
cooperation on the part of OPOs.
We propose to strengthen the current
requirement for OPOs to cooperate with
tissue banks in the retrieval, processing,
preservation, storage, and distribution of
tissues, as may be appropriate, to ensure
that all usable tissues are obtained from
potential donors. We propose requiring
OPOs to have arrangements with tissue
banks that have agreements with
hospitals and critical access hospitals
with which the OPO has agreements to
cooperate in the following activities, as
may be appropriate, to assure that all
usable tissues are obtained from
potential donors:
(1) Screening and referral of potential
tissue donors;
(2) Obtaining informed consent from
families of potential tissue donors in the
absence of a donor document; and
(3) The retrieval, processing,
preservation, storage, and distribution of
tissues.
An OPO would not be required to
have an arrangement with a tissue bank
unwilling to have an arrangement with
the OPO. In such a situation, we would
not consider the OPO to be out of
compliance with the requirement.
It should be noted here that the goal
of the Secretary’s Donation Initiative is
to increase all types of donation,
including tissue, marrow, and blood
donation. Therefore, although the
purpose of this proposed rule is to
increase organ donation, the Secretary
has an interest in ensuring that OPOs
act responsibly and collaboratively to
further tissue donation in the United
States.
Condition: Administration and
Governing Body (§ 486.324)
[If you choose to comment on this
section, please include the caption
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6103
‘‘Administration and governing body’’ at
the beginning of your comments.]
In the current regulations,
requirements for OPO boards are found
at § 486.306, which lists qualifications
to be designated by us as an OPO. We
propose creating a separate section for
administration and governing body,
which would contain the proposed
requirements for membership
composition and bylaws of OPO boards,
as well as requirements for the
governing body that would have legal
authority and responsibility for the
management and provision of OPO
services.
Section 371(b)(1)(G) of the PHS Act
(42 U.S.C. 273(b)(1)(G)) stipulates that a
qualified OPO must have a board of
directors or an advisory board that is
composed of:
• Members who represent hospital
administrators, intensive care or
emergency room personnel, tissue
banks, and voluntary health associations
in its service area;
• Members who represent the public
residing in such area,
• A physician with knowledge,
experience, or skill in the field of
histocompatibility;
• A physician with knowledge or
skill in the field of neurology; and
• A surgeon from each transplant
center in the OPO’s service area with
which the OPO has arrangements to
coordinate its activities. (The surgeon
must have practicing privileges in the
represented transplant center and
perform organ transplant surgery).
In addition, the PHS Act states the
board has the authority to recommend
policies for the procurement of organs
and other functions (which are
described below) and has no authority
over any other activity of the OPO.
The current regulations at § 486.306(f)
require an OPO to have a board of
directors or an advisory board. An OPO
may have more than one board, but at
least one board must be responsible for
recommending policies relating to the
donation, procurement, and distribution
of organs and include the specific
membership composition required by
the PHS Act. (See section 371(b)(1)(H)
(42 U.S.C 273(b)(1)(H).)
We are proposing a similar
requirement, in that an OPO may have
as many individual boards as it chooses,
but one of its boards must have the
specific membership composition
prescribed by the PHS Act and must
operate under restraints similar to those
prescribed by the PHS Act for that
board. That is, the board would be
limited to recommending policies
relating to the donation, procurement,
and distribution of organs, would serve
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only in an advisory capacity, and could
not also serve as the OPO’s board of
directors. For purposes of discussion in
this preamble, we refer to this board as
an advisory board. To ensure that the
board’s members remain in an advisory
capacity as stipulated by the PHS Act,
we propose that the board’s members
would be prohibited from serving on
any other OPO board. We also would
require OPOs to have bylaws for each of
its boards to address potential conflicts
of interest, length of terms, and criteria
for selection and removal of members.
Note that there appears to be a crossreference problem in the PHS Act
related to the recommendations of the
advisory board. The statute provides
that the advisory board ‘‘has the
authority to recommend policies for the
procurement of organs and other
functions described in (2). (See 42 U.S.C
273(b)(1)(H)(ii).) Currently, section
371(b)(2) is directed to the Secretary and
concerns rulemaking. It does not speak
to policies where an advisory board’s
recommendations would be relevant for
an OPO. We believe it is likely that
Congress intended that the OPO obtain
the recommendations of the advisory
board on the functions that an OPO is
required to perform and that are listed
in section 273(b)(3). We are proposing
that the advisory board make
recommendations to the OPOs on the
subjects discussed in section 273(b)(3)
and that are specifically listed in
proposed § 486.324(b) through (11).
Even if there were not a cross-reference
problem, we would propose that the
advisory board make recommendations
to the OPO on the topics identified in
our proposed rules based on our
authority at 42 U.S.C. 1102. The
expertise of the board would provide a
useful perspective on those issues, and
the advisory board’s recommendations
would likely lead to more efficient and
effective actions by the OPO in
procuring organs, as well as better
coordination with various business
partners.
We propose including in the
condition for administration and
governing body, certain language from
the PHS Act that specifies the types of
policies this advisory board can
recommend. We believe that it is worth
restating these specific provisions, both
because the philosophy behind them is
important and because we do not
believe all OPOs and OPO board
members are aware of them.
The single OPO advisory board whose
membership composition is mandated
by the Act has the authority to
recommend policies for the
procurement of organs and other
functions including: (1) Effective
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agreements to identify potential organ
donors with a substantial majority of
hospitals in its service area that have
facilities for organ donation; (2)
systematic efforts, including
professional education, to acquire all
usable organs from potential donors; (3)
arrangements for the acquisition and
preservation of donated organs and
provision of quality standards for the
acquisition of organs that are consistent
with the standards adopted by the
OPTN, including arranging for testing
with respect to preventing the
acquisition of organs that are infected
with the etiologic agent for acquired
immune deficiency syndrome;
appropriate tissue typing of organs; a
system for allocation of organs among
transplant patients according to
established medical criteria;
transportation of organs to transplant
hospitals; coordination of activities with
transplant hospitals in the OPO’s
service area; participation in the OPTN;
arrangements to cooperate with tissue
banks for the retrieval, processing,
preservation, storage, and distribution of
tissues as may be appropriate to ensure
that all usable tissues are obtained from
potential donors; annual evaluation of
the effectiveness of the OPO in
acquiring organs; and assistance to
hospitals in establishing and
implementing protocols for making
routine inquiries about organ donations
by potential donors. The PHS Act states
that the OPO board ‘‘has no authority
over any other activity of the
organization.’’ (See section
371(b)(1)(H)(iii) of the PHS Act (42
U.S.C. 273(b)(1)(H)(iii).)
It has come to our attention that some
OPO boards with the membership
composition stipulated by the PHS Act
may do more than recommend policies.
This is a matter of concern because
some OPOs have told us that their
boards prevent them from taking steps
to adopt best practices because of the
costs involved (for example, by refusing
to approve the hiring of additional staff
or implementation of protocols to
provide better management of potential
donors). Board members may be
motivated by a desire to keep standard
organ acquisition fees low for the
transplant hospitals in their OPO’s
service area; however, the result may be
that organ donation rates remain low as
well. We would note that some OPOs
have taken steps to address what they
regard as the conflict of interest created
by having a board heavily weighted
with representatives of transplant
centers. For example, New England
Organ Bank (one of the high-performing
OPOs studied in the Organ Donation
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Breakthrough Collaborative) has
balanced the representation on its board
by adding members to its board who
represent other hospitals and
community interests. Donor alliance,
another OPO studied by the
Collaborative, has a 25-member
community-based board that has
‘‘allowed considerable latitude for
innovation and risk-taking.’’
By incorporating this language into
our proposed regulations for OPOs, we
are reminding OPOs and their boards
that under the PHS Act, the OPO board
whose membership composition is
outlined in the PHS Act has specific
limits placed on its authority.
Note that our proposed language
differs from that of the PHS Act in some
respects. Instead of ‘‘a system for
allocating organs according to
established medical criteria’’ we
propose referencing ‘‘a system for
allocating organs according to the rules
and requirements of the OPTN,’’
because the OPTN establishes the
medical criteria used to allocate organs
among transplant patients. (The term
‘‘rules and requirements of the OPTN’’
means those rules and requirements
approved as enforceable by the
Secretary.)
Both the PHS Act and the existing
regulations require an OPO to have a
tissue bank representative on its board.
We propose requiring an OPO to have
on its advisory board a tissue bank
representative from a facility not
affiliated with the OPO, unless the only
tissue bank in the service area is
affiliated with the OPO. (In other words,
if the OPO operates a tissue bank, the
OPO must include an independent
tissue bank on the board that represents
all independent tissue banks in the
OPO’s service area, unless there are no
independent tissue banks in the OPO’s
service area.) These requirements
presume that tissue bank representatives
with these qualifications exist in an
OPO’s service area and would be willing
to serve on the OPO’s advisory board. If
not, the OPO would not be considered
out of compliance with this
requirement.
Because of the ‘‘gatekeeper’’ role of
OPOs in regard to potential tissue
donors, we believe it is important for
OPO boards to include representatives
from tissue banks that are not affiliated
with the OPO (unless, of course, the
OPO has the only tissue bank in the
service area) to ensure that tissue banks
have some voice in the OPO policies
that affect them and to encourage OPOs
and tissue banks to work together on
issues that affect both organizations.
Although the PHS Act specifies that
hospital administrators must be
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represented on an OPO’s board of
directors or advisory board, it does not
specify whether donor or transplant
hospital administrators should be
represented. Since transplant hospitals
are already well represented by the
many transplant surgeons who serve on
OPO boards, we strongly urge (but
would not require) OPOs to include
administrators from donor hospitals to
provide input and foster collaboration
between OPOs and their donor
hospitals.
We have received suggestions that we
require OPOs to include representatives
from research facilities, donor family
members, transplant recipients,
coroners or medical examiners, social
workers, and chaplains on their
advisory boards. Although these are
worthy suggestions, we are reluctant to
require OPO advisory boards to
accommodate all these interests, lest
they become too large to operate
effectively. Additionally, many OPOs
already include some of these
individuals on their boards to fulfill the
requirement for members representing
the public. Therefore, we are requesting
comments on the advisability of
requiring OPO boards to have those
representatives.
Note that, for clarification purposes,
we are proposing to change the current
requirement for an OPO to have a
transplant surgeon from each transplant
center on its board to a requirement for
an OPO to have a transplant surgeon
from each transplant hospital on its
advisory board. Although ‘‘transplant
hospital’’ and ‘‘transplant center’’ are
often used interchangeably, the term
‘‘transplant center’’ sometimes is used
to refer to an individual transplant
program (such as a heart transplant
program or liver transplant program)
within a hospital that performs
transplants. Since some OPOs have
more than a dozen transplant hospitals
in their service areas, a requirement to
have a transplant surgeon from each
program within each hospital would
lead to OPO advisory boards with an
overwhelming number of members.
Therefore, we believe it is advisable to
change the language to clarify that even
if a hospital has multiple transplant
programs, the OPO need have only one
transplant surgeon per transplant
hospital or hospital system.
In addition, we propose requiring that
the transplant surgeon who serves on
the OPO board must have practicing
privileges and perform transplants in
the hospital he or she represents. This
requirement would ensure the surgeon
has a thorough knowledge of the needs
of the transplant hospital and can
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represent the hospital or hospital system
adequately.
When selecting transplant surgeons
for their advisory boards, OPOs should
strive for representation of all organ
types. That is, if an OPO’s service area
includes heart, liver, lung, pancreas,
and kidney transplant programs, the
OPO should include a surgeon who
performs each type of transplant.
We are proposing to require that
OPOs have a governing body (for
example, a board of directors) that has
full legal authority and responsibility
for the management and provision of all
services. We believe it is important for
efficient operation of an OPO for
authority to reside in a single body. The
governing body would be responsible
for developing and overseeing
implementation of policies and
procedures necessary for effective
administration of the OPO, including
fiscal operations, a QAPI program, and
services furnished under contract or
arrangement, including agreements for
these services. We would require an
OPO to have a procedure to address
potential conflicts of interest for the
governing body. In addition, we would
require the governing body to appoint
an individual to be responsible for dayto-day operation of the OPO. We are
requesting public comment regarding
the proposed requirement for a
governing body, specifically, whether it
would be appropriate for the legal
authority and responsibility for the
management and provision of all OPO
services to lie with an individual, rather
than a governing body.
We believe the requirements we
propose would provide flexibility so
that each OPO would be free to choose
the most efficient and effective form of
administration and governance to suit
its own needs and to fulfill its mission
of maximizing organ donation.
Condition: Human Resources (Proposed
§ 486.326)
[If you choose to comment on this
section, please include the caption
‘‘Human resources’’ at the beginning of
your comments.]
The current regulations at § 486.306(e)
require an OPO to have ‘‘a director and
such other staff, including an organ
donation coordinator and an organ
procurement specialist, necessary to
obtain organs effectively from donors in
its service area.’’ There are no additional
human resources requirements in the
current regulations.
We do not believe this single
requirement is adequate to ensure that
each OPO has a sufficient number of
staff members with the proper skills to
provide necessary services and to
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6105
maximize recovery of healthy organs for
transplantation. Furthermore, both
research studies (which are cited
throughout our discussion of proposed
§ 486.326) and the experiences of our
OPO Coordinators provide evidence that
having a sufficient number of trained
and qualified staff is positively
associated with good outcomes, such as
increases in organ donation. We also
note that one of the best practices
identified by the Organ Donation
Breakthrough Collaborative is to ‘‘strive
to recruit and retain highly motivated
and skilled staff.’’
Thus, we are proposing human
resources requirements that we believe
are essential to the functioning of all
OPOs. We propose that an OPO would
be required to have a sufficient number
of qualified staff to ensure that all
usable organs are recovered and to
provide all required services to the
families of potential donors, hospitals,
tissue banks, and individuals and
facilities that use organs for research.
OPOs would be required to ensure
that all individuals who provide or
supervise services, including services
provided under contract or arrangement,
are qualified to perform these duties.
In addition, we would require every
OPO to develop and implement a
written policy to address potential
conflicts of interest for the OPO’s
director, medical director, senior
management, and procurement
coordinators. In 2002, we cited a Florida
OPO whose procurement director
owned a company that purchased
organs from the OPO and sold them for
research—a serious conflict of interest
that led to the dismissal of OPO
officials. We believe an OPO’s conflictof-interest policy should clearly
delineate and prohibit those outside
activities or affiliations that have the
potential to impact an employee’s
ability to make impartial decisions that
are in the best interests of both the OPO
itself and the organ procurement and
transplantation system in the United
States.
Although the Medicare hospital
regulations require hospitals to review
credentials and grant clinical privileges
to medical staff, it is difficult, if not
impossible, for a donor hospital to
credential and grant privileges to
recovery surgeons and other members of
recovery teams who are not members of
the hospital’s medical staff. Recovery
surgeons and other recovery team
members may recover organs in a
particular donor hospital no more than
once in a period of several years. Thus,
their work is too limited to undergo
effective review by the donor hospital
for the granting of clinical privileges.
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However, it is imperative that someone
ensure recovery personnel are qualified
to recover organs in a manner that
preserves their viability for
transplantation.
Therefore, we propose requiring OPOs
to maintain credentialing records for
physicians and other practitioners who
routinely recover organs in hospitals
under contract or arrangement with the
OPO (for example, transplant surgeons
from local transplant hospitals who
frequently recover organs in the OPO’s
donor hospitals). In addition, we
propose requiring OPOs to ensure that
all physicians and other practitioners
who recover organs in hospitals with
which the OPO has agreements are
qualified and trained. Note that we are
not proposing a requirement for an OPO
to maintain credentialing records for
physicians and other practitioners if
they do not routinely recover organs
under contract or arrangement with the
OPO (for example a transplant surgeon
from a hospital outside the OPO’s
service area). In those circumstances,
the OPO would be required only to
verify that the transplant surgeon was
qualified and trained. This could be
accomplished by, for example,
contacting the transplant hospital to
confirm that the surgeon who will be
recovering an organ at one of the OPO’s
hospitals is credentialed and has
privileges at the transplant hospital.
Studies provide empirical evidence
that sufficient staffing serves to
maximize organ donation. For example,
in a report on 12 years of experience at
LifeGift Organ Donation Center in
Texas, the report’s authors commented
that LifeGift’s staff resources were
‘‘critical to its ability to sustain and
increase donation.’’ They noted that
LifeGift in the 7-year period preceding
publication of the report had an 80
percent growth in staff and a 61 percent
increase in organ donors. (T. Shafer, C
Van Buren, C Andrews; Program
Development and Routine Notification
in a Large Independent OPO: A 12-year
Review, Journal of Transplant
Coordination, Vol. 9, No. 1, March,
1999.)
A recent report on OPO best practices
listed ‘‘timely, on-site response to
potential donor referrals’’ as a key
attribute of a successful OPO.
(Preliminary results of a best practices
study presented at tri-annual meeting of
the South-Eastern Organ Procurement
Foundation on September 14, 2000 by
R. Randal Bollinger, MD, Ph.D. Chief of
the Division of General Surgery, Duke
University Medical Center. In addition
to Dr. Bollinger, other study authors
include Dennis Heinrichs, MBA,
President, LifeLink Foundation; and
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United Network for Organ Sharing
(UNOS) staff members.) (Note that
UNOS is the organization under
contract with the Health Resources and
Services Administration to operate the
OPTN.)
The report on LifeGift’s 12-year
experience noted that ‘‘adequate, even
‘deep’ staffing levels allowed the OPO to
respond in person within one hour of
referral on every potential organ donor
case.’’ We do not propose mandating a
1-hour time frame because geographical
and other differences in OPO service
areas could make such a short time
frame impossible to meet. Furthermore,
some hospitals contact their OPOs very
early in the donation process, which
means it may not be necessary for OPO
staff to arrive at the hospital within 1
hour. Clearly the ideal time frame is one
in which the OPO arrives at the hospital
early enough to ensure that all steps in
the donation process can take place, and
the desired outcome is the recovery of
healthy organs.
Therefore, we propose requiring the
OPO to provide sufficient coverage,
either by its own staff or under contract
or arrangement, to screen hospital
referral calls for organ donor potential
and evaluate potential donors for
medical suitability for organ donation in
a timely manner. This means that once
an OPO receives timely notification
from a hospital about a patient who
appears likely to be medically suitable
for organ donation, the OPO must
perform an assessment of the patient’s
medical suitability for organ donation
early enough in the donation process so
that there is sufficient time to discuss
donation with the family of the
potential donor, implement
management protocols for the potential
donor, place the organs for
transplantation, and arrange for
recovery and transportation of the
organs while they are still viable.
In addition, we propose requiring an
OPO to have a sufficient number of
qualified staff to provide information
and support to potential organ donor
families; request consent for donation;
ensure optimal maintenance of donors,
efficient placement of organs, and
adequate oversight of organ recovery;
and conduct QAPI activities, such as
death record reviews and hospital
development. We are not proposing
specific staffing levels because we
believe each OPO must determine the
amount of staff it needs to ensure that
families of potential donors are treated
with sensitivity and respect and that the
maximum number of viable organs are
procured and provided to hospitals for
transplantation.
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However, we can provide guidance to
OPOs so that they can determine if the
number of staff they have would be
‘‘sufficient’’ under the proposed
regulation. The determination is based
primarily on outcomes, not just the
ultimate outcome—procuring a healthy
organ for transplantation—but the
intermediate steps that lead to the
procurement (such as assessing the
potential donor and obtaining consent),
as well as those critical activities that
support and surround the actual
donation process (such as hospital
development and death record reviews).
An OPO should analyze the flow of
the donation process in each of its
hospitals, and determine whether the
flow is impeded at any point by a lack
of staff. Does the OPO have enough staff
available at all times to: Assess potential
donors promptly; spend as much time
as necessary with the family to answer
questions and provide support and
counseling; manage the potential donor
optimally; maximize the number of
organs placed for transplantation; and
recover (or arrange for the recovery of)
organs as quickly as possible?
An OPO should scrutinize its QAPI
program and determine whether
additional staff would enable the OPO
to broaden the scope of its QAPI
program and lead to improved
performance. Does the OPO have
sufficient staff to monitor and evaluate
all donation services; recommend steps
to improve performance; track
performance over time; and perform
death record reviews at Medicare and
Medicaid hospitals that have a level I or
level II trauma center or 150 or more
beds (with the exception of psychiatric
and rehabilitation hospitals)?
An OPO also should look closely at
hospital development staffing because
effective hospital development creates a
culture that supports and promotes
donation. Does the OPO have sufficient
staff to make its presence felt in
hospitals (particularly those hospitals
with high donation potential) by:
Developing a relationship with
emergency department and intensive
care unit staff; providing ongoing
education for hospital staff; meeting
with hospital leaders and key
physicians to gain their support for
organ donation; providing donation data
and encouraging hospitals to use the
data in quality improvement activities?
As stated earlier, we do not propose
to establish specific staffing levels
because OPOs must have the flexibility
to determine their own staffing needs.
However, OPOs rightfully will be
concerned about how such an imprecise
requirement would be enforced.
Certainly we understand that for reasons
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beyond their control, OPOs (like all
other businesses) sometimes will not
have enough staff. We would not cite an
OPO for having insufficient staff if the
insufficiency is temporary or occasional
or if the OPO clearly is doing its best to
keep staffing at an optimal level. The
requirement is intended to give
surveyors the option of citing an OPO
when there is a pattern of chronic
understaffing in critical areas, and the
OPO has not taken the appropriate steps
to improve the situation (for example, if
the board of directors consistently has
refused to approve funds for additional
staff needed to improve the OPO’s
performance).
The OPTN/UNOS Council for Organ
Availability Requestor Project studied
organ donation requestors who have the
greatest success in getting families to
consent to organ donation. Results of
the study suggest that the experience of
procurement coordinators is positively
associated with increased consent rates;
the average ‘‘expert requestor’’ has 4
years of experience. The LifeGift report
notes that adequate staffing results in a
staff that is not ‘‘spread too thin.’’ The
report also notes that adequate staffing
allows, when appropriate, assigning two
coordinators to one donor case, which
may improve organ yield by allowing
one coordinator to focus on donor
management while another focuses on
organ placement. We believe that
adequate staffing by OPOs avoids staff
burn out and frequent turnover of organ
procurement coordinators, which is a
significant problem for many OPOs.
A recent study published in the
Journal of the American Medical
Association on factors that influence
family consent noted, ‘‘Our data
strongly indicated that involvement of
the family with a professional from the
OPO is critical. The time spent with the
OPO coordinator was a strong factor
associated with the decision to donate.’’
(Siminoff, L, Gordon, N, Hewlett, J,
Arnold, R. Factors Influencing Families’
Consent for Donation of Solid Organs
for Transplantation. Journal of the
American Medical Association. 2001;
286:71–77.) It is clear that adequate
staffing can ensure that procurement
coordinators have ample time to spend
with donor families. (Note that in citing
this study, we are not suggesting that
hospital designated requestors should
not be involved in the donation process.
Studies show that involvement of
hospital staff with the OPO in
requesting consent leads to the highest
consent rates.)
Finally, we propose requiring an OPO
to provide a sufficient number of
recovery personnel, either from its own
staff or under contract or arrangement,
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to ensure that all usable organs are
recovered in a manner that, to the extent
possible, preserves them for
transplantation. This proposal is based
on our OPO Coordinators’ knowledge of
situations in which organs were not
recovered from medically suitable
potential because local surgeons or
other recovery personnel were not
available. Some OPOs prevent these
situations by hiring their own recovery
personnel. For example, one of the highperforming OPOs studied in the Organ
Donation Breakthrough Collaborative,
Donor Alliance, has circumvented this
problem by hiring ‘‘organ recovery
specialists’’ with extensive training and
experience in organ recovery.
The current OPO regulations have no
requirements for an OPO’s management
of its human resources. We believe that
prudent management of human
resources, including provision of
sufficient education, training,
supervision and evaluation, is a
fundamental necessity if OPOs are to
have expert, highly qualified staff who
can maximize organ donation. Ongoing
staff training is a necessity at all OPOs
in order to maintain staff skill sets and
keep up with rapid advances in
procurement and transplantation.
However, we have found that a few
OPOs do not provide these services for
their staffs, which leads to confusion
about roles and responsibilities, suboptimal staff functioning, and resultant
poor OPO performance. Conversely, our
OPO Coordinators have noted lower
staff turnover among OPOs that provide
education and training and clearly
define their staffs’ roles and
responsibilities.
Therefore, we propose requiring OPOs
to provide their staffs with the
education, training, and supervision
necessary to furnish required services.
Training must include, but is not
limited to, performance expectations for
staff, applicable organizational policies
and procedures, and QAPI activities. In
addition, OPOs must evaluate the
performance of their staff and provide
training, as needed, to improve
individual and overall staff performance
and effectiveness. For example, staff
who make donation requests can be
evaluated by their consent rates; staff
who clinically manage donors can be
evaluated by how many organs are
recovered and transplanted from donors
and whether immediate organ function
occurs in the recipient; and hospital
development staff can be evaluated by
the percentage of cases in which timely
donation notifications are made and
how often donation requests are
conducted collaboratively between OPO
and hospital. An OPO can utilize this
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information to inform the development
of training, tailor their training to the
needs of their staffs, and identify
individual staff who require additional
training.
We believe in-depth training for
procurement coordinators is particularly
critical because procurement
coordinators serve on the OPO front
lines. They provide counseling to
grieving families, explain donation
options, make the request for donation,
oversee recovery of organs, and package
organs for transport to transplant
hospitals. One of a procurement
coordinator’s most critical functions is
management of potential donors to
maintain the viability of their organs,
which is a highly complex and
demanding task. Nevertheless, some
procurement coordinators have told us
their OPOs do not provide sufficient
training and supervision for new
procurement coordinators, even though
inexperienced coordinators run the risk
of making errors that can lead to denial
of consent or the loss of a donor.
Therefore, in an effort to decrease
errors and provide support to the
inexperienced coordinator, we are
requesting comments on the advisability
of including a requirement in the final
rule for supervision of an inexperienced
procurement coordinator by an
experienced procurement coordinator,
director of procurement, medical
director, or other experienced
individual during the consent process
and during management of all donor
cases. In addition, we are requesting
comments on whether experience
should be defined by length of service
or number of donation cases, what
experience thresholds would be
appropriate, and how long an
inexperienced procurement coordinator
would need supervision.
We acknowledge that it can be
difficult for OPOs to hire and retain staff
with the necessary qualifications,
experience, and dedication to fill
critical staff positions, particularly
procurement coordinator positions, and
to provide their staffs with education
and training. Many OPOs find high staff
turnover to be a significant barrier to
increasing organ donation in their
service areas. Nevertheless, many OPOs
are able to recruit and retain qualified
staff by providing training,
opportunities for growth, and a
supportive atmosphere that encourages
independence and innovation. It is clear
that the six OPOs whose practices were
studied as part of HRSA’s Breakthrough
Collaborative would all agree that
professional, committed, and
experienced staff have formed the basis
for their success. One of the OPOs, New
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England Organ Bank, emphasizes that
its devoted staff and low staff turnover
are contributing factors to its high
performance.
The Collaborative’s Best Practices
Final Report identified five strategies
OPOs can use to recruit and retain
skilled and motivated staff.
The first strategy is to use various
practices to identify and recruit staff.
For example, according to the study
report, LifeLink of Florida uses an
extensive ‘‘reality’’ interview process in
which candidates meet with staff and
participate in actual organ referral and
donation events. This process enables
LifeLink to hire staff who are
‘‘aggressive, collaborative, assertive, and
able to work under stressful
conditions.’’
The second strategy is to offer
adequate orientation and training. One
of the six high-performing OPOs, New
England Organ Bank, puts newly-hired
staff through a formal training program
‘‘tailored to their specialized function.’’
The third strategy is to create a
culture of collaboration and autonomy.
Every high-performing OPO studied
pointed to strong collaborative
relationships as a factor that contributes
to their success. These OPOs have
forged successful relationships both
within their own staffs and with outside
organizations and other parties in the
donation process, such as tissue banks,
hospital administrators, physicians, and
nurses.
Perhaps the best example of
collaboration is the in-house
coordinator (IHC) program developed by
LifeGift Organ Donation Center in
Houston, which places two full-time
nurses in all Level I trauma centers.
According to the study, the OPO staff
are ‘‘fully integrated into hospital
operations,’’ which promotes ‘‘strong,
transparent hospital partnerships.’’
The fourth strategy discussed in the
study is to offer flexible work
environments and other benefits. At
Mid-America Transplant Services in St.
Louis, OPO staff are given specialized
roles in the donation process based on
their professional experience. Staff have
the flexibility to work from home and
are given financial incentives when they
meet performance targets.
The fifth strategy noted in the study
is to provide opportunities for
professional growth and development.
The Report’s authors provide many
examples of the opportunities that the
high-performing OPOs provide to their
staffs. For example, since most ‘‘family
support coordinators’’ at Donor alliance
have non-clinical backgrounds, the OPO
provides extensive training in the
medical suitability of organ donors. In
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another example, Mid-America’s two
operating rooms are used to give their
clinical staff an opportunity to learn
new skills and develop professionally.
We urge all OPOs to read the report
of the Collaborative, titled, ‘‘The Organ
Donation Breakthrough Collaborative:
Best Practices Final Report,’’ which is
available on the Department’s Web site
at https://www.organdonor.gov.
Voluntary OPTN bylaws call for OPOs
to have a medical director who is a
licensed physician and is responsible
for the medical and clinical activities of
the OPO. Although current regulations
do not require OPOs to have a medical
director, most OPOs employ a medical
director as part of their management
staff and recognize the value and
expertise this position brings to their
OPO programs. Our OPO Coordinators
have found that most high-performing
OPOs have active, involved medical
directors. Therefore, we propose
requiring an OPO to have a medical
director who would be responsible for
implementation of protocols for donor
evaluation and management and organ
placement and recovery.
The medical director would be
responsible for oversight of the clinical
management of donation cases,
including providing assistance in the
medical management of a donor case
when the surgeon on call is unavailable.
We would expect that in meeting these
requirements, OPOs would have
medical directors who oversee clinical
donation processes, facilitate best
practices, and provide guidance for OPO
staff, both clinical and non-clinical,
about all clinical donation issues.
We believe the human resources
requirements we propose would ensure
efficient and effective operation of
OPOs, which is in the best interests of
the organ donation and transplantation
system. In addition, the requirements
would further the efficient
administration of the Medicare program.
As we stated earlier, section 1102 of the
Act grants the Secretary the authority to
establish requirements necessary for the
efficient administration of the Medicare
program.
Condition: Reporting of Data (Proposed
§ 486.328)
[If you choose to comment on this
section, please include the caption
‘‘Reporting Data’’ at the beginning of
your comments.]
The current regulations (§ 486.310)
require an OPO to submit data to us
annually showing the number of donors,
the number of kidneys and extra-renal
organs procured, and the number of
kidneys and extra-renal organs
transplanted so that we can determine
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whether the OPO has met the
performance requirements. We propose
broadening this requirement to require
OPOs to provide individuallyidentifiable, hospital-specific organ
donation and transplantation data to the
OPTN and the Scientific Registry of
Transplant Recipients (SRTR), as
directed by the Secretary. (Note that at
present the SRTR does not collect data;
its current mandate is to analyze data
collected by the OPTN.) We also
propose requiring OPOs to provide
hospital-specific organ donation data to
transplant hospitals, annually. Finally,
we propose requiring OPOs to report
individually-identifiable, hospitalspecific organ donation and
transplantation data and other
information to the Department, as
requested by the Secretary.
Data could include, but would not be
limited to, (1) The number of hospital
deaths; (2) results of death record
reviews; (3) number and timeliness of
referral calls from hospitals; (4)
potential donor denominator (as defined
in § 486.302); (5) data related to nonrecovery of organs, (6) data about
consents for donation; (7) number of
donors; (8) number of organs recovered
(by type of organ); and (9) number of
organs transplanted (by type of organ).
We would note that OPOs are
specifically exempted from regulatory
requirements for the privacy of
individually identifiable health care
information under the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act.
Regulations at 45 CFR 164.512(h) state,
‘‘A covered entity may use or disclose
protected health care information to
organ procurement organizations or
other entities engaged in the
procurement, banking, or
transplantation of cadaveric organs,
eyes, or tissue for the purpose of
facilitating organ, eye, or tissue
donation and transplantation.’’
Our reasons for proposing this
requirement are three-fold. First, it
would bring data reporting requirements
for OPOs into agreement with those for
transplant hospitals. Hospital
regulations at 42 CFR 482.45(b)(3)
require transplant hospitals to provide
organ-transplant-related data as
requested by the OPTN, the SRTR, and
the OPOs. Transplant hospitals must
also provide those data directly to the
Department when requested by the
Secretary. Ensuring a flow of data
between transplant hospitals and OPOs
promotes collaboration and can enable
transplant hospitals to improve their
programs. For example, a transplant
hospital can use data from OPOs in its
QAPI program, such as data that allow
it to compare its transplantation rates
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with those of other transplant hospitals
in the OPO’s service area or data
showing how many times and for what
reasons the hospital’s own transplant
programs have turned down organ offers
from the OPO.
Second, CMS Regional Office OPO
Coordinators need data from OPOs to
target areas for improvement both in
OPOs and hospitals, and third, the OIG
has recommended CMS use hospitalspecific data provided by OPOs to
monitor the impact of the hospital CoP
and improve hospital compliance with
the CoP. In short, we believe these data
reporting requirements for OPOs are
necessary for the efficient
administration of the Medicare program
and can be required based on the
Secretary’s authority under section 1102
of the Act.
We would note that most OPO data
needed by us or other agencies within
the Department can be obtained from
the OPTN or the SRTR. In fact 42 CFR
121.11(b)(2) requires OPOs and
transplant hospitals to submit
information about tranplant candidates,
transplant recipients, organ donors,
transplant program costs and
performance, and ‘‘other information
that the Secretary deems appropriate.’’
We would not request data from OPOs
if the data were readily available from
other sources. We are including this
provision only to give us and other
entities the flexibility to request data
from OPOs if data cannot be obtained
expeditiously from other sources. The
Secretary would use such data and other
information for monitoring of hospital
compliance with the CoP, monitoring of
OPO compliance with the process
performance measures and other
requirements, and assisting OPOs with
their QAPI programs.
We propose including language that
defines how OPOs should report data
for donors and organs procured and
transplanted to ensure that all OPOs are
following the same reporting protocol. A
uniform process would ensure accurate
reporting and will enable us to make a
true comparison of the OPOs’
performance. We propose including
reporting protocols for the following:
‘‘kidneys procured,’’ ‘‘kidneys
transplanted,’’ extra-renal organs
procured,’’ and ‘‘extra-renal organs
transplanted.’’ For example, under
‘‘kidneys procured,’’ en bloc kidneys are
counted as two kidneys procured.
Under ‘‘extra-renal organs procured,’’ a
heart and two lungs recovered from one
donor would count as three organs
procured.
In August 2000, the Office of the
Inspector General (OIG) for the
Department of Health and Human
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Services released a report on the CoP
titled, ‘‘Medicare Conditions of
Participation for Organ Donation: An
Early Assessment of the New Donation
Rule.’’ The OIG found that OPOs and
hospitals had not yet taken full
advantage of the CoP. The OIG noted,
‘‘Maximizing organ donation requires
coordination and collaboration between
hospitals and OPOs. The donation rule,
however, is contained in the Medicare
conditions of participation for hospitals.
While it provides OPOs with significant
leverage that they can use to work with
hospitals on donation, the rule places
the obligation for compliance solely on
hospitals; it sets no requirements for
OPOs. Effective implementation of the
donation rule requires accountability on
behalf of both OPOs and hospitals.’’
The OIG recommended that to
increase OPO accountability, we require
OPOs to provide hospital-specific data
on referrals and organ recovery. The
OIG stated that obtaining data from
OPOs would be the most effective and
efficient way to monitor the CoP and
assess hospital compliance because
OPOs already collect the necessary data
and have them readily available. The
report states, ‘‘We believe that OPOs
could reasonably, inexpensively, and
easily provide current data on a
quarterly basis.’’
We agree with the OIG’s conclusions.
Although all OPOs collect hospitalspecific data on referrals and organs
recovered, current regulations do not
require OPOs to share these data with
us, and OPOs have been reluctant to
share data with us voluntarily lest they
affect their collegial relationships with
their hospitals. Therefore, we must rely
on surveys performed by the Joint
Commission on Accreditation of
Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) and
State survey agencies to monitor
hospital compliance. However, JCAHO
surveys usually are performed only once
every 3 years and State Medicare
surveys are performed even less
frequently. Moreover, requirements for
organ, tissue, and eye procurement are
only a small part of hospital
accreditation and certification surveys,
and surveying for those requirements
may have a lower priority than
surveying for requirements affecting
direct patient care. In fact, the OIG
noted that some hospitals reported to
them that surveyors asked only to see
their policies and procedures for organ
donation and did not probe further to
determine whether the hospital was
complying with all requirements in the
regulation.
Based on the OIG’s recommendations,
HRSA, CMS, and the Association for
Organ Procurement Organizations
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(AOPO) determined what data should
be reported to the OPTN (and, in turn,
reported by the OPTN to HRSA and
CMS). As stated earlier in this preamble,
in September 2001, OPOs began
reporting the following hospital-specific
data electronically to the OPTN: (1) The
number of referral calls received from
hospitals; (2) the number of potential
donors; and (3) the number of consents
to donation. The OPTN calls for OPOs
to report the number of donors and the
number of organs recovered at each
hospital. In the future, as data needs are
identified (for example, the number of
deaths in each hospital), the OPTN may
begin collecting additional data. We can
obtain data from the OPTN through
HRSA at any time. OPOs currently
report data to the OPTN within 30 days
of the end of the month in which a
death occurs, and we propose requiring
that OPOs continue to report their data
within this time frame. However, if an
OPO determined through death record
reviews or by other means that the data
it reported to the OPTN was incorrect,
we would require the OPO to report the
corrected data to the OPTN within 30
days of the end of the month in which
the error was identified.
The OIG report recommended that we
require OPOs to make hospital-specific
donation performance data publicly
available in order to recognize hospitals
that do a good job. They pointed out
that one OPO in the nation already
publishes organ donation data for every
hospital in its service area. We agree
that the efforts of hospitals that
collaborate with their OPOs and support
organ donation should be recognized.
Publication of those data has the dual
effect of recognizing the efforts of goodperforming hospitals, while holding
hospitals more accountable for organ
donation. In addition, as we note
elsewhere in this preamble, if OPOs
report the same hospital-specific data
publicly that they report to the OPTN,
the published data would provide an
additional opportunity to verify the
completeness and accuracy of the OPTN
data. Furthermore, publication of
hospital-specific organ donation data
would be an effective way to promote
the exchange of information among
OPOs, hospitals, and the public.
Therefore, we propose requiring OPOs
to report hospital-specific organ
donation data, including organ donor
potential and the number of actual
organ donors, at least annually to the
public. We would suggest that OPOs
include these data in their newsletters
and their annual reports.
We are interested in other avenues to
hold hospitals more accountable for
organ donation and for implementing
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the CoP. In fact, the AOPO has
requested that we ask for public
comment regarding specific actions we
might consider to address problems
some OPOs have encountered in regard
to their hospitals. For example, OPOs
have complained to us that hospitals
sometimes refer a brain dead patient
only after the patient has been removed
from the ventilator (rendering the
patient medically unsuitable for organ
donation) and that hospital staff
physicians sometimes are reluctant to
declare brain death, provide assistance
in evaluating potential donors, or
provide services for intraoperative
donor management.
We believe it is important to point
out, however, that in these specific
situations (and many others), there is
regulatory relief available to OPOs
under the hospital and critical access
hospital CoPs, which requires hospitals
to refer patients whose death is
imminent and to cooperate with their
OPOs in maintaining potential donors
while necessary testing and placement
of organs takes place. This means that
a hospital could be in violation of the
CoP if it did not refer a brain dead
patient before removing the patient from
the ventilator or if the hospital did not
provide the support services necessary
to maintain a potential donor.
We are aware that OPOs are reluctant
to provide details about violations of the
hospital CoP to us because they fear
disturbing their relationships with
hospitals. One OPO has stated, ‘‘it’s not
our intention to find fault with anybody.
This is a relationship business.’’
However, the CoP for organ, tissue, and
eye procurement has been in effect since
August 1998. We would suggest that if
an OPO has not been able to urge a
hospital into compliance with the CoP
by now, it needs our assistance. We
cannot aid hospitals and OPOs in
improving their relationships and assure
that all hospitals are complying with the
CoP unless OPOs are willing to bring
problems to our attention. Nevertheless,
we are interested in receiving comments
regarding other actions we might take to
improve hospital compliance with the
CoP and hold hospitals more
accountable for organ donation.
[If you choose to comment on this issue,
please include the caption ‘‘Hospital
Accountability’’ at the beginning of your
comments.]
Condition: Information Management
(Proposed § 486.330)
[If you choose to comment on this
section, please include the caption
‘‘Information management’’ at the
beginning of your comments.]
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This section incorporates the data
maintenance and record keeping
requirements now found at
§ 486.304(c)(8). We believe these
requirements should be retained to
ensure that a smooth transition of
records would occur if an OPO’s service
area were taken over by another OPO
and so that OPOs maintain adequate
information about each donor. We
propose that, as in current regulations,
an OPO would be required to establish
and use an information management
system to maintain the required
medical, social and identifying
information for every donor and
transplant recipient and develop and
follow procedures to ensure the
confidentiality and security of the
information.
OPOs have asked for guidance
regarding how long records should be
kept. We propose requiring OPOs to
maintain donor and transplant recipient
records for 7 years because the
regulations that govern the OPTN at
§ 121.11(a)(2)(i) require OPOs to retain
records for 7 years. We also propose
requiring certain additional data that
OPOs would be required to keep in their
donor records.
Currently, OPOs are required to
include the following in their donor
records: information identifying the
donor (for example, name, address, date
of birth, social security number or other
unique identifier, such as Medicare
health insurance claim number), organs
and (when applicable) tissues
recovered, date of the organ recovery,
and all test results. We propose
requiring the following additional data
elements: donor management data,
current hospital history, past medical
and social history, the pronouncement
of death, and consent and next-of-kin
information. We currently require OPOs
to keep identifying information for each
transplant recipient. We propose
requiring OPOs to include a record of
the disposition of organs recovered for
transplantation.
In proposing these new data elements,
we are expanding upon the data
elements required for donor records
under existing regulations at
§ 486.304(c)(8). There are three reasons
why we propose requiring these
additional data elements. First, such
data is critically necessary to the
investigation of the transmission of
infectious disease from organ donors.
Recently, CMS and the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
needed donor records (including donor
management data, hospital history, past
medical and social history, the
pronouncement of death, and consent
and next-of-kin information) to
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investigate two separate cases of
Hepatitis C transmission from organ
donors and to determine whether the
donors had been tested, why they had
not tested positive for Hepatitis C, and
whether the donors had exhibited signs
of Hepatitis C that should have been
apparent before donation taking place.
In addition, CMS and the CDC needed
to quickly establish the disposition of
all organs recovered from the infected
donors to establish whether other organ
recipients were infected. Although some
of the data we propose requiring would
be available from the hospital where a
donor died, some would be available
from the OPTN, and some would be
available from the OPO, it is important
for all data to be available in one
location to provide speedy access in
cases of disease transmission.
In addition, CMS needs access to
several of these additional data elements
to determine whether an OPO has
complied with the process performance
measures. Donor management, hospital
history, and past medical and social
history would be used to assess
compliance with § 486.344(a) and (b).
Consent and next-of-kin information
would be used to assess compliance
with § 486.342.
Finally, we believe the additional data
elements we propose for donor records
would provide an invaluable source of
information for OPOs to use in their
QAPI programs. For example, an OPO
may want to review donors’ medical
and social histories to assess and
improve its protocol for obtaining
medical and social histories from
potential donor families.
Condition: Requesting Consent
(Proposed § 486.342)
[If you choose to comment on this
section, please include the caption
‘‘Requesting consent’’ at the beginning
of your comments.]
In addition to requesting consent for
organ donation from families of
potential donors, OPOs often request
consent for tissue donation on behalf of
their hospitals’ designated tissue banks.
In April 2000, the ‘‘Orange County (CA)
Register’’ (Register) published a five-part
series of articles based on its
investigation of the tissue banking
industry. One of the allegations made by
the Register was that tissue donor
families were not being fully informed
before making the decision to donate.
The Register articles noted that families
of potential donors often are not
informed about how donated tissues
may be used (for example, skin may be
used for cosmetic surgery, as well as
grafts for burn patients) or that some
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tissue banks make profits from donated
tissues.
In January 2001, the OIG published a
report entitled, ‘‘Informed Consent in
Tissue Donation.’’ The OIG noted that in
recent years, tissue banking and
processing practices have gradually
diverged from tissue donor families’
expectations. The expansion of the
tissue banking industry, new
technology, large profits, and tissue
marketing practices have raised
questions about the non-profit basis of
tissue banking. Therefore, the OIG
suggested that certain steps should be
taken in regard to tissue donation to
ensure that families and other decisionmakers are fully informed before making
a decision. One of the OIG’s
recommendations was that we add a
provision to the OPO conditions for
coverage to hold OPOs accountable for
obtaining informed consent from tissue
donor families when OPOs request
consent on behalf of tissue banks. The
OIG also recommended that we require
OPOs to include tissue banks when
developing and conducting training for
hospital designated requestors for
tissue.
We agree with the OIG’s
recommendations. Providing informed
consent is an integral part of
encouraging discretion and sensitivity
with respect to the circumstances,
views, and beliefs of potential donor
families, which is required for hospitals
and critical access hospitals under
section 1138(a)(1)(A)(ii) of the Social
Security Act, in hospital regulations at
§ 482.45(a)(4), and in critical access
hospital regulations at § 485.643, and
which we propose as a requirement for
OPOs in this proposed rule. Ensuring
that all donor families and other
individuals responsible for making
donation decisions are fully informed
before making a decision guards against
negative publicity that may result if a
donor family does not receive informed
consent. As noted earlier in this
preamble, negative perceptions of or
publicity about tissue donation can
affect the public’s attitude about organ
donation and individuals’ willingness to
donate. Therefore, we propose requiring
that all requests made by OPOs for
tissues, as well as organs, include a
properly executed informed consent
process.
An OPO would be required to have a
written protocol to ensure that, in the
absence of a donor document, the
individual or individuals with
responsibility to make the donation
decision are informed of their option to
donate organs or tissues or to decline to
donate. We note that with respect to
informed consent, a potential donor
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may have executed a consent or
indicated in an advance directive or
power of attorney the individual who
will make a decision about organ
donation on his or her behalf. The OIG
appended to its report a list of model
elements of informed consent for organ
and tissue donation developed by the
American Association of Tissue Banks,
AOPO, and the Eye Bank Association of
America, as well as an informed consent
policy for tissue donation developed by
the National Donor Family Council. We
have incorporated many of the
recommendations made by these
organizations into our proposal.
For example, the OIG noted that
although tissue donor families assume
the tissue they agree to donate will be
used to meet important medical needs,
tissue is sometimes processed into
products used for elective cosmetic
procedures. Tissues may also be used
for research or education rather than
transplantation. To address this issue,
the National Donor Family Council
recommends that tissue donor families
be told they may restrict or limit use of
the tissue they donate. We agree with
this recommendation and propose
requiring that individuals responsible
for making the donation decision be
informed that they may limit or restrict
the use of donated organs or tissues.
In addition, we propose requiring
OPOs to provide to the individual(s)
responsible for making the donation
decision, at a minimum, a list of the
organs or tissues that may be recovered;
a description of all possible uses for the
donated organs or tissues; information
(such as non-profit or for-profit status)
about organizations that will recover,
process, and distribute the tissues; a
description of the screening and
recovery processes; information
regarding access to and release of the
donor’s medical records; an explanation
of the impact the donation process may
have on burial arrangements and the
appearance of the donor’s body;
information about the procedure for
filing a complaint; contact information
in case the individual(s) making the
decision have questions; and a copy of
the signed consent form.
When developing protocols for
informed consent for tissue donation,
OPOs may wish to review the informed
consent policies appended to the OIG
report. The National Donor Family
Council represents approximately 8,000
donor families, and the American
Association of Tissue Banks accredits 58
tissue banks in the U.S. Their policies
include specific descriptions of
elements that address full disclosure for
consent for tissue donation.
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We would note that a recent survey of
tissue donor families conducted by the
National Donor Family Council and
Case Western Reserve University found
that a large majority of families said
they would have preferred receiving
more, rather than less, information to
aid them in their decision making. For
example, 79 percent of families
surveyed said they would have wanted
to know that some tissue banks are forprofit entities. To guarantee that all
donor families and other individuals
responsible for making donation
decisions have the information they
need to make an informed decision, as
well as to avoid a negative impact on
organ and tissue donation, we believe
information should be provided about
all facets of the donation process before
a donation decision is made.
Finally, the family of the donor is
likely to have many questions about the
donation process, even if the OPO does
not request consent. Thus, although we
do not propose requiring an OPO to seek
informed consent if the potential donor
consented to donation before his or her
death in a manner that satisfied the
governing State law requirements, we
propose requiring the OPO to provide
information about the donation if it is
requested by the donor’s family.
Condition: Donor Evaluation and
Management and Organ Placement and
Recovery (Proposed § 486.344)
[If you choose to comment on this
section, please include the caption
‘‘Donor evaluation and management,
organ placement and recovery’’ at the
beginning of your comments.]
The current OPO regulations have
minimal requirements for donor
evaluation and management and organ
placement and recovery. They require
OPOs only to: (1) Have a system to
allocate donated organs equitably
among transplant patients consistent
with specific CDC guidelines for
preventing the transmission of HIV and
with the rules of the OPTN; and (2)
ensure that appropriate donor screening
and infection tests consistent with CDC
and OPTN guidelines are performed by
a laboratory certified in the appropriate
specialty or subspecialty in accordance
with CLIA requirements. There are no
provisions in our regulations addressing
donor management or organ recovery.
We propose requiring every OPO to
have written protocols for donor
evaluation and management and organ
placement and recovery. The OPO
would be required to ensure that
protocols meet current standards of
practice and that established practices
and criteria are designed to optimize the
number of donors and the number of
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organs recovered and transplanted per
donor.
As stated earlier, our OPO
Coordinators have observed that the
most successful OPOs have active,
involved medical directors. Therefore,
we are proposing requirements to
ensure both that every OPO has a
medical director and that medical
directors are involved in the day-to-day
oversight of clinical staff and the staff’s
evaluation and management of potential
donors. We propose that an OPO’s
medical director would be responsible
for ensuring that protocols for
evaluation and management of donors
are implemented correctly and
appropriately to ensure every potential
donor is thoroughly assessed for
medical suitability for organ donation
and clinically managed to optimize
organ viability and function.
Managing a brain dead potential
donor so that organs remain
transplantable is very difficult. In fact,
experienced OPO procurement
coordinators agree that it can be more
difficult to manage a brain dead
potential donor successfully than to
manage a living, critically ill patient.
Sometimes donors are lost at this point
in the donation process because cardiac
arrest occurs before organs can be
recovered. Therefore, we propose that
OPOs be required to implement a
system that ensures the medical director
or other qualified physician is available
to assist in the medical management of
a donor when the surgeon on call is
unavailable. We believe these proposals
would ensure that once consent is
obtained, every medically suitable
potential donor will go to surgery and
every transplantable organ will be
recovered.
We believe detailed protocols whose
implementation is well coordinated
between the OPO medical director and
procurement coordinators would work
to safeguard against outcomes that
hinder the goal of optimizing recovery
of transplantable organs. The complex
clinical interventions required for each
stage of the donor evaluation and
management and organ recovery
processes contain numerous variables
that would benefit from increased
surveillance and accountability.
An excellent example of the
importance of following a protocol for
donor management can be found in a
recent OPTN/UNOS study of the UNOS
‘‘Critical Pathway for the Organ Donor’’
protocol for donor management. The
study found that when the critical
pathway protocol was used, outcomes
improved significantly. The number of
organs recovered per donor increased by
10.3 percent, and the number of organs
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transplanted per donor increased by
11.3 percent. (Chabalewski, F.,
Rosendale, J., Edwards, C.: The Effect of
a Critical Care Pathway on Donor
Management Time and Cost—A Pilot
Study. Presented at the American
Association of Critical Care Nurses, May
1, 2000.) The Secretary’s Advisory
Committee on Transplantation (ACOT)
recently recommended that OPOs be
encouraged to develop, evaluate, and
support the implementation of
improved management protocols for
potential donors. The ACOT noted that
the UNOS ‘‘Critical Pathway’’ is a
‘‘novel and improved’’ standard of care
for heart and lung donors, and the
Committee called for development of
improved management standards for
recovery of other types of organs.
Currently, the CDC’s ‘‘Guidelines for
Preventing Transmission of Human
Immunodeficiency Virus Through
Transplantation of Human Tissue and
Organs’’ are appended to our OPO
regulations, but we are not proposing to
include them in our new regulations.
Once guidelines are appended to
Federal regulations, agencies can
incorporate new guidelines only
through the rulemaking process.
Therefore, we propose removing the
CDC guidelines from the OPO
regulations and requiring, instead, that
OPOs arrange for donor screening and
testing for infectious disease following
current standards of practice. This
requirement would give OPOs the
flexibility to follow the most up-to-date
guidelines for preventing transmission
of infectious disease. We would expect
OPOs to change their testing practices
quickly if the organ donation and
transplantation community agrees that a
change is indicated.
For example, in 2001 three transplant
recipients were infected with the
parasite that causes Chagas disease after
receiving organs from a donor from
Central America. One of the recipients
later died from the disease. Chagas
disease is endemic in Latin America but
had not previously been reported in the
United States. Although at present there
is no test available in the United States
to screen donors or organs for the
presence of Chagas disease, if a test
becomes available and the OPTN and
CDC recommend that OPOs use the test
to screen potential donors, we would
regard that testing as being part of
current standards of practice for donor
testing.
We propose requiring that all testing
of potential donors (including point-ofcare testing and blood typing) be
conducted by a laboratory that is
certified in the appropriate specialty or
subspecialty of service in accordance
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with part 493 (that is, the CLIA
regulations). Thus, an OPO using its
own mobile unit to perform point-ofcare testing for management of donors
before organ recovery would be required
to have the appropriate CLIA
certification. The OPO would be
required to ensure that the donor’s
blood is typed using two separate blood
samples. Furthermore, we would
require OPOs to document donor
records with all test results, including
blood type, before organ recovery.
To provide opportunity for
improvements in partnerships between
OPOs and the transplant hospitals in
their service areas, we would require
OPOs to establish protocols
collaboratively with transplant hospitals
that clearly define the roles and
responsibilities of the OPO and the
transplant hospital for all activities
associated with donor evaluation, donor
management, and organ recovery.
In February 2003, a medical error
occurred at a large university hospital
that made headlines across the country.
Surgeons at the hospital transplanted a
heart and lungs from a type A donor
into a type O recipient. The recipient
immediately began to reject the
mismatched organs, and a second
transplant several days later from a
donor of the correct blood type failed to
save her life. Although a number of
errors and mistaken assumptions on the
part of the hospital and both OPOs
involved in the procurement of the
organs led to the mismatched
transplant, it could have been prevented
by better communication between the
hospital and the OPOs involved in
procuring and placing the organ.
Therefore, we propose requiring OPOs
to include in the protocol the
procedures to be used to ensure that the
blood type of the donor is compared
with the blood type of the intended
recipient by two OPO staff members
before organ recovery takes place and
that documentation of the donor’s blood
type accompanies the organ to the
transplant hospital.
OPOs would be required to review the
protocols periodically with their
transplant hospitals to incorporate best
practices and maximize placement of
transplantable organs. We believe that
implementation of current,
comprehensive protocols would
improve donor evaluation, management
and organ recovery and contribute to the
maximum number of organs per donor
recovered and transplanted.
In our investigation of the
mismatched transplant, we found that
the OPOs involved did not obtain
documentation of the recipient’s blood
type or position on the waiting list from
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the OPTN. Therefore, we propose
requiring that before recovery of an
organ for transplantation, an OPO must
have written documentation from the
OPTN showing, at a minimum, the
intended recipient’s OPTN
identification number and blood type,
as well as the recipient’s position on the
waiting list in relation to other suitable
candidates. We have included
additional safeguards in this proposed
rule (see § 486.346) to prevent
mismatched transplants.
Section 371(b)(3)(E) of the PHS Act
requires OPOs to ‘‘have a system to
allocate donated organs among
transplant patients according to
established medical criteria.’’ The OPTN
develops the medical criteria upon
which allocation policies are based with
the input of the organ donation and
transplantation community. Therefore,
we propose retaining the requirement in
the current regulations that OPOs have
a system to equitably allocate donated
organs among transplant patients
consistent with the rules of the OPTN.
However, we propose adding language
to clarify that the ‘‘rules’’ of the OPTN
are those that have been approved as
enforceable by the Secretary.
We are proposing a requirement that
OPOs develop and implement a
protocol that maximizes placement of
transplantable organs. This means that
OPOs should be aware of organ
acceptance criteria for centers outside
their service areas and make every
possible effort to place healthy organs.
We would encourage OPOs to include
organ placement in their QAPI programs
and explore innovative ideas for
maximizing both organ recovery and
transplantation.
According to the Collaborative’s
report, LifeLink of Florida evaluates
every brain death on-site at the hospital,
regardless of the patient’s age, medical
history, or social history, and makes
every effort to find potential recipients
for marginal or ‘‘extended criteria’’
organs. LifeGift’s philosophy includes
‘‘turning potential donors previously
considered unsuitable into actual
donors.’’
Many OPOs have developed
innovative methods for maximizing the
number of organs they place and
recover. For example, the Hawaii OPO
has partnered with a California
transplant hospital to arrange for hearts
donated in Hawaii to be transplanted in
California, even though the transport
time to California is at the upper limits
of the acceptable cold ischemic time for
a heart. At the July 2002 meeting of the
North American Transplant
Coordinators Organization in
Washington, DC, OPOs presented case
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studies and abstracts describing their
successes in recovering organs from
marginal donors. Gift of Life OPO in
Philadelphia presented an abstract
documenting its success in
implementing a comprehensive
initiative for recovering organs from
pediatric donors after cardiac death
(that is, non-heartbeating donors). From
1995 through 2001, 55 organs recovered
by the OPO from pediatric donors after
cardiac death were successfully
transplanted. Gift of Life also presented
an abstract demonstrating the number of
viable organs they recovered from
donors over the age of 60 and a case
study describing how optimal donor
management, biopsy, and perfusion
enabled them to recover viable kidneys
from a donor with initially poor kidney
function.
Condition: Organ Preparation and
Transport (Proposed § 486.346)
[If you choose to comment on this
section, please include the caption
‘‘Organ preparation and transport’’ at
the beginning of your comments.]
Our current regulations have minimal
requirements for OPOs for organ
preparation and transport. OPOs are
required only to arrange for appropriate
tissue typing of organs and to provide or
arrange for transportation of organs to
transplant hospitals. There are no
requirements for organ packaging in the
current regulations.
We propose requiring OPOs to arrange
for testing of organs for infectious
disease and tissue typing of organs
according to current standards of
practice. The OPO would be required to
ensure that testing and tissue typing of
organs are conducted by a laboratory
that is certified in the appropriate
specialty or subspecialty of service in
accordance with part 493 of this
chapter.
We propose requiring OPOs to
develop and follow a protocol for
packaging, labeling, handling and
transporting organs in a manner that
ensures their arrival without
compromise to the quality of the organ
or the health of the recipient. OPOs
would be required to include
procedures to check the accuracy and
integrity of labels, packaging, and
contents before transport, including two
separate verifications of the data on the
labels and in the documentation that
accompanies an organ to a transplant
center.
The impetus for this proposal came
from an incident that occurred in
Illinois in 2000. In packaging organs for
shipment, an OPO mixed up the label
identifying a kidney intended for
transplantation with the label for a heart
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intended for research. It was only after
the intended kidney recipient had been
anesthetized and surgery had begun that
hospital staff discovered the OPO had
sent a heart instead of a kidney.
In investigating the incident, we
discovered that while organ mix-ups are
rare, they are not unheard of, and no
one in the OPO community seemed
surprised that it had happened. In fact,
the OPTN/UNOS OPO Committee
recently documented 15 instances of
organ packaging errors that occurred
over a period of only 6 months. These
errors included three organs shipped
without sufficient ice, a right kidney
shipped instead of the left kidney
expected by the transplant hospital, a
vessel container leaking (thus
compromising the sterile integrity of
segments of the donor’s aorta and
inferior vena cava intended for use in
the transplant procedure), as well as
other errors that may have resulted in
organ wastage. Although the OPTN has
packaging requirements for OPOs,
clearly, the requirements have not been
sufficient to prevent errors that waste
organs and endanger recipients. In light
of the critical nature of the organ
shortage, such errors are unacceptable.
Finally, an OPO would be required to
mark all packaging in which organs are
transported with the identification
number, specific contents, and donor’s
blood type. This requirement is one of
our proposals to guard against
transplantation of organs mismatched
by blood type or delivery of the wrong
organ to a transplant center.
Condition: Quality Assessment and
Performance Improvement (QAPI)
§ 486.348
[If you choose to comment on this
section, please include the caption
‘‘Quality Assessment and Performance
Improvement’’ at the beginning of your
comments.]
There is no requirement in current
regulations that OPOs have a QAPI
program. Although our regulations for
most Medicare providers and suppliers
require, at the least, a quality assurance
program (the ‘‘find a problem, fix it’’
approach), there is no corresponding
requirement in the OPO regulations.
QAPI is the process of using objective
data to study and continually make
improvements to all aspects of an
organization’s operations and services.
QAPI rests on the assumption that an
organization’s own quality management
system is the key to improved
performance. It seeks to increase the
amount and quality of information on
which to base decisions and improve
quality. QAPI programs allow health
care entities to assess their functioning
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continuously and make changes to
improve their quality and efficiency.
QAPI is regarded by the health care
community as the most efficient and
effective method for improving the
quality and performance of health care
providers. QAPI has become so
pervasive that in a recent publication of
the Institute of Medicine (IOM) of the
National Academy of Sciences,
‘‘Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New
Health System for the 21st Century,’’ the
IOM recommended that the Department
itself should monitor and track quality
improvements in six key areas including
safety, effectiveness, responsiveness to
patients, timeliness, efficiency, and
equity.
However, as the focus on improving
outcomes in health care shifted from
quality assurance to QAPI, OPOs
seemed to be left behind, perhaps
because they do not provide hands-on
health care to patients. Nevertheless, an
OPO’s success in recovering healthy
organs impacts patients who need
transplants due to end-stage organ
failure just as surely as if the OPO were
providing direct care to those patients.
Although some OPOs have strong
QAPI programs and use them to effect
change both within their own
organizations and within their hospitals,
some OPOs’ QAPI programs are
inadequate to drive badly needed
systemic changes. Some OPOs admit
that, as a group, they tend to be reactive
rather than proactive, fixing individual
problems instead of systems.
Nonetheless, it appears that OPOs are
catching up with the rest of the health
care community. We know that most
OPOs have a quality improvement
program. Some programs are
comprehensive, highly structured, and
completely integrated into the day-today operations of the OPO. OPOs with
these programs utilize them for databased decision making and strategic
planning. Other OPOs are still
developing and formalizing their QAPI
programs.
In November 2001, AOPO conducted
a survey to assess quality improvement
programs among OPOs. Of the 35 OPOs
that responded to the survey,
approximately 40 percent had been
developing a quality program for 2 years
or less, and only 43 percent had
designated an individual whose primary
responsibility was coordinating and
monitoring a quality improvement
program. However, approximately 67
percent had made quality improvement
part of their strategic plans and had
developed appropriate measures or
indicators of work system effectiveness
for most major activities.
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However, AOPO notes that due to
several factors, there has been
significant growth in quality
improvement among OPOs since the
November 2001 survey. These factors
include: (1) The Department’s
Breakthrough Collaborative, which
utilizes QAPI-type strategies to improve
donation rates; (2) the Department’s
initiative to provide comparative data
from the SRTR to all OPOs and the
public; (3) new perspectives on quality
improvement gleaned from individuals
hired by OPOs from outside the OPO
community; (4) sharing of quality
improvement plans among OPOs; and
(5) the growth and activism of AOPO’s
Quality Council. These factors have
provided all OPOs with opportunities to
expand and improve their quality
improvement programs.
All six high-performing OPOs studied
during the Organ Donation
Breakthrough Collaborative have a
process (such as death record reviews)
for collecting hospital-specific data and
using the data both in their hospital
development programs and to effect
change within their own organizations.
New England Organ Bank collects and
monitors hospital-specific data on
requests, consents, organs recovered,
and organs transplants and reviews the
data with hospital leadership every
month. Included in their QAPI program
are ‘‘formalized feedback mechanisms,’’
such as weekly meetings with OPO staff,
monthly meetings with hospital staff,
post-donation briefings with all
involved OPO and hospital staff, along
with two data reporting mechanisms
(quantitative and qualitative reports).
We believe it is critical for every OPO
to have such a comprehensive QAPI
program (that is, a program that
addresses all aspects of an OPO’s
functioning and the functioning of its
hospitals in the organ donation process).
As a recent article describing
characteristics of successful OPOs
pointed out, ‘‘OPOs no longer have the
luxury of using trial and error in
determining which programs will
increase organ donation, which factors
are key for success.’’ (Shafer, T., Kappel,
D., Heinrichs, D., Strategies for success
among OPOs: a study of three organ
procurement organizations. Journal of
Transplant Coordination. V.7, No.1: 22–
31.)
Therefore, we are proposing a
requirement for every OPO to develop,
implement, and maintain a
comprehensive, data-driven QAPI
program designed to monitor and
evaluate all donation services, including
services provided under contract or
arrangement. The OPO’s QAPI program
must include the use of objective
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measures to evaluate and demonstrate
improved performance with regard to
OPO activities.
These requirements are based on our
commitment to encouraging continuous
quality improvement for all Medicare
providers and suppliers. As we develop
new regulations, we are shifting our
focus from targeting the substandard
practices of a small number of poor
performers to emphasizing the
responsibility of all Medicare providers
and suppliers for continuous quality
improvement in their own
organizations. QAPI is a regulatory
requirement for hospitals, Medicare +
Choice providers, and providers in the
Program for All-Inclusive Care for the
Elderly (PACE). QAPI has been
proposed as a requirement for home
health agencies and rural health clinics.
We believe a requirement for OPOs to
have a QAPI program will encourage
continuous quality improvement, as
well as the use of best practices, as
determined by the individual OPO and
the OPO community.
We do not intend to stipulate specific
activities an OPO must include in its
QAPI program. However, we suggest
that all OPOs track and take actions to
improve their consent rates. Although
knowledge is the foundation for
performance improvement, some OPOs
do not know their consent rates, either
for their service area as a whole or for
individual hospitals. Nationwide, the
consent rate to organ donation hovers
around 50 percent, and it is generally
agreed that families’ failure to consent
to donation is the single most important
roadblock to increasing donation.
Although there is some evidence that
public education efforts targeted toward
increasing the public’s awareness of and
support for organ donation may result in
an increase in consent rates, the single
greatest opportunity for increasing
consent rates lies within the interaction
among OPO staffs, hospital staffs, and
potential donor families.
We propose requiring an OPO’s QAPI
program to include objective measures
to evaluate and demonstrate improved
performance with regard to OPO
activities, such as hospital development,
designated requestor training, donor
management, timeliness of response to
hospital referrals, consent practices,
organ recovery, and organ packaging
and transport. The OPO would be
required to take actions that result in
performance improvements and track
performance to ensure that
improvements are sustained.
There are many resources available to
OPOs to develop and improve QAPI
within their organizations. The AOPO
Quality Council is available to assist all
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AOPO members interested in QAPI. The
Council has a quality improvement list
serve and a chat room used for
mentoring and for scheduled
discussions of quality improvement
topics. The Council holds meetings for
all interested OPOs three times per year,
with training in basic and intermediate
level QAPI, basic quality assurance
statistics and data analysis,
implementation of quality plans, flow
charting, root cause analysis, and
preparation for audits and surveys.
In addition, the resources of both
CMS (through the OPO Coordinators)
and HRSA’s Division of Transplantation
(DOT) are available to OPOs to assist
them in implementing QAPI. CMS OPO
Coordinators are always available to
assist OPOs with their QAPI programs.
Once a final rule is published, the CMS
OPO Coordinators will provide
guidance to OPOs so that they
thoroughly understand how to
implement the QAPI requirements in
the regulation.
When OPOs are surveyed to see if
they meet the requirements for QAPI,
surveyors initially would focus on
whether an OPO has or is developing a
QAPI program. If a QAPI program were
still in the development phase,
surveyors would determine what
remains to be accomplished, what steps
the OPO needed to take to have a
comprehensive, fully integrated
program, and what resources it would
need to reach that goal. When an OPO
is surveyed for the QAPI requirement
for the first time under the final OPO
rule, the OPO would not be cited for
being out of compliance, as long as it
had a QAPI program in some stage of
development and was working to
expand and improve the program with
the goal being a comprehensive, datadriven program to monitor and evaluate
all donation services.
The hospital CoP at § 482.45(a)(5) and
critical access hospital CoP at § 485.643
require hospitals to cooperate with
OPOs in reviewing death records to
improve identification of potential
donors. We included this requirement
in the hospital and critical access
hospital CoPs because missed
opportunities for donation are not
uncommon, and review of hospitals’
death records is essential for both OPOs
and the hospitals they serve to
determine where and how systems need
to be changed to ensure future potential
donors are identified.
We propose requiring hospital death
record reviews as a component of every
OPO’s QAPI program. OPOs would be
expected to use data from their death
record reviews as the basis for their
quality improvement efforts. We believe
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that to have sufficient data on which to
base changes in their organizations,
OPOs must perform death record
reviews on an ongoing basis. Death
record reviews provide information
about nearly the entire range of an
OPO’s critical operations, as well as the
performance of the OPO’s hospitals in
the donation process. Death record
reviews provide information about the
timeliness of hospital referrals of
potential donors, the timeliness of the
OPO’s response, OPO or hospital staffs’
interactions with family members,
management of potential donors, and
other matters that affect quality. The
information OPOs gain from periodic
death record reviews can be used to
identify and correct systemic problems
that interfere with organ donation.
In a 1997 article, ‘‘Medical Record
Review as a Measure of the
Effectiveness of Organ Procurement
Practices in the Hospital,’’ [The Joint
Commission Journal on Quality
Improvement, Vol. 23, No. 6, June 1997]
The Partnership for Organ Donation
concluded that death record reviews
provide a solid foundation for
identifying gaps in organ procurement
performance, implementing and
tracking the success of [quality
improvement] initiatives, and
monitoring ongoing performance The
researchers recommended that OPOs
conduct death record reviews annually
at large hospitals where medically
suitable donor candidates are
concentrated and provide feedback from
the death record reviews to key hospital
staff concerning practice improvements
that could be adopted. The researchers
suggested annual death record reviews
at hospitals with 150 or more beds or
with trauma centers.
As stated earlier, the organ donation
community recognizes that death record
reviews are the ‘‘gold standard’’ for
assessing donor potential and improving
organ donation rates. In fact, in
discussions with directors of OPOs that
perform death record reviews, we were
told that OPOs that do not perform them
are ‘‘missing the boat’’ because they
have no way of knowing their true
donor potential and no way of
identifying and addressing problems.
Although death record reviews are labor
intensive, they are well worth the effort
expended.
The Michigan OPO, Gift of Life,
recently demonstrated what can be
accomplished by using death record
reviews as the basis for improving organ
donation rates. The OPO used data from
death record reviews performed
monthly in Michigan’s leading organ
donation hospital to determine that
organ donors could be increased in key
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critical care units in the hospital. The
OPO partnered with the hospital to
increase organ donation rates. The OPO
made a commitment to (1) Respond on
site to every referral; (2) provide
monthly in-service education to resident
physicians in the key units; and (3)
follow up on all cases within 96 hours
of every referral to obtain information
for improving systems for donation. The
result—from 2000 to 2001, the hospital’s
organ donation rate increased by 48
percent to 40 donors and the rate of
organs recovered increased by 43
percent to 143 organs.
At the Joint American Transplant
Meeting, ‘‘Transplantation 2001’’
conference held from May 11–16 2001
in Chicago, a group of researchers,
including the researchers from the
AOPO death record review study,
presented results from a study that used
death record reviews to understand
opportunities for increasing organ
donation within an OPO service area.
The researchers concluded that: (1)
Increasing organ donation can be
achieved by focusing on hospitals with
150 or more beds known to have organ
donor potential by death record review;
(2) death record reviews offer an
objective way to prioritize hospitals by
potential and to tailor interventions
within each hospital to address specific
obstacles to donation; and (3) by
focusing on hospitals with 150 or more
beds, OPOs can reach more than 90
percent of their target market.
Therefore, we propose that an OPO be
required to conduct death record
reviews in every Medicare or Medicaid
participating hospital with which it has
an agreement if the hospital has 150 or
more beds or if it has a level I or level
II trauma center, with the exception of
psychiatric or rehabilitation hospitals.
(We propose excluding psychiatric and
rehabilitation hospitals because of their
limited organ donation potential.) When
missed opportunities for donation are
identified, the OPO would be required
to implement actions to improve
performance.
As part of the QAPI process, an OPO
would be required to investigate adverse
events and complete a thorough
analysis. An adverse event for an OPO
could be caused by mismanagement of
a donor, failure to test organs for
infectious disease, failure to compare
the blood type of the donor with the
blood type of the intended recipient, or
mixing up the labels on packaged
organs. Examples of situations involving
direct patient outcomes that might
qualify as adverse events include but are
not limited to: (1) Avoidable loss of a
medically suitable potential donor for
whom consent for donation has been
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obtained; (2) avoidable loss of a viable
organ; (3) transmission of infectious
disease to a recipient, and delivery to a
transplant center of the wrong organ (for
example, a left kidney instead of a right
kidney or a kidney instead of pancreas)
or an organ whose blood type does not
match the blood type of the intended
recipient.
In addition, we are proposing that an
OPO be required to report an adverse
event to us within 10 business days of
becoming aware of the event and
provide written documentation of the
investigation and analysis of the adverse
event to us within 15 days of becoming
aware of the event. The OPO would be
required to implement changes and
safeguards to decrease the probability of
the adverse event recurring. We believe
that this formal analysis is essential to
examining an OPO’s existing policies
and practices, improving the organ
donation process, and improving
outcomes. We believe the proposed time
frames for reporting and providing
written documentation would be
sufficient and would ensure prompt
attention by the OPO to adverse events.
We believe the requirements we
propose for OPOs to develop and
implement QAPI programs, perform
death record reviews, report and
analyze adverse events, and operate
under a CAP, as needed, would provide
concrete steps OPOs can use to improve
their operations and increase organ
donation. We also believe these
proposed requirements are the single
most important provision in this
proposed rule to fulfill the
congressional mandate for process
performance measures based on
empirical evidence of organ donor
potential and other related factors in
OPO service areas.
Additional Conforming Changes
(§ 413.200, (§ 413.202, § 441.13, and
§ 498.2)
In addition to the changes discussed
above, we are also proposing a number
of conforming and correcting
amendments.
As discussed previously, we propose
making changes to § 498.1 to remove
OPOs from the definition of ‘‘supplier’’
under part 498. Since we propose a
process for OPOs to appeal a decertification on substantive and
procedural grounds, OPOs would not
need the part 498 appeals process.
We also propose to correct a number
of cross-references related to the
certification of OPOs. In § 441.13(c), and
in § 498.2, we propose to change
references to ‘‘part 485, subpart D’’ to
read, ‘‘part 486, subpart G’’. On
September 29, 1995 (60 FR 50447), the
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conditions for coverage for OPOs was
re-designated from part 485, subpart D
to part 486, subpart G. When this redesignation occurred, these two
references were not amended to reflect
the change.
In addition, § 413.202 refers to OPOs
‘‘as defined in § 435.302 or this
chapter’’. This is an error. We propose
correcting this reference to read ‘‘as
defined in § 486.302 of this chapter’’.
Request for Comments on Related Issues
Living Donation
[If you choose to comment on this
section, please include the caption
‘‘OPO role in living donation’’ at the
beginning of your comments.]
In 2001, living donors outnumbered
deceased donors for the first time, with
6,445 living donors and only 6,077
deceased donors. However, with the
exception of two pilot programs in
which OPOs assist transplant hospitals
by arranging for medical and
psychological evaluations of voluntary
living kidney donors, the 59 OPOs do
not play a role in living donation; their
mission is to increase the number of
deceased donors. Given the
demonstrated risks to donors (primarily
living liver donors), we believe that
living donation should remain a
medical decision between individuals
interested in donating and their
physicians. However, in view of the
increasing importance of living
donation, we are specifically requesting
public comments on what role, if any,
OPOs should play in living donation.
Public Education
[If you choose to comment on this
section, please include the caption
‘‘Public Education’’ at the beginning of
your comments.]
The current regulations at
§ 486.306(p) require that OPOs conduct
and participate in professional
education concerning organ
procurement, but they do not contain a
requirement for public education.
However, most OPOs are aware of the
importance of the role public education
plays in reaching ethnic populations,
dispelling myths about organ donation,
and addressing other issues that create
barriers for consent to donation. Many
in the OPO community believe that
targeted public education about organ
donation plays a key role in overcoming
these barriers. Some researchers
however, believe that available funding
should go to basic research, professional
education, and hospital development
rather than public education.
While we believe that systematic
efforts by OPOs to identify specific
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barriers to donation, along with public
education programs designed to address
those barriers, may result in increased
rates of consent to donation among
targeted populations, the OPO
community appears to lack consensus
about this issue. Therefore, we have not
included requirements for public
education in this proposed rule.
However, we are specifically requesting
comments on the advisability of
requiring OPOs to conduct public
education based on systematic
evaluation of specific barriers to
donation within their individual service
areas.
III. Collection of Information
Requirements
Under the Paperwork Reduction Act
of 1995, we are required to provide 60day notice in the Federal Register and
solicit public comment before a
collection of information requirement is
submitted to the Office of Management
and Budget (OMB) for review and
approval. In order to fairly evaluate
whether an information collection
should be approved by OMB, section
3506(c)(2)(A) of the Paperwork
Reduction Act of 1995 requires that we
solicit comment on the following issues:
• The need for the information
collection and its usefulness in carrying
out the proper functions of our agency.
• The accuracy of our estimate of the
information collection burden.
• The quality, utility, and clarity of
the information to be collected.
• Recommendations to minimize the
information collection burden on the
affected public, including automated
collection techniques.
We are soliciting public comment on
each of these issues for the following
sections of this document that contain
information collection requirements
(ICRs):
General Requirements (§ 486.304)
For designation purposes, an
organization would have to meet
specified requirements, including:
It would have to have accounting and
other fiscal procedures necessary to
assure the fiscal stability of the
organization, including procedures to
obtain payment for organs provided to
transplant centers.
It would have to submit to CMS a
written application for designation,
using the application form prescribed by
CMS.
It would have to document that it has
a defined service area that meets the
requirements of § 486.306.
An OPO would have to enter into an
agreement with CMS. In the agreement,
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the OPO would have to agree to do
comply with the following ICRs:
(1) Maintain compliance with cited
laws, regulations and rules of the OPTN,
as defined by § 486.20, and to report
promptly to the Secretary any failure to
do so.
(2) File a cost report in accordance
with § 413.24(f) of this chapter within 5
months after the end of each fiscal year.
(3) Provide budget or cost projection
information as may be required to
establish an initial interim payment
rate.
The ICRs in this section are those that
would require an OPO to have
accounting and other fiscal procedures;
to submit a written application for
designation, using a form prescribed by
CMS; to enter into an agreement with
CMS; and to document that it has a
defined service area that meets specified
requirements.
These ICRs are currently approved
under OMB approval #0938–0512.
OPO Service Area Size Designation and
Documentation Requirements
(§ 486.306)
Under this section, an OPO would
have to make available to CMS
documentation verifying that the OPO
meets the requirements of paragraph (b)
and (c) of this section at the time of
application and throughout the period
of its designation.
Under paragraph (c), Service area
location and characteristics, an OPO
would have to precisely define and
document a proposed service area’s
location through the following
information:
(1) The names of counties (or parishes
in Louisiana) served or, if the service
area includes an entire State, the name
of the State.
(2) Geographic boundaries of the
service area for which U.S. population
statistics are available.
(3) Total population in service area.
(4) The number of and the names of
hospitals in the service area with an
operating room and the equipment and
personnel to retrieve organs.
The ICR in this section would be that
requiring making documentation
available. We believe that it would take
a typical OPO an average of 1 hour to
make the information available. There
are 59 OPOs that would have to comply
with this requirement; therefore, there
would be a total of 59 hours needed to
comply annually.
with the newly designated OPO or
submit a request for a waiver in
accordance with paragraph (e) of this
section within 30 days of notice of the
change in designation.
A hospital would be able to request
and CMS might grant a waiver
permitting the hospital to have an
agreement with a designated OPO other
than the OPO designated for the service
area in which the hospital is located. To
qualify for a waiver, the hospital would
have to submit data to CMS establishing
that—
(1) The waiver is expected to increase
organ donations; and
(2) The waiver will ensure equitable
treatment of patients referred for
transplants within the service area
served by the hospital’s designated OPO
and within the service area served by
the OPO with which the hospital seeks
to enter into an agreement.
The burden associated with this
section is the time it would take a
hospital to request a waiver and to
create an agreement with an OPO. We
estimate that there will be 6 hospitals
that would request a waiver and that all
of these would need to enter into an
agreement with the designated OPO.
Under 5 CFR 1320.3(c), a ‘‘collection
of information’’ does not include
requirements imposed on fewer than ten
entities. Therefore, the ICRs of this
section are not subject to the PRA.
Designation of One OPO for Each
Service Area (§ 486.308)
Changes in Ownership or Service Area
(§ 486.310)
Under this section, a designated OPO
considering a change in ownership or in
its service area would have to notify
CMS before putting it into effect and
would have to obtain prior CMS
approval. In the case of a service area
change that results from a change of
ownership due to merger or
consolidation, the entities would have
to submit anew the information required
in an application for designation. The
OPO would have to provide information
specific to the board structure of the
new organization, as well as operating
budgets, financial information, or other
written documentation CMS determines
to be necessary for designation.
The burden associated with this
section is the time it takes to gather and
submit the information CMS needs. We
estimate that two OPOs would be
affected annually and that it will be the
same amount of time it would take a
potential OPO requesting designation
and is covered under OMB approval
#0938–0512.
If CMS changes the OPO designated
for an area, hospitals located in that area
would have to enter into agreements
De-Certification (§ 486.312)
Under this section, if an OPO wishes
to terminate its agreement, it would
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have to send written notice of its
intention with the proposed effective
date to CMS. In the case of voluntary
termination, the OPO would have to
give prompt public notice of the date of
termination, and such information
regarding the effect of that termination
as CMS may require, through
publication in local newspapers in the
service area. In the case of involuntary
termination, CMS gives notice of the
date of termination.
The burden associated with these
requirements is the time it would take
to send written notice to CMS and to
publish pertinent information in the
local newspapers. We estimate that one
OPO would be affected by these
requirements per year.
Under 5 CFR 1320.3(c), a ‘‘collection
of information’’ does not include
requirements imposed on fewer than ten
entities. Therefore, the ICRs of this
section are not subject to the PRA.
Appeals (§ 486.314)
Under this section, if an OPO’s decertification is due to involuntary
termination or non-renewal of its
agreement with CMS, the OPO may
appeal the de-certification on
substantive or procedural grounds. The
OPO must file its appeal within 30
calendar days of the date of the notice
of de-certification. In its appeal, the
OPO may submit evidence to
demonstrate why it should not be decertified.
The burden associated with this
provision is the time it will take an OPO
to file an appeal. We do not expect to
decertify more than three OPOs in a
given year.
Under 5 CFR 1320.3(c), a ‘‘collection
of information’’ does not include
requirements imposed on fewer than ten
entities. Therefore, the ICRs of this
section are not subject to the PRA.
Re-Certification and Competition
Processes (§ 486.316)
Under this section, OPOs competing
for the open service area must submit an
acceptable plan to increase organ
donation in the open service area. An
acceptable plan to increase organ
donation would, at a minimum:
(1) Be based on the competing OPO’s
experience and success in its own
service area;
(2) Include an analysis of existing
barriers, both internal and external, to
increasing organ donation in the open
area; and
(3) Provide a detailed description of
specific activities and interventions for
increasing organ donation in the open
area.
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The burden associated with this
requirement is the time it would take to
create the plan and to submit it. We
expect that it would take approximately
16 hours to develop an acceptable plan
to increase organ donation. In each of
the 1996, 1998, and 2000 re-certification
cycles, approximately two to three
OPOs failed the performance standards.
Therefore, we do not anticipate
terminating more than three OPOs in
any four-year period. In previous recertification cycles no more than two
OPOs have competed for an open
service area. Therefore, we do not
believe that more than two OPOs would
compete for an open area. Therefore, we
expect that no more than 6 OPOs would
compete for service areas of OPOs being
de-certified by CMS.
We propose limiting competition for
the service areas of OPOs that have met
the conditions of coverage to OPOs that
have met 4 out of 5 outcome measures
at 100 percent of the mean and whose
conversion rate of potential donors to
actual donors is at least 15 percentage
points higher than the incumbent’s
conversion rate. It is likely that no more
than 15 OPOs (those in the upper
quartile) would fall into this category.
Therefore, we expect that no more
than 21 OPOs would want to develop an
acceptable plan to increase organ
donation as part of a bid to expand into
a new service area. Assuming that it
would take 16 hours to develop such a
plan, the burden would be 336 hours.
Condition: Relationships With
Hospitals, Tissue Banks, and Eye Banks
(§ 486.322)
Under this section, an OPO would
have to have a written agreement with
95% of the Medicare and Medicaid
hospitals in its service area that have
both a ventilator and an operating room,
that describes the responsibilities of
both the OPO and hospital in regard to
the requirements for hospitals in
§ 482.45. The agreement would have to
address the requirement in § 486.326
that the OPO would have to maintain
credentialing records for physicians
who routinely recover organs in
hospitals under contract or arrangement
with the OPO and would have to assure
that physicians and other practitioners
who recover organs in hospitals are
qualified and trained.
The burden associated with these
ICRs would be the time it will take an
OPO to enter into an agreement with a
hospital. Currently, OPOs are likely to
have agreements with all hospitals in
their service areas because the hospital
CoP for organ, tissue, and eye
procurement, which was effective
August 21, 1998 (see section 482.45)
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requires all hospitals to have agreements
with their OPO. We believe that it
would take an average of two hours to
draft an agreement with a hospital.
Condition: Administration and
Governing Body (§ 486.324)
Under this section, the OPO would
have to have bylaws for its board(s) that
address conflicts of interest, length of
terms, and criteria for selecting and
removing members.
A governing body or individual
would have to have full legal authority
and responsibility for the management
and provision of all OPO services and
would have to develop and implement
policies and procedures necessary for
the effective administration of the OPO,
including services furnished under
contract or arrangement, fiscal
operations, and continuous quality
assessment and performance
improvement.
The OPO would have to have a
procedure to address conflicts of
interest for the governing body or
individual described above.
The burden associated with the above
requirements is the time it would take
an OPO to create bylaws and to develop
policies and procedures necessary for
the effective administration of the OPO.
It is usual and customary business
practice to have such bylaws, policies,
and procedures; therefore, there would
be no additional burden.
Condition: Human Resources
(§ 486.326)
The first ICR in this section is that we
would require the OPO to have a written
policy that addresses conflicts of
interest for the OPO’s director, medical
director, and senior management, and
procurement coordinators.
Another ICR would be that the OPO
must maintain credentialing records for
physicians who routinely recover organs
in hospitals with which the OPO has an
agreement.
The third ICR is that the OPO would
have to reevaluate staff competency at
least yearly and provide individual job
descriptions and performance
expectations to staff.
The burden associated with this
section is the time it would take an OPO
to document policy, maintain records
and to provide job descriptions and
expectations. These requirements reflect
usual and customary business practices
and thus do not create any additional
burden.
Condition: Reporting of Data (§ 486.328)
Under this section, the OPO would
have to provide individually
identifiable, hospital-specific organ
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donation and transplantation data to the
OPTN and the SRTR, as directed by the
Secretary. The OPO would have to
provide hospital-specific data directly to
transplant hospitals, annually. In
addition, the OPO would be required to
provide individually identifiable,
hospital-specific organ donation and
transplantation and other information to
the Secretary, as requested. Such data
may include, but are not limited to—
(1) Number of hospital deaths;
(2) Results of death record reviews;
(3) Number and timeliness of referral
calls from hospitals;
(4) Potential donor denominator (as
defined in 486.302);
(5) Data related to non-recovery of
organs,
(6) Data about consents for donation;
(7) Number of donors;
(8) Number of organs recovered (by
type of organ); and
(9) Number of organs transplanted (by
type of organ).
This section would also require that
potential donor data reported to the
OPTN to be used for OPO recertification would have to include data
for all deaths that occurred in hospitals
in the OPO’s service area, unless a
hospital has a waiver to work with a
different OPO. If an OPO determines
through death record review or other
means that the potential donor
denominator data it reported to the
OPTN was incorrect, it must report the
corrected data to the OPTN.
The OPO would have to report
hospital-specific organ donation data to
the public at least annually.
The burden associated with these
requirements is the time it would take
the OPOs to report certain information.
We believe that this would take no more
than 4 hours per OPO per year, or a
national total of 236 hours. In addition,
although it appears this requirement has
the potential to add a significant new
reporting burden, OPOs are required as
a condition of their membership in the
OPTN to report a large amount of data
to the OPTN (which, in turn, provides
the data to the SRTR for analysis). For
example, the cadaver donor registration
form (OMB approval #0915–0157) OPOs
are required to complete for each donor
contains more than 300 data elements.
In addition, 42 CFR 121.11(b)(2)
requires OPOs and transplant hospitals
to submit information about transplant
candidates, transplant recipients, organ
donors, transplant program costs and
performance, and ‘‘other information
that the Secretary deems appropriate.’’
Thus, most information needed by the
OPTN, the SRTR or the Department is
already being reported by OPOs.
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We cannot quantify the number of
hours it would take to comply with the
data reporting requirement, as data
would be requested on an as-needed
basis. We believe that almost any OPO
data needed by CMS or other agencies
within the Department could be
obtained from the OPTN or the SRTR.
We are including this provision only to
give CMS and other agencies the
flexibility to request data from OPOs in
the event that needed data cannot be
obtained expeditiously from the OPTN
or the SRTR. We would not request data
from OPOs if the data were readily
available from other sources.
Concerning the requirement that
OPOs give data to the public, almost all
OPOs publish newsletters to inform the
public of their activities, and, most
likely, OPOs would report the hospital
data in their newsletters at very little
additional cost. For those OPOs that do
not publish newsletters, we estimate
that it would take 4 hours to create a
document suitable for publication
yearly. We estimate that three OPOs do
not have newsletters, for an annual
burden of 12 hours.
Condition: Information Management
(§ 486.330)
The ICRs under this section would
require the OPO to maintain a record for
every donor. The record would have to
include, at a minimum, information
identifying the donor (for example,
name, address, date of birth, social
security number), organs and (when
applicable) tissues and eyes recovered,
date of the organ recovery, donor
management data, all test results,
current hospital history, past medical
and social history, pronouncement of
depth, consent and next-of-kin
information. Donor records would have
to be maintained in a human readable
and reproducible format for 5 years.
The OPO would have to maintain data
in a format that can readily be
continued by a successor OPO and
would have to provide to CMS copies of
all records, data, and software necessary
to ensure uninterrupted service by a
successor OPO. Records and data
subject to this requirement would
include records of individual donors,
records on transplant candidates
(including identifying data and data on
immune system and other medical
indications) and procedural manuals
and other materials used in conducting
OPO operations.
Although these ICRs would be subject
to the PRA, we believe that all of them
reflect usual and customary business
practice and therefore have no added
burden.
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Condition: Informed Consent (§ 486.342)
The ICRs of this section would require
that an OPO have a written protocol to
ensure that the individual(s) making the
donation decision for each potential
organ donor is informed of their options
to donate organs and tissues or eyes
(when the OPO is making a request for
tissues or eyes) or to decline to donate
and are given sufficient time to consider
their decisions and sufficient
information on which to base fully
informed decisions. The OPO would
have to provide to the individual(s)
making the donation decision, at a
minimum, the following:
(1) A list of the organs, tissues, or eyes
to be recovered,
(2) All possible uses for the donated
organs and/or tissues,
(3) The information that the
individual(s) have the right to limit or
restrict use of the organs or tissues,
(4) A description of the screening and
recovery processes,
(5) Information (such as profit or nonprofit status) about organizations that
will recover, process, and distribute
tissue,
(6) Information regarding access to
and release of the donor’s medical
records,
(7) An explanation of the impact the
donation process will have on burial
arrangements and the appearance of the
donor’s body,
(8) Information about the procedure
for filing a complaint,
(9) Contact information in case the
individual(s) have questions, and
(10) A copy of the signed consent
form.
If an OPO does not request consent to
donation because a potential donor
consented to donation prior to his or her
death in a manner that satisfied
applicable State law requirements, the
OPO must provide information about
the donation to the family of the
potential donor, as requested.
We believe that all OPOs currently
have policies regarding informed
consent, so there would basically be no
additional burden to them as the
policies are usual and customary
business practice. (Some OPOs might
have to add some information, which
could minimally increase the time it
takes to inform the individual(s) making
the donation decision.)
Condition: Donor Evaluation and
Maintenance and Organ Placement and
Recovery (§ 486.344)
Under this section, the OPO must
have an effective written protocol for
donor evaluation and management and
organ placement and recovery.
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The OPO must document the donor’s
record with all test results, including
blood type, prior to organ recovery.
Prior to recovery of an organ for
transplantation, the OPO must have
written documentation from the OPTN
showing, at a minimum, the intended
recipient’s position on the waiting list
in relation to other suitable candidates
and the recipient’s OPTN identification
number and blood type.
The burden associated with this
requirement is the time it would take to
create the protocols. We believe that
good business practices would dictate
that an OPO have written protocols that
meet the requirements of this section.
Therefore, there would be no additional
burden.
Condition: Organ Preparation and
Transport (§ 486.346)
The ICR in this section requires that
the OPO develop and follow a written
protocol for packaging, labeling,
handling and shipping of organs in a
manner that ensures their arrival
without compromise to the quality of
the organ or health of the recipient. The
protocol would have to include
procedures to check the accuracy and
integrity of labels prior to transport.
The burden associated with this
requirement is the time it would take to
create the protocols. We believe that
good business practices would dictate
that an OPO have written protocols that
meet the requirements of this section.
Therefore, there would be no additional
burden.
Section 486.348 Condition: Quality
Assessment and Performance
Improvement (QAPI)
The ICRs under this section would
require the OPO to develop, implement,
and maintain a comprehensive, datadriven quality assessment and
performance improvement (QAPI)
program designed to monitor and
evaluate ongoing and overall
performance of all donation services,
including services provided under
contract or arrangement
An OPO would have to establish in
writing a policy to address adverse
events that occur during any phase of an
organ donation case. The policy would
have to address, at a minimum, the
process for identification, reporting,
analysis, and prevention of adverse
events.
The OPO would have to report an
adverse event to CMS and would have
to provide to CMS written
documentation of the investigation and
analysis of the adverse event within 15
days of reporting the adverse event.
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The burden associated with these
requirements would be the time
required to develop a QAPI and policy
regarding adverse events. It is also the
time it would take to report the adverse
events to CMS.
We believe that, as part of its usual
and customary business, a typical OPO
would already have a QAPI and a policy
regarding reviewing adverse events.
While we believe that each of the 58
OPOs already has a QAPI program in
place, the burden of reporting adverse
events is subject to the PRA. We
estimate that on average, CMS would
receive 30 adverse event reports
annually. We have assumed that each
report would require 30 minutes to
prepare, yielding a total annual burden
of 15 hours.
If you comment on these information
collection and record keeping
requirements, please mail copies
directly to the following:
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid
Services, Office of Strategic
Operations and Regulatory Affairs,
Division of Regulations Development,
Attn.: Dawn Willinghan, CMS–3064–
P, Room C5–14–03, 7500 Security
Boulevard, Baltimore, MD 21244–
1850.
Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs, Office of Management and
Budget, Room 10235, New Executive
Office Building, Washington, DC
20503, Attn: Christopher Martin, CMS
Desk Officer.
Comments submitted to OMB may
also be e-mailed to the following
address: e-mail: CMartin@omb.eop.gov;
or faxed to OMB at (202) 395–6974.
IV. Response to Comments
Because of the large number of items
of correspondence we normally receive
on Federal Register documents
published for comment, we are not able
to acknowledge or respond to them
individually. We will consider all
comments we receive by the date and
time specified in the DATES section of
this preamble, and, if we proceed with
a subsequent document, we will
respond to the major comments in the
preamble to that document.
V. Regulatory Impact
We have examined the impacts of this
proposed rule as required by Executive
Order 12866 (September 1993,
Regulatory Planning and Review) and
the Regulatory Flexibility Act
(RFA)(September 19, 1980 Pub. L. 96–
354). Section 1102(b) of the Social
Security Act, the Unfunded Mandates
Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104–4) and
Executive Order 13132.
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Executive Order 12866 directs
agencies to assess all costs and benefits
of available regulatory alternatives and,
if regulation is necessary, to select
regulatory approaches that maximize
net benefits (including potential
economic, environmental, public health
and safety effects, distributive impacts,
and equity). A regulatory impact
analysis (RIA) must be prepared for
major rules with economically
significant effects ($100 million or more
annually). This proposed rule is an
economically significant rulemaking
under Executive Order 12866.
The RFA requires agencies to analyze
options for regulatory relief of small
entities. For purposes of the RFA, small
entities include small businesses, nonprofit organizations, and government
agencies. Most hospitals and most other
providers and suppliers are small
entities, either by non-profit status or by
having revenues of $6 million to $29
million in any one year. For purposes of
the RFA, all OPOs are considered to be
small entities. Individuals and States are
not included in the definition of a small
entity.
In addition, section 1102(b) of the Act
requires us to prepare a regulatory
impact analysis if a rule may have a
significant impact on the operations of
a substantial number of small rural
hospitals. This analysis must conform to
the provisions of section 603 of the
RFA. For the purposes of section
1102(b) of the Act, we define a small
rural hospital as a hospital that is
located outside of a Metropolitan
Statistical Area and has fewer than 100
beds.
Section 202 of the Unfunded
Mandates Reform Act of 1995 also
requires that agencies assess anticipated
costs and benefits before issuing any
rule that may result in expenditure in
any one year by State, local or tribal
governments, in the aggregate, or by the
private sector, of $110 million.
Executive Order 13132 establishes
certain requirements that an agency
must meet when it promulgates a
proposed rule (and subsequent final
rule) that imposes substantial direct
requirement costs on State and local
governments, preempts State law, or
otherwise has Federalism implications.
This rule does not impose substantial
direct requirement costs on State or
local governments and does not preempt
State law or have other Federalism
implications.
Section 701 of Pub. L. 106–505, which
was passed by Congress in 2000,
requires us to promulgate regulations
with new OPO outcome measures and
to certify OPOs under those new
measures by January 1, 2002. The new
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outcome and process performance
measures must rely on empirical
evidence, obtained through reasonable
efforts, of organ donor potential and
other related factors in each OPO’s
service area. The regulations must
include multiple outcome measures.
All 59 OPOs would be affected by the
requirements in this proposed rule to a
greater or lesser degree. Many—
probably the majority—of OPOs have
already put into practice many of the
requirements we propose. However,
OPO practices vary widely. Some
requirements would impact many OPOs
but have relatively little economic
impact; others would have a larger
economic impact but would impact very
few OPOs. Thus, while we do not
believe the requirements in this
proposed rule would have a substantial
economic impact on a significant
number of OPOs, we believe it is
desirable to inform the public of our
projections of the likely effects of the
final rule on OPOs. It is important to
note that since OPOs are paid by the
Medicare program on a cost basis, any
additional costs that exceed an OPO’s
annual revenues would be fully
reimbursed by the Medicare program.
Our projections are based largely on
data and information provided by the
CMS OPO Coordinators. Each
Coordinator is responsible for the OPOs
located in one of the four CMS
Consortia areas (Midwest, West, South,
and Northeast). In some cases, no data
were available for one or more of the
Consortia. However, OPO practices
typically vary by size and affiliation
(hospital-based or independent), rather
than by geographic location. Since all
types of OPOs are represented within
each Consortium, we feel confident that
the practices and experiences of the
OPOs within two or three of the
Consortia are representative of all OPOs.
Therefore, where data were not
available for all four Consortia, we
based our projections on data from
fewer than four.
The provisions of this proposed rule
would have a very limited economic
impact on hospitals. It is expected that
improved OPO performance would
result from the rule and would increase
organ donation and, therefore, the
number of organs available for
transplantation. However, transplant
hospitals are reimbursed for their costs
related to performing transplants, and
donor hospitals are reimbursed by OPOs
for the cost of maintaining potential
donors. Therefore, there are no negative
economic impacts on hospitals that
would result from the rule.
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Reason for This Regulation
Approximately 70 people receive an
organ transplant every day. However,
another 16 die due to the lack of
transplantable organs (https://
organdonor.org). OPOs play a critical
role in securing transplantable human
organs for seriously ill patients suffering
from end-stage organ failure. In fact,
OPO performance is one of the most
critical elements in the nation’s organ
transplantation system. An OPO that is
effective in procuring organs and
delivering them safely to transplant
centers clearly will save more lives than
an ineffective one.
In passing the Organ Procurement
Organization Certification Act of 2000,
Pub. L. 106–505, Section 701, Congress
made certain findings related to OPOs
and the current re-certification process
for OPOs. These findings included:
a. Organ Procurement Organizations
play an important role in increasing
organ donation.
b. The uncertainty that resulted from
the Department of Health and Human
Services’ current certification and
recertification process was actually
interfering with the OPOs’ effectiveness
in increasing the level of organ
donation.
c. The limitations noted in the DHHS’
recertification process included:
i. Sole reliance on population-based
measures of performance that do not
take into consideration a particular
population’s organ donation potential.
ii. No allowance for other outcome
and process standards that may more
precisely reflect each OPO’s
performance and potential.
iii. Lack of a process to appeal for
recertification on either procedural or
substantive grounds to the Secretary of
DHHS.
The Organ Procurement Organization
Certification Act required that the
Secretary of DHHS promulgate
regulations that incorporate certain key
requirements. Those requirements have
been incorporated into this proposed
rule.
Congress clearly wanted the Secretary
to establish a certification process that
would decrease the uncertainty inherent
in the current CMS certification process
and improve OPO performance. The
goal was to increase organ donation and
the number of transplantable organs
available for persons experiencing organ
failure. We believe that this proposed
rule establishes certification and
competition processes that will meet
those goals.
1. Feasible Alternatives for Competition
Among OPOs for Service Areas
Under this proposed rule, OPOs may
compete for an OPO’s service if the OPO
has been de-certified by CMS. OPOs
may also compete for other OPOs’
service areas at the end of each 4-year
re-certification cycle. OMB Circular A–
4 recommends that agencies explore
modifications of some or all of a
regulation’s attributes or provisions to
identify appropriate alternatives. CMS
believes that an important policy
decision in this rulemaking is the level
of competition that would be allowed
between the OPOs.
Three levels of competition were
considered. We have defined these
alternatives, some of which are also
discussed in the preamble, as:
a. Full Competition. Every OPO that
has met the re-certification criteria
would be eligible to compete for another
OPO’s service area.
b. Limited Competition. Only those
OPOs that meet specific criteria would
be allowed to compete for another
OPO’s service area.
c. Restricted Competition. The only
competition allowed between OPOs
would be for the service area of an OPO
that had been de-certified by CMS.
In this proposed rule, CMS has
attempted to strike a balance between
the costs of competition in terms of
resource use and disruption of normal
business operations and the benefits of
competition, namely the ability of
competition to improve performance
and inspire innovative activity.
Under this proposed rule, we would
select an OPO to replace an incumbent
OPO if, in our assessment, the OPO
could significantly increase organ
donation within that service area. This
assessment would be based on the past
performance of the competing OPOs and
our assessment of the plans to increase
organ donation submitted by each
competing OPO. These plans would, at
a minimum:
a. Be based on the competing OPO’s
experience in its own service area;
b. Include an analysis of existing
barriers to increasing organ donation in
the open service area, both internal and
external; and
c. Contain a detailed description of
specific activities and interventions for
increasing organ donation in the open
service area.
Many factors can affect organ
donation rates. For example, a service
area might have a large elderly
population, a low motor vehicle
accident rate, or a high incidence of
Human Immunodeficiency Virus/
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
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6121
(HIV/AIDS). It is possible that cultural,
ethnic, or racial factors may affect organ
donation rates. For example, if there is
a large immigrant population in a
service area, there might be significant
cultural and language barriers to
donation. Therefore, an OPO that
decided to compete for an open service
area might need to perform significant
research and data analysis to determine
the barriers to increased organ donation
in a particular service area. Once this
analysis was completed, the OPO’s staff
would have to develop a detailed
description of specific activities and
interventions for increasing organ
donation in the open service area.
Therefore, the development of an
acceptable bid would require the
diversion of staff resources from the
OPO’s normal operations.
Full Competition Under Existing
Regulations
Under the current Conditions for
Coverage for OPOs, there was full
competition for each service area at the
end of each re-certification cycle (42
CFR 486.316). OPOs that did not meet
the performance standards were decertified and were not able to compete.
Therefore, only OPOs that met the
performance standards were permitted
to compete for service areas.
Benefits of this approach: All other
things being equal, greater competition
between OPOs should improve
performance. If an OPO knows that it is
in danger of losing its service area
during the recertification process, it
should have an incentive to perform
well. This incentive would likely cause
some OPOs to develop new, innovative
practices.
Costs of this approach: As explained
above, the process of competing for a
service area involves the expenditure of
resources. However, there would be
little additional effort or resource
expenditure for an incumbent OPO to
compete for its own area. In addition,
full competition is an adversarial
process. This may adversely affect the
current collaborative atmosphere that
exists between the OPOs.
Finally, full competition provides an
opportunity for a minimally effective
OPO to take over a failing OPO.
Depending upon which OPOs competed
for a particular service area, however,
there is no guarantee that a winning
OPO would have more than the
minimum requirements to be recertified, and thus the winning OPO
may be unable to improve donation in
the service area. Therefore, we are not
proposing that OPO service areas be
opened to competition from all OPOs.
We have not yet quantitatively analyzed
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the costs and benefits from this full
competition approach, but we will do so
for the final rule. However, we are
requesting comment on this and other
approaches that allow for more intense
competition than our preferred option.
Limited Competition
Under this option, all OPO service
areas would be open to competition as
under the full competition option;
however, only those OPOs that met
specific criteria would be allowed to
compete for another OPO’s service area.
The specific criteria used to designate
which OPOs would be eligible to
compete for another OPO’s service area
would ensure that the competition was
limited to OPOs that had demonstrated
above average performance and that
OPOs permitted to compete for open
service areas would be measurably
superior to the incumbent OPOs.
Benefits of this approach: The intent
of establishing competition between the
OPOs is to improve the overall
performance of OPOs by allowing above
average OPOs to take over the service
areas of poorly or marginally performing
OPOs, and to allow OPOs to bid for
areas in which they have the potential
to significantly outperform the
incumbent OPO. The intent is not to
have OPOs competing against one
another when there are only marginal
differences between the OPOs.
Therefore, we believe the specific
criteria would have to establish a
measurable differential. We have not yet
quantitatively analyzed the costs and
benefits from this limited competition
approach, but we will do so for the final
rule. However, we are requesting
comments on this and other approaches
that allow for more intense competition
than our preferred option.
Costs of this approach: Although
limited competition would require
fewer resources from OPOs, the
competitive activities would require
resources from OPOs that decide to
compete for an open service area,
especially a large amount of staff time.
For OPOs competing for another OPO’s
service area, these resources would be
in addition to those used to improve an
OPO’s performance in its existing
service area.
Although fewer OPOs would be
involved with limited competition, it
would still be an adversarial process.
We anticipate that most OPOs would
soon realize who their potential
competitors were and this could
adversely affect the current
collaborative atmosphere that exists
between many of the OPOs. Although
this effect would be to a much lesser
extent than with full competition, the
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collaborative atmosphere between some
OPOs may be adversely affected by
limited competition.
Thus, limited competition offers the
advantage of having a better performing
OPO take over the service area of an
incumbent OPO that is not performing
as well. It also offers the advantage of
setting specific criteria to ensure that
the better performing OPO has the
expertise to increase organ donation in
another service area. This should result
in increased organ donation in the
competed service area. Further, while
limited competition has disadvantages,
those disadvantages can be minimized.
Restricted Competition
Under this option, the only
competition allowed between OPOs
would be for the service areas of OPOs
that had been de-certified by CMS.
However, the competition would still be
limited to OPOs that met specific
criteria. The specific criteria would
need to ensure that the competing OPOs
were more than minimally performing
OPOs. The intent would be to have an
OPO that is performing measurably
better than the de-certified OPO take
over the service area.
Benefits of this approach: Limiting
competition in this way would restrict
competition to areas in which the
expectation of significant improvement
in service could be met. In addition,
fewer resources would be diverted from
organ procurement itself to the
competitive process.
Costs of this approach: Clearly,
restricted competition would severely
limit the competition between OPOs.
Only service areas of de-certified OPOs
would be opened for competition. The
service areas of minimally performing
OPOs (that is, OPOs whose performance
was only slightly above the performance
of failing OPOs) would not be opened
for competition from OPOs that had
performed measurably better. Therefore,
restricted competition could not
improve organ donation in service areas
of minimally performing OPOs.
2. Competition for De-Certified OPO’s
Service Area
Our preferred option for competing
service areas of de-certified OPOs is
limited competition, as we feel this
option best balances the benefits and
costs of the competitive process.
However, we are soliciting comments on
this conclusion. We propose that a decertified OPO would not be allowed to
compete. The competition would be
limited to OPOs that met 4 out of 5 of
the outcome performance measures at or
above the mean in the preceding recertification cycle. We would select an
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OPO for the service area based on its
success in meeting the process
performance standards, as well as
submission of an acceptable plan to
increase organ donation in the service.
By requiring an OPO to have attained
the mean or greater in 4 out of 5
outcome performance measures in the
preceding re-certification cycle, we
would limit competition to OPOs that
had performed measurably better than
the de-certified OPO. We believe such
OPOs would have the expertise to take
over a poorly performing OPO’s service
area and improve organ donation. Also,
our preferred competition process
would require fewer resources from the
OPOs than full competition, ensure
timely completion of the competitive
process, and minimize disruption to
operations in service areas.
3. Quadrennial Certification
Competition
For the quadrennial certification
competition, our preferred option is also
limited competition with the following
characteristics. We propose that for an
OPO to compete for an incumbent
OPO’s service area, the competing OPO
must have achieved at least 100 percent
of the mean in 4 out of 5 outcome
performance measures in the preceding
re-certification cycle. In addition, the
competing OPO’s conversion rate of
potential donors to actual donors must
be at least 15 percentage points above
the incumbent OPO’s conversion rate
for the preceding re-certification cycle.
This option offers two clear
advantages. First, the competition is
limited to at least average performing
OPOs because of the requirement that
an OPO must have achieved at least 100
percent of the mean in 4 out of 5
outcome performance measures for the
preceding re-certification cycle. Second,
OPOs permitted to compete for open
service areas would be measurably
superior to the incumbent OPOs due to
the requirement for an OPO to have a
conversion rate at least 15 percentage
points greater than the conversion rat of
the incumbent. These advantages
provide us with the assurance that a
competing OPO would have the
expertise needed to increase organ
donation in an incumbent OPO’s service
area.
This option would restrict the number
of OPOs that would be eligible to
compete for another OPO’s service area.
However, we anticipate that there
would be a substantial number of OPOs
that would qualify to compete.
Under this option, it is possible that
a superior performing OPO could
compete for the service area of an above
average performing OPO. For example,
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an OPO that achieved 120 percent of the
mean in 4 out of 5 outcome performance
measures could compete for the service
area of an OPO that achieved 105
percent of the mean in 4 out of 5
outcome performance measures.
However, as long as the betterperforming OPO could significantly
increase organ donation in the open
area, we believe it would be worthwhile
for the competition to take place.
In determining the necessary
differential that would be required to
allow competition we had two goals.
The first was that we wanted the
differential to be large enough to assure
us that the competing OPO had the
expertise to take over another service
area and increase organ donation; in
other words, we wanted the differential
to reflect significant differences in
performance. The second was that we
wanted to minimize the disturbance to
routine OPO operations that is inherent
in the competition process.
We believe that our proposed 15
percentage point differential strikes the
balance needed to achieve both of these
goals. It is large enough to demonstrate
that the competing OPO is performing
measurably better than the incumbent
OPO. It will also limit the competition
to OPOs that we can reasonably expect
will be able to take over another service
territory and increase organ donation.
Congress clearly intended that a
competitive process would reduce
uncertainty and result in improved
performance by OPOs. We believe that
such a competition would result in an
increase in organ donation and the
number of transplantable organs
available for patients on the waiting list.
We are specifically soliciting comment,
however, on modifications within our
chosen limited competition framework.
These options are discussed below.
Option 1
Under this option, an OPO competing
for an open service area must have
achieved at least 120 percent of the
mean in 4 out of 5 outcome performance
measures for the preceding recertification cycle. In addition, the
competing OPO must have at least a 15
percentage point conversion rate
advantage over the incumbent OPO.
That is, the competing OPO’s
conversion rate of potential donors to
actual donors (the first of the five
performance measures) must be 15
percentage points higher than the
incumbent OPO’s conversion rate.
This option would ensure that the
competing OPO had above average
performance and that its performance
was measurably superior to the
performance of the incumbent OPO. It
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also would provide us with the
assurance that the competing OPO had
the expertise to increase organ donation
in the incumbent OPO’s service area.
We are, however, concerned that this
option would severely restrict
competition among OPOs because we
anticipate that few OPOs would meet
120 percent of the mean for 4 out of 5
performance measures. In addition,
since most OPOs would probably be
interested only in competing for service
areas in their own geographical areas,
this could result in virtually no
competition in certain areas of the
country.
Option 2
As in the first option, option 2 would
require that to compete for an
incumbent OPO’s service area, the
competing OPO must have at least a 15
percentage point conversion rate
advantage over the incumbent OPO for
the preceding re-certification cycle. The
advantage of this option is that the
competing OPO would be required to
demonstrate that it had performed
measurably better than the incumbent
OPO. While a variation of a few points
would not be a reliable indicator of an
OPO’s superior quality, we believe a 15
percentage point advantage in
conversion rate is a large enough
difference to assure us that the
competing OPO’s performance is
actually superior to the incumbent
OPO’s performance.
However, this option would not
require an OPO to have achieved a
certain level of performance in the
outcome performance measures during
the prior re-certification cycle. Thus, we
are concerned that a 15 percentage point
advantage is an insufficient criterion to
determine whether or not a competing
OPO has the expertise to perform
measurably better in the incumbent
OPO’s service area because, under this
option, an OPO that is a below average
performer could compete for the service
area of a poorly performing OPO. For
example, an OPO that achieved 90
percent of the mean in 4 out of 5
outcome performance measures would
be permitted to compete for a service
area in which the incumbent OPO
achieved 75 percent of the mean in 4
out of 5 outcome performance measures.
While the 15 percentage point
difference indicates that the competing
OPO is measurably superior to the
incumbent OPO, it does not require that
the OPO is at a minimum an average
performer.
We are concerned about an OPO with
below average performance competing
for the service area of another OPO
because we do not believe that a OPO
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that is performing below average in its
own service area would have the
expertise needed to increase organ
donation in another OPO’s service area,
especially when the incumbent is
performing poorly.
In addition, the competitive process
itself causes disturbance in the
operations of both the competing and
incumbent OPOs. Each must develop an
acceptable plan for the competition.
This requires resources from both OPOs
that may have to be diverted from their
routine operations, as well as from their
efforts to increase organ donation in
their service areas. In order to justify the
disruption to OPO operations, there
should be some assurance that the
competing OPO would be able to
increase organ donation in the
incumbent OPO’s service area. With
only a 15 percentage point difference
and no requirement that the competing
OPO be a good performer, we would not
feel confident that the competing OPO
would have the expertise needed to
increase organ donation in the
incumbent OPO’s service area.
Therefore, we believe that if the
competing OPO is not at least an
average performer, the potential for a
slight improvement in the service area
would not justify this disruption to the
service area.
We also are requesting comments on
the option of restricted competition.
Under this option, the only competition
allowed between OPOs would be for the
service areas of OPOs that had been decertified by CMS. The competition
would be limited to OPOs that met 4 out
of 5 performance measures at 100
percent of the mean or greater. These
specific criteria would ensure that the
competing OPOs were more than
minimally-performing OPOs and that
they were performing measurably better
than the de-certified OPO.
Under this option, fewer resources
would be diverted from organ
procurement itself to the competitive
process, and collaboration among OPOs
would not be disturbed. However, this
option would not allow for competition
for the service areas of OPOs that only
barely met the qualifications for recertification.
Cost-Effectiveness and Cost-Benefit
Analysis of Preferred Option
Our proposed criteria for selecting a
competing OPO are success in meeting
the process performance measures
during the prior re-certification cycle
and an acceptable plan to increase organ
donation in the open service area. The
minimum requirements for an
acceptable plan would be:
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• Demonstrate the competing OPO’s
experience in its own service area;
• Include an analysis of existing
barriers to increasing organ donation in
the open service area, both internal and
external; and
• Provide a detailed description of
specific activities and interventions for
increasing organ donation in the open
service area.
We feel that it would take a
competing OPO approximately 16 hours
to develop an acceptable plan. A
competing OPO would need to assess
the incumbent OPO’s service area,
determine the reasons for or the factors
that affected the incumbent’s
performance, develop an analysis of the
existing internal and external barriers to
increasing organ donation in the service
area, determine the specific activities
and interventions the competing OPO
can perform to increase organ donation,
and finally, prepare and submit the
plan.
CMS has not yet fully analyzed the
costs and benefits of the alternatives
presented above. We expect that the
costs per bid assumed in this analysis
will be roughly linear as the number of
bids increases or decreases based on the
allowed level of competition; however,
the costs of preparing a bid may depend
on local variation in labor rates. We
expect that the benefits of competition
are not linear; under limited
competition, CMS would limit bids only
to those situations where we expect that
competition will be especially
successful in improving performance.
We expect that the marginal returns to
competition are greater for the more
restrictive limited competition options,
and that the marginal returns to
competition diminish as the options
become more permissive. CMS plans to
fully analyze the costs and the benefits
of the competitive process in the final
rule.
Under the statute and current OPO
regulations, OPOs must be members of
and abide by the rules of the OPTN (as
defined in § 486.320); therefore, there is
no additional burden associated with
this condition.
Current OPO regulations require
OPOs to have a board of directors or an
advisory board with a specific
membership composition. The
condition for administration and
governing body in this proposed rule
might require an OPO to add one
additional member to its board. If the
tissue banks in the OPO’s service area
currently are represented on the board
by the OPO’s own tissue bank, the OPO
would be required to add a member
from a tissue bank that is not affiliated
with the OPO. This condition would
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also require OPOs to have bylaws to
address potential conflicts of interest,
length of terms, and criteria for selection
and removal of board members. It
requires an individual or a governing
body to have full legal authority and
responsibility for management and
provision of all OPO services, including
development and implementation of
policies and procedures for
administration of the OPO.
The economic impact to add a tissue
bank member to an OPO board would be
negligible because OPOs generally do
not pay board members for their
services. The economic impact on OPOs
that do not have bylaws for their boards
addressing conflicts of interest, length of
terms, and criteria for selection and
removal of board members would be the
cost of developing such bylaws. The
extent of the impact would depend on
the process used to develop the bylaws.
For example, at some OPOs, it is likely
an executive committee of the board
would develop bylaws for approval by
the entire board. This process would
result in little or no cost to the OPO
because the bylaws would be developed
by unpaid board members. However,
other OPOs might include the OPO
director in the development of the
bylaws. In this case, there would be a
cost to the OPO, based on the number
of hours needed to develop the bylaws
and the director’s salary. We do not
expect that development of bylaws
would take more than a few hours, since
information and advice regarding
development of bylaws would be
available from OPOs that already have
bylaws in place for their boards.
It appears that about 70 percent of
OPOs do not have bylaws for their
boards addressing conflicts of interest,
and approximately 22 percent do not
have bylaws addressing length of terms
and criteria for selection and removal of
board members. This would mean that
approximately 18 OPOs would need to
develop bylaws addressing conflicts of
interest, and approximately 46 would
need to develop bylaws addressing
length of terms and criteria for selection
and removal of board members. Thus,
under this proposed rule, OPOs would
need to write 64 sets of bylaws for their
boards of directors.
In one CMS Consortium, OPO
Directors’ salaries range from
approximately $80,000 to more than
$130,000. To estimate the economic
impact, we assumed that all OPOs
would choose to have their directors
participate in developing bylaws for
their boards, and that the development
of each set of bylaws would take 8 hours
of an OPO director’s time. If every
director made $105,000 per year
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(approximately $50 per hour), it would
cost an OPO $400 to develop a set of
bylaws, for a total of $25,600 to develop
64 sets of bylaws. We expect that most,
if not all, OPOs currently have an
individual or governing body legally
responsible for management and
provision of OPO services. Therefore,
we do not expect that there would be a
cost to OPOs to implement this
provision of the regulation.
It is extremely difficult to quantify the
costs for OPOs of meeting the
requirements for human resources. The
human resources condition would
require every OPO to have a medical
director, although it would not specify
that the medical director must be full
time. We believe all OPOs have medical
directors, because the OPTN states that
OPOs must have medical directors who
are licensed physicians and who are
responsible for medical and clinical
activities of the OPO. However, our
proposal would require the medical
director to be involved in the day-to-day
operations of the OPO because he or she
would be responsible for
implementation of protocols for donor
evaluation and management and organ
placement and recovery, as well as
assisting in management of donor cases
if the surgeon on call were unavailable.
We believe that nearly all OPOs have
a full-time medical director or one or
more part-time directors whose
responsibilities include implementation
of protocols for donor evaluation and
management and organ placement and
recovery and who assist in the
management of donor cases if the
surgeon on call is unavailable. These
OPOs would already meet the
requirements of the proposed rule. In
fact, we believe that every OPO in two
of the CMS Consortia already fully meet
this proposed requirement. However, in
a very small number of OPOs, medical
directors are not actively engaged in
OPO operations; their participation may
be limited to consulting and attending
board meetings.
It is difficult to quantify the cost to
these few OPOs of meeting the proposed
requirement because the cost to an
individual OPO would be dependent on
whether the OPO needed to hire a fulltime medical director, hire one or more
additional part-time medical directors,
or increase the hours of an existing
medical director, and to what extent.
Furthermore, salaries of medical
directors vary widely. Some local
transplant surgeons who serve as parttime OPO medical directors do not
accept a salary for the services they
provide to the OPO; other part-time
medical directors are paid up to
$100,000 per year. A full-time medical
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director may be paid less than $100,000
or as much as $250,000 annually.
To estimate the economic impact of
the medical director requirement, we
assumed that 10 percent of OPOs (6
OPOs) would need to hire a part-time or
full-time medical director or increase
the hours of an existing director and
that, on average, each of these OPOs
would need a medical director for an
additional 20 hours per week. If the
OPOs reimbursed the medical directors
based on a rate of $125,000 annually, it
would cost each OPO $62,500, and the
total economic impact would be
$375,000.
We are also proposing to require an
OPO to maintain sufficient staff to carry
on essential OPO activities, such as
answering hospital referral calls in a
timely manner and providing
information and support to potential
donor families. Most OPOs have
sufficient staffing to carry on essential
activities; to the extent that they do not,
this rule would require them to hire
additional staff. However, the impact on
individual OPOs would vary, depending
upon their situations. For example, all
OPOs in one CMS Consortium appear to
have sufficient staff to carry on essential
activities. In another Consortium, all but
two OPOs have sufficient staff. These
two OPOs are adding staff based on
comparative data from successful OPOs
and from the AOPO Annual Report and
expect to be staffed fully by mid-2004.
However, in a third Consortium, slightly
more than half of the OPOs most likely
would need one or two procurement
coordinators or other professionals in
order to have sufficient staff.
Most staff carrying on what would be
considered ‘‘essential’’ activities (for
example, procurement, hospital
development, and screening of referral
calls) have a medical background.
Procurement coordinators are usually
registered nurses (RNs), but sometimes
they are social workers. In 2000, the
median annual income of an RN was
$44,840, and the median annual income
of medical and public health social
workers was $40,020. We have observed
that procurement coordinators generally
earn about $40,000 to $45,000 to start.
Hospital development staff are
sometimes RNs and sometimes
individuals with public relations
backgrounds. In 2000, public relations
managers had a median annual income
of $54,540. Sometimes OPOs’ hospital
development and procurement staffs
screen referral calls; however, OPOs
may hire other individuals to screen
calls, such as medical and nursing
students or emergency medical
technicians. In 2000, emergency
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medical technicians had a median
annual income of $24,460.
We estimate that 10 percent of OPOs
(6 OPOs) would need to add one
additional professional staff person and
5 percent (3 OPOs) would need to hire
2 additional staff, for a total 12
additional staff. (This estimate includes
additional staff needed to meet all
proposed requirements except the QAPI
requirements, which are discussed later
in this preamble.) If each staff person
was paid $45,000, the total economic
impact would be $540,000.
The human resources condition also
would require OPOs to provide the
education, training, and supervision to
their staffs necessary to furnish required
services. We have found that OPOs
generally offer three types of staff
education and training, depending upon
the size and resources of the OPO: (1)
On-the-job-training; (2) in-depth
training provided within the OPO,
sometimes using a modular training
structure; and/or (3) classroom training
that, in some cases, leads to certification
in procurement and transplantation.
Costs for training vary widely;
however, we have found that good staff
training need not be expensive. OPOs
provide no-cost training to each other,
in the form of on-site training sessions
in hospital development, as well as
opportunities for staff details and
‘‘shadowing’’ of staff at high-performing
OPOs. UNOS Regional Forums, which
are held once or twice per year in the
11 UNOS Regions, provide
opportunities for staff training at a low
cost (for example, $75 per day). Since
the training is held within the UNOS
Region, travel costs are kept to a
minimum. Two OPOs in one of the CMS
Regional Consortia have elected to use
modular training with demonstration
and examination required to move to
the next level. Training will be provided
to all new and existing OPO
professional staff; the cost is estimated
at $5000 per OPO. Some OPOs send
their procurement coordinators for
training provided by the North
American Transplant Coordinators
Organization, which costs
approximately $1000 to $1500 per
coordinator.
If we estimate that 25 percent of OPOs
(approximately 15 OPOs) would need to
provide additional education and
training to their professional staff in
order to meet the requirements of the
proposed rule, and all 15 chose to use
in-depth modular training within the
OPO, the cost to each OPO would be
approximately $5,000, and the total cost
for all 15 OPOs would be $75,000.
The human resources condition
would require an OPO to have a written
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policy to address potential conflicts of
interest for its director, medical director,
senior management, and procurement
coordinators. Although we expect that
most OPOs have written policies in
place, we know that some OPOs do not.
If an OPO had to develop such a policy,
it is likely it would be developed by the
OPO director and would take
approximately 8 hours. If the director is
paid $105,000 annually (approximately
$50 per hour), the cost to the OPO
would be approximately $400. If 25
percent of OPOs (approximately 15
OPOs) needed to develop such bylaws,
the total economic impact would be
$6000.
The human resources condition also
would require OPOs to maintain
credentialing records for physicians and
other practitioners who routinely
recover organs in donor hospitals with
which the OPO has agreements and
ensure that all physicians and other
practitioners who recover organs in
hospitals are qualified and trained. We
have been told by OPOs that most, if not
all, OPOs have some type of process to
ensure that physicians and other
practitioners who recover organs are
qualified.
In most cases, organs are recovered by
transplant surgeons from the hospital
that will perform the transplant or by
physicians or technicians employed by
or under contract with OPOs. OPOs that
do not have a process to ensure that
physicians and other practitioners are
qualified and trained would incur some
costs to put a process into place. An
OPO would incur a cost for the staff
time needed to request and review
credentialing records for transplant
surgeons and to request and review
documentation of the qualifications of
other recovery personnel.
We estimate that requesting and
reviewing a record would take no more
than 15 minutes. There are
approximately 270 hospitals in the
United States with transplant programs.
Thus, each of the 59 OPOs has, on
average, about five transplant hospitals
in its service area. If each hospital has
20 surgeons who recover organs, an
OPO would have to request and review
approximately 100 records. Presuming
this activity was performed by an OPO
medical director making $125,000 per
year ($60 per hour), the cost to the OPO
for the medical director to spend 25
hours reviewing 100 records would be
$1500. If we estimate that 10 percent of
OPOs (approximately 6 OPOs) will need
to perform this activity, the total cost
would be $9000.
We have not assigned a cost for an
OPO to request and review records for
physicians or other recovery personnel
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who work for or are under contract to
the OPO because we assume the OPO
would perform those activities in the
normal course of business. Likewise, we
have not assigned a cost for activities
associated with ensuring the
qualifications and training of physicians
and other recovery personnel from
outside an OPO’s service area. The time
needed to verify qualifications and
training of these recovery personnel,
who only occasionally recover organs in
an OPO’s service area, would be
minimal and could be accomplished by
contacting a transplant hospital to
confirm that a surgeon who will recover
an organ at one of the OPO’s hospitals
is credentialed and has privileges at the
transplant hospital.
The current OPO regulations require
OPOs to maintain donor records with
specific data elements, although there is
no requirement for how long the records
must be kept. The proposed information
management condition would require
OPOs to include specific data elements
in their records and maintain their
records for 7 years. We do not anticipate
a significant burden associated with this
requirement because, the final rule
governing the operation of the OPTN
state that OPOs must maintain donor
records for 7 years; thus, we expect
OPOs already meet the proposed
requirement.
The condition for reporting of data
specifies that an OPO must provide
organ donation and transplantation data
as requested by the OPTN, the SRTR,
and transplant hospitals. Additionally,
the OPO would be required to provide
data and other information directly to
the Department as requested by the
Secretary. The current regulations
require only that OPOs report five
performance data elements to us
annually and ‘‘maintain and make
available to CMS, the Comptroller
General, or their designees data that
show the number of organs procured
and transplanted.’’
Although it appears this requirement
has the potential to add a significant
new reporting burden, OPOs already
report a large amount of data to the
OPTN (which, in turn, provides the data
to the SRTR for analysis). For example,
the cadaver donor registration form that
OPOs are required to complete for each
donor contains more than 300 data
elements. Further, regulations governing
the operation of the OPTN at 42 CFR
121.11(b)(2) require OPOs, as specified
by the Secretary, to submit data to the
OPTN. Thus, most information needed
by the OPTN, the SRTR or the Secretary
would already be reported by OPOs.
Although it is impossible to quantify
the impact of the data reporting
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requirement, as data would be requested
on an as-needed basis, we believe that
almost any OPO data needed by us or
other agencies within the Department
could be obtained from the OPTN or the
SRTR. We are including this provision
only to give us and other agencies the
flexibility to request data from OPOs in
the event that needed data cannot be
obtained expeditiously from the OPTN
or the SRTR. We would not request data
from OPOs if the data were readily
available from other sources.
However, we can quantify the impact
on OPOs of reporting the four hospitalspecific data elements they currently
report voluntarily to the OPTN (that is,
referrals, medically suitable potential
donors, consents, and donors). All 59
OPOs have the capability of reporting
data to the OPTN electronically. HRSA
estimates that reporting the four data
elements takes OPOs about 1 hour per
month. If the data are entered by a data
coordinator earning $40,000 per year
(approximately $19.25 per hour), the
cost to the OPO would be approximately
$231 annually, for a total cost for all 59
OPOs of approximately $13,629.
At the recommendation of the OIG,
we are including a requirement for
OPOs to report hospital-specific
donation data to the public. More than
90 percent of OPOs publish newsletters
and annual reports to inform the public
of their activities, and, most likely,
OPOs will report the hospital data in
their newsletters and annual reports at
very little additional cost. Since all 59
OPOs maintain Internet sites, they could
include the hospital data on their sites
at a negligible cost.
There are provisions in the proposed
condition for OPOs’ relationships with
hospitals that do not appear in our
current regulations for OPOs. First, the
condition would require an OPO to have
written agreements with 95 percent of
the hospitals and critical access
hospitals in the OPO’s service area
(unless a hospital has a waiver to work
with another OPO) that have both a
ventilator and an operating room. We
expect that OPOs already have
agreements with all Medicare and
Medicaid hospitals in their service areas
(unless a hospital in the service area has
a waiver to work with another OPO)
because the hospital and critical access
hospital CoPs for organ, tissue, and eye
procurement (see 42 CFR 482.45 and
485.643), require Medicare and
Medicaid participating hospitals and
critical access hospitals to have an
agreement with an OPO. We have found
that most agreements between OPOs
and hospitals are ‘‘generic’’ in nature
and do not specify the OPO and hospital
roles in the donation process. However,
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we propose requiring OPOs to address
the responsibilities of both the OPO and
the hospital in implementing § 482.45
and § 485.643 and include definitions
for the terms ‘‘imminent death’’ and
‘‘timely referral.’’
Many OPOs would be required to
rewrite their agreements; however, we
expect OPOs would develop a standard
agreement that addresses OPO and
hospital responsibilities and defines
‘‘imminent death’’ and ‘‘timely death’’
and would ask each of their hospitals to
sign the standard agreement. We
estimate that it would take an attorney
8 hours to draft a new standard
agreement that the OPO could present to
each hospital. The average hourly wage
for an attorney is $40; therefore, the cost
to the OPO would be $320. The total
cost for all 59 OPOs to have a new
standard agreement drafted would be
$18,880.
The average OPO has approximately
100 hospitals in its service area. Based
on past experience, we expect that
between 50 percent and 67 percent of
the hospitals in an OPO’s service area
would sign the standard agreement with
no changes. With few exceptions, the
remainder of the hospitals would sign
the agreements after a minimal amount
of negotiation. If 50 hospitals (50
percent of the 100 hospitals in an OPO’s
service area) requested changes in the
agreement before signing, and it took the
OPO’s attorney 2 hours per agreement to
make the changes, it would cost the
average OPO $4000. The total cost for
all OPOs to make changes in their
agreements with hospitals would be
$236,000.
The condition also would require
OPOs to offer annual designated
requestor training to hospital and
critical access hospital staffs. Although
the hospital and critical access hospital
CoPs give OPOs the responsibility for
offering or approving designated
requestor training for hospitals, very few
OPOs have actually provided a
significant amount of training to their
hospitals. In fact, an August 2000 OIG
report (Medicare Conditions of
Participation for Organ Donation: An
Early Assessment of the New Donation
Rule) criticized OPOs for not providing
more designated requestor training.
Therefore, complying with this
proposed requirement may add some
costs for an OPO that has provided little
or no designated requestor training if
hospitals and critical access hospitals in
its service area respond positively to the
OPO’s offer to provide training.
However, we do not anticipate a
significant economic impact because
most hospitals cannot spare staff to
attend training in the entire consent
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process and prefer to have their OPO
handle most of the consent process.
Additionally, although many hospital
staff act as designated requestors in a
supportive or collaborative role, we
expect training for the supportive or
collaborative role to be significantly less
extensive (and therefore less costly)
than training hospital staff for a
requestor role. For example, complete
designated requestor training might last
for 4 to 8 hours, whereas, supporter or
collaborator training might last for 2
hours or less. Designated requestor
training also may be provided through
the use of a videotape. At least one OPO
provides designated requestor training
over the Internet.
Generally OPO hospital development
staff (who are likely to earn about
$45,000 per year) provide designated
requestor training in hospitals. If the
average training session lasts 4 hours
and is given at a hospital located 20
miles from the OPO, the total cost of a
training session (including salaries for
two trainers for preparation, travel, and
training time; mileage; and preparing
and printing training packets) would be
approximately $300. Based on our
experience, we expect that nationwide,
approximately 75 hospitals might
request designated requestor training.
Thus, the total economic impact would
be approximately $22,500, with an
average of less than $400 per OPO.
An OPO would be required to have
arrangements to cooperate with tissue
banks that have agreements with
hospitals with which the OPO has
agreements. OPOs would be required to
cooperate in screening and referring
potential tissue donors, obtaining
informed consent on behalf of tissue
banks, and in the retrieval, processing,
preservation, storage, and distribution of
tissues. Most OPOs already have
arrangements with the tissue banks in
their service areas that address such
issues as screening and referral of tissue
donors. We are proposing this
requirement to address situations in
which an OPO has refused to have an
arrangement with the tissue bank
selected by the hospital.
There are approximately 300 tissue
banks in the United States (166
conventional tissue banks and 134 eye
banks) or approximately 5 tissue banks
per OPO service. In many service areas,
the OPO owns or is affiliated with one
of the tissue banks. In nearly all service
areas, OPOs have arrangements with all
tissue banks that have agreements with
the hospitals in the service area. Based
on our experience, we would expect
that fewer than 5 percent of tissue banks
(15 tissue banks) that do not have
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arrangements with an OPO would
request an arrangement.
If an OPO and tissue bank elected to
have a written agreement, we would
expect that the cost to the OPO of
preparing the written agreement and
making any changes negotiated with the
tissue bank would be similar to the costs
of preparing and making changes to a
written agreement between an OPO and
a hospital (that is, a one-time cost to the
OPO of $320 for preparing an
agreement, and an additional cost of $80
to make changes). However, unlike
hospital agreements which could be
standardized, we would assume that
OPO/tissue bank agreements would be
individualized, since it is unlikely that
more than one tissue bank in an OPO’s
service area would request an
arrangement. Therefore, the total cost of
preparing each agreement and making
changes would be $400, and the cost of
preparing agreements with 15 tissue
banks would be $6000.
For several reasons, we do not believe
the proposed requirement to have a
QAPI program will have a significant
impact on a large number of OPOs.
First, as stated earlier in this preamble,
most OPOs have a QAPI-type program
(although not all programs are
sufficiently comprehensive to meet the
requirements of the proposed
regulation). Second, AOPO is actively
encouraging all OPOs to expand and
improve their programs; in fact, AOPO
recently added the development of a
quality improvement program to their
requirements for AOPO accreditation,
although the new requirements will be
phased in over 3 years. Third, in
November 2001, AOPO surveyed OPOs
to assess its programs and found that 43
percent of the 35 OPOs that responded
had designated a staff person whose
primary job responsibility was
coordinating and monitoring quality
improvement. We have reason to believe
this percentage would be much higher
if the survey were performed today.
Since AOPO conducted their survey, the
majority of the OPO community has
embraced continuous quality
improvement and taken steps to
integrate quality improvement into their
core business structure.
Additionally, there are numerous lowcost or no-cost resources available to
OPOs to develop QAPI programs,
including the Breakthrough
Collaborative, assistance from CMS OPO
Coordinators, and the AOPO Quality
Council. While we know that some
OPOs will be impacted by the proposed
QAPI requirement, we do not expect the
impact to be significant because, at this
time, all OPOs appear to be working
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6127
toward developing a comprehensive
QAPI program.
We believe it is likely that
approximately 20 percent of the 59
OPOs (12 OPOs) would need 1⁄2 of a
full-time equivalent (FTE) position to
bring their QAPI programs into
compliance with the requirement, and
15 percent (9 OPOs) would need 1 FTE.
An OPO would be likely to use an
experienced individual from its hospital
development or procurement staff, and
we estimate that the individual would
be paid approximately $50,000
annually. Thus, the cost to each of the
12 OPOs that would need to add 1⁄2 of
an FTE would be approximately $25,000
per year, and the cost to each of the 9
OPOs that would need to add a full FTE
would be $50,000 per year, for a total
cost of $750,000.
In addition, the proposed requirement
for QAPI would require an OPO to
perform death record reviews in every
Medicare and Medicaid hospital in its
service area that has 150 or more beds
or a level I or level II trauma center,
with the exception of rehabilitation or
psychiatric hospitals. Based on our
experience, all OPOs routinely perform
death record reviews in hospitals they
consider to have significant donor
potential, but an OPO’s definition of
‘‘significant donor potential’’ may not
encompass as many hospitals as the
requirement in the proposed rule. To
the extent that it does not, the OPO
might need to increase staff hours to
perform the additional death record
reviews. We estimate that
approximately 20 percent of OPOs (12
OPOs) may need to add 1⁄2 of an FTE in
order to expand the number of hospitals
in which it performs death record
reviews. It is likely the death record
reviews would be performed by RNs
earning approximately $45,000 per year,
thus the cost to an OPO of adding 1⁄2 of
an FTE to perform death record reviews
would be approximately $22,500. The
total economic impact for all 12 OPOs
would be $270,000.
The proposed rule requires that an
OPO’s QAPI program include a written
policy to address adverse events. We
estimate that about 90 percent of OPOs
(53 OPOs ) would need to develop a
written adverse event policy and that
development of the policy would
require 40 staff hours. We expect that
the policy would be developed by
professional staff, including
procurement coordinators, medical
directors, and OPO directors. We
estimated an annual salary of $45,000
(approximately $22 per hour) for a
procurement coordinator, $125,000
(approximately $60 per hour) for a
medical director, and $105,000
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(approximately $50 per hour) for an
OPO director, and we averaged the three
hourly rates to arrive at a cost of $44 per
staff hour to develop an adverse event
policy. Therefore, the cost to one OPO
of developing an adverse event policy
would be $1760 for 40 hours of work.
The total cost to all 53 OPOs that would
need to develop such policies would be
$93,280.
The condition for requesting consent
will have little impact on OPOs. We
believe all OPOs have policies for
obtaining informed consent and provide
training to their staffs in the informed
consent process. Under the proposed
conditions, some OPOs may have to
broaden their informed consent policies,
but there will be little resultant
economic impact.
The proposed rule would require
OPOs to have written protocols for
donor evaluation and management and
organ placement and recovery that meet
current standards of practice and are
designed to maximize organ quality and
optimize the number of donors and the
number of organs recovered and
transplanted per donor. Based on our
experience, all OPOs have written
protocols for donor evaluation and
management and organ placement and
recovery. The OPTN also has model
protocols OPOs can follow for
evaluation and management of potential
donors. Some OPOs might need to
update or change their protocols
somewhat to meet the proposed
requirements, but we believe the cost to
individual OPOs would be negligible.
The condition for donor evaluation
and management and organ placement
and recovery requires the medical
director from the OPO to be responsible
for ensuring that the OPO has written
protocols for donor evaluation and
management and for ensuring the
implementation of the protocols for
each donor. Costs related to hiring or
increasing the hours of a medical
director are discussed as part of the
human resources condition.
This condition also requires OPOs to
establish protocols in collaboration with
transplant programs that define the roles
and responsibilities of the OPO and the
transplant program. It appears that all
OPOs have some type of agreement or
arrangement with the transplant centers
in their service areas, but often these
agreements or arrangements are
informal in nature. Based on our
experience, we expect that developing a
protocol with a transplant center as
required under the proposed rule would
take approximately 10 hours. There are
approximately 824 transplant programs
in the U.S.; therefore, each of the 59
OPOs has approximately 14 transplant
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programs in its service area. If it took an
OPO medical director 10 hours to
develop a protocol with a transplant
center and the medical director earned
a salary of $125,000 annually
(approximately $60 per hour), it would
cost an OPO $600 for development of a
single protocol and a total of $8400 to
develop 14 protocols. (We assume that
each protocol would be individualized.)
If we assume that 70 percent of the 59
OPOs (41 OPOs) needed to develop
protocols, the total economic impact
would be $344,400.
We foresee little economic impact
from the proposed requirements in the
condition for organ preparation and
transport. We believe nearly all OPOs
follow appropriate standards of practice
for testing and tissue typing of organs.
Developing and following a protocol for
packaging, labeling, handling and
shipping of organs can be done at very
little added cost. For example, the cost
of additional supplies for labeling inner
and outer packaging of organs with the
donor blood type would be negligible.
Our estimates of the economic impact
on OPOs to meet the requirements in
this proposed rule are as follows.
• $25,600 to develop bylaws for OPO
boards
• $375,000 annually for medical
director salaries
• $540,000 annually for additional
staff to meet human resources
requirements
• $75,000 initial cost for staff training
• $6,000 to develop bylaws for OPO
directors and other management staff
• $9,000 to develop credentialing
records for recovery staff
• $13,629 annually to report data
• $18,880 to develop hospital
agreements
• $22,500 for designated requestor
training
• $6,000 to develop arrangements
with tissue banks
• $750,000 annually for QAPI staff
• $270,000 to perform death record
reviews
• $93,280 to develop an adverse event
policy
• $344,400 to develop protocols with
transplant centers.
Summary of Direct Cost
Therefore, the first-year economic
impact would be $2,549,289, and the
average first-year cost to each of the 59
OPOs would be $43,208.
Benefits
The primary economic impact of this
proposed rule would lie with its
potential to increase organ donation.
However, it is nearly impossible to
predict what that impact will be.
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Although many in the donation organ
community believe that little can be
done to increase the number of deceased
donors, we would note that in 1998, the
year in which the hospital CoP (see
§ 482.45) went into effect, organ
donation increased by nearly 6 percent.
Therefore, we estimate that by
increasing OPOs’ efficiency and
adherence to continuous quality
improvement measures, the provisions
of this proposed rule could increase the
number of organ donors by as much as
3 percent per year, resulting in an
additional 180 donors in the
regulation’s first year. Based on 2000
data for the number of organs
transplanted per donor (2.87), a 3
percent increase would result in
approximately 517 additional
transplants in the first year after
implementation of the regulation.
Transplants are performed both to
save lives and to improve the quality of
recipients’ lives. For end-stage renal
disease patients, dialysis is an
alternative to transplantation for
extended periods of time. Nevertheless,
physical health while on dialysis is
significantly impaired, and dialysis
imposes major stresses and substantial
inconveniences in carrying out normal
activities. Therefore, while for most
patients, kidney transplantation is not
necessary for survival, it significantly
improves the quality of the transplant
recipient’s life. For all other organs, a
transplant is, in most cases, necessary
for survival.
Of the 17,219 transplants from
deceased donors performed in 2000,
slightly less than half (46.7 percent), or
8,040, were kidney transplants. Thus,
we estimate that in the first year, this
regulation could result in approximately
241 (46.7 percent of 517 transplants)
lives vastly improved by kidney
transplants and 276 (53.3 percent of
517) lives both vastly improved and
prolonged by transplantation of other
major organs.
The following reasoning was used to
construct an estimate of the benefits of
this proposed rule. It is common, in cost
benefit analysis, to use a concept termed
‘‘value of a statistical life’’ (VSL) to
estimate in monetary terms the benefits
from lives saved. Estimates of this value
can be derived from information on the
preferences of individuals for reduction
in the risk of death, and their
willingness to pay for those reductions.
For purposes of our cost benefit
analysis, we have used a VSL of
$5,000,000. Applying this VSL, the
social benefit from 276 non-renal
transplants would be $1,380,000,000.
Kidney transplantation costs are offset
by reductions in other medical costs
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over time, primarily dialysis costs.
Since private payers generally base their
payments on Medicare payment rates,
we used data on Medicare payments to
estimate the total cost to the economy of
the additional non-renal transplants that
would be performed. Below, based on
2000 payment data, are 1-year estimated
costs to the Medicare program resulting
from a 3 percent increase in non-renal
organ transplants. Costs for intestinal
transplants were not available as
Medicare did not begin paying for
intestinal transplants until April 2001.
However, the number was small—only
36 intestine transplants were performed
in the United States in 1999. In
addition, the chart does not include
heart-lung, kidney-pancreas, and other
multi-organ transplants, since complete
data are not available for these
transplants. In 1999, there were 48
heart-lung, 928 kidney-pancreas, and
120 other multi-organ transplants in the
6129
United States, for a total, with intestinal
transplants, of 1,132 transplants.
Therefore, the figures below
underestimate the economic impact of a
3 percent increase in the number of
transplants by approximately 14 percent
(1,132 is approximately 14 percent of
the 15,670 heart, liver, lung, pancreas,
and kidney transplants performed in
1999).
ESTIMATED ONE-YEAR COSTS OF NON-RENAL TRANSPLANTS
Organ type
3 percent increase
Cost (inpatient
hospital & physician)
Heart ............................................................................................................................................................
Liver .............................................................................................................................................................
Lung .............................................................................................................................................................
Pancreas ......................................................................................................................................................
66
137
28
13
$9,277,620
11,227,835
2,012,976
357,565
Total ......................................................................................................................................................
244
22,875,996
In order to estimate the costs of
providing post-transplant care, we
turned to the Milliman and Robertson 5year cost estimates that were used by us
in the regulation for Medicare and
Medicaid hospitals, Identification of
Potential Organ, Tissue, and Eye
Donors. They are as follows: heart,
$317,000; liver, $394,000; lung,
$312,000; and pancreas, $149,000.
However, note that in recent years,
inpatient hospital stays for heart
transplant patients have increased
considerably (with a resultant rise in
costs), whereas inpatient stays for liver
transplant patients have decreased
considerably. Nevertheless, as Milliman
and Robertson estimates are the only
transplant data available on posttransplant costs, we used their
estimates.
Based on their estimates, the 5-year
costs would be as shown on the
following chart.
Organ type
5–year cost
Heart .....................................
Liver ......................................
Lung ......................................
Pancreas ...............................
$20,922,000
53,978,000
8,736,000
1,937,000
not prepared a formal uncertainty
analysis for this proposed rule;
however, we will prepare a formal
uncertainty analysis for the final rule.
Possible sources of uncertainty are the
actual percentage improvement in organ
donation expected by this rule and
alternatives; the number of expected
total donations, which varies somewhat
year to year; the cost of competitive
bids; the expected number of OPOs decertified, and the number of OPOs
eligible to compete based on their
performance measures. We request
comments on other potential sources of
uncertainty.
In accordance with the provisions of
Executive Order 12866, this regulation
was reviewed by the Office of
Management and Budget.
Authority: Secs. 1102, 1138(b), 1812(d),
1814(b), 1815, 1833(a), (i), and (n), 1871,
1881, 1883, and 1886 of the Social Security
Act (42 U.S.C. 1302, 1395d(d), 1395f(b),
1395g, 1395l(a), (i), and (n), 1395hh, 1395rr,
1395tt, 1395ww, and 1395(x)(v)).
List of Subjects
§ 413.200
42 CFR Part 413
§ 413.202
As discussed elsewhere in this
preamble, our best estimate of the
impact of this proposed rule is a benefit
of more than $1 billion each year, based
on the number of lives we expect would
be saved by an increase in organ
donation and transplantation due to
increased OPO performance. We have
Health professionals, Medicare, Organ
procurement, X-rays.
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[Amended]
42 CFR Part 441
42 CFR Part 486
19:13 Feb 03, 2005
1. The authority citation for part 413
is revised to read as follows:
2. Section 413.200(f) is amended by
removing the phrase ‘‘part 485, subpart
D’’ and by adding ‘‘part 486, subpart D’’
in its place.
Formal Uncertainty Analysis
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PART 413—PRINCIPLES OF
REASONABLE COST
REIMBURSEMENT; PAYMENT FOR
END-STAGE RENAL DISEASE
SERVICES; PROSPECTIVELY
DETERMINED PAYMENT RATES FOR
SKILLED NURSING FACILITIES
Health facilities, Kidney diseases,
Medicare, Puerto Rico, Reporting and
recordkeeping requirements.
Family planning, Grant programshealth, Infants and children, Medicaid,
Penalties, Reporting and recordkeeping
85,573,000
requirements.
Total ...............................
For the reasons set forth in the
preamble, the Centers for Medicare &
Medicaid Services proposes to amend
42 CFR chapter IV as set forth below:
42 CFR Part 498
Administrative practice and
procedure, Health facilities, Health
professions, Medicare, Reporting and
recordkeeping requirements.
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[Amended]
3. Section 413.202 is amended by
removing the phrase ‘‘as defined in
§ 435.302 of this chapter’’ and by adding
‘‘as defined in § 486.302 of this chapter’’
in its place.
PART 441—SERVICES:
REQUIREMENTS AND LIMITS
APPLICABLE TO SPECIFIC SERVICES
1. The authority citation for part 441
continues to read as follows:
Authority: Sec. 1102 of the Social Security
Act (42 U.S.C. 1302).
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[Amended]
2. Section 441.13(c) is amended by
removing the reference ‘‘part 485,
subpart D’’ and adding ‘‘part 486
subpart G’’ in its place.
PART 486—CONDITIONS FOR
COVERAGE OF SPECIALIZED
SERVICES FURNISHED BY
SUPPLIERS
1. The authority citation for part 486
is revised to read as follows:
Authority: Secs. 1102, 1138, and 1871 of
the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 1302,
1320b–g, and 1395hh) and section 371 of the
Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C 273).
2. Section 486.1 is amended by
revising paragraph (a) to read as follows:
§ 486.1
Basis and scope.
(a) Statutory basis. This part is based
on the following sections of the Act:
1102 and 1138(b)—for coverage of
organ procurement services.
1861(p)—for coverage of outpatient
physical therapy services furnished by
physical therapists in independent
practice.
1861(s) (3), (15), and (17)—for
coverage of portable X-ray services.
*
*
*
*
*
3. Part 486 is further amended by
revising subpart G to read as follows:
Subpart G—Requirements for
Certification and Designation and
Conditions for Coverage: Organ
Procurement Organizations
Sec.
486.301
486.302
Basis and scope.
Definitions.
Requirements for Certification and
Designation
486.303 Requirements for certification.
486.304 Requirements for designation.
486.306 OPO service area size designation
and documentation requirements.
486.308 Designation of one OPO for each
service area.
486.310 Changes in ownership or service
area.
Re-Certification and De-Certification
486.312 De-certification.
486.314 Appeals.
486.316 Re-certification and competition
processes.
Organ Procurement Organization
Outcome Requirements
486.318
Condition: Outcome measures.
Organ Procurement Organization
Process Performance Measures
486.320 Condition: Participation in Organ
Procurement and Transplantation
Network.
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486.322 Condition: Relationships with
hospitals, critical access hospitals, and
tissue banks.
486.324 Condition: Administration and
governing body.
486.326 Condition: Human resources.
486.328 Condition: Reporting of data.
486.330 Condition: Information
management.
486.342 Condition: Requesting consent.
486.344 Condition: Donor evaluation and
management, and organ placement and
recovery.
486.346 Condition: Organ preparation and
transport.
486.348 Condition: Quality assessment and
performance improvement (QAPI).
Subpart G—Requirements for
Certification and Designation and
Conditions for Coverage: Organ
Procurement Organizations
§ 486.301
Basis and scope.
(a) Statutory basis. (1) Section 1138(b)
of the Act sets forth the requirements
that an organ procurement organization
(OPO) must meet to have its organ
procurement services to hospitals
covered under Medicare and Medicaid.
These include certification as a
‘‘qualified’’ OPO and designation as the
OPO for a particular service area.
(2) Section 371(b) of the Public Health
Service Act sets forth the requirements
for certification and the functions that a
qualified OPO is expected to perform.
(3) Section 1102 of the Act authorizes
the Secretary of Health and Human
Services to make and publish rules and
regulations necessary to the efficient
administration of the functions that are
assigned to the Secretary under the Act.
(b) Scope. This subpart sets forth—
(1) The conditions and requirements
that an OPO must meet;
(2) The procedures for certification
and designation of OPOs; and
(3) The terms of the agreement with
CMS and the basis for and the effect of
termination or non-renewal of the
agreement.
(4) The requirements for an OPO to be
re-certified for the performance data
cycle from January 1, 2002 through
December 31, 2005.
§ 486.302
Definitions.
As used in this subpart, the following
definitions apply:
Adverse event means an untoward,
undesirable, and usually unanticipated
event that causes death or serious injury
or the risk thereof. As applied to OPOs,
adverse events include but are not
limited to transmission of disease from
a donor to a recipient, avoidable loss of
a medically suitable potential donor for
whom consent for donation has been
obtained, or delivery to a transplant
center of the wrong organ or an organ
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whose blood type does not match the
blood type of the intended recipient.
Agreement cycle refers to the 4-year
time period of the agreement between
CMS and an OPO. To provide sufficient
time for CMS to analyze outcome
performance data and assign OPO
service areas, the OPO agreement cycle
generally begins on August 1 of the year
following the end of the re-certification
cycle and lasts for 4 years.
Certification means a determination
by the Secretary that an OPO meets the
requirements at § 486.303 and is eligible
for designation if it meets the additional
requirements for designation.
Death record review is an assessment
of the medical chart of a deceased
patient to evaluate potential for organ
donation.
De-certification means a CMS
determination that an OPO no longer
meets one or more conditions for
coverage, including the outcome
measures, the process performance
measures and other requirements, or no
longer meets the requirements for
certification or designation. In addition,
if an OPO’s agreement with CMS is
terminated or is not renewed, the OPO
is de-certified.
Designated requestor is an individual
(generally employed by a hospital), who
is trained to handle or participate in the
donation consent process. The
designated requestor may request
consent for donation from the family of
a potential donor or from the
individual(s) responsible for making the
donation decision in circumstances
permitted under State law, provide
information about donation to the
family or decision-maker(s), or provide
support to or collaborate with the OPO
in the donation consent process.
Designation means CMS assignment
of a geographic service area to an OPO.
Once an OPO is certified and assigned
a geographic service area, organ
procurement costs of the OPO are
eligible for Medicare and Medicaid
payment under section 1138(b)(1)(F) of
the Act.
Donor means a deceased individual
from whom at least one vascularized
organ (heart, liver, lung, kidney,
pancreas, or intestine) is recovered for
the purpose of transplantation.
Donor document means any
documented indication of an
individual’s choice in regard to
donation that meets the requirements of
the governing state law.
Entire metropolitan statistical area
means a metropolitan statistical area
(MSA), a consolidated metropolitan
statistical area (CMSA), or a primary
metropolitan statistical area (PMSA)
listed in the State and Metropolitan
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Area Data Book published by the U.S.
Bureau of the Census. CMS does not
recognize a CMSA as a metropolitan
area for the purposes of establishing a
geographical area for an OPO.
Open area means an OPO service area
for which CMS has notified the public
that it is accepting applications for
designation.
Organ means a human kidney, liver,
heart, lung, pancreas, or intestine (or
multivisceral organs when transplanted
at the same time as an intestine).
Organ donor potential means the
number of patients whose age is 70 or
less meeting death by neurological
criteria, based on generally accepted
practice parameters for determining
brain death, who do not have any of the
following clinical indications:
(1) Tuberculosis.
(2) Creutzfeldt-Jacob Disease or any
other prion-induced disease.
(3) Viral septicemia.
(4) Rabies.
(5) Reactive hepatitis B surface
antigen.
(6) Any retro virus infection.
(7) Active malignant neoplasms,
except primary central nervous system
tumors and basal and squamous cell
carcinomas.
(8) Aplastic anemia.
(9) Agranulocytosis.
(10) Active viral and systemic fungal
infections.
(11) Gangrene of bowel.
(12) Extreme prematurity.
(13) Positive serological or viral
culture findings for HIV.
(14) Chagas disease.
Organ procurement organization
(OPO) means an organization that
performs or coordinates the
procurement, preservation, and
transport of organs and maintains a
system for locating prospective
recipients for available organs.
Potential donor denominator is the
basis for the OPO outcome measures.
The potential donor denominator
indicates the number of individuals in
an OPO’s service area who meet the
criteria for organ donor potential.
Re-certification cycle means the 4calendar-year cycle of outcome measure
data on which an OPO’s re-certification
is based. The re-certification cycle
begins on January 1 and ends (4 years
later) on December 31.
Service area means a geographical
area of sufficient size to ensure
maximum effectiveness in the
procurement and equitable distribution
of organs and that either includes an
entire metropolitan statistical area or
does not include any part of such an
area and that meets the standards of this
subpart.
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Transplant hospital means a hospital
that provides organ transplants and
other medical and surgical specialty
services required for the care of
transplant patients. There may be one or
more types of organ transplant centers
operating within the same transplant
hospital.
Requirements for Certification and
Designation
§ 486.303
Requirements for certification.
In order to be certified, an organ
procurement organization must:
(a) Have received a grant under 42
U.S.C. 273(a).
(b) Be a non-profit entity that is
exempt from Federal income taxation
under § 501 of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986.
(c) Have accounting and other fiscal
procedures necessary to assure the fiscal
stability of the organization, including
procedures to obtain payment for
kidneys and non-renal organs provided
to transplant hospitals.
(d) Have an agreement with the
Secretary to be reimbursed under title
XVIII for the procurement of kidneys.
(e) Have been re-certified as an OPO
under the Medicare program from
January 1, 2002 through December 31,
2005.
(f) Have procedures to obtain payment
for non-renal organs provided to
transplant centers.
(g) Agree to enter into an agreement
with any hospital or critical access
hospital in the OPO’s service area,
including a transplant hospital, that
requests an agreement.
(h) Meet or have met the conditions
for coverage, including the outcome
measures and the process performance
measures and other requirements.
§ 486.304
Requirements for designation.
(a) Designation is a condition for
payment. Payment may be made under
the Medicare and Medicaid programs
for organ procurement costs attributable
to payments made to an OPO by a
hospital only if the OPO has been
designated by the Secretary as an OPO.
(b) Requirements for designation. An
OPO must do the following:
(1) Be certified as a qualified OPO by
the Secretary under 42 U.S.C. 273(b)
and § 486.303.
(2) Enter into an agreement with CMS
that meets the requirements set forth in
paragraph (c) of this section.
(3) Document that it has a defined
service area that meets the requirements
of § 486.306.
(c) Agreement with CMS. In order for
the organ procurement costs attributable
to the OPO to be reimbursed under
Medicare and Medicaid, an OPO must
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enter into an agreement with CMS. The
agreement is effective upon submission
by the OPO and acceptance by CMS but
may be canceled by either party. If an
OPO is de-certified under § 486.312,
payment for organ procurement services
attributable to that OPO will not be
made for services furnished on or after
the effective date of the de-certification.
In the agreement, the OPO must agree to
do the following:
(1) Maintain compliance with the
requirements of titles XVIII and XIX of
the Act, section 1138 of the Act, section
371(b) of the Public Health Service Act,
and applicable regulations, including
the conditions set forth in this subpart
and the rules and requirements of the
OPTN, as defined by § 486.320, and to
report promptly to the Secretary any
failure to do so.
(2) Become a member of the OPTN.
(3) File a cost report in accordance
with § 413.24(f) of this chapter within 5
months after the end of each fiscal year.
(4) Permit CMS to designate an
intermediary to determine the interim
payment rate payable to transplant
hospitals for services provided by the
OPO and to make a determination of
reasonable cost based on the cost report
in the OPO files.
(5) Provide budget or cost projection
information as may be required to
establish an initial interim payment
rate.
(6) Pay to CMS amounts that have
been paid by CMS to transplant
hospitals as Medicare payment for organ
recovery fees that are determined to be
in excess of the reasonable cost of the
services provided by the OPO.
(7) Not charge an individual for items
or services for which that individual is
entitled to have payment made under
the Medicare program.
(d) Application for designation. An
OPO that has met 4 out of 5 outcome
performance measures at or above the
mean for the previous re-certification
cycle may apply for designation for the
service area of an OPO that did not meet
the conditions for coverage for the
previous re-certification cycle. An OPO
that has met 4 out of 5 outcome
performance measures at 100 percent of
the mean may apply for designation
whenever a service area becomes an
open area if the OPO’s conversion rate
of potential donors to actual donors is
at least 15 percentage points greater
than the conversion rate of the OPO
currently designated for the service area.
(e) Designation periods—
(1) General. An OPO is normally
designated for 4 years. A designation
period may be shorter, for example, an
interim designation for the service area
of an OPO that has terminated its
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agreement with CMS. A designation
period may be longer, for example, a
designation may be extended if
additional time is needed to select a
successor OPO to an OPO that has been
de-certified.
(2) Re-designation. Re-certification
and re-designation must occur not more
frequently than every 4 years.
§ 486.306 OPO service area size
designation and documentation
requirements.
(a) General documentation
requirement. An OPO must make
available to CMS documentation
verifying that the OPO meets the
requirements of paragraphs (b) through
(d) of this section at the time of
application and throughout the period
of its designation.
(b) Service area designation. The
defined service area either includes an
entire metropolitan statistical area or a
New England county metropolitan
statistical area as specified by the
Director of the Office of Management
and Budget or does not include any part
of such an area.
(c) Service area location and
characteristics. An OPO must define
and document a proposed service area’s
location through the following
information:
(1) The names of counties (or parishes
in Louisiana) served or, if the service
area includes an entire State, the name
of the State.
(2) Geographic boundaries of the
service area.
(3) The number of and the names of
all hospitals and critical access
hospitals in the service area that have
both a ventilator and an operating room.
(d) It must procure organs from an
average of at least 24 donors per
calendar year in the 4 years before the
year of re-designation.
§ 486.308 Designation of one OPO for each
service area.
(a) CMS designates only one OPO per
service area. A service area is open for
competition once the existing
designation period has expired or when
the existing designated status of the
OPO for the service area has been
terminated.
(b) Unless CMS has granted a hospital
a waiver under paragraphs (d) through
(f) of this section, the hospital must
enter into an agreement only with the
OPO designated to serve the area in
which the hospital is located.
(c) If CMS changes the OPO
designated for an area, hospitals located
in that area must enter into agreements
with the newly designated OPO or
submit a request for a waiver in
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accordance with paragraph (d) of this
section within 30 days of notice of the
change in designation.
(d) A hospital may request and CMS
may grant a waiver permitting the
hospital to have an agreement with a
designated OPO other than the OPO
designated for the service area in which
the hospital is located. To qualify for a
waiver, the hospital must submit data to
CMS establishing that—
(1) The waiver is expected to increase
organ donations; and
(2) The waiver will ensure equitable
treatment of patients listed for
transplants within the service area
served by the hospital’s designated OPO
and within the service area served by
the OPO with which the hospital seeks
to enter into an agreement.
(e) In making a determination on
waiver requests, CMS considers—
(1) Cost effectiveness;
(2) Improvements in quality;
(3) Changes in a hospital’s designated
OPO due to changes in the definitions
of metropolitan statistical areas, if
applicable; and
(4) The length and continuity of a
hospital’s relationship with an OPO
other than the hospital’s designated
OPO.
(f) A hospital may continue to operate
under its existing agreement with an
out-of-area OPO while CMS is
processing the waiver request. If a
waiver request is denied, a hospital
must enter into an agreement with the
designated OPO within 30 days of
notification of the final determination.
§ 486.310
area.
Changes in ownership or service
(a) OPO requirements. (1) A
designated OPO considering a change in
ownership or in its service area must
notify CMS before putting it into effect.
This notification is required to ensure
that the OPO, if changed, will continue
to satisfy Medicare and Medicaid
requirements. The merger of one OPO
into another or the consolidation of one
OPO with another is considered a
change in ownership.
(2) A designated OPO considering a
change in its service area must obtain
prior CMS approval. In the case of a
service area change that results from a
change of ownership due to merger or
consolidation, the OPOs must resubmit
the information required in an
application for designation. The OPO
must provide information specific to the
board structure of the new organization,
as well as operating budgets, financial
information, and other written
documentation CMS determines to be
necessary for designation.
(b) CMS requirements. (1) If CMS
finds that the OPO has changed to such
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an extent that it no longer satisfies the
requirements for OPO designation, CMS
may de-certify the OPO and declare the
OPO’s service area to be an open area.
An OPO may appeal such a decertification as set forth in § 486.314.
The OPO’s service area is not opened for
competition until the conclusion of the
appeals process.
(2) If CMS finds that the changed OPO
continues to satisfy the requirements for
OPO designation, the period of
designation of the changed OPO is the
remaining portion of the 4 year term of
the OPO that was reorganized. If more
than one designated OPO is involved in
the reorganization, the remaining
designation term is the longest of the
remaining periods unless CMS
determines that a shorter period is in
the best interest of the Medicare and
Medicaid programs. The changed OPO
must continue to meet the process
performance measures and other
requirements at § 486.20 through
§ 486.48 throughout the remaining
period and must meet the outcome
measures at § 486.318 at the end of this
remaining period.
Re-Certification and De-Certification
§ 486.312
De-certification.
(a) De-certification due to voluntary
termination of agreement. If an OPO
wishes to terminate its agreement, it
must send written notice of its intention
to terminate its agreement and the
proposed effective date of the
termination to CMS. CMS may approve
the proposed date, set a different date
no later than 6 months after the
proposed effective date, or set a date
less than 6 months after the proposed
effective date if it determines that a
different date would not disrupt
services to the service area or otherwise
interfere with the effective and efficient
administration of the Medicare and
Medicaid programs. If CMS determines
that a designated OPO has ceased to
furnish organ procurement services to
its service area, the cessation of services
is deemed to constitute a voluntary
termination by the OPO, effective on a
date determined by CMS. CMS will decertify the OPO as of the effective date
of the voluntary termination.
(b) De-certification due to involuntary
termination of agreement. CMS may
terminate an agreement with an OPO if
CMS finds that the OPO no longer meets
the requirements for designation or
certification or the conditions for
coverage in this subpart or is not in
substantial compliance with any other
applicable Federal regulations or
provisions of titles XI, XVIII, or XIX of
the Act. CMS may also terminate an
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agreement immediately in cases of
urgent need, such as the discovery of
unsound medical practices. CMS will
de-certify the OPO as of the effective
date of the involuntary termination.
(c) De-certification due to nonrenewal of agreement. CMS will not
voluntarily renew its agreement with an
OPO if the OPO fails to meet the
condition for coverage at § 486.318
based on data from the most recent recertification cycle or if the OPO’s
designation has been terminated. CMS
will de-certify the OPO as of the ending
date of the agreement.
(d) Notice to OPO. Except in cases of
urgent need, CMS gives written notice
of de-certification to an OPO at least 90
days before the effective date of the decertification. In cases of urgent need,
CMS gives written notice of decertification at least three calendar days
prior to the effective date of the decertification. The notice of decertification states the reason for decertification and the effective date.
(e) Public notice. Once CMS approves
the date for a voluntary termination, the
OPO must provide prompt public notice
of the date of de-certification and such
other information as CMS may require
through publication in local newspapers
in the service area. In the case of
involuntary termination or non-renewal
of an agreement, CMS provides public
notice of the date of de-certification
through publication in local newspapers
in the service area. No payment under
title XVIII or title XIX of the Act will be
made with respect to organ procurement
costs attributable to the OPO on or after
the date the de-certification is effective.
§ 486.314
Appeals.
If an OPO’s de-certification is due to
involuntary termination or non-renewal
of its agreement with CMS, the OPO
may appeal the de-certification on
substantive or procedural grounds.
(a) Appeal process. The OPO must file
its appeal within 30 calendar days of the
date of the notice of de-certification. In
its appeal, the OPO may submit
evidence to demonstrate why it should
not be de-certified. Within 2 weeks of
receipt of the OPO’s appeal, a CMS
hearing officer will schedule a hearing.
The hearing officer will issue notice of
his or her decision to the OPO by
certified mail within 2 weeks of the
hearing.
(b) Reversal of de-certification. If the
hearing officer reverses CMS’
determination to de-certify an OPO in a
case involving the involuntary
termination of the OPO’s agreement,
CMS will not terminate the OPO’s
agreement and will not de-certify the
OPO at that time.
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(c) De-certification is upheld. If the
de-certification determination is upheld
by the hearing officer, Medicare and
Medicaid payment may not be made for
organ procurement services the OPO
furnishes on or after the effective date
of de-certification. There are no further
administrative appeal rights.
(d) Effects of de-certification. When
an OPO agreement is terminated or is
not renewed, CMS will accept
applications from other OPOs to be
designated for the open area as set forth
in § 486.316(b). An OPO that is decertified may not apply or be designated
for an open area.
(e) Extension of agreement. If there is
insufficient time prior to expiration of
an agreement with CMS to allow for
competition of the service area and, if
necessary, transition of the service area
to a successor OPO, CMS may choose to
extend the OPO’s agreement with CMS
for a period not to exceed an additional
60 days.
§ 486.316 Re-certification and competition
processes.
CMS opens all OPO service areas for
competition at the end of every recertification cycle.
(a) OPO meets conditions for
coverage. When an OPO meets the
outcome measures in § 486.318 and has
been found to be in compliance with the
process performance measures and
other requirements in §§ 486.320
through 486.348, CMS will open the
OPO’s service area for competition. An
OPO may compete for the open area
only if it met 4 out of 5 outcome
measures at or above 100 percent of the
mean for the preceding re-certification
cycle and its conversion rate of potential
donors to actual donors is at least 15
percentage points higher than the
conversion rate of the OPO currently
designated for the service area. The OPO
must compete for the entire service area.
The incumbent OPO may compete for
its own service area.
(b) OPO does not meet conditions for
coverage. If CMS notifies an OPO that it
will be de-certified because its
agreement will not be renewed or will
be terminated by CMS, and the OPO
does not appeal within the time frame
specified in § 486.314(a) or the OPO’s
de-certification is upheld on appeal,
CMS will open the OPO’s service area
for competition from other OPOs. An
OPO may compete for the open service
area only if it met 4 out of 5 outcome
measures at or above the mean for the
preceding re-certification cycle. The
OPO must compete for the entire area.
(c) Criteria for selection. CMS will
designate an OPO for an open service
area based on the competing OPOs’
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degree of success in meeting the process
performance measures during the
preceding re-certification cycle and the
submission of an acceptable plan to
increase organ donation in the open
service area. An acceptable plan to
increase organ donation, at a
minimum—
(1) Is based on the competing OPO’s
experience and success in its own
service area;
(2) Includes an analysis of existing
barriers, both internal and external, to
increasing organ donation in the open
area; and
(3) Provides a detailed description of
specific activities and interventions for
increasing organ donation in the open
service area.
(d) No OPO applies. If no OPO applies
to compete for the open area, CMS may
select a single OPO to take over the
entire open area or may adjust the
service area boundaries of two or more
contiguous OPOs to incorporate the
open area. CMS will make its decision
based on the OPOs’ success in meeting
the process performance measures
during the preceding re-certification
cycle.
Organ Procurement Organization
Outcome Requirements
§ 486.318
Condition: Outcome measures.
(a) With the exception of OPOs
operating exclusively in non-contiguous
U.S. States, U.S. territories, U.S.
possessions, or U.S. commonwealths, an
OPO must achieve at least 75 percent of
the national mean in 4 of the 5
following performance categories,
averaged over the 4 calendar years
before the year of re-certification:
(1) Donors, as a percentage of the
potential donor denominator.
(2) Number of kidneys procured, as a
percentage of the potential donor
denominator.
(3) Number of kidneys transplanted,
as a percentage of the potential donor
denominator.
(4) Number of extra-renal organs
procured, as a percentage of the
potential donor denominator.
(5) Number of extra-renal organs
transplanted, as a percentage of the
potential donor denominator.
(b) An OPO operating exclusively in
non-contiguous U.S. States, U.S.
territories, U.S. possessions, or U.S.
commonwealths must meet the
following outcome measures at 50
percent or more of the national mean,
averaged over the 4 calendar years
before the year of re-certification:
(1) Number of kidneys procured, as a
percentage of the potential donor
denominator.
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(2) Number of kidneys transplanted,
as a percentage of the potential donor
denominator.
Organ Procurement Organization
Process Performance Measures
§ 486.320 Condition: Participation in
Organ Procurement and Transplantation
Network.
After being designated, an OPO must
become a member of and abide by the
rules and requirements of the OPTN
established and operated in accordance
with section 372 of the Public Health
Service Act (42 U.S.C. 274). The term
‘‘rules and requirements of the OPTN’’
means those rules and requirements
approved by the Secretary. No OPO is
considered out of compliance with
section 1138(b)(1)(D) of the Act or this
section until the Secretary approves the
determination that the OPO failed to
comply with the rules and requirements
of the OPTN. The Secretary may impose
sanctions under section 1138 only after
such non-compliance has been
determined in this manner.
§ 486.322 Condition: Relationships with
hospitals, critical access hospitals, and
tissue banks.
(a) Standard: Hospital agreements. An
OPO must have a written agreement
with 95 percent of the hospitals and
critical access hospitals in its service
area that have both a ventilator and an
operating room and have not been
granted a waiver by CMS to work with
another OPO. The agreement must
describe the responsibilities of both the
OPO and hospital or critical access
hospital in regard to the requirements
for hospitals at § 482.45 or § 485.643
and specify the meaning of the terms
‘‘timely referral’’ and ‘‘imminent death.’’
(b) Standard: Designated requestor
training for hospital staff. The OPO
must offer designated requestor training
on at least an annual basis for hospital
and critical access hospital staff.
(c) Standard: Cooperation with tissue
banks. (1) The OPO must have
arrangements to cooperate with tissue
banks that have agreements with
hospitals and critical access hospitals
with which the OPO has agreements.
The OPO must cooperate in the
following activities, as may be
appropriate, to ensure that all usable
tissues are obtained from potential
donors:
(i) Screening and referral of potential
tissue donors.
(ii) Obtaining informed consent from
families of potential tissue donors.
(iii) Retrieval, processing,
preservation, storage, and distribution of
tissues.
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(2) An OPO is not required to have an
arrangement with a tissue bank that is
unwilling to have an arrangement with
the OPO.
§ 486.324 Condition: Administration and
governing body.
(a) While an OPO may have more than
one board, the OPO must have an
advisory board that has both the
authority described in paragraph (b) of
this section and the following
membership:
(1) Members who represent hospital
administrators, voluntary health
associations in the OPO’s service area,
and either intensive care or emergency
room personnel.
(2) An individual from a tissue bank
who represents all tissue banks that
have agreements with hospitals with
which the OPO has agreements (if such
an individual is available to serve on the
board). The individual must be from a
tissue bank not affiliated with the OPO,
unless the only tissue bank in the
service area is affiliated with the OPO.
(3) Individuals who represent the
public residing in the OPO’s service
area.
(4) A physician with knowledge,
experience, or skill in the field of
human histocompatibility or an
individual with a doctorate degree in a
biological science and with knowledge,
experience, or skills in the field of
human histocompatibility.
(5) A neurosurgeon or other physician
with knowledge or skills in
neurosciences.
(6) A transplant surgeon representing
each transplant hospital in the service
area with which the OPO has
arrangements to coordinate its activities.
The transplant surgeon must have
practicing privileges and perform
transplants in the transplant hospital
represented.
(b) The advisory board described in
paragraph (a) of this section has the
authority to recommend policies for the
following:
(1) Procurement of organs.
(2) Effective agreements to identify
potential organ donors with a
substantial majority of hospitals in its
service area that have facilities for organ
donation.
(3) Systematic efforts, including
professional education, to acquire all
useable organs from potential donors.
(4) Arrangements for the acquisition
and preservation of donated organs and
provision of quality standards for the
acquisition of organs that are consistent
with the standards adopted by the
OPTN, including arranging for testing
with respect to preventing the
acquisition of organs that are infected
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with the etiologic agent for acquired
immune deficiency syndrome.
(5) Appropriate tissue typing of
organs.
(6) A system for allocation of organs
among transplant patients that is
consistent with the rules and
requirements of the OPTN, as defined in
§ 486.320 of this part.
(7) Transportation of organs to
transplant hospitals.
(8) Coordination of activities with
transplant hospitals in the OPO’s
service area.
(9) Participation in the OPTN.
(10) Arrangements to cooperate with
tissue banks for the retrieval,
processing, preservation, storage, and
distribution of tissues as may be
appropriate to assure that all useable
tissues are obtained from potential
donors.
(11) Annual evaluation of the
effectiveness of the OPO in acquiring
organs.
(12) Assistance to hospitals in
establishing and implementing
protocols for making routine inquiries
about organ donations by potential
donors.
(c) The advisory board described in
paragraph (a) of this section has no
authority over any other activity of the
OPO and may not serve as the OPO’s
governing body or board of directors.
Members of the advisory board
described in paragraph (a) of this
section are prohibited from serving on
any other OPO board.
(d) The OPO must have bylaws for
each of its board(s) that address
potential conflicts of interest, length of
terms, and criteria for selecting and
removing members.
(e) A governing body must have full
legal authority and responsibility for the
management and provision of all OPO
services and must develop and oversee
implementation of policies and
procedures considered necessary for the
effective administration of the OPO,
including fiscal operations, the OPO’s
quality assessment and performance
improvement (QAPI) program, and
services furnished under contract or
arrangement, including agreements for
these services. The governing body must
appoint an individual to be responsible
for the day-to-day operation of the OPO.
(f) The OPO must have a procedure to
address potential conflicts of interest for
the governing body described in
paragraph (e) of this section.
§ 486.326
Condition: Human resources.
All OPOs must have a sufficient
number of qualified staff, including a
director, a medical director, organ
procurement coordinators, and hospital
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development staff to obtain all usable
organs from potential donors, and to
ensure that required services are
provided to families of potential donors,
hospitals, tissue banks, and individuals
and facilities that use organs for
research.
(a) Standard: Qualifications. (1) The
OPO must ensure that all individuals
who provide services and/or supervise
services, including services furnished
under contract or arrangement, are
qualified to provide or supervise the
services.
(2) The OPO must develop and
implement a written policy that
addresses potential conflicts of interest
for the OPO’s director, medical director,
and senior management, and
procurement coordinators.
(3) The OPO must have credentialing
records for physicians and other
practitioners who routinely recover
organs in hospitals under contract or
arrangement with the OPO and ensure
that all physicians and other
practitioners who recover organs in
hospitals with which the OPO has
agreements are qualified and trained.
(b) Standard: Staffing. (1) The OPO
must provide sufficient coverage, either
by its own staff or under contract or
arrangement, to assure both that
hospital referral calls are screened for
donor potential and that potential
donors are evaluated for medical
suitability in a timely manner.
(2) The OPO must have a sufficient
number of qualified staff to provide
information and support to potential
organ donor families; request consent
for donation; ensure optimal
maintenance of the donor, efficient
placement of organs, and adequate
oversight of organ recovery; and
conduct QAPI activities, such as death
record reviews and hospital
development.
(3) The OPO must provide a sufficient
number of recovery personnel, either
from its own staff or under contract or
arrangement, to ensure that all usable
organs are recovered in a manner that,
to the extent possible, preserves them
for transplantation.
(c) Standard: Education, training, and
performance evaluation. The OPO must
provide its staff with the education,
training, and supervision necessary to
furnish required services. Training must
include but is not limited to
performance expectations for staff,
applicable organizational policies and
procedures, and QAPI activities. OPOs
must evaluate the performance of their
staffs and provide training, as needed, to
improve individual and overall staff
performance and effectiveness.
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(d) Standard: Medical director. The
OPO’s medical director is responsible
for implementation of the OPO’s
protocols for donor evaluation and
management and organ recovery and
placement. The medical director is
responsible for oversight of the clinical
management of potential donors,
including providing assistance in
managing a donor case when the
surgeon on call is unavailable.
§ 486.328
Condition: Reporting of data.
(a) The OPO must provide
individually-identifiable, hospitalspecific organ donation and
transplantation data to the OPTN and
the Scientific Registry of Transplant
Recipients (SRTR), as directed by the
Secretary. The OPO must provide
hospital-specific organ donation data to
transplant hospitals, annually. The OPO
must report individually-identifiable,
hospital-specific organ donation and
transplantation data and other
information to the Department, as
requested by the Secretary. The data
may include, but are not limited to—
(1) Number of hospital deaths;
(2) Results of death record reviews;
(3) Number and timeliness of referral
calls from hospitals;
(4) Potential donor denominator (as
defined in § 486.302);
(5) Data related to non-recovery of
organs;
(6) Data about consents for donation;
(7) Number of donors;
(8) Number of organs recovered (by
type of organ); and
(9) Number of organs transplanted (by
type of organ).
(b) The potential donor denominator
data reported to the OPTN to be used for
OPO re-certification must include data
for all deaths that occurred in hospitals
and critical access hospitals in the
OPO’s service area, unless a hospital or
critical access hospital has been granted
a waiver under 486.308(d) to work with
a different OPO. Data reported by the
OPO to the OPTN must be reported
within 30 days after the end of the
month in which a death occurred. If an
OPO determines through death record
review or other means that the potential
donor denominator data it reported to
the OPTN was incorrect, it must report
the corrected data to the OPTN within
30 days of the end of the month in
which the mistake is identified.
(c) For the purpose of determining the
information to be collected under
paragraph (a) of this section, the
following definitions apply:
(1) Kidneys procured. Each kidney
recovered will be counted individually.
En bloc kidneys recovered will count as
two kidneys procured.
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6135
(2) Kidneys transplanted. Each kidney
transplanted will be counted
individually. En bloc kidney transplants
will be counted as two kidneys
transplanted.
(3) Extra-renal organs procured. Each
organ recovered is counted individually.
(4) Extra-renal organs transplanted.
Each organ or part thereof transplanted
will be counted individually. For
example, a single liver is counted as one
organ procured and each portion that is
transplanted will count as a transplant.
Further, a heart and double lung
transplant will be counted as three
organs transplanted. A kidney/pancreas
transplant will count as one kidney
transplanted and one extra-renal organ
transplanted.
(d) The OPO must report hospitalspecific organ donation data, including
organ donor potential and the number of
donors, to the public at least annually.
§ 486.330 Condition: Information
management.
An OPO must establish and use an
information management system to
maintain the required medical, social
and identifying information for every
donor and transplant recipient and
develop and follow procedures to
ensure the confidentiality and security
of the information.
(a) Donor information. The OPO must
maintain a record for every donor. The
record must include, at a minimum,
information identifying the donor (for
example, name, address, date of birth,
social security number or other unique
identifier, such as Medicare health
insurance claim number), organs and
(when applicable) tissues recovered,
date of the organ recovery, donor
management data, all test results,
current hospital history, past medical
and social history, the pronouncement
of death, and consent and next-of-kin
information.
(b) Disposition of organs. The OPO
must maintain records showing the
disposition of each organ recovered for
the purpose of transplantation,
including information identifying
transplant recipients.
(c) Data retention. Donor and
transplant recipient records must be
maintained in a human readable and
reproducible paper or electronic format
for 7 years.
(d) Format of records. The OPO must
maintain data in a format that can
readily be transferred to a successor
OPO and in the event of a transfer must
provide to CMS copies of all records,
data, and software necessary to ensure
uninterrupted service by a successor
OPO. Records and data subject to this
requirement include donor and
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transplant recipient records and
procedural manuals and other materials
used in conducting OPO operations.
§ 486.342
Condition: Requesting consent.
An OPO must encourage discretion
and sensitivity with respect to the
circumstances, views, and beliefs of
potential donor families.
(a) An OPO must have a written
protocol to ensure that, in the absence
of a donor document, the individual(s)
responsible for making the donation
decision are informed of their options to
donate organs or tissues (when the OPO
is making a request for tissues) or to
decline to donate. The OPO must
provide to the individual(s) responsible
for making the donation decision, at a
minimum, the following:
(1) A list of the organs or tissues that
may be recovered.
(2) All possible uses for the donated
organs or tissues.
(3) The information that the
individual(s) have the right to limit or
restrict use of the organs or tissues.
(4) A description of the screening and
recovery processes.
(5) Information (such as for-profit or
non-profit status) about organizations
that will recover, process, and distribute
the tissue.
(6) Information regarding access to
and release of the donor’s medical
records.
(7) An explanation of the impact the
donation process will have on burial
arrangements and the appearance of the
donor’s body.
(8) Information about the procedure
for filing a complaint.
(9) Contact information in case the
individual(s) making the donation
decision have questions.
(10) A copy of the signed consent
form if a donation is made.
(b) If an OPO does not request consent
to donation because a potential donor
consented to donation before his or her
death in a manner that satisfied
applicable State law requirements in the
potential donor’s State of residence, the
OPO must provide information about
the donation to the family of the
potential donor, as requested.
§ 486.344 Condition: Donor evaluation and
management and organ placement and
recovery.
The OPO must have written protocols
for donor evaluation and management
and organ placement and recovery that
meet current standards of practice and
are designed to maximize organ quality
and optimize the number of donors and
the number of organs recovered and
transplanted per donor.
(a) Donor protocol management. (1)
The medical director is responsible for
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ensuring that donor evaluation and
management protocols are implemented
correctly and appropriately to ensure
that every potential donor is thoroughly
assessed for medical suitability for
organ donation and clinically managed
to optimize organ viability and function.
(2) The OPO must implement a
system that ensures the medical director
or other qualified physician is available
to assist in the medical management of
a donor when the surgeon on call is
unavailable.
(b) Evaluation. The OPO must do the
following:
(1) Verify that death has been
pronounced according to applicable
local, state, and federal laws pertaining
to organ donation.
(2) Determine whether there are
conditions that may contraindicate
donation.
(3) If possible, obtain the potential
donor’s medical and social history.
(4) Review the potential donor’s
medical chart and perform a physical
examination of the donor.
(5) Obtain the donor’s vital signs and
perform all pertinent tests.
(c) Testing. The OPO must do the
following:
(1) Arrange for screening and testing
of the donor for infectious disease
according to current standards of
practice, including testing for the
human immunodeficiency virus.
(2) Ensure that screening and testing
of the donor (including point-of-care
testing and blood typing) are conducted
by a laboratory that is certified in the
appropriate specialty or subspecialty of
service in accordance with part 493 of
this chapter.
(3) Ensure that the donor’s blood is
typed using two separate blood samples.
(4) Document the donor’s record with
all test results, including blood type,
before organ recovery.
(d) Standard: Collaboration with
transplant programs. (1) The OPO must
establish protocols in collaboration with
transplant programs that define the roles
and responsibilities of the OPO and the
transplant program for all activities
associated with donor evaluation, donor
management, organ recovery, and organ
placement. The protocol for organ
placement must include procedures to
ensure that the blood type of the donor
is compared with the blood type of the
intended recipient by two OPO staff
members before organ recovery takes
place and that documentation of the
donor’s blood type accompanies the
organ to the hospital where the
transplant will take place.
(2) The established protocols must be
reviewed periodically with the
transplant programs to incorporate best
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practices in the field and maximize
organ donation.
(e) Documentation of recipient
information. Prior to recovery of an
organ for transplantation, the OPO must
have written documentation from the
OPTN showing, at a minimum, the
intended recipient’s position on the
waiting list in relation to other suitable
candidates and the recipient’s OPTN
identification number and blood type.
(f) Organ allocation. The OPO must
have a system to allocate donated organs
among transplant patients that is
consistent with the rules and
requirements of the OPTN, as defined in
§ 486.320 of this part.
(g) Organ placement. The OPO must
develop and implement a protocol to
maximize placement of organs for
transplantation.
§ 486.346 Condition: Organ preparation
and transport.
(a) The OPO must arrange for testing
of organs for infectious disease and
tissue typing of organs according to
current standards of practice. The OPO
must ensure that testing and tissue
typing of organs are conducted by a
laboratory that is certified in the
appropriate specialty or subspecialty of
service in accordance with part 493 of
this chapter.
(b) The OPO must send complete
documentation of donor information to
the transplant center with the organ,
including donor evaluation, the
complete record of the donor’s
management, documentation of consent,
documentation of the pronouncement of
death, and documentation for
determining organ quality. Two OPO
staff members must verify that the
documentation that accompanies an
organ to a transplant center is correct.
(c) The OPO must develop and follow
a written protocol for packaging,
labeling, handling, and shipping organs
in a manner that ensures their arrival
without compromise to the quality of
the organ or health of the recipient. The
protocol must include procedures to
check the accuracy and integrity of
labels, packaging, and contents prior to
transport, including verification by two
OPO staff members that information
listed on the labels is correct.
(d) All packaging in which an organ
is transported must be marked with the
identification number, specific contents,
and donor’s blood type.
§ 486.348 Condition: Quality assessment
and performance improvement (QAPI).
The OPO must develop, implement,
and maintain a comprehensive, datadriven QAPI program designed to
monitor and evaluate performance of all
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donation services, including services
provided under contract or arrangement.
(a) Standard: Components of a QAPI
program. The OPO’s QAPI program
must include objective measures to
evaluate and demonstrate improved
performance with regard to OPO
activities, such as hospital development,
designated requestor training, donor
management, timeliness of on-site
response to hospital referrals, consent
practices, organ recovery and
placement, and organ packaging and
transport. The OPO must take actions
that result in performance
improvements and track performance to
ensure that improvements are sustained.
(b) Standard: Death record reviews.
As part of its ongoing QAPI efforts, an
OPO must conduct death record reviews
in every Medicare and Medicaid
participating hospital in its service area
that has a level I or level II trauma
center or 150 or more beds (unless the
hospital has a waiver to work with
another OPO), with the exception of
psychiatric and rehabilitation hospitals.
When missed opportunities for donation
are identified, the OPO must implement
actions to improve performance.
(c) Standard: Adverse events. (1) An
OPO must establish a written policy to
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address adverse events that occur
during any phase of an organ donation
case. The policy must address, at a
minimum, the process for identification,
reporting, analysis, and prevention of
adverse events.
(2) The OPO must conduct a thorough
analysis of any adverse event and must
use the analysis to affect changes in the
OPO’s policies and practices to prevent
repeat incidents.
(3) The OPO must—
(i) Report an adverse event to CMS
within 10 business days of becoming
aware of the adverse event; and
(ii) Provide to CMS written
documentation of the investigation and
analysis of the adverse event within 15
business days of becoming aware of the
event.
PART 498—APPEALS PROCEDURES
FOR DETERMINATIONS THAT AFFECT
PARTICIPATION IN THE MEDICARE
PROGRAM AND FOR
DETERMINATIONS THAT AFFECT THE
PARTICIPATION OF ICFs/MR AND
CERTAIN NFs IN THE MEDICAID
PROGRAM
Authority: Secs. 1102 and 1871 of the
Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 1302 and
1395hh).
Subpart A—General Provisions
§ 498.2
[Amended]
2. In § 498.2, the definition of
‘‘Supplier’’ is amended by removing
‘‘organ procurement organization
(OPO),’’.
(Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance
Program No. 93.778, Medical Assistance
Program)
(Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance
Program No. 93.773, Medicare—Hospital
Insurance; and Program No. 93.774,
Medicare—Supplementary Medical
Insurance Program)
Editorial Note: This document was
received in the Office of the Federal Register
on January 26, 2005.
Approved: July 29, 2004.
Tommy G. Thompson,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 05–1695 Filed 1–28–05; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4120–01–P
1. The authority citation for part 498
continues to read as follows:
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Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 70, Number 23 (Friday, February 4, 2005)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 6086-6137]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 05-1695]
[[Page 6085]]
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Part II
Department of Health and Human Services
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Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services
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42 CFR Parts 413, 441, et al.
Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Conditions for Coverage for Organ
Procurement Organizations (OPOs); Proposed Rule
Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 23 / Friday, February 4, 2005 /
Proposed Rules
[[Page 6086]]
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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services
42 CFR Parts 413, 441, 486 and 498
[CMS-3064-P]
RIN: 0938-AK81
Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Conditions for Coverage for Organ
Procurement Organizations (OPOs)
AGENCY: Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), HHS.
ACTION: Proposed rule.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: This proposed rule would establish new conditions for coverage
for organ procurement organizations (OPOs), including multiple new
outcome and process performance measures based on donor potential and
other related factors in each service area of qualified OPOs. We are
proposing new standards with the goal of improving OPO performance and
increasing organ donation.
DATES: We will consider comments if we receive them at the appropriate
address, as provided below, no later than 5 p.m. on April 5, 2005.
ADDRESSES: In commenting, please refer to file code CMS-3064-P. Because
of staff and resource limitations, we cannot accept comments by
facsimile (FAX) transmission.
You may submit comments in one of three ways (no duplicates
please):
You may submit comments in one of three ways (no duplicates,
please):
1. Electronically. You may submit electronic comments on specific
issues in this regulation to https://www.cms.hhs.gov/regulations/
ecomments. (Attachments should be in Microsoft Word, WordPerfect, or
Excel; however, we prefer Microsoft Word.)
2. By mail. You may mail written comments (one original and two
copies) to the following address ONLY: Centers for Medicare & Medicaid
Services, Department of Health and Human Services, Attention: CMS-3064-
P, P.O. Box 8015, Baltimore, MD 21244-8015.
Please allow sufficient time for mailed comments to be received
before the close of the comment period.
3. By hand or courier. If you prefer, you may deliver (by hand or
courier) your written comments (one original and two copies) before the
close of the comment period to one of the following addresses. If you
intend to deliver your comments to the Baltimore address, please call
telephone number (410) 786-9994 in advance to schedule your arrival
with one of our staff members. Room 445-G, Hubert H. Humphrey Building,
200 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20201; or 7500 Security
Boulevard, Baltimore, MD 21244-1850.
(Because access to the interior of the HHH Building is not readily
available to persons without Federal Government identification,
commenters are encouraged to leave their comments in the CMS drop slots
located in the main lobby of the building. A stamp-in clock is
available for persons wishing to retain a proof of filing by stamping
in and retaining an extra copy of the comments being filed.)
Comments mailed to the addresses indicated as appropriate for hand
or courier delivery may be delayed and received after the comment
period.
Submission of comments on paperwork requirements. You may submit
comments on this document's paperwork requirements by mailing your
comments to the addresses provided at the end of the ``Collection of
Information Requirements'' section in this document.
For information on viewing public comments, see the beginning of
the SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Marcia Newton, (410) 786-5265. Diane
Corning, (410) 786-8486.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Submitting Comments: We welcome comments from the public on all
issues set forth in this rule to assist us in fully considering issues
and developing policies. You can assist us by referencing the file code
CMS-3064-P and the specific ``issue identifier'' that precedes the
section on which you choose to comment.
Inspection of Public Comments: All comments received before the
close of the comment period are available for viewing by the public,
including any personally identifiable or confidential business
information that is included in a comment. CMS posts all electronic
comments received before the close of the comment period on its public
Web site as soon as possible after they have been received. Hard copy
comments received timely will be available for public inspection as
they are received, generally beginning approximately 3 weeks after
publication of a document, at the headquarters of the Centers for
Medicare & Medicaid Services, 7500 Security Boulevard, Baltimore,
Maryland 21244, Monday through Friday of each week from 8:30 a.m. to 4
p.m. To schedule an appointment to view public comments, phone 1-800-
743-3951.
I. Background
A. Key Statutory Provisions
The Organ Procurement Organization Certification Act of 2000
(section 701 of Pub. L. 106-505) and section 219 of the Conference
Report accompanying the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2001 (Pub. L.
106-554) contain identical provisions that amended section 371(b)(1) of
the Public Health Service (PHS) Act (42 U.S.C. 273(b)(1)). The
legislation directs the Secretary to establish regulations that include
four major requirements. These are to:
1. Increase the re-certification cycle for OPOs from 2 to at least
4 years.
2. Establish outcome and process performance measures based on
empirical evidence, obtained through reasonable efforts, of organ donor
potential and other related factors in each service area of qualified
OPOs.
3. Establish multiple outcome measures.
4. Establish a process for OPOs to appeal a de-certification on
substantive and procedural grounds.
The re-certification cycle was increased from 2 years to 4 years
through an interim final rule with comment (December 28, 2001, 66 FR
67109), ``Emergency Re-certification for Coverage for Organ Procurement
Organizations (OPOs).'' The interim final rule re-certified all 59 OPOs
until December 31, 2005 and extended their agreements with us until
July 31, 2006. Thus, the re-certification cycle set forth in the
interim final rule satisfies the first of the new criteria (that is,
certification not more frequently than once every 4 years.) Our
proposed rule addresses the remaining three requirements.
Section 1138 of the Social Security Act (the Act) (42 U.S.C. 1320b-
8) provides the statutory qualifications and requirements that an OPO
must meet in order for organ procurement costs to be reimbursed in
hospitals and critical access hospitals under the Medicare or Medicaid
programs. Section 1138(b) of the Act also specifies that an OPO must
operate under a grant made under section 371(a) of the PHS Act or must
be certified or re-certified by the Secretary as meeting the standards
to be a qualified OPO. Under these authorities, we previously
established conditions for coverage for OPOs at 42 CFR 486.301, et seq.
(May 2, 1996, 61 FR 19722).
Section 1102 of the Act gives the Secretary of Health and Human
Services the authority to make and publish such rules and regulations
as may be necessary to the efficient administration of the functions
with which he is charged under the Act. This section of
[[Page 6087]]
the Act gives the Secretary broad authority to establish requirements
for OPOs that are necessary for the efficient administration of the
Medicare program.
B. Why We Are Proposing New OPO Regulations
OPOs are government contractors that play a crucial role in
ensuring that scarce transplantable human organs are provided to
seriously ill patients suffering from end-stage organ failure. OPOs are
responsible for identifying potential organ donors, informing families
about their donation options, obtaining consent to donation, screening
potential donors for infectious disease, clinically managing potential
organ donors to maintain viability of their organs, placing the maximum
number of organs possible with transplant centers, arranging for
recovery, testing, and tissue typing of organs, and packaging and
transporting organs to transplant hospitals. Clearly, OPO performance
is one of the most critical elements of the nation's organ
transplantation system. An OPO that is effective in procuring organs
and delivering them safely to transplant centers will save more lives
than an ineffective OPO. Therefore, under the broad authority in the
statute, the Secretary has established performance standards for OPOs
so that they excel in their critical mission.
The need for organ donors is acute and growing rapidly. While
medical advances have made transplantation a viable treatment option
for many patients suffering from end-stage organ failure, the supply of
organs has not kept pace with the number of patients who need them.
Since 1996 when the current OPO regulations went into effect through
the end of 2002, the number of patients waiting for organs increased by
nearly 60 percent to more than 80,792, while the number of deceased
donors grew by only 14 percent. As of June 23, 2003, there were 82,049
patients waiting for a transplant.
Various studies, including those by the Harvard School of Public
Health, the Partnership for Organ Donation, and the Association of
Organ Procurement Organizations (AOPO), have estimated that
approximately 10,500 to 22,000 deaths occurring in the United States
every year could yield suitable donor organs. (C Christiansen, S
Gortmaker, J William, et al: A Method for Estimating Solid Organ Donor
Potential by Organ Procurement Region, American Journal of Public
Health, Vol. 88, No. 22, November, 1998. E Sheey, S Conrad, L Brigham,
et al: Estimating the Number of Potential Organ Donors in the United
States, The New England Journal of Medicine, 349:667-74, August 14,
2003. E Guadagnoli, C Christiansen, C Beasley, Potential Organ-Donor
Supply and Efficiency of Organ Procurement Organizations, Health Care
Financing Review, Vol. 24, No. 24, Summer 2003.) However, there were
only 6,182 deceased donors in 2002 and only 18,244 transplants
resulting from those donations. Based on these estimates, OPOs are
recovering organs from, at most, only a little more than half the
number of potential donors per year.
The study published in The New England Journal of Medicine found
that of all potential organ donors reported in the study, only 42
percent became donors. Of those families who were asked to donate, only
39 percent agreed, and 16 percent of families were never asked whether
they would agree to donation. The study published in the Health Care
Financing Review found that of all potential organ donors reported in
the study, only 35 percent became donors.
Over the years, many research studies have analyzed factors that
impact donation rates, including health professionals' attitudes toward
donation, the setting in which requests for donation are made, and
medical examiner prohibitions on donation. Recently, researchers have
increasingly turned their attention to the best practices of OPOs whose
service areas have high donation rates.
In April 2003, the Health Resources and Services Administration
(HRSA) began an ongoing ``Organ Donation Breakthrough Collaborative''
to bring best practices in organ donation to OPOs and hospitals,
particularly to hospitals identified as having the greatest number of
potential donors. More than three-quarters of the 59 OPOs are
participating in the Collaborative. By studying the practices of six of
the best-performing OPOs, the Collaborative's researchers have already
identified several best practices for OPOs, as well as strategies for
implementing them. Many of the best practices and associated strategies
are discussed throughout this preamble to provide guidance for OPOs in
implementing the requirements of the proposed rule.
Our proposals would fundamentally change the existing OPO
regulations to emphasize quality and continuous quality improvement.
The changes would ensure that each OPO utilizes best practices to
improve its efficiency, effectiveness, and quality. While the
requirements in the proposed rule apply to all OPOs, we have
specifically targeted the requirements toward OPOs that may not
understand the value of incorporating best practices into the structure
of their organizations. Thus, our overall goal is to improve the
functioning of poor performing OPOs, rather than simply to terminate
them.
In April 2001, the Department of Health and Human Services (the
Department) launched ``The Secretary's Donation Initiative,'' a multi-
pronged effort to increase all types of donation--blood, marrow,
tissue, and organ. In his speech launching the Initiative, the
Secretary noted, ``The facts are just astounding. Someone dies every 96
minutes because there aren't enough organs to go around.'' The five
initial key elements of the Initiative were the Workplace Partnership
for Life, a new model donor card, a national forum on donor registries,
a national gift of life medal, and a drivers' education donation
curriculum. The Department promised that it would launch additional
elements under the Initiative in the future. The Organ Donation
Breakthrough Collaborative is the sixth key element of the Secretary's
Initiative. The Secretary believes promulgation of the multiple outcome
and process performance measures in this rule will improve OPO
performance and, as a result, increase organ donation and
transplantation in the United States.
B. Overview of Key Proposed Provisions
1. Appeals and Competition Processes
In the congressional findings associated with section 219 of the
Conference Report accompanying the Consolidated Appropriations Act,
2001 (42 U.S.C. 219(a)(2)) Congress found that the process for OPO re-
certification created a level of uncertainty among OPOs that interfered
with their effectiveness in increasing organ donation. Therefore,
Congress directed the Secretary to develop a process for OPOs to appeal
a de-certification on substantive and procedural grounds. (See section
219(c)(3) codified at 42 U.S.C. 273(b)(1)(D)(ii)(iv).) Under this
authority, we are proposing a streamlined appeals process, in which an
OPO facing de-certification could appeal and receive a decision on its
appeal before its service area is opened for competition from other
OPOs. (See proposed Sec. 486.314.)
To further reduce the level of uncertainty identified by Congress,
we propose making certain changes in the current re-certification
process. Although we would open every OPO's service area for
competition at the end of every re-certification cycle as under the
current regulations, we would: (1) Permit OPOs to compete for open
areas only if they met certain specific objective criteria; (2) allow
competition only for entire service areas; and (3) use
[[Page 6088]]
clear, objective criteria for determining which OPO would be designated
for the service area (See proposed Sec. 486.316.)
A more extensive discussion of our proposal for the appeals and
competition processes, as well as a description of other competition
processes on which we are requesting comments, can be found in this
preamble under proposed ``General Requirements.''
2. Proposed Multiple Outcome Performance Measures
When we published the current OPO regulations in 1996, population
was the only measure readily available to assess donor potential.
Therefore, we promulgated regulations that judge an OPO's performance
based on the population in its service area (for example, the number of
donors per million population). Subsequently, we began to investigate
alternative methods for assessing donor potential in order to develop
new outcome measures based on the organ donation potential in each
OPO's service area. This preamble contains a discussion of our analysis
of these alternative methods, as well as an explanation of the method
we propose--using potential donor data reported by OPOs to the Organ
Procurement and Transplantation Network (OPTN) based on information
from hospital referral calls to OPOs. A discussion of the proposed
multiple outcome measures can be found in this preamble under ``OPO
Outcome Performance Measures.'' The proposed regulatory text can be
found at Sec. 486.318.
The proposed outcome measures would address two requirements of the
Organ Procurement Organization Certification Act of 2000 and section
219 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2001. The first requirement
calls for promulgation of ``outcome* * *performance measures that are
based on empirical evidence obtained through reasonable efforts of
organ donor potential and other related factors in each service area of
qualified organ procurement organizations.'' The second requirement
calls for the use of ``multiple outcome measures as part of the
certification process.''
3. Proposed Multiple Process Performance Measures
In addition to proposing multiple outcome measures, the Organ
Procurement Organization Certification Act of 2000 and section 219 of
the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2001 require the Secretary to
propose ``process performance measures that are based on empirical
evidence obtained through reasonable efforts of organ donor potential
and other related factors in each service area of qualified organ
procurement organizations.'' In the congressional findings associated
with section 219 of the Conference Report accompanying the Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2001 (Pub. L. 106-554, 42 U.S.C. 219(a)(6)(B)),
Congress urged us to ``improve the overall certification process'' by
incorporating process as well as outcome performance measures. Congress
noted that current OPO regulations do not permit consideration of
outcome and process performance measures that ``would more accurately
reflect the relative capability and performance of each organ
procurement organization.''
Therefore, we propose to establish outcome and process performance-
related measures based on factors that affect an OPO's ability to
provide the maximum number of healthy organs to transplant centers. The
purpose of these measures is to improve OPO performance and increase
organ donation by ensuring that OPOs attain the highest possible level
of effectiveness and quality. The process performance measures we
propose would require OPOs to develop performance protocols, monitor
their own performance continuously, and make changes to improve the
quality of their organizations.
The proposed new process performance measures are based on
empirical evidence of organ donor potential and other related factors
in each OPO service area derived from three bodies of knowledge: (1)
Research into best practices in organ donation, (2) information about
methods of maximizing organ donation based on our work with OPOs, and
(3) accepted standards of practice and quality improvement strategies
used by the larger health care community.
A review of the literature on best practices in organ donation
provides empirical evidence that certain characteristics are common to
successful OPOs. These characteristics include experienced leadership;
efficient mechanisms for tracking activity; excellent communication
with transplant hospitals; timely, on-site response to donor referrals;
adequate experienced staff; data-driven decision making; in-hospital
coordinators; and targeted hospital development programs. We have
incorporated findings from the literature into the proposed process
performance measures. Discussions and citations of individual studies
can be found in this preamble in ``Organ Procurement Organization
Process Performance Measures.''
Our experience with top-performing OPOs supports the validity of
the literature on best practices. In 1998, we developed four ``OPO
Coordinator'' positions in the four CMS Regional Consortia (Midwest,
West, South, and Northeast). The OPO Coordinator positions are unique;
OPOs are the only Medicare providers or suppliers that have our staff
assigned to work with them on an ongoing basis to improve their quality
and outcomes. The Coordinators sponsor seminars, conduct conferences
and workshops, provide education for OPO staffs, conduct site visits,
meet with OPO directors and hospital development staffs, recommend
interventions to increase OPO efficiency and quality, analyze OPO's
voluntary quality improvement efforts, and act as liaisons between OPOs
and hospitals and between OPOs and tissue banks to resolve problems and
promote cooperation. (We would note that for ease of use, the term
``tissue bank'' when used in this preamble and in the proposed
regulations text refers to all types of tissue banks, including those
that recover only corneas and eyes, and the word ``tissues'' refers to
all types of tissues, including corneas and eyes.)
The proposed process performance measures are based heavily on the
Coordinators' extensive experience with all 59 OPOs. The Coordinators'
experience with and knowledge about OPOs provide much of the empirical
evidence that has enabled us to develop proposed process performance
measures targeted specifically toward increasing OPO performance and
quality.
As stated earlier, some of the proposed requirements are based on
other factors such as accepted standards of practice for all health
care organizations. For example, proposed Sec. 486.344 would require
OPOs to use accepted standards of practice for testing donors to
prevent transmission of the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) and
other infectious diseases. Proposed Sec. 486.348 is based on quality
assessment and performance improvement (QAPI) programs that have been
embraced by the health care community and that have been shown to
increase quality and outcomes of care.
Therefore, the process performance measures we propose would
satisfy the second requirement in the Organ Procurement Organization
Certification Act of 2000 and section 219 of the Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2001 for the Secretary to propose process
performance measures ``based on empirical evidence, obtained through
reasonable efforts, of organ donor potential and other related factors
in
[[Page 6089]]
each OPO's service area.'' These include the following proposed
requirements for OPOs:
Have agreements with hospitals and critical access
hospitals that address responsibilities in regard to the requirements
for hospitals at Sec. 482.45 and for critical access hospitals at
Sec. 485.643. (Sec. 486.322.)
Maintain sufficient qualified staff (either from the OPO
or under contract or arrangement) to accomplish a number of different
objectives, including screening referral calls for donor potential,
assessment of potential donors for medical suitability, requesting
consent, maintaining donors, placing organs, overseeing organ recovery,
performing death record reviews, and conducting QAPI activities. (Sec.
486.326.)
Ensure that organ recovery personnel are qualified and
trained. (Sec. 486.326.)
Provide education, training, and performance evaluations
for OPO staff. (Sec. 486.326.)
Obtain informed consent for organ and tissue donation.
(Sec. 486.342.)
Develop and follow protocols for donor evaluation and
management and organ placement and recovery. (Sec. 486.344.)
Have a medical director who is responsible for
implementation of these protocols, as well as oversight management of
potential donors. (Sec. 486.326.)
Arrange for screening and testing of the donor for
infectious disease and testing and tissue typing of organs by a
laboratory certified under the Clinical Laboratory Improvement
Amendments (CLIA) of 1998. (Sec. 486.344 and Sec. 486.346.)
Collaborate with transplant programs and have protocols
defining OPO and transplant hospital roles and responsibilities for
donor evaluation, donor management, organ recovery, and organ
placement. (Sec. 486.344.)
Document recipient information, including blood type and
position on the wait list, before organ recovery. (Sec. 486.344.)
Develop and follow a protocol for packaging, labeling,
handling, and shipping organs. (Sec. 486.346.)
Establish a comprehensive, data-driven, QAPI program
designed to monitor and evaluate performance of all donation services.
(Sec. 486.348.)
Perform death record reviews in hospitals with level I or
level II trauma centers or 150 or more beds. (Sec. 486.348.)
In addition, we propose a number of other requirements based on the
Secretary's authority under section 1102 of the Act to establish
requirements necessary for the efficient administration of the Medicare
program. These requirements generally are related to (1) administrative
matters (because efficient administration by Medicare contractors such
as OPOs supports efficient administration of the Medicare program); (2)
OPOs' relationships with Medicare donor and transplant hospitals; and
(3) data collection, management, and reporting (because OPO data are
needed by other Medicare entities, by other agencies within the
Department, and by us for the certification of OPOs.) These proposed
requirements include:
Participation in the Organ Procurement and Transplantation
Network. (Sec. 486.320.)
Designated requestor training for hospital staffs. (Sec.
486.322.)
Legal authority of a governing body for management and
provision of OPO services and development and implementation of
policies and procedures for administration of the OPO, the OPO's QAPI
program, and services furnished under contract or arrangement. (Sec.
486.324.)
Conflict of interest policies for the governing body, OPO
directors, medical directors, senior management, and procurement
coordinators. (Sec. 486.324 and Sec. 486.326.)
Credentialing records for organ recovery personnel. (Sec.
486.326.)
Hospital-specific organ donation and transplantation data
reported to Secretary and public. (Sec. 486.328.)
Information management, including donor and transplant
recipient information, data retention, and format of records. (Sec.
486.330.)
A system to allocate donated organs that is consistent
with the rules and requirements of the OPTN. (Sec. 486.344.)
Investigation, analysis, and reporting of adverse events
to us. (Sec. 486.348.)
Some of the proposed process performance measurements have a dual
role in that they both satisfy the requirements of the Organ
Procurement Organization Certification Act of 2000 and section 219 of
the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2001 and are based on the
Secretary's authority under section 1102 of the Act. For example, the
requirement for OPOs to provide designated requestor training for
hospitals can be linked to the Organ Procurement Organization
Certification Act of 2000 and section 219 of the Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2001 because the requirement is based on empirical
evidence that shows improved consent rates when the OPO and hospital
collaborate in requesting consent. (Note that factors in each OPO's
service area, such as the OPO's relationship with its hospitals, would
determine whether hospitals would request, and OPOs would need to
provide, designated requestor training). This proposed requirement also
is necessary to the effective and efficient administration of the
Medicare and Medicaid programs because under 42 CFR Sec. 482.45,
hospitals must ensure that individuals who discuss donation with
families of potential organ donors are trained in a course offered or
approved by the OPO.
Finally, section 1138(b)(1)(A) of the Act requires an OPO to be a
``qualified'' OPO as described in section 371(b) of the PHS Act. A
number of the requirements we propose (for example, arrangements to
cooperate with tissue banks and membership composition and authority of
OPO boards) are based on requirements for qualified OPOs under the PHS
Act. (See Sec. 486.322 and Sec. 486.324.) Proposed requirements that
relate to the PHS Act are noted in the broader discussion in this
preamble under ``Proposed Process Performance Measures and Other
Requirements.''
II. Provisions of the Proposed Regulations
For the reasons discussed above, we propose to reorganize and
revise 42 CFR part 486, subpart G. Following is a discussion of the
specific requirements contained in the proposed conditions.
Proposed General Requirements
Basis and Scope (Proposed Sec. 486.301)
Section 486.301 (Basis and scope) would remain unchanged from the
existing regulations except that we would add a reference to Sec. 1102
of the Act, and we would add the term, ``non-renewal'' to Sec.
486.301(b)(3) to clarify that the scope includes non-renewal of
agreements.
Definitions (Proposed Sec. 486.302)
To reflect organizational changes in the regulations text, to
remove obsolete material, and to provide further clarity to the
regulations, we propose several amendments and additions to the
definitions.
We propose amending the definition for ``certification'' to mean a
Secretarial determination that an OPO meets (or has met) the
requirements at 42 CFR 486.303 and is eligible for designation if it
meets the additional requirements for designation.
We propose amending the definition of ``designation'' to clarify
that designation is the process of assigning geographic service areas
to OPOs. Once an OPO is certified and assigned a
[[Page 6090]]
geographic service area, organ procurement costs of the OPO are
eligible for Medicare and Medicaid payment under Sec. 1138(b)(1)(F) of
the Act.
We propose amending the definition of ``entire metropolitan
statistical area'' to state that we do not recognize consolidated
metropolitan statistical areas (CMSAs) when making service area
determinations.
We propose amending the definition of ``organ'' to clarify that the
definition includes multivisceral organs only when they are
transplanted with an intestine.
We propose eliminating ``potential donor'' and replacing it with
``organ donor potential.'' The definition of ``potential donor'' in the
current regulations refers to causes and conditions of death that are
``generally acceptable'' for donation of at least one solid organ.'' In
our definition for ``organ donor potential,'' we would include specific
parameters for the cause and conditions of death that indicate medical
suitability for organ donation. These parameters are discussed in this
preamble under ``Proposed OPO Outcome Measures,'' section C3. We are
particularly interested in public comments on this proposed definition.
We propose replacing ``transplant center'' with ``transplant
hospital'' and have standardized the use of ``transplant hospital''
throughout this proposed regulation. A transplant hospital means a
hospital that furnishes organ transplants and other medical and
surgical specialty services required for the care of transplant
patients. There may be one or more types of organ transplant centers
operating within the same transplant hospital.
Additionally, we propose adding definitions for ``adverse event,''
``agreement cycle,'' ``death record review,'' ``de-certification,''
``designated requestor,'' ``donor,'' ``donor document,'' ``potential
donor denominator,'' and ``re-certification cycle.''
We propose a definition for ``adverse event'' because we propose
requiring an OPO to report those events to us so that we can monitor
the OPO's response to the adverse event. An adverse event would mean an
untoward, undesirable, and usually unanticipated event that causes
death or serious injury or the risk thereof.
We propose definitions for ``agreement cycle'' and ``re-
certification cycle'' to clarify the difference between the two. The 4-
year CMS/OPO agreement cycle runs from August 1 through July 31, unless
it is extended according to Sec. 486.314. The 4-year re-certification
cycle is based on the calendar year.
We have included a proposed definition for ``death record review''
because we would require OPOs to perform death record reviews as part
of their QAPI programs.
We have included a definition for ``de-certification'' to explain
that de-certification follows our determination that an OPO no longer
meets one or more conditions for coverage (including, the outcome
measures at Sec. 486.318 and the process performance measures and
other requirements) or no longer meets the requirements for
certification or designation. If an OPO's agreement with us is
terminated or is not renewed, the OPO is de-certified.
We propose adding a definition for ``designated requestor'' to
explain the role of designated requestors in the donation process. We
propose a definition for ``donor'' to ensure that OPOs'' reporting of
donor data is standardized. (The definition of ``donor'' is not
intended to limit acceptable donors.)
We are proposing a definition for ``donor document'' because we
would require OPOs to ensure that, in the absence of a donor document,
the individual or individuals with responsibility to make the donation
decision are informed of their option to donate organs or tissues or to
decline to donate.
We propose adding ``potential donor denominator'' to the
definitions because we would use this term for the potential donor data
OPOs would report to the OPTN. Those data would be used as the basis
for the multiple outcome measures.
These definitions, as we propose to add or revise them, are
contained in the regulatory text section at the end of this document.
Requirements for Certification and Designation
[If you choose to comment on this section, please include the caption
``Certification and Designation Requirements'' at the beginning of your
comments.]
Requirements for Certification (Proposed Sec. 486.303)
The current regulations do not make a clear distinction between the
requirements necessary for certification and the requirements necessary
for designation, nor do they specify that an OPO must be certified
before it is designated for a service area. Therefore, we propose
adding a new section to specify the requirements an OPO must meet to be
certified.
Following are the proposed requirements. After each proposed
requirement, we have listed the location of the requirement in the
statute or in current regulations. To be certified, an OPO must:
(1) Have received a grant under 42 U.S.C. 273(a).
(2) Be a non-profit entity that is exempt from Federal income
taxation under Sec. 501 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986. (See
Sec. 486.306(a).)
(3) Have accounting and other fiscal procedures necessary to assure
the fiscal stability of the organization, including procedures to
obtain payment for kidneys and non-renal organs provided to transplant
hospitals. (See Sec. 486.306(b).)
(4) Have an agreement with the Secretary to be reimbursed under
title XVIII for the procurement of kidneys. (See section 371(b)(1)(C)
of the PHS Act.)
(5) Have been re-certified as an OPO under the Medicare program
from January 1, 2002 through December 31, 2005. (See Sec.
486.301(b)(4).)
(6) Have procedures to obtain payment for non-renal organs provided
to transplant centers. (See Sec. 273(b)(1)(E).)
(7) Agree to enter into an agreement with any hospital in the OPO's
service area, including a transplant hospital, that requests an
agreement. (See 486.304(b)(8).)
(8) Meet or have met the conditions for coverage, including the
outcome measures and the process performance measures and other
requirements. (See Sec. 486.314. This section states that an OPO's
agreement with CMS may be terminated if the OPO does not meet the two
conditions for coverage in the current regulations, as well as the
requirements for qualifications for designation found in Sec.
486.306.)
We propose that these threshold requirements for certification must
be met before an OPO can be designated, pursuant to our proposed Sec.
486.304.
Requirements for Designation (Proposed Sec. 486.304)
Provisions regarding general requirements for designation as an OPO
currently found in Sec. 486.304 (``General requirements'') and
requirements at Sec. 486.306 (``Qualifications for designation as an
OPO'') would be reorganized. Some requirements found in current Sec.
486.304 have been moved to proposed Sec. 486.303. Other requirements
judged to be burdensome or unnecessary have been removed. For example,
we would no longer require
[[Page 6091]]
OPOs to submit a written application for designation.
Most requirements in the current Sec. 486.306 would be
incorporated into other sections of the proposed rule. Specifically,
requirements for OPO advisory boards and boards of directors have been
moved to proposed Sec. 486.324 (``Administration and governing
body''). Requirements for agreements with hospitals, critical access
hospitals, and tissue banks can be found in proposed Sec. 486.322
(Relationships with hospitals, critical access hospitals, and tissue
banks). Requirements for testing of donors and organs can be found in
both proposed Sec. 486.344 (Donor evaluation and management and organ
placement and recovery) and proposed Sec. 486.346 (Organ preparation
and transport). Requirements for data reporting have been moved to
proposed Sec. 486.328 (Reporting of data), and requirements for
protecting privacy of data can be found in proposed Sec. 486.330
(Information management). Finally, requirements for professional
education can be found in Sec. 486.326 (Human resources). Our
rationale for these proposed changes is addressed later in this
preamble in our discussion of the individual sections.
In addition, we propose requiring OPOs to file a cost report within
5 months following the end of the fiscal year, rather than the current
3 months. This would conform the OPO regulations to Sec. 413.24(f).
OPO Service Area Size Designation and Documentation Requirements
(Proposed Sec. 486.306)
The requirements contained in this section would be re-designated
from the current Sec. 486.307, and many requirements would remain
unchanged. We would no longer require OPOs to provide population data
to us since population would no longer be used as a basis for OPO
certification.
We propose retaining the requirement that an OPO must procure
organs from an average of at least 24 donors per calendar year. We
believe it is important to retain this requirement to assure that each
OPO has ``a defined service area of sufficient size to assure maximum
effectiveness in the procurement and equitable distribution of organs*
* *'' as Congress intended. (See section 371(b)(1)(F) of the PHS Act.)
In addition, we would change the current requirement for an average of
24 donors per calendar year in the 2 years before the year of re-
designation to a requirement for an average of 24 donors per calendar
year in the 4 years before the year of re-designation because the re-
certification cycle has been increased from 2 years to 4 years.
However, we would no longer permit exceptions to the 24-donor per
year rule, including the exception for an OPO that serves an entire
state. (See Sec. 486.307(d)(2)(ii).) When the current regulations were
published in 1996, the average OPO recovered 77 donors per year.
Because of a decrease in the number of OPOs and an increase in the
number of donors recovered nationwide, the average OPO procured
approximately 100 donors in 2002. Therefore, we believe that an OPO
procuring fewer than 96 donors in a 4-year period is too small to
operate efficiently and effectively.
We propose removing language from the current regulations that
refers to new entities or organizations becoming OPOs. Section 371(a)
of the PHS Act provides authority for the Secretary to make grants to
qualified OPOs that are described in subsection (b). However, given the
provision in (b)(1)(D) added by the OPO Certification Act of 2000
(``notwithstanding any other provision of law, has met the requirements
of this section and has been certified or re-certified by the Secretary
within the previous 4-year period as meeting the performance standards
to be a qualified organ procurement organization* * *''), it appears
impossible for the Secretary to give a grant to an organization that
was not one of the 59 OPOs that was certified by the Secretary as
meeting the performance standards in the 4-year period before January
1, 2000.
Therefore, we propose removing the language at Sec.
486.307(d)(2)(iv) that requires an entity to show that it can procure
organs from at least 50 potential donors per year if it was not
previously designated as an OPO. We also propose removing references
related to designation of or requirements for entities or organizations
that are not currently OPOs
Additionally, we would remove obsolete service area size standards
for periods during 1996 and before. We would change the current
requirement for submission of information about acute care hospitals
that have an operating room and the equipment and personnel to retrieve
organs to submission of information about hospitals that have both a
ventilator and an operating room, since we propose requiring OPOs to
have agreements with 95 percent of those hospitals. (See discussion in
this preamble of Sec. 486.322, Relationships with hospitals, critical
access hospitals, and tissue banks). Finally, we would increase the
designation period from 2 years to 4 years to conform the designation
period to the re-certification cycle.
Designation of One OPO for Each Service Area (Proposed Sec. 486.308)
Requirements for the designation of one OPO for each service area
would be moved from Sec. 486.316 to proposed Sec. 486.308. Many
requirements would remain unchanged. However, we propose replacing the
``tie-breaker criteria'' used to designate an OPO when two or more OPOs
apply for the same area with new criteria found in proposed Sec.
486.316 (``Re-certification and competition processes''). (See
discussion of proposed Sec. 486.316 in this preamble for a discussion
of the proposed criteria.)
Changes in Ownership or Service Area (Proposed Sec. 486.310)
The requirements for an OPO changing ownership or changing its
service area found in Sec. 486.318 would be moved to proposed Sec.
486.310. Many requirements would remain unchanged. However, we propose
requiring certain additional information if there is a change in
ownership of an OPO. The OPO would be required to provide information
specific to the board structure of the new organization to ensure that
all required representatives are included. In addition, the OPO would
be required to submit operating budgets, financial information, and
other written documentation we determine to be necessary for
designation to ensure that the OPO continues to meet the requirements
for designation.
De-Certification (Proposed Sec. 486.312)
[If you choose to comment on this section, please include the caption
``De-certification'' at the beginning of your comments.]
Many of the requirements contained in Sec. 486.325 (``Termination
of agreement with CMS'') would be moved to proposed Sec. 486.312, but
the title of the section would be changed to ``De-certification,'' to
reflect the fact that if an OPO's agreement with us ends (whether
through voluntary or involuntary termination or non-renewal of the
OPO's agreement), we would de-certify the OPO.
The paragraph titled ``Voluntary termination'' would remain
substantially unchanged, but the paragraph would be renamed ``De-
certification due to voluntary termination of agreement.''
Additionally, we would add language to indicate that we would de-
certify the OPO as of the effective date of the voluntary termination.
The paragraph
[[Page 6092]]
titled ``Involuntary termination'' also would remain substantially
unchanged, but the paragraph would be renamed ``De-certification due to
involuntary termination of agreement.'' Additionally, we propose adding
language to indicate that we would de-certify the OPO as of the
effective date of the involuntary termination.
We propose adding a paragraph titled, ``De-certification due to
non-renewal of agreement,'' which states that we will not renew an
OPO's agreement if the OPO fails to meet the outcome measures at Sec.
486.318 based on data from the most recent re-certification cycle or if
the OPO is no longer designated for the service area. In that case, we
would de-certify the OPO as of the ending date of the agreement. We
propose removing the paragraph titled, ``Appeal right,'' because we
propose a new appeals process in Sec. 486.314.
In proposed Sec. 486.312(d), we have retained our general policy
of providing an OPO with at least 90 days notice before a de-
certification would be effective. However, we propose that in cases of
urgent need, notice of de-certification would be given at least three
days before de-certification. We expect that cases where an OPO would
need to be replaced based on urgent need would be extremely rare.
Nevertheless, in unusual circumstances, this expedited time frame may
be necessary to protect the public health. The notice to the OPO would
specifically state the reason for de-certification and the effective
date. We propose changing the title of the paragraph, ``Effects of
termination'' to ``Effects of de-certification.'' We propose retaining
the paragraph, ``Public Notice,'' but we would add language that states
we would give public notice of involuntary termination or non-renewal
of agreement in local newspapers in the OPO's service area.
Finally, we propose eliminating the paragraph, ``Reinstatement''
because our proposed appeals process sets forth the process we would
use for an OPO whose de-certification was reversed by a CMS hearing
officer. If a hearing officer upheld a de-certification, we would not
voluntarily reinstate the de-certified OPO. Thus the current language
regarding reinstatement would no longer be needed.
Appeals (Proposed Sec. 486.314)
[If you choose to comment on this section, please include the caption
``Appeals'' at the beginning of your comments.]
Under existing regulations, an agreement with an OPO could be
involuntarily terminated for failure to meet the conditions for
coverage, and any resulting appeals were governed by regulations at 42
CFR part 498. If an OPO failed the outcome performance standards set
forth in 486.310, we de-certified the OPO as of August 1 of the year
following the end of the re-certification cycle. Although the OPO was
given the right to appeal under part 498, it was not possible to
complete the appeals process prior to expiration of our agreement with
the OPO on August 1. Therefore, we opened the OPO's service area to
competition from other OPOs as soon as the OPO was notified about the
de-certification. The existing time frame generally did not permit a
decision to be made on an appeal prior to a successor OPO taking over
the service area when the de-certified OPO's agreement with us expired
on August 1. In order to resolve this problem, we propose to make
changes to the appeals process and alter the timing of the competition.
Specifically, we would: (1) Delay competition until an appeal is
completed; (2) expedite appeals by using a CMS hearing officer; and (3)
extend an OPO's agreement beyond August 1 if necessary.
In the OPO Certification Act of 2000, Congress specified that we
must propose a process whereby an OPO could appeal a de-certification
on substantive or procedural grounds. (See section 273(b)(D)(ii)(IV).)
Therefore, we are proposing a process whereby an OPO facing de-
certification due to involuntary termination or non-renewal of its
agreement with us would be able to appeal the de-certification on
substantive or procedural grounds and receive a decision on its appeal
before its service area was opened for competition from other OPOs. We
believe the proposed appeals process would be both fair and
expeditious.
An OPO would have 30 calendar days from the date on the notice of
de-certification to submit an appeal to a CMS hearing officer. In the
appeal, the OPO would be given the opportunity to submit evidence to
show why it should not be decertified. Appeals could be based on
substantive and/or procedural grounds. Within 2 weeks of receipt of the
OPO's appeal, the CMS hearing officer would schedule a hearing. The
hearing officer would issue notice of his or her decision to the OPO by
certified mail within 2 weeks following the date of the hearing.
In making an appeal on substantive grounds, an OPO could submit
evidence of factors that negatively impacted organ donation in its
service area and prevented it from meeting the outcome or process
performance measures or other requirements. For example, an OPO might
have evidence that its ability to obtain consent from families of
potential donors was adversely affected by certain demographic factors
in its service area, such as the presence of a significant number of
citizens whose race, ethnicity, religion, or educational level may be
associated with lower rates of consent to organ donation. As another
example, an OPO might have evidence that its ability to recover and
transport organs to transplant centers while they are still viable for
transplantation was hampered by the remote location of many of its
donor hospitals.
Since most OPOs have some factors in their service areas that work
against organ donation, the failing OPO would need to demonstrate not
only the specific factors that affected its ability to meet the outcome
measures but also what it did to attempt to ameliorate the factors. For
example, if an OPO provided data to show that it has a high minority
population that historically has had a lower rate of consent to
donation, the OPO would have to demonstrate what it did to address the
situation (such as conducting targeted public education) and whether
these efforts were successful.
Evidence submitted by an OPO about substantive factors could
include, but would not be limited to, research studies, demographic
studies, data from the OPO's QAPI program, and information on the OPO's
public and professional education and hospital development activities.
In making an appeal on procedural grounds, an OPO could, for
example, provide evidence that incorrect data were used by us to
determine whether the OPO met the outcome measures.
We propose that if the hearing officer reversed our determination
to de-certify an OPO in a case involving the involuntary termination of
the OPO's agreement, we would not de-certify the OPO. An OPO that was
successful in its appeal would have a right to compete for this service
area for the next cycle.
If the de-certification determination was upheld by the hearing
officer, Medicare and Medicaid payment would not be made for organ
procurement services the OPO furnished on or after the effective date
of de-certification. The unsuccessful OPO would not be permitted to
compete for the service area, or any other service area.
As stated earlier, OPOs currently have the right to appeal a de-
certification under part 498, which sets forth procedures for providers
and suppliers to appeal decisions that affect participation in the
Medicare program. Since this proposed rule includes an appeals process
for OPOs that is
[[Page 6093]]
separate from the part 498 process, we propose that if a hearings
officer denied an OPO's appeal, the OPO would have no further
administrative appeal rights. Thus, we propose removing OPOs from the
definition of suppliers found at Sec. 498.2.
However, we note that section 901 of the Medicare Prescription
Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act (MMA) defines the term
``supplier'' to mean ``unless the context otherwise requires, a
physician or other practitioner, a facility, or other entity (other
than a provider of services) that furnishes items or services under
this title [title XVIII].'' Nevertheless, the unique nature of OPOs and
their special role in the Medicare program distinguishes them from
other suppliers. Typically, suppliers furnish medical items and
services directly to Medicare beneficiaries and obtain direct payment
for Medicare-covered items and services from a Medicare carrier. A
supplier may furnish one or more of the health care items included
within the definition of ``medical and other health services'' that are
defined in section 1861(s) of the Act and are included in the scope of
the part B program. (See section 1832 of the Act.) Many suppliers do
not have a formal participation agreement with the Secretary. (See
section 1842(h) of the Act.) In contrast, an OPO is required to have an
agreement with the Secretary. (See 42 U.S.C 273(b)(1)(C).) Moreover,
many, if not most, organ donors are not Medicare beneficiaries, and
many organs recovered by OPOs are not transplanted into Medicare
beneficiaries.
Given this framework, and to ensure that Medicare pays
appropriately for its share of organ acquisition costs, OPOs have
payment rules and methodologies that differ from the payment rules and
methodologies used for other suppliers. (See, for example, 42 CFR Sec.
413.200.) Among other differences, organ acquisition costs are not paid
directly by a carrier to an OPO. Instead, the OPO is paid by the
transplant hospital, subject to later adjustment (see 42 CFR
413.200(c)(iv)), and Medicare pays the transplant hospital for the
organ acquisition costs. If necessary, Medicare payment to the OPO is
adjusted after it files its yearly cost report; for example, if the
OPO's costs to recover organs exceeded the payments it received for the
organs, Medicare covers the additional costs, based on the percentage
of organs that were recovered and transplanted into Medicare
beneficiaries. However, for purposes of the adjustment, all organs
provided by the OPO to Medicare-approved transplant centers are
considered to be organs that were transplanted into Medicare
beneficiaries. Since approximately 64 percent to 74 percent of extra-
renal organ transplant centers and approximately 100 percent of kidney
transplant centers are Medicare approved, the Medicare program
reimburses OPOs for their excess costs for most of the organs they
recover. Thus, the legal relationship between an OPO and the Medicare
program is different from other ``suppliers'' and reflects important
statutory differences.
The MMA also requires the Secretary to establish in regulations a
provider and supplier enrollment process that includes an appeals
process. Section 936 of MMA states that suppliers ``whose application
to enroll (or, if applicable, to renew enrollment) under this title is
denied may have a hearing and judicial review of such denial under the
procedures that apply under subsection [1866](h)(1)(A) to a provider of
services that is dissatisfied with a determination by the Secretary.
Although the appeals process we propose for OPOs differs from the MMA
appeals process, it specifically addresses the congressional findings
associated with the OPO Certification Act of 2000 that the uncertainty
of the current re-certification interferes with the effectiveness of
OPOs in raising the level of donation. This alternative appeals process
is necessary because there is a limited time period from the date that
the outcome performance measure data are available to the date when the
OPO contract cycle ends. Therefore, to achieve the goals of the 2000
legislation, including providing an equitable process for appeals, OPO
appeals must be expedited and completed before a replacement OPO is
named in order to avoid disruption in organ procurement.
Under our proposed rule, if the hearing officer upheld a de-
certification determination, we would open the OPO's service area for
competition from other OPOs. The de-certified OPO would not be
permitted to compete for the open area, and in most cases, the de-
certification would be effective as of the ending date of the OPO's
agreement with us.
However, if the appeals process did not leave sufficient time for
us to conduct a competition process for the open area and provide for a
smooth transition of the service area to the successor OPO, we could,
at our discretion, extend the OPO's agreement with us for a period of
time not to exceed an additional 60 days.
We believe the appeals process we propose fully satisfies the
statutory requirement to provide a process for an OPO to appeal a de-
certification on substantive and procedural grounds. Although the
process is streamlined to allow an OPO to receive a decision on its
appeal before the effective date of the de-certification and before its
service area being opened for competition, it allows ample time for the
OPO to prepare and present evidence of the substantive or procedural
basis for its appeal. Furthermore, the process allows sufficient time
for a hearing officer to consider the evidence and make a fair decision
that affords all of the process that is due to the OPO, while
safeguarding our ability to remove and replace an OPO that has not
performed well.
Re-Certification and Competition Processes (Proposed Sec. 486.316)
[If you choose to comment on this section, please include the
caption ``Re-certification and competition'' at the beginning of your
comments.]
Congress stated in the congressional findings associated with
section 219 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2001 that the OPO
re-certification process ``created a level of uncertainty that is
interfering with the effectiveness of organ procurement organizations
in raising the level of donation.'' Under existing regulations at Sec.
486.310 and Sec. 486.316, the service area of every OPO was opened for
competition at the conclusion of every re-certification cycle,
regardless of whether the OPO met the outcome performance standards for
the prior re-certification cycle. Any OPO that met the performance
standards for the prior re-certification cycle was eligible to compete
for an open service area or a portion of an open service area.
Under existing OPO regulations, an OPO that failed to meet the
outcome measures would lose its service area and be de-certified. Its
service area would be opened for competition from all OPOs that met the
outcome performance standards. If no OPO that met the outcome
performance standards was willing to accept responsibility for the
service area, the OPO that failed the outcome performance measures
would be re-designated for the service area if it submitted an
acceptable corrective action plan to us.
Under existing regulations, if more than one OPO that met the
performance standards wanted to take over the service area or part of
the service area of another OPO, we used six ``tiebreaker'' criteria to
determine which OPO should be awarded the service area. The tiebreakers
were: (1) Prior performance, including the previous
[[Page 6094]]
year's experience in terms of the number of organs retrieved and wasted
and the average cost per organ; (2) actual number of donors compared to
the number of potential donors; (3) the nature of relationships and
degree of involvement with hospitals in the organization's service
area; (4) bed capacity associated with the hospitals with which the
organizations have a working relationship; (5) willingness and ability
to place organs within the service area; and (6) proximity of the
organization to the donor hospitals.
As stated earlier in this preamble, we propose opening every OPO's
service area for competition at the end of every re-certification cycle
as we did under the existing regulations. However, we are proposing
certain limitations that we believe would address the uncertainty in
the re-certification process that was noted by Congress. The
limitations would ensure that: (1) The process can be completed
expeditiously; (2) disruptions to service areas will be minimized; and
(3) an OPO may compete for an open area only if it is likely to be able
to improve organ donation in the service area.
The proposed competition process would differ somewhat, depending
upon whether a service area was opened for competition because the
incumbent OPO was de-certified or because of the wider competition
process taking place at the end of a re-certification cycle. First, we
would permit OPOs to compete for open areas only if they met certain
specific objective criteria. These criteria would vary, depending upon
whether the incumbent OPO was or was not de-certified. Second, we would
allow competition only for entire service areas. A service area could
be divided only if the incumbent OPO was de-certified and no OPO wanted
to accept responsibility for the service area. In such case, we could,
at our discretion, choose a single OPO to take over the service area or
adjust the service area boundaries of two contiguous OPOs to
incorporate the open area. Finally, we are proposing to use specific
clear, objective criteria for determining which OPO would be selected
for a service area.
The chart below shows how the process would differ. Following the
chart is a more detailed explanation of our proposal.
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Incumbent OPO Criteria OPOs must
Incumbent OPO decertified? permitted to Can service area meet to compete Criteria CMS uses
compete? be divided? for open area to choose OPO
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Yes............................. No................ Yes, at discretion 4 out of 5 outcome Acceptable plan to
of CMS. performance increase organ
measures at or donation in open
above the mean. area.
No.............................. Yes............... No................ 4 out of 5 outcome Acceptable plan to
performance increase organ
measures at or donation in open
above the mean. area.
Conversion rate
(actual donors as
a percentage of
potential donors)
at least 15
percentage points
higher than
incumbent's
conversion rate.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Competition When OPO Has Been De-Certified
We propose that if we notify an OPO that it will be de-certified
because its agreement will be terminated or will not be renewed and the
OPO does not appeal within the time frame specified in Sec. 486.314(a)
or the OPO appeals but the de-certification is upheld (see Sec.
486.314(c)), we would o