OIG Supplemental Compliance Program Guidance for Hospitals, 4858-4876 [05-1620]
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relevant risk areas. Copies of these CPGs
can be found on the OIG Web page at
https://oig.hhs.gov.
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES
Office of Inspector General
Supplementing the Compliance
Program Guidance for Hospitals
OIG Supplemental Compliance
Program Guidance for Hospitals
Office of Inspector General
(OIG), HHS.
ACTION: Notice.
AGENCY:
This Federal Register notice
sets forth the Supplemental Compliance
Program Guidance (CPG) for Hospitals
developed by the Office of Inspector
General (OIG). Through this notice, the
OIG is supplementing its prior
compliance program guidance for
hospitals issued in 1998. The
supplemental CPG contains new
compliance recommendations and an
expanded discussion of risk areas,
taking into account recent changes to
hospital payment systems and
regulations, evolving industry practices,
current enforcement priorities, and
lessons learned in the area of corporate
compliance. The supplemental CPG
provides voluntary guidelines to assist
hospitals and hospital systems in
identifying significant risk areas and in
evaluating and, as necessary, refining
ongoing compliance efforts.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Darlene M. Hampton, Office of Counsel
to the Inspector General, (202) 619–
0335.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
SUMMARY:
Background
Several years ago, the OIG embarked
on a major initiative to engage the
private health care community in
preventing the submission of erroneous
claims and in combating fraud and
abuse in the Federal health care
programs through voluntary compliance
efforts. In the last several years, the OIG
has developed a series of compliance
program guidances (CPGs) directed at
the following segments of the health
care industry: hospitals; clinical
laboratories; home health agencies;
third-party billing companies; the
durable medical equipment, prosthetics,
orthotics, and supply industry;
hospices; Medicare+Choice
organizations; nursing facilities;
physicians; ambulance suppliers; and
pharmaceutical manufacturers. CPGs are
intended to encourage the development
and use of internal controls to monitor
adherence to applicable statutes,
regulations, and program requirements.
The suggestions made in these CPGs are
not mandatory, and the CPGs should not
be viewed as exhaustive discussions of
beneficial compliance practices or
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The OIG originally published a CPG
for the hospital industry on February 23,
1998. (See 63 FR 8987 (February 23,
1998), available on our Web page at
https://oig.hhs.gov/authorities/docs/
cpghosp.pdf.) Since that time, there
have been significant changes in the
way hospitals deliver, and are
reimbursed for, health care services. In
response to these developments, on June
18, 2002, the OIG published a notice in
the Federal Register, soliciting public
suggestions for revising the hospital
CPG. (See 67 FR 41433 (June 18, 2002),
available on our Web page at https://
oig.hhs.gov/authorities/docs/
cpghospitalsolicitationnotice.pdf.) After
consideration of the public comments
and the issues raised, the OIG published
a draft supplemental compliance
program guidance for hospitals in the
Federal Register on June 8, 2004, to
ensure that all parties had a reasonable
and meaningful opportunity to provide
input into the final product. (See 69 FR
32012 (June 8, 2004), available on our
Web page at https://oig.hhs.gov/
authorities/docs/04/
060804hospitaldraftsuppCPGFR.pdf.)
The OIG received comments from a
variety of parties with interests in the
hospital industry and diverse points of
view. These comments were carefully
considered during the development of
this final supplemental CPG. While
some commenters preferred a
replacement CPG, for efficiency and to
create a concise product of particular
use to hospitals with existing
compliance programs, we have decided
to supplement, rather than replace, the
1998 guidance.
Many public commenters sought
guidance on the application of specific
Medicare rules and regulations related
to payment and coverage, an area
beyond the scope of this OIG guidance.
Hospitals with questions about the
interpretation or application of payment
and coverage rules or regulations should
contact their Fiscal Intermediaries (FIs)
or the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid
Services, as appropriate.
Supplemental Compliance Program
Guidance for Hospitals
I. Introduction
Continuing its efforts to promote
voluntary compliance programs for the
health care industry, the Office of
Inspector General (OIG) of the
Department of Health and Human
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Services (the Department) publishes this
Supplemental Compliance Program
Guidance (CPG) for Hospitals.1 This
document supplements, rather than
replaces, the OIG’s 1998 CPG for the
hospital industry (63 FR 8987; February
23, 1998), which addressed the
fundamentals of establishing an
effective compliance program.2 Neither
this supplemental CPG, nor the original
1998 CPG, is a model compliance
program. Rather, collectively the two
documents offer a set of guidelines that
hospitals should consider when
developing and implementing a new
compliance program or evaluating an
existing one.
We are mindful that many hospitals
have already devoted substantial time
and resources to compliance efforts. We
believe that those efforts demonstrate
the industry’s good faith commitment to
ensuring and promoting integrity. For
those hospitals with existing
compliance programs, this document
may serve as a benchmark or
comparison against which to measure
ongoing efforts and as a roadmap for
updating or refining their compliance
plans.
In crafting this supplemental CPG, we
considered, among other things, the
public comments received in response
to the solicitation notice published in
the Federal Register 3 and the draft
supplemental CPG,4 as well as relevant
OIG and Centers for Medicare &
Medicaid Services (CMS) statutory and
regulatory authorities (including the
Federal anti-kickback statute, together
with the safe harbor regulations and
1 For purposes of convenience in this guidance,
we use the term ‘‘hospitals’’ to refer to individual
hospitals, multi-hospital systems, health systems
that own or operate hospitals, academic medical
centers, and any other organization that owns or
operates one or more hospitals. Where applicable,
the term ‘‘hospitals’’ is also intended to include,
without limitation, hospital owners, officers,
managers, staff, agents, and sub-providers. This
guidance primarily focuses on hospitals reimbursed
under the inpatient and outpatient prospective
payment systems. While other hospitals should find
this CPG useful, we recognize that they may be
subject to different laws, rules, and regulations and,
accordingly, may have different or additional risk
areas and may need to adopt different compliance
strategies. We encourage all hospitals to establish
and maintain ongoing compliance programs.
2 The 1998 OIG Compliance Program Guidance
for Hospitals is available on our Web page at http:
//oig.hhs.gov/authorities/docs/cpghosp.pdf.
3 See 67 FR 41433 (June 18, 2002), ‘‘Solicitation
of Information and Recommendations for Revising
a Compliance Program Guidance for the Hospital
Industry,’’ available on our Web page at https://
oig.hhs.gov/authorities/docs/
cpghospitalsolicitationnotice.pdf.
4 See 69 FR 32012 (June 8, 2004), ‘‘OIG Draft
Supplemental Compliance Program Guidance for
Hospitals,’’ available on our Web page at https://
oig.hhs.gov/authorities/docs/04/
060804hospitaldraftsuppCPGFR.pdf.
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preambles,5 and CMS transmittals and
program memoranda); other OIG
guidance (such as OIG advisory
opinions, special fraud alerts, bulletins,
and other guidance); experience gained
from investigations conducted by the
OIG’s Office of Investigations, the
Department of Justice (DoJ), and the
State Medicaid Fraud Units; and
relevant reports issued by the OIG’s
Office of Audit Services and Office of
Evaluation and Inspections.6 We also
consulted generally with CMS, the
Department’s Office for Civil Rights, and
DoJ.
A. Benefits of a Compliance Program
A successful compliance program
addresses the public and private sectors’
mutual goals of reducing fraud and
abuse; enhancing health care providers’
operations; improving the quality of
health care services; and reducing the
overall cost of health care services.
Attaining these goals benefits the
hospital industry, the government, and
patients alike. Compliance programs
help hospitals fulfill their legal duty to
refrain from submitting false or
inaccurate claims or cost information to
the Federal health care programs 7 or
engaging in other illegal practices. A
hospital may gain important additional
benefits by voluntarily implementing a
compliance program, including:
• Demonstrating the hospital’s
commitment to honest and responsible
corporate conduct;
• Increasing the likelihood of
preventing, identifying, and correcting
unlawful and unethical behavior at an
early stage;
• Encouraging employees to report
potential problems to allow for
appropriate internal inquiry and
corrective action; and
• Through early detection and
reporting, minimizing any financial loss
to government and taxpayers, as well as
any corresponding financial loss to the
hospital.
5 See
42 U.S.C. 1320a–7b(b). See also 42 CFR
1001.952. The safe harbor regulations and
preambles are available on our Web page at http:
//oig.hhs.gov/fraud/safeharborregulations.html#1.
6 The OIG’s materials are available on our Web
page at https://oig.hhs.gov.
7 The term ‘‘Federal health care programs,’’ as
defined in 42 U.S.C. 1320a–7b(f), includes any plan
or program that provides health benefits, whether
directly, through insurance, or otherwise, which is
funded directly, in whole or in part, by the United
States Government (other than the Federal
Employees Health Benefit Plan described at 5
U.S.C. 8901–8914) or any State health plan (e.g.,
Medicaid or a program receiving funds from block
grants for social services or child health services).
In this document, the term ‘‘Federal health care
program requirements’’ refers to the statutes,
regulations, and other rules governing Medicare,
Medicaid, and all other Federal health care
programs.
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The OIG recognizes that
implementation of a compliance
program may not entirely eliminate
improper or unethical conduct from the
operations of health care providers.
However, an effective compliance
program demonstrates a hospital’s good
faith effort to comply with applicable
statutes, regulations, and other Federal
health care program requirements, and
may significantly reduce the risk of
unlawful conduct and corresponding
sanctions.
B. Application of Compliance Program
Guidance
Given the diversity of the hospital
industry, there is no single ‘‘best’’
hospital compliance program. The OIG
recognizes the complexities of the
hospital industry and the differences
among hospitals and hospital systems.
Some hospital entities are small and
may have limited resources to devote to
compliance measures; others are
affiliated with well-established, large,
multi-facility organizations with a
widely dispersed work force and
significant resources to devote to
compliance.
Accordingly, this supplemental CPG
is not intended to be one-size-fits-all
guidance. Rather, the OIG strongly
encourages hospitals to identify and
focus their compliance efforts on those
areas of potential concern or risk that
are most relevant to their individual
organizations. Compliance measures
adopted by a hospital to address
identified risk areas should be tailored
to fit the unique environment of the
organization (including its structure,
operations, resources, and prior
enforcement experience). In short, the
OIG recommends that each hospital
adapt the objectives and principles
underlying this guidance to its own
particular circumstances.
In section II below, titled ‘‘Fraud and
Abuse Risk Areas,’’ we present several
fraud and abuse risk areas that are
particularly relevant to the hospital
industry. Each hospital should carefully
examine these risk areas and identify
those that potentially impact the
hospital. Next, in section III, ‘‘Hospital
Compliance Program Effectiveness,’’ we
offer recommendations for assessing and
improving an existing compliance
program to better address identified risk
areas. Finally, in section IV, ‘‘SelfReporting,’’ we set forth the actions
hospitals should take if they discover
credible evidence of misconduct.
II. Fraud and Abuse Risk Areas
This section is intended to help
hospitals identify areas of their
operations that present a potential risk
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of liability under several key Federal
fraud and abuse statutes and
regulations. This section focuses on
areas that are currently of concern to the
enforcement community and is not
intended to address all potential risk
areas for hospitals. Importantly, the
identification of a particular practice or
activity in this section is not intended
to imply that the practice or activity is
necessarily illegal in all circumstances
or that it may not have a valid or lawful
purpose underlying it.
This section addresses the following
areas of significant concern for
hospitals: (A) Submission of accurate
claims and information; (B) the referral
statutes; (C) payments to reduce or limit
services; (D) the Emergency Medical
Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA); (E)
substandard care; (F) relationships with
Federal health care beneficiaries; (G)
HIPAA Privacy and Security Rules; and
(H) billing Medicare or Medicaid
substantially in excess of usual charges.
In addition, a final section (I) addresses
several areas of general interest that,
while not necessarily matters of
significant risk, have been of continuing
interest to the hospital community. This
guidance does not create any new law
or legal obligations, and the discussions
in this guidance are not intended to
present detailed or comprehensive
summaries of lawful and unlawful
activity. Nor is this guidance intended
as a substitute for consultation with
CMS or a hospital’s Fiscal Intermediary
(FI) with respect to the application and
interpretation of Medicare payment and
coverage provisions, which are subject
to change. Rather, this guidance should
be used as a starting point for a
hospital’s legal review of its particular
practices and for development or
refinement of policies and procedures to
reduce or eliminate potential risk.
A. Submission of Accurate Claims and
Information
Perhaps the single biggest risk area for
hospitals is the preparation and
submission of claims or other requests
for payment from the Federal health
care programs. It is axiomatic that all
claims and requests for reimbursement
from the Federal health care programs—
and all documentation supporting such
claims or requests—must be complete
and accurate and must reflect
reasonable and necessary services
ordered by an appropriately licensed
medical professional who is a
participating provider in the health care
program from which the individual or
entity is seeking reimbursement.
Hospitals must disclose and return any
overpayments that result from mistaken
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or erroneous claims.8 Moreover, the
knowing submission of a false,
fraudulent, or misleading statement or
claim is actionable. A hospital may be
liable under the False Claims Act 9 or
other statutes imposing sanctions for the
submission of false claims or
statements, including liability for civil
money penalties (CMPs) or exclusion.10
Underlying assumptions used in
connection with claims submission
should be reasoned, consistent, and
appropriately documented, and
hospitals should retain all relevant
records reflecting their efforts to comply
with Federal health care program
requirements.
Common and longstanding risks
associated with claims preparation and
submission include inaccurate or
incorrect coding, upcoding, unbundling
of services, billing for medically
unnecessary services or other services
not covered by the relevant health care
program, billing for services not
provided, duplicate billing, insufficient
documentation, and false or fraudulent
cost reports. While hospitals should
continue to be vigilant with respect to
these important risk areas, we believe
these risk areas are relatively wellunderstood in the industry and,
therefore, they are not generally
addressed in this section.11 Rather, the
following discussion highlights evolving
risks or risks that appear to the OIG to
be under-appreciated by the industry.
The risks are grouped under the
following topics: Outpatient procedure
coding; admissions and discharges;
supplemental payment considerations;
and use of information technology. By
8 See
42 U.S.C. 1320a–7b(a)(3).
False Claims Act (31 U.S.C. 3729–33),
among other things, prohibits knowingly presenting
or causing to be presented to the Federal
government a false or fraudulent claim for payment
or approval, knowingly making or using or causing
to be made or used a false record or statement to
have a false or fraudulent claim paid or approved
by the government, and knowingly making or using
or causing to be made or used a false record or
statement to conceal, avoid, or decrease an
obligation to pay or transmit money or property to
the government. The False Claims Act defines
‘‘knowing’’ and ‘‘knowingly’’ to mean that ‘‘a
person, with respect to the information—(1) has
actual knowledge of the information; (2) acts in
deliberate ignorance of the truth or falsity of the
information; or (3) acts in reckless disregard of the
truth or falsity of the information, and no proof of
specific intent to defraud is required.’’ 31 U.S.C.
3729(b).
10 In some circumstances, inaccurate or
incomplete reporting may lead to liability under the
Federal anti-kickback statute. In addition, hospitals
should be mindful that many States have fraud and
abuse statutes—including false claims, antikickback, and other statutes—that are not addressed
in this guidance.
11 To review the risk areas discussed in the
original hospital CPG, see 63 FR 8987, 8990
(February 23, 1998), available on our Web page at
https://oig.hhs.gov/authorities/docs/cpghosp.pdf.
9 The
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necessity, this discussion is illustrative,
not exhaustive, of risks associated with
the submission of claims or other
information. In all cases, hospitals
should consult the applicable laws,
rules, and regulations.
1. Outpatient Procedure Coding
The implementation of Medicare’s
Hospital Outpatient Prospective
Payment System (OPPS) 12 increased the
importance of accurate procedure
coding for hospital outpatient services.
Previously, hospital coding concerns
mainly consisted of ensuring accurate
ICD–9–CM diagnosis and procedure
coding for reimbursement under the
inpatient prospective payment system
(PPS). Hospitals reported procedure
codes for outpatient services, but were
reimbursed for outpatient services based
on their charges for services. With the
OPPS, procedure codes effectively
became the basis for Medicare
reimbursement. Under the OPPS, each
reported procedure code is assigned to
a corresponding Ambulatory Payment
Classification (APC) code. Hospitals are
then reimbursed a predetermined
amount for each APC, irrespective of the
specific level of resources used to
furnish the individual service. In
implementing the OPPS, CMS
developed new rules governing the use
of procedure code modifiers for
outpatient coding.13 Because incorrect
procedure coding may lead to
overpayments and subject a hospital to
liability for the submission of false
claims, hospitals need to pay close
attention to coder training and
qualifications.
Hospitals should also review their
outpatient documentation practices to
ensure that claims are based on
complete medical records and that the
medical records support the levels of
service claimed. Under the OPPS,
hospitals must generally include on a
single claim all services provided to the
same patient on the same day. Coding
from incomplete medical records may
create problems in complying with this
claim submission requirement.
Moreover, submitting claims for services
12 Congress enacted the OPPS in section 4523 of
the Balanced Budget Act of 1997. The OPPS became
effective on August 1, 2001. CMS promulgated
regulations implementing the OPPS at 42 CFR part
419. For more information regarding the OPPS, see
https://www.cms.gov/providers/hopps/.
13 The list of current modifiers is listed in the
Current Procedural Terminology (CPT) coding
manual. However, hospitals should pay particular
attention to CMS transmittals and program
memoranda that may introduce new or altered
application of modifiers for claims submission and
reimbursement purposes. See chapter 4, section
20.6 of the Medicare Claims Processing Manual at
https://www.cms.gov/manuals/104_claims/
clm104c04.pdf.
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that are not supported by the medical
record may also result in the submission
of improper claims.
In addition to the coding risk areas
noted above and in the 1998 hospital
CPG, other specific risk areas associated
with incorrect outpatient procedure
coding include the following:
• Billing on an outpatient basis for
‘‘inpatient-only’’ procedures—CMS has
identified procedures for which
reimbursement is typically allowed only
if the service is performed in an
inpatient setting.14
• Submitting claims for medically
unnecessary services by failing to follow
the FI’s local policies—Each FI
publishes local policies, including local
medical review polices (LMRPs) and
local coverage determinations (LCDs),
that identify certain procedures that are
only reimbursable when specific
conditions are present.15 In addition to
relying on a physician’s sound clinical
judgment with respect to the
appropriateness of a proposed course of
treatment, hospitals should regularly
review and become familiar with their
individual FI’s LMRPs and LCDs.
LMRPs and LCDs should be
incorporated into a hospital’s regular
coding and billing operations.16
• Submitting duplicate claims or
otherwise not following the National
Correct Coding Initiative guidelines—
CMS developed the National Correct
Coding Initiative (NCCI) to promote
correct coding methodologies. The NCCI
identifies certain codes that should not
be used together because they are either
mutually exclusive or one is a
component of another. If a hospital uses
code pairs that are listed in the NCCI
and those codes are not detected by the
editing routines in the hospital’s billing
system, the hospital may submit
duplicate or unbundled claims.
Intentional manipulation of code
assignments to maximize payments and
avoid NCCI edits constitutes fraud.
Unintentional misapplication of NCCI
coding and billing guidelines may also
give rise to overpayments or civil
liability for hospitals that have
developed a pattern of inappropriate
billing. To minimize risk, hospitals
14 The list of ‘‘inpatient-only’’ procedures appears
in the annual update to the OPPS rule. For the 2004
final rule, the ‘‘inpatient-only’’ list is found in
Addendum E. See https://www.cms.gov/regulations/
hopps/2004f.
15 Effective December 7, 2003, FI’s began issuing
LCDs instead of LMRPs, and FI’s will convert all
existing LMRPs into LCDs by December 31, 2005.
16 A hospital may contact its FI to request a copy
of the pertinent LMRPs and LCDs, or visit CMS’s
Web page at https://www.cms.gov/mcd to search
existing local and national policies.
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should ensure that their coding software
includes up-to-date NCCI edit files.17
• Submitting incorrect claims for
ancillary services because of outdated
Charge Description Masters—Charge
Description Masters (CDMs) list all of a
hospital’s charges for items and services
and include the underlying procedure
codes necessary to bill for those items
and services. Outdated CDMs create
significant compliance risk for
hospitals. Because the Healthcare
Common Procedure Coding System
(HCPCS) codes and APCs are updated
regularly, hospitals should pay
particular attention to the task of
updating the CDM to ensure the
assignment of correct codes to
outpatient claims. This should include
timely updates, proper use of modifiers,
and correct associations between
procedure codes and revenue codes.18
• Circumventing the multiple
procedure discounting rules—A surgical
procedure performed in connection
with another surgical procedure may be
discounted. However, certain surgical
procedures are designated as nondiscounted, even when performed with
another surgical procedure. Hospitals
should ensure that the procedure codes
selected represent the actual services
provided, irrespective of the
discounting status. They should also
review the annual OPPS rule update to
understand more fully CMS’s multiple
procedure discounting rule.19
• Improper evaluation and
management code selection—Hospitals
should use proper codes to describe the
evaluation and management (E/M)
services they provide. A hospital’s E/M
coding guidelines should ensure that
services are medically necessary and
sufficiently documented and that the
codes accurately reflect the intensity of
hospital resources required to deliver
the services.
• Improperly billing for observation
services—In certain circumstances,
Medicare provides a separate APC
payment for observation services for
patients with diagnoses of chest pain,
asthma, or congestive heart failure.
Claims for these observation services
must correctly reflect the diagnosis and
meet certain other requirements.
Seeking a separate payment for
observation services in situations that
do not satisfy the requirements is
inappropriate and may result in hospital
17 More information regarding the NCCI can be
obtained from CMS’s Web page at https://
www.cms.gov/medlearn/ncci.asp.
18 For information relating to HCPCS code
updates, see https://www.cms.gov/medicare/hcpcs/.
For information relating to annual APC updates, see
https://www.cms.gov/providers/hopps/.
19 See https://www.cms.gov/medlearn/refopps.asp.
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liability. Hospitals should become
familiar with CMS’s detailed policies for
the submission of claims for observation
services.20
2. Admissions and Discharges
Often, the status of patients at the
time of admission or discharge
significantly influences the amount and
method of reimbursement hospitals
receive. Therefore, hospitals have a duty
to ensure that admission and discharge
policies are updated and reflect current
CMS rules. Risk areas with respect to
the admission and discharge processes
include the following:
• Failure to follow the ‘‘same-day
rule’’—The OPPS rules require hospitals
to include on the same claim all OPPS
services provided at the same hospital,
to the same patient, on the same day,
unless certain conditions are met.
Hospitals should review internal billing
systems and procedures to ensure that
they are not submitting multiple claims
for OPPS services delivered to the same
patient on the same day.21
• Abuse of partial hospitalization
payments—Under the OPPS, Medicare
provides a per diem payment for
specific hospital services rendered to
behavioral and mental health patients
on a partial hospitalization basis.
Examples of improper billing under the
partial hospitalization program include,
without limitation: reducing the range
of services offered; withholding services
that are medically appropriate; billing
for services not covered; and billing for
services without a certificate of medical
necessity.22
• Same-day discharges and
readmissions—Same-day discharges
and readmissions may indicate
premature discharges, medically
unnecessary readmissions, or incorrect
discharge coding. Hospitals should have
procedures in place to review
discharges and admissions carefully to
ensure that they reflect prudent clinical
decision-making and are properly
coded.23
• Violation of Medicare’s post-acute
care transfer policy—The post-acute
20 See CMS Program Transmittal A–02–026,
available on CMS’s Web page at https://
www.ems.gov/manuals/pm_trans/A02026.pdf.
21 See, e.g., chapter 1, section 50.2 of the
Medicare Claims Processing Manual, available on
CMS’s Web page at https://www.cms.gov/manuals/
104_claims/clm104c01.pdf.
22 See chapter 4, section 260 of the Medicare
Claims Processing Manual, available on CMS’s Web
page at https://www.cms.gov/manuals/104_claims/
clm104c04.pdf.
23 See, e.g., OIG Audit Report A–03–01–00011,
‘‘Review of Medicare Same-Day, Same-Provider
Acute Care Readmissions in Pennsylvania During
Calendar year 1998,’’ August 2002, available on our
Web page at https://oig.hhs.gov/oas/reports/region 3/
30100011.pdf.
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care transfer policy provides that, for
certain designated Diagnosis Related
Groups (DRGs), a hospital will receive a
per diem transfer payment, rather than
the full DRG payment, if the patient is
discharged to certain post-acute care
settings.24 CMS may periodically revise
the list of designated DRGs that are
subject to its post-acute care transfer
policy.25 To avoid improperly billing for
discharges, hospitals should pay
particular attention to CMS’s post-acute
care transfer policy and keep an
accurate list of all designated DRGs
subject to that policy.
• Improper churning of patients by
long-term care hospitals co-located in
acute care hospitals—Long term care
hospitals that are co-located within
acute care hospitals may qualify for
PPS-exempt status if certain regulatory
requirements are satisfied.26 Hospitals
should not engage in the practice of
churning, or inappropriately
transferring, patients between the host
hospital and the hospital-within-ahospital.
3. Supplemental Payment
Considerations
Under the Medicare program, in
certain limited situations, hospitals may
claim payments in addition to, or in
some cases in lieu of, the normal
reimbursement available to hospitals
under the regular payment systems.
Eligibility for these payments depends
on compliance with specific criteria.
Hospitals that claim supplemental
payments improperly are liable for fines
and penalties under Federal law.
Examples of specific risks that hospitals
should address include the following:
• Improper reporting of the costs of
‘‘pass-through’’ items—‘‘Pass-through’’
items are certain items of new
technology and drugs for which
Medicare will reimburse the hospital
24 See 42 CFR 412.4(c). See, e.g., OIG Audit
Report A–04–00–01220 ‘‘Implementation of
Medicare’s Postacute Care Transfer Policy,’’ October
2001, available on our Web page at https://
oig.hhs.gov/oas/reports/region4/40001220.pdf.
25 The initial 10 designated DRGs were selected
by the Secretary, pursuant to section 1886(d)(5)(J)
of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C.
1395ww(d)(5)(J)). With the 2004 fiscal year PPS
rule, CMS revised the list of DRGs paid under
CMS’s post-acute care transfer policy, bringing the
total number of designated DRGs to 29. See 68 FR
45346 (August 1, 2003). Then, with the 2005 fiscal
year PPS rule, CMS revised the list again, bringing
the current total number of designated DRGs to 30.
See 69 FR 48916 (August 11, 2004). See also chapter
3, section 402.4 of the Medicare Claims Processing
Manual, available on CMS’s Web page at https://
www.cms.gov/manuals/104_claims/clm104c03.pdf.
26 See 42 CFR 412.22(e).
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based on costs during a limited
transitional period.27
• Abuse of DRG outlier payments—
Recent investigations revealed
substantial abuse of outlier payments by
hospitals with Medicare patients.
Hospital management, compliance staff,
and counsel should familiarize
themselves with CMS’s new outlier
rules and requirements intended to curb
abuses.28
• Improper claims for incorrectly
designated ‘‘provider-based’’ entities—
Certain hospital-affiliated entities and
clinics can be designated as ‘‘providerbased,’’ which allows for a higher level
of reimbursement for certain services.29
Hospitals should take steps to ensure
that facilities or organizations are only
designated as provider-based if they
satisfy the criteria set forth in the
regulations.
• Improper claims for clinical trials—
Since September 2000, Medicare has
covered items and services furnished
during certain clinical trials, as long as
those items and services would
typically be covered for Medicare
beneficiaries, but for the fact that they
are provided in an experimental or
clinical trial setting. Hospitals that
participate in clinical trials should
review the requirements for submitting
claims for patients participating in
clinical trials.30
• Improper claims for organ
acquisition costs—Hospitals that are
approved transplantation centers may
receive reimbursement on a reasonable
cost basis to cover the costs of
acquisition of certain organs.31 Organ
acquisition costs are only reimbursable
if a hospital satisfies several
requirements, such as having adequate
cost information, supporting
documentation, and supporting medical
records.32 Hospitals must also ensure
that expenses not related to organ
27 For more information regarding CMS’s APC
‘‘pass-through’’ payments, See https://www.cms.gov/
providers/hopps/apc.asp.
28 See 42 CFR 412.84; 68 FR 34493 (June 9, 2003).
29 The criteria for determining whether a facility
or organization is provider-based can be found at 42
CFR 413.65. In April 2003, CMS published
Transmittal A–03–030, outlining changes to the
criteria for provider-based designation. See https://
www.cms.gov/manuals/pm_trans/A03030.pdf.
30 To view Medicare’s National Coverage Decision
regarding clinical trials, see https://www.cms.gov/
coverage/8d2.asp. Specific requirements for
submitting claims for reimbursement for clinical
trials can be accessed on CMS’s Web page at http:/
/www.cms.gov/coverage/8d4.asp.
31 See 42 CFR 412.2(e)(4), 42 CFR 412.113(d), and
42 CFR 413.203. See generally 42 CFR part 413
(setting forth the principles of reasonable cost
reimbursement).
32 See Medicare’s Provider Reimbursement
Manual (PRM), Part I, section 2304 and Part II,
section 3610, available on CMS’s Web page at http:/
/www.cms.gov/manuals/cmsfoc.asp.
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acquisition, such as transplant and posttransplant activities and costs from
other cost centers, are not included in
the hospital’s organ acquisition costs.33
• Improper claims for cardiac
rehabilitation services—Medicare covers
reasonable and necessary cardiac
rehabilitation services under the
hospital ‘‘incident-to’’ benefit, which
requires that the services of
nonphysician personnel be furnished
under a physician’s direct supervision.
In addition to satisfying the supervision
requirement, hospitals must ensure that
cardiac rehabilitation services are
reasonable and necessary.34
• Failure to follow Medicare rules
regarding payment for costs related to
educational activities35—Hospitals
should pay particular attention to these
rules when implementing dental or
other education programs, particularly
those not historically operated at the
hospital.
4. Use of Information Technology
The implementation of the OPPS
increased the need for hospitals to pay
particular attention to their
computerized billing, coding, and
information systems. Billing and coding
under the OPPS is more data intensive
than billing and coding under the
inpatient PPS. When the OPPS began,
many hospitals’ existing systems were
unable to accommodate the new
requirements and required adjustments.
33 See 42 CFR 412.100. See also, chapter 3,
section 90 of the Medicare Claims Processing
Manual, available on CMS’s Web page at https://
www.cms.gov/manuals/104_claims/clm104c03.
pdf.See, e.g., OIG Audit Report A–04–02–02017,
‘‘Audit of Medicare Costs for Organ Acquisitions at
Tampa General Hospital,’’ April 2003, available on
our Web page at https://oig.hhs.gov/oas/reports/
region4/40202017.pdf.
34 See section 35–25 of the Medicare Coverage
Issues Manual. See, e.g., OIG Audit Report A–01–
03–00516, ‘‘Review of Outpatient Cardiac
Rehabilitation Services at the Cooley Dickinson
Hospital,’’ December 2003, available on our Web
page at https://oig.hhs.gov/oas/reports/region 1/
10300516.pdf.
35 Payments for direct graduage medical
education (GME) and indirect graduate medical
education (IME) costs are, in part, based upon the
number of full-time equivalent (FTE) residents at
each hospital and the proportion of time residents
spend in training. Hospitals that inappropriately
calculate the number of FTE residents risk receiving
inappropriate medical education payments.
Hospitals should have in place procedures
regarding: (i) Resident rotation monitoring; (ii)
resident credentialing; (iii) written agreements with
non-hospital providers; and (iv) the approval
process for research activities. For more information
regarding medical education reimbursement, see 42
CFR 413.75 et. seq. (GME requirements) and 42 CFR
412.105 (IME requirements). See, e.g., OIG Audit
Report A–01–01–00547 ‘‘Review of Graduate
Medical Education Costs Claimed by the Hartford
Hospital for Fiscal Year Ending September 30,
1999,’’ October 2003, available on our Web page at
https://oig.hhs.gov/oas/reports/region 1/
10100547.pdf.
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As the health care industry moves
forward, hospitals will increasingly rely
on information technology. For
example, HIPAA Privacy and Security
Rules (discussed below in section II.G),
electronic claims submission,36
electronic prescribing, networked
information sharing among providers,
and systems for the tracking and
reduction of medical errors, among
others, will require hospitals to depend
more on information technologies.
Information technology presents new
opportunities to advance health care
efficiency, but also new challenges to
ensuring the accuracy of claims and the
information used to generate claims. It
may be difficult for purchasers of
computer systems and software to know
exactly how the system operates and
generates information. Prudent hospitals
will take steps to ensure that they
thoroughly assess all new computer
systems and software that impact
coding, billing, or the generation or
transmission of information related to
the Federal health care programs or
their beneficiaries.
B. The Referral Statutes: The Physician
Self-Referral Law (the ‘‘Stark’’ Law) and
the Federal Anti-Kickback Statute
1. The Physician Self-Referral Law
From a hospital compliance
perspective, the physician self-referral
law (section 1877 of the Social Security
Act (Act), commonly known as the
‘‘Stark’’ law) should be viewed as a
threshold statute. The statute prohibits
hospitals from submitting—and
Medicare from paying—any claim for a
‘‘designated health service’’ (DHS) if the
referral of the DHS comes from a
physician with whom the hospital has
a prohibited financial relationship.37
This is true even if the prohibited
financial relationship is the result of
inadvertence or error. In addition,
hospitals and physicians that knowingly
violate the statute may be subject to
CMPs and exclusion from the Federal
health care programs. Furthermore,
under certain circumstances, a knowing
violation of the Stark law may also give
rise to liability under the False Claims
Act. Because all inpatient and
outpatient hospital services furnished to
Medicare or Medicaid patients
36 For more information regarding Medicare’s
Electronic Data Interchange programs, see https://
www.cms.gov/providers/edi/.
37 The statute also prohibits physicians from
referring DHS to entities, including hospitals, with
which they have prohibited financial relationships.
However, the billing prohibition and nonpayment
sanction apply only to the DHS entity (e.g., the
hospital). See section 1877(a) of the Act. Section
1903(s) of the Act extends the statutory prohibition
to Medicaid-covered services.
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(including services furnished directly by
a hospital or by others ‘‘under
arrangements’’ with a hospital) are DHS
under the statute,38 hospitals must
diligently review all financial
relationships with referring physicians
for compliance with the Stark law.
Simply put, hospitals face significant
financial exposure unless their financial
relationships with referring physicians
fit squarely in statutory or regulatory
exceptions to the Stark law.
For purposes of analyzing a financial
relationship under the Stark law, the
following three-part inquiry is useful:
• Is there a referral from a physician
for a designated health service? If not,
then there is no Stark law issue
(although other fraud and abuse
authorities, such as the anti-kickback
statute, may be implicated). If the
answer is ‘‘yes,’’ the next inquiry is:
• Does the physician (or an
immediate family member) have a
financial relationship with the entity
furnishing the DHS (e.g., the hospital)?
Again, if the answer is no, the Stark law
is not implicated. However, if the
answer is ‘‘yes,’’ the third inquiry is:
• Does the financial relationship fit in
an exception? If not, the statute has been
violated.
Detailed definitions of the highlighted
terms are set forth in regulations at 42
CFR 411.351 through 411.361
(substantial additional explanatory
material appears in the regulatory
preambles to the final regulations: 66 FR
856 (January 4, 2001); 69 FR 16054
(March 26, 2004); and 69 FR 17933
(April 6, 2004)). Importantly, a financial
relationship can be almost any kind of
direct or indirect ownership or
investment relationship (e.g., stock
ownership, a partnership interest, or
secured debt) or direct or indirect
compensation arrangement, whether in
cash or in-kind (e.g., a rental contract,
personal services contract, salary, gift,
or gratuity), between a referring
physician (or immediate family
member) and a hospital. Moreover, the
financial relationship need not relate to
the provision of DHS (e.g., a joint
venture between a hospital and a
physician to operate a hospice would
create an indirect compensation
relationship between the hospital and
the physician for Stark law purposes).
38 The statute lists ten additional categories of
DHS, including, among others, clinical laboratory
services, radiology services, and durable medical
equipment. See section 1877(h)(6) of the Act.
Hospitals and health systems that own or operate
free-standing DHS entities should be mindful of the
ten additional DHS categories. CMS has clarified
that lithotripsy services furnished to hospital
inpatients are not DHS. See 69 FR 16054, 16106
(March 26, 2004).
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The statutory and regulatory
exceptions are the key to compliance
with the Stark law. Any financial
relationship between the hospital and a
physician who refers to the hospital
must fit in an exception. Exceptions
exist in the statute and regulations for
many common types of business
arrangements. To fit in an exception, an
arrangement must squarely meet all of
the conditions set forth in the exception.
Importantly, it is the actual relationship
between the parties, and not merely the
paperwork, that must fit in an
exception. Unlike the anti-kickback safe
harbors, which are voluntary, fitting in
an exception is mandatory under the
Stark law.
Compliance with a Stark law
exception does not immunize an
arrangement under the anti-kickback
statute. Rather, the Stark law sets a
minimum standard for arrangements
between physicians and hospitals. Even
if a hospital-physician relationship
qualifies for a Stark law exception, it
should still be reviewed for compliance
with the anti-kickback statute. The antikickback statute is discussed in greater
detail in the next subsection.
Because of the significant exposure
for hospitals under the Stark law, we
recommend that hospitals implement
systems to ensure that all conditions in
the exceptions upon which they rely are
fully satisfied. For example, many of the
exceptions, such as the rental and
personal services exceptions, require
signed, written agreements with
physicians. We are aware of numerous
instances in which hospitals failed to
maintain these signed written
agreements, often inadvertently (e.g., a
holdover lease without a written lease
amendment; a physician hired as an
independent contractor for a short-term
project without a signed agreement). To
avoid a large overpayment, hospitals
should ensure frequent and thorough
review of their contracting and leasing
processes. The final regulations contain
a new limited exception for certain
inadvertent, temporary instances of
noncompliance with another exception.
This exception may only be used on an
occasional basis. Hospitals should be
mindful that this exception is not a
substitute for vigilant contracting and
leasing oversight. In addition, hospitals
should review the new reporting
requirements at 42 CFR 411.361, which
generally require hospitals to retain
records that the hospitals know or
should know about in the course of
prudently conducting business.
Hospitals should ensure that they have
policies and procedures in place to
address these reporting requirements.
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In addition, because many exceptions
to the Stark law require fair market
value compensation for items or
services actually needed and rendered,
hospitals should have appropriate
processes for making and documenting
reasonable, consistent, and objective
determinations of fair market value and
for ensuring that needed items and
services are furnished or rendered.
Other areas that may require careful
monitoring include, without limitation,
the total value of nonmonetary
compensation provided annually to
each referring physician, the value of
medical staff incidental benefits, and
the provision of professional courtesy.39
As discussed further in the antikickback section below, hospitals
should exercise care when recruiting
physicians. Importantly, while the final
regulations contain a limited exception
for certain joint recruiting by hospitals
and existing group practices, the
exception strictly forbids the use of
income guarantees that shift group
practice overhead or expenses to the
hospital or any payment structure that
otherwise transfers remuneration to the
group practice.
Further information about the Stark
law and applicable regulations can be
found on CMS’s Web page at https://
cms.gov/medlearn/refphys.asp.
Information regarding CMS’s Stark
advisory opinion process can be found
at https://cms.gov/physicians/aop/
default.asp.
2. The Federal Anti-Kickback Statute
Hospitals should also be aware of the
Federal anti-kickback statute, section
1128B(b) of the Act, and the constraints
it places on business arrangements
related directly or indirectly to items or
services reimbursable by any Federal
health care program, including, but not
limited to, Medicare and Medicaid. The
anti-kickback statute prohibits in the
health care industry some practices that
are common in other business sectors,
such as offering gifts to reward past or
potential new referrals.
The anti-kickback statute is a criminal
prohibition against payments (in any
form, whether the payments are direct
39 Hospitals affiliated with academic medical
centers should be aware that the regulations contain
a special exception for certain academic medical
center arrangements. See 42 CFR 411.355(e).
Specialty hospitals should be mindful of certain
limitations on new physician-owned specialty
hospitals contained in section 507 of the Medicare
Prescription Drug, Improvement and Modernization
Act of 2003. See CMS’s One-Time Notification
regarding the 18-month moratorium on physician
investment in specialty hospitals, CMS Manual
System Pub. 100–20 One-Time Notification,
Transmittal 26 (March 19, 2004), available on
CMS’s Web page at https://www.cms.gov/manuals/
pm_trans/R62OTN.pdf.
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or indirect) made purposefully to
induce or reward the referral or
generation of Federal health care
program business. The anti-kickback
statute addresses not only the offer or
payment of anything of value for patient
referrals, but also the offer or payment
of anything of value in return for
purchasing, leasing, ordering, or
arranging for or recommending the
purchase, lease, or ordering of any item
or service reimbursable in whole or in
part by a Federal health care program.
The statute extends equally to the
solicitation or acceptance of
remuneration for referrals or the
generation of other business payable by
a Federal health care program. Liability
under the anti-kickback statute is
determined separately for each party
involved. In addition to criminal
penalties, violators may be subject to
CMPs and exclusion from the Federal
health care programs. Hospitals should
also be mindful that compliance with
the anti-kickback statute is a condition
of payment under Medicare and other
Federal health care programs. See, e.g.,
Medicare Federal Health Care Provider/
Supplier Application, CMS Form 855A,
Certification Statement at section 15,
paragraph A.3, available on CMS’s Web
page at https://www.cms.gov/providers/
enrollment/forms/. As such, liability
may arise under the False Claims Act
where the anti-kickback statute
violation results in the submission of a
claim for payment under a Federal
health care program.
Although liability under the antikickback statute ultimately turns on a
party’s intent, it is possible to identify
arrangements or practices that may
present a significant potential for abuse.
For purposes of analyzing an
arrangement or practice under the antikickback statute, the following two
inquiries are useful:
• Does the hospital have any
remunerative relationship between itself
(or its affiliates or representatives) and
persons or entities in a position to
generate Federal health care program
business for the hospital (or its
affiliates) directly or indirectly? Persons
or entities in a position to generate
Federal health care program business for
a hospital include, for example,
physicians and other health care
professionals, ambulance companies,
clinics, hospices, home health agencies,
nursing facilities, and other hospitals.
• With respect to any remunerative
relationship so identified, could one
purpose of the remuneration be to
induce or reward the referral or
recommendation of business payable in
whole or in part by a Federal health care
program? Importantly, under the anti-
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kickback statute, neither a legitimate
business purpose for the arrangement,
nor a fair market value payment, will
legitimize a payment if there is also an
illegal purpose (i.e., inducing Federal
health care program business).
Although any arrangement satisfying
both tests implicates the anti-kickback
statute and requires careful scrutiny by
a hospital, the courts have identified
several potentially aggravating
considerations that can be useful in
identifying arrangements at greatest risk
of prosecution. In particular, hospitals
should ask the following questions,
among others, about any potentially
problematic arrangements or practices
they identify:
• Does the arrangement or practice
have a potential to interfere with, or
skew, clinical decision-making?
• Does the arrangement or practice
have a potential to increase costs to
Federal health care programs,
beneficiaries, or enrollees?
• Does the arrangement or practice
have a potential to increase the risk of
overutilization or inappropriate
utilization?
• Does the arrangement or practice
raise patient safety or quality of care
concerns?
Hospitals that have identified
potentially problematic arrangements or
practices can take a number of steps to
reduce or eliminate the risk of an antikickback violation. Detailed guidance
relating to a number of specific practices
is available from several sources. Most
importantly, the anti-kickback statute
and the corresponding regulations
establish a number of ‘‘safe harbors’’ for
common business arrangements. The
following safe harbors are of most
relevance to hospitals:
• Investment interests safe harbor (42
CFR 1001.952(a)),
• Space rental safe harbor (42 CFR
1001.952(b)),
• Equipment rental safe harbor (42
CFR 1001.952(c)),
• Personal services and management
contracts safe harbor (42 CFR
1001.952(d)),
• Sale of practice safe harbor (42 CFR
1001.952(e)),
• Referral services safe harbor (42
CFR 1001.952(f)),
• Discount safe harbor (42 CFR
1001.952(h)),
• Employee safe harbor (42 CFR
1001.952(i)),
• Group purchasing organizations
safe harbor (42 CFR 1001.952(j)),
• Waiver of beneficiary coinsurance
and deductible amounts safe harbor (42
CFR 1001.952(k)),
• Practitioner recruitment safe harbor
(42 CFR 1001.952(n)),
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• Obstetrical malpractice insurance
subsidies safe harbor (42 CFR
1001.952(o)),
• Cooperative hospital service
organizations safe harbor (42 CFR
1001.952(q)),
• Ambulatory surgical centers safe
harbor (42 CFR 1001.952(r)),
• Ambulance replenishing safe harbor
(42 CFR 1001.952(v)), and
• Safe harbors for certain managed
care and risk sharing arrangements (42
CFR 1001.952(m), (t), and (u)).40
Safe harbor protection requires strict
compliance with all applicable
conditions set out in the relevant safe
harbor.41 Although compliance with a
safe harbor is voluntary and failure to
comply with a safe harbor does not
mean an arrangement is illegal per se,
we recommend that hospitals structure
arrangements to fit in a safe harbor
whenever possible. Arrangements that
do not fit in a safe harbor must be
evaluated on a case-by-case basis.
Other available guidance includes
special fraud alerts and advisory
bulletins issued by the OIG identifying
and discussing particular practices or
issues of concern and OIG advisory
opinions issued to specific parties about
their particular business
arrangements.42 A hospital concerned
about an existing or proposed
arrangement may request a binding OIG
advisory opinion regarding whether the
arrangement violates the Federal antikickback statute or other OIG fraud and
abuse authorities, using the procedures
set out at 42 CFR part 1008. The safe
harbor regulations (and accompanying
Federal Register preambles), fraud
alerts and bulletins, advisory opinions
(and instructions for obtaining them,
including a list of frequently asked
questions), and other guidance are
40 Importantly, the anti-kickback statute safe
harbors are not the same as the Stark law exceptions
described above at section II.B.1 of this guidance.
An arrangement’s compliance with the antikickback statute and the Stark law must be
evaluated separately.
41 Parties to an arrangement cannot obtain safe
harbor protection by entering into a sham contract
that complies with the written agreement
requirement of a safe harbor and appears, on paper,
to meet all of the other safe harbor requirements,
but does not reflect the actual arrangement between
the parties. In other words, in assessing compliance
with a safe harbor, the OIG examines not only
whether the written contract satisfies all of the safe
harbor requirements, but also whether the actual
arrangement satisfies the requirements.
42 While informative for guidance purposes, an
OIG advisory opinion is binding only with respect
to the particular party or parties that requested the
opinion. The analyses and conclusions set forth in
OIG advisory opinions are very fact-specific.
Accordingly, hospitals should be aware that
different facts may lead to different results.
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available on the OIG Web page at http:/
/oig.hhs.gov.
The following discussion highlights
several known areas of potential risk
under the anti-kickback statute. The
propriety of any particular arrangement
can only be determined after a detailed
examination of the attendant facts and
circumstances. The identification of a
given practice or activity as ‘‘suspect’’ or
as an area of ‘‘risk’’ does not mean it is
necessarily illegal or unlawful, or that it
cannot be properly structured to fit in a
safe harbor; nor does it mean that the
practice or activity is not beneficial from
a clinical, cost, or other perspective.
Rather, the areas identified below are
areas of activity that have a potential for
abuse and that should receive close
scrutiny from hospitals. The discussion
highlights potential risks under the antikickback statute arising from hospitals’
relationships in the following seven
categories: (a) Joint ventures; (b)
compensation arrangements with
physicians; (c) relationships with other
health care entities; (d) recruitment
arrangements; (e) discounts; (f) medical
staff credentialing; and (g) malpractice
insurance subsidies. (In addition, the
kickback risks associated with
gainsharing arrangements are discussed
below in section II.C of this guidance.)
Physicians are the primary referral
source for hospitals, and, therefore,
most of the discussion below focuses on
hospitals’ relationships with physicians.
Notwithstanding, hospitals also receive
referrals from other health care
professionals, including physician
assistants and nurse practitioners, and
from other providers and suppliers
(such as ambulance companies, clinics,
hospices, home health agencies, nursing
facilities, and other hospitals).
Therefore, in addition to reviewing their
relationships with physicians, hospitals
should also review their relationships
with nonphysician referral sources to
ensure that the relationships do not
violate the anti-kickback statute. The
principles described in the following
discussions can be used to assess the
risk associated with relationships with
both physician and nonphysician
referral sources.
a. Joint Ventures
The OIG has a long-standing concern
about joint venture arrangements
between those in a position to refer or
generate Federal health care program
business and those providing items or
services reimbursable by Federal health
care programs.43 In the context of joint
43 See 1989 Special Fraud Alert on Joint Venture
Arrangements, reprinted in the Federal Register (59
FR 65372; December 19,1994) and available on our
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ventures, our chief concern is that
remuneration from a joint venture might
be a disguised payment for past or
future referrals to the venture or to one
or more of its participants. Such
remuneration may take a variety of
forms, including dividends, profit
distributions, or, with respect to
contractual joint ventures, the economic
benefit received under the terms of the
operative contracts.
When scrutinizing joint ventures
under the anti-kickback statute,
hospitals should examine the following
factors, among others:
• The manner in which joint venture
participants are selected and retained. If
participants are selected or retained in
a manner that takes into account,
directly or indirectly, the value or
volume of referrals, the joint venture is
suspect. The existence of one or more of
the following indicators suggests that
there might be an improper nexus
between the selection or retention of
participants and the value or volume of
their referrals:
—A substantial number of participants
are in a position to make or influence
referrals to the venture, other
participants, or both;
—Participants that are expected to make
a large number of referrals are offered
a greater or more favorable investment
or business opportunity in the joint
venture than those anticipated to
make fewer referrals;
—Participants are actively encouraged
or required to make referrals to the
joint venture;
—Participants are encouraged or
required to divest their ownership
interest if they fail to sustain an
‘‘acceptable’’ level of referrals;
—The venture (or its participants) tracks
its sources of referrals and distributes
this information to the participants; or
—The investment interests are
nontransferable or subject to transfer
restrictions related to referrals.
• The manner in which the joint
venture is structured. The structure of
the joint venture is suspect if a
participant is already engaged in the
line of business to be conducted by the
joint venture, and that participant will
own all or most of the equipment,
provide or perform all or most of the
items or services, or take responsibility
for all or most of the day-to-day
operations. With this kind of structure,
the co-participant’s primary
contribution is typically as a captive
referral base.
• The manner in which the
investments are financed and profits are
Web page at https://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/
alertsandbulletins/121994.html.
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distributed. The existence of one or
more of the following indicators
suggests that the joint venture may be a
vehicle to disguise referrals:
—Participants are offered investment
shares for a nominal or no capital
contribution;
—The amount of capital that
participants invest is
disproportionately small, and the
returns on the investment are
disproportionately large, when
compared to a typical investment in a
new business enterprise;
—Participants are permitted to borrow
their capital investments from another
participant or from the joint venture,
and to pay back the loan through
deductions from profit distributions,
thus eliminating even the need to
contribute cash;
—Participants are paid extraordinary
returns on the investment in
comparison with the risk involved; or
—A substantial portion of the gross
revenues of the venture are derived
from participant-driven referrals.
In light of the obvious risk inherent in
joint ventures, whenever possible,
hospitals should structure joint ventures
to fit squarely in one of the following
safe harbors for investment interests:
• The ‘‘small entity’’ investment safe
harbor (42 CFR 1001.952(a)(2)), which
applies to returns on investments as
long as no more than 40 percent of the
investment interests are held by
investors who are in a position to make
or influence referrals to, furnish items or
services to, or otherwise generate
business for the venture (interested
investors), no more than 40 percent of
revenues come from referrals or
business otherwise generated from
investors, and all other conditions are
satisfied; 44
• The safe harbor for investment
interests in an entity located in an
underserved area (42 CFR
1001.952(a)(3)), which applies to
ventures located in medically
underserved areas (as defined in
regulations issued by the Department
and set forth at 42 CFR part 51c), as long
as no more than 50 percent of the
investment interests are held by
interested investors and all other
conditions are satisfied; or
• The hospital-physician ambulatory
surgical center (ASC) safe harbor (42
CFR 1001.952(r)(4)). This safe harbor
only protects investments in Medicarecertified ASCs owned by hospitals and
certain qualifying physicians.
Importantly, it does not protect
44 There is also a safe harbor for investment
interests in large entities (i.e., entities with over fifty
million dollars in assets) (42 CFR 1001.952(a)(1)).
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investments by hospitals and physicians
in non-ASC clinical joint ventures,
including, for example, cardiac
catheterization or vascular laboratories,
oncology centers, and dialysis facilities.
Investors in such clinical ventures
should look to other safe harbors and to
the factors noted above.
These safe harbors protect
remuneration in the form of returns on
investment interests (i.e., money paid by
an entity to its owners or investors as
dividends, profit distributions, or the
like). However, they do not protect
payments made by participating
investors to a venture or payments made
by the venture to other parties, such as
vendors, contractors, or employees
(although in some cases these
arrangements may fit in other safe
harbors).
As we originally observed in our 1989
Special Fraud Alert on Joint Venture
Arrangements,45 joint ventures may take
a variety of forms, including a
contractual arrangement between two or
more parties to cooperate in a common
and distinct enterprise providing items
or services, thereby creating a
‘‘contractual joint venture.’’ We
elaborated more fully on contractual
joint ventures in our 2003 Special
Advisory Bulletin on Contractual Joint
Ventures.46 Contractual joint ventures
pose the same kinds of risks as equity
joint ventures and should be analyzed
similarly. Factors to consider include,
for example, whether the hospital is
expanding into a new line of business
created predominately or exclusively to
serve the hospital’s existing patient
base, whether a would-be competitor of
the new line of business is providing all
or most of the key services, and whether
the hospital assumes little or no bona
fide business risk. An example of a
potentially problematic contractual joint
venture would be a hospital contracting
with an existing durable medical
equipment (DME) supplier to operate
the hospital’s newly formed DME
subsidiary (with its own DME supplier
number) on essentially a turnkey basis,
with the hospital primarily furnishing
referrals and assuming little or no
business risk.47
45 See 1989 Special Fraud Alert on Joint Venture
Arrangements, supra note 43.
46 This Special Advisory Bulletin is available on
our Web page at https://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/
alertsandbulletins/042303SABJointVentures.pdf.
47 Contractual ventures with existing clinical
laboratories and outpatient therapy providers,
among others, are also potentially problematic,
particularly if the venture is functionally a turnkey
operation that enables a hospital to use its captive
referrals to expand into a new line of business with
little or no contribution of resources or assumption
of real risk.
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Hospitals should be aware that, for
reasons described in our 2003 Special
Advisory Bulletin on Contractual Joint
Ventures,48 safe harbor protection may
not be available for contractual joint
ventures, and attempts to carve out
separate contracts and qualify each
separately for safe harbor protection
may be ineffectual and leave the parties
at risk under the statute.49
If a hospital is planning to participate,
directly or indirectly, in a joint venture
involving referring physicians and the
venture does not qualify for safe harbor
protection, the hospital should
scrutinize the venture with care, taking
into account the factors noted above,
and consider obtaining advice from an
experienced attorney. At a minimum, to
reduce (but not necessarily eliminate)
the risk of abuse, hospitals should
consider (i) barring physicians
employed by the hospital or its affiliates
from referring to the joint venture; (ii)
taking steps to ensure that medical staff
and other affiliated physicians are not
encouraged in any manner to refer to the
joint venture; (iii) notifying physicians
annually in writing of the preceding
policy; (iv) refraining from tracking in
any manner the volume of referrals
attributable to particular referrals
sources; (v) ensuring that no physician
compensation is tied in any manner to
the volume or value of referrals to, or
other business generated for, the
venture; (vi) disclosing all financial
interests to patients; 50 and (vii)
requiring that other participants in the
joint venture adopt similar steps.
b. Compensation Arrangements With
Physicians
Hospitals enter into a variety of
compensation arrangements with
48 See 2003 Special Advisory Bulletin on
Contractual Joint Ventures, supra note 46.
49 The Medicare program permits hospitals to
furnish services ‘‘under arrangements’’ with other
providers or suppliers. Hospitals frequently furnish
services ‘‘under arrangements’’ with an entity
owned, in whole or in part, by referring physicians.
Standing alone, these ‘‘under arrangements’’
relationships do not fall within the scope of
problematic contractual joint ventures described in
the Special Fraud Alert; however, these
relationships will violate the anti-kickback statute
if remuneration is purposefully offered or paid to
induce referrals (e.g., paying above-market rates for
the services to influence referrals or otherwise tying
the arrangements to referrals in any manner). These
‘‘under arrangements’’ relationships should be
structured, when possible, to fit within an antikickback safe harbor. They must fit within a Stark
exception, even if the service furnished ‘‘under
arrangements’’ is not itself a DHS. See 66 FR 856,
941–2 (January 4, 2001); 69 FR 16054, 16106 (March
26, 2004).
50 While disclosure to patients does not offer
sufficient protection against Federal health care
program abuse, effective and meaningful disclosure
offers some protection against possible abuses of
patient trust.
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physicians whereby physicians provide
items or services to, or on behalf of, the
hospital. Conversely, in some
arrangements, hospitals provide items
or services to physicians. Examples of
these compensation arrangements
include, without limitation, medical
director agreements, personal or
management services agreements, space
or equipment leases, and agreements for
the provision of billing, nursing, or
other staff services. Although many
compensation arrangements are
legitimate business arrangements,
compensation arrangements may violate
the anti-kickback statute if one purpose
of the arrangement is to compensate
physicians for past or future referrals.51
The general rule of thumb is that any
remuneration flowing between hospitals
and physicians should be at fair market
value for actual and necessary items
furnished or services rendered based
upon an arm’s-length transaction and
should not take into account, directly or
indirectly, the value or volume of any
past or future referrals or other business
generated between the parties.
Arrangements under which hospitals (i)
provide physicians with items or
services for free or less than fair market
value, (ii) relieve physicians of financial
obligations they would otherwise incur,
or (iii) inflate compensation paid to
physicians for items or services pose
significant risk. In such circumstances,
an inference arises that the
remuneration may be in exchange for
generating business.
In particular, hospitals should review
their physician compensation
arrangements and carefully assess the
risk of fraud and abuse using the
following factors, among others:
• Are the items and services obtained
from a physician legitimate,
commercially reasonable, and necessary
to achieve a legitimate business purpose
of the hospital (apart from obtaining
referrals)? Assuming that the hospital
needs the items and services, does the
hospital have multiple arrangements
with different physicians, so that in the
aggregate the items or services provided
by all physicians exceed the hospital’s
actual needs (apart from generating
business)?
• Does the compensation represent
fair market value in an arm’s-length
transaction for the items and services?
Could the hospital obtain the services
from a non-referral source at a cheaper
rate or under more favorable terms?
Does the remuneration take into
51 As previously noted, a hospital should ensure
that each compensation arrangement with a
referring physician fits squarely in a statutory or
regulatory exception to the Stark law.
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account, directly or indirectly, the value
or volume of any past or future referrals
or other business generated between the
parties? Is the compensation tied,
directly or indirectly, to Federal health
care program reimbursement?
• Is the determination of fair market
value based upon a reasonable
methodology that is uniformly applied
and properly documented? If fair market
value is based on comparables, the
hospital should ensure that the market
rate for the comparable services is not
distorted (e.g., the market for ancillary
services may be distorted if all providers
of the service are controlled by
physicians).
• Is the compensation commensurate
with the fair market value of a physician
with the skill level and experience
reasonably necessary to perform the
contracted services?
• Were the physicians selected to
participate in the arrangement in whole
or in part because of their past or
anticipated referrals?
• Is the arrangement properly and
fully documented in writing? Are the
physicians documenting the services
they provide? Is the hospital monitoring
the services?
• In the case of physicians staffing
hospital outpatient departments, are
safeguards in place to ensure that the
physicians do not use hospital
outpatient space, equipment, or
personnel to conduct their private
practices? In addition, physicians
working in outpatient departments must
bill the appropriate site-of-service
modifier. The hospital should take
reasonable steps to ensure that
physicians are aware of this requirement
and should take appropriate action if it
identifies physicians engaging in
improper site-of-service billing.
Whenever possible, hospitals should
structure their compensation
arrangements with physicians to fit in a
safe harbor. Potentially applicable are
the space rental safe harbor (42 CFR
1001.952(b)), the equipment rental safe
harbor (42 CFR 1001.952(c)), the
personal services and management
contracts safe harbor (42 CFR
1001.952(d)), the sale of practice safe
harbor (42 CFR 1001.952(e)), the referral
services safe harbor (42 CFR
1001.952(f)), the employee safe harbor
(42 CFR 1001.952(i)), the practitioner
recruitment safe harbor (42 CFR
1001.952(n)), and the obstetrical
malpractice insurance subsidies safe
harbor (42 CFR 1001.952(o)). An
arrangement must fit squarely in a safe
harbor to be protected. Arrangements
that do not fit in a safe harbor should
be reviewed in light of the totality of all
facts and circumstances. At minimum,
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hospitals should develop policies and
procedures requiring physicians to
document, and the hospital to monitor,
the services or items provided under
compensation arrangements (including,
for example, by using written time
reports). In some cases, particularly
rentals, hospitals should consider
obtaining an independent fair market
valuation using appropriate health care
valuation standards.
Arrangements between hospitals and
traditional hospital-based physicians
(e.g., anesthesiologists, radiologists, and
pathologists) raise some different
concerns.52 In these arrangements, it is
typically the hospitals that are in a
position to influence the flow of
business to the physicians, rather than
the physicians making referrals to the
hospitals.53 Such arrangements may
violate the anti-kickback statute if the
hospital solicits or receives something
of value—or the physicians offer or pay
something of value—in exchange for
access to the hospital’s Federal health
care program business. Illegal kickbacks
between hospitals and hospital-based
physicians may take a variety of forms,
including, without limitation:
• A hospital requiring physicians to
pay more than the fair market value for
services provided to the hospital-based
physicians by the hospital; or
• A hospital compensating physicians
less than the fair market value for goods
or services provided to the hospital by
the physicians.
Accordingly, arrangements that
require physicians to provide Medicare
Part A supervision and management
services for token or no payment in
exchange for the ability to provide
physician-billable Medicare Part B
services at the hospital potentially
violate the anti-kickback statute and
should be closely scrutinized.
We are aware that hospitals have long
provided for the delivery of certain
hospital-based physician services
52 Arrangements between hospitals and hospitalbased physicians were the topic of a Management
Advisory Report (MAR) titled ‘‘Financial
Arrangements Between Hospitals and HospitalBased Physicians,’’ OEI–09–89–00330, available on
our Web page at https://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei09-89-00330.pdf.
53 In this regard, arrangements between hospitals
and traditional hospital-based physicians generally
do not pose the same potential to cause the harms
typically associated with kickback schemes.
Moreover, a hospital’s attending medical staff’s
quality expectations and a hospital’s liability
exposure for the malpractice of hospital-based
physicians constrain the hospital’s choice of a
hospital-based physician or group. Finally, to the
extent that any qualified group can bid for hospitalbased business and the request for proposals clearly
includes the entire arrangement, the competition is
not unfair. (Of course, an open, competitive bidding
process does not protect an otherwise illegal
kickback arrangement.)
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4867
through the grant of an exclusive
contract to a physician or physician
group, which includes management,
staffing, and other administrative
functions, and in some cases limited
clinical duties. These exclusive
arrangements affect the cash and noncash value of the overall arrangement to
the respective parties.
Depending on the circumstances, an
exclusive contract can have substantial
value to the hospital-based physician or
group, as well as to the hospital, that
may well have nothing to do with the
value or volume of business flowing
between the hospital and the
physicians. By way of example only, an
exclusive arrangement may reduce the
costs a physician or group would
otherwise incur for business
development and may eliminate
administrative costs otherwise incurred
by the hospital. In an appropriate
context, an exclusive arrangement that
requires a hospital-based physician or
physician group to perform reasonable
administrative or limited clinical duties
directly related to the hospital-based
professional services at no or a reduced
charge would not violate the antikickback statute, provided that the
overall arrangement is consistent with
fair market value in an arm’s-length
transaction, taking into account the
value attributable to the exclusivity.
Depending on the circumstances,
examples of directly-related
administrative or clinical duties
include, without limitation:
participation on hospital committees,
tumor boards, or similar hospital
entities; participation in on-call
rotation; and performance of quality
assurance and oversight activities.
Notwithstanding, whether the scope and
volume of the required services in a
particular arrangement reasonably
reflect the value of the exclusivity will
depend on the facts and circumstances
of the arrangement.
Nothing in this supplemental CPG
should be construed as requiring
hospital-based physicians to perform
administrative or clinical services at no
or a reduced charge. Uncompensated or
below-market arrangements for goods or
services will be subject to close scrutiny
for compliance with the statute.
c. Relationships With Other Health Care
Entities
As addressed in the preceding
subsection, hospitals may obtain
referrals of Federal health care program
business from a variety of health care
professionals and entities. In addition,
when furnishing inpatient, outpatient,
and related services, hospitals often
direct or influence referrals for items
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and services reimbursable by Federal
health care programs. For example,
hospitals may refer patients to, or order
items or services from, home health
agencies,54 skilled nursing facilities,
durable medical equipment companies,
laboratories, pharmaceutical companies,
and other hospitals. In cases where a
hospital is the referral source for other
providers or suppliers, it would be
prudent for the hospital to scrutinize
carefully any remuneration flowing to
the hospital from the provider or
supplier to ensure compliance with the
anti-kickback statute, using the
principles outlined above.
Remuneration may include, for
example, free or below-market-value
items and services or the relief of a
financial obligation.
Hospitals should also review their
managed care arrangements to ensure
compliance with the anti-kickback
statute. Managed care arrangements that
do not fit within one of the managed
care and risk sharing safe harbors at 42
CFR 1001.952(m), (t), or (u) must be
evaluated on a case-by-case basis.
d. Recruitment Arrangements
Many hospitals provide incentives to
recruit a physician or other health care
professional to join the hospital’s
medical staff and provide medical
services to the surrounding community.
When used to bring needed physicians
to an underserved community, these
arrangements can benefit patients.
However, recruitment arrangements
pose substantial fraud and abuse risk.
In most cases, the recruited physician
establishes a private practice in the
community instead of becoming a
hospital employee.55 Such arrangements
potentially implicate the anti-kickback
statute if one purpose of the recruitment
arrangement is to induce referrals to the
recruiting hospital. Safe harbor
protection is available for certain
recruitment arrangements offered by
hospitals to attract primary care
physicians and practitioners to health
professional shortage areas (HPSAs), as
defined in regulations issued by the
54 When referring to home health agencies and
skilled nursing facilities, hospitals must comply
with section 1861(ee)(2)(D) and (H) of the Act,
requiring that Medicare participating hospitals, as
part of the discharge planning process, (i) share
with each beneficiary a list of Medicare-certified
home health agencies or skilled nursing facilities,
as applicable, that serve the beneficiary’s
geographic area, and (ii) identify any home health
agency or skilled nursing facility in which the
hospital has a disclosable financial interest or that
has a financial interest in the hospital. See also 42
CFR 482.43.
55 When paid pursuant to a properly structured
employment arrangement, payments to physicians
who become hospital employees may be protected
by the employee safe harbor at 42 CFR 1001.952(i).
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Department.56 The scope of this safe
harbor is very limited. In particular, the
safe harbor does not protect (a)
recruitment arrangements in areas that
are not designated as HPSAs, (b)
recruitment of specialists, or (c) joint
recruitment with existing physician
practices in the area.
Because of the significant risk of fraud
and abuse posed by improper
recruitment arrangements, hospitals
should scrutinize these arrangements
with care. When assessing the degree of
risk associated with recruitment
arrangements, hospitals should examine
the following factors, among others:
• The size and value of the
recruitment benefit. Does the benefit
exceed what is reasonably necessary to
attract a qualified physician to the
particular community? Has the hospital
previously tried and failed to recruit or
retain physicians?
• The duration of payout of the
recruitment benefit. Total benefit payout
periods extending longer than three
years from the initial recruitment
agreement should trigger heightened
scrutiny.
• The practice of the existing
physician. Is the physician a new
physician with few or no patients or an
established practitioner with a ready
stream of referrals? Is the physician
relocating from a substantial distance so
that referrals are unlikely to follow or is
it possible for the physician to bring an
established patient base?
• The need for the recruitment. Is the
recruited physician’s specialty
necessary to provide adequate access to
medically necessary care for patients in
the community? Do patients already
have reasonable access to comparable
services from other providers or
practitioners in or near the community?
An assessment of community need
based wholly or partially on the
competitive interests of the recruiting
hospital or existing physician practices
would subject the recruitment payments
to heightened scrutiny under the statute.
Significantly, hospitals should be
aware that the practitioner recruitment
safe harbor excludes any arrangement
that directly or indirectly benefits any
existing or potential referral source
other than the recruited physician.
Accordingly, the safe harbor does not
protect ‘‘joint recruitment’’
arrangements between hospitals and
other entities or individuals, such as
solo practitioners, group practices, or
managed care organizations, pursuant to
which the hospital makes payments
directly or indirectly to the other entity
or individual. These joint recruitment
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56 See
42 CFR 1001.952(n).
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arrangements present a high risk of
fraud and abuse and have been the
subject of recent government
investigations and prosecutions. These
arrangements can easily be used as
vehicles to disguise payments from the
hospital to an existing referral source—
typically an existing physician
practice—in exchange for the existing
practice’s referrals to the hospital.
Suspect payments to existing referral
sources may include, among other
things, income guarantees that shift
costs from the existing referral source to
the recruited physician and overhead
and build-out costs funded for the
benefit of the existing referral source.
Hospitals should review all ‘‘joint
recruiting’’ arrangements to ensure that
remuneration does not inure in whole or
in part to the benefit of any party other
than the recruited physician.
e. Discounts
Public policy favors open and
legitimate price competition in health
care. Thus, the anti-kickback statute
contains an exception for discounts
offered to customers that submit claims
to the Federal health care programs, if
the discounts are properly disclosed and
accurately reported.57 However, to
qualify for the exception, the discount
must be in the form of a reduction in the
price of the good or service based on an
arm’s-length transaction. In other words,
the exception covers only reductions in
the product’s price. Moreover, the
regulation provides that the discount
must be given at the time of sale or, in
certain cases, set at the time of sale,
even if finally determined subsequent to
the time of sale (i.e., a rebate).
In conducting business, hospitals sell
and purchase items and services
reimbursable by Federal health care
programs. Therefore, hospitals should
thoroughly familiarize themselves with
the discount safe harbor at 42 CFR
1001.952(h). In particular, depending on
their role in the arrangement, hospitals
should pay attention to the discount
safe harbor requirements applicable to
‘‘buyers,’’ ‘‘sellers,’’ or ‘‘offerors.’’
Compliance with the safe harbor is
determined separately for each party. In
general, hospitals should ensure that all
discounts—including rebates—are
properly disclosed and accurately
reflected on hospital cost reports. If a
hospital offers a discount on an item or
service to a buyer, it should ensure that
the discount is properly disclosed on
the invoice or other documentation for
the item or service.
57 See 42 U.S.C. 1320a–7b(b)(3)(A); 42 CFR
1001.952(h).
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The discount safe harbor does not
protect a discount offered to one payor
but not to the Federal health care
programs. Accordingly, in negotiating
discounts for items and services paid
from a hospital’s pocket (such as those
reimbursed under the Medicare Part A
prospective payment system), the
hospital should ensure that there is no
link or connection, explicit or implicit,
between discounts offered or solicited
for that business and the hospital’s
referral of business billable by the seller
directly to Medicare or another Federal
health care program. For example, a
hospital should not engage in
‘‘swapping’’ by accepting from a
supplier an unreasonably low price on
Part A services that the hospital pays for
out of its own pocket in exchange for
hospital referrals that are billable by the
supplier directly to Part B (e.g.,
ambulance services). Suspect
arrangements include below-cost
arrangements or arrangements at prices
lower than the prices offered by the
supplier to other customers with similar
volumes of business, but without
Federal health care program referrals.
Hospitals may also receive discounts
on items and services purchased
through group purchasing organizations
(GPOs). Discounts received from a
vendor in connection with a GPO to
which a hospital belongs should be
properly disclosed and accurately
reported on the hospital cost reports.
Although there is a safe harbor for
payments made by a vendor to a GPO
as part of an agreement to furnish items
or services to a group of individuals or
entities (42 CFR 1001.952(j)), the safe
harbor does not protect the discount
received by the individual or entity.58
f. Medical Staff Credentialing
Certain medical staff credentialing
practices may implicate the antikickback statute.59 For example,
conditioning privileges on a particular
number of referrals or requiring the
performance of a particular number of
procedures, beyond volumes necessary
to ensure clinical proficiency,
potentially raise substantial risks under
the statute. On the other hand, a
credentialing policy that categorically
refuses privileges to physicians with
significant conflicts of interest would
58 To preclude improper shifting of discounts, the
safe harbor excludes GPOs that wholly own their
members or have members that are subsidiaries of
the parent company that wholly owns the GPO.
Hospitals with affiliated GPOs should be mindful
of these limitations.
59 In addition to the anti-kickback statute,
hospitals should make sure that their credentialing
policies comply with all other applicable Federal
and State laws and regulations, some of which may
prohibit or limit economic credentialing.
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not appear to implicate the statute in
most situations. Whether a particular
credentialing policy runs afoul of the
anti-kickback statute would depend on
the specific facts and circumstances,
including the intent of the parties.
Hospitals are advised to examine their
credentialing practices to ensure that
they do not run afoul of the antikickback statute. The OIG has solicited
comments about, and is considering,
whether further guidance in this area is
appropriate.60
g. Malpractice Insurance Subsidies
The OIG historically has been
concerned that a hospital’s subsidy of
malpractice insurance premiums for
potential referral sources, including
hospital medical staff, may be suspect
under the anti-kickback statute, because
the payments may be used to influence
referrals. The OIG has established a safe
harbor for medical malpractice premium
subsidies provided to obstetrical care
practitioners in health professional
shortage areas.61 Depending on the
circumstances, premium support may
also be structured to fit in other safe
harbors.
We are aware of the current
disruption (i.e., dramatic premium
increases, insurers’ withdrawals from
certain markets, and/or sudden
termination of coverage based upon
factors other than the physicians’ claims
history) in the medical malpractice
liability insurance markets in some
geographic areas.62 Notwithstanding,
hospitals should review malpractice
insurance subsidy arrangements closely
to ensure that there is no improper
inducement to referral sources. Relevant
factors include, without limitation:
• Whether the subsidy is being
provided on an interim basis (e.g., until
an unrelated insurer is commercially
available) for a reasonable fixed period
in a geographic area experiencing severe
access or affordability problems;
• Whether the subsidy is being
offered only to current active medical
staff (or physicians new to the locality
or in practice less than a year, i.e.,
physicians with no or few established
patients);
• Whether the criteria for receiving a
subsidy is unrelated to the volume or
value of referrals or other business
our ‘‘Solicitation of New Safe Harbors and
Special Fraud Alerts’’ (67 FR 72894; December 9,
2002), available on our Web page at https://
oig.hhs.gov/authorities/docs/
solicitationannsafeharbor.pdf.
61 See 42 CFR 1001.952(o).
62 See the OIG’s letter on a hospital corporaiton’s
medical malpractice insurance assistance program,
available on our Web page at https://oig.hhs.gov/
fraud/docs/alertsandbulletins/
MalpracticeProgram.pdf
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generated by the subsidized physician
or his practice;
• Whether physicians receiving
subsidies are paying at least as much as
they currently pay for malpractice
insurance (i.e., are windfalls to
physicians avoided);
• Whether physicians are required to
perform services or relinquish rights,
which have a value equal to the fair
market value of the insurance
assistance; and
• Whether the insurance is available
regardless of the location at which the
physician provides services, including,
but not limited to, other hospitals.
No one of these factors is
determinative, and this list is
illustrative, not exhaustive, of potential
considerations in connection with the
provision of malpractice insurance
subsidies. Parties contemplating
malpractice subsidy programs that do
not fit into one of the safe harbors may
want to consider obtaining an advisory
opinion. Parties should also be mindful
that these subsidy arrangements also
implicate the Stark law.
C. Payments To Reduce or Limit
Services: Gainsharing Arrangements
The CMP set forth in section
1128A(b)(1) of the Act prohibits a
hospital from knowingly making a
payment directly or indirectly to a
physician as an inducement to reduce or
limit items or services furnished to
Medicare or Medicaid beneficiaries
under the physician’s direct care.63
Hospitals that make (and physicians
that receive) such payments are liable
for CMPs of up to $2,000 per patient
covered by the payments.64 The
statutory proscription is very broad. The
payment need not be tied to an actual
diminution in care, so long as the
hospital knows that the payment may
influence the physician to reduce or
limit services to his or her patients.
There is no requirement that the
prohibited payment be tied to a specific
patient or to a reduction in medically
necessary care. In short, any hospital
incentive plan that encourages
physicians through payments to reduce
63 The prohibition applies only to reductions or
limitations of items or services provided to
Medicare and Medicaid fee-for-service
beneficiaries. See section 1128A(b)(1)(A) of the Act.
See also our August 19, 1999 letter regarding
‘‘Social Security Act sections 1128A(b)(1) and (2)
and hospital-physician incentive plans for Medicare
or Medicaid beneficiaries enrolled in managed care
plans,’’ available on our Web page at https://
oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/alertsandbulletins/
gsletter.htm.
64 See sections 1128A(b)(1)(B) and (b)(2) of the
Act.
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or limit clinical services directly or
indirectly violates the statute.
We are aware that a number of
hospitals are engaged in, or considering
entering into, incentive arrangements
commonly called ‘‘gainsharing.’’ While
there is no fixed definition of a
‘‘gainsharing’’ arrangement, the term
typically refers to an arrangement in
which a hospital gives physicians a
percentage share of any reduction in the
hospital’s costs for patient care
attributable in part to the physicians’
efforts. We recognize that, properly
structured, gainsharing arrangements
can serve legitimate business and
medical purposes, such as increasing
efficiency, reducing waste, and, thereby,
potentially increasing a hospital’s
profitability. However, the plain
language of section 1128A(b)(1) of the
Act prohibits tying the physicians’
compensation for services to reductions
or limitations in items or services
provided to patients under the
physicians’ clinical care.65
In addition to the CMP risks described
above, gainsharing arrangements can
also implicate the anti-kickback statute
if the cost-savings payments are used to
influence referrals. For example, the
statute is potentially implicated if a
gainsharing arrangement is intended to
influence physicians to ‘‘cherry pick’’
healthy patients for the hospital offering
gainsharing payments and steer sicker
(and more costly) patients to hospitals
that do not offer gainsharing payments.
Similarly, the statute may be implicated
if a hospital offers a cost-sharing
program with the intent to foster
physician loyalty and attract more
referrals. In addition, we have serious
concerns about overly broad
arrangements under which a physician
continues for an extended time to reap
the benefits of previously-achieved
savings or receives cost-savings
payments unrelated to anything done by
the physician, whether work, services,
or other undertaking (e.g., a change in
the way the physician practices).
Wherever possible, hospitals should
consider structuring cost-saving
arrangements to fit in the personal
services safe harbor. However, in many
cases, protection under the personal
services safe harbor is not available
because gainsharing arrangements
typically involve a percentage payment
(i.e., the aggregate fee will not be set in
advance, as required by the safe harbor).
65 A detailed discussion of gainsharing can be
found in our July 1999 Special Advisory Bulletin
titled ‘‘Gainsharing Arrangements and CMPs for
Hospital Payments to Physicians to Reduce or Limit
Services to Beneficiaries,’’ available on our Web
page at https://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/
altersandbulletins/gainsh.htm.
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Finally, gainsharing arrangements may
also implicate the Stark law.
D. Emergency Medical Treatment and
Labor Act (EMTALA)
Hospitals should review their
obligations under EMTALA (section
1867 of the Act) to evaluate and treat
individuals who come to their
emergency departments and, in some
circumstances, other facilities. Hospitals
should pay particular attention to when
an individual must receive a medical
screening exam to determine whether
that individual is suffering from an
emergency medical condition. When
such a screening or treatment of an
emergency medical condition is
required, it cannot be delayed to inquire
about an individual’s method of
payment or insurance status. If the
hospital’s emergency department (ED) is
‘‘on diversion’’ and an individual comes
to the ED for evaluation or treatment of
a medical condition, the hospital is
required to provide such services
despite its diversionary status.
Generally, hospital emergency
departments may not transfer an
individual with an unstable emergency
medical condition unless a physician
certifies that the benefits outweigh the
risks. In such circumstances, the
hospital must provide stabilizing
treatment to minimize the risks of
transfer. Further, the hospital must
ensure that the receiving facility has
available space and qualified personnel
to treat the individual and has agreed to
accept transfer of that individual.
Moreover, certain medical records must
accompany the individual and a
hospital that has specialized capabilities
or facilities must accept an appropriate
transfer of an individual who requires
such specialized capabilities or facilities
if the hospital has the capacity to treat
the individual.
A hospital must provide appropriate
screening and treatment services within
the full capabilities of its staff and
facilities. This includes access to
specialists who are on call. Thus,
hospital policies and procedures should
be clear on how to access the full
services of the hospital, and all staff
should understand the hospital’s
obligations to individuals under
EMTALA. In particular, on-call
physicians need to be educated as to
their responsibilities under EMTALA,
including the responsibility to accept
appropriately transferred individuals
from other facilities. In addition, all
persons working in emergency
departments should be periodically
trained and reminded of the hospital’s
EMTALA obligations and hospital
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policies and procedures designed to
ensure that such obligations are met.
For further information about
EMTALA, hospitals are directed to: (i)
The EMTALA statute at section 1867 of
the Act; (ii) the EMTALA statute’s
implementing regulations at 42 CFR part
489; (iii) our 1999 Special Advisory
Bulletin on the Patient Anti-Dumping
Statute (64 FR 61353; November 10,
1999), available on our Web page at
https://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/
alertsandbulletins/frdump.pdf; and (iv)
CMS’s EMTALA resource Web page
located at https://www.cms.gov/
providers/emtala/emtala.asp.
E. Substandard Care
The OIG has authority to exclude any
individual or entity from participation
in Federal health care programs if the
individual or entity provides
unnecessary items or services (i.e., items
or services in excess of the needs of a
patient) or substandard items or services
(i.e., items or services of a quality which
fails to meet professionally recognized
standards of health care).66
Significantly, neither knowledge nor
intent is required for exclusion under
this provision. The exclusion can be
based upon unnecessary or substandard
items or services provided to any
patient, even if that patient is not a
Medicare or Medicaid beneficiary.
We are mindful that the vast majority
of hospitals are fully committed to
providing quality care to their patients.
To achieve their quality-related goals,
hospitals should continually measure
their performance against
comprehensive standards. Medicare
participating hospitals must meet all of
the Medicare hospital conditions of
participation (COPs), including without
limitation, the COP pertaining to a
quality assessment and performance
improvement program at 42 CFR 482.21
and the hospital COP pertaining to the
medical staff at 42 CFR 482.22.
Compliance with the COPs is
determined by State survey agencies or
accreditation organizations, such as the
Joint Commission on Accreditation of
Healthcare Organizations or the
American Osteopathic Association. In
addition, hospitals should develop their
own quality of care protocols and
implement mechanisms for evaluating
compliance with those protocols.
In reviewing the quality of care
provided, hospitals must not limit their
review to the quality of their nursing
and other ancillary services. Hospitals
must monitor the quality of medical
66 See section 1128(b)(6)(B) of the Act, which is
available through the Internet at https://
www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/42/1320a-7.html.
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services provided at the hospital by
appropriately overseeing the
credentialing and peer review of their
medical staffs.
F. Relationships With Federal Health
Care Beneficiaries
Hospitals’ relationships with Federal
health care beneficiaries may also
implicate the fraud and abuse laws. In
particular, hospitals should be aware
that section 1128A(a)(5) of the Act
authorizes the OIG to impose CMPs on
hospitals (and others) that offer or
transfer remuneration to a Medicare or
Medicaid beneficiary that the offeror
knows or should know is likely to
influence the beneficiary to order or
receive items or services from a
particular provider, practitioner, or
supplier for which payment may be
made under the Medicare or Medicaid
programs. The definition of
‘‘remuneration’’ expressly includes the
offer or transfer of items or services for
free or other than fair market value,
including the waiver of all or part of a
Medicare or Medicaid cost-sharing
amount.67 In other words, hospitals may
not offer valuable items or services to
Medicare or Medicaid beneficiaries to
attract their business. In this regard,
hospitals should familiarize themselves
with the OIG’s August 2002 Special
Advisory Bulletin on Offering Gifts and
Other Inducements to Beneficiaries.68
1. Gifts and Gratuities
Hospitals should scrutinize any offers
of gifts or gratuities to beneficiaries for
compliance with the CMP provision
prohibiting inducements to Medicare
and Medicaid beneficiaries. The key
inquiry under the CMP is whether the
remuneration is something that the
hospital knows or should know is likely
to influence the beneficiary’s selection
of a particular provider, practitioner, or
supplier for Medicare or Medicaid
payable services. As interpreted by the
OIG, section 1128A(a)(5) of the Act does
not apply to the provision of items or
services valued at less than $10 per item
and $50 per patient in the aggregate on
an annual basis.69 A special exception
for incentives to promote the delivery of
preventive care services is discussed
below at section II.I.2.
2. Cost-Sharing Waivers
In general, hospitals are obligated to
collect cost-sharing amounts owed by
67 See
section 1128A(i)(6) of the Act.
Special Advisory Bulletin on Offering Gifts
and Other Inducements to Beneficiaries (67 FR
55855; August 30, 2002) is available on our Web
page at https://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/
alertsandbulletins/SABGiftsandInducements.pdf.
69 See id.
68 The
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Federal health care program
beneficiaries. Waiving owed amounts
may constitute prohibited remuneration
to beneficiaries under section
1128A(a)(5) of the Act or the antikickback statute. Certain waivers of Part
A inpatient cost-sharing amounts may
be protected by structuring them to fit
in the safe harbor for waivers of
beneficiary inpatient coinsurance and
deductible amounts at 42 CFR
1001.952(k). In particular, under the
safe harbor, waived amounts may not be
claimed as bad debt; the waivers must
be offered uniformly across the board
without regard to the reason for
admission, length of stay, or DRG; and
waivers may not be made as part of any
agreement with a third party payer,
unless the third party payer is a
Medicare SELECT plan under section
1882(t)(1) of the Act.70
In addition, hospitals (and others)
may waive cost-sharing amounts on the
basis of a beneficiary’s financial need,
so long as the waiver is not routine, not
advertised, and made pursuant to a good
faith, individualized assessment of the
beneficiary’s financial need or after
reasonable collection efforts have
failed.71 The OIG recognizes that what
constitutes a good faith determination of
‘‘financial need’’ may vary depending
on the individual patient’s
circumstances and that hospitals should
have flexibility to take into account
relevant variables. These factors may
include, for example:
• The local cost of living;
• A patient’s income, assets, and
expenses;
• A patient’s family size; and
• The scope and extent of a patient’s
medical bills.
Hospitals should use a reasonable set
of financial need guidelines that are
based on objective criteria and
appropriate for the applicable locality.
The guidelines should be applied
uniformly in all cases. While hospitals
have flexibility in making the
determination of financial need, we do
not believe it is appropriate to apply
inflated income guidelines that result in
waivers for beneficiaries who are not in
genuine financial need. Hospitals
should consider that the financial status
of a patient may change over time and
should recheck a patient’s eligibility at
OIG has proposed a rule to extend this safe
harbor to protect waivers of Part B cost-sharing
amounts pursuant to agreements with Medicare
SELECT plans. See 67 FR 60202 (September 25,
2002), available on our Web page at https://
oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/safeharborregulations/
MedicareSELECTNPRMFederalRegister.pdf.
However, the OIG is still considering comments on
this rule, and it has not been finalized.
71 See section 1128A(i)(6)(A) of the Act.
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reasonable intervals sufficient to ensure
that the patient remains in financial
need. For example, a patient who
obtains outpatient hospital services
several times a week would not need to
be rechecked every visit. Hospitals
should take reasonable measures to
document their determinations of
Medicare beneficiaries’ financial need.
We are aware that in some situations
patients may be reluctant or unable to
provide documentation of their
financial status. In those cases, hospitals
may be able to use other reasonable
methods for determining financial need,
including, for example, documented
patient interviews or questionnaires.
In sum, hospitals should review their
waiver policies to ensure that the
policies and the manner in which they
are implemented comply with all
applicable laws. For more information
about cost-sharing waivers, hospitals
should review our February 2, 2004
paper on ‘‘Hospital Discounts Offered
To Patients Who Cannot Afford To Pay
Their Hospital Bills,’’ containing a
section titled ‘‘Reductions or Waivers of
Cost-Sharing Amounts for Medicare
Beneficiaries Experiencing Financial
Hardship’’ and available on our Web
page at https://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/
alertsandbulletins/2004/
FA021904hospitaldiscounts.pdf.72
3. Free Transportation
The plain language of the CMP
prohibits offering free transportation to
Medicare or Medicaid beneficiaries to
influence their selection of a particular
provider, practitioner, or supplier.
Notwithstanding, hospitals can offer
free local transportation of low value
(i.e., within the $10 per item and $50
annual limits).73 Luxury and specialized
transportation, such as limousines or
ambulances, would exceed the low
value threshold and are problematic, as
are arrangements tied in any manner to
the volume or value of referrals and
arrangements tied to particularly
lucrative treatments or medical
conditions. However, we have indicated
that we are considering developing a
regulatory exception for some
complimentary local transportation
provided to beneficiaries residing in a
72 See also the OIG’s Special Fraud Alert on
Routine Waiver of Copayments or Deductibles
Under Medicare Part B, issued May 1991,
republished in the Federal Register at 59 FR 65372,
65374 (December 19, 1994), and available on our
Web page at https://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/
alertsandbulletins/121994.html.
73 Our position on local transportation of nominal
value is more fully set forth in the preamble to the
final rule enacting 42 CFR 1003.102(b)(13). See 65
FR 24400, 24411 (April 26, 2000).
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hospital’s primary service area.74
Accordingly, until such time as we
promulgate a final rule on
complimentary local transportation
under section 1128A(a)(5) of the Act or
indicate our intention not to proceed
with such rule, we have indicated that
we will not impose administrative
sanctions for violations of section
1128A(a)(5) of the Act in connection
with hospital-based complimentary
transportation programs that meet the
following conditions:
• The program was in existence prior
to August 30, 2002, the date of
publication of the Special Advisory
Bulletin on Offering Gifts and Other
Inducements to Beneficiaries.
• Transportation is offered uniformly
and without charge or at reduced charge
to all patients of the hospital or
hospital-owned ambulatory surgical
center (and may also be made available
to their families).
• The transportation is only provided
to and from the hospital or a hospitalowned ambulatory surgical center and is
for the purpose of receiving hospital or
ambulatory surgical center services (or,
in the case of family members,
accompanying or visiting hospital or
ambulatory surgical center patients).
• The transportation is provided only
within the hospital’s or ambulatory
surgical center’s primary service area.
• The costs of the transportation are
not claimed directly or indirectly by any
Federal health care program cost report
or claim and are not otherwise shifted
to any Federal health care program.
• The transportation does not include
ambulance transportation.
Other arrangements are subject to a
case-by-case review under the statute to
ensure that no improper inducement
exists.
G. HIPAA Privacy and Security Rules
As of April 14, 2003, all hospitals that
conduct electronic transactions for
which standards have been adopted
under the Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA)
were required to comply with the
Privacy Rule promulgated pursuant to
HIPAA. Generally, the HIPAA Privacy
Rule addresses the use and disclosure of
individuals’ identifiable health
information (protected health
information or PHI) by covered
hospitals and other covered entities, as
well as standards for individuals’
privacy rights to understand and control
how their health information is used.
The Privacy Rule (45 CFR parts 160 and
164, subparts A and E) and other helpful
information about how it applies,
74 See
supra note 68.
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including frequently asked questions,
can be found on the Web page of the
Department’s Office for Civil Rights
(OCR) at https://www.hhs.gov/ocr/
hipaa/. Questions about the privacy rule
should be submitted to OCR. Hospitals
can contact OCR by following the
instructions on its Web page, https://
www.hhs.gov/ocr/contact.html, or by
calling the HIPAA toll-free number,
(866) 627–7748.
To ease the burden of complying with
the new requirements, the Privacy Rule
gives covered hospitals and other
covered entities some flexibility to
create their own privacy procedures.
Each hospital should make sure that it
is compliant with all applicable
provisions of the Privacy Rule,
including provisions pertaining to
required disclosures (such as required
disclosures to the Department when it is
undertaking a Privacy Rule investigation
or compliance review) in developing its
privacy procedures that are tailored to
fit its particular size and needs.
The final HIPAA Security Rule (45
CFR parts 160 and 164, subparts A and
C) was published in the Federal
Register on February 20, 2003. It is
available on CMS’s Web page at
https://www.cms.gov/hipaa/hipaa2. The
Security Rule specifies a series of
administrative, technical, and physical
security safeguards for hospitals that are
covered entities and other covered
entities to use to assure, among other
provisions, the confidentiality of
electronic PHI. Hospitals that are
covered entities must be compliant with
the Security Rule by April 20, 2005. The
Security Rule requirements are flexible
and scalable, which allows each covered
entity to tailor its approach to
compliance based on its own unique
circumstances. Covered entities can
consider their organization and
capabilities, as well as costs, in
designing their security plans and
procedures. Questions about the HIPAA
Security Rule should be submitted to
CMS. Hospitals can contact CMS by
following the instructions on its Web
page, https://www.cms.gov/hipaa/
hipaa2/contact, or by calling the HIPAA
toll-free number, (866) 627–7748.
H. Billing Medicare or Medicaid
Substantially in Excess of Usual Charges
Section 1128(b)(6)(A) of the Act
provides for the permissive exclusion
from Federal health care programs of
any provider or supplier that submits a
claim based on costs or charges to the
Medicare or Medicaid programs that is
‘‘substantially in excess’’ of its usual
charge or cost, unless the Secretary
finds there is ‘‘good cause’’ for the
higher charge or cost. The exclusion
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provision does not require a provider to
charge everyone the same price; nor
does it require a provider to offer
Medicare or Medicaid its ‘‘best price.’’
However, providers cannot routinely
charge Medicare or Medicaid
substantially more than they usually
charge others. Hospitals have raised
concerns regarding the impact of the
exclusion authority on hospital services,
and the OIG is considering those
concerns in the context of the
rulemaking process.75 The OIG’s policy
regarding application of the exclusion
authority to discounts offered to
uninsured and underinsured patients is
discussed below.
I. Areas of General Interest
Although in most cases the following
areas do not pose significant fraud and
abuse risk, the OIG has received
numerous inquiries from hospitals and
others on these topics. Therefore, we
offer the following guidance to assist
hospitals in their review of these
arrangements.
1. Discounts to Uninsured Patients
No OIG authority, including the
Federal anti-kickback statute, prohibits
or restricts hospitals from offering
discounts to uninsured patients who are
unable to pay their hospital bills.76 In
addition, the OIG has never excluded or
attempted to exclude any provider or
supplier for offering discounts to
uninsured or underinsured patients
under the permissive exclusion
authority at section 1128(b)(6)(A) of the
Act. However, to provide additional
assurance to the industry, the OIG
recently proposed regulations that
would define key terms in the statute.77
Among other things, the proposed
regulations would make clear that free
or substantially reduced charges to
75 See Notice of Proposed Rulemaking regarding
‘‘Clarification of Terms and Application of Program
Exclusion Authority for Submitting Claims
Containing Excessive Charges’’ (68 FR 53939;
September 15, 2003), available on our Web page at
https://oig.hhs.gov/authorities/docs/
FRSIENPRM.pdf.
76 Discounts offered to underinsured patients
potentially raise a more significant concern under
the anti-kickback statute, and hospitals should
exercise care to ensure that such discounts are not
tied directly or indirectly to the furnishing of items
or services payable by a Federal health care
program. For more information, see our February 2,
2004 paper on ‘‘Hospital Discounts Offered To
Patients Who Cannot Afford To Pay Their Hospital
Bills,’’ available on our Web page at https://
oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/alertsandbulletins/2004/
FA021904hospitaldiscounts.pdf, and CMS’s paper
titled ‘‘Questions On Charges For The Uninsured,’’
dated February 17, 2004, and available on CMS’s
Web page at https://www.cms.gov/
FAQ_Uninsured.pdf.
77 See 68 FR 53939 (September 15, 2003),
available on our Web page at https://oig.hhs.gov/
authorities/docs/FRSIENPRM.pdf.
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uninsured persons would not affect the
calculation of a provider’s or supplier’s
‘‘usual’’ charges, as the term ‘‘usual
charges’’ is used in the exclusion
provision. The OIG is currently
reviewing the public comments to the
proposed regulations. Until such time as
a final regulation is promulgated or the
OIG indicates its intention not to
promulgate a final rule, it will continue
to be the OIG’s enforcement policy that
when calculating their ‘‘usual charges’’
for purposes of section 1128(b)(6)(A) of
the Act, individuals and entities do not
need to consider free or substantially
reduced charges to (i) uninsured
patients or (ii) underinsured patients
who are self-paying patients for the
items or services furnished. In offering
such discounts, a hospital should report
full uniform charges, rather than the
discounted amounts, on its Medicare
cost report and make the FI aware that
it has reported its full charges.78
Under CMS rules, Medicare generally
reimburses a hospital for a percentage of
its ‘‘bad debt’’ (i.e., uncollectible
Medicare deductible or coinsurance
amounts), but only if the hospital bills
the Medicare patient for unpaid
amounts first, and engages in
reasonable, good faith collection efforts
that are consistent with the degree of
effort applied to collecting similar debts
from non-Medicare patients.79 However,
as explained in CMS’s paper titled
‘‘Questions On Charges For The
Uninsured,’’ a hospital can forgo
collection efforts aimed at a Medicare
patient, if the hospital, using its
customary methods, documents that the
patient is indigent or medically
indigent 80 and that no source other than
78 For more information, see CMS’s paper titled
‘‘Questions On Charges For The Uninsured,’’ dated
February 17, 2004, and available on CMS’s Web
page at https://www.cms.gov/FAQ_Uninsured.pdf.
79 See 42 CFR 413.89 and Medicare’s Provider
Reimbursement Manual, Part I, Chapter 3, Section
310, available on CMS’s Web page at https://
www.cms.hhs.gov/manuals/pub151/PUB_15_1.asp;
see also Provider Reimbursement Manual, Part II,
chapter 11, section 1102.3.L, available on CMS’s
Web page at https://www.cms.gov/manuals/pub152/
PUB_15_2.asp.
80 See ‘‘Questions On Charges For The
Uninsured,’’ dated February 17, 2004 and available
on CMS’s Web page at https://www.cms.gov/
FAQ_Uninsured.pdf. In the paper, CMS further
explains that hospitals may, but are not required to,
determine a patient’s indigency using a sliding
scale. In this type of arrangement, the provider
would agree to deem the patient indigent with
respect to a portion of the patient’s account (e.g.,
a flat percentage of the debt based on the patient’s
income, assets, or the size of the patient’s liability
relative to income). In the case of a Medicare
patient who is determined to be indigent using this
method, the amount the hospital decides, pursuant
to its policy, not to collect from the patient can be
claimed by the provider as Medicare bad debt. The
hospital must, however, engage in a reasonable
collection effort to collect the remaining balance
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the patient is legally responsible for the
unpaid deductibles and coinsurance.
CMS Medicare bad debt
reimbursement guidelines provide that a
hospital should apply its customary
indigency criteria to Medicare patients;
however, the hospital must document
such determination for such patients. To
claim Medicare bad debt
reimbursement, the hospital must
follow the guidance laid out in sections
310, 312, and 322 of the Provider
Reimbursement Manual.81 A hospital
should examine a patient’s total
resources, which could include, but are
not limited to, an analysis of assets,
liabilities, income, expenses, and any
extenuating circumstances that would
affect the determination. The hospital
should document the method by which
it determined the indigency and include
all backup information used to
substantiate the determination. If,
instead of making such a determination,
a hospital attempts to collect the
outstanding amounts from the Medicare
beneficiary, such efforts must be
documented in the patient’s file with
copies of the bill(s), follow-up letters,
and reports of telephone and personal
contacts. In the case of a dually-eligible
patient (i.e., a patient entitled to both
Medicare and Medicaid), the hospital
should document the bad debt claim by
including a denial of payment from the
State.
2. Preventive Care Services
Hospitals frequently participate in
community-based efforts to deliver
preventive care services. The Medicare
and Medicaid programs encourage
patients to access preventive care
services. The prohibition against
beneficiary inducements at section
1128A(a)(5) of the Act does not apply to
incentives offered to promote the
delivery of certain preventive care
services, if the programs are structured
in accordance with the regulatory
requirements at 42 CFR 1003.101.
Generally, to fit within the preventive
care exception, a service must be a
prenatal service or post-natal well-baby
visit or a specific clinical service
described in the current U.S. Preventive
Services Task Force’s Guide to Clinical
Preventive Services 82 that is reimbursed
by Medicare or Medicaid. Obtaining the
service may not be tied directly or
indirectly to the provision of other
before claiming such balance as reimbursable bad
debt. Id.
81 See Medicare’s Provider Reimbursement
Manual, Part I, chapter 3, available on CMS’s Web
page at https://www.cms.hhs.gov/manuals/pub151/
PUB_15_1.asp.
82 Available on the Internet at https://
www.ahrq.gov/clinic/cps3dix.htm.
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Medicare or Medicaid services. In
addition, the incentives may not be in
the form of cash or cash equivalents and
may not be disproportionate to the value
of the preventive care provided. From
an anti-kickback perspective, the chief
concern is whether an arrangement to
induce patients to obtain preventive
care services is intended to induce other
business payable by a Federal health
care program. Relevant factors in
making this evaluation would include,
but not be limited to: the nature and
scope of the preventive care services;
whether the preventive care services are
tied directly or indirectly to the
provision of other items or services and,
if so, the nature and scope of the other
services; the basis on which patients are
selected to receive the free or
discounted services; and whether the
patient is able to afford the services.
3. Professional Courtesy
Although historically ‘‘professional
courtesy’’ referred to the practice of
physicians waiving the entire
professional fee for other physicians, the
term is variously used in the industry
now to describe a range of practices
involving free or discounted services
(including ‘‘insurance only’’ billing)
furnished to physicians and their
families and staff. Some hospitals have
used the term ‘‘professional courtesy’’ to
describe various programs that offer free
or discounted hospital services to
medical staff, employees, community
physicians, and their families and staff.
Although many professional courtesy
programs are unlikely to pose a
significant risk of abuse (and many may
be legitimate employee benefits
programs eligible for the employee safe
harbor), some hospital-sponsored
‘‘professional courtesy’’ programs may
implicate the fraud and abuse statutes.
In general, whether a professional
courtesy program runs afoul of the antikickback statute turns on whether the
recipients of the professional courtesy
are selected in a manner that takes into
account, directly or indirectly, any
recipient’s ability to refer to, or
otherwise generate business for, the
hospital. Also relevant is whether the
physicians have solicited the
professional courtesy in return for
referrals. With respect to the Stark law,
the key inquiry is whether the
arrangement fits in the exception for
professional courtesy at 42 CFR
411.357(s). Finally, hospitals should
evaluate the method by which the
courtesy is granted. For example,
‘‘insurance only’’ billing offered to a
Federal program beneficiary potentially
implicates the anti-kickback statute, the
False Claims Act, and the CMP
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provision prohibiting inducements to
Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries
(discussed in section II.F above).
Notably, the Stark law exception for
professional courtesy requires that
insurers be notified if ‘‘professional
courtesy’’ includes ‘‘insurance only’’
billing.
III. Hospital Compliance Program
Effectiveness
Hospitals with an organizational
culture that values compliance are more
likely to have effective compliance
programs and, thus, are better able to
prevent, detect, and correct problems.
Building and sustaining a successful
compliance program rarely follows the
same formula from organization to
organization. However, such programs
generally include: The commitment of
the hospital’s governance and
management at the highest levels;
structures and processes that create
effective internal controls; and regular
self-assessment and enhancement of the
existing compliance program. The 1998
CPG provided guidance for hospitals on
establishing sound internal controls.83
This section discusses the important
roles of corporate leadership and selfassessment of compliance programs.
A. Code of Conduct
Every effective compliance program
necessarily begins with a formal
commitment to compliance by the
hospital’s governing body and senior
management. Evidence of that
commitment should include active
involvement of the organizational
leadership, allocation of adequate
resources, a reasonable timetable for
implementation of the compliance
measures, and the identification of a
compliance officer and compliance
committee vested with sufficient
autonomy, authority, and accountability
to implement and enforce appropriate
compliance measures. A hospital’s
leadership should foster an
organizational culture that values, and
even rewards, the prevention, detection,
and resolution of problems. Moreover,
hospitals’ leadership and management
should ensure that policies and
procedures, including, for example,
compensation structures, do not create
83 Among other things, the 1998 hospital CPG
includes a detailed discussion of the structure and
processes that make up the recommended seven
elements of a compliance program. The seven basic
elements of a compliance program are: Designation
of a compliance officer and compliance committee;
development of compliance policies and
procedures, including standards of conduct;
development of open lines of communication;
appropriate training and education; response to
detected offenses; internal monitoring and auditing;
and enforcement of disciplinary standards.
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undue pressure to pursue profit over
compliance. In short, the hospital
should endeavor to develop a culture
that values compliance from the top
down and fosters compliance from the
bottom up. Such an organizational
culture is the foundation of an effective
compliance program.
Although a clear statement of detailed
and substantive policies and
procedures—and the periodic
evaluation of their effectiveness—is at
the core of a compliance program, the
OIG recommends that hospitals also
develop a general organizational
statement of ethical and compliance
principles that will guide the entity’s
operations. One common expression of
this statement of principles is a code of
conduct. The code should function in
the same fashion as a constitution, i.e.,
as a document that details the
fundamental principles, values, and
framework for action within an
organization. The code of conduct for a
hospital should articulate a commitment
to compliance by management,
employees, and contractors, and should
summarize the broad ethical and legal
principles under which the hospital
must operate. The Code of Conduct
should also include a requirement that
professionals follow the ethical
standards dictated by their respective
professional organizations. Unlike the
more detailed policies and procedures,
the code of conduct should be brief,
easily readable, and cover general
principles applicable to all members of
the organization.
As appropriate, the OIG strongly
encourages the participation and
involvement of the hospital’s board of
directors, officers (including the chief
executive officer (CEO)), members of
senior management, representatives
from the medical and clinical staffs, and
other personnel from various levels of
the organizational structure in the
development of all aspects of the
compliance program, especially the
code of conduct. Management and
employee involvement in this process
communicates a strong and explicit
commitment by management to foster
compliance with applicable Federal
health care program requirements. It
also communicates the need for all
directors, officers, managers, employees,
contractors, and medical and clinical
staff members to comply with the
organization’s code of conduct and
policies and procedures.
B. Regular Review of Compliance
Program Effectiveness
Hospitals should regularly review the
implementation and execution of their
compliance program elements. This
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review should be conducted at least
annually and should include an
assessment of each of the basic elements
individually, as well as the overall
success of the program. This review
should help the hospital identify any
weaknesses in its compliance program
and implement appropriate changes.
A common method of assessing
compliance program effectiveness is
measurement of various outcomes
indicators (e.g., billing and coding error
rates, identified overpayments, and
audit results). However, we have
observed that exclusive reliance on
these indicators may cause an
organization to miss crucial underlying
weaknesses. We recommend that
hospitals examine program outcomes
and assess the underlying structure and
process of each compliance program
element. We have identified a number
of factors that may be useful when
evaluating the effectiveness of basic
compliance program elements.
Hospitals should consider these factors,
as well as others, when developing a
strategy for assessing their compliance
programs. While no one factor is
determinative of program effectiveness,
the following factors are often observed
in effective compliance programs.
1. Designation of a Compliance Officer
and Compliance Committee
The compliance department is the
backbone of the hospital’s compliance
program. The compliance department
should be led by a well-qualified
compliance officer, who is a member of
senior management, and should be
supported by a compliance committee.
The purpose of the compliance
department is to implement the
hospital’s compliance program and to
ensure that the hospital complies with
all applicable Federal health care
program requirements. To ensure that
the compliance department is meeting
this objective, each hospital should
conduct an annual review of its
compliance department. Some factors
that the organization may wish to
consider in its evaluation include the
following:
• Does the compliance department
have a clear, well-crafted mission?
• Is the compliance department
properly organized?
• Does the compliance department
have sufficient resources (staff and
budget), training, authority, and
autonomy to carry out its mission?
• Is the relationship between the
compliance function and the general
counsel function appropriate to achieve
the purpose of each?
• Is there an active compliance
committee, comprised of trained
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representatives of each of the relevant
functional departments, as well as
senior management?
• Are ad hoc groups or task forces
assigned to carry out any special
missions, such as conducting an
investigation or evaluating a proposed
enhancement to the compliance
program?
• Does the compliance officer have
direct access to the governing body, the
president or CEO, all senior
management, and legal counsel?
• Does the compliance officer have
independent authority to retain outside
legal counsel?
• Does the compliance officer have a
good working relationship with other
key operational areas, such as internal
audit, coding, billing, and clinical
departments?
• Does the compliance officer make
regular reports to the board of directors
and other hospital management
concerning different aspects of the
hospital’s compliance program?
2. Development of Compliance Policies
and Procedures, Including Standards of
Conduct
The purpose of compliance policies
and procedures is to establish brightline rules that help employees carry out
their job functions in a manner that
ensures compliance with Federal health
care program requirements and furthers
the mission and objective of the hospital
itself. Typically, policies and
procedures are written to address
identified risk areas for the organization.
As hospitals conduct a review of their
written policies and procedures, some
of the following factors may be
considered:
• Are policies and procedures clearly
written, relevant to day-to-day
responsibilities, readily available to
those who need them, and re-evaluated
on a regular basis?
• Does the hospital monitor staff
compliance with internal policies and
procedures?
• Have the standards of conduct been
distributed to all directors, officers,
managers, employees, contractors, and
medical and clinical staff members?
• Has the hospital developed a risk
assessment tool, which is re-evaluated
on a regular basis, to assess and identify
weaknesses and risks in operations?
• Does the risk assessment tool
include an evaluation of Federal health
care program requirements, as well as
other publications, such as the OIG’s
CPGs, work plans, special advisory
bulletins, and special fraud alerts?
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3. Developing Open Lines of
Communication
Open communication is essential to
maintaining an effective compliance
program. The purpose of developing
open communication is to increase the
hospital’s ability to identify and
respond to compliance problems.
Generally, open communication is a
product of organizational culture and
internal mechanisms for reporting
instances of potential fraud and abuse.
When assessing a hospital’s ability to
communicate potential compliance
issues effectively, a hospital may wish
to consider the following factors:
• Has the hospital fostered an
organizational culture that encourages
open communication, without fear of
retaliation?
• Has the hospital established an
anonymous hotline or other similar
mechanism so that staff, contractors,
patients, visitors, and medical and
clinical staff members can report
potential compliance issues?
• How well is the hotline publicized;
how many and what types of calls are
received; are calls logged and tracked (to
establish possible patterns); and is the
caller informed of the hospital’s actions?
• Are all instances of potential fraud
and abuse investigated?
• Are the results of internal
investigations shared with the hospital
governing body and relevant
departments on a regular basis?
• Is the governing body actively
engaged in pursuing appropriate
remedies to institutional or recurring
problems?
• Does the hospital utilize alternative
communication methods, such as a
periodic newsletter or compliance
intranet website?
4. Appropriate Training and Education
Hospitals that fail to train and educate
their staff adequately risk liability for
the violation of health care fraud and
abuse laws. The purpose of conducting
a training and education program is to
ensure that each employee, contractor,
or any other individual that functions
on behalf of the hospital is fully capable
of executing his or her role in
compliance with rules, regulations, and
other standards. In reviewing their
training and education programs,
hospitals may consider the following
factors:
• Does the hospital provide qualified
trainers to conduct annual compliance
training for its staff, including both
general and specific training pertinent
to the staff’s responsibilities?
• Has the hospital evaluated the
content of its training and education
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4875
program on an annual basis and
determined that the subject content is
appropriate and sufficient to cover the
range of issues confronting its
employees?
• Has the hospital kept up-to-date
with any changes in Federal health care
program requirements and adapted its
education and training program
accordingly?
• Has the hospital formulated the
content of its education and training
program to consider results from its
audits and investigations; results from
previous training and education
programs; trends in hotline reports; and
OIG, CMS, or other agency guidance or
advisories?
• Has the hospital evaluated the
appropriateness of its training format by
reviewing the length of the training
sessions; whether training is delivered
via live instructors or via computerbased training programs; the frequency
of training sessions; and the need for
general and specific training sessions?
• Does the hospital seek feedback
after each session to identify
shortcomings in the training program,
and does it administer post-training
testing to ensure attendees understand
and retain the subject matter delivered?
• Has the hospital’s governing body
been provided with appropriate training
on fraud and abuse laws?
• Has the hospital documented who
has completed the required training?
• Has the hospital assessed whether
to impose sanctions for failing to attend
training or to offer appropriate
incentives for attending training?
5. Internal Monitoring and Auditing
Effective auditing and monitoring
plans will help hospitals avoid the
submission of incorrect claims to
Federal health care program payors.
Hospitals should develop detailed
annual audit plans designed to
minimize the risks associated with
improper claims and billing practices.
Some factors hospitals may wish to
consider include the following:
• Is the audit plan re-evaluated
annually, and does it address the proper
areas of concern, considering, for
example, findings from previous years’
audits, risk areas identified as part of
the annual risk assessment, and high
volume services?
• Does the audit plan include an
assessment of billing systems, in
addition to claims accuracy, in an effort
to identify the root cause of billing
errors?
• Is the role of the auditors clearly
established and are coding and audit
personnel independent and qualified,
with the requisite certifications?
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• Is the audit department available to
conduct unscheduled reviews and does
a mechanism exist that allows the
compliance department to request
additional audits or monitoring should
the need arise?
• Has the hospital evaluated the error
rates identified in the annual audits?
• If the error rates are not decreasing,
has the hospital conducted a further
investigation into other aspects of the
hospital compliance program in an
effort to determine hidden weaknesses
and deficiencies?
• Does the audit include a review of
all billing documentation, including
clinical documentation, in support of
the claim?
6. Response to Detected Deficiencies
By consistently responding to
detected deficiencies, hospitals can
develop effective corrective action plans
and prevent further losses to Federal
health care programs. Some factors a
hospital may wish to consider when
evaluating the manner in which it
responds to detected deficiencies
include the following:
• Has the hospital created a response
team, consisting of representatives from
the compliance, audit, and any other
relevant functional areas, which may be
able to evaluate any detected
deficiencies quickly?
• Are all matters thoroughly and
promptly investigated?
• Are corrective action plans
developed that take into account the
root causes of each potential violation?
• Are periodic reviews of problem
areas conducted to verify that the
corrective action that was implemented
successfully eliminated existing
deficiencies?
• When a detected deficiency results
in an identified overpayment to the
hospital, are overpayments promptly
reported and repaid to the FI?
• If a matter results in a probable
violation of law, does the hospital
promptly disclose the matter to the
appropriate law enforcement agency? 84
7. Enforcement of Disciplinary
Standards
By enforcing disciplinary standards,
hospitals help create an organizational
culture that emphasizes ethical
behavior. Hospitals may consider the
following factors when assessing the
effectiveness of internal disciplinary
efforts:
• Are disciplinary standards wellpublicized and readily available to all
hospital personnel?
84 For more information on when to self-report,
see section IV, below.
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• Are disciplinary standards enforced
consistently across the organization?
• Is each instance involving the
enforcement of disciplinary standards
thoroughly documented?
• Are employees, contractors and
medical and clinical staff members
checked routinely (e.g., at least
annually) against government sanctions
lists, including the OIG’s List of
Excluded Individuals/Entities (LEIE) 85
and the General Services
Administration’s Excluded Parties
Listing System.
In sum, while no single factor is
conclusive of an effective compliance
program, the preceding seven areas form
a useful starting point for developing
and maintaining an effective
compliance program.
IV. Self-Reporting
Where the compliance officer,
compliance committee, or a member of
senior management discovers credible
evidence of misconduct from any source
and, after a reasonable inquiry, believes
that the misconduct may violate
criminal, civil, or administrative law,
the hospital should promptly report the
existence of misconduct to the
appropriate Federal and State
authorities 86 within a reasonable
period, but not more than 60 days,87
after determining that there is credible
evidence of a violation.88 Prompt
85 See https://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/exclusions.html.
The OIG also makes available Monthly
Supplements for Standard LEIE, which can be
compared to existing hospital personnel lists.
86 Appropriate Federal and State authorities
include the OIG, CMS, the Criminal and Civil
Divisions of the Department of Justice, the U.S.
Attorney in relevant districts, the Food and Drug
Administration, the Department’s Office for Civil
Rights, the Federal Trade Commission, the Drug
Enforcement Administration, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, and the other investigative arms for
the agencies administering the affected Federal or
State health care programs, such as the State
Medicaid Fraud Control Unit, the Defense Criminal
Investigative Service, the Department of Veterans
Affairs, the Health Resources and Services
Administration, and the Office of Personnel
Management (which administers the Federal
Employee Health Benefits Program).
87 In contrast, to qualify for the ‘‘not less than
double damages’’ provision of the False Claims Act,
the provider must provide the report to the
government within 30 days after the date when the
provider first obtained the information. See 31
U.S.C. 3729(a).
88 Some violations may be so serious that they
warrant immediate notification to governmental
authorities prior to, or simultaneous with,
commencing an internal investigation. By way of
example, the OIG believes a provider should
immediately report misconduct that: (i) Is a clear
violation of administrative, civil, or criminal laws;
(ii) has a significant adverse effect on the quality of
care provided to Federal health care program
beneficiaries; or (iii) indicates evidence of a
systemic failure to comply with applicable laws or
an existing corporate integrity agreement, regardless
of the financial impact on Federal health care
programs.
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voluntary reporting will demonstrate
the hospital’s good faith and willingness
to work with governmental authorities
to correct and remedy the problem. In
addition, reporting such conduct will be
considered a mitigating factor by the
OIG in determining administrative
sanctions (e.g., penalties, assessments,
and exclusion), if the reporting hospital
becomes the subject of an OIG
investigation.89 To encourage providers
to make voluntary disclosures, the OIG
published the Provider Self-Disclosure
Protocol.90
When reporting to the government, a
hospital should provide all information
relevant to the alleged violation of
applicable Federal or State law(s)and
the potential financial or other impact of
the alleged violation. The compliance
officer, under advice of counsel and
with guidance from the governmental
authorities, could be requested to
continue to investigate the reported
violation. Once the investigation is
completed, and especially if the
investigation ultimately reveals that
criminal, civil, or administrative
violations have occurred, the
compliance officer should notify the
appropriate governmental authority of
the outcome of the investigation,
including a description of the impact of
the alleged violation on the applicable
Federal health care programs or their
beneficiaries.
V. Conclusion
In today’s environment of increased
scrutiny of corporate conduct and
increasingly large expenditures for
health care, it is imperative for hospitals
to establish and maintain effective
compliance programs. These programs
should foster a culture of compliance
that begins at the highest levels and
extends throughout the organization.
This supplemental CPG is intended as a
resource for hospitals to help them
operate effective compliance programs
that decrease errors, fraud, and abuse
and increase compliance with Federal
health care program requirements for
the benefit of the hospitals and public
alike.
[FR Doc. 05–1620 Filed 1–27–05; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4150–01–P
89 The OIG has published criteria setting forth
those factors that the OIG takes into consideration
in determining whether it is appropriate to exclude
an individual or entity from program participation
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1320a–7(b)(7) for violations
of various fraud and abuse laws. See 62 FR 67392
(December 24, 1997).
90 See 63 FR 58399 (October 30, 1998), available
on our Web page at https://oig.hhs.gov/authorities/
docs/selfdisclosure.pdf.
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Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 70, Number 19 (Monday, January 31, 2005)]
[Notices]
[Pages 4858-4876]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 05-1620]
[[Page 4858]]
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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
Office of Inspector General
OIG Supplemental Compliance Program Guidance for Hospitals
AGENCY: Office of Inspector General (OIG), HHS.
ACTION: Notice.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: This Federal Register notice sets forth the Supplemental
Compliance Program Guidance (CPG) for Hospitals developed by the Office
of Inspector General (OIG). Through this notice, the OIG is
supplementing its prior compliance program guidance for hospitals
issued in 1998. The supplemental CPG contains new compliance
recommendations and an expanded discussion of risk areas, taking into
account recent changes to hospital payment systems and regulations,
evolving industry practices, current enforcement priorities, and
lessons learned in the area of corporate compliance. The supplemental
CPG provides voluntary guidelines to assist hospitals and hospital
systems in identifying significant risk areas and in evaluating and, as
necessary, refining ongoing compliance efforts.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Darlene M. Hampton, Office of Counsel
to the Inspector General, (202) 619-0335.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
Several years ago, the OIG embarked on a major initiative to engage
the private health care community in preventing the submission of
erroneous claims and in combating fraud and abuse in the Federal health
care programs through voluntary compliance efforts. In the last several
years, the OIG has developed a series of compliance program guidances
(CPGs) directed at the following segments of the health care industry:
hospitals; clinical laboratories; home health agencies; third-party
billing companies; the durable medical equipment, prosthetics,
orthotics, and supply industry; hospices; Medicare+Choice
organizations; nursing facilities; physicians; ambulance suppliers; and
pharmaceutical manufacturers. CPGs are intended to encourage the
development and use of internal controls to monitor adherence to
applicable statutes, regulations, and program requirements. The
suggestions made in these CPGs are not mandatory, and the CPGs should
not be viewed as exhaustive discussions of beneficial compliance
practices or relevant risk areas. Copies of these CPGs can be found on
the OIG Web page at https://oig.hhs.gov.
Supplementing the Compliance Program Guidance for Hospitals
The OIG originally published a CPG for the hospital industry on
February 23, 1998. (See 63 FR 8987 (February 23, 1998), available on
our Web page at https://oig.hhs.gov/authorities/docs/cpghosp.pdf.) Since
that time, there have been significant changes in the way hospitals
deliver, and are reimbursed for, health care services. In response to
these developments, on June 18, 2002, the OIG published a notice in the
Federal Register, soliciting public suggestions for revising the
hospital CPG. (See 67 FR 41433 (June 18, 2002), available on our Web
page at https://oig.hhs.gov/authorities/docs/
cpghospitalsolicitationnotice.pdf.) After consideration of the public
comments and the issues raised, the OIG published a draft supplemental
compliance program guidance for hospitals in the Federal Register on
June 8, 2004, to ensure that all parties had a reasonable and
meaningful opportunity to provide input into the final product. (See 69
FR 32012 (June 8, 2004), available on our Web page at https://
oig.hhs.gov/authorities/docs/04/060804hospitaldraftsuppCPGFR.pdf.) The
OIG received comments from a variety of parties with interests in the
hospital industry and diverse points of view. These comments were
carefully considered during the development of this final supplemental
CPG. While some commenters preferred a replacement CPG, for efficiency
and to create a concise product of particular use to hospitals with
existing compliance programs, we have decided to supplement, rather
than replace, the 1998 guidance.
Many public commenters sought guidance on the application of
specific Medicare rules and regulations related to payment and
coverage, an area beyond the scope of this OIG guidance. Hospitals with
questions about the interpretation or application of payment and
coverage rules or regulations should contact their Fiscal
Intermediaries (FIs) or the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services,
as appropriate.
Supplemental Compliance Program Guidance for Hospitals
I. Introduction
Continuing its efforts to promote voluntary compliance programs for
the health care industry, the Office of Inspector General (OIG) of the
Department of Health and Human Services (the Department) publishes this
Supplemental Compliance Program Guidance (CPG) for Hospitals.\1\ This
document supplements, rather than replaces, the OIG's 1998 CPG for the
hospital industry (63 FR 8987; February 23, 1998), which addressed the
fundamentals of establishing an effective compliance program.\2\
Neither this supplemental CPG, nor the original 1998 CPG, is a model
compliance program. Rather, collectively the two documents offer a set
of guidelines that hospitals should consider when developing and
implementing a new compliance program or evaluating an existing one.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ For purposes of convenience in this guidance, we use the
term ``hospitals'' to refer to individual hospitals, multi-hospital
systems, health systems that own or operate hospitals, academic
medical centers, and any other organization that owns or operates
one or more hospitals. Where applicable, the term ``hospitals'' is
also intended to include, without limitation, hospital owners,
officers, managers, staff, agents, and sub-providers. This guidance
primarily focuses on hospitals reimbursed under the inpatient and
outpatient prospective payment systems. While other hospitals should
find this CPG useful, we recognize that they may be subject to
different laws, rules, and regulations and, accordingly, may have
different or additional risk areas and may need to adopt different
compliance strategies. We encourage all hospitals to establish and
maintain ongoing compliance programs.
\2\ The 1998 OIG Compliance Program Guidance for Hospitals is
available on our Web page at http: //oig.hhs.gov/authorities/docs/
cpghosp.pdf.
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We are mindful that many hospitals have already devoted substantial
time and resources to compliance efforts. We believe that those efforts
demonstrate the industry's good faith commitment to ensuring and
promoting integrity. For those hospitals with existing compliance
programs, this document may serve as a benchmark or comparison against
which to measure ongoing efforts and as a roadmap for updating or
refining their compliance plans.
In crafting this supplemental CPG, we considered, among other
things, the public comments received in response to the solicitation
notice published in the Federal Register \3\ and the draft supplemental
CPG,\4\ as well as relevant OIG and Centers for Medicare & Medicaid
Services (CMS) statutory and regulatory authorities (including the
Federal anti-kickback statute, together with the safe harbor
regulations and
[[Page 4859]]
preambles,\5\ and CMS transmittals and program memoranda); other OIG
guidance (such as OIG advisory opinions, special fraud alerts,
bulletins, and other guidance); experience gained from investigations
conducted by the OIG's Office of Investigations, the Department of
Justice (DoJ), and the State Medicaid Fraud Units; and relevant reports
issued by the OIG's Office of Audit Services and Office of Evaluation
and Inspections.\6\ We also consulted generally with CMS, the
Department's Office for Civil Rights, and DoJ.
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\3\ See 67 FR 41433 (June 18, 2002), ``Solicitation of
Information and Recommendations for Revising a Compliance Program
Guidance for the Hospital Industry,'' available on our Web page at
https://oig.hhs.gov/authorities/docs/
cpghospitalsolicitationnotice.pdf.
\4\ See 69 FR 32012 (June 8, 2004), ``OIG Draft Supplemental
Compliance Program Guidance for Hospitals,'' available on our Web
page at https://oig.hhs.gov/authorities/docs/04/
060804hospitaldraftsuppCPGFR.pdf.
\5\ See 42 U.S.C. 1320a-7b(b). See also 42 CFR 1001.952. The
safe harbor regulations and preambles are available on our Web page
at http: //oig.hhs.gov/fraud/safeharborregulations.html#1.
\6\ The OIG's materials are available on our Web page at https://
oig.hhs.gov.
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A. Benefits of a Compliance Program
A successful compliance program addresses the public and private
sectors' mutual goals of reducing fraud and abuse; enhancing health
care providers' operations; improving the quality of health care
services; and reducing the overall cost of health care services.
Attaining these goals benefits the hospital industry, the government,
and patients alike. Compliance programs help hospitals fulfill their
legal duty to refrain from submitting false or inaccurate claims or
cost information to the Federal health care programs \7\ or engaging in
other illegal practices. A hospital may gain important additional
benefits by voluntarily implementing a compliance program, including:
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\7\ The term ``Federal health care programs,'' as defined in 42
U.S.C. 1320a-7b(f), includes any plan or program that provides
health benefits, whether directly, through insurance, or otherwise,
which is funded directly, in whole or in part, by the United States
Government (other than the Federal Employees Health Benefit Plan
described at 5 U.S.C. 8901-8914) or any State health plan (e.g.,
Medicaid or a program receiving funds from block grants for social
services or child health services). In this document, the term
``Federal health care program requirements'' refers to the statutes,
regulations, and other rules governing Medicare, Medicaid, and all
other Federal health care programs.
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Demonstrating the hospital's commitment to honest and
responsible corporate conduct;
Increasing the likelihood of preventing, identifying, and
correcting unlawful and unethical behavior at an early stage;
Encouraging employees to report potential problems to
allow for appropriate internal inquiry and corrective action; and
Through early detection and reporting, minimizing any
financial loss to government and taxpayers, as well as any
corresponding financial loss to the hospital.
The OIG recognizes that implementation of a compliance program may
not entirely eliminate improper or unethical conduct from the
operations of health care providers. However, an effective compliance
program demonstrates a hospital's good faith effort to comply with
applicable statutes, regulations, and other Federal health care program
requirements, and may significantly reduce the risk of unlawful conduct
and corresponding sanctions.
B. Application of Compliance Program Guidance
Given the diversity of the hospital industry, there is no single
``best'' hospital compliance program. The OIG recognizes the
complexities of the hospital industry and the differences among
hospitals and hospital systems. Some hospital entities are small and
may have limited resources to devote to compliance measures; others are
affiliated with well-established, large, multi-facility organizations
with a widely dispersed work force and significant resources to devote
to compliance.
Accordingly, this supplemental CPG is not intended to be one-size-
fits-all guidance. Rather, the OIG strongly encourages hospitals to
identify and focus their compliance efforts on those areas of potential
concern or risk that are most relevant to their individual
organizations. Compliance measures adopted by a hospital to address
identified risk areas should be tailored to fit the unique environment
of the organization (including its structure, operations, resources,
and prior enforcement experience). In short, the OIG recommends that
each hospital adapt the objectives and principles underlying this
guidance to its own particular circumstances.
In section II below, titled ``Fraud and Abuse Risk Areas,'' we
present several fraud and abuse risk areas that are particularly
relevant to the hospital industry. Each hospital should carefully
examine these risk areas and identify those that potentially impact the
hospital. Next, in section III, ``Hospital Compliance Program
Effectiveness,'' we offer recommendations for assessing and improving
an existing compliance program to better address identified risk areas.
Finally, in section IV, ``Self-Reporting,'' we set forth the actions
hospitals should take if they discover credible evidence of misconduct.
II. Fraud and Abuse Risk Areas
This section is intended to help hospitals identify areas of their
operations that present a potential risk of liability under several key
Federal fraud and abuse statutes and regulations. This section focuses
on areas that are currently of concern to the enforcement community and
is not intended to address all potential risk areas for hospitals.
Importantly, the identification of a particular practice or activity in
this section is not intended to imply that the practice or activity is
necessarily illegal in all circumstances or that it may not have a
valid or lawful purpose underlying it.
This section addresses the following areas of significant concern
for hospitals: (A) Submission of accurate claims and information; (B)
the referral statutes; (C) payments to reduce or limit services; (D)
the Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA); (E) substandard
care; (F) relationships with Federal health care beneficiaries; (G)
HIPAA Privacy and Security Rules; and (H) billing Medicare or Medicaid
substantially in excess of usual charges. In addition, a final section
(I) addresses several areas of general interest that, while not
necessarily matters of significant risk, have been of continuing
interest to the hospital community. This guidance does not create any
new law or legal obligations, and the discussions in this guidance are
not intended to present detailed or comprehensive summaries of lawful
and unlawful activity. Nor is this guidance intended as a substitute
for consultation with CMS or a hospital's Fiscal Intermediary (FI) with
respect to the application and interpretation of Medicare payment and
coverage provisions, which are subject to change. Rather, this guidance
should be used as a starting point for a hospital's legal review of its
particular practices and for development or refinement of policies and
procedures to reduce or eliminate potential risk.
A. Submission of Accurate Claims and Information
Perhaps the single biggest risk area for hospitals is the
preparation and submission of claims or other requests for payment from
the Federal health care programs. It is axiomatic that all claims and
requests for reimbursement from the Federal health care programs--and
all documentation supporting such claims or requests--must be complete
and accurate and must reflect reasonable and necessary services ordered
by an appropriately licensed medical professional who is a
participating provider in the health care program from which the
individual or entity is seeking reimbursement. Hospitals must disclose
and return any overpayments that result from mistaken
[[Page 4860]]
or erroneous claims.\8\ Moreover, the knowing submission of a false,
fraudulent, or misleading statement or claim is actionable. A hospital
may be liable under the False Claims Act \9\ or other statutes imposing
sanctions for the submission of false claims or statements, including
liability for civil money penalties (CMPs) or exclusion.\10\ Underlying
assumptions used in connection with claims submission should be
reasoned, consistent, and appropriately documented, and hospitals
should retain all relevant records reflecting their efforts to comply
with Federal health care program requirements.
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\8\ See 42 U.S.C. 1320a-7b(a)(3).
\9\ The False Claims Act (31 U.S.C. 3729-33), among other
things, prohibits knowingly presenting or causing to be presented to
the Federal government a false or fraudulent claim for payment or
approval, knowingly making or using or causing to be made or used a
false record or statement to have a false or fraudulent claim paid
or approved by the government, and knowingly making or using or
causing to be made or used a false record or statement to conceal,
avoid, or decrease an obligation to pay or transmit money or
property to the government. The False Claims Act defines ``knowing''
and ``knowingly'' to mean that ``a person, with respect to the
information--(1) has actual knowledge of the information; (2) acts
in deliberate ignorance of the truth or falsity of the information;
or (3) acts in reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the
information, and no proof of specific intent to defraud is
required.'' 31 U.S.C. 3729(b).
\10\ In some circumstances, inaccurate or incomplete reporting
may lead to liability under the Federal anti-kickback statute. In
addition, hospitals should be mindful that many States have fraud
and abuse statutes--including false claims, anti-kickback, and other
statutes--that are not addressed in this guidance.
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Common and longstanding risks associated with claims preparation
and submission include inaccurate or incorrect coding, upcoding,
unbundling of services, billing for medically unnecessary services or
other services not covered by the relevant health care program, billing
for services not provided, duplicate billing, insufficient
documentation, and false or fraudulent cost reports. While hospitals
should continue to be vigilant with respect to these important risk
areas, we believe these risk areas are relatively well-understood in
the industry and, therefore, they are not generally addressed in this
section.\11\ Rather, the following discussion highlights evolving risks
or risks that appear to the OIG to be under-appreciated by the
industry. The risks are grouped under the following topics: Outpatient
procedure coding; admissions and discharges; supplemental payment
considerations; and use of information technology. By necessity, this
discussion is illustrative, not exhaustive, of risks associated with
the submission of claims or other information. In all cases, hospitals
should consult the applicable laws, rules, and regulations.
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\11\ To review the risk areas discussed in the original hospital
CPG, see 63 FR 8987, 8990 (February 23, 1998), available on our Web
page at http: // oig. hhs. gov/ authorities / docs / cpghosp. pdf.
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1. Outpatient Procedure Coding
The implementation of Medicare's Hospital Outpatient Prospective
Payment System (OPPS) \12\ increased the importance of accurate
procedure coding for hospital outpatient services. Previously, hospital
coding concerns mainly consisted of ensuring accurate ICD-9-CM
diagnosis and procedure coding for reimbursement under the inpatient
prospective payment system (PPS). Hospitals reported procedure codes
for outpatient services, but were reimbursed for outpatient services
based on their charges for services. With the OPPS, procedure codes
effectively became the basis for Medicare reimbursement. Under the
OPPS, each reported procedure code is assigned to a corresponding
Ambulatory Payment Classification (APC) code. Hospitals are then
reimbursed a predetermined amount for each APC, irrespective of the
specific level of resources used to furnish the individual service. In
implementing the OPPS, CMS developed new rules governing the use of
procedure code modifiers for outpatient coding.\13\ Because incorrect
procedure coding may lead to overpayments and subject a hospital to
liability for the submission of false claims, hospitals need to pay
close attention to coder training and qualifications.
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\12\ Congress enacted the OPPS in section 4523 of the Balanced
Budget Act of 1997. The OPPS became effective on August 1, 2001. CMS
promulgated regulations implementing the OPPS at 42 CFR part 419.
For more information regarding the OPPS, see https://www.cms.gov/
providers/hopps/.
\13\ The list of current modifiers is listed in the Current
Procedural Terminology (CPT) coding manual. However, hospitals
should pay particular attention to CMS transmittals and program
memoranda that may introduce new or altered application of modifiers
for claims submission and reimbursement purposes. See chapter 4,
section 20.6 of the Medicare Claims Processing Manual at http: //
www.cms.gov/manuals/104_claims/ clm104c04. pdf.
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Hospitals should also review their outpatient documentation
practices to ensure that claims are based on complete medical records
and that the medical records support the levels of service claimed.
Under the OPPS, hospitals must generally include on a single claim all
services provided to the same patient on the same day. Coding from
incomplete medical records may create problems in complying with this
claim submission requirement. Moreover, submitting claims for services
that are not supported by the medical record may also result in the
submission of improper claims.
In addition to the coding risk areas noted above and in the 1998
hospital CPG, other specific risk areas associated with incorrect
outpatient procedure coding include the following:
Billing on an outpatient basis for ``inpatient-only''
procedures--CMS has identified procedures for which reimbursement is
typically allowed only if the service is performed in an inpatient
setting.\14\
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\14\ The list of ``inpatient-only'' procedures appears in the
annual update to the OPPS rule. For the 2004 final rule, the
``inpatient-only'' list is found in Addendum E. See https://
www.cms.gov/regulations/hopps/2004f.
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Submitting claims for medically unnecessary services by
failing to follow the FI's local policies--Each FI publishes local
policies, including local medical review polices (LMRPs) and local
coverage determinations (LCDs), that identify certain procedures that
are only reimbursable when specific conditions are present.\15\ In
addition to relying on a physician's sound clinical judgment with
respect to the appropriateness of a proposed course of treatment,
hospitals should regularly review and become familiar with their
individual FI's LMRPs and LCDs. LMRPs and LCDs should be incorporated
into a hospital's regular coding and billing operations.\16\
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\15\ Effective December 7, 2003, FI's began issuing LCDs instead
of LMRPs, and FI's will convert all existing LMRPs into LCDs by
December 31, 2005.
\16\ A hospital may contact its FI to request a copy of the
pertinent LMRPs and LCDs, or visit CMS's Web page at https://
www.cms.gov/mcd to search existing local and national policies.
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Submitting duplicate claims or otherwise not following the
National Correct Coding Initiative guidelines--CMS developed the
National Correct Coding Initiative (NCCI) to promote correct coding
methodologies. The NCCI identifies certain codes that should not be
used together because they are either mutually exclusive or one is a
component of another. If a hospital uses code pairs that are listed in
the NCCI and those codes are not detected by the editing routines in
the hospital's billing system, the hospital may submit duplicate or
unbundled claims. Intentional manipulation of code assignments to
maximize payments and avoid NCCI edits constitutes fraud. Unintentional
misapplication of NCCI coding and billing guidelines may also give rise
to overpayments or civil liability for hospitals that have developed a
pattern of inappropriate billing. To minimize risk, hospitals
[[Page 4861]]
should ensure that their coding software includes up-to-date NCCI edit
files.\17\
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\17\ More information regarding the NCCI can be obtained from
CMS's Web page at https://www.cms.gov/medlearn/ncci.asp.
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Submitting incorrect claims for ancillary services because
of outdated Charge Description Masters--Charge Description Masters
(CDMs) list all of a hospital's charges for items and services and
include the underlying procedure codes necessary to bill for those
items and services. Outdated CDMs create significant compliance risk
for hospitals. Because the Healthcare Common Procedure Coding System
(HCPCS) codes and APCs are updated regularly, hospitals should pay
particular attention to the task of updating the CDM to ensure the
assignment of correct codes to outpatient claims. This should include
timely updates, proper use of modifiers, and correct associations
between procedure codes and revenue codes.\18\
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\18\ For information relating to HCPCS code updates, see https://
www.cms.gov/medicare/hcpcs/. For information relating to annual APC
updates, see https://www.cms.gov/providers/hopps/.
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Circumventing the multiple procedure discounting rules--A
surgical procedure performed in connection with another surgical
procedure may be discounted. However, certain surgical procedures are
designated as non-discounted, even when performed with another surgical
procedure. Hospitals should ensure that the procedure codes selected
represent the actual services provided, irrespective of the discounting
status. They should also review the annual OPPS rule update to
understand more fully CMS's multiple procedure discounting rule.\19\
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\19\ See http: // www.cms.gov/medlearn/ refopps. asp.
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Improper evaluation and management code selection--
Hospitals should use proper codes to describe the evaluation and
management (E/M) services they provide. A hospital's E/M coding
guidelines should ensure that services are medically necessary and
sufficiently documented and that the codes accurately reflect the
intensity of hospital resources required to deliver the services.
Improperly billing for observation services--In certain
circumstances, Medicare provides a separate APC payment for observation
services for patients with diagnoses of chest pain, asthma, or
congestive heart failure. Claims for these observation services must
correctly reflect the diagnosis and meet certain other requirements.
Seeking a separate payment for observation services in situations that
do not satisfy the requirements is inappropriate and may result in
hospital liability. Hospitals should become familiar with CMS's
detailed policies for the submission of claims for observation
services.\20\
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\20\ See CMS Program Transmittal A-02-026, available on CMS's
Web page at https://www.ems.gov/manuals/pm_trans/A02026.pdf.
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2. Admissions and Discharges
Often, the status of patients at the time of admission or discharge
significantly influences the amount and method of reimbursement
hospitals receive. Therefore, hospitals have a duty to ensure that
admission and discharge policies are updated and reflect current CMS
rules. Risk areas with respect to the admission and discharge processes
include the following:
Failure to follow the ``same-day rule''--The OPPS rules
require hospitals to include on the same claim all OPPS services
provided at the same hospital, to the same patient, on the same day,
unless certain conditions are met. Hospitals should review internal
billing systems and procedures to ensure that they are not submitting
multiple claims for OPPS services delivered to the same patient on the
same day.\21\
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\21\ See, e.g., chapter 1, section 50.2 of the Medicare Claims
Processing Manual, available on CMS's Web page at https://
www.cms.gov/manuals/104_claims/clm104c01.pdf.
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Abuse of partial hospitalization payments--Under the OPPS,
Medicare provides a per diem payment for specific hospital services
rendered to behavioral and mental health patients on a partial
hospitalization basis. Examples of improper billing under the partial
hospitalization program include, without limitation: reducing the range
of services offered; withholding services that are medically
appropriate; billing for services not covered; and billing for services
without a certificate of medical necessity.\22\
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\22\ See chapter 4, section 260 of the Medicare Claims
Processing Manual, available on CMS's Web page at https://
www.cms.gov/manuals/104_claims/clm104c04.pdf.
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Same-day discharges and readmissions--Same-day discharges
and readmissions may indicate premature discharges, medically
unnecessary readmissions, or incorrect discharge coding. Hospitals
should have procedures in place to review discharges and admissions
carefully to ensure that they reflect prudent clinical decision-making
and are properly coded.\23\
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\23\ See, e.g., OIG Audit Report A-03-01-00011, ``Review of
Medicare Same-Day, Same-Provider Acute Care Readmissions in
Pennsylvania During Calendar year 1998,'' August 2002, available on
our Web page at https://oig.hhs.gov/oas/reports/region 3/
30100011.pdf.
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Violation of Medicare's post-acute care transfer policy--
The post-acute care transfer policy provides that, for certain
designated Diagnosis Related Groups (DRGs), a hospital will receive a
per diem transfer payment, rather than the full DRG payment, if the
patient is discharged to certain post-acute care settings.\24\ CMS may
periodically revise the list of designated DRGs that are subject to its
post-acute care transfer policy.\25\ To avoid improperly billing for
discharges, hospitals should pay particular attention to CMS's post-
acute care transfer policy and keep an accurate list of all designated
DRGs subject to that policy.
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\24\ See 42 CFR 412.4(c). See, e.g., OIG Audit Report A-04-00-
01220 ``Implementation of Medicare's Postacute Care Transfer
Policy,'' October 2001, available on our Web page at https://
oig.hhs.gov/oas/reports/region4/40001220.pdf.
\25\ The initial 10 designated DRGs were selected by the
Secretary, pursuant to section 1886(d)(5)(J) of the Social Security
Act (42 U.S.C. 1395ww(d)(5)(J)). With the 2004 fiscal year PPS rule,
CMS revised the list of DRGs paid under CMS's post-acute care
transfer policy, bringing the total number of designated DRGs to 29.
See 68 FR 45346 (August 1, 2003). Then, with the 2005 fiscal year
PPS rule, CMS revised the list again, bringing the current total
number of designated DRGs to 30. See 69 FR 48916 (August 11, 2004).
See also chapter 3, section 402.4 of the Medicare Claims Processing
Manual, available on CMS's Web page at https://www.cms.gov/manuals/
104_claims/clm104c03.pdf.
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Improper churning of patients by long-term care hospitals
co-located in acute care hospitals--Long term care hospitals that are
co-located within acute care hospitals may qualify for PPS-exempt
status if certain regulatory requirements are satisfied.\26\ Hospitals
should not engage in the practice of churning, or inappropriately
transferring, patients between the host hospital and the hospital-
within-a-hospital.
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\26\ See 42 CFR 412.22(e).
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3. Supplemental Payment Considerations
Under the Medicare program, in certain limited situations,
hospitals may claim payments in addition to, or in some cases in lieu
of, the normal reimbursement available to hospitals under the regular
payment systems. Eligibility for these payments depends on compliance
with specific criteria. Hospitals that claim supplemental payments
improperly are liable for fines and penalties under Federal law.
Examples of specific risks that hospitals should address include the
following:
Improper reporting of the costs of ``pass-through''
items--``Pass-through'' items are certain items of new technology and
drugs for which Medicare will reimburse the hospital
[[Page 4862]]
based on costs during a limited transitional period.\27\
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\27\ For more information regarding CMS's APC ``pass-through''
payments, See https://www.cms.gov/providers/hopps/apc.asp.
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Abuse of DRG outlier payments--Recent investigations
revealed substantial abuse of outlier payments by hospitals with
Medicare patients. Hospital management, compliance staff, and counsel
should familiarize themselves with CMS's new outlier rules and
requirements intended to curb abuses.\28\
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\28\ See 42 CFR 412.84; 68 FR 34493 (June 9, 2003).
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Improper claims for incorrectly designated ``provider-
based'' entities--Certain hospital-affiliated entities and clinics can
be designated as ``provider-based,'' which allows for a higher level of
reimbursement for certain services.\29\ Hospitals should take steps to
ensure that facilities or organizations are only designated as
provider-based if they satisfy the criteria set forth in the
regulations.
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\29\ The criteria for determining whether a facility or
organization is provider-based can be found at 42 CFR 413.65. In
April 2003, CMS published Transmittal A-03-030, outlining changes to
the criteria for provider-based designation. See https://www.cms.gov/
manuals/pm_trans/A03030.pdf.
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Improper claims for clinical trials--Since September 2000,
Medicare has covered items and services furnished during certain
clinical trials, as long as those items and services would typically be
covered for Medicare beneficiaries, but for the fact that they are
provided in an experimental or clinical trial setting. Hospitals that
participate in clinical trials should review the requirements for
submitting claims for patients participating in clinical trials.\30\
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\30\ To view Medicare's National Coverage Decision regarding
clinical trials, see https://www.cms.gov/coverage/8d2.asp. Specific
requirements for submitting claims for reimbursement for clinical
trials can be accessed on CMS's Web page at https://www.cms.gov/
coverage/8d4.asp.
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Improper claims for organ acquisition costs--Hospitals
that are approved transplantation centers may receive reimbursement on
a reasonable cost basis to cover the costs of acquisition of certain
organs.\31\ Organ acquisition costs are only reimbursable if a hospital
satisfies several requirements, such as having adequate cost
information, supporting documentation, and supporting medical
records.\32\ Hospitals must also ensure that expenses not related to
organ acquisition, such as transplant and post-transplant activities
and costs from other cost centers, are not included in the hospital's
organ acquisition costs.\33\
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\31\ See 42 CFR 412.2(e)(4), 42 CFR 412.113(d), and 42 CFR
413.203. See generally 42 CFR part 413 (setting forth the principles
of reasonable cost reimbursement).
\32\ See Medicare's Provider Reimbursement Manual (PRM), Part I,
section 2304 and Part II, section 3610, available on CMS's Web page
at https://www.cms.gov/manuals/cmsfoc.asp.
\33\ See 42 CFR 412.100. See also, chapter 3, section 90 of the
Medicare Claims Processing Manual, available on CMS's Web page at
http: // www.cms.gov/manuals/104_claims/ clm104c03.
pdf.See, e.g., OIG Audit Report A-04-02-02017, ``Audit of Medicare
Costs for Organ Acquisitions at Tampa General Hospital,'' April
2003, available on our Web page at https://oig.hhs.gov/oas/reports/
region4/40202017.pdf.
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Improper claims for cardiac rehabilitation services--
Medicare covers reasonable and necessary cardiac rehabilitation
services under the hospital ``incident-to'' benefit, which requires
that the services of nonphysician personnel be furnished under a
physician's direct supervision. In addition to satisfying the
supervision requirement, hospitals must ensure that cardiac
rehabilitation services are reasonable and necessary.\34\
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\34\ See section 35-25 of the Medicare Coverage Issues Manual.
See, e.g., OIG Audit Report A-01-03-00516, ``Review of Outpatient
Cardiac Rehabilitation Services at the Cooley Dickinson Hospital,''
December 2003, available on our Web page at https://oig.hhs.gov/
oas/ reports/region 1/10300516.pdf.
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Failure to follow Medicare rules regarding payment for
costs related to educational activities\35\--Hospitals should pay
particular attention to these rules when implementing dental or other
education programs, particularly those not historically operated at the
hospital.
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\35\ Payments for direct graduage medical education (GME) and
indirect graduate medical education (IME) costs are, in part, based
upon the number of full-time equivalent (FTE) residents at each
hospital and the proportion of time residents spend in training.
Hospitals that inappropriately calculate the number of FTE residents
risk receiving inappropriate medical education payments. Hospitals
should have in place procedures regarding: (i) Resident rotation
monitoring; (ii) resident credentialing; (iii) written agreements
with non-hospital providers; and (iv) the approval process for
research activities. For more information regarding medical
education reimbursement, see 42 CFR 413.75 et. seq. (GME
requirements) and 42 CFR 412.105 (IME requirements). See, e.g., OIG
Audit Report A-01-01-00547 ``Review of Graduate Medical Education
Costs Claimed by the Hartford Hospital for Fiscal Year Ending
September 30, 1999,'' October 2003, available on our Web page at
https://oig.hhs.gov/oas/reports/region 1/10100547.pdf.
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4. Use of Information Technology
The implementation of the OPPS increased the need for hospitals to
pay particular attention to their computerized billing, coding, and
information systems. Billing and coding under the OPPS is more data
intensive than billing and coding under the inpatient PPS. When the
OPPS began, many hospitals' existing systems were unable to accommodate
the new requirements and required adjustments.
As the health care industry moves forward, hospitals will
increasingly rely on information technology. For example, HIPAA Privacy
and Security Rules (discussed below in section II.G), electronic claims
submission,\36\ electronic prescribing, networked information sharing
among providers, and systems for the tracking and reduction of medical
errors, among others, will require hospitals to depend more on
information technologies. Information technology presents new
opportunities to advance health care efficiency, but also new
challenges to ensuring the accuracy of claims and the information used
to generate claims. It may be difficult for purchasers of computer
systems and software to know exactly how the system operates and
generates information. Prudent hospitals will take steps to ensure that
they thoroughly assess all new computer systems and software that
impact coding, billing, or the generation or transmission of
information related to the Federal health care programs or their
beneficiaries.
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\36\ For more information regarding Medicare's Electronic Data
Interchange programs, see https://www.cms.gov/providers/edi/.
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B. The Referral Statutes: The Physician Self-Referral Law (the
``Stark'' Law) and the Federal Anti-Kickback Statute
1. The Physician Self-Referral Law
From a hospital compliance perspective, the physician self-referral
law (section 1877 of the Social Security Act (Act), commonly known as
the ``Stark'' law) should be viewed as a threshold statute. The statute
prohibits hospitals from submitting--and Medicare from paying--any
claim for a ``designated health service'' (DHS) if the referral of the
DHS comes from a physician with whom the hospital has a prohibited
financial relationship.\37\ This is true even if the prohibited
financial relationship is the result of inadvertence or error. In
addition, hospitals and physicians that knowingly violate the statute
may be subject to CMPs and exclusion from the Federal health care
programs. Furthermore, under certain circumstances, a knowing violation
of the Stark law may also give rise to liability under the False Claims
Act. Because all inpatient and outpatient hospital services furnished
to Medicare or Medicaid patients
[[Page 4863]]
(including services furnished directly by a hospital or by others
``under arrangements'' with a hospital) are DHS under the statute,\38\
hospitals must diligently review all financial relationships with
referring physicians for compliance with the Stark law. Simply put,
hospitals face significant financial exposure unless their financial
relationships with referring physicians fit squarely in statutory or
regulatory exceptions to the Stark law.
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\37\ The statute also prohibits physicians from referring DHS to
entities, including hospitals, with which they have prohibited
financial relationships. However, the billing prohibition and
nonpayment sanction apply only to the DHS entity (e.g., the
hospital). See section 1877(a) of the Act. Section 1903(s) of the
Act extends the statutory prohibition to Medicaid-covered services.
\38\ The statute lists ten additional categories of DHS,
including, among others, clinical laboratory services, radiology
services, and durable medical equipment. See section 1877(h)(6) of
the Act. Hospitals and health systems that own or operate free-
standing DHS entities should be mindful of the ten additional DHS
categories. CMS has clarified that lithotripsy services furnished to
hospital inpatients are not DHS. See 69 FR 16054, 16106 (March 26,
2004).
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For purposes of analyzing a financial relationship under the Stark
law, the following three-part inquiry is useful:
Is there a referral from a physician for a designated
health service? If not, then there is no Stark law issue (although
other fraud and abuse authorities, such as the anti-kickback statute,
may be implicated). If the answer is ``yes,'' the next inquiry is:
Does the physician (or an immediate family member) have a
financial relationship with the entity furnishing the DHS (e.g., the
hospital)? Again, if the answer is no, the Stark law is not implicated.
However, if the answer is ``yes,'' the third inquiry is:
Does the financial relationship fit in an exception? If
not, the statute has been violated.
Detailed definitions of the highlighted terms are set forth in
regulations at 42 CFR 411.351 through 411.361 (substantial additional
explanatory material appears in the regulatory preambles to the final
regulations: 66 FR 856 (January 4, 2001); 69 FR 16054 (March 26, 2004);
and 69 FR 17933 (April 6, 2004)). Importantly, a financial relationship
can be almost any kind of direct or indirect ownership or investment
relationship (e.g., stock ownership, a partnership interest, or secured
debt) or direct or indirect compensation arrangement, whether in cash
or in-kind (e.g., a rental contract, personal services contract,
salary, gift, or gratuity), between a referring physician (or immediate
family member) and a hospital. Moreover, the financial relationship
need not relate to the provision of DHS (e.g., a joint venture between
a hospital and a physician to operate a hospice would create an
indirect compensation relationship between the hospital and the
physician for Stark law purposes).
The statutory and regulatory exceptions are the key to compliance
with the Stark law. Any financial relationship between the hospital and
a physician who refers to the hospital must fit in an exception.
Exceptions exist in the statute and regulations for many common types
of business arrangements. To fit in an exception, an arrangement must
squarely meet all of the conditions set forth in the exception.
Importantly, it is the actual relationship between the parties, and not
merely the paperwork, that must fit in an exception. Unlike the anti-
kickback safe harbors, which are voluntary, fitting in an exception is
mandatory under the Stark law.
Compliance with a Stark law exception does not immunize an
arrangement under the anti-kickback statute. Rather, the Stark law sets
a minimum standard for arrangements between physicians and hospitals.
Even if a hospital-physician relationship qualifies for a Stark law
exception, it should still be reviewed for compliance with the anti-
kickback statute. The anti-kickback statute is discussed in greater
detail in the next subsection.
Because of the significant exposure for hospitals under the Stark
law, we recommend that hospitals implement systems to ensure that all
conditions in the exceptions upon which they rely are fully satisfied.
For example, many of the exceptions, such as the rental and personal
services exceptions, require signed, written agreements with
physicians. We are aware of numerous instances in which hospitals
failed to maintain these signed written agreements, often inadvertently
(e.g., a holdover lease without a written lease amendment; a physician
hired as an independent contractor for a short-term project without a
signed agreement). To avoid a large overpayment, hospitals should
ensure frequent and thorough review of their contracting and leasing
processes. The final regulations contain a new limited exception for
certain inadvertent, temporary instances of noncompliance with another
exception. This exception may only be used on an occasional basis.
Hospitals should be mindful that this exception is not a substitute for
vigilant contracting and leasing oversight. In addition, hospitals
should review the new reporting requirements at 42 CFR 411.361, which
generally require hospitals to retain records that the hospitals know
or should know about in the course of prudently conducting business.
Hospitals should ensure that they have policies and procedures in place
to address these reporting requirements.
In addition, because many exceptions to the Stark law require fair
market value compensation for items or services actually needed and
rendered, hospitals should have appropriate processes for making and
documenting reasonable, consistent, and objective determinations of
fair market value and for ensuring that needed items and services are
furnished or rendered. Other areas that may require careful monitoring
include, without limitation, the total value of nonmonetary
compensation provided annually to each referring physician, the value
of medical staff incidental benefits, and the provision of professional
courtesy.\39\ As discussed further in the anti-kickback section below,
hospitals should exercise care when recruiting physicians. Importantly,
while the final regulations contain a limited exception for certain
joint recruiting by hospitals and existing group practices, the
exception strictly forbids the use of income guarantees that shift
group practice overhead or expenses to the hospital or any payment
structure that otherwise transfers remuneration to the group practice.
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\39\ Hospitals affiliated with academic medical centers should
be aware that the regulations contain a special exception for
certain academic medical center arrangements. See 42 CFR 411.355(e).
Specialty hospitals should be mindful of certain limitations on new
physician-owned specialty hospitals contained in section 507 of the
Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement and Modernization Act of
2003. See CMS's One-Time Notification regarding the 18-month
moratorium on physician investment in specialty hospitals, CMS
Manual System Pub. 100-20 One-Time Notification, Transmittal 26
(March 19, 2004), available on CMS's Web page at https://www.cms.gov/
manuals/pm_trans/R62OTN.pdf.
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Further information about the Stark law and applicable regulations
can be found on CMS's Web page at https://cms.gov/medlearn/refphys.asp.
Information regarding CMS's Stark advisory opinion process can be found
at https://cms.gov/physicians/aop/default.asp.
2. The Federal Anti-Kickback Statute
Hospitals should also be aware of the Federal anti-kickback
statute, section 1128B(b) of the Act, and the constraints it places on
business arrangements related directly or indirectly to items or
services reimbursable by any Federal health care program, including,
but not limited to, Medicare and Medicaid. The anti-kickback statute
prohibits in the health care industry some practices that are common in
other business sectors, such as offering gifts to reward past or
potential new referrals.
The anti-kickback statute is a criminal prohibition against
payments (in any form, whether the payments are direct
[[Page 4864]]
or indirect) made purposefully to induce or reward the referral or
generation of Federal health care program business. The anti-kickback
statute addresses not only the offer or payment of anything of value
for patient referrals, but also the offer or payment of anything of
value in return for purchasing, leasing, ordering, or arranging for or
recommending the purchase, lease, or ordering of any item or service
reimbursable in whole or in part by a Federal health care program. The
statute extends equally to the solicitation or acceptance of
remuneration for referrals or the generation of other business payable
by a Federal health care program. Liability under the anti-kickback
statute is determined separately for each party involved. In addition
to criminal penalties, violators may be subject to CMPs and exclusion
from the Federal health care programs. Hospitals should also be mindful
that compliance with the anti-kickback statute is a condition of
payment under Medicare and other Federal health care programs. See,
e.g., Medicare Federal Health Care Provider/Supplier Application, CMS
Form 855A, Certification Statement at section 15, paragraph A.3,
available on CMS's Web page at http: // www.cms.gov/providers/
enrollment/ forms /. As such, liability may arise under the False
Claims Act where the anti-kickback statute violation results in the
submission of a claim for payment under a Federal health care program.
Although liability under the anti-kickback statute ultimately turns
on a party's intent, it is possible to identify arrangements or
practices that may present a significant potential for abuse. For
purposes of analyzing an arrangement or practice under the anti-
kickback statute, the following two inquiries are useful:
Does the hospital have any remunerative relationship
between itself (or its affiliates or representatives) and persons or
entities in a position to generate Federal health care program business
for the hospital (or its affiliates) directly or indirectly? Persons or
entities in a position to generate Federal health care program business
for a hospital include, for example, physicians and other health care
professionals, ambulance companies, clinics, hospices, home health
agencies, nursing facilities, and other hospitals.
With respect to any remunerative relationship so
identified, could one purpose of the remuneration be to induce or
reward the referral or recommendation of business payable in whole or
in part by a Federal health care program? Importantly, under the anti-
kickback statute, neither a legitimate business purpose for the
arrangement, nor a fair market value payment, will legitimize a payment
if there is also an illegal purpose (i.e., inducing Federal health care
program business).
Although any arrangement satisfying both tests implicates the anti-
kickback statute and requires careful scrutiny by a hospital, the
courts have identified several potentially aggravating considerations
that can be useful in identifying arrangements at greatest risk of
prosecution. In particular, hospitals should ask the following
questions, among others, about any potentially problematic arrangements
or practices they identify:
Does the arrangement or practice have a potential to
interfere with, or skew, clinical decision-making?
Does the arrangement or practice have a potential to
increase costs to Federal health care programs, beneficiaries, or
enrollees?
Does the arrangement or practice have a potential to
increase the risk of overutilization or inappropriate utilization?
Does the arrangement or practice raise patient safety or
quality of care concerns?
Hospitals that have identified potentially problematic arrangements
or practices can take a number of steps to reduce or eliminate the risk
of an anti-kickback violation. Detailed guidance relating to a number
of specific practices is available from several sources. Most
importantly, the anti-kickback statute and the corresponding
regulations establish a number of ``safe harbors'' for common business
arrangements. The following safe harbors are of most relevance to
hospitals:
Investment interests safe harbor (42 CFR 1001.952(a)),
Space rental safe harbor (42 CFR 1001.952(b)),
Equipment rental safe harbor (42 CFR 1001.952(c)),
Personal services and management contracts safe harbor (42
CFR 1001.952(d)),
Sale of practice safe harbor (42 CFR 1001.952(e)),
Referral services safe harbor (42 CFR 1001.952(f)),
Discount safe harbor (42 CFR 1001.952(h)),
Employee safe harbor (42 CFR 1001.952(i)),
Group purchasing organizations safe harbor (42 CFR
1001.952(j)),
Waiver of beneficiary coinsurance and deductible amounts
safe harbor (42 CFR 1001.952(k)),
Practitioner recruitment safe harbor (42 CFR 1001.952(n)),
Obstetrical malpractice insurance subsidies safe harbor
(42 CFR 1001.952(o)),
Cooperative hospital service organizations safe harbor (42
CFR 1001.952(q)),
Ambulatory surgical centers safe harbor (42 CFR
1001.952(r)),
Ambulance replenishing safe harbor (42 CFR 1001.952(v)),
and
Safe harbors for certain managed care and risk sharing
arrangements (42 CFR 1001.952(m), (t), and (u)).\40\
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\40\ Importantly, the anti-kickback statute safe harbors are not
the same as the Stark law exceptions described above at section
II.B.1 of this guidance. An arrangement's compliance with the anti-
kickback statute and the Stark law must be evaluated separately.
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Safe harbor protection requires strict compliance with all
applicable conditions set out in the relevant safe harbor.\41\ Although
compliance with a safe harbor is voluntary and failure to comply with a
safe harbor does not mean an arrangement is illegal per se, we
recommend that hospitals structure arrangements to fit in a safe harbor
whenever possible. Arrangements that do not fit in a safe harbor must
be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.
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\41\ Parties to an arrangement cannot obtain safe harbor
protection by entering into a sham contract that complies with the
written agreement requirement of a safe harbor and appears, on
paper, to meet all of the other safe harbor requirements, but does
not reflect the actual arrangement between the parties. In other
words, in assessing compliance with a safe harbor, the OIG examines
not only whether the written contract satisfies all of the safe
harbor requirements, but also whether the actual arrangement
satisfies the requirements.
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Other available guidance includes special fraud alerts and advisory
bulletins issued by the OIG identifying and discussing particular
practices or issues of concern and OIG advisory opinions issued to
specific parties about their particular business arrangements.\42\ A
hospital concerned about an existing or proposed arrangement may
request a binding OIG advisory opinion regarding whether the
arrangement violates the Federal anti-kickback statute or other OIG
fraud and abuse authorities, using the procedures set out at 42 CFR
part 1008. The safe harbor regulations (and accompanying Federal
Register preambles), fraud alerts and bulletins, advisory opinions (and
instructions for obtaining them, including a list of frequently asked
questions), and other guidance are
[[Page 4865]]
available on the OIG Web page at https://oig.hhs.gov.
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\42\ While informative for guidance purposes, an OIG advisory
opinion is binding only with respect to the particular party or
parties that requested the opinion. The analyses and conclusions set
forth in OIG advisory opinions are very fact-specific. Accordingly,
hospitals should be aware that different facts may lead to different
results.
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The following discussion highlights several known areas of
potential risk under the anti-kickback statute. The propriety of any
particular arrangement can only be determined after a detailed
examination of the attendant facts and circumstances. The
identification of a given practice or activity as ``suspect'' or as an
area of ``risk'' does not mean it is necessarily illegal or unlawful,
or that it cannot be properly structured to fit in a safe harbor; nor
does it mean that the practice or activity is not beneficial from a
clinical, cost, or other perspective. Rather, the areas identified
below are areas of activity that have a potential for abuse and that
should receive close scrutiny from hospitals. The discussion highlights
potential risks under the anti-kickback statute arising from hospitals'
relationships in the following seven categories: (a) Joint ventures;
(b) compensation arrangements with physicians; (c) relationships with
other health care entities; (d) recruitment arrangements; (e)
discounts; (f) medical staff credentialing; and (g) malpractice
insurance subsidies. (In addition, the kickback risks associated with
gainsharing arrangements are discussed below in section II.C of this
guidance.)
Physicians are the primary referral source for hospitals, and,
therefore, most of the discussion below focuses on hospitals'
relationships with physicians. Notwithstanding, hospitals also receive
referrals from other health care professionals, including physician
assistants and nurse practitioners, and from other providers and
suppliers (such as ambulance companies, clinics, hospices, home health
agencies, nursing facilities, and other hospitals). Therefore, in
addition to reviewing their relationships with physicians, hospitals
should also review their relationships with nonphysician referral
sources to ensure that the relat