Biweekly Notice; Applications and Amendments to Facility Operating Licenses Involving No Significant Hazards Considerations, 2886-2907 [05-779]
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the Donald C. Cook Plant, Units 1 and
2. The Subcommittee will hear
presentations by and hold discussions
with representatives of the NRC staff,
Indiana Michigan Power Company, and
other interested persons regarding this
matter. The Subcommittee will gather
information, analyze relevant issues and
facts, and formulate proposed positions
and actions, as appropriate, for
deliberation by the full Committee.
Members of the public desiring to
provide oral statements and/or written
comments should notify the Designated
Federal Official, Mr. Cayetano Santos
(telephone 301/415–7270) five days
prior to the meeting, if possible, so that
appropriate arrangements can be made.
Electronic recordings will be permitted.
Further information regarding this
meeting can be obtained by contacting
the Designated Federal Official between
7:30 a.m. and 4:15 p.m. (ET). Persons
planning to attend this meeting are
urged to contact the above named
individual at least two working days
prior to the meeting to be advised of any
potential changes to the agenda.
Dated: January 10, 2005.
John H. Flack,
Acting Branch Chief, ACRS/ACNW.
[FR Doc. 05–891 Filed 1–14–05; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590–01–P
NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION
Biweekly Notice; Applications and
Amendments to Facility Operating
Licenses Involving No Significant
Hazards Considerations
I. Background
Pursuant to section 189a.(2) of the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended
(the Act), the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (the Commission or NRC
staff) is publishing this regular biweekly
notice. The Act requires the
Commission publish notice of any
amendments issued, or proposed to be
issued and grants the Commission the
authority to issue and make
immediately effective any amendment
to an operating license upon a
determination by the Commission that
such amendment involves no significant
hazards consideration, notwithstanding
the pendency before the Commission of
a request for a hearing from any person.
This biweekly notice includes all
notices of amendments issued, or
proposed to be issued from December
23, 2004, through January 5, 2005. The
last biweekly notice was published on
January 4, 2005 (70 FR 398).
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Notice of Consideration of Issuance of
Amendments to Facility Operating
Licenses, Proposed No Significant
Hazards Consideration Determination,
and Opportunity for a Hearing
The Commission has made a
proposed determination that the
following amendment requests involve
no significant hazards consideration.
Under the Commission’s regulations in
10 CFR 50.92, this means that operation
of the facility in accordance with the
proposed amendment would not (1)
involve a significant increase in the
probability or consequences of an
accident previously evaluated; or (2)
create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any
accident previously evaluated; or (3)
involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety. The basis for this
proposed determination for each
amendment request is shown below.
The Commission is seeking public
comments on this proposed
determination. Any comments received
within 30 days after the date of
publication of this notice will be
considered in making any final
determination. Within 60 days after the
date of publication of this notice, the
licensee may file a request for a hearing
with respect to issuance of the
amendment to the subject facility
operating license and any person whose
interest may be affected by this
proceeding and who wishes to
participate as a party in the proceeding
must file a written request for a hearing
and a petition for leave to intervene.
Normally, the Commission will not
issue the amendment until the
expiration of 60 days after the date of
publication of this notice. The
Commission may issue the license
amendment before expiration of the 60day period provided that its final
determination is that the amendment
involves no significant hazards
consideration. In addition, the
Commission may issue the amendment
prior to the expiration of the 30-day
comment period should circumstances
change during the 30-day comment
period such that failure to act in a
timely way would result, for example in
derating or shutdown of the facility.
Should the Commission take action
prior to the expiration of either the
comment period or the notice period, it
will publish in the Federal Register a
notice of issuance. Should the
Commission make a final No Significant
Hazards Consideration Determination,
any hearing will take place after
issuance. The Commission expects that
the need to take this action will occur
very infrequently.
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Written comments may be submitted
by mail to the Chief, Rules and
Directives Branch, Division of
Administrative Services, Office of
Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Washington, DC 20555–
0001, and should cite the publication
date and page number of this Federal
Register notice. Written comments may
also be delivered to Room 6D22, Two
White Flint North, 11545 Rockville
Pike, Rockville, Maryland, from 7:30
a.m. to 4:15 p.m. Federal workdays.
Copies of written comments received
may be examined at the Commission’s
Public Document Room (PDR), located
at One White Flint North, Public File
Area O1F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first
floor), Rockville, Maryland. The filing of
requests for a hearing and petitions for
leave to intervene is discussed below.
Within 60 days after the date of
publication of this notice, the licensee
may file a request for a hearing with
respect to issuance of the amendment to
the subject facility operating license and
any person whose interest may be
affected by this proceeding and who
wishes to participate as a party in the
proceeding must file a written request
for a hearing and a petition for leave to
intervene. Requests for a hearing and a
petition for leave to intervene shall be
filed in accordance with the
Commission’s ‘‘Rules of Practice for
Domestic Licensing Proceedings’’ in 10
CFR part 2. Interested persons should
consult a current copy of 10 CFR 2.309,
which is available at the Commission’s
PDR, located at One White Flint North,
Public File Area 01F21, 11555 Rockville
Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland.
Publicly available records will be
accessible from the Agencywide
Documents Access and Management
System’s (ADAMS) Public Electronic
Reading Room on the Internet at the
NRC Web site, https://www.nrc.gov/
reading-rm/doc-collections/cfr/. If a
request for a hearing or petition for
leave to intervene is filed within 60
days, the Commission or a presiding
officer designated by the Commission or
by the Chief Administrative Judge of the
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board
Panel, will rule on the request and/or
petition; and the Secretary or the Chief
Administrative Judge of the Atomic
Safety and Licensing Board will issue a
notice of a hearing or an appropriate
order.
As required by 10 CFR 2.309, a
petition for leave to intervene shall set
forth with particularity the interest of
the petitioner in the proceeding, and
how that interest may be affected by the
results of the proceeding. The petition
should specifically explain the reasons
why intervention should be permitted
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with particular reference to the
following general requirements: (1) The
name, address, and telephone number of
the requestor or petitioner; (2) the
nature of the requestor’s/petitioner’s
right under the Act to be made a party
to the proceeding; (3) the nature and
extent of the requestor’s/petitioner’s
property, financial, or other interest in
the proceeding; and (4) the possible
effect of any decision or order which
may be entered in the proceeding on the
requestor’s/petitioner’s interest. The
petition must also set forth the specific
contentions which the petitioner/
requestor seeks to have litigated at the
proceeding.
Each contention must consist of a
specific statement of the issue of law or
fact to be raised or controverted. In
addition, the petitioner/requestor shall
provide a brief explanation of the bases
for the contention and a concise
statement of the alleged facts or expert
opinion which support the contention
and on which the petitioner/requestor
intends to rely in proving the contention
at the hearing. The petitioner/requestor
must also provide references to those
specific sources and documents of
which the petitioner is aware and on
which the petitioner/requestor intends
to rely to establish those facts or expert
opinion. The petition must include
sufficient information to show that a
genuine dispute exists with the
applicant on a material issue of law or
fact. Contentions shall be limited to
matters within the scope of the
amendment under consideration. The
contention must be one which, if
proven, would entitle the petitioner/
requestor to relief. A petitioner/
requestor who fails to satisfy these
requirements with respect to at least one
contention will not be permitted to
participate as a party.
Those permitted to intervene become
parties to the proceeding, subject to any
limitations in the order granting leave to
intervene, and have the opportunity to
participate fully in the conduct of the
hearing.
If a hearing is requested, and the
Commission has not made a final
determination on the issue of no
significant hazards consideration, the
Commission will make a final
determination on the issue of no
significant hazards consideration. The
final determination will serve to decide
when the hearing is held. If the final
determination is that the amendment
request involves no significant hazards
consideration, the Commission may
issue the amendment and make it
immediately effective, notwithstanding
the request for a hearing. Any hearing
held would take place after issuance of
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the amendment. If the final
determination is that the amendment
request involves a significant hazards
consideration, any hearing held would
take place before the issuance of any
amendment.
A request for a hearing or a petition
for leave to intervene must be filed by:
(1) First class mail addressed to the
Office of the Secretary of the
Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Washington, DC 20555–
0001, Attention: Rulemaking and
Adjudications Staff; (2) courier, express
mail, and expedited delivery services:
Office of the Secretary, Sixteenth Floor,
One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville
Pike, Rockville, Maryland, 20852,
Attention: Rulemaking and
Adjudications Staff; (3) e-mail
addressed to the Office of the Secretary,
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
HearingDocket@nrc.gov; or (4) facsimile
transmission addressed to the Office of
the Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Washington, DC,
Attention: Rulemakings and
Adjudications Staff at (301) 415–1101,
verification number is (301) 415–1966.
A copy of the request for hearing and
petition for leave to intervene should
also be sent to the Office of the General
Counsel, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Washington, DC 20555–
0001, and it is requested that copies be
transmitted either by means of facsimile
transmission to (301) 415–3725 or by email to OGCMailCenter@nrc.gov. A copy
of the request for hearing and petition
for leave to intervene should also be
sent to the attorney for the licensee.
Nontimely requests and/or petitions
and contentions will not be entertained
absent a determination by the
Commission or the presiding officer of
the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board
that the petition, request and/or the
contentions should be granted based on
a balancing of the factors specified in 10
CFR 2.309(a)(1)(i)–(viii).
For further details with respect to this
action, see the application for
amendment which is available for
public inspection at the Commission’s
PDR, located at One White Flint North,
Public File Area 01F21, 11555 Rockville
Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland.
Publicly available records will be
accessible from the ADAMS Public
Electronic Reading Room on the Internet
at the NRC Web site, https://
www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. If
you do not have access to ADAMS or if
there are problems in accessing the
documents located in ADAMS, contact
the PDR Reference staff at 1 (800) 397–
4209, (301) 415–4737 or by e-mail to
pdr@nrc.gov.
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Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc.,
Docket No. 50–336, Millstone Power
Station, Unit No. 2, New London
County, Connecticut
Date of amendment request: July 15,
2004, supplemented by letter dated
August 23, 2004.
Description of amendment request:
The amendment would revise Operating
License DPR–65 to address the
resolution of a non-conservative
Technical Specification (TS) associated
with control room isolation radiation
monitoring instrumentation.
Specifically, the amendment would
revise the TS to require two operable
channels of control room isolation
radiation monitoring instrumentation.
Basis for proposed no significant
hazards consideration determination:
As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the
licensee has provided its analysis of the
issue of no significant hazards
consideration. The NRC staff has
reviewed the licensee’s analysis against
the standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c). The
NRC staff’s review is presented below:
1. Involve a significant increase in the
probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
The proposed change involves
requirements to maintain two operable
channels in order to add a level of detection
capability and greater assurance that the
safety function for control room isolation is
met. In addition, the proposed change will
not alter the setpoint value for the radiation
monitors nor will it affect the method for
control room air filtration during the
emergency mode of operation. Therefore, the
proposed change from one operable channel
to two operable channels for the control room
isolation radiation monitoring
instrumentation will not increase the
probability of consequences of any
previously evaluated accident.
2. Create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident
previously evaluated.
The proposed change involves radiation
monitoring channels designed to send a
signal to isolate the control room when high
radiation levels are detected to limit the
radiological dose to the control room
operators in the event of an accident. In
addition, the proposed change will not have
an impact on the setpoint value to change the
radiation level at which control room
isolation is assumed to occur. Again, the
proposed change will not introduce failure
modes, accident initiators, or malfunctions.
Therefore, the proposed change from one
operable channel to two operable channels
for the control room isolation radiation
monitoring instrumentation, will not create
the possibility of a new or different kind of
accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
3. Involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety.
Increasing the number of radiation
monitoring channels for the control room
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isolation radiation monitoring
instrumentation will not reduce a margin of
safety. The proposed change to add
requirements to the TS for a redundant
radiation monitoring channel will increase
the reliability of the system to perform its
intended function. In addition, the proposed
change will add appropriate compensatory
actions for conditions when both channels
are not available. Therefore, given that the
proposed change will continue to meet the
current design basis, any reduction in a
margin of safety would not be significant.
Based on the NRC staff’s analysis, it
appears that the three standards of 10
CFR 50.929(c) are satisfied. Therefore,
the NRC staff proposes to determine that
the amendment request involves no
significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: Lillian M.
Cuoco, Senior Nuclear Counsel,
Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc.,
Rope Ferry Road, Waterford, CT 06385.
NRC Section Chief: Darrell J. Roberts.
Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc.,
Docket Nos. 50–245, 50–336, and 50–
423, Millstone Nuclear Power Station,
Unit Nos. 1, 2, and 3, New London
County, Connecticut
Date of amendment request:
September 8, 2002.
Description of amendment request:
The proposed amendment would
modify the Technical Specifications to
support the implementation of the
proposed Dominion Nuclear Facility
Quality Assurance Program (Topical
Report DOM–QA–1). Implementation of
this Topical Report would create a
common quality assurance program for
all sites owned by Dominion Nuclear
Connecticut, Inc. Review of this
proposed amendment was requested to
be done in concert with review of the
Topical Report. The Topical Report is
available in the Agencywide Document
Access and Management System under
accession number ML042470015.
Basis for proposed no significant
hazards consideration determination:
As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the
licensee has provided its analysis of the
issue of no significant hazards
consideration, which is presented
below:
1. Involve a significant increase in the
probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
The proposed changes do not involve a
significant increase in the probability or
consequence of an accident previously
analyzed. The changes involve the transfer of
requirements from the administrative section
of the Technical Specifications to the
Consolidated Quality Assurance Program and
other licensee controlled documents.
Therefore, the proposed changes are
administrative in nature, and have no effect
on a design basis accident, and will not
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increase the probability or consequences of
any previously analyzed accident.
2. Create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident
previously evaluated.
The implementation of the proposed
changes does not create the possibility of an
accident of a different type than was
previously evaluated in the Updated Final
Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR). The transfer
of requirements concerning facility staff
qualifications from the administrative section
of the Technical Specifications to the
Consolidated Quality Assurance Program and
other licensee controlled documents can not
initiate a new or different kind of accident.
These changes do not alter the nature of
events postulated in the UFSAR nor do they
introduce any unique precursor mechanisms.
Therefore, the proposed changes are
administrative in nature and do not create
the possibility of a new or different kind of
accident from those previously analyzed.
3. Involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety.
The implementation of the proposed
changes does not reduce the margin of safety.
The proposed changes to transfer certain
requirements from the administration section
of the Technical Specifications to the
Consolidated Quality Assurance Program and
other licensee controlled documents have no
effect on design bases radiological events. It
is thus concluded that the proposed changes
are administrative in nature and the margin
of safety will not be reduced by the
implementation of the changes.
Based on this review, it appears that
the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c)
are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff
proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves no
significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: Lillian M.
Cuoco, Senior Nuclear Counsel,
Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc.,
Rope Ferry Road, Waterford, CT 06385.
NRC Section Chief: Darrell J. Roberts.
Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, LLC
and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.,
Docket No. 50–271, Vermont Yankee
Nuclear Power Station, Vernon,
Vermont
Date of amendment request:
December 6, 2004.
Description of amendment request:
The proposed amendment would make
administrative changes to the Technical
Specifications (TSs) including
correction of references and deleting
obsolete or redundant TS requirements
and surveillances.
Basis for proposed no significant
hazards consideration determination:
As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the
licensee has provided its analysis of the
issue of no significant hazards
consideration which is presented below:
1. The operation of Vermont Yankee
Nuclear Power Station in accordance with
the proposed amendment will not involve a
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significant increase in the probability or
consequences of an accident previously
evaluated.
The proposed changes are administrative
or editorial in nature and do not involve any
physical changes to the plant. The changes
do not revise the methods of plant operation
which could increase the probability or
consequences of accidents. No new modes of
operation are introduced by the proposed
changes such that a previously evaluated
accident is more likely to occur or more
adverse consequences would result.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not
involve a significant increase in the
probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
2. The operation of Vermont Yankee
Nuclear Power Station in accordance with
the proposed amendment will not create the
possibility of a new or different kind of
accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
These changes are administrative or
editorial in nature and do not affect the
operation of any systems or equipment, nor
do they involve any potential initiating
events that would create any new or different
kind of accident. There are no changes to the
design assumptions, conditions,
configuration of the facility, or manner in
which the plant is operated and maintained.
The changes do not affect assumptions
contained in plant safety analyses or the
physical design and/or modes of plant
operation. Consequently, no new failure
mode is introduced.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not
create the possibility of a new or different
kind of accident from any previously
evaluated.
3. The operation of Vermont Yankee
Nuclear Power Station in accordance with
the proposed amendment will not involve a
significant reduction in a margin of safety.
There are no changes being made to the
Technical Specification (TS) safety limits or
safety system settings. The operating limits
and functional capabilities of systems,
structures and components are unchanged as
a result of these administrative and editorial
changes. These changes do not affect any
equipment involved in potential initiating
events or plant response to accidents. There
is no change to the basis for any TS that is
related to the establishment, or maintenance
of, a nuclear safety margin.
Therefore, the proposed change does not
involve a significant reduction in a margin of
safety.
The NRC staff has reviewed the
licensee’s analysis and, based on this
review, it appears that the three
standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff
proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves no
significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: Mr. David R.
Lewis, Shaw, Pittman, Potts and
Trowbridge, 2300 N Street, NW.,
Washington, DC 20037–1128.
NRC Section Chief: Allen G. Howe.
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Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, LLC
and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.,
Docket No. 50–271, Vermont Yankee
Nuclear Power Station, Vernon,
Vermont
Date of amendment request:
December 7, 2004.
Description of amendment request:
The proposed amendment would revise
the Technical Specifications (TSs) to: (1)
Delete the surveillance requirement (SR)
associated with testing of the standby
liquid control (SLC) pump discharge
pressure relief valves; and (2) remove
details from the SR for testing of the
recirculation pump discharge valves.
Basis for proposed no significant
hazards consideration determination:
As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the
licensee has provided its analysis of the
issue of no significant hazards
consideration which is presented below:
1. The operation of Vermont Yankee
Nuclear Power Station (VY) in accordance
with the proposed amendment will not
involve a significant increase in the
probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
The proposed amendment removes details
of SLC pressure relief valve and recirculation
pump discharge valve testing requirements
from the TS. Following implementation of
the proposed change, the VY TS will still
require operability testing of the subject
components by reference to the VY IST
[Inservice Testing] Program. Details of SLC
pressure relief valve and recirculation pump
discharge valve testing requirements will still
be contained in the VY IST Program. The
SLC pressure relief valve and recirculation
pump discharge valve setpoint values related
to the safety functions of those systems will
continue to be contained in the VY UFSAR
[Updated Final Safety Analysis Report].
Changes to the VY UFSAR are evaluated per
the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59. These
controls are adequate to ensure the required
inservice testing is performed to verify the
components are operable and capable of
performing their respective safety functions.
The proposed amendment introduces no new
equipment or changes to how equipment is
operated. Neither the SLC pressure relief
valves nor the recirculation pump discharge
valves are initiators of any analyzed
accidents. Therefore, operation of VY in
accordance with the proposed amendment
will not involve a significant increase in the
probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
2. The operation of Vermont Yankee
Nuclear Power Station (VY) in accordance
with the proposed amendment will not create
the possibility of a new or different kind of
accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
The proposed amendment removes details
of SLC pressure relief valve and recirculation
pump discharge valve testing requirements
from the TS. The proposed amendment does
not change the design or function of any
component or system. No new modes of
failure or initiating events are being
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introduced. Therefore, operation of VY in
accordance with the proposed amendment
will not create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident
previously evaluated.
3. The operation of Vermont Yankee
Nuclear Power Station (VY) in accordance
with the proposed amendment will not
involve a significant reduction in a margin of
safety.
The proposed amendment removes details
of SLC pressure relief valve and recirculation
pump discharge valve testing requirements
from the TS. The proposed amendment does
not change the design or function of any
component or system. The proposed
amendment does not involve any safety
limits or limiting safety system settings.
Since the proposed controls are adequate
to ensure the required inservice testing is
performed, there will still be high assurance
that the components are operable and
capable of performing their respective safety
functions, and that the systems will respond
as designed to mitigate the subject events.
Therefore, operation of VY in accordance
with the proposed amendment will not
involve a significant reduction in a margin of
safety.
The NRC staff has reviewed the
licensee’s analysis and, based on this
review, it appears that the three
standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff
proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves no
significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: Mr. David R.
Lewis, Shaw, Pittman, Potts and
Trowbridge, 2300 N Street, NW,
Washington, DC 20037–1128.
NRC Section Chief: Allen G. Howe.
Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, LLC
and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.,
Docket No. 50–271, Vermont Yankee
Nuclear Power Station, Vernon,
Vermont
Date of amendment request:
December 15, 2004.
Description of amendment request:
The proposed amendment would revise
the limiting conditions for operation in
Technical Specification (TS) 3.3 and the
surveillance requirements in TS 4.3
associated with the control rod system.
Specifically, the proposed changes
would revise the TSs associated with:
(1) Control rod operability; (2) control
rod scram time testing; and (3) control
rod accumulator operability.
Basis for proposed no significant
hazards consideration determination:
As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the
licensee has provided its analysis of the
issue of no significant hazards
consideration which is presented below:
1. The operation of Vermont Yankee
Nuclear Power Station in accordance with
the proposed amendment will not involve a
significant increase in the probability or
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2889
consequences of an accident previously
evaluated.
The proposed changes do not significantly
affect the design or fundamental operation
and maintenance of the plant. Accident
initiators or the frequency of analyzed
accident events are not significantly affected
as a result of the proposed changes; therefore,
there will be no significant change to the
probabilities of accidents previously
evaluated.
The proposed changes do not significantly
alter assumptions or initial conditions
relative to the mitigation of an accident
previously evaluated. The proposed changes
continue to ensure process variables,
structures, systems, and components (SSCs)
are maintained consistent with the safety
analyses and licensing basis. The revised
technical specifications continue to require
that SSCs are properly maintained to ensure
operability and performance of safety
functions as assumed in the safety analyses.
The design basis events analyzed in the
safety analyses will not change significantly
as a result of the proposed changes to the TS.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not
involve a significant increase in the
probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
2. The operation of Vermont Yankee
Nuclear Power Station in accordance with
the proposed amendment will not create the
possibility of a new or different kind of
accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
The proposed changes do not involve any
physical alteration of the plant (no new or
different type of equipment being installed)
and do not involve a change in the design,
normal configuration or basic operation of
the plant. The proposed changes do not
introduce any new accident initiators. In
some cases, the proposed changes impose
different requirements; however, these new
requirements are consistent with the
assumptions in the safety analyses and
current licensing basis. Where requirements
are relocated to other licensee-controlled
documents, adequate controls exist to ensure
their proper maintenance.
The proposed changes do not involve
significant changes in the fundamental
methods governing normal plant operation
and do not require unusual or uncommon
operator actions. The proposed changes
provide assurance that the plant will not be
operated in a mode or condition that violates
the essential assumptions or initial
conditions in the safety analyses and that
SSCs remain capable of performing their
intended safety functions as assumed in the
same analyses. Consequently, the response of
the plant and the plant operator to postulated
events will not be significantly different.
Therefore, the proposed TS change does
not create the possibility of a new or different
kind of accident from any previously
evaluated.
3. The operation of Vermont Yankee
Nuclear Power Station in accordance with
the proposed amendment will not involve a
significant reduction in a margin of safety.
Margin of safety is related to the
confidence in the ability of the fission
product barriers to perform their design
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functions during and following an accident
situation. The proposed changes do not
significantly affect any of the assumptions,
initial conditions or inputs to the safety
analyses. Plant design is unaffected by these
proposed changes and will continue to
provide adequate defense-in-depth and
diversity of safety functions as assumed in
the safety analyses.
There are no proposed changes to any of
the Safety Limits or Limiting Safety System
Setting requirements. The proposed changes
maintain requirements consistent with safety
analyses assumptions and the licensing basis.
Fission product barriers will continue to
meet their design capabilities without any
significant impact to their ability to maintain
parameters within acceptable limits. The
safety functions are maintained within
acceptable limits without any significant
decrease in capability.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not
involve a significant reduction in a margin of
safety.
The NRC staff has reviewed the
licensee’s analysis and, based on this
review, it appears that the three
standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff
proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves no
significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: Mr. David R.
Lewis, Shaw, Pittman, Potts and
Trowbridge, 2300 N Street, NW.,
Washington, DC 20037–1128.
NRC Section Chief: Allen G. Howe.
Entergy Operations, Inc., Docket No. 50–
313, Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit No. 1,
Pope County, Arkansas
Date of amendment request:
December 20, 2004.
Description of amendment request:
The requested change will delete the
requirements in Technical Specification
(TS) 5.6.1, ‘‘Occupational Radiation
Exposure Report,’’ and TS 5.6.4,
‘‘Monthly Operating Reports.’’
The NRC staff issued a notice of
availability of a model no significant
hazards consideration (NSHC)
determination for referencing in license
amendment applications in the Federal
Register on June 23, 2004 (69 FR 35067).
The licensee affirmed the applicability
of the model NSHC determination in its
application dated December 20, 2004.
Basis for proposed no significant
hazards consideration determination:
As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), an
analysis of the issue of no significant
hazards consideration is presented
below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a
significant increase in the probability or
consequences of an accident previously
evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change eliminates the
Technical Specifications (TSs) reporting
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requirements to provide a monthly operating
letter report of shutdown experience and
operating statistics if the equivalent data is
submitted using an industry electronic
database. It also eliminates the TS reporting
requirement for an annual occupational
radiation exposure report, which provides
information beyond that specified in NRC
regulations. The proposed change involves
no changes to plant systems or accident
analyses. As such, the change is
administrative in nature and does not affect
initiators of analyzed events or assumed
mitigation of accidents or transients.
Therefore, the proposed change does not
involve a significant increase in the
probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the
possibility of a new or different kind of
accident from any accident previously
evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change does not involve a
physical alteration of the plant, add any new
equipment, or require any existing
equipment to be operated in a manner
different from the present design. Therefore,
the proposed change does not create the
possibility of a new or different kind of
accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a
significant reduction in a margin of safety?
Response: No.
This is an administrative change to
reporting requirements of plant operating
information and occupational radiation
exposure data, and has no effect on plant
equipment, operating practices or safety
analyses assumptions. For these reasons, the
proposed change does not involve a
significant reduction in the margin of safety.
Based upon the reasoning presented
above, the requested change does not
involve significance hazards
consideration.
Attorney for licensee: Nicholas S.
Reynolds, Esquire, Winston and Strawn,
1400 L Street, NW., Washington, DC
20005–3502.
NRC Section Chief: Michael A. Webb
(Acting).
Entergy Operations, Inc., Docket No. 50–
368, Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit No. 2,
Pope County, Arkansas
Date of amendment request:
December 20, 2004.
Description of amendment request:
The requested change will delete the
requirements in Technical Specification
(TS) 6.6.1, ‘‘Occupational Radiation
Exposure Report,’’ and TS 6.6.4,
‘‘Monthly Operating Reports.’’
The NRC staff issued a notice of
availability of a model no significant
hazards consideration (NSHC)
determination for referencing in license
amendment applications in the Federal
Register on June 23, 2004 (69 FR 35067).
The licensee affirmed the applicability
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Sfmt 4703
of the model NSHC determination in its
application dated December 20, 2004.
Basis for proposed no significant
hazards consideration determination:
As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), an
analysis of the issue of no significant
hazards consideration is presented
below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a
significant increase in the probability or
consequences of an accident previously
evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change eliminates the
Technical Specifications (TSs) reporting
requirements to provide a monthly operating
report of shutdown experience and operating
statistics if the equivalent data is submitted
using an industry electronic database. It also
eliminates the TS reporting requirement for
an annual occupational radiation exposure
report, which provides information beyond
that specified in NRC regulations. The
proposed change involves no changes to
plant systems or accident analyses. As such,
the change is administrative in nature and
does not affect initiators of analyzed events
or assumed mitigation of accidents or
transients. Therefore, the proposed change
does not involve a significant increase in the
probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the
possibility of a new or different kind of
accident from any accident previously
evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change does not involve a
physical alteration of the plant, add any new
equipment, or require any existing
equipment to be operated in a manner
different from the present design. Therefore,
the proposed change does not create the
possibility of a new or different kind of
accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a
significant reduction in a margin of safety?
Response: No.
This is an administrative change to
reporting requirements of plant operating
information and occupational radiation
exposure data, and has no effect on plant
equipment, operating practices or safety
analyses assumptions. For these reasons, the
proposed change does not involve a
significant reduction in the margin of safety.
Based upon the reasoning presented
above, the requested change does not
involve significance hazards
consideration.
Attorney for licensee: Nicholas S.
Reynolds, Esquire, Winston and Strawn,
1400 L Street, NW., Washington, DC
20005–3502.
NRC Section Chief: Michael A. Webb
(Acting).
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Florida Power Corporation, et al.,
Docket No. 50–302, Crystal River Unit 3
Nuclear Generating Plant, Citrus
County, Florida
Date of amendment request: October
14, 2004.
Brief description of amendments: The
proposed change will revise the
surveillance requirement (SR) 3.6.6.8
frequency of every 10 years. Instead, the
proposed change to SR 3.6.6.8 will
require verification that spray nozzles
are unobstructed following maintenance
that could result in nozzle blockage.
Basis for proposed no significant
hazards consideration determination:
As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the
licensee has provided its analysis of the
issue of no significant hazards
consideration, which is presented below
and states that the amendment request:
1. Does not involve a significant increase
in the probability or consequences of an
accident previously evaluated.
The proposed change modifies the
[Surveillance Requirements] SR to verify that
the [Reactor Building] RB spray nozzles are
unobstructed after maintenance that could
introduce material that could result in nozzle
blockage. The spray nozzles are not assumed
to be initiators of any previously analyzed
accident. Therefore, the change does not
increase the probability of any accident
previously evaluated. The spray nozzles are
assumed in the accident analyses to mitigate
design basis accidents. The revised SR to
verify system OPERABILITY following
maintenance is considered adequate to
ensure OPERABILITY of the RB spray
system. Since the system will still be able to
perform its accident mitigation function, the
consequences of accidents previously
evaluated are not increased. Therefore, the
proposed change does not involve a
significant increase in the probability or
consequences of an accident previously
evaluated.
2. Does not create the possibility of a new
or different type of accident from any
accident previously evaluated.
The proposed change revises the SR to
verify that the RB spray nozzles are
unobstructed after maintenance that could
result in nozzle blockage. The change does
not introduce a new mode of plant operation
and does not involve physical modification
to the plant. The change will not introduce
new accident initiators or impact the
assumptions made in the safety analysis.
Therefore, the proposed change does not
create the possibility of a new or different
kind of accident from any previously
evaluated.
3. Does not involve a significant reduction
in the margin of safety.
The proposed change revises the frequency
for performance of the SR to verify that the
RB spray nozzles are unobstructed. The
frequency is changed from every 10 years to
following maintenance that could result in
nozzle blockage. This requirement, along
with foreign material exclusion programs and
the remote physical location of the spray
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nozzles, provides assurance that the spray
nozzles will remain unobstructed. As the
spray nozzles are expected to remain
unobstructed and able to perform their postaccident mitigation function, plant safety is
not significantly affected. Therefore, the
proposed change does not involve a
significant reduction in a margin of safety.
The NRC staff has reviewed the
licensee’s analysis and, based on this
review, it appears that the three
standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff
proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves no
significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: Steven R. Carr,
Associate General Counsel—Legal
Department, Progress Energy Service
Company, LLC, Post Office Box 1551,
Raleigh, North Carolina 27602.
NRC Section Chief: Michael L.
Marshall, Jr.
Nebraska Public Power District, Docket
No. 50–298, Cooper Nuclear Station,
Nemaha County, Nebraska
Date of amendment request:
November 22, 2004.
Description of amendment request:
The requested change will delete the
requirements in Technical Specification
(TS) 5.6.1, ‘‘Occupational Radiation
Exposure Report,’’ and TS 5.6.4,
‘‘Monthly Operating Reports.’’
The NRC staff issued a notice of
availability of a model no significant
hazards consideration (NSHC)
determination for referencing in license
amendment applications in the Federal
Register on June 23, 2004 (69 FR 35067).
The licensee affirmed the applicability
of the model NSHC determination in its
application dated November 22, 2004.
Basis for proposed no significant
hazards consideration determination:
As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), an
analysis of the issue of no significant
hazards consideration is presented
below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a
significant increase in the probability or
consequences of an accident previously
evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change eliminates the
Technical Specifications (TSs) reporting
requirements to provide a monthly operating
report of shutdown experience and operating
statistics if the equivalent data is submitted
using an industry electronic database. It also
eliminates the TS reporting requirement for
an annual occupational radiation exposure
report, which provides information beyond
that specified in NRC regulations. The
proposed change involves no changes to
plant systems or accident analyses. As such,
the change is administrative in nature and
does not affect initiators of analyzed events
or assumed mitigation of accidents or
transients. Therefore, the proposed change
PO 00000
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2891
does not involve a significant increase in the
probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the
possibility of a new or different kind of
accident from any accident previously
evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change does not involve a
physical alteration of the plant, add any new
equipment, or require any existing
equipment to be operated in a manner
different from the present design. Therefore,
the proposed change does not create the
possibility of a new or different kind of
accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a
significant reduction in a margin of safety?
Response: No.
This is an administrative change to
reporting requirements of plant operating
information and occupational radiation
exposure data, and has no effect on plant
equipment, operating practices or safety
analyses assumptions. For these reasons, the
proposed change does not involve a
significant reduction in the margin of safety.
Based upon the reasoning presented
above, the requested change does not
involve significance hazards
consideration.
Attorney for licensee: Mr. John R.
McPhail, Nebraska Public Power
District, Post Office Box 499, Columbus,
NE 68602–0499.
NRC Section Chief: Michael K. Webb
(Acting).
Nuclear Management Company, LLC,
Docket No. 50–263, Monticello Nuclear
Generating Plant, Wright County,
Minnesota
Date of amendment request: April 29,
2004, as supplemented November 23,
2004.
Description of amendment request:
The proposed amendment is a selectivescope application of an alternative
source term (AST) for the fuel handling
accident (FHA) in accordance with Title
10 of the Code of Federal Regulations
(10 CFR) Section 50.67, ‘‘Accident
Source Term.’’
Basis for proposed no significant
hazards consideration determination:
As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the
licensee has provided its analysis of the
issue of no significant hazards
consideration, which is presented
below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a
significant increase in the probability or
consequences of an accident previously
evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed amendment involves
implementation of the AST for the fuel
handling accident at MNGP [Monticello
Nuclear Generating Plant]. There are no
physical design modifications to the plant
associated with the proposed amendment.
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The revised calculations do not impact the
initiators of an FHA in any way.
The changes also do not impact the
initiators for any other design basis accident
(DBA) or events. Therefore, because DBA
initiators are not being altered by adoption of
the AST analyses, the probability of an
accident previously evaluated is not affected.
With respect to consequences, the only
previously evaluated accident that could be
affected is the FHA. The AST is an input to
calculations used to evaluate the
consequences of the accident, and does not,
in and of itself, affect the plant response or
the actual pathways to the environment
utilized by the radiation/activity released by
the fuel. It does however, better represent the
physical characteristics of the release, so that
appropriate mitigation techniques may be
applied. For the FHA, the AST analyses
demonstrate acceptable doses that are within
regulatory limits after 24 hours of
radiological decay, without credit for
Secondary Containment integrity, selected
ESF [engineered safety feature] filtration
system operation (i.e., SBGT [standby gas
treatment] System or Control Room EFT
[emergency filtration] System) or Control
Room isolation. Therefore, the consequences
of an accident previously evaluated are not
significantly increased.
Based on the above conclusions, this
proposed amendment does not involve a
significant increase in the probability or
consequences of an accident previously
evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the
possibility of a new or different kind of
accident from any accident previously
evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed amendment does not involve
a physical alteration of the plant. No new or
different types of equipment will be installed
and there are no physical modifications to
existing equipment associated with the
proposed changes. Also, no changes are
proposed to the methods governing plant/
system operation during handling of
irradiated fuel, so no new initiators or
precursors of a new or different kind of
accident are created. New equipment or
personnel failure modes that might initiate a
new type of accident are not created as a
result of the proposed amendment.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not
create the possibility of a new or different
kind of accident from any previously
analyzed.
3. Does the proposed change involve a
significant reduction in the margin of safety?
Response: No.
The proposed amendment is associated
with the implementation of a new licensing
basis for the MNGP FHA. Approval of this
change from the original source term to an
alternative source term derived in accordance
with the guidance of RG 1.183 [‘‘Alternative
Radiological Source Terms for Evaluating
Design Basis Accidents at Nuclear Power
Reactors’’] is being requested. The results of
the FHA accident analysis, revised in support
of the proposed license amendment, are
subject to revised acceptance criteria. The
AST FHA analysis has been performed using
conservative methodologies, as specified in
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RG 1.183. Safety margins have been
evaluated and analytical conservatism has
been utilized to ensure that the analyses
adequately bound the postulated limiting
event scenario. The dose consequences of the
limiting FHA remain within the acceptance
criteria presented in 10 CFR 50.67 and RG
1.183.
The proposed changes continue to ensure
that the doses at the Exclusion Area
Boundary (EAB) and Low Population Zone
(LPZ) boundaries, as well as the Control
Room, are within the corresponding
regulatory limits. For the FHA, RG 1.183
conservatively sets the EAB and LPZ limits
below the 10 CFR 50.67 limit, and sets the
Control Room limit consistent with 10 CFR
50.67.
Since the proposed amendment continues
to ensure the doses at the EAB, LPZ and
Control Room are within corresponding
regulatory limits, the proposed license
amendment does not involve a significant
reduction in a margin of safety.
Based on the above, NMC has determined
that operation of the facility in accordance
with the proposed change does not involve
a significant hazards consideration as defined
in 10 CFR 50.92(c), in that it: (1) Does not
involve a significant increase in the
probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated; (2) does not create the
possibility of a new or different kind of
accident from any accident previously
evaluated; and (3) does not involve a
significant reduction in a margin of safety.
The U. S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) staff has reviewed
the licensee’s analysis and, based on
this review, it appears that the three
standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff
proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves no
significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: Jonathan Rogoff,
Esquire, Vice President, Counsel &
Secretary, Nuclear Management
Company, LLC, 700 First Street,
Hudson, WI 54016.
NRC Section Chief: L. Raghavan.
Nuclear Management Company, LLC,
Docket No. 50–263, Monticello Nuclear
Generating Plant, Wright County,
Minnesota
Date of amendment request: June 30,
2004, as supplemented November 5,
2004.
Description of amendment request:
The proposed amendment would revise
the technical specifications (TSs) to
implement a 24-month fuel cycle.
Basis for proposed no significant
hazards consideration determination:
As required by Title 10 of the Code of
Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 50.91(a),
the licensee has provided its analysis of
the issue of no significant hazards
consideration (NSHC), which is
presented below:
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1. The proposed amendment does not
involve a significant increase in the
probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
a. Surveillance Testing Interval Extensions
The proposed Technical Specification (TS)
changes involve changes in the surveillance
testing to facilitate a change in the operating
cycle from 18 months to 24 months. The
proposed TS changes do not physically
impact the normal operation of the plant, nor
do they impact any design or functional
requirements of the associated systems. That
is, the proposed TS changes neither impact
the TS SRs [surveillance requirements]
themselves nor the manner in which the
surveillances are performed.
In addition, the proposed TS changes do
not introduce any accident initiators, since
no accidents previously evaluated relate to
the frequency of surveillance testing. Also,
evaluations of the proposed TS changes
demonstrate that the availability of
equipment and systems required to prevent
or mitigate the radiological consequences of
an accident are not significantly affected
because of other, more frequent testing that
is performed, the availability of redundant
systems and equipment, or the high
reliability of the equipment. Since the impact
on the systems is minimal NMC [Nuclear
Management Company] has concluded that
the overall impact on the plant safety
analysis is negligible.
A historical review of surveillance test
results and associated maintenance records
indicated that there was no evidence of any
failure that would invalidate the above
conclusions.
Therefore, the proposed TS changes do not
significantly increase the probability or
consequences of an accident previously
evaluated.
b. TS Trip Setting Changes
Changes are proposed to the Monticello TS
Trip Settings. The proposed changes are a
result of application of the Monticello
Instrument Setpoint Methodology using
plant-specific drift values. Application of this
methodology results in Trip Setpoints that
more accurately reflect total instrumentation
loop accuracy, as well as that of test
equipment and calculated drift between
surveillances. The proposed changes will not
result in hardware changes. The
instrumentation is not assumed to be
initiators of any analyzed events, nor do they
impact any design or functional requirements
of the associated systems. Existing operating
margins between plant conditions and actual
plant setpoints are not significantly reduced
due to the proposed changes. The role of the
instrumentation is in mitigating and thereby,
limiting the consequences of accidents.
The Nominal Trip Setpoints were
developed to ensure the design and safety
analysis limits are satisfied. The
methodology used for the development of the
Trip Settings ensures: (1) The affected
instrumentation remains capable of
mitigating design basis events as described in
the safety analysis; and, (2) the results and
radiological consequences described in the
safety analysis remain bounding. The
proposed changes do not alter the plant’s
ability to detect and mitigate events.
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Therefore, these changes do not involve a
significant increase in the probability or
consequences of an accident previously
evaluated.
c. Surveillance Testing Interval Reductions
The proposed TS changes involve
reductions in the surveillance testing
intervals from once per operating cycle or
refueling outage to once every three (3)
months or once per quarter for the equipment
associated with these TS SRs. The shorter
intervals are based upon the plant-specific
results of a review of the surveillance test
history for this equipment. The
implementing procedures for these SRs have
been performed on a once per three (3)
month or once per quarter interval for a
number of years, and these changes more
accurately reflect actual plant maintenance
practices. The proposed, more restrictive TS
changes do not physically impact the plant,
nor do they impact any design or functional
requirements of the associated systems. That
is, the proposed TS changes neither degrade
the performance of, nor increase the
challenges to, any safety system assumed to
function in the safety analysis. These
proposed TS changes neither impact the TS
SRs themselves nor the manner in which the
surveillances are performed.
The proposed TS changes do not introduce
any accident initiators, since no accident
previously evaluated relate to the frequency
of surveillance testing. The proposed TS
intervals demonstrate that the equipment and
systems required to prevent or mitigate the
radiological consequences of an accident are
continuing to meet the assumptions of the
setpoint evaluation on a more frequent basis.
Since the impacts on systems are minimal
and the assumptions of the safety analyses
are maintained, NMC has concluded that the
overall impact on the plant safety analysis is
negligible.
Therefore, the proposed TS changes do not
significantly increase the probability or
consequences of any accident previously
evaluated.
2. The proposed amendment does not
create the possibility of a new or different
kind or accident from any accident
previously evaluated.
a. Surveillance Testing Interval Extensions
The proposed TS changes involve changes
in the surveillance testing intervals to
facilitate a change in the operating cycle
length. The proposed TS changes do not
introduce any failure mechanisms of a
different type than those previously
evaluated. There are no physical changes
being made to the facility. No new or
different equipment is being installed. No
installed equipment is being operated in a
different manner. As a result no new failure
modes are introduced. The SRs themselves,
and the manner in which surveillance tests
are performed, remain unchanged.
A historical review of surveillance test
results and associated maintenance records
indicated that there was no evidence of any
failure that would invalidate the above
conclusions.
Therefore, the proposed TS changes do not
create the possibility of a new or different
kind of accident from any previously
evaluated.
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b. TS Trip Setting Changes
The proposed changes to the Trip Settings
are a result of applying the Monticello
Instrument Setpoint Methodology using
plant-specific drift values. The application of
this methodology does not create the
possibility of any new or different kinds of
accidents from any accidents previously
evaluated. This is based upon the fact that
the method and manner of plant operations
are unchanged.
The use of the proposed Trip Setpoints
does not impact the safe operation of the
plant in that the safety analysis limits are
maintained. The proposed changes in Trip
Settings involve no system additions or
physical modifications to plant systems. The
Trip Settings are revised to ensure the
affected instrumentation remains capable of
mitigating accidents and transients. Plant
equipment will not be operated in a manner
different from previous operation. Since
operational methods remain unchanged and
the operating parameters were evaluated to
maintain the plant within existing design
basis criteria no different type of failure or
accident is created.
Therefore, the proposed TS changes do not
create the possibility of a new or different
kind of accident from any previously
evaluated.
c. Surveillance Testing Interval Reductions
The proposed TS changes involve
reductions in the surveillance testing
intervals from once per operating cycle or
refueling outage to once every three (3)
months or once per quarter for the equipment
associated with these TS SRs. The shorter
intervals are based upon the plant-specific
results of a review of the surveillance test
history for this equipment. The
implementing procedures for these SRs have
been performed on a once per three (3)
month or once per quarter interval for a
number of years and these changes more
accurately reflect actual plant maintenance
practices. The proposed more restrictive TS
changes do not physically impact the plant,
nor do they impact any design or functional
requirements of the associated systems. That
is, the proposed TS changes neither degrade
the performance of, nor increase the
challenges to, any safety system assumed to
function in the safety analysis. These
proposed TS changes neither impact the TS
SRs themselves nor the manner in which the
surveillances are performed.
The proposed TS changes do not introduce
any failure mechanism of a different type
than those previously evaluated. The
proposed changes make no physical changes
to the plant. No new or different equipment
is being installed. No installed equipment is
being operated in a different manner.
A historical review of surveillance test
results and associated maintenance records
indicate that there is no evidence of any
failure that would invalidate the above
conclusions.
Therefore, the proposed TS changes do not
create the possibility of a new or different
kind of accident from any previously
evaluated.
3. The proposed amendment will not
involve a significant reduction in a margin of
safety.
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2893
a. Surveillance Testing Interval Extensions
Although the proposed TS changes result
in changes in the interval between
surveillance tests, the impact, if any, on
system availability is minimal based upon
other, more frequent testing that is
performed, the existence of redundant
systems and equipment or overall system
reliability. Evaluations show there is no
evidence of any time-dependant failure that
would impact system availability.
The proposed changes do not significantly
impact the condition or performance of
structures, systems and components relied
upon for accident mitigation. The proposed
TS changes do not physically impact the
plant, nor do they impact any design or
functional requirements of the associated
systems. The proposed changes do not
significantly impact any safety analysis
assumptions or results.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not
involve a significant reduction in a margin of
safety.
b. TS Trip Setting Changes
The proposed changes do not involve a
reduction in a margin of safety. The proposed
changes were developed using a Monticello
Instrument Setpoint Methodology using
plant-specific drift values. This methodology
ensures no safety analysis limits are
exceeded. The proposed TS changes do not
physically impact the plant, nor do they
impact any design or functional requirements
of the associated systems.
As such, these proposed changes do not
involve a reduction in a margin of safety.
c. Surveillance Testing Interval Reductions
The proposed TS changes result in a
shorter interval between surveillance tests to
ensure the assumptions of the safety analysis
are maintained. The impact, if any, on system
availability is minimal, as a result of the
more frequent testing that is performed. The
proposed changes do not significantly impact
the condition or performance of structures,
systems and components relied upon for
accident mitigation. The proposed TS
changes do not physically impact the plant,
nor do they impact any design or functional
requirements of the associated systems. The
proposed changes do not significantly impact
any safety analysis assumptions or results.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not
involve a significant reduction in a margin of
safety.
The U. S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) staff has reviewed
the licensee’s analysis and, based on
this review, it appears that the three
standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff
proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves NSHC.
Attorney for licensee: Jonathan Rogoff,
Esquire, Vice President, Counsel &
Secretary, Nuclear Management
Company, LLC, 700 First Street,
Hudson, WI 54016.
NRC Section Chief: L. Raghavan.
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Omaha Public Power District, Docket
No. 50–285, Fort Calhoun Station, Unit
No. 1, Washington County, Nebraska
Date of amendment request:
September 8, 2004.
Description of amendment request:
The proposed amendment deletes the
requirements from the technical
specifications (TS) to maintain
containment hydrogen monitors.
Licensees were generally required to
implement upgrades as described in
NUREG–0737, ‘‘Clarification of TMI
[Three Mile Island] Action Plan
Requirements,’’ and Regulatory Guide
(RG) 1.97, ‘‘Instrumentation for LightWater-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to
Assess Plant and Environs Conditions
During and Following an Accident.’’
Implementation of these upgrades was
an outcome of the lessons learned from
the accident that occurred at TMI Unit
2. Requirements related to combustible
gas control were imposed by Order for
many facilities and were added to or
included in the TS for nuclear power
reactors currently licensed to operate.
The revised 10 CFR 50.44, ‘‘Standards
for Combustible Gas Control System in
Light-Water-Cooled Power Reactors,’’
eliminated the requirements for
hydrogen recombiners and relaxed
safety classifications and licensee
commitments to certain design and
qualification criteria for hydrogen and
oxygen monitors.
The NRC staff issued a notice of
availability of a model no significant
hazards consideration determination for
referencing in license amendment
applications in the Federal Register on
September 25, 2003 (68 FR 55416). The
licensee affirmed the applicability of the
relevant portions of the model NSHC
determination (TS for Fort Calhoun do
not include requirements for hydrogen
recombiners) in its application dated
September 8, 2004.
Basis for proposed no significant
hazards consideration determination:
As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), an
analysis of the issue of no significant
hazards consideration is presented
below:
Criterion 1—The Proposed Change Does Not
Involve a Significant Increase in the
Probability or Consequences of an Accident
Previously Evaluated
The revised 10 CFR 50.44 no longer defines
a design-basis loss-of-coolant accident
(LOCA) hydrogen release, and eliminates
requirements for hydrogen control systems to
mitigate such a release. The installation of
hydrogen recombiners and/or vent and purge
systems required by 10 CFR 50.44(b)(3) was
intended to address the limited quantity and
rate of hydrogen generation that was
postulated from a design-basis LOCA. The
Commission has found that this hydrogen
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release is not risk-significant because the
design-basis LOCA hydrogen release does not
contribute to the conditional probability of a
large release up to approximately 24 hours
after the onset of core damage. In addition,
these systems were ineffective at mitigating
hydrogen releases from risk-significant
accident sequences that could threaten
containment integrity.
With the elimination of the design-basis
LOCA hydrogen release, hydrogen monitors
are no longer required to mitigate designbasis accidents and, therefore, the hydrogen
monitors do not meet the definition of a
safety-related component as defined in 10
CFR 50.2. Category 1 in RG 1.97 is intended
for key variables that most directly indicate
the accomplishment of a safety function for
design-basis accident events. The hydrogen
monitors no longer meet the definition of
Category 1 in RG 1.97. As part of the
rulemaking to revise 10 CFR 50.44 the
Commission found that Category 3, as
defined in RG 1.97, is an appropriate
categorization for the hydrogen monitors
because the monitors are required to
diagnose the course of beyond design-basis
accidents.
The regulatory requirements for the
hydrogen monitors can be relaxed without
degrading the plant emergency response. The
emergency response, in this sense, refers to
the methodologies used in ascertaining the
condition of the reactor core, mitigating the
consequences of an accident, assessing and
projecting offsite releases of radioactivity,
and establishing protective action
recommendations to be communicated to
offsite authorities. Classification of the
hydrogen monitors as Category 3, and
removal of the hydrogen monitors from TS
will not prevent an accident management
strategy through the use of the severe
accident management guidelines (SAMGs),
the emergency plan (EP), the emergency
operating procedures (EOPs), and site survey
monitoring that support modification of
emergency plan protective action
recommendations (PARs).
Therefore, the elimination of the hydrogen
recombiner requirements and relaxation of
the hydrogen monitor requirements,
including removal of these requirements
from TS, does not involve a significant
increase in the probability or the
consequences of any accident previously
evaluated.
Criterion 2—The Proposed Change Does Not
Create the Possibility of a New or Different
Kind of Accident From Any Previously
Evaluated
The elimination of the hydrogen
recombiner requirements and relaxation of
the hydrogen monitor requirements,
including removal of these requirements
from TS, will not result in any failure mode
not previously analyzed. The hydrogen
recombiner and hydrogen monitor equipment
was intended to mitigate a design-basis
hydrogen release. The hydrogen recombiner
and hydrogen monitor equipment are not
considered accident precursors, nor does
their existence or elimination have any
adverse impact on the pre-accident state of
the reactor core or post accident confinement
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Sfmt 4703
of radionuclides within the containment
building.
Therefore, this change does not create the
possibility of a new or different kind of
accident from any previously evaluated.
Criterion 3—The Proposed Change Does Not
Involve a Significant Reduction in the Margin
of Safety
The elimination of the hydrogen
recombiner requirements and relaxation of
the hydrogen monitor requirements,
including removal of these requirements
from TS, in light of existing plant equipment,
instrumentation, procedures, and programs
that provide effective mitigation of and
recovery from reactor accidents, results in a
neutral impact to the margin of safety.
The installation of hydrogen recombiners
and/or vent and purge systems required by
10 CFR 50.44(b)(3) was intended to address
the limited quantity and rate of hydrogen
generation that was postulated from a designbasis LOCA. The Commission has found that
this hydrogen release is not risk-significant
because the design-basis LOCA hydrogen
release does not contribute to the conditional
probability of a large release up to
approximately 24 hours after the onset of
core damage.
Category 3 hydrogen monitors are adequate
to provide rapid assessment of current
reactor core conditions and the direction of
degradation while effectively responding to
the event in order to mitigate the
consequences of the accident. The intent of
the requirements established as a result of the
TMI Unit 2 accident can be adequately met
without reliance on safety-related hydrogen
monitors.
Therefore, this change does not involve a
significant reduction in the margin of safety.
Removal of hydrogen monitoring from TS
will not result in a significant reduction in
their functionality, reliability, and
availability.
Based upon the reasoning presented
above, the requested change does not
involve a significant hazards
consideration.
Attorney for licensee: James R.
Curtiss, Esq., Winston & Strawn, 1400 L
Street, NW., Washington, DC 20005–
3502.
NRC Section Chief: Robert A. Gramm.
Pacific Gas and Electric Company,
Docket Nos. 50–275 and 50–323, Diablo
Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Unit Nos.
1 and 2, San Luis Obispo County,
California
Date of amendment requests:
November 1, 2004.
Description of amendment requests:
The requested change will delete
Technical Specification (TS) 5.6.1,
‘‘Occupational Radiation Exposure
Report,’’ and TS 5.6.4, ‘‘Monthly
Operating Reports.’’
The NRC staff issued a notice of
availability of a model no significant
hazards consideration (NSHC)
determination for referencing in license
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amendment applications in the Federal
Register on June 23, 2004 (69 FR 35067).
The licensee affirmed the applicability
of the model NSHC determination in its
application dated November 1, 2004.
Basis for proposed no significant
hazards consideration determination:
As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), an
analysis of the issue of no significant
hazards consideration is presented
below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a
significant increase in the probability or
consequences of an accident previously
evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change eliminates the
Technical Specifications (TSs) reporting
requirements to provide a monthly operating
letter report of shutdown experience and
operating statistics if the equivalent data is
submitted using an industry electronic
database. It also eliminates the TS reporting
requirement for an annual occupational
radiation exposure report, which provides
information beyond that specified in NRC
regulations. The proposed change involves
no changes to plant systems or accident
analyses. As such, the change is
administrative in nature and does not affect
initiators of analyzed events or assumed
mitigation of accidents or transients.
Therefore, the proposed change does not
involve a significant increase in the
probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the
possibility of a new or different kind of
accident from any accident previously
evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change does not involve a
physical alteration of the plant, add any new
equipment, or require any existing
equipment to be operated in a manner
different from the present design. Therefore,
the proposed change does not create the
possibility of a new or different kind of
accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a
significant reduction in a margin of safety?
Response: No.
This is an administrative change to
reporting requirements of plant operating
information and occupational radiation
exposure data, and has no effect on plant
equipment, operating practices or safety
analyses assumptions. For these reasons, the
proposed change does not involve a
significant reduction in the margin of safety.
Based upon the reasoning presented
above, the requested change does not
involve a significant hazards
consideration.
Attorney for licensee: Richard F.
Locke, Esq., Pacific Gas and Electric
Company, P.O. Box 7442, San
Francisco, California 94120.
NRC Section Chief: Robert A. Gramm.
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PPL Susquehanna, LLC, Docket Nos. 50–
387 and 50–388, Susquehanna Steam
Electric Station, Units 1 and 2, Luzerne
County, Pennsylvania
Date of amendment request:
September 22, 2004.
Description of amendment request:
The proposed change allows entry into
a mode or other specified condition in
the applicability of a Technical
Specification (TS), while in a condition
statement and the associated required
actions of the TS, provided the licensee
performs a risk assessment and manages
risk consistent with the program in
place for complying with the
requirements of Title 10 of the Code of
Federal Regulations (10 CFR), part 50,
§ 50.65(a)(4). Limiting Condition for
Operation (LCO) 3.0.4 exceptions in
individual TSs would be eliminated,
several notes or specific exceptions are
revised to reflect the related changes to
LCO 3.0.4, and Surveillance
Requirement (SR) 3.0.4 is revised to
reflect the LCO 3.0.4 allowance.
This change was proposed by the
industry’s Technical Specification Task
Force (TSTF) and is designated TSTF–
359. The NRC staff issued a notice of
opportunity for comment in the Federal
Register on August 2, 2002 (67 FR
50475), on possible amendments
concerning TSTF–359, including a
model safety evaluation and model no
significant hazards consideration
(NSHC) determination, using the
consolidated line item improvement
process. The NRC staff subsequently
issued a notice of availability of the
models for referencing in license
amendment applications in the Federal
Register on April 4, 2003 (68 FR 16579).
The licensee affirmed the applicability
of the following NSHC determination in
its application dated September 22,
2004.
Basis for proposed no significant
hazards consideration determination:
As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), an
analysis of the issue of no significant
hazards consideration is presented
below:
Criterion 1—The Proposed Change Does Not
Involve a Significant Increase in the
Probability or Consequences of an Accident
Previously Evaluated
The proposed change allows entry into a
mode or other specified condition in the
applicability of a TS, while in a TS condition
statement and the associated required actions
of the TS. Being in a TS condition and the
associated required actions is not an initiator
of any accident previously evaluated.
Therefore, the probability of an accident
previously evaluated is not significantly
increased. The consequences of an accident
while relying on required actions as allowed
by proposed LCO 3.0.4, are no different than
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Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
2895
the consequences of an accident while
entering and relying on the required actions
while starting in a condition of applicability
of the TS. Therefore, the consequences of an
accident previously evaluated are not
significantly affected by this change. The
addition of a requirement to assess and
manage the risk introduced by this change
will further minimize possible concerns.
Therefore, this change does not involve a
significant increase in the probability or
consequences of an accident previously
evaluated.
Criterion 2—The Proposed Change Does Not
Create the Possibility of a New or Different
Kind of Accident From Any Previously
Evaluated
The proposed change does not involve a
physical alteration of the plant (no new or
different type of equipment will be installed).
Entering into a mode or other specified
condition in the applicability of a TS, while
in a TS condition statement and the
associated required actions of the TS, will
not introduce new failure modes or effects
and will not, in the absence of other
unrelated failures, lead to an accident whose
consequences exceed the consequences of
accidents previously evaluated. The addition
of a requirement to assess and manage the
risk introduced by this change will further
minimize possible concerns. Thus, this
change does not create the possibility of a
new or different kind of accident from an
accident previously evaluated.
Criterion 3—The Proposed Change Does Not
Involve a Significant Reduction in a Margin
of Safety
The proposed change allows entry into a
mode or other specified condition in the
applicability of a TS, while in a TS condition
statement and the associated required actions
of the TS. The TS allow operation of the
plant without the full complement of
equipment through the conditions for not
meeting the TS LCO. The risk associated with
this allowance is managed by the imposition
of required actions that must be performed
within the prescribed completion times. The
net effect of being in a TS condition on the
margin of safety is not considered significant.
The proposed change does not alter the
required actions or completion times of the
TS. The proposed change allows TS
conditions to be entered, and the associated
required actions and completion times to be
used in new circumstances. This use is
predicated upon the licensee’s performance
of a risk assessment and the management of
plant risk. The change also eliminates current
allowances for utilizing required actions and
completion times in similar circumstances,
without assessing and managing risk. The net
change to the margin of safety is
insignificant. Therefore, this change does not
involve a significant reduction in a margin of
safety.
The NRC staff proposes to determine
that the amendment request involves no
significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: Bryan A. Snapp,
Esquire, Assoc. General Counsel, PPL
Services Corporation, 2 North Ninth St.,
GENTW3, Allentown, PA 18101–1179.
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NRC Section Chief: Richard J. Laufer.
Southern California Edison Company, et
al., Docket Nos. 50–361 and 50–362,
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station,
Units 2 and 3, San Diego County,
California
Date of amendment requests:
December 10, 2004.
Description of amendment requests:
The proposed amendment will delete
the requirements from the Technical
Specifications (TS) to maintain
hydrogen recombiners and hydrogen
monitors. Licensees were generally
required to implement upgrades as
described in NUREG–0737,
‘‘Clarification of TMI [Three Mile
Island] Action Plan Requirements,’’ and
Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.97,
‘‘Instrumentation for Light-WaterCooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assess
Plant and Environs Conditions During
and Following an Accident.’’
Implementation of these upgrades was
an outcome of the lessons learned from
the accident that occurred at TMI Unit
2. Requirements related to combustible
gas control were imposed by Order for
many facilities and were added to or
included in the TS for nuclear power
reactors currently licensed to operate.
The revised § 50.44 of Title 10 of the
Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR),
‘‘Standards for Combustible Gas Control
System in Light-Water-Cooled Power
Reactors,’’ eliminated the requirements
for hydrogen recombiners and relaxed
safety classifications and licensee
commitments to certain design and
qualification criteria for hydrogen and
oxygen monitors.
The proposed license amendment will
revise TS 3.3.11, ‘‘Post Accident
Monitoring Instrumentation (PAMI),’’ to
delete the Note in Condition C. Also in
TS 3.3.11, Condition D will be deleted.
In TS Table 3.3.11–1, Item 10,
‘‘Containment Hydrogen Monitors,’’ is
deleted. Other TS changes included in
this application are limited to
renumbering and formatting changes
that resulted directly from the deletion
of the above requirements related to
hydrogen monitors. The changes to TS
requirements result in changes to
various TS Bases sections. The TS Bases
changes will be submitted with a future
update in accordance with TS 5.4.4,
‘‘Technical Specifications (TS) Bases
Control.’’
The NRC staff issued a notice of
availability of a model no significant
hazards consideration (NSHC)
determination for referencing in license
amendment applications in the Federal
Register on September 25, 2003 (68 FR
55416). The licensee affirmed the
applicability of the model NSHC
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Jkt 205001
determination in its application dated
December 10, 2004.
Basis for proposed no significant
hazards consideration determination:
As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), an
analysis of the issue of no significant
hazards consideration is presented
below:
Criterion 1—The Proposed Change Does Not
Involve a Significant Increase in the
Probability or Consequences of an Accident
Previously Evaluated
The revised 10 CFR 50.44 no longer defines
a design-basis loss-of-coolant accident
(LOCA) hydrogen release, and eliminates
requirements for hydrogen control systems to
mitigate such a release. The installation of
hydrogen recombiners and/or vent and purge
systems required by 10 CFR 50.44(b)(3) was
intended to address the limited quantity and
rate of hydrogen generation that was
postulated from a design-basis LOCA. The
Commission has found that this hydrogen
release is not risk-significant because the
design-basis LOCA hydrogen release does not
contribute to the conditional probability of a
large release up to approximately 24 hours
after the onset of core damage. In addition,
these systems were ineffective at mitigating
hydrogen releases from risk-significant
accident sequences that could threaten
containment integrity.
With the elimination of the design-basis
LOCA hydrogen release, hydrogen monitors
are no longer required to mitigate designbasis accidents and, therefore, the hydrogen
monitors do not meet the definition of a
safety-related component as defined in 10
CFR 50.2. RG 1.97 Category 1, is intended for
key variables that most directly indicate the
accomplishment of a safety function for
design-basis accident events. The hydrogen
monitors no longer meet the definition of
Category 1 in RG 1.97. As part of the
rulemaking to revise 10 CFR 50.44 the
Commission found that Category 3, as
defined in RG 1.97, is an appropriate
categorization for the hydrogen monitors
because the monitors are required to
diagnose the course of beyond design-basis
accidents.
The regulatory requirements for the
hydrogen monitors can be relaxed without
degrading the plant emergency response. The
emergency response, in this sense, refers to
the methodologies used in ascertaining the
condition of the reactor core, mitigating the
consequences of an accident, assessing and
projecting offsite releases of radioactivity,
and establishing protective action
recommendations to be communicated to
offsite authorities. Classification of the
hydrogen monitors as Category 3, and
removal of the hydrogen monitors from TS
will not prevent an accident management
strategy through the use of the SAMGs
[severe accident management guidelines], the
emergency plan (EP), the emergency
operating procedures (EOP), and site survey
monitoring that support modification of
emergency plan protective action
recommendations (PARs).
Therefore, the elimination of the hydrogen
recombiner requirements and relaxation of
the hydrogen monitor requirements,
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Sfmt 4703
including removal of these requirements
from TS, does not involve a significant
increase in the probability or the
consequences of any accident previously
evaluated.
Criterion 2—The Proposed Change Does Not
Create the Possibility of a New or Different
Kind of Accident From Any Previously
Evaluated
The elimination of the hydrogen
recombiner requirements and relaxation of
the hydrogen monitor requirements,
including removal of these requirements
from TS, will not result in any failure mode
not previously analyzed. The hydrogen
recombiner and hydrogen monitor equipment
was intended to mitigate a design-basis
hydrogen release. The hydrogen recombiner
and hydrogen monitor equipment are not
considered accident precursors, nor does
their existence or elimination have any
adverse impact on the pre-accident state of
the reactor core or post accident confinement
of radionuclides within the containment
building.
Therefore, this change does not create the
possibility of a new or different kind of
accident from any previously evaluated.
Criterion 3—The Proposed Change Does Not
Involve a Significant Reduction in the Margin
of Safety
The elimination of the hydrogen
recombiner requirements and relaxation of
the hydrogen monitor requirements,
including removal of these requirements
from TS, in light of existing plant equipment,
instrumentation, procedures, and programs
that provide effective mitigation of and
recovery from reactor accidents, results in a
neutral impact to the margin of safety.
The installation of hydrogen recombiners
and/or vent and purge systems required by
10 CFR 50.44(b)(3) was intended to address
the limited quantity and rate of hydrogen
generation that was postulated from a designbasis LOCA. The Commission has found that
this hydrogen release is not risk-significant
because the design-basis LOCA hydrogen
release does not contribute to the conditional
probability of a large release up to
approximately 24 hours after the onset of
core damage.
Category 3 hydrogen monitors are adequate
to provide rapid assessment of current
reactor core conditions and the direction of
degradation while effectively responding to
the event in order to mitigate the
consequences of the accident. The intent of
the requirements established as a result of the
TMI, Unit 2 accident can be adequately met
without reliance on safety-related hydrogen
monitors.
Therefore, this change does not
involve a significant reduction in the
margin of safety. Removal of hydrogen
monitoring from TS will not result in a
significant reduction in their
functionality, reliability, and
availability.
Based upon the reasoning presented
above and the previous discussion of
the amendment request, the requested
change does not involve a significant
hazards consideration.
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Attorney for licensee: Douglas K.
Porter, Esquire, Southern California
Edison Company, 2244 Walnut Grove
Avenue, Rosemead, California 91770.
NRC Section Chief: Robert A. Gramm.
Southern California Edison Company, et
al., Docket Nos. 50–361 and 50–362,
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station,
Units 2 and 3, San Diego County,
California
Date of amendment requests:
December 17, 2004.
Description of amendment requests:
The proposed amendments would
revise Technical Specification (TS)
3.8.1, ‘‘AC Sources—Operating,’’ TS
3.8.4, ‘‘DC Sources—Operating,’’ TS
3.8.5, ‘‘DC Sources—Shutdown,’’ TS
3.8.6, ‘‘Battery Cell Parameters,’’ TS
3.8.7, ‘‘Inverters—Operating,’’ and TS
3.8.9, ‘‘Distribution Systems—
Operating.’’ This change will also add a
new Battery Monitoring and
Maintenance Program, section 5.5.2.16.
The proposed change will provide
operational flexibility to credit DC
electrical subsystem design upgrades
that are in progress. These upgrades will
provide increased capacity batteries,
additional battery chargers, and the
means to cross-connect DC subsystems
while meeting all design battery loading
requirements. With these modifications
in place, it will be feasible to perform
routine surveillance as well as battery
replacements online.
Basis for proposed no significant
hazards consideration determination:
As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the
licensee has provided its analysis of the
issue of no significant hazards
consideration, which is presented
below:
1. Will operation of the facility in
accordance with this proposed change
involve a significant increase in the
probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed changes to Technical
Specifications (TS) 3.8.4 and 3.8.6 would
allow extension of the Completion Time (CT)
for inoperable Direct Current (DC)
distribution subsystems to manually crossconnect DC distribution buses of the same
safety train of the operating unit for a period
of 30 days. Currently the CT only allows for
2 hours to ascertain the source of the problem
before a controlled shutdown is initiated.
Loss of a DC subsystem is not an initiator of
an event. However, complete loss of a Train
A (subsystems A and C) or Train B
(subsystems B and D) DC system would
initiate a plant transient/plant trip.
Operation of a DC Train in cross-connected
configuration does not affect the quality of
DC control and motive power to any system.
Therefore, allowing the cross-connect of DC
distribution systems does not significantly
increase the probability of an accident
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previously evaluated in Chapter 15 of the
Updated Final Safety Analysis Report
(UFSAR).
The above conclusion is supported by
Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) evaluation
which encompasses all accidents, including
UFSAR Chapter 15.
Modification to the Frequency for
Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.8.6.1 is
consistent with the recommendations of
TSTF 360 Rev. 1 and IEEE 450–2002, and
similarly does not impact safety
considerations.
Further changes are made of an editorial
nature or provide clarification only. For
example, discussions regarding electrical
‘Trains’ and ‘Subsystems’ will be in more
conventional terminology. Limiting
Condition for Operations (LCOs) affected by
editorial changes include 3.8.1, 3.8.4, 3.8.5,
3.8.6, 3.8.7, and 3.8.9.
Enhancements from TSTF–360, Rev. 1 and
IEEE 450–2002 have been incorporated into
LCOs 3.8.4 and 3.8.6. TSTF–360, Rev. 1 was
previously approved by the NRC, and IEEE
450–2002 includes industry-generic
recommendations.
The changes being proposed do not affect
assumptions contained in other safety
analyses or the physical design of the plant
other than the upgrades of the electrical
systems described in this change, nor do they
affect other Technical Specifications that
preserve safety analysis assumptions.
Therefore, operation of the facility in
accordance with the proposed amendment
would not involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an
accident previously analyzed.
2. Will operation of the facility in
accordance with this proposed change create
the possibility of new or different kind of
accident from any accident previously
evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change to Technical
Specifications 3.8.4 will enable the cross-tie
of subsystems. New equipment, swing battery
chargers, distribution panels, and associated
protective devices are added to increase
overall DC system reliability. Both
administrative and mechanical controls will
be in place to ensure the design and
operation of the DC distribution systems
continue to perform to applicable design
standards. During cross connecting of
subsystem buses, two batteries would be
paralleled for a short duration. An electrical
fault during that duration could exceed the
interrupting duties of the protective devices.
This is standard industry practice during
transfer of power sources and is considered
to be an acceptable minimal risk. For
example, the design of the 1E 4kV power
system is based on this practice as well.
Therefore, the addition of new equipment
does not create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any
previously evaluated.
Enhancements from TSTF–360, Rev. 1 and
IEEE 450–2002 have been incorporated into
LCOs 3.8.4 and 3.8.6. TSTF–360, Rev. 1 is
previously approved and IEEE 450–2002
includes industry-generic recommendations.
Enhancements, including surveillance
intervals or required completion times, will
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2897
not create the possibility of a new or different
kind of accident from any previously
evaluated.
LCOs 3.8.1, 3.8.4, 3.8.5, 3.8.6, 3.8.7, and
3.8.9 are revised to incorporate editorial
changes. Since these changes do not affect
plant design but enhance clarity, these
modifications do not create the possibility of
a new or different kind of accident from any
previously evaluated.
Therefore, operation of the facility in
accordance with this proposed change will
not create the possibility of new or different
kind of accident from any accident
previously evaluated.
3. Will operation of the facility in
accordance with this proposed change
involve a significant reduction in a margin of
safety?
Response: No.
The proposed change does not alter the
bases for assurance that safety-related
activities are performed correctly or the basis
for any Technical Specification that is related
to the establishment of or maintenance of a
safety margin. Specifically, battery sizing
calculations continue to show that new
upgraded capacity batteries will meet the
most limiting load profile that includes
margin for growth, with aging and
temperature correction. Battery modified
performance discharge testing will
demonstrate on an on-going basis that battery
capacity will be greater than or equal to 80%
of original design requirements at all times
during service life and that the service
profiles will be met as is currently required
by Surveillance Requirements 3.8.4.7 and
3.8.4.8. The addition of the DC cross-tie
capability proposed for LCO 3.8.4 will ensure
appropriate operations of the DC buses
during maintenance activities such as battery
testing or replacement. Enhancements from
TSTF–360, Rev. 1 and IEEE 450–2002 have
been incorporated into LCOs 3.8.4 and 3.8.6.
TSTF–360, Rev. 1 is previously approved and
IEEE 450–2002 includes industry-generic
recommendations. Enhancements including
surveillance intervals or required completion
times will not involve a significant reduction
in a margin of safety.
Also, LCOs 3.8.1, 3.8.4, 3.8.5, 3.8.6, 3.8.7,
and 3.8.9 are revised to incorporate editorial
changes. Since these changes do not affect
plant design or operations but should
enhance clarity, these modifications would
not involve a significant reduction in margin
of safety.
Therefore, operation of the facility in
accordance with the proposed amendment
would not involve a significant reduction in
a margin of safety.
The NRC staff has reviewed the
licensee’s analysis and, based on this
review, it appears that the three
standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff
proposes to determine that the
amendment requests involve no
significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: Douglas K.
Porter, Esquire, Southern California
Edison Company, 2244 Walnut Grove
Avenue, Rosemead, California 91770.
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NRC Section Chief: Robert A. Gramm.
Southern Nuclear Operating Company,
Inc., et al., Docket Nos. 50–424 and 50–
425, Vogtle Electric Generating Plant,
Units 1 and 2, Burke County, Georgia
Date of amendment request: October
26, 2004.
Description of amendment request:
The proposed change allows entry into
a mode or other specified condition in
the applicability of a Technical
Specification (TS), while in a condition
statement and the associated required
actions of the TS, provided the licensee
performs a risk assessment and manages
risk consistent with the program in
place for complying with the
requirements of title 10 of the Code of
Federal Regulations (10 CFR) part 50,
§ 50.65(a)(4). Limiting Condition for
Operation (LCO) 3.0.4 exceptions in
individual TSs would be eliminated,
several notes or specific exceptions are
revised to reflect the related changes to
LCO 3.0.4, and Surveillance
Requirement 3.0.4 is revised to reflect
the LCO 3.0.4 allowance.
This change was proposed by the
industry’s Technical Specification Task
Force (TSTF) and is designated TSTF–
359. The NRC staff issued a notice of
opportunity for comment in the Federal
Register on August 2, 2002 (67 FR
50475), on possible amendments
concerning TSTF–359, including a
model safety evaluation and model no
significant hazards consideration
(NSHC) determination, using the
consolidated line item improvement
process. The NRC staff subsequently
issued a notice of availability of the
models for referencing in license
amendment applications in the Federal
Register on April 4, 2003 (68 FR 16579).
The licensee affirmed the applicability
of the following NSHC determination in
its application dated October 26, 2004.
Basis for proposed no significant
hazards consideration determination:
As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), an
analysis of the issue of no significant
hazards consideration is presented
below:
Criterion 1—The Proposed Change Does Not
Involve a Significant Increase in the
Probability or Consequences of an Accident
Previously Evaluated
The proposed change allows entry into a
mode or other specified condition in the
applicability of a TS, while in a TS condition
statement and the associated required actions
of the TS. Being in a TS condition and the
associated required actions is not an initiator
of any accident previously evaluated.
Therefore, the probability of an accident
previously evaluated is not significantly
increased. The consequences of an accident
while relying on required actions as allowed
by proposed LCO 3.0.4, are no different than
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the consequences of an accident while
entering and relying on the required actions
while starting in a condition of applicability
of the TS. Therefore, the consequences of an
accident previously evaluated are not
significantly affected by this change. The
addition of a requirement to assess and
manage the risk introduced by this change
will further minimize possible concerns.
Therefore, this change does not involve a
significant increase in the probability or
consequences of an accident previously
evaluated.
Criterion 2—The Proposed Change Does Not
Create the Possibility of a New or Different
Kind of Accident From Any Previously
Evaluated
The proposed change does not involve a
physical alteration of the plant (no new or
different type of equipment will be installed).
Entering into a mode or other specified
condition in the applicability of a TS, while
in a TS condition statement and the
associated required actions of the TS, will
not introduce new failure modes or effects
and will not, in the absence of other
unrelated failures, lead to an accident whose
consequences exceed the consequences of
accidents previously evaluated. The addition
of a requirement to assess and manage the
risk introduced by this change will further
minimize possible concerns. Thus, this
change does not create the possibility of a
new or different kind of accident from an
accident previously evaluated.
Criterion 3—The Proposed Change Does Not
Involve a Significant Reduction in a Margin
of Safety
The proposed change allows entry into a
mode or other specified condition in the
applicability of a TS, while in a TS condition
statement and the associated required actions
of the TS. The TS allow operation of the
plant without the full complement of
equipment through the conditions for not
meeting the TS LCO. The risk associated with
this allowance is managed by the imposition
of required actions that must be performed
within the prescribed completion times. The
net effect of being in a TS condition on the
margin of safety is not considered significant.
The proposed change does not alter the
required actions or completion times of the
TS. The proposed change allows TS
conditions to be entered, and the associated
required actions and completion times to be
used in new circumstances. This use is
predicated upon the licensee’s performance
of a risk assessment and the management of
plant risk. The change also eliminates current
allowances for utilizing required actions and
completion times in similar circumstances,
without assessing and managing risk. The net
change to the margin of safety is
insignificant. Therefore, this change does not
involve a significant reduction in a margin of
safety.
1. Does the proposed amendment involve
a significant increase in the probability or
consequences of an accident previously
evaluated?
No. The DGs are designed as backup AC
power sources in the event of loss of offsite
power. The proposed DG TS AOT does not
change the conditions, operating
configurations, or minimum amount of
operating equipment assumed in the safety
analysis for accident mitigation. No changes
are proposed in the manner in which the DGs
provide plant protection or which create new
modes of plant operation. In addition, a PSA
[probabilistic safety assessment] evaluation
concluded that the risk contribution of the
DG TS AOT extension is non-risk significant.
Therefore, the proposed amendment does not
involve a significant increase in the
probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
2. Does the proposed amendment create
the possibility of a new or different kind of
accident from any accident previously
evaluated?
No. The proposed amendment does not
introduce new equipment, which could
create a new or different kind of accident. No
new external threats, release pathways, or
equipment failure modes are created.
Therefore, the implementation of the
proposed amendment will not create a
possibility for an accident of a new or
different type than those previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed amendment involve
a significant reduction in a margin of safety?
No. BFN’s emergency AC system is
designed with sufficient redundancy such
that a DG may be removed from service for
maintenance or testing. The remaining DGs
are capable of carrying sufficient electrical
loads to satisfy the UFSAR [Updated Final
Safety Analysis Report] requirements for
accident mitigation or unit safe shutdown.
The NRC staff proposes to determine
that the amendment request involves no
significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: Mr. Arthur H.
Domby, Troutman Sanders,
NationsBank Plaza, Suite 5200, 600
The NRC staff has reviewed the
licensee’s analysis and, based on this
review, it appears that the three
standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff
proposes to determine that the
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Peachtree Street, NE., Atlanta, Georgia
30308–2216.
NRC Section Chief: John A. Nakoski.
Tennessee Valley Authority, Docket No.
50–259, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant,
Unit 1, Limestone County, Alabama
Date of amendment request:
December 6, 2004 (TS 426).
Description of amendment request:
The proposed amendment would revise
the current Unit 1 Diesel Generators
(DG) Allowed Outage Time (AOT) in the
Technical Specifications (TS).
Basis for proposed no significant
hazards consideration determination:
As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the
licensee has provided its analysis of the
issue of no significant hazards
consideration, which is presented
below:
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amendment request involves no
significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: General
Counsel, Tennessee Valley Authority,
400 West Summit Hill Drive, ET 11A,
Knoxville, Tennessee 37902.
NRC Section Chief: Michael L.
Marshall, Jr.
Tennessee Valley Authority, Docket No.
50–259, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant
(BFN), Unit 1, Limestone County,
Alabama
Date of amendment request:
December 6, 2004 (TS 428).
Description of amendment request:
The proposed amendment would revise
the reactor vessel Pressure-Temperature
(P–T) curves depicted in the Technical
Specification (TS) Figure 3.4.9–1 and
adds a new TS Figure 3.4.9–2.
Basis for proposed no significant
hazards consideration determination:
As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the
licensee has provided its analysis of the
issue of no significant hazards
consideration, which is presented
below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a
significant increase in the probability or
consequences of an accident previously
evaluated?
No. The proposed changes deal exclusively
with the reactor vessel P–T curves, which
define the permissible regions for operation
and testing. Failure of the reactor vessel is
not considered as a design basis accident.
Through the design conservatisms used to
calculate the P–T curves, reactor vessel
failure has a low probability of occurrence
and is not considered in the safety analyses.
The proposed changes adjust the reference
temperature for the limiting material to
account for irradiation effects and provide
the same level of protection as previously
evaluated and approved.
The adjusted reference temperature
calculations were performed in accordance
with the requirements of 10 CFR 50
Appendix G using the guidance contained in
Regulatory Guide 1.190, ‘‘Calculational and
Dosimetry Methods for Determining Pressure
Vessel Neutron Fluence,’’ to reflect use of the
operating limits to no more than 16 Effective
Full Power Years (EFPY). These changes do
not alter or prevent the operation of
equipment required to mitigate any accident
analyzed in the BFN Final Safety Analysis
Report.
Therefore, the proposed change does not
involve a significant increase in the
probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the
possibility of a new or different kind of
accident from any accident previously
evaluated?
No. The proposed changes to the reactor
vessel P–T curves do not involve a
modification to plant equipment. No new
failure modes are introduced. There is no
effect on the function of any plant system,
and no new system interactions are
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introduced by this change. Therefore, the
proposed change does not create the
possibility of a new or different kind of
accident from any previously evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a
significant reduction in a margin of safety?
No. The proposed curves conform to the
guidance contained in Regulatory Guide (RG)
1.190, ‘‘Calculational and Dosimetry Methods
for Determining Pressure Vessel Neutron
Fluence,’’ and maintain the safety margins
specified in 10 CFR 50 Appendix G.
Therefore, the proposed change does not
involve a significant reduction in a margin of
safety.
The NRC staff has reviewed the
licensee’s analysis and, based on this
review, it appears that the three
standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff
proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves no
significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: General
Counsel, Tennessee Valley Authority,
400 West Summit Hill Drive, ET 11A,
Knoxville, Tennessee 37902.
NRC Section Chief: Michael L.
Marshall, Jr.
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA),
Docket No. 50–328, Sequoyah Nuclear
Plant, Unit 2, Hamilton County,
Tennessee
Date of amendment request:
December 2, 2004.
Description of amendment request:
The proposed amendment would revise
Technical Specification (TS) 3/4.4.5,
‘‘Steam Generators,’’ including
associated Bases 3/4.4.5 to change the
inspection scope of steam generator
tubing in the Westinghouse Electric
Company explosive tube expansion
region below the top of the tubesheet.
Additionally, the proposed TS change
removes the axial primary water stress
corrosion cracking at dented tube
support plate alternate repair criteria
and the associated note for the
exclusion made for Unit 2 Cycle 12
operation only and changes the current
definition of plugging limit to exclude
possible indications below the W*
distance.
Basis for proposed no significant
hazards consideration determination:
As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the
licensee has provided its analysis of the
issue of no significant hazards
consideration, which is presented
below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a
significant increase in the probability or
consequences of an accident previously
evaluated?
Response: No.
Of the various accidents previously
evaluated, the proposed changes only affect
the steam generator tube rupture (SGTR)
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2899
event evaluation and the postulated steam
line break (SLB) accident evaluation. Loss-ofcoolant accident (LOCA) conditions cause a
compressive axial load to act on the tube.
Therefore, since the LOCA tends to force the
tube into the tubesheet rather than pull it out,
it is not a factor in this amendment request.
Another faulted load consideration is a safe
shutdown earthquake (SSE); however, the
seismic analysis of Westinghouse 51 series
SGs has shown that axial loading of the tubes
is negligible during an SSE.
TVA’s amendment request takes credit for
how the tubesheet enhances the tube
integrity in the Westinghouse Electric
Company explosive tube expansion
(WEXTEX) region by precluding tube
deformation beyond its initial expanded
outside diameter. For the SGTR and SLB
events, the required structural margins of the
SG tubes will be maintained due to the
presence of the tubesheet. Tube rupture is
precluded for axial cracks in the WEXTEX
region due to the constraint provided by the
tubesheet. Therefore, the normal operating
3DP margin and the postulated accident
1.43DP margin against burst are maintained.
The W* length supplies the necessary
resistive force to preclude pullout loads
under both normal operating and accident
conditions. The contact pressure results from
the WEXTEX expansion process, thermal
expansion mismatch between the tube and
tubesheet, and from the differential pressure
between the primary and secondary side.
Therefore, the proposed change results in no
significant increase in the probability or the
occurrence of an SGTR or SLB accident.
The proposed changes do not affect other
systems, structures, components or
operational features. Therefore, based on the
above evaluation, the proposed changes do
not involve a significant increase in the
probability of an accident previously
evaluated.
The consequences of an SGTR event are
primarily affected by the primary-tosecondary flow rate and the time duration of
the primary-to-secondary flow during the
event. Primary-to-secondary flow rate
through a postulated ruptured tube (i.e.,
complete severance of a single SG tube) is not
affected by the proposed change since the
flow rate is based on the inside diameter of
a SG tube and the pressure differential.
TVA’s amendment request does not change
either of these. The duration of primary-tosecondary leakage is based on the time
required for an operator to determine that a
SGTR has occurred, the time to identify and
isolate the faulty SG, and ensure termination
of radioactive release to the atmosphere from
the faulty SG. TVA’s amendment request
does not affect the duration of the primaryto-secondary leakage because it does not
change the control room indicators with
which an operator would determine that an
SGTR has occurred. The consequences of an
SGTR are secondarily affected by primary-tosecondary leakage, which could occur due to
axial cracks remaining in service in the
WEXTEX region in a non-faulted SG. During
a SGTR, the primary-to-secondary differential
pressure is less than or equal to the normal
operating differential pressure; therefore, the
primary-to-secondary leakage due to axial
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cracks in the WEXTEX region of a nonfaulted SG during a SGTR would be less than
or equal to the primary-to-secondary leakage
experienced during normal operation.
Primary-to-secondary leakage is considered
in the calculation determining the
consequences of a SGTR and the value is
bounding.
The postulated SLB has the greatest
primary-to-secondary pressure differential,
and therefore could experience the greatest
primary-to-secondary leakage. TVA’s
amendment request requires the aggregate
leakage, (i.e., the combined leakage for the
tubes with service induced degradation
inside the tubesheet) plus the combined
leakage developed by other ARC [alternate
repair criteria], to remain below the
maximum allowable SLB primary-tosecondary leakage rate limit such that the
doses are maintained to less than a fraction
of the 10 CFR 100 limits and also less than
the general design criteria (GDC)—19 limits.
TVA’s proposed change also removes the
existing axial PWSCC [primary water stress
corrosion cracking] at dented tube support
plate ARC and removes the exclusion made
for Unit 2 Cycle 12 operation only from the
TS. This ARC was not used on Unit 2 and
was only intended through the Unit 2 Cycle
12 operation. Therefore, this change is
inherently more conservative.
Therefore, the proposed change does not
involve a significant increase in the
probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the
possibility of a new or different kind of
accident from any accident previously
evaluated?
Response: No.
TVA’s amendment request does not
introduce any physical changes to the
Sequoyah Unit 2 SGs. TVA’s amendment
request takes credit for how the tubesheet
enhances the SG tube integrity in the
WEXTEX region by precluding tube
deformation beyond its initial expanded
outside. Removal of the existing PWSCC
axial at dented tube support plate ARC
incorporates the more conservative TS limit
for SG tube plugging. A failure to meet SG
tube integrity results in an SGTR. Because
degradation detected within the WEXTEX
region are required to be plugged, it is highly
unlikely that a W* tube would fail as a result
of a circumferential defect. Therefore a tube
severance, which would strike neighboring
tubes and create a multiple tube rupture, is
not credible.
The proposed change does not introduce
any new equipment or any change to existing
equipment. No new effects on existing
equipment are created.
Based on the above evaluation, the
proposed changes do not create the
possibility of a new or different kind of
accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
Therefore, the proposed change does not
create the possibility of a new or different
kind of accident from any previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a
significant reduction in a margin of safety?
Response: No.
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The amendment request maintains the
structural margins of the SG tubes for both
normal and accident conditions that are
required by Regulatory Guide 1.121.
For cracking located within the tubesheet,
tube burst is precluded due to the presence
of the tubesheet. WCAP–14797 defines a
length, W*, of degradation free expanded
tubing that provides the necessary resistance
to tube pullout due to the pressure induced
forces (with applicable safety factor applied).
Application of the W* methodology will
preclude unacceptable primary-to-secondary
leakage during all plant conditions. The
methodology for determining leakage
provides for large margins between
calculated and actual leakage values in the
W* criteria. TVA’s proposed change to
remove PWSCC ARC from the TS does not
compromise structural integrity or leakage
integrity of SG tubes.
Based on the above, it is concluded that the
proposed changes do not result in a
significant reduction of margin with respect
to plant safety as defined in the safety
analysis report or TSs.
Therefore, the proposed change does not
involve a significant reduction in a margin of
safety.
The NRC staff has reviewed the
licensee’s analysis and, based on this
review, it appears that the three
standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff
proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves no
significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: General
Counsel, Tennessee Valley Authority,
400 West Summit Hill Drive, ET 11A,
Knoxville, Tennessee 37902.
NRC Section Chief: Michael L.
Marshall, Jr.
Tennessee Valley Authority, Docket
Nos. 50–327 and 50–328, Sequoyah
Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, Hamilton
County, Tennessee
Date of amendment request:
September 30, 2004.
Description of amendment request:
The proposed amendment would revise
the technical specifications to relocate
the requirements for the emergency
diesel generator start loss of power
instrumentation and associated actions
in the engineering safety features tables
to a new limiting conditions for
operation (LCO). In addition, an upper
allowable value has been added to the
voltage sensors for loss of voltage and
degraded voltage consistent with
Technical Specification Task Force
(TSTF) Item TSTF–365 along with a
lower allowable value limit for the
degraded voltage diesel generator start
and load shed timer. The auxiliary
feedwater loss of power start setpoints
and allowable values have been
relocated to this new LCO.
Basis for proposed no significant
hazards consideration determination:
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As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the
licensee has provided its analysis of the
issue of no significant hazards
consideration, which is presented
below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a
significant increase in the probability or
consequences of an accident previously
evaluated?
Response: No.
The relocation and enhancement of the
loss of power functions to a new LCO does
not alter the intended functions of this
feature or physically alter these systems.
Changes to Avs [allowable values] have been
evaluated in accordance with TVA
[Tennessee Valley Authority] setpoint
methodology and have been verified to
acceptably protect the associated safety
limits. Format changes provide a clearer
representation of the requirements and
provide more consistency with the standard
TSs [Technical Specifications] in NUREG–
1431. The EDG [emergency diesel generator]
and AFW [auxiliary feedwater] start
functions provided by this instrumentation
are utilized for the mitigation of accident
conditions and are not considered to be a
potential source for accident generation.
Additionally, these start functions are
enhanced by the addition of an upper
allowable value limit such that the accident
mitigation functions are not challenged
unnecessarily. This further assures the ability
to mitigate accidents and maintain acceptable
offsite dose limits. These changes continue to
support or improve the required safety
functions; therefore, the proposed change
does not involve a significant increase in the
probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the
possibility of a new or different kind of
accident from any accident previously
evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed changes for the loss of power
instrumentation will not alter plant
processes, components, or operating
practices. The function to start the EDGs and
AFW pumps on a loss of voltage or degraded
voltage to the shutdown boards will not be
altered by the proposed change.
Additionally, the EDGs and AFW system is
not considered to be a source for the
generation of postulated accidents. Therefore,
the proposed change does not create the
possibility of a new or different kind of
accident from any previously evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a
significant reduction in a margin of safety?
Response: No.
The proposed changes do not alter any
plant settings or functions that are utilized to
mitigate accident conditions. The enhanced
allowable values for the voltage sensors help
to prevent unnecessary actuation of
mitigation systems to ensure their ability to
respond to actual accident conditions. The
parameters that ensure the required margin of
safety will be maintained with the proposed
changes or improved. Therefore, the
proposed change does not involve a
significant reduction in a margin of safety.
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The NRC staff has reviewed the
licensee’s analysis and, based on this
review, it appears that the three
standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff
proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves no
significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: General
Counsel, Tennessee Valley Authority,
400 West Summit Hill Drive, ET 11A,
Knoxville, Tennessee 37902.
NRC Section Chief: Michael L.
Marshall, Jr.
Tennessee Valley Authority, Docket
Nos. 50–327 and 50–328, Sequoyah
Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, Hamilton
County, Tennessee
Date of amendment request:
December 2, 2004.
Description of amendment request:
The proposed change allows entry into
a mode or other specified condition in
the applicability of a Technical
Specification (TS), while in a condition
statement and the associated required
actions of the TS, provided the licensee
performs a risk assessment and manages
risk consistent with the program in
place for complying with the
requirements of title 10 of the Code of
Federal Regulations (10 CFR), part 50,
§ 50.65(a)(4). Limiting Condition for
Operation (LCO) 3.0.4 exceptions in
individual TSs would be eliminated,
several notes or specific exceptions are
revised to reflect the related changes to
LCO 3.0.4, and Surveillance
Requirement (SR) 3.0.4 is revised to
reflect the LCO 3.0.4 allowance.
This change was proposed by the
industry’s Technical Specification Task
Force (TSTF) and is designated TSTF–
359. The NRC staff issued a notice of
opportunity for comment in the Federal
Register on August 2, 2002 (67 FR
50475), on possible amendments
concerning TSTF–359, including a
model safety evaluation and model no
significant hazards consideration
(NSHC) determination, using the
consolidated line item improvement
process. The NRC staff subsequently
issued a notice of availability of the
models for referencing in license
amendment applications in the Federal
Register on April 4, 2003 (68 FR 16579).
The licensee affirmed the applicability
of the following NSHC determination in
its application dated December 2, 2004.
Basis for proposed no significant
hazards consideration determination:
As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), an
analysis of the issue of no significant
hazards consideration is presented
below:
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Criterion 1—The Proposed Change Does Not
Involve a Significant Increase in the
Probability or Consequences of an Accident
Previously Evaluated
The proposed change allows entry into a
mode or other specified condition in the
applicability of a TS, while in a TS condition
statement and the associated required actions
of the TS. Being in a TS condition and the
associated required actions is not an initiator
of any accident previously evaluated.
Therefore, the probability of an accident
previously evaluated is not significantly
increased. The consequences of an accident
while relying on required actions as allowed
by proposed LCO 3.0.4, are no different than
the consequences of an accident while
entering and relying on the required actions
while starting in a condition of applicability
of the TS. Therefore, the consequences of an
accident previously evaluated are not
significantly affected by this change. The
addition of a requirement to assess and
manage the risk introduced by this change
will further minimize possible concerns.
Therefore, this change does not involve a
significant increase in the probability or
consequences of an accident previously
evaluated.
Criterion 2—The Proposed Change Does Not
Create the Possibility of a New or Different
Kind of Accident From Any Previously
Evaluated
The proposed change does not involve a
physical alteration of the plant (no new or
different type of equipment will be installed).
Entering into a mode or other specified
condition in the applicability of a TS, while
in a TS condition statement and the
associated required actions of the TS, will
not introduce new failure modes or effects
and will not, in the absence of other
unrelated failures, lead to an accident whose
consequences exceed the consequences of
accidents previously evaluated. The addition
of a requirement to assess and manage the
risk introduced by this change will further
minimize possible concerns. Thus, this
change does not create the possibility of a
new or different kind of accident from an
accident previously evaluated.
Criterion 3—The Proposed Change Does Not
Involve a Significant Reduction in a Margin
of Safety
The proposed change allows entry into a
mode or other specified condition in the
applicability of a TS, while in a TS condition
statement and the associated required actions
of the TS. The TS allow operation of the
plant without the full complement of
equipment through the conditions for not
meeting the TS LCO. The risk associated with
this allowance is managed by the imposition
of required actions that must be performed
within the prescribed completion times. The
net effect of being in a TS condition on the
margin of safety is not considered significant.
The proposed change does not alter the
required actions or completion times of the
TS. The proposed change allows TS
conditions to be entered, and the associated
required actions and completion times to be
used in new circumstances. This use is
predicated upon the licensee’s performance
of a risk assessment and the management of
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plant risk. The change also eliminates current
allowances for utilizing required actions and
completion times in similar circumstances,
without assessing and managing risk. The net
change to the margin of safety is
insignificant. Therefore, this change does not
involve a significant reduction in a margin of
safety.
The NRC staff proposes to determine
that the amendment request involves no
significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: General
Counsel, Tennessee Valley Authority,
400 West Summit Hill Drive, ET 11A,
Knoxville, Tennessee 37902.
NRC Section Chief: Michael L.
Marshall, Jr.
Tennessee Valley Authority, Docket No.
50–390, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 1,
Rhea County, Tennessee
Date of amendment request:
September 15, 2004.
Description of amendment request:
The proposed change allows entry into
a mode or other specified condition in
the applicability of a Technical
Specification (TS), while in a condition
statement and the associated required
actions of the TS, provided the licensee
performs a risk assessment and manages
risk consistent with the program in
place for complying with the
requirements of title 10 of the Code of
Federal Regulations (10 CFR), part 50,
§ 50.65(a)(4). Limiting Condition for
Operation (LCO) 3.0.4 exceptions in
individual TSs would be eliminated,
several notes or specific exceptions are
revised to reflect the related changes to
LCO 3.0.4, and Surveillance
Requirement (SR) 3.0.4 is revised to
reflect the LCO 3.0.4 allowance.
This change was proposed by the
industry’s Technical Specification Task
Force (TSTF) and is designated TSTF–
359. The NRC staff issued a notice of
opportunity for comment in the Federal
Register on August 2, 2002 (67 FR
50475), on possible amendments
concerning TSTF–359, including a
model safety evaluation and model no
significant hazards consideration
(NSHC) determination, using the
consolidated line item improvement
process. The NRC staff subsequently
issued a notice of availability of the
models for referencing in license
amendment applications in the Federal
Register on April 4, 2003 (68 FR 16579).
The licensee affirmed the applicability
of the following NSHC determination in
its application dated September 15,
2004.
Basis for proposed no significant
hazards consideration determination:
As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), an
analysis of the issue of no significant
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hazards consideration is presented
below:
Criterion 1—The Proposed Change Does Not
Involve a Significant Increase in the
Probability or Consequences of an Accident
Previously Evaluated
The proposed change allows entry into a
mode or other specified condition in the
applicability of a TS, while in a TS condition
statement and the associated required actions
of the TS. Being in a TS condition and the
associated required actions is not an initiator
of any accident previously evaluated.
Therefore, the probability of an accident
previously evaluated is not significantly
increased. The consequences of an accident
while relying on required actions as allowed
by proposed LCO 3.0.4, are no different than
the consequences of an accident while
entering and relying on the required actions
while starting in a condition of applicability
of the TS. Therefore, the consequences of an
accident previously evaluated are not
significantly affected by this change. The
addition of a requirement to assess and
manage the risk introduced by this change
will further minimize possible concerns.
Therefore, this change does not involve a
significant increase in the probability or
consequences of an accident previously
evaluated.
Criterion 2—The Proposed Change Does Not
Create the Possibility of a New or Different
Kind of Accident From Any Previously
Evaluated
The proposed change does not involve a
physical alteration of the plant (no new or
different type of equipment will be installed).
Entering into a mode or other specified
condition in the applicability of a TS, while
in a TS condition statement and the
associated required actions of the TS, will
not introduce new failure modes or effects
and will not, in the absence of other
unrelated failures, lead to an accident whose
consequences exceed the consequences of
accidents previously evaluated. The addition
of a requirement to assess and manage the
risk introduced by this change will further
minimize possible concerns. Thus, this
change does not create the possibility of a
new or different kind of accident from an
accident previously evaluated.
Criterion 3—The Proposed Change Does Not
Involve a Significant Reduction in a Margin
of Safety
The proposed change allows entry into a
mode or other specified condition in the
applicability of a TS, while in a TS condition
statement and the associated required actions
of the TS. The TS allow operation of the
plant without the full complement of
equipment through the conditions for not
meeting the TS LCO. The risk associated with
this allowance is managed by the imposition
of required actions that must be performed
within the prescribed completion times. The
net effect of being in a TS condition on the
margin of safety is not considered significant.
The proposed change does not alter the
required actions or completion times of the
TS. The proposed change allows TS
conditions to be entered, and the associated
required actions and completion times to be
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used in new circumstances. This use is
predicated upon the licensee’s performance
of a risk assessment and the management of
plant risk. The change also eliminates current
allowances for utilizing required actions and
completion times in similar circumstances,
without assessing and managing risk. The net
change to the margin of safety is
insignificant. Therefore, this change does not
involve a significant reduction in a margin of
safety.
The NRC staff proposes to determine
that the amendment request involves no
significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: General
Counsel, Tennessee Valley Authority,
400 West Summit Hill Drive, ET 11A,
Knoxville, Tennessee 37902.
NRC Section Chief: Michael L.
Marshall, Jr.
Tennessee Valley Authority, Docket No.
50–390, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 1,
Rhea County, Tennessee
Date of amendment request:
November 8, 2004.
Description of amendment request:
The requested change will delete
Technical Specification (TS) 5.9.1,
‘‘Occupational Radiation Exposure
Report,’’ and TS 5.9.4, ‘‘Monthly
Operating Reports.’’
The NRC staff issued a notice of
availability of a model no significant
hazards consideration (NSHC)
determination for referencing in license
amendment applications in the Federal
Register on June 23, 2004 (69 FR 35067).
The licensee affirmed the applicability
of the model NSHC determination in its
application dated November 8, 2004.
Basis for proposed no significant
hazards consideration determination:
As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), an
analysis of the issue of no significant
hazards consideration is presented
below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a
significant increase in the probability or
consequences of an accident previously
evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change eliminates the
Technical Specifications (TSs) reporting
requirements to provide a monthly operating
letter report of shutdown experience and
operating statistics if the equivalent data is
submitted using an industry electronic
database. It also eliminates the TS reporting
requirement for an annual occupational
radiation exposure report, which provides
information beyond that specified in NRC
regulations. The proposed change involves
no changes to plant systems or accident
analyses. As such, the change is
administrative in nature and does not affect
initiators of analyzed events or assumed
mitigation of accidents or transients.
Therefore, the proposed change does not
involve a significant increase in the
probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
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2. Does the proposed change create the
possibility of a new or different kind of
accident from any accident previously
evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change does not involve a
physical alteration of the plant, add any new
equipment, or require any existing
equipment to be operated in a manner
different from the present design. Therefore,
the proposed change does not create the
possibility of a new or different kind of
accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a
significant reduction in a margin of safety?
Response: No.
This is an administrative change to
reporting requirements of plant operating
information and occupational radiation
exposure data, and has no effect on plant
equipment, operating practices or safety
analyses assumptions. For these reasons, the
proposed change does not involve a
significant reduction in the margin of safety.
Based upon the reasoning presented
above, the requested change does not
involve significant hazards
consideration.
Attorney for licensee: General
Counsel, Tennessee Valley Authority,
400 West Summit Hill Drive, ET 11A,
Knoxville, Tennessee 37902.
NRC Section Chief: Michael L.
Marshall, Jr.
Virginia Electric and Power Company,
Docket Nos. 50–338 and 50–339, North
Anna Power Station, Units No. 1 and
No. 2, Louisa County, Virginia; Docket
Nos. 50–280 and 50–281, Surry Power
Station, Units No. 1 and 2, Surry
County, VA
Date of amendment request:
September 8, 2004.
Description of amendment request:
The proposed amendments delete the
requirements from the technical
specifications (TS) to maintain
hydrogen recombiners (North Anna
Power Station only) and hydrogen
monitors (North Anna and Surry Power
Stations). Licensees were generally
required to implement upgrades as
described in NUREG–0737,
‘‘Clarification of TMI [Three Mile
Island] Action Plan Requirements,’’ and
Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.97,
‘‘Instrumentation for Light-WaterCooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assess
Plant and Environs Conditions During
and Following an Accident.’’
Implementation of these upgrades was
an outcome of the lessons learned from
the accident that occurred at TMI, Unit
2. Requirements related to combustible
gas control were imposed by Order for
many facilities and were added to or
included in the TS for nuclear power
reactors currently licensed to operate.
The revised title 10 of the Code of
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Federal Regulations (10 CFR), § 50.44,
‘‘Standards for Combustible Gas Control
System in Light-Water-Cooled Power
Reactors,’’ eliminated the requirements
for hydrogen recombiners and relaxed
safety classifications and licensee
commitments to certain design and
qualification criteria for hydrogen and
oxygen monitors.
The NRC staff issued a notice of
availability of a model no significant
hazards consideration determination for
referencing in license amendment
applications in the Federal Register on
September 25, 2003 (68 FR 55416). The
licensee affirmed the applicability of the
model NSHC determination in its
application dated September 8, 2004.
Basis for proposed no significant
hazards consideration determination:
As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), an
analysis of the issue of no significant
hazards consideration is presented
below:
Criterion 1—The Proposed Change Does Not
Involve a Significant Increase in the
Probability or Consequences of an Accident
Previously Evaluated
The revised 10 CFR 50.44 no longer defines
a design-basis loss-of-coolant accident
(LOCA) hydrogen release, and eliminates
requirements for hydrogen control systems to
mitigate such a release. The installation of
hydrogen recombiners and/or vent and purge
systems required by 10 CFR 50.44(b)(3) was
intended to address the limited quantity and
rate of hydrogen generation that was
postulated from a design-basis LOCA. The
Commission has found that this hydrogen
release is not risk-significant because the
design-basis LOCA hydrogen release does not
contribute to the conditional probability of a
large release up to approximately 24 hours
after the onset of core damage. In addition,
these systems were ineffective at mitigating
hydrogen releases from risk-significant
accident sequences that could threaten
containment integrity.
With the elimination of the design-basis
LOCA hydrogen release, hydrogen monitors
are no longer required to mitigate designbasis accidents and, therefore, the hydrogen
monitors do not meet the definition of a
safety-related component as defined in 10
CFR 50.2. Category 1 in RG 1.97 is intended
for key variables that most directly indicate
the accomplishment of a safety function for
design-basis accident events. The hydrogen
monitors no longer meet the definition of
Category 1 in RG 1.97. As part of the
rulemaking to revise 10 CFR 50.44 the
Commission found that Category 3, as
defined in RG 1.97, is an appropriate
categorization for the hydrogen monitors
because the monitors are required to
diagnose the course of beyond design-basis
accidents.
The regulatory requirements for the
hydrogen monitors can be relaxed without
degrading the plant emergency response. The
emergency response, in this sense, refers to
the methodologies used in ascertaining the
condition of the reactor core, mitigating the
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consequences of an accident, assessing and
projecting offsite releases of radioactivity,
and establishing protective action
recommendations to be communicated to
offsite authorities. Classification of the
hydrogen monitors as Category 3, and
removal of the hydrogen monitors from TS
will not prevent an accident management
strategy through the use of the severe
accident management guidelines (SAMGs),
the emergency plan (EP), the emergency
operating procedures (EOP), and site survey
monitoring that support modification of
emergency plan protective action
recommendations (PARs).
Therefore, the elimination of the hydrogen
recombiner requirements and relaxation of
the hydrogen monitor requirements,
including removal of these requirements
from TS, does not involve a significant
increase in the probability or the
consequences of any accident previously
evaluated.
Criterion 2—The Proposed Change Does Not
Create the Possibility of a New or Different
Kind of Accident From Any Previously
Evaluated
The elimination of the hydrogen
recombiner requirements and relaxation of
the hydrogen monitor requirements,
including removal of these requirements
from TS, will not result in any failure mode
not previously analyzed. The hydrogen
recombiner and hydrogen monitor equipment
was intended to mitigate a design-basis
hydrogen release. The hydrogen recombiner
and hydrogen monitor equipment are not
considered accident precursors, nor does
their existence or elimination have any
adverse impact on the pre-accident state of
the reactor core or post accident confinement
of radionuclides within the containment
building.
Therefore, this change does not create the
possibility of a new or different kind of
accident from any previously evaluated.
Criterion 3—The Proposed Change Does Not
Involve a Significant Reduction in the Margin
of Safety
The elimination of the hydrogen
recombiner requirements and relaxation of
the hydrogen monitor requirements,
including removal of these requirements
from TS, in light of existing plant equipment,
instrumentation, procedures, and programs
that provide effective mitigation of and
recovery from reactor accidents, results in a
neutral impact to the margin of safety.
The installation of hydrogen recombiners
and/or vent and purge systems required by
10 CFR 50.44(b)(3) was intended to address
the limited quantity and rate of hydrogen
generation that was postulated from a designbasis LOCA. The Commission has found that
this hydrogen release is not risk-significant
because the design-basis LOCA hydrogen
release does not contribute to the conditional
probability of a large release up to
approximately 24 hours after the onset of
core damage.
Category 3 hydrogen monitors are adequate
to provide rapid assessment of current
reactor core conditions and the direction of
degradation while effectively responding to
the event in order to mitigate the
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2903
consequences of the accident. The intent of
the requirements established as a result of the
TMI, Unit 2 accident can be adequately met
without reliance on safety-related hydrogen
monitors.
Therefore, this change does not involve a
significant reduction in the margin of safety.
Removal of hydrogen monitoring from TS
will not result in a significant reduction in
their functionality, reliability, and
availability.
The NRC staff proposes to determine
that the amendment requests involve no
significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: Ms. Lillian M.
Cuoco, Esq., Senior Counsel, Dominion
Resources Services, Inc., Millstone
Power Station, Building 475, 5th Floor,
Rope Ferry Road, Rt. 156, Waterford,
Connecticut 06385.
NRC Section Chief: John A. Nakoski.
Virginia Electric and Power Company,
Docket Nos. 50–338 and 50–339, North
Anna Power Station, Units No. 1 and
No. 2, Louisa County, Virginia; Docket
Nos. 5050–280 and 50–281, Surry Power
Station, Unit No. 1 and No. 2, Surry
County, Virginia
Date of amendment request:
December 21, 2004.
Description of amendment request:
The requested change will delete
Technical Specification requirements
for the licensee to submit annual
occupational radiation exposure reports
and monthly operating reports.
The NRC staff issued a notice of
availability of a model no significant
hazards consideration (NSHC)
determination for referencing in license
amendment applications in the Federal
Register on June 23, 2004 (69 FR 35067).
The licensee affirmed the applicability
of the model NSHC determination in its
application dated December 21, 2004.
Basis for proposed no significant
hazards consideration determination:
As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), an
analysis of the issue of no significant
hazards consideration is presented
below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a
significant increase in the probability or
consequences of an accident previously
evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change eliminates the
Technical Specifications (TSs) reporting
requirements to provide a monthly operating
letter report of shutdown experience and
operating statistics if the equivalent data is
submitted using an industry electronic
database. It also eliminates the TS reporting
requirement for an annual occupational
radiation exposure report, which provides
information beyond that specified in NRC
regulations. The proposed change involves
no changes to plant systems or accident
analyses. As such, the change is
administrative in nature and does not affect
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initiators of analyzed events or assumed
mitigation of accidents or transients.
Therefore, the proposed change does not
involve a significant increase in the
probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
Does the proposed change create the
possibility of a new or different kind of
accident from any accident previously
evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change does not involve a
physical alteration of the plant, add any new
equipment, or require any existing
equipment to be operated in a manner
different from the present design. Therefore,
the proposed change does not create the
possibility of a new or different kind of
accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a
significant reduction in a margin of safety?
Response: No.
This is an administrative change to
reporting requirements of plant operating
information and occupational radiation
exposure data, and has no effect on plant
equipment, operating practices or safety
analyses assumptions. For these reasons, the
proposed change does not involve a
significant reduction in the margin of safety.
Based upon the reasoning presented
above, the requested change does not
involve significance hazards
consideration.
Attorney for licensee: Ms. Lillian M.
Cuoco, Esq., Senior Counsel, Dominion
Resources Services, Inc., Millstone
Power Station, Building 475, 5th Floor,
Rope Ferry Road, Rt. 156, Waterford,
Connecticut 06385.
NRC Section Chief: John A. Nakoski.
Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating
Corporation, Docket No. 50–482, Wolf
Creek Generating Station, Coffey
County, Kansas
Date of amendment request:
December 13, 2004.
Description of amendment request:
This amendment would revise
Technical Specification Surveillance
Requirement (SR) 3.8.1.7 (fast-start test),
SR 3.8.1.12 (safety injection actuation
signal test), SR 3.8.1.15 (hot restart test),
and SR 3.8.1.20 (redundant unit test) to
clarify what voltage and frequency
limits are applicable during the
transient and steady state portions of the
diesel generator (DG) start testing
performed by these SRs.
Basis for proposed no significant
hazards consideration determination:
As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the
licensee has provided its analysis of the
issue of no significant hazards
consideration, which is presented
below:
1. The proposed change does not involve
a significant increase in the probability or
consequences of an accident previously
evaluated.
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The proposed change does not affect the
DGs ability to supply the minimum voltage
and frequency within 12 seconds or the
steady state voltage and frequency. The DGs
will continue to perform their intended
safety function, in accordance with the safety
analysis. The design of plant equipment is
not being modified by the proposed change.
In addition, the DGs and their associated
emergency loads are accident mitigating
features. As such, testing of the DGs
themselves is not associated with any
potential accident-initiating mechanism.
The proposed changes do not adversely
affect accident initiators or precursors nor
alter the design assumptions, conditions, or
configuration of the facility or the manner in
which the plant is operated and maintained.
The proposed changes do not alter or prevent
the ability of structures, systems, and
components (SSCs) from performing their
intended function to mitigate the
consequences of an initiating event within
the assumed acceptance limits. The proposed
changes do not affect the source term,
containment isolation, or radiological release
assumptions used in evaluating the
radiological consequences of an accident
previously evaluated. Further, the proposed
changes do not increase the types or amounts
of radioactive effluent that may be released
offsite, nor significantly increase individual
or cumulative occupational [or] public
radiation exposures. The proposed changes
are consistent with the safety analysis
assumptions and resultant consequences.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not
involve a significant increase in the
probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
2. The proposed change does not create the
possibility of a new or different accident
from any accident previously evaluated.
The proposed change revises surveillance
requirements to clarify what voltage and
frequency limits are applicable during the
transient and steady state portions of the DG
start testing. No changes are being made in
equipment hardware, operational
philosophy, testing frequency, system
operation, or how the DGs are physically
tested.
The proposed changes do not result in a
change in the manner in which the electrical
distribution subsystems provide plant
protection. The changes do not alter
assumptions made in the safety analysis. The
proposed changes are consistent with the
safety analysis assumptions and current plant
operating practice.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not
create the possibility of a new or different
kind of accident from any accident
previously evaluated.
3. The proposed change does not involve
a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
The margin of safety is related to the
confidence in the ability of the fission
product barriers to perform their design
functions during and following an accident
situation. These barriers include the fuel
cladding, the reactor coolant system, and the
containment system. The proposed change
does not directly affect these barriers, nor do
they involve any significantly adverse impact
on the DGs which serve to support these
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barriers in the event of an accident
concurrent with a loss of offsite power.
The proposed change does not alter the
manner in which safety limits, limiting safety
system settings or limiting conditions for
operation are determined. The safety analysis
acceptance criteria are not impacted by these
changes. The proposed changes will not
result in plant operation in a configuration
outside the design basis.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not
involve a significant reduction in the margin
of safety.
The NRC staff has reviewed the
licensee’s analysis and, based on this
review, it appears that the three
standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff
proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves no
significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: Jay Silberg, Esq.,
Shaw, Pittman, Potts and Trowbridge,
2300 N Street, NW., Washington, DC
20037.
NRC Section Chief: Robert A. Gramm.
Previously Published Notices of
Consideration of Issuance of
Amendments to Facility Operating
Licenses, Proposed No Significant
Hazards Consideration Determination,
and Opportunity for a Hearing
The following notices were previously
published as separate individual
notices. The notice content was the
same as above. They were published as
individual notices either because time
did not allow the Commission to wait
for this biweekly notice or because the
action involved exigent circumstances.
They are repeated here because the
biweekly notice lists all amendments
issued or proposed to be issued
involving no significant hazards
consideration.
For details, see the individual notice
in the Federal Register on the day and
page cited. This notice does not extend
the notice period of the original notice.
Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Inc.,
Docket Nos. 50–317 and 50–318, Calvert
Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Unit Nos. 1
and 2, Calvert County, Maryland
Date of application for amendment:
June 7, 2004.
Brief description of amendment: The
proposed amendment revised Technical
Specification 3.9.4, ‘‘Shutdown Cooling
(SDC) and Coolant Circulation-High
Water Level,’’ to incorporate the use of
an alternate cooling method to function
as a path for decay heat removal when
in MODE 6 with the refueling pool fully
flooded. The spent fuel pool cooling
system is the alternative cooling method
intended to be used as a substitute for
the SDC system during the refueling
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operations, including during fuel
movement.
Date of publication of individual
notice in Federal Register: November
29, 2004 (69 FR 69417).
Expiration date of individual notice:
January 27, 2005.
Pacific Gas and Electric Company,
Docket Nos. 50–275 and 50–323, Diablo
Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Unit Nos.
1 and 2, San Luis Obispo County,
California
Date of amendment request:
November 3, 2004.
Brief description of amendment
request: The proposed amendments
would revise Technical Specification
(TS) 3.7.17 and TS 4.3 for Cycles 14–16
to allow installation and use of a
temporary cask pit spent fuel storage
rack (cask pit rack) for Diablo Canyon
Power Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2. The
total spent fuel pool storage capacity for
each unit would be increased from 1324
fuel assemblies to 1478 fuel assemblies
for Cycles 14–16.
Date of publication of individual
notice in Federal Register: December
21, 2004 (69 FR 76486).
Expiration date of individual notice:
February 22, 2005.
Notice of Issuance of Amendments to
Facility Operating Licenses
During the period since publication of
the last biweekly notice, the
Commission has issued the following
amendments. The Commission has
determined for each of these
amendments that the application
complies with the standards and
requirements of the Atomic Energy Act
of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the
Commission’s rules and regulations.
The Commission has made appropriate
findings as required by the Act and the
Commission’s rules and regulations in
10 CFR Chapter I, which are set forth in
the license amendment.
Notice of Consideration of Issuance of
Amendment to Facility Operating
License, Proposed No Significant
Hazards Consideration Determination,
and Opportunity for A Hearing in
connection with these actions was
published in the Federal Register as
indicated.
Unless otherwise indicated, the
Commission has determined that these
amendments satisfy the criteria for
categorical exclusion in accordance
with 10 CFR 51.22. Therefore, pursuant
to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental
impact statement or environmental
assessment need be prepared for these
amendments. If the Commission has
prepared an environmental assessment
under the special circumstances
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provision in 10 CFR 51.12(b) and has
made a determination based on that
assessment, it is so indicated.
For further details with respect to the
action see (1) the applications for
amendment, (2) the amendment, and (3)
the Commission’s related letter, Safety
Evaluation and/or Environmental
Assessment as indicated. All of these
items are available for public inspection
at the Commission’s Public Document
Room (PDR), located at One White Flint
North, Public File Area 01F21, 11555
Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville,
Maryland. Publicly available records
will be accessible from the Agencywide
Documents Access and Management
Systems (ADAMS) Public Electronic
Reading Room on the Internet at the
NRC Web site, https://www.nrc.gov/
reading-rm/adams.html. If you do not
have access to ADAMS or if there are
problems in accessing the documents
located in ADAMS, contact the PDR
Reference staff at 1 (800) 397–4209,
(301) 415–4737 or by e-mail to
pdr@nrc.gov.
Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power
Company, Docket No. 50–213, Haddam
Neck Plant, Middlesex County,
Connecticut
Date of amendment request: August
11, 2004.
Brief description of amendment: The
amendment revises Technical
Specifications to eliminate operational
requirements and certain design
requirements that will no longer be
applicable following the transfer of all
of the spent fuel from the Haddam Neck
Plant spent fuel pool into dry cask
storage at the Haddam Neck Plant
Independent Spent Fuel Storage
Installation. The amendment relocates
administrative requirements to the
Connecticut Yankee Quality Assurance
Program. The amendment also deletes
the requirement for submittal of an
annual Occupational Radiation
Exposure Report.
Date of issuance: December 20, 2004.
Effective date: As of the date that all
reactor fuel has been permanently
removed from the spent fuel pool and
stored in an Independent Spent Fuel
Storage Installation. The license
amendment shall be implemented
within 60 days of its effective date.
Amendment No.: 201.
Facility Operating License No. DPR–
61: The amendment revises the
Technical Specifications.
Date of initial notice in Federal
Register: September 28, 2004 (69 FR
57978).
The Commission’s related evaluation
of the amendment is contained in a
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Sfmt 4703
2905
Safety Evaluation Report, dated
December 20, 2004.
No significant hazards consideration
comments received: No.
Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.,
Docket No. 50–293, Pilgrim Nuclear
Power Station, Plymouth County,
Massachusetts
Date of application for amendment:
October 12, 2004.
Brief description of amendment: This
amendment approves an engineering
evaluation performed in accordance
with the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station
Technical Specifications (TS). TS
3.6.D.3 requires the licensee to perform
an engineering evaluation when safety
relief valve (SRV) discharge pipe
temperatures exceed 212 °F during
normal reactor power operation for a
period greater than 24 hours, and TS
3.6.D.4 further requires that power
operation may not continue beyond 90
days from the initial discovery of
discharge pipe temperatures in excess of
212 °F, without prior NRC approval of
the engineering evaluation. The Nuclear
Regulatory Commission staff has
reviewed the engineering evaluation
and has determined that the licensee
has adequately justified power
operations beyond the end of the TSrequired 90-day period for plant
shutdown, until the next cold shutdown
of 72 hours or more.
Date of issuance: December 23, 2004.
Effective date: As of the date of
issuance, and shall be implemented
within 30 days.
Amendment No.: 208.
Facility Operating License No. DPR–
35: Amendment does not revise the
Technical Specifications.
Date of initial notice in Federal
Register: October 20, 2004 (69 FR
61695).
The Commission’s related evaluation
of the amendment is contained in a
Safety Evaluation dated December 23,
2004.
No significant hazards consideration
comments received: No.
Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.,
Docket No. 50–293, Pilgrim Nuclear
Power Station, Plymouth County,
Massachusetts
Date of application for amendment:
December 8, 2003.
Brief description of amendment: The
proposed amendment would delete a
portion of the Pilgrim Nuclear Power
Station (Pilgrim) Technical
Specification (TS) 4.6.A.2, ‘‘Primary
System Boundary—Thermal and
Pressurization Limitations,’’ and the
associate TS Table 4.6–3, ‘‘Reactor
Vessel Material Surveillance Program
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Withdrawal Schedule.’’ The amendment
would replace the existing Reactor
Vessel Material Surveillance Program
with the Boiling Water Reactor Vessel
and Internal Project (BWRVIP)
Integrated Surveillance Program (ISP)
and Supplemental Surveillance Program
(SSP). The BWRVIP ISP/SSP would be
incorporated into the Pilgrim Updated
Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR).
Date of issuance: January 5, 2005.
Effective date: As of the date of
issuance, and shall be implemented
within 60 days.
Amendment No.: 209.
Facility Operating License No. DPR–
35: Amendment revised the Technical
Specifications and updated the UFSAR.
Date of initial notice in Federal
Register: February 17, 2004 (69 FR
7521).
The Commission’s related evaluation
of the amendment is contained in a
Safety Evaluation dated January 5, 2005.
No significant hazards consideration
comments received: No.
FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating
Company, Docket No. 50–346, DavisBesse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1,
Ottawa County, Ohio
Date of application for amendment:
August 11, 2003, as supplemented
January 9, May 3, and July 19, 2004.
Brief description of amendment: This
amendment relocates the Technical
Specification requirement to leak rate
test the enclosure for decay heat
removal system valves DH–11 and DH–
12 to the Technical Requirements
Manual.
Date of issuance: December 21, 2004.
Effective date: As of the date of
issuance and shall be implemented
within 120 days.
Amendment No.: 263.
Facility Operating License No. NPF–3:
Amendment revised the Technical
Specifications.
Date of initial notice in Federal
Register: September 18, 2003 (68 FR
54750).
The supplemental letters contained
clarifying information and did not
change the initial no significant hazards
consideration determination and did not
expand the scope of the original Federal
Register notice.
The Commission’s related evaluation
of the amendment is contained in a
Safety Evaluation dated December 21,
2004.
No significant hazards consideration
comments received: No.
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Nebraska Public Power District, Docket
No. 50–298, Cooper Nuclear Station,
Nemaha County, Nebraska
Date of amendment request: May 27,
2004, as supplement by letter dated
September 28, 2004.
Brief description of amendment: The
amendment revises the Technical
Specifications (TSs) to lower the reactor
vessel water level at which the reactor
water cleanup system isolates,
secondary containment isolates, and the
control room emergency filter system
starts.
Date of issuance: December 23, 2004.
Effective date: As of the date of
issuance and shall be implemented
upon startup in Operating Cycle 23.
Amendment No.: 209.
Facility Operating License No. DPR–
46: Amendment revised the TS.
Date of initial notice in Federal
Register: June 22, 2004 (69 FR 34702).
The supplement dated September 28,
2004, provided additional information
that clarified the application, did not
expand the scope of the application as
originally noticed, and did not change
the staff’s original proposed no
significant hazards consideration
determination as published in the
Federal Register.
The Commission’s related evaluation
of the amendment is contained in a
Safety Evaluation dated December 23,
2004.
No significant hazards consideration
comments received: No.
Nuclear Management Company, LLC,
Docket Nos. 50–266 and 50–301, Point
Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2,
Town of Two Creeks, Manitowoc
County, Wisconsin
Date of application for amendments:
December 23, 2003.
Brief description of amendments: The
amendments modified TS requirements
to adopt the provisions of Industry/TS
Task Force (TSTF) change TSTF–359,
‘‘Increased Flexibility in Mode
Restraints.’’ The availability of TSTF–
359 for adoption by licensees was
announced in the Federal Register on
April 4, 2003 (68 FR 16579).
Date of issuance: December 22, 2004.
Effective date: As of the date of
issuance and shall be implemented
within 120 days.
Amendment Nos.: 215, 220.
Facility Operating License Nos. DPR–
24 and DPR–27: Amendments revised
the Technical Specifications.
Date of initial notice in Federal
Register: September 16, 2004 (69 FR
55844)
The Commission’s related evaluation
of the amendments is contained in a
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Frm 00070
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
Safety Evaluation dated December 22,
2004.
No significant hazards consideration
comments received: No.
Southern California Edison Company, et
al., Docket Nos. 50–361 and 50–362,
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station,
Units 2 and 3, San Diego County,
California
Date of application for amendments:
August 4, 2003, as supplemented by
letters dated December 24, 2003, and
June 3, August 24, and October 6 and
22, 2004.
Brief description of amendments: The
proposed amendments would revise
Technical Specification 3.9.3,
‘‘Containment Penetrations,’’ by adding
a note to the limiting condition for
operation that permits the containment
equipment hatch to be open during core
alterations and movement of irradiated
fuel in containment during refueling
operations.
Date of issuance: December 23, 2004.
Effective date: As of the date of
issuance and shall be implemented
within 60 days.
Amendment Nos.: 193/184.
Facility Operating License Nos. NPF–
10 and NPF–15: The amendments
revised the Technical Specifications.
Date of initial notice in Federal
Register: September 18, 2003 (68 FR
54752). The supplemental letters dated
December 24, 2003, and June 3, August
24, October 6, and October 22, 2004,
provided additional information that
clarified the application, did not expand
the scope of the application as originally
noticed, and did not change the NRC
staff’s original proposed no significant
hazards consideration determination.
The Commission’s related evaluation
of the amendments is contained in a
Safety Evaluation dated December 23,
2004.
No significant hazards consideration
comments received: No.
STP Nuclear Operating Company,
Docket No. 50–498, South Texas Project,
Unit 1, Matagorda County, Texas
Date of amendment request:
September 30, 2004.
Brief description of amendment: The
amendment changes Technical
Specification (TS) Surveillance
Requirement 4.4.4.2 to expand the range
of conditions under which quarterly
testing of block valves for the
pressurizer power operated relief valves
would be unnecessary.
Date of issuance: December 28, 2004.
Effective date: As of the date of
issuance and shall be implemented
within 30 days of issuance.
Amendment No.: Unit 1—166.
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Facility Operating License No. NPF–
76: The amendment revised the
Technical Specifications.
Date of initial notice in Federal
Register: October 26, 2004 (69 FR
62477).
The Commission’s related evaluation
of the amendments is contained in a
Safety Evaluation dated December 28,
2004.
No significant hazards consideration
comments received: No.
STP Nuclear Operating Company,
Docket Nos. 50–498 and 50–499, South
Texas Project, Units 1 and 2, Matagorda
County, Texas
Date of amendment requests:
September 22, 2003, and September 27,
2004.
Brief description of amendments: The
amendments change Technical
Specification (TS) Surveillance
Requirement 4.7.1.6, ‘‘Atmospheric
Steam Relief Valves’’ to provide
consistency with TS 3.3.5.1,
‘‘Atmospheric Steam Relief Valve
Instrumentation,’’ regarding
atmospheric steam relief valve
automatic controls. The amendments
also correct typographical errors in TSs
3.7.1.6 and 3.2.4. The remaining
proposed changes associated with the
September 22, 2003, application were
withdrawn as noted in the NRC staff’s
letter to the licensee dated October 19,
2004.
Date of issuance: December 28, 2004.
Effective date: As of the date of
issuance and shall be implemented
within 30 days of issuance.
Amendment Nos.: Unit 1—167; Unit
2—156.
Facility Operating License Nos. NPF–
76 and NPF–80: The amendments
revised the Technical Specifications.
Date of initial notice in Federal
Register: November 12, 2003 (68 FR
64139) for the September 22, 2003,
application and October 26, 2004 (69 FR
62478) for the September 27, 2004,
application.
The Commission’s related evaluation
of the amendments is contained in a
Safety Evaluation dated December 28,
2004.
No significant hazards consideration
comments received: No.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 10th day
of January, 2005.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Ledyard B. Marsh,
Director, Division of Licensing Project
Management, Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation.
[FR Doc. 05–779 Filed 1–14–05; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590–01–P
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND
BUDGET
Public Availability of Fiscal Year 2004
Agency Inventories Under the Federal
Activities Inventory Reform Act of 1998
(Public Law 105–270) (‘‘FAIR Act’’)
Office of Management and
Budget, Executive Office of the
President.
ACTION: Notice of public availability of
agency inventory of activities that are
not inherently governmental and of
activities that are inherently
governmental.
AGENCY:
2907
SUMMARY: In accordance with the FAIR
Act, agency inventories of activities that
are not inherently governmental are
now available to the public from the
agencies listed below. The FAIR Act
requires that OMB publish an
announcement of public availability of
agency inventories of activities that are
not inherently governmental upon
completion of OMB’s review and
consultation process concerning the
content of the agencies’ inventory
submissions. After review and
consultation with OMB, agencies make
their inventories available to the public,
and these inventories also include
activities that are inherently
governmental. This is the second release
of the FAIR Act inventories for FY 2004.
Interested parties who disagree with the
agency’s initial judgment can challenge
the inclusion or the omission of an
activity on the list of activities that are
not inherently governmental within 30
working days and, if not satisfied with
this review, may demand a higher
agency review/appeal.
The Office of Federal Procurement
Policy has made available a FAIR Act
User’s Guide through its Internet site:
https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/
procurement/fair-index.html. This
User’s Guide will help interested parties
review FY 2004 FAIR Act inventories,
and gain access to agency inventories
through agency Web site addresses.
Joshua B. Bolten,
Director.
Attachment
SECOND FAIR ACT RELEASE FY 2004
Appalachian Regional Commission ..................................................
Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board ..........
Arlington National Cemetery .............................................................
Barry Goldwater Scholarship Education Foundation ........................
Broadcasting Board of Governors .....................................................
Christopher Columbus Fellowship Foundation .................................
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board ..........................................
Department of Defense .....................................................................
Department of Defense (IG) ..............................................................
Department of Education ..................................................................
Department of Housing and Urban Development .............................
Department of Housing and Urban Development (IG) .....................
Department of State ..........................................................................
Department of Treasury ....................................................................
Environmental Protection Agency .....................................................
Environmental Protection Agency (IG) ..............................................
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ...................................
Farm Credit Administration ...............................................................
Federal Maritime Commission ..........................................................
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service .....................................
Federal Trade Commission ...............................................................
General Services Administration .......................................................
Harry S. Truman Scholarship Foundation ........................................
James Madison Memorial Fellowship Foundation ............................
National Archives and Records Administration .................................
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Frm 00071
Mr. Guy Land, (202) 884–7674; www.arc.gov.
Mr. Larry Roffee, (202) 272–0001; www.access-board.gov.
Mr. Rory Smith, (703) 607–8561; www.arlingtoncemetery.org.
Mr. Gerald Smith, (703) 756–6012; www.act.org/goldwater.
Mr. Stephen Smith, (202) 203–4588; www.bbg.gov.
Ms. Judith M. Shellenberger, (315) 258–0090; www.whitehouse.gov/omb/
procurement/fair_list_nosite.html.
Mr. Kenneth Pusateri, (202) 694–7000; www.dnfsb.gov.
Mr. Paul Soloman, (703) 602–3666; web.lmi.org/fairnet.
Mr. John R. Crane, (703) 604–8324; www.dodig.osd.mil.
Mr. Glenn Perry, (202) 245–6200; www.ed.gov.
Ms. Janice Blake-Green, (202) 708–0614, x3214; www.hud.gov.
Ms. Peggy Dickinson, (202) 708–0614, x8192; www.hudoig.gov.
Ms. Valerie Dumas, (703) 516–1506; www.state.gov.
Mr. Jim Sullivan, (202) 622–9395; www.treas.gov/fair.
Ms. Melanie Gooden (202) 566–2222; www.epa.gov.
Mr. Michael J. Binder (202) 566–2617; www.epa.gov/oig.
Mr. Jeffrey Smith, (202) 663–4200; www.eeoc.gov.
Mr. Philip Shebest, (703) 883–4146; www.fca.gov.
Mr. Bruce Dombrowski, (202) 523–5800; www.fmc.gov.
Mr. Dan Ellerman, (202) 606–5460; www.fmcs.gov.
Ms. Darlene Cossette, (202) 326–3255; www.ftc.gov.
Mr. Paul Boyle, (202) 501–0324; www.gsa.gov.
Ms. Tara Kneller, (202) 395–7434; www.truman.gov.
Mr. Steve Weiss, (202) 653–6109; www.jamesmadison.com.
Ms. Lori Lisowski, (301) 837–1850; www.nara.gov.
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
E:\FR\FM\18JAN1.SGM
18JAN1
Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 70, Number 11 (Tuesday, January 18, 2005)]
[Notices]
[Pages 2886-2907]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 05-779]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Biweekly Notice; Applications and Amendments to Facility
Operating Licenses Involving No Significant Hazards Considerations
I. Background
Pursuant to section 189a.(2) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as
amended (the Act), the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the
Commission or NRC staff) is publishing this regular biweekly notice.
The Act requires the Commission publish notice of any amendments
issued, or proposed to be issued and grants the Commission the
authority to issue and make immediately effective any amendment to an
operating license upon a determination by the Commission that such
amendment involves no significant hazards consideration,
notwithstanding the pendency before the Commission of a request for a
hearing from any person.
This biweekly notice includes all notices of amendments issued, or
proposed to be issued from December 23, 2004, through January 5, 2005.
The last biweekly notice was published on January 4, 2005 (70 FR 398).
Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Amendments to Facility Operating
Licenses, Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination,
and Opportunity for a Hearing
The Commission has made a proposed determination that the following
amendment requests involve no significant hazards consideration. Under
the Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 50.92, this means that operation
of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1)
involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an
accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new
or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated;
or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The basis
for this proposed determination for each amendment request is shown
below.
The Commission is seeking public comments on this proposed
determination. Any comments received within 30 days after the date of
publication of this notice will be considered in making any final
determination. Within 60 days after the date of publication of this
notice, the licensee may file a request for a hearing with respect to
issuance of the amendment to the subject facility operating license and
any person whose interest may be affected by this proceeding and who
wishes to participate as a party in the proceeding must file a written
request for a hearing and a petition for leave to intervene.
Normally, the Commission will not issue the amendment until the
expiration of 60 days after the date of publication of this notice. The
Commission may issue the license amendment before expiration of the 60-
day period provided that its final determination is that the amendment
involves no significant hazards consideration. In addition, the
Commission may issue the amendment prior to the expiration of the 30-
day comment period should circumstances change during the 30-day
comment period such that failure to act in a timely way would result,
for example in derating or shutdown of the facility. Should the
Commission take action prior to the expiration of either the comment
period or the notice period, it will publish in the Federal Register a
notice of issuance. Should the Commission make a final No Significant
Hazards Consideration Determination, any hearing will take place after
issuance. The Commission expects that the need to take this action will
occur very infrequently.
Written comments may be submitted by mail to the Chief, Rules and
Directives Branch, Division of Administrative Services, Office of
Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC
20555-0001, and should cite the publication date and page number of
this Federal Register notice. Written comments may also be delivered to
Room 6D22, Two White Flint North, 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville,
Maryland, from 7:30 a.m. to 4:15 p.m. Federal workdays. Copies of
written comments received may be examined at the Commission's Public
Document Room (PDR), located at One White Flint North, Public File Area
O1F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland. The
filing of requests for a hearing and petitions for leave to intervene
is discussed below.
Within 60 days after the date of publication of this notice, the
licensee may file a request for a hearing with respect to issuance of
the amendment to the subject facility operating license and any person
whose interest may be affected by this proceeding and who wishes to
participate as a party in the proceeding must file a written request
for a hearing and a petition for leave to intervene. Requests for a
hearing and a petition for leave to intervene shall be filed in
accordance with the Commission's ``Rules of Practice for Domestic
Licensing Proceedings'' in 10 CFR part 2. Interested persons should
consult a current copy of 10 CFR 2.309, which is available at the
Commission's PDR, located at One White Flint North, Public File Area
01F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland.
Publicly available records will be accessible from the Agencywide
Documents Access and Management System's (ADAMS) Public Electronic
Reading Room on the Internet at the NRC Web site, https://www.nrc.gov/
reading-rm/doc-collections/cfr/. If a request for a hearing or petition
for leave to intervene is filed within 60 days, the Commission or a
presiding officer designated by the Commission or by the Chief
Administrative Judge of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel,
will rule on the request and/or petition; and the Secretary or the
Chief Administrative Judge of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board
will issue a notice of a hearing or an appropriate order.
As required by 10 CFR 2.309, a petition for leave to intervene
shall set forth with particularity the interest of the petitioner in
the proceeding, and how that interest may be affected by the results of
the proceeding. The petition should specifically explain the reasons
why intervention should be permitted with particular reference to the
following general requirements: (1) The name, address, and telephone
number of the requestor or petitioner; (2) the nature of the
requestor's/petitioner's right under the Act to be made a party to the
proceeding; (3) the nature and extent of the requestor's/petitioner's
property, financial, or other interest in the proceeding; and (4) the
possible effect of any decision or order which may be entered in the
proceeding on the requestor's/petitioner's interest. The petition must
also set forth the specific contentions which the petitioner/requestor
seeks to have litigated at the proceeding.
Each contention must consist of a specific statement of the issue
of law or fact to be raised or controverted. In addition, the
petitioner/requestor shall provide a brief explanation of the bases for
the contention and a concise statement of the alleged facts or expert
[[Page 2887]]
opinion which support the contention and on which the petitioner/
requestor intends to rely in proving the contention at the hearing. The
petitioner/requestor must also provide references to those specific
sources and documents of which the petitioner is aware and on which the
petitioner/requestor intends to rely to establish those facts or expert
opinion. The petition must include sufficient information to show that
a genuine dispute exists with the applicant on a material issue of law
or fact. Contentions shall be limited to matters within the scope of
the amendment under consideration. The contention must be one which, if
proven, would entitle the petitioner/requestor to relief. A petitioner/
requestor who fails to satisfy these requirements with respect to at
least one contention will not be permitted to participate as a party.
Those permitted to intervene become parties to the proceeding,
subject to any limitations in the order granting leave to intervene,
and have the opportunity to participate fully in the conduct of the
hearing.
If a hearing is requested, and the Commission has not made a final
determination on the issue of no significant hazards consideration, the
Commission will make a final determination on the issue of no
significant hazards consideration. The final determination will serve
to decide when the hearing is held. If the final determination is that
the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration,
the Commission may issue the amendment and make it immediately
effective, notwithstanding the request for a hearing. Any hearing held
would take place after issuance of the amendment. If the final
determination is that the amendment request involves a significant
hazards consideration, any hearing held would take place before the
issuance of any amendment.
A request for a hearing or a petition for leave to intervene must
be filed by: (1) First class mail addressed to the Office of the
Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC 20555-0001, Attention: Rulemaking and Adjudications
Staff; (2) courier, express mail, and expedited delivery services:
Office of the Secretary, Sixteenth Floor, One White Flint North, 11555
Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland, 20852, Attention: Rulemaking and
Adjudications Staff; (3) e-mail addressed to the Office of the
Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, HearingDocket@nrc.gov;
or (4) facsimile transmission addressed to the Office of the Secretary,
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC, Attention:
Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff at (301) 415-1101, verification
number is (301) 415-1966. A copy of the request for hearing and
petition for leave to intervene should also be sent to the Office of
the General Counsel, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC
20555-0001, and it is requested that copies be transmitted either by
means of facsimile transmission to (301) 415-3725 or by e-mail to
OGCMailCenter@nrc.gov. A copy of the request for hearing and petition
for leave to intervene should also be sent to the attorney for the
licensee.
Nontimely requests and/or petitions and contentions will not be
entertained absent a determination by the Commission or the presiding
officer of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board that the petition,
request and/or the contentions should be granted based on a balancing
of the factors specified in 10 CFR 2.309(a)(1)(i)-(viii).
For further details with respect to this action, see the
application for amendment which is available for public inspection at
the Commission's PDR, located at One White Flint North, Public File
Area 01F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland.
Publicly available records will be accessible from the ADAMS Public
Electronic Reading Room on the Internet at the NRC Web site, https://
www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. If you do not have access to ADAMS
or if there are problems in accessing the documents located in ADAMS,
contact the PDR Reference staff at 1 (800) 397-4209, (301) 415-4737 or
by e-mail to pdr@nrc.gov.
Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc., Docket No. 50-336, Millstone Power
Station, Unit No. 2, New London County, Connecticut
Date of amendment request: July 15, 2004, supplemented by letter
dated August 23, 2004.
Description of amendment request: The amendment would revise
Operating License DPR-65 to address the resolution of a non-
conservative Technical Specification (TS) associated with control room
isolation radiation monitoring instrumentation. Specifically, the
amendment would revise the TS to require two operable channels of
control room isolation radiation monitoring instrumentation.
Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards
consideration. The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis
against the standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c). The NRC staff's review is
presented below:
1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or
consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
The proposed change involves requirements to maintain two
operable channels in order to add a level of detection capability
and greater assurance that the safety function for control room
isolation is met. In addition, the proposed change will not alter
the setpoint value for the radiation monitors nor will it affect the
method for control room air filtration during the emergency mode of
operation. Therefore, the proposed change from one operable channel
to two operable channels for the control room isolation radiation
monitoring instrumentation will not increase the probability of
consequences of any previously evaluated accident.
2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident
from any accident previously evaluated.
The proposed change involves radiation monitoring channels
designed to send a signal to isolate the control room when high
radiation levels are detected to limit the radiological dose to the
control room operators in the event of an accident. In addition, the
proposed change will not have an impact on the setpoint value to
change the radiation level at which control room isolation is
assumed to occur. Again, the proposed change will not introduce
failure modes, accident initiators, or malfunctions. Therefore, the
proposed change from one operable channel to two operable channels
for the control room isolation radiation monitoring instrumentation,
will not create the possibility of a new or different kind of
accident from any accident previously evaluated.
3. Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
Increasing the number of radiation monitoring channels for the
control room isolation radiation monitoring instrumentation will not
reduce a margin of safety. The proposed change to add requirements
to the TS for a redundant radiation monitoring channel will increase
the reliability of the system to perform its intended function. In
addition, the proposed change will add appropriate compensatory
actions for conditions when both channels are not available.
Therefore, given that the proposed change will continue to meet the
current design basis, any reduction in a margin of safety would not
be significant.
Based on the NRC staff's analysis, it appears that the three
standards of 10 CFR 50.929(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff
proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no
significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: Lillian M. Cuoco, Senior Nuclear Counsel,
Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc., Rope Ferry Road, Waterford, CT
06385.
NRC Section Chief: Darrell J. Roberts.
[[Page 2888]]
Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc., Docket Nos. 50-245, 50-336, and 50-
423, Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit Nos. 1, 2, and 3, New London
County, Connecticut
Date of amendment request: September 8, 2002.
Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would
modify the Technical Specifications to support the implementation of
the proposed Dominion Nuclear Facility Quality Assurance Program
(Topical Report DOM-QA-1). Implementation of this Topical Report would
create a common quality assurance program for all sites owned by
Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. Review of this proposed amendment
was requested to be done in concert with review of the Topical Report.
The Topical Report is available in the Agencywide Document Access and
Management System under accession number ML042470015.
Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards
consideration, which is presented below:
1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or
consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
The proposed changes do not involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequence of an accident previously analyzed.
The changes involve the transfer of requirements from the
administrative section of the Technical Specifications to the
Consolidated Quality Assurance Program and other licensee controlled
documents. Therefore, the proposed changes are administrative in
nature, and have no effect on a design basis accident, and will not
increase the probability or consequences of any previously analyzed
accident.
2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident
from any accident previously evaluated.
The implementation of the proposed changes does not create the
possibility of an accident of a different type than was previously
evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR). The
transfer of requirements concerning facility staff qualifications
from the administrative section of the Technical Specifications to
the Consolidated Quality Assurance Program and other licensee
controlled documents can not initiate a new or different kind of
accident.
These changes do not alter the nature of events postulated in
the UFSAR nor do they introduce any unique precursor mechanisms.
Therefore, the proposed changes are administrative in nature and do
not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident
from those previously analyzed.
3. Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
The implementation of the proposed changes does not reduce the
margin of safety. The proposed changes to transfer certain
requirements from the administration section of the Technical
Specifications to the Consolidated Quality Assurance Program and
other licensee controlled documents have no effect on design bases
radiological events. It is thus concluded that the proposed changes
are administrative in nature and the margin of safety will not be
reduced by the implementation of the changes.
Based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR
50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine
that the amendment request involves no significant hazards
consideration.
Attorney for licensee: Lillian M. Cuoco, Senior Nuclear Counsel,
Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc., Rope Ferry Road, Waterford, CT
06385.
NRC Section Chief: Darrell J. Roberts.
Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, LLC and Entergy Nuclear Operations,
Inc., Docket No. 50-271, Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station, Vernon,
Vermont
Date of amendment request: December 6, 2004.
Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would make
administrative changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) including
correction of references and deleting obsolete or redundant TS
requirements and surveillances.
Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards
consideration which is presented below:
1. The operation of Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station in
accordance with the proposed amendment will not involve a
significant increase in the probability or consequences of an
accident previously evaluated.
The proposed changes are administrative or editorial in nature
and do not involve any physical changes to the plant. The changes do
not revise the methods of plant operation which could increase the
probability or consequences of accidents. No new modes of operation
are introduced by the proposed changes such that a previously
evaluated accident is more likely to occur or more adverse
consequences would result.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
2. The operation of Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station in
accordance with the proposed amendment will not create the
possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident
previously evaluated.
These changes are administrative or editorial in nature and do
not affect the operation of any systems or equipment, nor do they
involve any potential initiating events that would create any new or
different kind of accident. There are no changes to the design
assumptions, conditions, configuration of the facility, or manner in
which the plant is operated and maintained. The changes do not
affect assumptions contained in plant safety analyses or the
physical design and/or modes of plant operation. Consequently, no
new failure mode is introduced.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not create the possibility of
a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.
3. The operation of Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station in
accordance with the proposed amendment will not involve a
significant reduction in a margin of safety.
There are no changes being made to the Technical Specification
(TS) safety limits or safety system settings. The operating limits
and functional capabilities of systems, structures and components
are unchanged as a result of these administrative and editorial
changes. These changes do not affect any equipment involved in
potential initiating events or plant response to accidents. There is
no change to the basis for any TS that is related to the
establishment, or maintenance of, a nuclear safety margin.
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant
reduction in a margin of safety.
The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: Mr. David R. Lewis, Shaw, Pittman, Potts and
Trowbridge, 2300 N Street, NW., Washington, DC 20037-1128.
NRC Section Chief: Allen G. Howe.
Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, LLC and Entergy Nuclear Operations,
Inc., Docket No. 50-271, Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station, Vernon,
Vermont
Date of amendment request: December 7, 2004.
Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would
revise the Technical Specifications (TSs) to: (1) Delete the
surveillance requirement (SR) associated with testing of the standby
liquid control (SLC) pump discharge pressure relief valves; and (2)
remove details from the SR for testing of the recirculation pump
discharge valves.
Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards
consideration which is presented below:
1. The operation of Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station (VY) in
accordance
[[Page 2889]]
with the proposed amendment will not involve a significant increase
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously
evaluated.
The proposed amendment removes details of SLC pressure relief
valve and recirculation pump discharge valve testing requirements
from the TS. Following implementation of the proposed change, the VY
TS will still require operability testing of the subject components
by reference to the VY IST [Inservice Testing] Program. Details of
SLC pressure relief valve and recirculation pump discharge valve
testing requirements will still be contained in the VY IST Program.
The SLC pressure relief valve and recirculation pump discharge valve
setpoint values related to the safety functions of those systems
will continue to be contained in the VY UFSAR [Updated Final Safety
Analysis Report]. Changes to the VY UFSAR are evaluated per the
requirements of 10 CFR 50.59. These controls are adequate to ensure
the required inservice testing is performed to verify the components
are operable and capable of performing their respective safety
functions. The proposed amendment introduces no new equipment or
changes to how equipment is operated. Neither the SLC pressure
relief valves nor the recirculation pump discharge valves are
initiators of any analyzed accidents. Therefore, operation of VY in
accordance with the proposed amendment will not involve a
significant increase in the probability or consequences of an
accident previously evaluated.
2. The operation of Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station (VY) in
accordance with the proposed amendment will not create the
possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident
previously evaluated.
The proposed amendment removes details of SLC pressure relief
valve and recirculation pump discharge valve testing requirements
from the TS. The proposed amendment does not change the design or
function of any component or system. No new modes of failure or
initiating events are being introduced. Therefore, operation of VY
in accordance with the proposed amendment will not create the
possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident
previously evaluated.
3. The operation of Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station (VY) in
accordance with the proposed amendment will not involve a
significant reduction in a margin of safety.
The proposed amendment removes details of SLC pressure relief
valve and recirculation pump discharge valve testing requirements
from the TS. The proposed amendment does not change the design or
function of any component or system. The proposed amendment does not
involve any safety limits or limiting safety system settings.
Since the proposed controls are adequate to ensure the required
inservice testing is performed, there will still be high assurance
that the components are operable and capable of performing their
respective safety functions, and that the systems will respond as
designed to mitigate the subject events. Therefore, operation of VY
in accordance with the proposed amendment will not involve a
significant reduction in a margin of safety.
The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: Mr. David R. Lewis, Shaw, Pittman, Potts and
Trowbridge, 2300 N Street, NW, Washington, DC 20037-1128.
NRC Section Chief: Allen G. Howe.
Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, LLC and Entergy Nuclear Operations,
Inc., Docket No. 50-271, Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station, Vernon,
Vermont
Date of amendment request: December 15, 2004.
Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would
revise the limiting conditions for operation in Technical Specification
(TS) 3.3 and the surveillance requirements in TS 4.3 associated with
the control rod system. Specifically, the proposed changes would revise
the TSs associated with: (1) Control rod operability; (2) control rod
scram time testing; and (3) control rod accumulator operability.
Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards
consideration which is presented below:
1. The operation of Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station in
accordance with the proposed amendment will not involve a
significant increase in the probability or consequences of an
accident previously evaluated.
The proposed changes do not significantly affect the design or
fundamental operation and maintenance of the plant. Accident
initiators or the frequency of analyzed accident events are not
significantly affected as a result of the proposed changes;
therefore, there will be no significant change to the probabilities
of accidents previously evaluated.
The proposed changes do not significantly alter assumptions or
initial conditions relative to the mitigation of an accident
previously evaluated. The proposed changes continue to ensure
process variables, structures, systems, and components (SSCs) are
maintained consistent with the safety analyses and licensing basis.
The revised technical specifications continue to require that SSCs
are properly maintained to ensure operability and performance of
safety functions as assumed in the safety analyses. The design basis
events analyzed in the safety analyses will not change significantly
as a result of the proposed changes to the TS.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
2. The operation of Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station in
accordance with the proposed amendment will not create the
possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident
previously evaluated.
The proposed changes do not involve any physical alteration of
the plant (no new or different type of equipment being installed)
and do not involve a change in the design, normal configuration or
basic operation of the plant. The proposed changes do not introduce
any new accident initiators. In some cases, the proposed changes
impose different requirements; however, these new requirements are
consistent with the assumptions in the safety analyses and current
licensing basis. Where requirements are relocated to other licensee-
controlled documents, adequate controls exist to ensure their proper
maintenance.
The proposed changes do not involve significant changes in the
fundamental methods governing normal plant operation and do not
require unusual or uncommon operator actions. The proposed changes
provide assurance that the plant will not be operated in a mode or
condition that violates the essential assumptions or initial
conditions in the safety analyses and that SSCs remain capable of
performing their intended safety functions as assumed in the same
analyses. Consequently, the response of the plant and the plant
operator to postulated events will not be significantly different.
Therefore, the proposed TS change does not create the
possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any
previously evaluated.
3. The operation of Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station in
accordance with the proposed amendment will not involve a
significant reduction in a margin of safety.
Margin of safety is related to the confidence in the ability of
the fission product barriers to perform their design functions
during and following an accident situation. The proposed changes do
not significantly affect any of the assumptions, initial conditions
or inputs to the safety analyses. Plant design is unaffected by
these proposed changes and will continue to provide adequate
defense-in-depth and diversity of safety functions as assumed in the
safety analyses.
There are no proposed changes to any of the Safety Limits or
Limiting Safety System Setting requirements. The proposed changes
maintain requirements consistent with safety analyses assumptions
and the licensing basis. Fission product barriers will continue to
meet their design capabilities without any significant impact to
their ability to maintain parameters within acceptable limits. The
safety functions are maintained within acceptable limits without any
significant decrease in capability.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant
reduction in a margin of safety.
The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on
this review, it appears that the three
[[Page 2890]]
standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff
proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no
significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: Mr. David R. Lewis, Shaw, Pittman, Potts and
Trowbridge, 2300 N Street, NW., Washington, DC 20037-1128.
NRC Section Chief: Allen G. Howe.
Entergy Operations, Inc., Docket No. 50-313, Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit
No. 1, Pope County, Arkansas
Date of amendment request: December 20, 2004.
Description of amendment request: The requested change will delete
the requirements in Technical Specification (TS) 5.6.1, ``Occupational
Radiation Exposure Report,'' and TS 5.6.4, ``Monthly Operating
Reports.''
The NRC staff issued a notice of availability of a model no
significant hazards consideration (NSHC) determination for referencing
in license amendment applications in the Federal Register on June 23,
2004 (69 FR 35067). The licensee affirmed the applicability of the
model NSHC determination in its application dated December 20, 2004.
Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), an analysis of the issue
of no significant hazards consideration is presented below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change eliminates the Technical Specifications
(TSs) reporting requirements to provide a monthly operating letter
report of shutdown experience and operating statistics if the
equivalent data is submitted using an industry electronic database.
It also eliminates the TS reporting requirement for an annual
occupational radiation exposure report, which provides information
beyond that specified in NRC regulations. The proposed change
involves no changes to plant systems or accident analyses. As such,
the change is administrative in nature and does not affect
initiators of analyzed events or assumed mitigation of accidents or
transients. Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a
significant increase in the probability or consequences of an
accident previously evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of
the plant, add any new equipment, or require any existing equipment
to be operated in a manner different from the present design.
Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility of a
new or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety?
Response: No.
This is an administrative change to reporting requirements of
plant operating information and occupational radiation exposure
data, and has no effect on plant equipment, operating practices or
safety analyses assumptions. For these reasons, the proposed change
does not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.
Based upon the reasoning presented above, the requested change does
not involve significance hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: Nicholas S. Reynolds, Esquire, Winston and
Strawn, 1400 L Street, NW., Washington, DC 20005-3502.
NRC Section Chief: Michael A. Webb (Acting).
Entergy Operations, Inc., Docket No. 50-368, Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit
No. 2, Pope County, Arkansas
Date of amendment request: December 20, 2004.
Description of amendment request: The requested change will delete
the requirements in Technical Specification (TS) 6.6.1, ``Occupational
Radiation Exposure Report,'' and TS 6.6.4, ``Monthly Operating
Reports.''
The NRC staff issued a notice of availability of a model no
significant hazards consideration (NSHC) determination for referencing
in license amendment applications in the Federal Register on June 23,
2004 (69 FR 35067). The licensee affirmed the applicability of the
model NSHC determination in its application dated December 20, 2004.
Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), an analysis of the issue
of no significant hazards consideration is presented below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change eliminates the Technical Specifications
(TSs) reporting requirements to provide a monthly operating report
of shutdown experience and operating statistics if the equivalent
data is submitted using an industry electronic database. It also
eliminates the TS reporting requirement for an annual occupational
radiation exposure report, which provides information beyond that
specified in NRC regulations. The proposed change involves no
changes to plant systems or accident analyses. As such, the change
is administrative in nature and does not affect initiators of
analyzed events or assumed mitigation of accidents or transients.
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of
the plant, add any new equipment, or require any existing equipment
to be operated in a manner different from the present design.
Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility of a
new or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety?
Response: No.
This is an administrative change to reporting requirements of
plant operating information and occupational radiation exposure
data, and has no effect on plant equipment, operating practices or
safety analyses assumptions. For these reasons, the proposed change
does not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.
Based upon the reasoning presented above, the requested change does
not involve significance hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: Nicholas S. Reynolds, Esquire, Winston and
Strawn, 1400 L Street, NW., Washington, DC 20005-3502.
NRC Section Chief: Michael A. Webb (Acting).
Florida Power Corporation, et al., Docket No. 50-302, Crystal River
Unit 3 Nuclear Generating Plant, Citrus County, Florida
Date of amendment request: October 14, 2004.
Brief description of amendments: The proposed change will revise
the surveillance requirement (SR) 3.6.6.8 frequency of every 10 years.
Instead, the proposed change to SR 3.6.6.8 will require verification
that spray nozzles are unobstructed following maintenance that could
result in nozzle blockage.
Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards
consideration, which is presented below and states that the amendment
request:
1. Does not involve a significant increase in the probability or
consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
The proposed change modifies the [Surveillance Requirements] SR
to verify that the [Reactor Building] RB spray nozzles are
unobstructed after maintenance that could introduce material that
could result in nozzle blockage. The spray nozzles are not assumed
to be initiators of any previously analyzed
[[Page 2891]]
accident. Therefore, the change does not increase the probability of
any accident previously evaluated. The spray nozzles are assumed in
the accident analyses to mitigate design basis accidents. The
revised SR to verify system OPERABILITY following maintenance is
considered adequate to ensure OPERABILITY of the RB spray system.
Since the system will still be able to perform its accident
mitigation function, the consequences of accidents previously
evaluated are not increased. Therefore, the proposed change does not
involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of
an accident previously evaluated.
2. Does not create the possibility of a new or different type of
accident from any accident previously evaluated.
The proposed change revises the SR to verify that the RB spray
nozzles are unobstructed after maintenance that could result in
nozzle blockage. The change does not introduce a new mode of plant
operation and does not involve physical modification to the plant.
The change will not introduce new accident initiators or impact the
assumptions made in the safety analysis. Therefore, the proposed
change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of
accident from any previously evaluated.
3. Does not involve a significant reduction in the margin of
safety.
The proposed change revises the frequency for performance of the
SR to verify that the RB spray nozzles are unobstructed. The
frequency is changed from every 10 years to following maintenance
that could result in nozzle blockage. This requirement, along with
foreign material exclusion programs and the remote physical location
of the spray nozzles, provides assurance that the spray nozzles will
remain unobstructed. As the spray nozzles are expected to remain
unobstructed and able to perform their post-accident mitigation
function, plant safety is not significantly affected. Therefore, the
proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin
of safety.
The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: Steven R. Carr, Associate General Counsel--
Legal Department, Progress Energy Service Company, LLC, Post Office Box
1551, Raleigh, North Carolina 27602.
NRC Section Chief: Michael L. Marshall, Jr.
Nebraska Public Power District, Docket No. 50-298, Cooper Nuclear
Station, Nemaha County, Nebraska
Date of amendment request: November 22, 2004.
Description of amendment request: The requested change will delete
the requirements in Technical Specification (TS) 5.6.1, ``Occupational
Radiation Exposure Report,'' and TS 5.6.4, ``Monthly Operating
Reports.''
The NRC staff issued a notice of availability of a model no
significant hazards consideration (NSHC) determination for referencing
in license amendment applications in the Federal Register on June 23,
2004 (69 FR 35067). The licensee affirmed the applicability of the
model NSHC determination in its application dated November 22, 2004.
Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), an analysis of the issue
of no significant hazards consideration is presented below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change eliminates the Technical Specifications
(TSs) reporting requirements to provide a monthly operating report
of shutdown experience and operating statistics if the equivalent
data is submitted using an industry electronic database. It also
eliminates the TS reporting requirement for an annual occupational
radiation exposure report, which provides information beyond that
specified in NRC regulations. The proposed change involves no
changes to plant systems or accident analyses. As such, the change
is administrative in nature and does not affect initiators of
analyzed events or assumed mitigation of accidents or transients.
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of
the plant, add any new equipment, or require any existing equipment
to be operated in a manner different from the present design.
Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility of a
new or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety?
Response: No.
This is an administrative change to reporting requirements of
plant operating information and occupational radiation exposure
data, and has no effect on plant equipment, operating practices or
safety analyses assumptions. For these reasons, the proposed change
does not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.
Based upon the reasoning presented above, the requested change does
not involve significance hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: Mr. John R. McPhail, Nebraska Public Power
District, Post Office Box 499, Columbus, NE 68602-0499.
NRC Section Chief: Michael K. Webb (Acting).
Nuclear Management Company, LLC, Docket No. 50-263, Monticello Nuclear
Generating Plant, Wright County, Minnesota
Date of amendment request: April 29, 2004, as supplemented November
23, 2004.
Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment is a
selective-scope application of an alternative source term (AST) for the
fuel handling accident (FHA) in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of
Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Section 50.67, ``Accident Source Term.''
Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards
consideration, which is presented below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed amendment involves implementation of the AST for
the fuel handling accident at MNGP [Monticello Nuclear Generating
Plant]. There are no physical design modifications to the plant
associated with the proposed amendment. The revised calculations do
not impact the initiators of an FHA in any way.
The changes also do not impact the initiators for any other
design basis accident (DBA) or events. Therefore, because DBA
initiators are not being altered by adoption of the AST analyses,
the probability of an accident previously evaluated is not affected.
With respect to consequences, the only previously evaluated
accident that could be affected is the FHA. The AST is an input to
calculations used to evaluate the consequences of the accident, and
does not, in and of itself, affect the plant response or the actual
pathways to the environment utilized by the radiation/activity
released by the fuel. It does however, better represent the physical
characteristics of the release, so that appropriate mitigation
techniques may be applied. For the FHA, the AST analyses demonstrate
acceptable doses that are within regulatory limits after 24 hours of
radiological decay, without credit for Secondary Containment
integrity, selected ESF [engineered safety feature] filtration
system operation (i.e., SBGT [standby gas treatment] System or
Control Room EFT [emergency filtration] System) or Control Room
isolation. Therefore, the consequences of an accident previously
evaluated are not significantly increased.
Based on the above conclusions, this proposed amendment does not
involve a
[[Page 2892]]
significant increase in the probability or consequences of an
accident previously evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed amendment does not involve a physical alteration of
the plant. No new or different types of equipment will be installed
and there are no physical modifications to existing equipment
associated with the proposed changes. Also, no changes are proposed
to the methods governing plant/system operation during handling of
irradiated fuel, so no new initiators or precursors of a new or
different kind of accident are created. New equipment or personnel
failure modes that might initiate a new type of accident are not
created as a result of the proposed amendment.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not create the possibility of
a new or different kind of accident from any previously analyzed.
3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in
the margin of safety?
Response: No.
The proposed amendment is associated with the implementation of
a new licensing basis for the MNGP FHA. Approval of this change from
the original source term to an alternative source term derived in
accordance with the guidance of RG 1.183 [``Alternative Radiological
Source Terms for Evaluating Design Basis Accidents at Nuclear Power
Reactors''] is being requested. The results of the FHA accident
analysis, revised in support of the proposed license amendment, are
subject to revised acceptance criteria. The AST FHA analysis has
been performed using conservative methodologies, as specified in RG
1.183. Safety margins have been evaluated and analytical
conservatism has been utilized to ensure that the analyses
adequately bound the postulated limiting event scenario. The dose
consequences of the limiting FHA remain within the acceptance
criteria presented in 10 CFR 50.67 and RG 1.183.
The proposed changes continue to ensure that the doses at the
Exclusion Area Boundary (EAB) and Low Population Zone (LPZ)
boundaries, as well as the Control Room, are within the
corresponding regulatory limits. For the FHA, RG 1.183
conservatively sets the EAB and LPZ limits below the 10 CFR 50.67
limit, and sets the Control Room limit consistent with 10 CFR 50.67.
Since the proposed amendment continues to ensure the doses at
the EAB, LPZ and Control Room are within corresponding regulatory
limits, the proposed license amendment does not involve a
significant reduction in a margin of safety.
Based on the above, NMC has determined that operation of the
facility in accordance with the proposed change does not involve a
significant hazards consideration as defined in 10 CFR 50.92(c), in
that it: (1) Does not involve a significant increase in the
probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; (2)
does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of
accident from any accident previously evaluated; and (3) does not
involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
The U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff has reviewed
the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the
three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC
staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no
significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: Jonathan Rogoff, Esquire, Vice President,
Counsel & Secretary, Nuclear Management Company, LLC, 700 First Street,
Hudson, WI 54016.
NRC Section Chief: L. Raghavan.
Nuclear Management Company, LLC, Docket No. 50-263, Monticello Nuclear
Generating Plant, Wright County, Minnesota
Date of amendment request: June 30, 2004, as supplemented November
5, 2004.
Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would
revise the technical specifications (TSs) to implement a 24-month fuel
cycle.
Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration
determination: As required by Title 10 of the Code of Federal
Regulations (10 CFR) 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis
of the issue of no significant hazards consideration (NSHC), which is
presented below:
1. The proposed amendment does not involve a significant
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
a. Surveillance Testing Interval Extensions
The proposed Technical Specification (TS) changes involve
changes in the surveillance testing to facilitate a change in the
operating cycle from 18 months to 24 months. The proposed TS changes
do not physically impact the normal operation of the plant, nor do
they impact any design or functional requirements of the associated
systems. That is, the proposed TS changes neither impact the TS SRs
[surveillance requirements] themselves nor the manner in which the
surveillances are performed.
In addition, the proposed TS changes do not introduce any
accident initiators, since no accidents previously evaluated relate
to the frequency of surveillance testing. Also, evaluations of the
proposed TS changes demonstrate that the availability of equipment
and systems required to prevent or mitigate the radiological
consequences of an accident are not significantly affected because
of other, more frequent testing that is performed, the availability
of redundant systems and equipment, or the high reliability of the
equipment. Since the impact on the systems is minimal NMC [Nuclear
Management Company] has concluded that the overall impact on the
plant safety analysis is negligible.
A historical review of surveillance test results and associated
maintenance records indicated that there was no evidence of any
failure that would invalidate the above conclusions.
Therefore, the proposed TS changes do not significantly increase
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
b. TS Trip Setting Changes
Changes are proposed to the Monticello TS Trip Settings. The
proposed changes are a result of application of the Monticello
Instrument Setpoint Methodology using plant-specific drift values.
Application of this methodology results in Trip Setpoints that more
accurately reflect total instrumentation loop accuracy, as well as
that of test equipment and calculated drift between surveillances.
The proposed changes will not result in hardware changes. The
instrumentation is not assumed to be initiators of any analyzed
events, nor do they impact any design or functional requirements of
the associated systems. Existing operating margins between plant
conditions and actual plant setpoints are not significantly reduced
due to the proposed changes. The role of the instrumentation is in
mitigating and thereby, limiting the consequences of accidents.
The Nominal Trip Setpoints were developed to ensure the design
and safety analysis limits are satisfied. The methodology used for
the development of the Trip Settings ensures: (1) The affected
instrumentation remains capable of mitigating design basis events as
described in the safety analysis; and, (2) the results and
radiological consequences described in the safety analysis remain
bounding. The proposed changes do not alter the plant's ability to
detect and mitigate events.
Therefore, these changes do not involve a significant increase
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously
evaluated.
c. Surveillance Testing Interval Reductions
The proposed TS changes involve reductions in the surveillance
testing intervals from once per operating cycle or refueling outage
to once every three (3) months or once per quarter for the equipment
associated with these TS SRs. The shorter intervals are based upon
the plant-specific results of a review of the surveillance test
history for this equipment. The implementing procedures for these
SRs have been performed on a once per three (3) month or once per
quarter interval for a number of years, and these changes more
accurately reflect actual plant maintenance practices. The proposed,
more restrictive TS changes do not physically impact the plant, nor
do they impact any design or functional requirements of the
associated systems. That is, the proposed TS changes neither degrade
the performance of, nor increase the challenges to, any safety
system assumed to function in the safety analysis. These proposed TS
changes neither impact the TS SRs themselves nor the manner in which
the surveillances are performed.
The proposed TS changes do not introduce any accident
initiators, since no accident previously evaluated relate to the
frequency
[[Page 2893]]
of surveillance testing. The proposed TS intervals demonstrate that
the equipment and systems required to prevent or mitigate the
radiological consequences of an accident are continuing to meet the
assumptions of the setpoint evaluation on a more frequent basis.
Since the impacts on systems are minimal and the assumptions of the
safety analyses are maintained, NMC has concluded that the overall
impact on the plant safety analysis is negligible.
Therefore, the proposed TS changes do not significantly increase
the probability or consequences of any accident previously
evaluated.
2. The proposed amendment does not create the possibility of a
new or different kind or accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
a. Surveillance Testing Interval Extensions
The proposed TS changes involve changes in the surveillance
testing intervals to facilitate a change in the operating cycle
length. The proposed TS changes do not introduce any failure
mechanisms of a different type than those previously evaluated.
There are no physical changes being made to the facility. No new or
different equipment is being installed. No installed equipment is
being operated in a different manner. As a result no new failure
modes are introduced. The SRs themselves, and the manner in which
surveillance tests are performed, remain unchanged.
A historical review of surveillance test results and associated
maintenance records indicated that there was no evidence of any
failure that would invalidate the above conclusions.
Therefore, the proposed TS changes do not create the possibility
of a new or different kind of accident from any previously
evaluated.
b. TS Trip Setting Changes
The proposed changes to the Trip Settings are a result of
applying the Monticello Instrument Setpoint Methodology using plant-
specific drift values. The application of this methodology does not
create the possibility of any new or different kinds of accidents
from any accidents previously evaluated. This is based upon the fact
that the method and manner of plant operations are unchanged.
The use of the proposed Trip Setpoints does not impact the safe
operation of the plant in that the safety analysis limits are
maintained. The proposed changes in Trip Settings involve no system
additions or physical modifications to plant systems. The Trip
Settings are revised to ensure the affected instrumentation remains
capable of mitigating accidents and transients. Plant equipment will
not be operated in a manner different from previous operation. Since
operational methods remain unchanged and the operating parameters
were evaluated to maintain the plant within existing design basis
criteria no different type of failure or accident is created.
Therefore, the proposed TS changes do not create the possibility
of a new or different kind of accident from any previously
evaluated.
c. Surveillance Testing Interval Reductions
The proposed TS changes involve reductions in the surveillance
testing intervals from once per operating cycle or refueling outage
to once every three (3) months or once per quarter for the equipment
associated with these TS SRs. The shorter intervals are based upon
the plant-specific results of a review of the surveillance test
history for this equipment. The implementing procedures for these
SRs have been performed on a once per three (3) month or once per
quarter interval for a number of years and these changes more
accurately reflect actual plant maintenance practices. The proposed
more restrictive TS changes do not physically impact the plant, nor
do they impact any design or functional requirements of the
associated systems. That is, the proposed TS changes neither degrade
the performance of, nor increase the challenges to, any safety
system assumed to function in the safety analysis. These proposed TS
changes neither impact the TS SRs themselves nor the manner in which
the surveillances are performed.
The proposed TS changes do not introduce any failure mechanism
of a different type than those previously evaluated. The proposed
changes make no physical changes to the plant. No new or different
equipment is being installed. No installed equipment is being
operated in a different manner.
A historical review of surveillance test results and associated
maintenance records indicate that there is no evidence of any
failure that would invalidate the above conclusions.
Therefore, the proposed TS changes do not create the possibility
of a new or different kind of accident from any previously
evaluated.
3. The proposed amendment will not involve a significant
reduction in a margin of safety.
a. Surveillance Testing Interval Extensions
Although the proposed TS changes result in changes in the
interval between surveillance tests, the impact, if any, on system
availability is minimal based upon other, more frequent testing that
is performed, the existence of redundant systems and equipment or
overall system reliability. Evaluations show there is no evidence of
any time-dependant failure that would impact system availability.
The proposed changes do not significantly impact the condition
or performance of structures, systems and components relied upon for
accident mitigation. The proposed TS changes do not physically
impact the plant, nor do they impact any design or functional
requirements of the associated systems. The proposed changes do not
significantly impact any safety analysis assumptions or results.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant
reduction in a margin of safety.
b. TS Trip Setting Changes
The proposed changes do not involve a reduction in a margin of
safety. The proposed changes were developed using a Monticello
Instrument Setpoint Methodology using plant-specific drift values.
This methodology ensures no safety analysis limits are exceeded. The
proposed TS changes do not physically impact the plant, nor do they
impact any design or functional requirements of the associated
systems.
As such, these proposed changes do not involve a reduction in a
margin of safety.
c. Surveillance Testing Interval Reductions
The proposed TS changes result in a shorter interval between
surveillance tests to ensure the assumptions of the safety analysis
are maintained. The impact, if any, on system availability is
minimal, as a result of the more frequent testing that is performed.
The proposed changes do not significantly impact the condition or
performance of structures, systems and components relied upon for
accident mitigation. The proposed TS changes do not physically
impact the plant, nor do they impact any design or functional
requirements of the associated systems. The proposed changes do not
significantly impact any safety analysis assumptions or results.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant
reduction in a margin of safety.
The U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff has reviewed
the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the
three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC
staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves NSHC.
Attorney for licensee: Jonathan Rogoff, Esquire, Vice President,
Counsel & Secretary, Nuclear Management Company, LLC, 700 First Street,
Hudson, WI 54016.
NRC Section Chief: L. Raghavan.
Omaha Public Power District, Docket No. 50-285, Fort Calhoun Station,
Unit No. 1, Washington County, Nebraska
Date of amendment request: September 8, 2004.
Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment deletes
the requirements from the technical specifications (TS) to maintain
containment hydrogen monitors. Licensees were generally required to
implement upgrades as described in NUREG-0737, ``Clarification of TMI
[Three Mile Island] Action Plan Requirements,'' and Regulatory Guide
(RG) 1.97, ``Instrumentation for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power
Plants to Assess Plant and Environs Conditions During and Following an
Accident.'' Implementation of these upgrades was an outcome of the
lessons learned from the accident that occurred at TMI Unit 2.
Requirements related to combustible gas control were imposed by Order
for many facilities and were added to or included in the TS for nuclear
power