Notice of Safety Advisory 2005-01; Position of Switches in Non-Signaled Territory, 2455-2456 [05-834]
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Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 9 / Thursday, January 13, 2005 / Notices
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Carol Gore, (202) 366–4013, Office of
Safety Programs, Federal Motor Carrier
Safety Administration, Department of
Transportation, 400 Seventh Street,
SW., Washington, DC 20590.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Section
12007(e) of the Commercial Motor
Vehicle Safety Act (CMVSA) of 1986
(Pub. L. 99–570) specified four entities
authorized to access information from
CDLIS. These entities were the Secretary
of Transportation, the States, an
employer or prospective employer of a
person who operates a commercial
motor vehicle (CMV), and a person who
operates a CMV for an employer that
owns or leases a CMV or assigns
employees to operate a CMV (49 U.S.C.
§ 31309(e)). This provision remained in
effect until Congress passed TEA–21
(Pub. L. 105–85) and revised the access
provision through sections 4004(a) and
4011(d) (5) (codified at 49 U.S.C.
31106(e) and 31309(c), respectively).
Sections 4004(a) and 4011(d)(5) of TEA–
21 expanded CDLIS access by requiring
the Secretary of Transportation to
develop a policy on making information
available from CDLIS. The policy must
conform to existing Federal information
laws and regulations.
Privacy Act Applicability
The Privacy Act of 1974 (Pub. L. 93–
579, as amended) regulates Federal
information system practices regarding
the collection, maintenance,
dissemination and use of records by
Federal executive branch agencies.
CDLIS is not a Federal ‘‘system of
records,’’ as defined by the Privacy Act
because the records in CDLIS are not
controlled by FMCSA. Federal agencies
obtaining access to CDLIS records may
be subject to the Privacy Act, if they
establish a system of records with the
information obtained from CDLIS. Such
agencies may also need to provide a
process for review and correction of
those records.
Availability of Information From CDLIS
Section 12007(c) of the CMVSA
directed the Secretary to establish an
information system, now known as
CDLIS, to exchange commercial driver
licensing information among all the
States. CDLIS includes the databases of
fifty-one licensing jurisdictions and the
CDLIS Central Site, all connected by a
telecommunications network.
The CDL program was designed based
on these fundamental principles—that
no person who operates a commercial
motor vehicle shall at any time have
more than one driver’s license, that one
license shall contain that person’s
complete driving record, and that the
VerDate jul<14>2003
17:46 Jan 12, 2005
Jkt 205001
licensing State shall be notified of any
convictions of violations of any motor
vehicle control laws in any other State.
CDLIS supports these principles by
providing the Central Site, the
telecommunications network, and the
operating protocols States need to
exchange commercial license,
conviction and safety information on
individual CDL drivers. Drivers who
wish to review and, if necessary, correct
information about them in CDLIS must
contact the State agency that issued
their license.
FMCSA Policy on Availability of
Information From CDLIS
It is FMCSA’s policy that another
Federal agency may request access to
information in CDLIS by written
submission to FMCSA’s Chief Safety
Officer. In the request, the applicant
must state the legal basis and the need
for access to CDLIS. A Federal agency
will be required to execute a
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)
with the Department of Transportation
and/or FMCSA before access to CDLIS
data will be provided.
Issued on: January 7, 2005.
Annette M. Sandberg,
Administrator.
[FR Doc. 05–669 Filed 1–12–05; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–EX–P
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Railroad Administration
Notice of Safety Advisory 2005–01;
Position of Switches in Non-Signaled
Territory
Federal Railroad
Administration (FRA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Notice of safety advisory.
AGENCY:
SUMMARY: FRA is issuing Safety
Advisory 2005–01 to advise all railroads
to review their operating rules and take
certain other action necessary to ensure
that train crews who operate manual
(hand-operated) main track switches in
non-signaled territory restore the
switches to their normal position after
use. FRA intends this advisory to reduce
the risk of serious injury or death both
to railroad employees and the general
public due to not restoring such
switches to their normal position after
use.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Douglas H. Taylor, Staff Director,
Operating Practices Division, Office of
Safety Assurance and Compliance, FRA,
1120 Vermont Avenue, NW., RRS–11,
PO 00000
Frm 00080
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
2455
Mail Stop 25, Washington, DC 20590
(telephone (202) 493–6255).
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Factual Background
A review of FRA’s accident/incident
data shows that, overall, the safety of
rail transportation continues to improve.
However, FRA has particular concern
that recent accidents on Class I railroads
in non-signaled territory were caused, or
apparently caused, by the failure of
railroad employees to return manual
(hand-operated) main track switches to
their normal position, i.e., lined for the
main track, after use. As a result, rather
than continuing their intended
movement on the main track, trains
approaching these switches in a facingpoint direction were unexpectedly
diverted from the main track onto the
diverging route, and consequently
derailed. Most recently:
• On January 8, 2005, a Burlington
Northern and Santa Fe Railway
Company (BNSF) freight train was
unexpectedly diverted onto an
industrial track in Bieber, California.
The BNSF train struck two loaded grain
cars, derailing seven locomotives and 14
cars. Two railroad employees were
injured. Initial damages to equipment
and track are in excess of $970,000.
• On January 6, 2005, a Norfolk
Southern Railway Company (NS) freight
train was apparently unexpectedly
diverted from the main track onto an
industrial lead in Graniteville, South
Carolina. The NS train struck a standing
train on the industrial lead, derailing
three locomotives and 16 cars. One of
the derailed cars that contained chlorine
ruptured and released product. As a
result, eight citizens and one railroad
employee were killed, 5,400 local
residents remain evacuated, and 234
people have sought medical treatment.
The National Transportation Safety
Board (NTSB) began its investigation
immediately and will not make its
findings of probable cause for some
time. FRA has representatives at the site
assisting in the investigation. By stating
here its preliminary impression of what
may have contributed to this tragic
accident, FRA in no way intends to
supersede the NTSB’s thorough and
painstaking efforts that will ultimately
lead to its official findings of cause.
FRA’s regulations (49 CFR part 217)
require each railroad to instruct its
employees on the meaning and
application of its code of operating
rules, and to periodically test its
employees to determine their level of
compliance. Railroad operating rules
provide that the normal position for a
main track switch is lined and locked
for movement on the main track.
E:\FR\FM\13JAN1.SGM
13JAN1
2456
Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 9 / Thursday, January 13, 2005 / Notices
Another related rule provides that,
where trains or engines are required to
report clear of the main track, such a
report must not be made until the
switch and derail, if any, have been
secured in the normal position. Where
no signal or other system is in service
that indicates, through wayside or cab
signals, or both, the possibility that a
main track switch may be in other than
its normal position, compliance with
these railroad operating rules is the
critical element in ensuring route
integrity for main track movements.
Failure to comply with these
important operating rules is the result of
various causes. Difficulties may be
especially likely to arise where a train
crew has exclusive authority to occupy
a specific track segment until they
release it for other movements, but due
to inattention to duty, their train does
not return to a main track switch that
they may have inadvertently left lined
for movement to a secondary track
before going off duty. Some railroads
have very recently amended their
operating rules to address this issue.
Two recent examples are:
• On October 1, 2004, Union Pacific
Railroad Company (UP) adopted a
requirement that before reporting clear
of the limits of a track warrant, the
crewmember releasing the track warrant
must first advise the train dispatcher
that main track switches have been
restored to their normal position. The
train dispatching system prompts the
dispatcher to request this information if
it has not been provided by the crew.
The change was made because of a
collision that occurred at Thomaston,
Texas, on September 29, 2004. A Texas
Mexican Railway Company (TM) crew
released their main track authority, in
this case a track warrant, without
verifying that the north siding switch
was properly lined for the main track.
A southbound UP train entered the
siding and collided with the unattended
TM train. The change was issued by
System General Order and was a change
to General Code of Operating Rules,
Rule 14.7, Reporting Clear of Limits.
• On October 31, 2004, BNSF adopted
a requirement that the train crew report
to the train dispatcher the position of
the switch that the train is using to clear
the main track when releasing the limits
of their track warrant. The dispatching
system will not allow a track warrant to
be cleared until the dispatcher confirms
the switch position through a job
briefing with the crew. The change was
not made because of any specific
incident, but rather as the result of a
recommendation from BNSF’s Northern
California Division Safety Team. The
BNSF Team had some concerns on a
VerDate jul<14>2003
17:46 Jan 12, 2005
Jkt 205001
particular subdivision involving crews
forgetting to line back main track
switches and asked BNSF’s System
Rules Department to adopt a rule change
to eliminate the potential for this
oversight. The Rules Department then
issued this change across BNSF’s
system.
Recommended Actions
The recent accidents have convinced
FRA that, on an industry-wide basis,
railroad operating rules need to be
strengthened, clarified and reemphasized so as to ensure that all main
track switches are returned to their
normal position after use, irrespective of
whether or not the crew releases (clears)
the track warrant at that time.
Furthermore, it is essential that all
crewmembers communicate to each
other the fact that all main track
switches have been properly restored
after their use. Since this is strictly an
issue of ensuring that employees
remember to perform a simple but
crucially important duty, FRA believes
that additional procedures that serve as
reminders of that duty may be of great
value.
Accordingly, FRA strongly urges all
railroads to immediately:
1. Ensure that their operating rules
contain a provision, similar to that
established on BNSF and UP, as
described above, that clearly requires
train crews who operate manual (handoperated) main track switches in nonsignaled territory to report to the
dispatcher that the main track switches
have been restored to normal position,
before reporting clear of the limits of
main track authority, such as a track
warrant.
2. Require the conductor of a train
crew operating in non-signaled territory
to complete and sign a Switch Position
Awareness Form (Form). FRA
recommends that the Form be
completed in ink and contain the train
symbol, date, subdivision, conductor’s
and engineer’s names, and a listing by
name and location of each main track
switch operated by any member of the
crew. The listing should contain the
switch location and name, the time the
switch was reversed, the time the switch
was returned to the normal position,
and the initials of the conductor and the
engineer. Entries made with respect to
a specific main track switch must be
completed by the conductor as soon as
possible after the switch is reversed and
as soon as possible after the switch is
returned to its normal position. The
engineer’s initials on the Form are
intended to serve as a cross-check
measure to reflect that the engineer has
been advised, through a job briefing
PO 00000
Frm 00081
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
with the conductor, that the main track
switch or switches have been restored to
their normal position. The engineer’s
initials should be affixed to the Form as
soon as practicable after the main track
switch has been restored to its normal
position. All initials required on the
Form must be entered before any
member of the crew reports clear of the
limits of the main track authority.
3. Require that, at the completion of
each trip or tour of duty, the original
Form be submitted to the designated
railroad official(s) as directed.
4. Require that railroad officers review
the completed Forms for accuracy. The
results of these reviews should be
incorporated into the railroad’s
operational tests and inspections
program as required by 49 CFR 217.9.
5. Ensure immediate dissemination of
guidance on these revised rules and
procedures and of the necessary Forms
to all affected operating personnel.
FRA is considering the need for any
additional action to address this
situation, such as regulatory action or
additional advisories. We are
considering the form that any additional
action might take, its specific content,
and any necessary variations based on
differing types of operations. FRA’s
operating practices inspectors will
determine the extent to which railroads
have taken action in accordance with
the measures recommended in this
advisory. These findings will be one
important factor in determining FRA’s
future course of action. We are
committed to taking whatever action
appears necessary to prevent any further
death or serious injury that might arise
from additional failures to comply with
the basic operating rules concerning the
proper positioning of main track
switches.
In the meantime, all railroads are
strongly urged to immediately adopt
and comply with the measures
recommended in this advisory.
Issued in Washington, DC, on January 10,
2005.
Robert D. Jamison,
Acting Administrator, Federal Railroad
Administration.
[FR Doc. 05–834 Filed 1–11–05; 2:37 pm]
BILLING CODE 4910–06–P
E:\FR\FM\13JAN1.SGM
13JAN1
Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 70, Number 9 (Thursday, January 13, 2005)]
[Notices]
[Pages 2455-2456]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 05-834]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Railroad Administration
Notice of Safety Advisory 2005-01; Position of Switches in Non-
Signaled Territory
AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Notice of safety advisory.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: FRA is issuing Safety Advisory 2005-01 to advise all railroads
to review their operating rules and take certain other action necessary
to ensure that train crews who operate manual (hand-operated) main
track switches in non-signaled territory restore the switches to their
normal position after use. FRA intends this advisory to reduce the risk
of serious injury or death both to railroad employees and the general
public due to not restoring such switches to their normal position
after use.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Douglas H. Taylor, Staff Director,
Operating Practices Division, Office of Safety Assurance and
Compliance, FRA, 1120 Vermont Avenue, NW., RRS-11, Mail Stop 25,
Washington, DC 20590 (telephone (202) 493-6255).
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Factual Background
A review of FRA's accident/incident data shows that, overall, the
safety of rail transportation continues to improve. However, FRA has
particular concern that recent accidents on Class I railroads in non-
signaled territory were caused, or apparently caused, by the failure of
railroad employees to return manual (hand-operated) main track switches
to their normal position, i.e., lined for the main track, after use. As
a result, rather than continuing their intended movement on the main
track, trains approaching these switches in a facing-point direction
were unexpectedly diverted from the main track onto the diverging
route, and consequently derailed. Most recently:
On January 8, 2005, a Burlington Northern and Santa Fe
Railway Company (BNSF) freight train was unexpectedly diverted onto an
industrial track in Bieber, California. The BNSF train struck two
loaded grain cars, derailing seven locomotives and 14 cars. Two
railroad employees were injured. Initial damages to equipment and track
are in excess of $970,000.
On January 6, 2005, a Norfolk Southern Railway Company
(NS) freight train was apparently unexpectedly diverted from the main
track onto an industrial lead in Graniteville, South Carolina. The NS
train struck a standing train on the industrial lead, derailing three
locomotives and 16 cars. One of the derailed cars that contained
chlorine ruptured and released product. As a result, eight citizens and
one railroad employee were killed, 5,400 local residents remain
evacuated, and 234 people have sought medical treatment. The National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) began its investigation immediately
and will not make its findings of probable cause for some time. FRA has
representatives at the site assisting in the investigation. By stating
here its preliminary impression of what may have contributed to this
tragic accident, FRA in no way intends to supersede the NTSB's thorough
and painstaking efforts that will ultimately lead to its official
findings of cause.
FRA's regulations (49 CFR part 217) require each railroad to
instruct its employees on the meaning and application of its code of
operating rules, and to periodically test its employees to determine
their level of compliance. Railroad operating rules provide that the
normal position for a main track switch is lined and locked for
movement on the main track.
[[Page 2456]]
Another related rule provides that, where trains or engines are
required to report clear of the main track, such a report must not be
made until the switch and derail, if any, have been secured in the
normal position. Where no signal or other system is in service that
indicates, through wayside or cab signals, or both, the possibility
that a main track switch may be in other than its normal position,
compliance with these railroad operating rules is the critical element
in ensuring route integrity for main track movements.
Failure to comply with these important operating rules is the
result of various causes. Difficulties may be especially likely to
arise where a train crew has exclusive authority to occupy a specific
track segment until they release it for other movements, but due to
inattention to duty, their train does not return to a main track switch
that they may have inadvertently left lined for movement to a secondary
track before going off duty. Some railroads have very recently amended
their operating rules to address this issue. Two recent examples are:
On October 1, 2004, Union Pacific Railroad Company (UP)
adopted a requirement that before reporting clear of the limits of a
track warrant, the crewmember releasing the track warrant must first
advise the train dispatcher that main track switches have been restored
to their normal position. The train dispatching system prompts the
dispatcher to request this information if it has not been provided by
the crew. The change was made because of a collision that occurred at
Thomaston, Texas, on September 29, 2004. A Texas Mexican Railway
Company (TM) crew released their main track authority, in this case a
track warrant, without verifying that the north siding switch was
properly lined for the main track. A southbound UP train entered the
siding and collided with the unattended TM train. The change was issued
by System General Order and was a change to General Code of Operating
Rules, Rule 14.7, Reporting Clear of Limits.
On October 31, 2004, BNSF adopted a requirement that the
train crew report to the train dispatcher the position of the switch
that the train is using to clear the main track when releasing the
limits of their track warrant. The dispatching system will not allow a
track warrant to be cleared until the dispatcher confirms the switch
position through a job briefing with the crew. The change was not made
because of any specific incident, but rather as the result of a
recommendation from BNSF's Northern California Division Safety Team.
The BNSF Team had some concerns on a particular subdivision involving
crews forgetting to line back main track switches and asked BNSF's
System Rules Department to adopt a rule change to eliminate the
potential for this oversight. The Rules Department then issued this
change across BNSF's system.
Recommended Actions
The recent accidents have convinced FRA that, on an industry-wide
basis, railroad operating rules need to be strengthened, clarified and
re-emphasized so as to ensure that all main track switches are returned
to their normal position after use, irrespective of whether or not the
crew releases (clears) the track warrant at that time. Furthermore, it
is essential that all crewmembers communicate to each other the fact
that all main track switches have been properly restored after their
use. Since this is strictly an issue of ensuring that employees
remember to perform a simple but crucially important duty, FRA believes
that additional procedures that serve as reminders of that duty may be
of great value.
Accordingly, FRA strongly urges all railroads to immediately:
1. Ensure that their operating rules contain a provision, similar
to that established on BNSF and UP, as described above, that clearly
requires train crews who operate manual (hand-operated) main track
switches in non-signaled territory to report to the dispatcher that the
main track switches have been restored to normal position, before
reporting clear of the limits of main track authority, such as a track
warrant.
2. Require the conductor of a train crew operating in non-signaled
territory to complete and sign a Switch Position Awareness Form (Form).
FRA recommends that the Form be completed in ink and contain the train
symbol, date, subdivision, conductor's and engineer's names, and a
listing by name and location of each main track switch operated by any
member of the crew. The listing should contain the switch location and
name, the time the switch was reversed, the time the switch was
returned to the normal position, and the initials of the conductor and
the engineer. Entries made with respect to a specific main track switch
must be completed by the conductor as soon as possible after the switch
is reversed and as soon as possible after the switch is returned to its
normal position. The engineer's initials on the Form are intended to
serve as a cross-check measure to reflect that the engineer has been
advised, through a job briefing with the conductor, that the main track
switch or switches have been restored to their normal position. The
engineer's initials should be affixed to the Form as soon as
practicable after the main track switch has been restored to its normal
position. All initials required on the Form must be entered before any
member of the crew reports clear of the limits of the main track
authority.
3. Require that, at the completion of each trip or tour of duty,
the original Form be submitted to the designated railroad official(s)
as directed.
4. Require that railroad officers review the completed Forms for
accuracy. The results of these reviews should be incorporated into the
railroad's operational tests and inspections program as required by 49
CFR 217.9.
5. Ensure immediate dissemination of guidance on these revised
rules and procedures and of the necessary Forms to all affected
operating personnel.
FRA is considering the need for any additional action to address
this situation, such as regulatory action or additional advisories. We
are considering the form that any additional action might take, its
specific content, and any necessary variations based on differing types
of operations. FRA's operating practices inspectors will determine the
extent to which railroads have taken action in accordance with the
measures recommended in this advisory. These findings will be one
important factor in determining FRA's future course of action. We are
committed to taking whatever action appears necessary to prevent any
further death or serious injury that might arise from additional
failures to comply with the basic operating rules concerning the proper
positioning of main track switches.
In the meantime, all railroads are strongly urged to immediately
adopt and comply with the measures recommended in this advisory.
Issued in Washington, DC, on January 10, 2005.
Robert D. Jamison,
Acting Administrator, Federal Railroad Administration.
[FR Doc. 05-834 Filed 1-11-05; 2:37 pm]
BILLING CODE 4910-06-P