Security Requirements for Portable Gauges Containing Byproduct Material, 2001-2009 [05-590]

Agencies

• NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Federal Register Volume 70, Number 8 (Wednesday, January 12, 2005)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 2001-2009]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 05-590]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

10 CFR Part 30

RIN 3150-AH06


Security Requirements for Portable Gauges Containing Byproduct 
Material

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is amending its 
regulations governing the use of byproduct material in specifically 
licensed portable gauges. The final rule requires a portable gauge 
licensee to use a minimum of two independent physical controls that 
form tangible barriers to secure portable gauges from unauthorized 
removal whenever the portable gauges are not under the control and 
constant surveillance of the licensee. The primary intent of this 
rulemaking is to increase licensees' control of portable gauges to 
reduce the opportunity for unauthorized removal or theft.

EFFECTIVE DATE: This final rule is effective on July 11, 2005.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Lydia Chang, Office of Nuclear 
Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
Washington, DC 20555-0001, telephone (301) 415-6319, e-mail 
lwc1@nrc.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

    Portable gauges are devices containing licensed material that are 
used to determine physical properties (such as density and moisture 
content of soil, concrete, and other materials) in a field setting. The 
most commonly used portable gauges contain two encapsulated sources of 
radioactive material. One source is a sealed gamma source containing 
0.30 to 0.37 gigabecquerels (8 to 10 millicuries) of cesium-137 (Cs-
137) used to measure density. Another source is a sealed neutron source 
containing 1.48 to 1.85 gigabecquerels (40 to 50 millicuries) of 
americium-241/beryllium (Am-241/Be) used to measure moisture content. 
Other sources have also been utilized in portable gauges. When not in 
use, portable gauges are generally stored in a permanent storage 
location within a licensed facility. Sometimes, portable gauges are 
stored at a jobsite, at a temporary storage location, or on a vehicle. 
When transporting a portable gauge in a vehicle, the gauge is often 
placed in a transportation case, and then is secured in or onto the 
vehicle.
    Under the authority of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, NRC, together 
with the 33 Agreement States, regulates byproduct material used in 
portable gauges. There are approximately 1100 NRC specific licensees 
for portable gauges in non-Agreement States and approximately 4000 
State specific licensees for portable gauges in Agreement States. There 
are an estimated 22,000 to 25,000 portable gauges in use in the United 
States.
    Subpart I of 10 CFR part 20 addresses storage and control of 
licensed material. Specifically, Sec.  20.1801, ``Security of stored 
material,'' requires licensees to secure from unauthorized removal or 
access licensed materials that are stored in controlled or unrestricted 
areas. Section 20.1802, ``Control of material not in storage,'' 
requires licensees to control and maintain constant surveillance of 
licensed material that is in a controlled or unrestricted area and that 
is not in storage. Despite these requirements, the theft of portable 
gauges continues at a rate of approximately 50 gauges per year with a 
less than 50-percent recovery rate, based on reports in NRC's Nuclear 
Materials Events Database (NMED). More than two-thirds of the stolen 
gauges were taken from vehicles parked outdoors. In most of these 
incidents, the gauge was in a U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) 
``Type A'' transportation case, which was then secured with a metal 
chain to the open bed of a pickup truck. Frequently, the chain was cut 
or the transportation case was broken, and then the gauge was stolen. 
NRC has issued several ``Information Notices'' to increase licensees' 
awareness of security concerns regarding portable gauges. However, the 
yearly number of reported incidents has not changed in response to 
these notices.
    Although the amount of radioactive material used in a portable 
gauge is relatively small, and the radioactive material is encapsulated 
in stainless steel, unauthorized removal of portable gauges still poses 
a potential public health and safety concern. A portable gauge that is 
not under the control of a licensee poses a potential radiation hazard 
to individuals that may come in close contact with the source. It also 
creates a concern if the portable gauge that is removed without 
authorization is abandoned, inadvertently recycled, or used 
inappropriately.

Discussion

    To reduce the potential risk to public health and safety, a working 
group with participation of personnel from the Agreement States of 
Florida and

[[Page 2002]]

Arkansas developed the proposed rule to impose security requirements 
for portable gauges to increase licensees' control, which would reduce 
the opportunity for unauthorized removal of the gauges. The security 
requirements would require that the portable gauge licensees must use a 
minimum of two independent physical controls that form tangible 
barriers to secure portable gauges from unauthorized removal whenever 
the portable gauges are not under the control and constant surveillance 
of the licensee. The primary intent of this rulemaking is to increase 
the control of portable gauges and thereby reduce the opportunity for 
and the number of unauthorized removals or thefts of portable gauges 
and, as a result, reduce the potential impact to public health and 
safety. NRC published a notice of proposed rule (68 FR 45172; August 1, 
2003) in the Federal Register with the opportunity for comment on the 
proposed amendment to 10 CFR 30.34.
    After considering all comments received on the proposed rule and 
evaluating recommended alternative methods to increase the control of 
portable gauges, NRC finds that the requirements in the proposed rule 
are the preferred alternative because they provide the most flexibility 
for licensees (permitting a choice from a wide range of physical 
controls) without imposing excessive costs in implementing the 
controls. Therefore, the final rule contains the same requirements as 
the proposed rule.

Summary of Public Comments on the Proposed Rule

    NRC received eleven comment letters on the proposed rule. The 
commenters included a member of the public, members of an industry 
advisory group, three licensees, a radiation service company, two 
manufacturers, and three States. Copies of the public comments are 
available for public inspection and copying for a fee at the NRC Public 
Document Room, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD 20852.
    Among the eleven comment letters, six state that they fully support 
the goal to reduce lost or stolen gauges; two state that current 
requirements are adequate; one indicates that the rule is well 
intended; one expresses the view that a double lock requirement may be 
excessive; and one believes that the current practice of using a chain 
to secure a portable gauge in an open-bed pickup truck is not adequate. 
Among comments from the three States, one indicates that the NRC 
proposed measures do not go far enough; one states that the current 
regulatory requirements are adequate; and one supports the goal of the 
rule but believes the proposed rule to be impractical. A discussion of 
the comments and NRC's responses follow:

Current Requirements Adequate

    Comment: One commenter believes the security procedures to be 
adequate, but is confident that he can also comply with the language of 
the proposed change.
    Response: Although certain licensees may have adequate procedures 
for securing the portable gauges, NRC does not believe the current 
practice of having one physical control is sufficient to reduce the 
current rate of portable gauge theft.
    Comment: The Virginia Department of Transportation (VDOT) has not 
had any gauges stolen in the past 8 years, and believes that the 
current security measures are adequate.
    Response: NRC disagrees that current security measures are 
adequate. Although no portable gauge was reported stolen from VDOT over 
the past 8 years, NRC notes that in the Commonwealth of Virginia, one 
incident of a lost gauge and two incidents of stolen gauges were 
reported in 2003, and two incidents of stolen gauges were reported in 
2004. To reduce the overall rate of unauthorized removal or theft of 
portable gauges, NRC believes it is necessary to increase controls for 
portable gauges.

Malevolent Use of Portable Gauges

    Comment: Four commenters stated that portable gauges are not likely 
to be used for malevolent purposes. One commenter stated that no 
credible study supports the conclusion that portable gauges might be 
used for malevolent purposes or that gauges are a substantial risk of 
such use. That commenter also stated that there is no identifiable 
pattern to support the idea that individuals are stealing portable 
moisture/density gauges for malevolent use. One commenter questioned 
what resulted in the need for a very prescriptive rule for increased 
security of these gauges since a report to Congress indicated that 
sources in a single portable gauge are small, and unlikely to be 
suitable for an effective radiological dispersion device (RDD). Another 
commenter stated that the potential for the stolen gauges to be used in 
a radiological dispersion device is minute because it takes such a 
significant effort to steal a large number of gauges and remove the 
radioisotopes to manufacture a ``dirty bomb.'' Another commenter 
indicated that there has not been an increase in gauge thefts in recent 
years, and that there is no evidence that thefts are for malevolent 
purposes, but rather it is likely that thefts are more for personal or 
monetary gain.
    Response: NRC agrees. As stated in the regulatory analysis for the 
proposed rule: ``Because of the small quantity of radioactive material 
in a portable gauge, the potential for its malevolent use is small.'' 
Due to the quantity and physical characteristics of the radioactive 
material used, portable gauges do not pose a substantial risk for 
malevolent purposes such as a ``dirty bomb.'' Similarly, NRC has not 
identified any trend or information indicating that reported thefts of 
portable gauges containing licensed material over the last 2 years 
resulted in a substantial health and safety consequence. However, NRC 
is still concerned with the continued loss of control of the licensed 
materials due to unauthorized removal or theft of portable gauges, the 
multiple resource impacts in response to such events, and the potential 
exposure to an individual, who come in close contact with the source in 
the portable gauge. NRC believes that these additional requirements are 
needed to improve the control of the licensed material and thus better 
protect the public from a potential health and safety risk.
    Comment: One commenter stated that the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) has published guidance on the security of radioactive 
sources, on categorization of radioactive sources, and on graded 
security measures based on potential hazard, vulnerability of the 
source or device, and potential consequences of malevolent acts. In the 
interim guidance document on security of radioactive sources, the IAEA 
has categorized portable gauges as Security Group C. Security measures 
that the IAEA recommended for Group C include one technical measure 
that separates the source from unauthorized personnel. The commenter 
stated that NRC's proposed rule exceeds the security measures 
recommended by the IAEA, and believes that one technical measure is 
sufficient.
    Response: In addition to one technical measure separating the 
source from unauthorized personnel for Security Group C material (such 
as portable gauges), the IAEA also recommends access control at the 
source location as a sufficient security measure based on the potential 
hazard, vulnerability of the device, and potential consequences of 
malevolent acts. This final rule is not based on common defense and 
security, but is based on protecting public health and safety from the 
potential of

[[Page 2003]]

radiation exposure as a result of unauthorized removal or theft of 
portable gauges. Instead of one technical measure and access control as 
recommended by IAEA, NRC believes that two technical measures are 
needed to sufficiently control the portable gauge from unauthorized 
removal or theft in the United States. The IAEA guidance on the 
Security of Radioactive Sources (TECDOC-1355) is an interim guidance 
for comment by its Member States, and has not been accepted by the 
United States. In general, NRC may modify IAEA standards, as necessary, 
to meet NRC's regulatory needs. NRC's current regulatory framework 
already requires licensees to use one measure of control in securing 
the portable gauges and has concluded that an additional measure is 
necessary to reduce the instances of unauthorized removal or theft of 
portable gauges. NRC has issued several Information Notices to portable 
gauge licensees to emphasize the importance of adequate control of the 
portable gauges; however, the number of unauthorized removals or thefts 
of portable gauges has not decreased. NRC believes that an additional 
measure of control is needed to reduce the current number.

Rule Will Not Prevent Thefts

    Comment: Although several commenters support the NRC's security 
concerns, one commenter stated that licensees are already required to 
secure gauges, but that does not prevent carelessness in their control. 
Securing gauges with two layers of security will not prevent thefts.
    Response: NRC agrees that the requirements would not necessarily 
prevent carelessness in the control of gauges or human error, or ensure 
compliance by all licensees. Although NRC also agrees that additional 
security measures can not totally prevent the unauthorized removal or 
theft of the portable gauges, requiring an additional layer of physical 
control should deter the likelihood of the unauthorized removal or 
theft.
    Comment: One commenter stated that the rule would not deter insider 
or opportunistic thefts that occur because of lapses such as leaving 
the keys in a vehicle that contains a gauge.
    Response: Although background checks and hiring practices could 
potentially deter theft by insiders, NRC does not believe that the very 
small number of thefts committed by insiders warrants such additional 
requirements. Requiring licensees to use two independent physical 
controls should reduce the risk of unauthorized removal or theft of 
portable gauges from a variety of causes.
    Comment: One commenter stated that licensees are already required 
by regulations to maintain ``adequate security.'' However, the current 
practice of leaving the gauge in the open bed of a pickup truck chained 
to the side of the truck is not ``adequate security,'' because gauges 
have been stolen from the open bed of a pickup truck after the chain 
was cut.
    Response: NRC agrees that all licensees are required to maintain 
adequate security and control of the licensed material. It appears that 
the current practices are not sufficient for control of portable 
gauges. NRC evaluated various alternatives in developing the proposed 
rule. Based on the cost/benefit analysis in the regulatory analysis, 
NRC believes that adding one additional layer of control would make it 
more difficult for a thief to defeat, and the total cost impact would 
be acceptable.
    Comment: One commenter believes that not all licensees would strive 
to comply with the new requirements. The portable gauge theft rate will 
not change because the new requirements would not affect these types of 
licensees, who will ignore the new regulation.
    Response: NRC expects the rate of unauthorized removal or theft of 
portable gauges to decrease once the amendment becomes effective. Not 
all of the unauthorized removals or thefts of portable gauges are 
caused by lack of compliance by licensees with security requirements, 
but are also due to defeating the current security measures allowing 
the use of one locking device to secure the portable gauge. NRC 
believes that adding an additional measure would reduce the number of 
unauthorized removals or thefts by making it more difficult and more 
time-consuming to defeat the security measures. Requiring two 
independent physical controls is the most effective alternative based 
on cost and flexibility to licensees in implementing the rule.
    Comment: One commenter stated that additional regulations are 
unlikely to significantly reduce the number of [stolen] gauges. The 
commenter believes that a large percentage of the gauges reported 
stolen were probably left unsecured, and the loss occurred as a ``theft 
of opportunity,'' rather than a ``determined thief.'' The gauges that 
were stolen by defeating one security measure would most likely be 
stolen regardless of the number of independent security systems because 
a ``determined thief'' is just as likely to defeat two security systems 
as one.
    Response: NRC believes that increasing physical controls provides a 
delay and deterrent mechanism making it more difficult for a thief to 
defeat. At a minimum, two controls would delay the thief by drawing 
attention from bystanders, which may deter the thief.
    Comment: One commenter believes that gauges will continue to be 
stolen from careless gauge owners and by persistent thieves, regardless 
of the increased security requirements and that the new requirements 
adversely affect the diligent and vigilant gauge owner.
    Response: NRC agrees that no measure is absolute in stopping 
persistent and determined thieves, but increasing the security controls 
would make theft more difficult. NRC believes that the financial impact 
on gauge owners from enhancing security requirements is small when 
compared to: The financial consequences to the gauge owners due to 
unauthorized removal or theft of the portable gauges; the potential 
health and safety risk to the public from these incidents; and the 
resource impacts on law enforcement and regulatory agencies.

Not Commensurate With Risk

    Comment: One commenter stated that the double-lock requirement may 
be excessive from a security standpoint. Another commenter stated that 
the proposed rule is inconsistent with a risk-informed approach to 
regulation because it imposes tighter security requirements on low-
activity portable gauges than high-activity devices such as radiography 
cameras, which pose far greater hazards. It would be far easier and 
more likely for someone with malevolent intent to steal a single, high-
activity radiography device than many low-activity portable gauges, and 
much less likely to raise suspicions. The commenter does not believe 
that moisture-density gauges merit security requirements more 
restrictive than those required for higher-activity portable devices.
    Response: NRC disagrees with the commenters. Since the terrorist 
attacks of September 11, 2001, NRC has issued Orders to enhance 
security measures for certain licensed facilities. Based on the IAEA 
Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and 
IAEA Categorization of Radioactive Source (TECDOC-1344), NRC considers 
that portable gauges are not high risk sources if used for malevolent 
purposes. NRC is still concerned with the number of unauthorized 
removals or thefts of portable gauges. Even though a typical portable 
gauge contains much lower activity than a radiography camera,

[[Page 2004]]

unauthorized removal or theft of such gauge still poses a potential 
health and safety risk to the public. As for higher-activity devices, 
NRC is taking appropriate actions to enhance security and protect the 
common defense and security.
    Comment: One commenter stated that even if the stolen gauge rate is 
reduced from approximately 50 gauges per year to 25 gauges per year, it 
would not represent a meaningful reduction in risk in the absence of 
any evidence that any harm has ever occurred to any individual from a 
stolen portable gauge.
    Response: NRC disagrees with the comment that the reduction would 
not represent a meaningful reduction in risk. On an average, 50 
portable gauges are stolen per year. Every gauge that is not recovered 
from unauthorized removal or theft poses a potential hazard to the 
public. It is true that severe radiation injury has not been associated 
with unauthorized removal or theft of portable gauges. Because the 
recovery rate is low, the number of unrecovered gauges will continue to 
grow, posing potential risk to the public.

Change in Gauge Design

    Comment: One commenter indicated that if grocery-cart manufacturers 
can make the wheels of their grocery carts lock if the cart is taken 
off the property, then portable gauge manufacturers could make it 
easier for licensees to secure their gauges.
    Response: NRC agrees that perhaps portable gauge manufacturers 
could make it easier for licensees to secure the gauges, but it is not 
an NRC requirement that such changes take place. Manufacturers are 
required to design the sealed sources and the devices to operate 
safely. Because portable gauges are used by licensees in different 
situations and stored in various locations, the licensees are in a 
better position to select the security measures best suited for their 
situation.
    Comment: One commenter stated that manufacturers must be required 
to make gauges ``idiot-proof'' and less attractive to thieves. The 
commenter suggests the portable gauges be designed so that if a gauge 
is stolen, the radioactive material portion is sequestered.
    Response: With the current portable gauge design, the sealed 
sources are inaccessible and can not be readily removed by a member of 
the public when the gauge is in its locked configuration. Because the 
commenter did not provide any details on the ``sequestering'' 
technology, it is uncertain if it is feasible to implement or 
sufficient to protect the public health and safety.
    Comment: One commenter suggested the gauge be designed so that the 
source rod has to be removed and stored separately.
    Response: NRC does not believe that it is necessary to remove and 
store the source rod separately. With the current design, the sealed 
sources are kept within a shielded compartment inside the portable 
gauge providing protection for the workers. If the sealed source and 
the source rod would have to be removed and stored separately, it would 
greatly increase the radiation exposure to workers from removal of the 
source rods and from having multiple storage sites. Additionally, the 
removed sealed source and the source rod would present a greater risk 
to the public if the licensee were to lose control of the material. 
Therefore, NRC does not believe there would be sufficient benefit from 
requiring removal of the sealed source or the source rod.
    Comment: A commenter suggests that a ``secured key'' be required 
for locks.
    Response: NRC does not believe that it is necessary to require a 
secured key for locks. Based on the NMED data, stolen gauges are not 
linked to a stolen key. Therefore, it would not be cost effective to 
incorporate a secured key system as means to reduce the opportunity for 
unauthorized removal or theft of a gauge.
    Comment: One commenter stated that ``there's some psychology to be 
reckoned with'' because merely the suggestion for redesign of an 
important engineering tool might make management much more amenable to 
require employees/authorized users to ensure that gauges were secure.
    Response: NRC's regulatory requirements are based on technical 
information and are not based on psychological reactions of certain 
individuals. NRC believes that having two independent physical controls 
is a tangible requirement that can be easily inspected and evaluated.

More Enforcement

    Comment: Three commenters stated that stricter enforcement action 
against non-compliant licensees would be better than more rules and 
would dramatically reduce the number of gauges stolen. One commenter 
stated that rules are only as effective as their enforcement and that 
current rules already require that gauges be secured against 
unauthorized removal. Those licensees that are diligent about security 
do not have gauges stolen. The annual stolen gauge rate is extremely 
low (about 0.2 percent), so most licensees are doing a good job. Those 
licensees that are not diligent or vigilant are unlikely to change as a 
result of a new rule. Only increased emphasis on inspection and 
enforcement of the security requirements is likely to cause those 
licensees to change their ways.
    Response: NRC does not believe that the existing security 
requirements are sufficient, and therefore, enforcement alone will not 
dramatically reduce the number of unauthorized removals or thefts of 
portable gauges. NRC believes that it is necessary to increase the 
current security measures to reduce the opportunity for unauthorized 
removal or theft. NRC does agree that more frequent inspections and 
increased enforcement would reduce licensees' future security lapses, 
but would not affect thefts where all procedures were followed and the 
thief still defeated the security measures. NRC disagrees that 
licensees, who are diligent about security, do not have gauges stolen. 
Many gauges were stolen from compliant licensees by thieves defeating 
current security measures. NRC has and will continue to enforce 
security requirements for portable gauges.

Information Notice

    Comment: One commenter recommended that NRC rescind the rule and 
use Information Notices to reduce the number of stolen gauges.
    Response: NRC disagrees with the suggestion to use Information 
Notices as a means to reduce the number of unauthorized removals or 
thefts of portable gauges. As indicated in the notice of proposed rule 
(68 FR 45172; August 1, 2003), NRC has issued several Information 
Notices in the past to remind licensees of their responsibilities 
concerning the security of portable gauges, and there has been no 
change in the number of reported incidents annually.

Root Cause Not Addressed

    Comment: One commenter claimed the proposed rule has not 
effectively addressed the root cause of the problem nor is it 
consistent with a risk-informed, performance-based approach to 
regulation.
    Response: NRC disagrees with the comment. The NRC working group 
evaluated various alternatives in developing and evaluating the 
proposed rule in light of comments. Although certain alternatives might 
be more effective than the chosen one, the associated cost impacts to 
the licensees' operations from such alternatives would be immense. For 
example, the alternative of prohibiting the storage of portable gauges 
in vehicles might be more effective, but the total resource impact on 
licensees is estimated to be

[[Page 2005]]

more than $200 million per year. This assumes each portable gauge 
operator would spend an additional 2 hours daily in transporting the 
portable gauge to and from the licensed facility. NRC believes that 
requiring two independent physical controls will reduce the likelihood 
of unauthorized removal or theft of portable gauges while minimizing 
cost impacts to the licensees.

Visibility Issue

    Comment: Four commenters suggested that the rule should address the 
visibility of the gauge (e.g., thief sees it, thinks it's valuable, and 
steals it). One of the commenters also stated that methods that reduce 
the visibility of devices are just as important as tangible barriers in 
preventing theft because most thefts occur when gauges are highly 
visible (i.e., in open-bed trucks). Keeping a gauge inside a box where 
it is not visible is an effective physical control.
    Response: NRC agrees that portable gauges are often stolen because 
the thief perceives that the transportation case contains valuable 
commercial equipment. NRC also agrees that there could be benefits from 
keeping the portable gauge and its transportation case out of sight or 
covered any time they are not under the control of the operator. NRC 
considered this and other various approaches to address the visibility 
issue, but rejected them as costly, impractical, or contrary to other 
regulatory requirements, and of questionable effectiveness. For 
example, NRC considered requiring that the gauge and its transportation 
case be covered, but the DOT staff informed the NRC staff that such 
covering of portable gauges during transport would be inconsistent with 
DOT regulations and defeats the intent of the requirements for labels 
and markings of portable gauges containing radioactive materials. 
Requiring the use of a cover to conceal the portable gauge and its 
transportation case could place licensees in non-compliance with DOT 
requirements. NRC also considered requiring use of an ``enclosure'' as 
a means to address the visibility problem. However, requiring the use 
of an enclosure would have significant cost impacts on licensees that 
might not be commensurate with the potential benefit gained. Because 
the rule does not prescribe specific methods for physical control, a 
licensee will have the flexibility to select an enclosure as one of the 
two independent physical controls if it were deemed beneficial for its 
situation. NRC believes it is necessary to have this flexibility for 
licensees because of the high number of licensees affected, each of 
which may vary in its operating and financial conditions.
    There are many methods that could be used to secure the gauge and 
its transportation case, which could also keep the gauge and its 
transportation case out of sight. NRC does not believe it is cost-
effective to require additional requirements for such purpose. NRC 
believes that regulations should provide sufficient flexibility to 
allow licensees to select the two independent physical controls to 
prevent the unauthorized removal of the portable gauges that best fit a 
licensee's needs.

Accessibility Issue

    Comment: According to an Agreement State, it requires portable 
gauges to be returned to an approved storage location after work when 
the temporary job-site is within 93 kilometers (50 miles) of an 
approved storage location.
    Response: NRC considered requiring the return of portable gauges to 
an approved storage location daily. However, NRC believes that making 
it a requirement applicable to all licensees would not be feasible and 
would not be cost efficient due to the time spent transporting the 
gauges back and forth from licensed facilities. In the regulatory 
analysis performed for the proposed rule, NRC evaluated several options 
including the option of daily return of portable gauges to a permanent 
storage location. Based on the estimated cost impact of this option, 
NRC determined that the cost would be excessive considering potential 
benefits gained from such a requirement.
    Comment: One commenter stated that the rule is not likely to be 
effective because it does not address the critical factors that lead to 
theft. Clearly, two key factors in the theft of gauges are visibility 
(open-bed truck) and accessibility (parking location). The fact that 
chains are frequently cut indicates that physical controls alone are 
not sufficient to deter a determined individual. The NRC rule does not 
address visibility or accessibility, but focuses on tangible barriers. 
NRC states that having to defeat two tangible barriers will deter 
thefts by requiring a more determined effort to remove the gauge. 
However, if a thief is able to cut one chain or lock, a second chain or 
lock hardly seems like much of an additional deterrent.
    Response: NRC agrees that using two metal chains as physical 
barriers instead of one may not be the most effective means of control. 
Although the use of metal chains is not the most desirable control 
method, NRC does want to give licensees flexibility to select the 
controls that are suitable for them. NRC encourages licensees to store 
gauges in a permanent location and not in vehicles, but NRC does not 
want to make it a requirement because of the potential economic impacts 
on licensees. However, since this is a performance-based rule, 
licensees must ensure that the two physical barriers chosen clearly 
increase the deterrence value and would make the gauge more difficult 
to steal.

Too Prescriptive and Not Performance-Based

    Comment: Three commenters indicated that the rule is too 
prescriptive. Specifically, one commenter stated that the rule would 
not be effective in all cases and would lead to misunderstandings about 
what is being required. Another commenter stated that the rule dictates 
too much detail and would severely limit the licensees' ability to be 
creative in controlling portable gauges. Another commenter stated that 
the rule is inconsistent with the NRC's performance-based regulatory 
philosophy. The rule is far more prescriptive than the existing rules 
in 10 CFR 20.1801 and 20.1802, which address the security of 
radioactive material in a performance-based manner without specifying 
the methods to be used. This rule specifies both the method of control 
and the number of controls required, which prescriptively limits the 
licensee's choice of methods for complying with the rule. The commenter 
suggested that other methods, such as reducing the visibility of 
devices are just as important. Keeping a gauge inside a box where it is 
not visible is an effective physical control. Audible and visual alarms 
are also effective physical controls for deterring theft. Security 
experts recommend layers of protection involving a variety of methods, 
such as these. By narrowly prescribing that tangible barriers as the 
only method of compliance, the rule may reduce a licensee's incentive 
to use other effective means to deter thefts. Deterrence of theft is 
largely a matter of common sense, which cannot be mandated by rule or 
regulation. The situations under which portable gauges may be used and 
stored vary so widely that no prescriptive rule will be practical or 
effective for all situations.
    Response: NRC disagrees with the commenters that the rule is too 
prescriptive. This rule does not prescribe a specific physical control 
that needs to be used to secure portable gauges. Licensees have options 
in selecting from a wide range of physical controls. Of course, there 
are some

[[Page 2006]]

physical controls that are more effective than others. Although options 
such as storing gauges inside a building or in an enclosure may be 
effective control methods, factors such as cost impact and variation in 
licensees' operations must also be considered when considering the 
control methods. Therefore, requiring ``a minimum of two physical 
controls'' affords a licensee the flexibility to choose the appropriate 
independent physical controls to meet its situation, and at the same 
time provide sufficient security for the portable gauges. Licensees can 
use more controls in addition to the requirements of the rule. While 
developing the rule, the working group considered various control 
methods including audible and visual alarms for vehicles. NRC believes 
that it would not be cost effective to make these requirements when 
considering that: (1) A small percentage of unauthorized removals or 
thefts of portable gauges was associated with vehicles being stolen; 
(2) the public tends to ignore alarms; and (3) the alarms would have 
no, or limited, impact on unauthorized removal or theft of portable 
gauges from open-bed trucks.

Requirements Not Practical

    Comment: One commenter stated that methods proposed for securing 
gauges in vehicles are impractical or costly. Portable gauges must be 
loaded and unloaded from vehicles frequently; therefore, methods of 
securing the gauge must be simple and quick. Most portable gauges are 
transported in open-bed pickup trucks. Any method that requires 
permanent installation of boxes or attachment would not be practical. 
The commenter also stated that it is almost impossible to secure a 
gauge transportation case with a chain or cable without running it 
through the case handles, which can be removed with ordinary hand 
tools. In addition, wrapping chains around cases may stress and damage 
the case requiring replacement to comply with DOT rules for Type A 
containers.
    Response: NRC disagrees with the commenter that methods proposed 
for securing gauges in vehicles are impractical and/or costly. A 
licensee is free to choose any physical control methods best suited for 
its purposes regarding cost and ease of use. The rule does not impose 
use of a specific physical control such as a metal box or metal chains 
to secure the gauge. For example, a licensee could use as a tangible 
barrier the cab area of an open-bed truck for storage of the portable 
gauge. Although many licensees have chosen to use a metal enclosure as 
one of the physical controls, it is only one of many possible options 
that a licensee can select. The use of metal chains as an additional 
means of physical control may be more practical for certain licensees 
than other options. Based on the regulatory analysis, NRC believes that 
requiring two physical controls to secure portable gauges from 
unauthorized removal would not significantly increase the current 
burden or be cost prohibitive to implement.
    Regarding the comment that wrapping chains around cases may stress 
and damage the case, NRC notes that transportation boxes are designed 
to be robust enough to safely transport the intended material. The DOT 
has design and testing requirements for Type A packages such as 
portable gauge transportation cases. Among the general design 
requirements, DOT has stated that each lifting attachment that is a 
structural part of the package must be designed with a minimum safety 
factor of three against yielding when used to lift the package in the 
intended manner. Type A packaging, with contents, must be capable of 
withstanding the water-spray, free-drop, stacking, and penetration 
tests. For example, for a stacking test, packaging must be subjected 
for a period of at least 24 hours to a compressive load equivalent to 
the greater of: (1) Five times the mass of the actual package; or (2) 
the equivalent of 13 kilopascals (1.9 pounds per square inch) 
multiplied by the vertically projected area of the package. For a 
penetration test, a bar of 3.2 centimeters (1.25 inches) in diameter 
with a mass of 6 kilograms (13.2 pounds) must be dropped and directed 
to fall onto the center of the weakest part of the case. Based on the 
rigorous testing requirements, it would appear that the transportation 
boxes for portable gauges are designed to withstand various stresses.
    Comment: One commenter stated that the prescriptive procedures are 
not practical for the wide variety of vehicles used for nuclear gauges.
    Response: NRC disagrees that the rule contains prescriptive 
procedures. The rule only requires the licensee to use two independent 
physical controls and does not prescribe what methods or procedures for 
control must be used. The licensee may choose from a wide range of 
physical controls to meet its specific needs as long as the controls 
form tangible barriers to secure the portable gauge. Physical controls 
may include, but are not limited to, metal chain with a lock, steel 
cable with a lock, a secured enclosure, a locked tool box, a locked 
camper, a locked trailer, locked trunk of a car, a locked vehicle, a 
locked shelter, a secured fenced-in area, a locked garage, a locked 
cabinet, a locked room, or a secured building.
    Comment: One commenter stated that California requirements for 
electronic security systems and alarms are impractical in trucks on 
construction sites. They are damaged and rendered useless by travel 
over uneven surfaces.
    Response: NRC is not requiring the use of electronic security 
systems nor alarms as one of the independent physical controls. Each 
licensee has the flexibility to select any two independent physical 
controls based on its operation, condition of its facilities, financial 
capability, and degree of control desired.
    Comment: Licensing authorities are making and enforcing rules that 
could only be done by trained security experts or mechanical engineers, 
even if they were justified.
    Response: NRC does not believe that the additional security 
requirements will call for security experts or engineers to implement. 
However, licensees and their operators are required to have proper 
training to safely manage the nuclear materials including properly 
securing and controlling the portable gauges.

Cost Implications

    Comment: One commenter stated that the NRC estimates of savings 
resulting from the rule are speculative. The saving estimates from 
implementing the rule are based on the optimistic assumption of a 50 
percent reduction in the stolen gauges. This is speculative, as there 
is no way to predict the actual reduction that may be achieved.
    Response: The percent reduction will be dependent, in part, on the 
type of physical controls that licensees elect to use. If more 
enclosures are used to secure gauges, a higher reduction in the 
percentage of unauthorized removal or theft of portable gauges would 
most likely be achieved. In any event, NRC believes that adding one 
more tangible barrier as a physical control will reduce the opportunity 
for unauthorized removal or theft. Given the wide range of physical 
controls available for the licensees to select, NRC believes that an 
assumption of a 50 percent reduction is reasonable.
    Comment: One commenter stated that the cost is greater than what 
NRC proposes.
    Response: Because the commenter did not provide any data in support 
of a higher cost impact, NRC cannot perform a comparison. NRC's cost 
estimate is based on the actual price of an item listed by the vendors. 
The regulatory analysis for the proposed rule contains the assumptions 
and unit costs used in

[[Page 2007]]

calculating the total cost impact on licensees.
    Comment: Two commenters believe that the rule would have a negative 
economic impact. One commenter believes that increased regulatory 
requirements and costs will have a negative impact on the sales and use 
of portable gauges. The other commenter believes that the economic 
impact on the construction material testing industry will be wide-
spread. The commenter stated that the use of portable gauges provides 
significant benefits in terms of the quality, safety, and longevity of 
roads. No other technology is as effective for measurement of the 
properties of materials in road construction as nuclear gauges.
    Response: NRC disagrees with the comment. In determining viable 
options, NRC considered cost to industry versus any potential benefit. 
The rule would be unlikely to have a major impact on sales and use of 
portable gauges. Based on estimates, a $200 average increase in the 
cost of portable gauge use per licensee is relatively small when 
compared to the cost of a gauge of approximately $7000. Throughout this 
rulemaking, NRC has remained mindful of cost impacts on licensees. 
NRC's goal in this rulemaking is not to decrease portable gauge use. 
This regulation may slightly increase the cost of portable gauge use, 
but this cost must be balanced against improving the security and 
control of portable gauges.
    Comment: One commenter stated that additional regulations represent 
an undue hardship to portable gauge licensees. A financial burden to a 
large licensee at a cost of $114 thousand is unacceptable given the 
limited potential in reducing the number of stolen gauges.
    Response: The NRC disagrees with the comment. With the estimated 
cost impact of about $200 per gauge, NRC does not believe the increased 
cost would result in an undue hardship for portable gauge licensees. 
There are more than 5,000 portable gauge licensees in the United 
States. The majority of these licensees owns about five to six portable 
gauges; therefore, the one-time cost impact to a portable gauge 
licensee would only be about $1000. Other than manufacturers or 
distributors, it is unusual for a licensee to own hundreds of portable 
gauges. To minimize cost impact, NRC is providing a 6-month period from 
the date of publication as the effective date to implement the rule. 
Along with the flexibility provided in the rule for a licensee to 
select physical controls most suitable for its situation, NRC does not 
believe that the new requirements would create an undue hardship to 
portable gauge licensees.
    Comment: A State commenter indicated that making changes to meet 
the new requirements would result in a large expenditure to taxpayers.
    Response: NRC disagrees with the comment. An average of $200 
increase per gauge is small when compared to the resources spent by 
State and Federal law enforcement and regulatory personnel in response 
to, and in investigating, incidents involving unauthorized removal or 
theft of portable gauges.
    Comment: One commenter predicts an increase in reporting of lost 
and stolen gauges as licensees find they cannot afford either 
compliance with the proposed rules or lawful disposal of the gauge 
sealed source.
    Response: NRC disagrees with the commenter's prediction of 
increased reporting due to cost to comply with the rule requirements or 
to dispose of the source material. NRC does not believe that the 
increased costs will force licensees to dispose of the devices 
improperly. Depending on the physical control selected, the cost impact 
may be as low as $100 per gauge for using a chain/cable with a lock or 
$500 per gauge for use of a secured metal enclosure. The disposal cost 
for each gauge is about $450.

Impact on Landfills, Steel Mills, Scrap Yard, and the Environment

    Comment: Three commenters indicated it is unlikely that a stolen 
gauge would be smelted in scrap-steel processing facilities. According 
to one commenter, there is no evidence that stolen gauges are more 
likely to end up at these facilities than gauges which are not stolen. 
NRC claims that most stolen gauges would be abandoned by the thief and 
are likely to end up in such places as scrap yards and smelters. In 
fact, the majority of gauges (51 percent) are recovered according to 
NRC figures for the last 2 years (SECY-03-0060). That the remainder are 
likely to end up in smelters, scrap yards, or incinerators is 
speculative. The second commenter believes that most nuclear devices 
end up in scrap yards due to the difficulty of disposing of the 
equipment and the associated cost. Another commenter stated that it is 
unlikely that a discarded moisture/density gauge would be smelted down 
because of the use of sensitive monitoring systems.
    Response: NRC agrees that the probability is small for a portable 
gauge obtained by unauthorized removal or theft to be smelted down and 
contaminate a steel processing plant. However, the potential does 
exist. Based on historical data, less than half of the unauthorized 
removals or thefts of portable gauges are recovered. After the 
September 2001, terrorist events, more resources have been spent in 
recovery efforts to retrieve portable gauges from unauthorized removal 
or theft due to heightened security concerns about loss of control of 
radioactive materials. As a result, the recovery rate for portable 
gauges may have improved slightly over the past 2 years. Most gauges 
from unauthorized removal or theft are abandoned or resold. This raises 
a concern about the potential public health and safety risk. In past 
years, there have been cases where gauges were found in the environment 
and in landfills, scrap yards, or recycling plants. For example, in 
June 2002, a portable gauge containing a Cs-137 source was found at a 
steel mill's scrap-metal stream, and, in May 2002, a portable moisture 
gauge containing Am-241 was discovered at a landfill by landfill 
personnel sorting through the refuse. In both cases, the gauges were 
removed for proper disposition. Many facilities are now equipped with 
radiation monitors, and sources are often detected and removed early in 
the process. Nonetheless, the potential for radioactive material to 
enter a metal recycling plant still exists. In fact, in 2001, a 
radioactive source was melted in a steel mill in Florida. The total 
cost of the cleanup was more than $10 million. The State of Florida 
suspected that the contamination was from a sealed source from a fixed 
gauge. Once the radioactive source is melted, it is extremely difficult 
to determine the type of device that may have contained the source. 
Although steel mill contamination has never proven to be caused by a 
portable gauge from unauthorized removal or theft, an abandoned 
portable gauge still poses a potential concern if it ever gets into a 
steel mill melt.
    Comment: One commenter stated that if an abandoned gauge is 
deposited in a landfill, the environmental impact would be 
insignificant.
    Response: NRC disagrees with the comment. All licensed materials 
are required to be properly controlled to ensure protection of public 
health and safety and the environment. Any uncontrolled licensed 
material abandoned in the environment or disposed of in a landfill not 
designed for managing licensed material poses a potential hazard to 
public health and safety and to the environment. In accordance with 10 
CFR part 61, an Am-241 source used in a portable gauge would be 
classified as a ``greater than Class C waste'' and is not generally

[[Page 2008]]

acceptable for near-surface disposal (e.g., landfill).

X-Ray Fluorescence

    Comment: One commenter is concerned about controlling lost or 
stolen generally licensed devices because there are more in circulation 
than specifically licensed portable devices. There are hundreds, 
perhaps even thousands, of portable X-Ray Fluorescence (XRF) analyzers 
that have been distributed as generally licensed devices.
    Response: Based on the NMED database, the number of reported 
incidents of lost or stolen XRF analyzers is extremely low, and in 
general, the amount of radioactive material used in XRF analyzers is 
much smaller than the amount used for portable moisture/density gauges. 
Therefore, there is a considerably reduced risk to public health and 
safety. Additionally, because XRF analyzers are very small and are 
usually hand-held units, they can be easily stored in the glove 
compartment or trunk of a vehicle. XRF analyzers stored in this manner 
are not visible or easily accessible, which reduces the possibility of 
opportunistic theft. For these reasons, NRC does not believe that 
additional security requirements are needed for generally licensed XRF 
analyzers at this time; therefore, this comment is not within the scope 
of this rulemaking.
    Comment: An Agreement State commenter indicated that it 
specifically licenses all portable nuclear gauges including lead paint 
analyzers.
    Response: Whether a nuclear device is specifically or generally 
licensed depends on the design of the device and other factors. In 
general, most moisture/density gauges are specifically licensed whereas 
most chemical detectors and lead paint analyzers are generally licensed 
by either NRC or the Agreement States. NRC regulations establish the 
basic requirements. Depending on the compatibility categories, 
individual Agreement States may impose more stringent requirements 
depending on their specific needs.

The Final Rule

Section 30.34 Terms and Conditions of Licenses

    After considering public comment and continuing informal discussion 
with the DOT staff, it was decided that no changes would be made to the 
proposed rule. The final rule contains the exact same requirements as 
the proposed rule. Therefore, the requirements state that each portable 
gauge licensee shall use a minimum of two independent physical controls 
that form tangible barriers to secure portable gauges from unauthorized 
removal, whenever portable gauges are not under the control and 
constant surveillance of the licensee.

Criminal Penalties

    For the purpose of section 223 of the Atomic Energy Act (AEA), the 
Commission is amending 10 CFR part 30 under one or more of sections 
161b, 161i, or 161o of the AEA. Willful violations of the rule would be 
subject to criminal enforcement.

Agreement State Compatibility

    Under the ``Policy Statement on Adequacy and Compatibility of 
Agreement State Programs'' approved by the Commission on June 30, 1997, 
and published in the Federal Register on September 3, 1997 (62 FR 
46517), this final rule is a matter of compatibility between NRC and 
the Agreement States, thereby providing consistency among the Agreement 
States and NRC requirements. The NRC staff analyzed the final rule in 
accordance with the procedure established within part III, 
``Categorization Process for NRC Program Elements,'' of Handbook 5.9 to 
Management Directive 5.9, ``Adequacy and Compatibility of Agreement 
State Programs'' (a copy of which may be viewed at https://
www.hsrd.ornl.gov/nrc/home.html). The NRC staff has determined that 
amendment to 10 CFR 30.34(I) is classified as Compatibility Category 
``C.'' An Agreement State should adopt the essential objectives of the 
Compatibility Category ``C'' program elements to avoid conflict, 
duplication, gaps, or the conditions that would jeopardize an orderly 
pattern in the regulation of agreement material on a nationwide basis.
    NRC determined that the essential objective of 10 CFR 30.34(I) is 
to reduce the opportunity for unauthorized removal or theft of a 
portable gauge by requiring a portable gauge licensee to use a minimum 
of two independent physical controls that form tangible barriers to 
secure portable gauges from unauthorized removal whenever portable 
gauges are not under the control and constant surveillance of the 
licensee.
    NRC believes that the final rule does not conflict with any 
existing State regulatory requirement. Personnel from the Agreement 
States of Florida and Arkansas participated as members of a working 
group along with the NRC staff in the development of this final rule 
and the earlier corresponding proposed rule.

Voluntary Consensus Standards

    The National Technology Transfer Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104-113) 
requires that Federal agencies use technical standards that are 
developed or adopted by voluntary consensus standards bodies unless the 
use of such a standard is inconsistent with applicable law or otherwise 
impractical. In this final rule, NRC is revising 10 CFR part 30 to add 
certain requirements for the security of portable gauges containing 
byproduct material. This action does not constitute the establishment 
of a standard that contains generally applicable requirements.

Finding of No Significant Environmental Impact: Availability

    The Commission has determined under the National Environmental 
Policy Act of 1969, as amended, and the Commission's regulations in 
Subpart A of 10 CFR part 51, that this rule is not a major Federal 
action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment; 
therefore, an environmental impact statement is not required. The 
Commission has concluded on the basis of an environmental assessment 
that these requirements would not have any effect on the environment in 
which portable gauges are currently regulated under 10 CFR part 30. The 
final rule would increase requirements to reduce opportunity for 
unauthorized removal or theft of portable gauges containing byproduct 
material.
    NRC requested the views of the States on the environmental 
assessment for this rule. No comments were received on the 
environmental assessment. Because no changes were made in the 
requirements from the proposed rule to the final rule, the 
environmental assessment has not been changed. The environmental 
assessment and finding of no significant impact are available for 
inspection at the NRC Public Document Room, Public File Area O1F21, One 
White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland. Single 
copies of the environmental assessment and finding of no significant 
impact are available from Lydia Chang, telephone (301) 415-6319, e-mail 
lwc1@nrc.gov, of the Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards.

Paperwork Reduction Act Statement

    This final rule does not contain new or amended information 
collection requirements subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 
(44 U.S.C. 3501, et seq.). Existing requirements were approved by the 
Office of Management

[[Page 2009]]

and Budget (OMB), approval number 3150-0017.

Public Protection Notification

    NRC may not conduct nor sponsor, and a person is not required to 
respond to, a request for information or an information collection 
requirement unless the requesting document displays a currently valid 
OMB control number.

Regulatory Analysis

    In the proposed rule, the Commission requested public comment on 
the draft regulatory analysis specifically on the costs to licensees. 
No comments were received on the draft regulatory analysis. However, 
one of the comments received on the proposed rule indicated that the 
cost per unit in most cases will be substantially greater than NRC's 
estimate. Because a licensee has flexibility in selecting the physical 
controls to be used in securing a portable gauge, the actual cost would 
depend on the controls selected. The cost per unit could range from 
$100 for a metal cable to $400 for a simple metal tool box, to even a 
higher cost for a more elaborately designed metal enclosure. In the 
regulatory analysis, an average of $200 was used.
    The Commission has finalized the regulatory analysis on this 
regulation. The analysis examines the costs and benefits of the 
alternatives considered by the Commission. The analysis is available 
for inspection in the NRC Public Document Room, Public File Area O1F21, 
One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD. Single 
copies of the regulatory analysis are available from Lydia Chang, 
telephone (301) 415-6319, e-mail, lwc1@nrc.gov, of the Office of 
Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards.

Regulatory Flexibility Certification

    As required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, 5 U.S.C. 
605(b), the Commission certifies that this rule will not have a 
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. 
The final rule would affect about 1100 portable gauge specific NRC 
licensees and an additional 4000 Agreement State specific licensees. 
These licenses are issued principally to companies involved in road 
construction and maintenance. Many portable gauge licensees would 
qualify as small business entities as defined by 10 CFR 2.810. However, 
the final rule is not expected to have a significant economic impact on 
these licensees. Based on the regulatory analysis conducted for this 
action, the costs of the final rule for affected licensees are 
estimated at $200 per gauge. Among various alternatives considered, NRC 
believes that this final rule is the least burdensome and most flexible 
means of accomplishing NRC's regulatory objective. The regulatory 
analysis also notes that the requirements would result in potential 
cost savings for portable gauge licensees, particularly for the 
replacement of portable gauges due to unauthorized removal or theft. 
These savings would offset the implementation costs for portable gauge 
licensees. The NRC staff also notes that several Agreement States have 
imposed similar or more stringent requirements on their portable gauge 
licensees either by rule, order, or license condition.
    In the published proposed rule (68 FR 45172; August 1, 2003), NRC 
specifically requested public comment from licensees concerning the 
impact of the proposed regulation because of the widely differing 
conditions under which portable gauge users operate. NRC particularly 
was seeking comment from licensees, who qualify as small businesses, as 
to how the proposed regulation would affect them and how the regulation 
may be tiered or otherwise modified to impose less stringent 
requirements on small entities while still adequately protecting the 
public health and safety. However, no comments were received on these 
issues.

Backfit Analysis

    NRC has determined that the backfit rule (Sec. Sec.  50.109, 70.76, 
72.62, or 76.76) does not apply to this final rule because this 
amendment does not involve any provisions that would impose backfits as 
defined in the backfit rule. Therefore, a backfit analysis is not 
required.

Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act

    In accordance with the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement 
Fairness Act of 1996, NRC has determined that this action is not a 
major rule and has verified this determination with the Office of 
Information and Regulatory Affairs of OMB.

List of Subjects in 10 CFR Part 30

    Byproduct material, Criminal penalties, Government contracts, 
Intergovernmental relations, Isotopes, Nuclear materials, Radiation 
protection, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.


0
For the reasons set out in the preamble and under the authority of the 
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended; the Energy Reorganization Act of 
1974, as amended; and 5 U.S.C. 552 and 553, NRC is adopting the 
following amendments to 10 CFR part 30.

PART 30--RULES OF GENERAL APPLICABILITY TO DOMESTIC LICENSING OF 
BYPRODUCT MATERIAL

0
1. The authority citation for part 30 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: Secs. 81, 82, 161, 182, 183, 186, 68 Stat. 935, 948, 
953, 954, 955, as amended, sec. 234, 83 Stat. 444, as amended (42 
U.S.C. 2111, 2112, 2201, 2232, 2233, 2236, 2282); secs. 201, as 
amended, 202, 206, 88 Stat. 1242, as amended, 1244, 1246 (42 U.S.C. 
5841, 5842, 5846); sec. 1704, 112 Stat. 2750 (44 U.S.C. 3504 note).
    Section 30.7 also issued under Pub. L. 95-601, sec. 10, 92 Stat. 
2951, as amended by Pub. L. 102-486, sec. 2902, 106 Stat. 3123 (42 
U.S.C. 5851). Section 30.34(b) also issued under sec. 184, 68 Stat. 
954, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2234). Section 30.61 also issued under 
sec. 187, 68 Stat. 955 (42 U.S.C. 2237).


0
2. In Sec.  30.34, paragraph (i) is added to read as follows:


Sec.  30.34  Terms and conditions of licenses.

* * * * *
    (i) Security requirements for portable gauges.
    Each portable gauge licensee shall use a minimum of two independent 
physical controls that form tangible barriers to secure portable gauges 
from unauthorized removal, whenever portable gauges are not under the 
control and constant surveillance of the licensee.

    Dated in Rockville, Maryland, this 6th day of January, 2005.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Annette Vietti-Cook,
Secretary of the Commission.
[FR Doc. 05-590 Filed 1-11-05; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P