Robert Clark Maiocco, M.D.; Decision and Order, 19383-19385 [2017-08450]
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Federal Register / Vol. 82, No. 80 / Thursday, April 27, 2017 / Notices
INTERNATIONAL TRADE
COMMISSION
[Investigation Nos. 701–TA–567–569 and
731–TA–1343–1345 (Preliminary)]
Silicon Metal from Australia, Brazil,
Kazakhstan, and Norway
Determinations
On the basis of the record 1 developed
in the subject investigations, the United
States International Trade Commission
(‘‘Commission’’) determines, pursuant
to the Tariff Act of 1930 (‘‘the Act’’),
that there is a reasonable indication that
an industry in the United States is
materially injured by reason of imports
of silicon metal from Australia, Brazil,
and Norway, provided for in
subheadings 2804.69.10 and 2804.69.50
of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of
the United States, that are alleged to be
sold at less-than-fair-value (‘‘LTFV’’)
and imports of silicon metal alleged to
be subsidized by the governments of
Australia, Brazil, and Kazakhstan.
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Commencement of Final Phase
Investigations
Pursuant to section 207.18 of the
Commission’s rules, the Commission
also gives notice of the commencement
of the final phase of its investigations.
The Commission will issue a final phase
notice of scheduling, which will be
published in the Federal Register as
provided in section 207.21 of the
Commission’s rules, upon notice from
the Department of Commerce
(‘‘Commerce’’) of affirmative
preliminary determinations in the
investigations under sections 703(b) or
733(b) of the Act, or, if the preliminary
determinations are negative, upon
notice of affirmative final
determinations in those investigations
under sections 705(a) or 735(a) of the
Act. Parties that filed entries of
appearance in the preliminary phase of
the investigations need not enter a
separate appearance for the final phase
of the investigations. Industrial users,
and, if the merchandise under
investigation is sold at the retail level,
representative consumer organizations
have the right to appear as parties in
Commission antidumping and
countervailing duty investigations. The
Secretary will prepare a public service
list containing the names and addresses
of all persons, or their representatives,
who are parties to the investigations.
1 The record is defined in sec. 207.2(f) of the
Commission’s Rules of Practice and Procedure (19
CFR 207.2(f)).
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Background
On March 8, 2017, Globe Specialty
Metals, Inc., Beverly, Ohio filed a
petition with the Commission and
Commerce, alleging that an industry in
the United States is materially injured
or threatened with material injury by
reason of subsidized imports of silicon
metal from Australia, Brazil, and
Kazakhstan, and LTFV imports of
silicon metal from Australia, Brazil, and
Norway. Accordingly, effective March 8,
2017, the Commission, pursuant to
sections 703(a) and 733(a) of the Act (19
U.S.C. 1671b(a) and 1673b(a)), instituted
countervailing duty investigation Nos.
701–TA–567–569 and antidumping
duty investigation Nos. 731–TA–1343–
1345 (Preliminary).
Notice of the institution of the
Commission’s investigations and of a
public conference to be held in
connection therewith was given by
posting copies of the notice in the Office
of the Secretary, U.S. International
Trade Commission, Washington, DC,
and by publishing the notice in the
Federal Register of March 14, 2017 (82
FR 16353). The conference was held in
Washington, DC, on March 29, 2017,
and all persons who requested the
opportunity were permitted to appear in
person or by counsel.
The Commission made these
determinations pursuant to sections
703(a) and 733(a) of the Act (19 U.S.C.
1671b(a) and 1673b(a)). It completed
and filed its determinations in these
investigations on April 24, 2017. The
views of the Commission are contained
in USITC Publication 4685 (May 2017),
entitled Silicon Metal from Australia,
Brazil, Kazakhstan, and Norway:
Investigation Nos. 701–TA–567–569 and
731–TA–1343–1345 (Preliminary).
By order of the Commission.
Issued: April 24, 2017.
William R. Bishop,
Supervisory Hearings and Information
Officer.
[FR Doc. 2017–08535 Filed 4–26–17; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7020–02–P
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Drug Enforcement Administration
[Docket No. 17–4]
Robert Clark Maiocco, M.D.; Decision
and Order
On September 22, 2016, the Assistant
Administrator, Diversion Control
Division, Drug Enforcement
Administration, issued an Order to
Show Cause to Robert Clark Maiocco,
M.D. (Respondent), of Denver, Colorado.
PO 00000
Frm 00034
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
19383
The Show Cause Order proposed the
revocation of Respondent’s DEA
Certificate of Registration No.
AM2281688, and the denial of any
applications to renew or modify his
registration, as well as the denial of
‘‘any applications for any other DEA
registrations,’’ on the ground that he has
‘‘no state authority to handle controlled
substances.’’ Show Cause Order, at 1
(citing 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(3) and
823(a)(3)).1
As to the Agency’s jurisdiction, the
Show Cause Order alleged that
Respondent is registered ‘‘as a
practitioner in Schedules II through V’’
under the above registration, at the
location of ‘‘Colorado Lipidology
Associates, 633 17th Street, Ste. 100,
Denver, Co.’’ Id. The Order alleges that
Respondent’s registration does not
expire until January 31, 2019. Id.
As to the substantive ground for the
proceeding, the Show Cause Order
alleged that ‘‘[o]n July 19, 2016, the
Colorado Medical Board suspended
[Respondent’s] medical license.’’ Id. at
2. The Show Cause Order then alleged
that Respondent is ‘‘currently without
authority to practice medicine or handle
controlled substances in the State of
Colorado, the [S]tate in which [he is]
registered with’’ DEA, and that as a
consequence, his registration is subject
to revocation.2
Following service of the Show Cause
Order, Respondent requested a hearing.
The matter was placed on the docket of
the Office of Administrative Law Judges
and assigned to ALJ Charles Wm.
Dorman who issued an order directing
the Government to file evidence
supporting the allegation and ‘‘any
motion for summary disposition’’ by 2
p.m. on November 7, 2016. Briefing
Schedule For Lack Of State Authority
Allegations (Briefing Schedule), at 1. In
1 As for the citation to 21 U.S.C. 823(a)(3), this
provision is a public interest factor applicable to
applicants for registration to manufacture schedule
I and II controlled substances, which directs the
Agency to consider the ‘‘promotion of technical
advances in the art of manufacturing these
substances and the development of new
substances.’’ This provision is not applicable to this
case, which involves a practitioner registered under
section 823(f).
While the Government also proposes the denial
of ‘‘any applications for any other DEA
registrations,’’ because this proceeding is based
solely on Respondent’s lack of state authority in
Colorado, the Agency’s authority to deny an
application is limited to an application for a
registration in Colorado.
2 The Show Cause Order also notified Respondent
of his right to request a hearing or to submit a
written statement in lieu of a hearing, the procedure
for electing either option, and the consequence of
failing to elect either option. Show Cause Order, at
2. Also, the Show Cause Order notified Respondent
of his right to submit a Corrective Action Plan. 21
U.S.C. 824(c)(2)(C).
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the same order, the ALJ directed
Respondent to file any reply to the
Government’s motion by 2 p.m. on
November 18, 2016. Noting that in his
hearing request, Respondent had sought
to hold the proceeding in abeyance
‘‘pending the resolution of the Colorado
[Board] matter either via a negotiated
disposition or a final agency order
following the hearing . . . set for June
26–30, 2017,’’ Resp. Hrng. Req., at 2; the
ALJ ordered that ‘‘if the Respondent
wishes to formally request a
continuance in this case, he must do so
in a written motion for continuance.’’
Briefing Schedule, at 1.
On November 3, 2016, Respondent
moved for a continuance of all
proceedings in the matter until and
including January 3, 2017. Resp.’s Mot.
for Continuance, at 1. As grounds for the
continuance, Respondent argued that
the suspension of his state license was
not a final agency action, that the state
administrative case was currently being
litigated, that the parties were engaged
in active negotiations to resolve the
matter ‘‘via a stipulated disposition that
would allow [him] to return to the
active practice of medicine,’’ and that
‘‘such a negotiated disposition may be
reached within the next 45 to 60 days.’’
Id. at 2. Upon receipt of the motion, the
ALJ ordered the Government to file a
response by 2 p.m. on November 10,
2016; he also extended the deadline for
the Government to file its summary
disposition motion until November 18,
2016 and for Respondent to file his
reply until November 30, 2016. Order
for Government’s Response to
Respondent’s Motion to Stay
Proceedings, at 1.
On November 10, 2016, the
Government filed a pleading which
combined its Opposition to
Respondent’s Motion for Continuance
and its Motion for Summary
Disposition. Gov.’s Opp. to Resp.’s Mot.
to Stay Proceedings and Gov.’s Mot. for
Summ. Disp. (hereinafter, Mot. for
Summ. Disp.), at 1. With respect to
Respondent’s stay motion, the
Government suggested that
Respondent’s statements regarding the
timing of a negotiated resolution of the
state matter was speculative. Id. at 4.
The Government then cited Agency
precedent to argue that ‘‘even if the
period of suspension is temporary or if
there is the potential that Respondent’s
state controlled substance privileges
will be reinstated, summary disposition
is warranted because ‘revocation is also
appropriate when a state license has
been suspended, but with the possibility
of future reinstatement.’ ’’ Id. (quoting
Roger A. Rodriguez, 70 FR 33206, 33207
(2005) (other citations omitted)). The
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Government thus maintained that
Respondent’s Motion for Continuance
should be denied. Id.
As for the Government’s Motion for
Summary Disposition, it argued that
based on the Order of Suspension
issued to Respondent by the Colorado
Medical Board, he does not have
‘‘authority to prescribe, administer, or
dispense controlled substances in the
State of Colorado.’’ Mot. for Summ.
Disp., at 3. The Government argued that
there is no dispute as to this material
fact, id. at 2, and that ‘‘[a]bsent authority
by the State of Colorado to dispense
controlled substances, Respondent is
not authorized to possess a DEA
registration in that state.’’ Id. at 3 (citing
21 U.S.C. 802(21), 823(f), 824(a)(3), and
Layfe Robert Anthony, 67 FR 35582
(2002)). The Government further argued
that ‘‘DEA does not have statutory
authority to maintain a registration if
the registrant is without state authority
to handle controlled substances,’’ and
that therefore, Respondent’s registration
should be revoked. Id. (citation
omitted).
On November 14, 2016, the ALJ
denied Respondent’s Motion for
Continuance. Order Denying the
Respondent’s Motion for Continuance,
at 1. The ALJ’s explained that ‘‘[i]t is
settled DEA precedent ‘that the
existence of other proceedings in which
Respondent is involved is not a basis
upon which to justify a stay of DEA
administrative enforcement
proceedings.’’ Id. (quoting James Alvin
Chaney, 80 FR 57391, 57393 (2015)).
On November 30, 2016, Respondent
submitted a pleading captioned:
‘‘Respondent’s Motion For Extension Of
Time In Which To Submit His Response
To The Government’s Motion for
Summary Disposition And, In The
Alternative, His Response To The
Government’s Motion For Summary
Disposition’’ (hereinafter, Extension
Mot.). Therein, Respondent represented
that he had ‘‘submitted a proposed
Stipulation and Final Agency Order to’’
the Colorado Board, ‘‘which, if agreed to
by the [Board], would result in the
lifting of the suspension and the
restoration of’’ his controlled substance
dispensing authority in Colorado.
Extension Mot., at 1–2. Respondent
further represented that the proposed
Stipulation was to be considered by the
Board at its December 15, 2016 meeting
and expressed his optimism that the
Board would accept the Stipulation. Id.
at 2. Further noting that the Board’s
decision would be dispositive of this
matter either way, Respondent sought
an extension of the time until December
20, 2016 to file his response to the
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Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
Government’s pending Motion for
Summary Disposition. Id.
Citing ‘‘the interest of administrative/
judicial economy,’’ the ALJ granted
Respondent’s motion and ordered
Respondent to file his evidence of
reinstatement and his Response to the
Motion for Summary Disposition by
December 20, 2016. Order Granting
Respondent’s Motion for Extension in
Which to Submit His Response to the
Government’s Mot. for Summary
Disposition, at 2. On December 20,
2016, Respondent filed his Response
and a Status Report. Response to Gov.
Mot. for Summ. Disp. and Status Rep.,
at 1. Therein, Respondent advised that
‘‘the parties in [the Board’s proceeding]
were unable to reach a resolution and
[that] the matter will proceed to a
hearing’’ scheduled for June 26 through
June 30, 2017. Id. Respondent further
acknowledged that his medical license
had not been reinstated. Id.
The same day, the ALJ granted the
Government’s Motion. The ALJ noted
that ‘‘[t]o maintain a DEA registration, a
practitioner must be currently
authorized to handle controlled
substances in the jurisdiction in which
the practitioner is registered.’’ R.D. at 3
(citing 21 U.S.C. 802(21), 823(f)).
Finding that there was no dispute over
the material fact that ‘‘Respondent lacks
state authorization to handle controlled
substances in Colorado,’’ the State in
which he is registered with DEA, the
ALJ granted the Government’s Motion
and recommended that Respondent’s
registration be revoked. Id. at 3–4.
Neither party filed exceptions to the
Recommended Decision. Thereafter, the
ALJ forwarded the record to my Office
for final agency action. Having
considered the record, I adopt the ALJ’s
factual finding, legal conclusions and
recommended order. I make the
following factual findings.
Findings of Fact
Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 556(e), I take
official notice of Respondent’s
registration record with the Agency.
According to the record, Respondent is
the holder of Certificate of Registration
No. AM2281688, pursuant to which he
is authorized to dispense controlled
substances in schedules II through V as
practitioner, at the registered address of
Colorado Lipidology Associates, 633
17th Street, Suite 100, Denver,
Colorado. Respondent’s registration
does not expire until January 31, 2019.3
Accordingly, I find that Respondent has
3 Respondent may refute these findings (as well
as any other finding based on my taking of official
notice) by filing a properly supported motion for
reconsideration no later than 10 business days from
the date of this Order.
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an active registration and that the
Agency has jurisdiction.4
Respondent is also the holder of
license number DR–36651, pursuant to
which he is authorized to practice
medicine as a physician by the Medical
Board of Colorado. Mot. for Summ.
Disp., Ex. 1, at 1. However, effective on
July 19, 2016, the Board suspended
Respondent’s medical license ‘‘pending
proceedings for suspension or
revocation.’’ Id. at 2. According to the
online records of the Colorado Division
of Professions and Occupations,
Respondent’s suspension remains in
effect as of the date of this Decision and
Order. See 5 U.S.C. 556(e).
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Discussion
Pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(3), the
Attorney General is authorized to
suspend or revoke a registration issued
under section 823 of the Controlled
Substances Act (CSA), ‘‘upon a finding
that the registrant . . . has had his State
license . . . suspended [or] revoked
. . . by competent State authority and is
no longer authorized by State law to
engage in the . . . dispensing of
controlled substances.’’ Moreover, DEA
has long held that the possession of
authority to dispense controlled
substances under the laws of the State
in which a practitioner engages in
professional practice is a fundamental
condition for obtaining and maintaining
a practitioner’s registration. See, e.g.,
James L. Hooper, 76 FR 71371 (2011),
pet. for rev. denied, 481 Fed. Appx. 826
(4th Cir. 2012); see also Frederick Marsh
Blanton, 43 FR 27616 (1978) (‘‘State
authorization to dispense or otherwise
handle controlled substances is a
prerequisite to the issuance and
maintenance of a Federal controlled
substances registration.’’).
This rule derives from the text of two
provisions of the CSA. First, Congress
defined ‘‘the term ‘practitioner’ [to]
mean[] a . . . physician . . . or other
person licensed, registered or otherwise
permitted, by . . . the jurisdiction in
which he practices . . . to distribute,
dispense, [or] administer . . . a
4 I note that the Government did not submit any
evidence regarding the status of Respondent’s
registration with its Motion for Summary
Disposition. DEA’s regulations do not require
responsive pleading to the allegations of a Show
Cause Order. Thus, the failure of a respondent to
refute an allegation in his hearing request does not
constitute an admission of the allegation and the
Government maintains the burden of providing
evidence establishing the Agency’s jurisdiction as
part of its Motion. The Agency has also noted in
several decisions that even in those matters which
are adjudicated on summary disposition, the ALJ is
obligated to make findings as to the Agency’s
jurisdiction. See James Alvin Chaney, 80 FR 57391,
57391 n.1 (2015); Sharad C. Patel, 80 FR 28693,
28694 n.3 (2015).
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17:07 Apr 26, 2017
Jkt 241001
controlled substance in the course of
professional practice.’’ 21 U.S.C.
802(21). Second, in setting the
requirements for obtaining a
practitioner’s registration, Congress
directed that ‘‘[t]he Attorney General
shall register practitioners . . . if the
applicant is authorized to dispense . . .
controlled substances under the laws of
the State in which he practices.’’ 21
U.S.C. 823(f).
Because ‘‘the controlling question’’ in
a proceeding brought under 21 U.S.C.
824(a)(3) is whether the holder of a DEA
registration ‘‘is currently authorized to
handle controlled substances in the
[S]tate,’’ Hooper, 76 FR at 71371
(quoting Anne Lazar Thorn, 62 FR
12847, 12848 (1997)), the Agency has
also long held that revocation is
warranted even where a practitioner has
lost his state authority by virtue of the
State’s use of summary process and the
State has yet to provide a hearing to
challenge the suspension. Bourne
Pharmacy, 72 FR 18273, 18274 (2007);
Wingfield Drugs, 52 FR 27070, 27071
(1987). Thus, it is of no consequence
that the Colorado Medical Board has
employed summary process in
suspending Registrant’s state license
and that Respondent may prevail at the
hearing schedule for late June.
Here, there is no dispute over the
material fact that Respondent is no
longer currently authorized to dispense
controlled substances in Colorado, the
State in which he is registered.
Accordingly, I adopt the ALJ’s
recommendation that Respondent’s
registration be revoked.
Order
Pursuant to the authority vested in me
by 21 U.S.C. 824(a), as well as 28 CFR
0.100(b), I order that DEA Certificate of
Registration AM2281688, issued to
Robert Clark Maiocco, M.D., be, and it
hereby is, revoked. Pursuant to the
authority vested in me by 21 U.S.C.
823(f), I further order that any pending
application of Robert C. Maiocco, M.D.,
to renew or modify his registration, be,
and it hereby is, denied. This Order is
effective immediately.5
Dated: April 18, 2017.
Chuck Rosenberg,
Acting Administrator.
[FR Doc. 2017–08450 Filed 4–26–17; 8:45 am]
19385
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Drug Enforcement Administration
David D. Moon, D.O.; Decision and
Order
On December 8, 2015, the Deputy
Assistant Administrator, Office of
Diversion Control, Drug Enforcement
Administration (hereinafter, DEA or
Government), issued an Order to Show
Cause to David D. Moon, D.O.
(hereinafter, Registrant), the holder of
Certificates of Registration Nos.
M9879024, in Tulsa, Oklahoma, and
BM2782692, in Las Vegas, Nevada,
authorizing him to prescribe controlled
substances in Schedules II through V.1
GX 4. The Show Cause Order proposed
the revocation of his Certificates of
Registration and the denial of any
pending application for renewal or
modification of Registrant’s registrations
on the grounds that: (1) Registrant does
not have authority to dispense
controlled substances in the States in
which he is registered and (2) he has
committed acts which render his
registrations ‘‘inconsistent with the
public interest.’’ 2 Id. at 1 (citing 21
U.S.C. 824(a)(3) and (4)).
As the jurisdictional basis for the
proceeding, the Show Cause Order
alleged that both of Registrant’s
registrations expire on January 31, 2018.
Id.
As the substantive grounds for the
proceeding, the Show Cause Order
alleged that on June 18, 2015, the
Oklahoma State Board of Osteopathic
Examiners revoked his Oklahoma
osteopathic license, and that on August
11, 2015, the Nevada State Board of
Osteopathic Medicine revoked his
Nevada osteopathic license, which
resulted in the status of his Nevada
State Board of Pharmacy license
becoming ‘‘inactive.’’ Id. at 2. Thus, due
to the actions of the two Boards, the
Registrant is without authority to handle
controlled substances in the States in
which he is registered with DEA.
The Show Cause Order alleged that on
April 17, 2013, Registrant was arrested
at McCarran International Airport while
proceeding through a Transportation
Security Administration checkpoint. Id.
It further alleged that law enforcement
officers found in his carry-on baggage
drugs in pill bottles labeled for other
people, drugs in unlabeled pill bottles,
and loose drugs. Id. Based on the airport
BILLING CODE 4410–09–P
5 For
the same reasons that led the Colorado
Board to summarily suspend Registrant’s medical
license, I find that the public interest necessitates
that this Order be effective immediately. 21 CFR
1316.67.
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Frm 00036
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
1 The Registrant is also known in the
Government’s records as ‘‘David DeWayne Moon.’’
Government Exhibit (hereinafter, GX) 13 and 14.
2 The Show Cause Order also proposed the denial
of any applications by Registrant for any other DEA
registrations.
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Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 82, Number 80 (Thursday, April 27, 2017)]
[Notices]
[Pages 19383-19385]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2017-08450]
=======================================================================
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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Drug Enforcement Administration
[Docket No. 17-4]
Robert Clark Maiocco, M.D.; Decision and Order
On September 22, 2016, the Assistant Administrator, Diversion
Control Division, Drug Enforcement Administration, issued an Order to
Show Cause to Robert Clark Maiocco, M.D. (Respondent), of Denver,
Colorado. The Show Cause Order proposed the revocation of Respondent's
DEA Certificate of Registration No. AM2281688, and the denial of any
applications to renew or modify his registration, as well as the denial
of ``any applications for any other DEA registrations,'' on the ground
that he has ``no state authority to handle controlled substances.''
Show Cause Order, at 1 (citing 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(3) and 823(a)(3)).\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ As for the citation to 21 U.S.C. 823(a)(3), this provision
is a public interest factor applicable to applicants for
registration to manufacture schedule I and II controlled substances,
which directs the Agency to consider the ``promotion of technical
advances in the art of manufacturing these substances and the
development of new substances.'' This provision is not applicable to
this case, which involves a practitioner registered under section
823(f).
While the Government also proposes the denial of ``any
applications for any other DEA registrations,'' because this
proceeding is based solely on Respondent's lack of state authority
in Colorado, the Agency's authority to deny an application is
limited to an application for a registration in Colorado.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As to the Agency's jurisdiction, the Show Cause Order alleged that
Respondent is registered ``as a practitioner in Schedules II through
V'' under the above registration, at the location of ``Colorado
Lipidology Associates, 633 17th Street, Ste. 100, Denver, Co.'' Id. The
Order alleges that Respondent's registration does not expire until
January 31, 2019. Id.
As to the substantive ground for the proceeding, the Show Cause
Order alleged that ``[o]n July 19, 2016, the Colorado Medical Board
suspended [Respondent's] medical license.'' Id. at 2. The Show Cause
Order then alleged that Respondent is ``currently without authority to
practice medicine or handle controlled substances in the State of
Colorado, the [S]tate in which [he is] registered with'' DEA, and that
as a consequence, his registration is subject to revocation.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ The Show Cause Order also notified Respondent of his right
to request a hearing or to submit a written statement in lieu of a
hearing, the procedure for electing either option, and the
consequence of failing to elect either option. Show Cause Order, at
2. Also, the Show Cause Order notified Respondent of his right to
submit a Corrective Action Plan. 21 U.S.C. 824(c)(2)(C).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Following service of the Show Cause Order, Respondent requested a
hearing. The matter was placed on the docket of the Office of
Administrative Law Judges and assigned to ALJ Charles Wm. Dorman who
issued an order directing the Government to file evidence supporting
the allegation and ``any motion for summary disposition'' by 2 p.m. on
November 7, 2016. Briefing Schedule For Lack Of State Authority
Allegations (Briefing Schedule), at 1. In
[[Page 19384]]
the same order, the ALJ directed Respondent to file any reply to the
Government's motion by 2 p.m. on November 18, 2016. Noting that in his
hearing request, Respondent had sought to hold the proceeding in
abeyance ``pending the resolution of the Colorado [Board] matter either
via a negotiated disposition or a final agency order following the
hearing . . . set for June 26-30, 2017,'' Resp. Hrng. Req., at 2; the
ALJ ordered that ``if the Respondent wishes to formally request a
continuance in this case, he must do so in a written motion for
continuance.'' Briefing Schedule, at 1.
On November 3, 2016, Respondent moved for a continuance of all
proceedings in the matter until and including January 3, 2017. Resp.'s
Mot. for Continuance, at 1. As grounds for the continuance, Respondent
argued that the suspension of his state license was not a final agency
action, that the state administrative case was currently being
litigated, that the parties were engaged in active negotiations to
resolve the matter ``via a stipulated disposition that would allow
[him] to return to the active practice of medicine,'' and that ``such a
negotiated disposition may be reached within the next 45 to 60 days.''
Id. at 2. Upon receipt of the motion, the ALJ ordered the Government to
file a response by 2 p.m. on November 10, 2016; he also extended the
deadline for the Government to file its summary disposition motion
until November 18, 2016 and for Respondent to file his reply until
November 30, 2016. Order for Government's Response to Respondent's
Motion to Stay Proceedings, at 1.
On November 10, 2016, the Government filed a pleading which
combined its Opposition to Respondent's Motion for Continuance and its
Motion for Summary Disposition. Gov.'s Opp. to Resp.'s Mot. to Stay
Proceedings and Gov.'s Mot. for Summ. Disp. (hereinafter, Mot. for
Summ. Disp.), at 1. With respect to Respondent's stay motion, the
Government suggested that Respondent's statements regarding the timing
of a negotiated resolution of the state matter was speculative. Id. at
4. The Government then cited Agency precedent to argue that ``even if
the period of suspension is temporary or if there is the potential that
Respondent's state controlled substance privileges will be reinstated,
summary disposition is warranted because `revocation is also
appropriate when a state license has been suspended, but with the
possibility of future reinstatement.' '' Id. (quoting Roger A.
Rodriguez, 70 FR 33206, 33207 (2005) (other citations omitted)). The
Government thus maintained that Respondent's Motion for Continuance
should be denied. Id.
As for the Government's Motion for Summary Disposition, it argued
that based on the Order of Suspension issued to Respondent by the
Colorado Medical Board, he does not have ``authority to prescribe,
administer, or dispense controlled substances in the State of
Colorado.'' Mot. for Summ. Disp., at 3. The Government argued that
there is no dispute as to this material fact, id. at 2, and that
``[a]bsent authority by the State of Colorado to dispense controlled
substances, Respondent is not authorized to possess a DEA registration
in that state.'' Id. at 3 (citing 21 U.S.C. 802(21), 823(f), 824(a)(3),
and Layfe Robert Anthony, 67 FR 35582 (2002)). The Government further
argued that ``DEA does not have statutory authority to maintain a
registration if the registrant is without state authority to handle
controlled substances,'' and that therefore, Respondent's registration
should be revoked. Id. (citation omitted).
On November 14, 2016, the ALJ denied Respondent's Motion for
Continuance. Order Denying the Respondent's Motion for Continuance, at
1. The ALJ's explained that ``[i]t is settled DEA precedent `that the
existence of other proceedings in which Respondent is involved is not a
basis upon which to justify a stay of DEA administrative enforcement
proceedings.'' Id. (quoting James Alvin Chaney, 80 FR 57391, 57393
(2015)).
On November 30, 2016, Respondent submitted a pleading captioned:
``Respondent's Motion For Extension Of Time In Which To Submit His
Response To The Government's Motion for Summary Disposition And, In The
Alternative, His Response To The Government's Motion For Summary
Disposition'' (hereinafter, Extension Mot.). Therein, Respondent
represented that he had ``submitted a proposed Stipulation and Final
Agency Order to'' the Colorado Board, ``which, if agreed to by the
[Board], would result in the lifting of the suspension and the
restoration of'' his controlled substance dispensing authority in
Colorado. Extension Mot., at 1-2. Respondent further represented that
the proposed Stipulation was to be considered by the Board at its
December 15, 2016 meeting and expressed his optimism that the Board
would accept the Stipulation. Id. at 2. Further noting that the Board's
decision would be dispositive of this matter either way, Respondent
sought an extension of the time until December 20, 2016 to file his
response to the Government's pending Motion for Summary Disposition.
Id.
Citing ``the interest of administrative/judicial economy,'' the ALJ
granted Respondent's motion and ordered Respondent to file his evidence
of reinstatement and his Response to the Motion for Summary Disposition
by December 20, 2016. Order Granting Respondent's Motion for Extension
in Which to Submit His Response to the Government's Mot. for Summary
Disposition, at 2. On December 20, 2016, Respondent filed his Response
and a Status Report. Response to Gov. Mot. for Summ. Disp. and Status
Rep., at 1. Therein, Respondent advised that ``the parties in [the
Board's proceeding] were unable to reach a resolution and [that] the
matter will proceed to a hearing'' scheduled for June 26 through June
30, 2017. Id. Respondent further acknowledged that his medical license
had not been reinstated. Id.
The same day, the ALJ granted the Government's Motion. The ALJ
noted that ``[t]o maintain a DEA registration, a practitioner must be
currently authorized to handle controlled substances in the
jurisdiction in which the practitioner is registered.'' R.D. at 3
(citing 21 U.S.C. 802(21), 823(f)). Finding that there was no dispute
over the material fact that ``Respondent lacks state authorization to
handle controlled substances in Colorado,'' the State in which he is
registered with DEA, the ALJ granted the Government's Motion and
recommended that Respondent's registration be revoked. Id. at 3-4.
Neither party filed exceptions to the Recommended Decision.
Thereafter, the ALJ forwarded the record to my Office for final agency
action. Having considered the record, I adopt the ALJ's factual
finding, legal conclusions and recommended order. I make the following
factual findings.
Findings of Fact
Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 556(e), I take official notice of Respondent's
registration record with the Agency. According to the record,
Respondent is the holder of Certificate of Registration No. AM2281688,
pursuant to which he is authorized to dispense controlled substances in
schedules II through V as practitioner, at the registered address of
Colorado Lipidology Associates, 633 17th Street, Suite 100, Denver,
Colorado. Respondent's registration does not expire until January 31,
2019.\3\ Accordingly, I find that Respondent has
[[Page 19385]]
an active registration and that the Agency has jurisdiction.\4\
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\3\ Respondent may refute these findings (as well as any other
finding based on my taking of official notice) by filing a properly
supported motion for reconsideration no later than 10 business days
from the date of this Order.
\4\ I note that the Government did not submit any evidence
regarding the status of Respondent's registration with its Motion
for Summary Disposition. DEA's regulations do not require responsive
pleading to the allegations of a Show Cause Order. Thus, the failure
of a respondent to refute an allegation in his hearing request does
not constitute an admission of the allegation and the Government
maintains the burden of providing evidence establishing the Agency's
jurisdiction as part of its Motion. The Agency has also noted in
several decisions that even in those matters which are adjudicated
on summary disposition, the ALJ is obligated to make findings as to
the Agency's jurisdiction. See James Alvin Chaney, 80 FR 57391,
57391 n.1 (2015); Sharad C. Patel, 80 FR 28693, 28694 n.3 (2015).
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Respondent is also the holder of license number DR-36651, pursuant
to which he is authorized to practice medicine as a physician by the
Medical Board of Colorado. Mot. for Summ. Disp., Ex. 1, at 1. However,
effective on July 19, 2016, the Board suspended Respondent's medical
license ``pending proceedings for suspension or revocation.'' Id. at 2.
According to the online records of the Colorado Division of Professions
and Occupations, Respondent's suspension remains in effect as of the
date of this Decision and Order. See 5 U.S.C. 556(e).
Discussion
Pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(3), the Attorney General is authorized
to suspend or revoke a registration issued under section 823 of the
Controlled Substances Act (CSA), ``upon a finding that the registrant .
. . has had his State license . . . suspended [or] revoked . . . by
competent State authority and is no longer authorized by State law to
engage in the . . . dispensing of controlled substances.'' Moreover,
DEA has long held that the possession of authority to dispense
controlled substances under the laws of the State in which a
practitioner engages in professional practice is a fundamental
condition for obtaining and maintaining a practitioner's registration.
See, e.g., James L. Hooper, 76 FR 71371 (2011), pet. for rev. denied,
481 Fed. Appx. 826 (4th Cir. 2012); see also Frederick Marsh Blanton,
43 FR 27616 (1978) (``State authorization to dispense or otherwise
handle controlled substances is a prerequisite to the issuance and
maintenance of a Federal controlled substances registration.'').
This rule derives from the text of two provisions of the CSA.
First, Congress defined ``the term `practitioner' [to] mean[] a . . .
physician . . . or other person licensed, registered or otherwise
permitted, by . . . the jurisdiction in which he practices . . . to
distribute, dispense, [or] administer . . . a controlled substance in
the course of professional practice.'' 21 U.S.C. 802(21). Second, in
setting the requirements for obtaining a practitioner's registration,
Congress directed that ``[t]he Attorney General shall register
practitioners . . . if the applicant is authorized to dispense . . .
controlled substances under the laws of the State in which he
practices.'' 21 U.S.C. 823(f).
Because ``the controlling question'' in a proceeding brought under
21 U.S.C. 824(a)(3) is whether the holder of a DEA registration ``is
currently authorized to handle controlled substances in the [S]tate,''
Hooper, 76 FR at 71371 (quoting Anne Lazar Thorn, 62 FR 12847, 12848
(1997)), the Agency has also long held that revocation is warranted
even where a practitioner has lost his state authority by virtue of the
State's use of summary process and the State has yet to provide a
hearing to challenge the suspension. Bourne Pharmacy, 72 FR 18273,
18274 (2007); Wingfield Drugs, 52 FR 27070, 27071 (1987). Thus, it is
of no consequence that the Colorado Medical Board has employed summary
process in suspending Registrant's state license and that Respondent
may prevail at the hearing schedule for late June.
Here, there is no dispute over the material fact that Respondent is
no longer currently authorized to dispense controlled substances in
Colorado, the State in which he is registered. Accordingly, I adopt the
ALJ's recommendation that Respondent's registration be revoked.
Order
Pursuant to the authority vested in me by 21 U.S.C. 824(a), as well
as 28 CFR 0.100(b), I order that DEA Certificate of Registration
AM2281688, issued to Robert Clark Maiocco, M.D., be, and it hereby is,
revoked. Pursuant to the authority vested in me by 21 U.S.C. 823(f), I
further order that any pending application of Robert C. Maiocco, M.D.,
to renew or modify his registration, be, and it hereby is, denied. This
Order is effective immediately.\5\
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\5\ For the same reasons that led the Colorado Board to
summarily suspend Registrant's medical license, I find that the
public interest necessitates that this Order be effective
immediately. 21 CFR 1316.67.
Dated: April 18, 2017.
Chuck Rosenberg,
Acting Administrator.
[FR Doc. 2017-08450 Filed 4-26-17; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410-09-P