Special Conditions: The Boeing Company, Boeing Model 767-2C Airplane; Non-Rechargeable Lithium Battery Installations, 57758-57761 [2016-19991]
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Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 164 / Wednesday, August 24, 2016 / Rules and Regulations
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may include the preamble
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contact designated in the rule regarding
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either a corrected rule or the rule as
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publicly available a written statement
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PART 431—ENERGY EFFICIENCY
PROGRAM FOR CERTAIN
COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL
EQUIPMENT
3. The authority citation for part 431
continues to read as follows:
■
Authority: 42 U.S.C. 6291–6317.
4. Section 431.3 is revised to read as
follows:
■
§ 431.3 Error Correction procedure for
energy conservation standards rules.
Requests for error corrections
pertaining to an energy conservation
standard rule for commercial or
industrial equipment shall follow those
procedures and provisions detailed in
10 CFR 430.5 of this chapter.
[FR Doc. 2016–19968 Filed 8–23–16; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6450–01–P
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 25
[Docket No. FAA–2015–5391; Special
Conditions No. 25–630–SC]
Special Conditions: The Boeing
Company, Boeing Model 767–2C
Airplane; Non-Rechargeable Lithium
Battery Installations
Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Final special conditions.
AGENCY:
These special conditions are
issued for the Boeing Model 767–2C
airplane. This airplane will have a novel
or unusual design feature when
compared to the state of technology
envisioned in the airworthiness
standards for transport-category
airplanes. This design feature is
associated with non-rechargeable
lithium battery installations. The
applicable airworthiness regulations do
not contain adequate or appropriate
SUMMARY:
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safety standards for this design feature.
These special conditions contain the
additional safety standards that the
Administrator considers necessary to
establish a level of safety equivalent to
that established by the existing
airworthiness standards.
DATES: Effective April 22, 2017.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Nazih Khaouly, Airplane and Flight
Crew Interface Branch, ANM–111,
Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft
Certification Service, 1601 Lind Avenue
SW., Renton, Washington 98057–3356;
telephone 425–227–2432; facsimile
425–227–1149.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Future Requests for Installation of NonRechargeable Lithium Batteries
The FAA anticipates that nonrechargeable lithium batteries will be
installed in other makes and models of
airplanes. We have determined to
require special conditions for all
applications requesting nonrechargeable lithium battery
installations, except the installations
excluded in the Applicability section,
until the airworthiness requirements
can be revised to address this issue.
Applying special conditions to these
installations across the range of all
transport-airplane makes and models
ensures regulatory consistency among
applicants.
The FAA issued special conditions
no. 25–612–SC to Gulfstream Aerospace
Corporation for their GVI airplane.
Those are the first special conditions the
FAA issued for non-rechargeable
lithium battery installations. We
explained in that document our
determination to make those special
conditions effective one year after
publication of those special conditions
in the Federal Register, and our
intention for other special conditions for
other makes and models to be effective
on this same date or 30 days after their
publication, whichever is later.
Background
On January 18, 2010, The Boeing
Company (Boeing) applied for an
amendment to type certificate no.
A1NM to include a new Model 767–2C
airplane. The Model 767–2C airplane is
a twin-engine, transport-category
freighter derivative of the Model 767–
200 airplane currently approved under
type certificate no. A1NM. This freighter
has a maximum takeoff weight of
415,000 pounds and can be configured
to carry up to 11 supernumeraries.
The Model 767–2C airplane
incorporates provisions to support
subsequent supplemental type
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certificate (STC) modifications, which
are intended to provide additional
mission capabilities, including
provisions to support conversion into an
aerial refueling platform (i.e., tanker)
configuration.
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Type Certification Basis
Under the provisions of Title 14, Code
of Federal Regulations, (14 CFR) 21.101,
Boeing must show that the Model 767–
2C airplane meets the applicable
provisions of the regulations listed in
type certificate no. A1NM or the
applicable regulations in effect on the
date of application for the change,
except for earlier amendments as agreed
upon by the FAA. The regulations listed
in the type certificate are commonly
referred to as the ‘‘original type
certification basis.’’ The regulations
listed in type certificate no. A1NM are
14 CFR part 25, effective February 1,
1965, including Amendments 25–1
through 25–37, with exceptions listed in
the type certificate. In addition, the
certification basis includes other
regulations, special conditions, and
exemptions that are not relevant to these
special conditions. Type certificate no.
A1NM will be updated to include a
complete description of the certification
basis for this airplane model.
If the Administrator finds that the
applicable airworthiness regulations
(i.e., 14 CFR part 25) do not contain
adequate or appropriate safety standards
for the Model 767–2C airplane because
of a novel or unusual design feature,
special conditions are prescribed under
the provisions of § 21.16.
Special conditions are initially
applicable to the airplane model for
which they are issued. Should the type
certificate for that model be amended
later to include any other model that
incorporates the same novel or unusual
design feature, or should any other
model already included on the same
type certificate be modified to
incorporate the same novel or unusual
design feature, these special conditions
would also apply to the other model
under § 21.101.
In addition to the applicable
airworthiness regulations and special
conditions, the Model 767–2C airplane
must comply with the fuel-vent and
exhaust-emission requirements of 14
CFR part 34, and the noise-certification
requirements of 14 CFR part 36.
The FAA issues special conditions, as
defined in 14 CFR 11.19, in accordance
with § 11.38, and they become part of
the type-certification basis under
§ 21.101.
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Novel or Unusual Design Features
The Boeing Model 767–2C airplane
will incorporate non-rechargeable
lithium batteries.
A battery system consists of the
battery and any protective, monitoring,
and alerting circuitry or hardware inside
or outside of the battery. It also includes
vents (where necessary) and packaging.
For the purpose of these special
conditions, a ‘‘battery’’ and ‘‘battery
system’’ are referred to as a battery.
Discussion
The FAA derived the current
regulations governing installation of
batteries in transport-category airplanes
from Civil Air Regulations (CAR)
4b.625(d) as part of the re-codification
of CAR 4b that established 14 CFR part
25 in February 1965. We basically
reworded the battery requirements,
which are currently in § 25.1353(b)(1)
through (b)(4), from the CAR
requirements. Non-rechargeable lithium
batteries are novel and unusual with
respect to the state of technology
considered when these requirements
were codified. These batteries introduce
higher energy levels into airplane
systems through new chemical
compositions in various battery-cell
sizes and construction. Interconnection
of these cells in battery packs introduces
failure modes that require unique design
considerations, such as provisions for
thermal management.
Recent events involving rechargeable
and non-rechargeable lithium batteries
prompted the FAA to initiate a broad
evaluation of these energy-storage
technologies. In January 2013, two
independent events involving
rechargeable lithium-ion batteries
demonstrated unanticipated failure
modes. A National Transportation
Safety Board (NTSB) letter to the FAA,
dated May 22, 2014, which is available
at https://www.ntsb.gov, filename A–14–
032–036.pdf, describes these events.
On July 12, 2013, an event involving
a non-rechargeable lithium battery in an
emergency-locator-transmitter
installation demonstrated unanticipated
failure modes. The United Kingdom’s
Air Accidents Investigation Branch
Bulletin S5/2013 describes this event.
Some known uses of rechargeable and
non-rechargeable lithium batteries on
airplanes include:
• Flight deck and avionics systems
such as displays, global positioning
systems, cockpit voice recorders, flight
data recorders, underwater locator
beacons, navigation computers,
integrated avionics computers, satellite
network and communication systems,
communication-management units, and
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remote-monitor electronic linereplaceable units;
• Cabin safety, entertainment, and
communications equipment, including
emergency-locator transmitters, life
rafts, escape slides, seatbelt air bags,
cabin management systems, Ethernet
switches, routers and media servers,
wireless systems, internet and in-flight
entertainment systems, satellite
televisions, remotes, and handsets;
• Systems in cargo areas including
door controls, sensors, video
surveillance equipment, and security
systems.
Some known potential hazards and
failure modes associated with nonrechargeable lithium batteries are:
• Internal failures: In general, these
batteries are significantly more
susceptible to internal failures that can
result in self-sustaining increases in
temperature and pressure (i.e., thermal
runaway) than their nickel-cadmium or
lead-acid counterparts. The metallic
lithium can ignite, resulting in a selfsustaining fire or explosion.
• Fast or imbalanced discharging:
Fast discharging or an imbalanced
discharge of one cell of a multi-cell
battery may create an overheating
condition that results in an
uncontrollable venting condition, which
in turn leads to a thermal event or an
explosion.
• Flammability: Unlike nickelcadmium and lead-acid batteries,
lithium batteries use higher energy and
current in an electrochemical system
that can be configured to maximize
energy storage of lithium. They also use
liquid electrolytes that can be extremely
flammable. The electrolyte, as well as
the electrodes, can serve as a source of
fuel for an external fire if the battery
casing is breached.
Special condition no. 1 requires that
each individual cell within a nonrechargeable lithium battery be designed
to maintain safe temperatures and
pressures. Special condition no. 2
addresses these same issues but for the
entire battery. Special condition no. 2
requires that the battery be designed to
prevent propagation of a thermal event,
such as self-sustained, uncontrolled
increases in temperature or pressure
from one cell to adjacent cells.
Special condition nos. 1 and 2 are
intended to ensure that the nonrechargeable lithium battery and its
cells are designed to eliminate the
potential for uncontrolled failures.
However, a certain number of failures
will occur due to various factors beyond
the control of the designer. Therefore,
other special conditions are intended to
protect the airplane and its occupants if
failure occurs.
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Special condition nos. 3, 7, and 8 are
self-explanatory, and the FAA does not
provide further explanation for them at
this time.
Special condition no. 4 makes it clear
that the flammable-fluid fire-protection
requirements of § 25.863 apply to nonrechargeable lithium battery
installations. Section 25.863 is
applicable to areas of the airplane that
could be exposed to flammable fluid
leakage from airplane systems. Nonrechargeable lithium batteries contain
electrolyte that is a flammable fluid.
Special condition no. 5 requires each
non-rechargeable lithium battery
installation to not damage surrounding
structure or adjacent systems,
equipment, or electrical wiring from
corrosive fluids or gases that may
escape. Special condition no. 6 requires
each non-rechargeable lithium battery
installation to have provisions to
prevent any hazardous effect on
airplane structure or systems caused by
the maximum amount of heat it can
generate due to any failure of it or its
individual cells. The means of meeting
these special conditions may be the
same, but they are independent
requirements addressing different
hazards. Special condition no. 5
addresses corrosive fluids and gases,
whereas special condition no. 6
addresses heat.
These special conditions will apply to
all non-rechargeable lithium battery
installations in lieu of § 25.1353(b)(1)
through (b)(4) at Amendment 25–123.
Sections 25.1353(b)(1) through (b)(4) at
Amendment 25–123 will remain in
effect for other battery installations.
These special conditions contain the
additional safety standards that the
Administrator considers necessary to
establish a level of safety equivalent to
that established by the existing
airworthiness standards.
Discussion of Comments
Notice of proposed special conditions
no. 25–16–01–SC, for the Boeing 767–
2C airplane, was published in the
Federal Register on January 27, 2016
[81 FR 4596]. We received four
substantive comments.
The Aerospace Industries Association
(AIA) provided several comments that
were identical to their comments for
special conditions no. 25–612–SC,
which we issued to Gulfstream
Aerospace Corporation for nonrechargeable lithium battery
installations on Gulfstream GVI
airplanes. The FAA responded to each
of these comments in that final special
conditions document. We incorporated
the same revisions into these Boeing
767–2C special conditions that we
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incorporated into the Gulfstream GVI
special conditions as a result of AIA’s
comments.
Boeing commented that they fully
support AIA’s comments.
Boeing requested that the FAA
provide adequate time before nonrechargeable lithium battery special
conditions become effective to support
validation activities by foreign civil
airworthiness authorities (FCAA) and to
not adversely impact future airplane
deliveries by all applicants. The FAA
considered this same comment from
Boeing for special conditions no. 25–
612–SC and provided a detailed
response in that document. We
determined the effective date for these
Boeing 767–2C special conditions based
on Boeing’s comment and other factors
stated in special conditions no. 25–612–
SC.
Boeing commented that the FAA
needs to clearly define the applicability
of these special conditions. Boeing’s
comment is similar to their comment on
special conditions no. 25–612–SC. We
provided a detailed response in special
conditions no. 25–612–SC and have
clearly defined the applicability for
these Boeing 767–2C special conditions.
One aspect of Boeing’s comment that we
did not address in special conditions
no. 25–612–SC is that some design
changes may not change a lithium
battery installation but affect it, which
results in these special conditions being
applicable. For example, adding a heat
source next to a lithium battery can
increase its possibility of entering into
thermal runaway. Lithium battery
installations affected by design changes
must meet these special conditions.
Some examples of changes that affect
lithium battery installations are those
that:
• Increase the temperatures or
pressures in a battery,
• Increase the electrical load on a
battery,
• Increase potential for imbalance
between battery cells,
• Modify protective circuitry for a
lithium battery,
• Increase the airplane level risk due
to the location of an existing lithium
battery. An example is installation of a
new oxygen line next to an existing part
that has a lithium battery. The airplane
level risk may increase due to the
potential hazard of a lithium battery fire
in the proximity of oxygen.
Gulfstream Aerospace Corporation
commented that they agree with
Boeing’s comments and requested that
the FAA consider incorporating their
proposed changes into this document.
AmSafe recommended that the FAA
state in the preamble that design
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mitigation or analysis at the airplane
level may be applied to show that
designs meet these special conditions.
The FAA has determined that these
special conditions are to require the
battery to be designed to minimize the
potential of uncontrollable failure, and
to not only rely on mitigation of a
battery failure at the airplane level.
Therefore, we have not incorporated the
proposed revision into the preamble of
these special conditions.
AmSafe commented that they concur
with proposed special condition no. 1
with an understanding that ‘‘foreseeable
operating conditions’’ equates to the full
normal operating envelope of the
airplane. However, this is not a correct
understanding of proposed special
condition no. 1. The FAA intends for
the term ‘‘foreseeable operating
conditions,’’ in these special conditions,
to apply at the cell level and not only
at the airplane level. In addition,
‘‘foreseeable’’ includes anticipated
abnormal operating conditions.
AmSafe recommended revising
proposed special condition no. 2 to
read, ‘‘Battery installation and/or
equipment containing any nonrechargeable lithium battery must
preclude the occurrence of, or mitigate
the effect of self-sustaining,
uncontrolled increases in temperature
or pressure.’’ Amsafe’s rationale was
based on their recommendation that
design mitigation or analysis at the
airplane level be acceptable. As
explained above, the FAA has
determined that these special conditions
are to require the battery to be designed
to minimize the potential of
uncontrollable failure, and to not only
rely on mitigation of a battery failure at
the airplane level. The FAA has not
incorporated the proposed revision into
special condition no. 2.
AmSafe recommended adding the
phrase ‘‘. . . failure which is not shown
to be extremely remote . . .’’ to
proposed special condition no. 3. The
FAA responds that service history
shows that battery failure is not
extremely remote. Therefore, to ensure
that failures are properly anticipated
and accounted for, we have not revised
proposed special condition no. 3 to
include these words.
AmSafe recommended deleting
§ 25.863(c)(d) from proposed special
condition no 4. The FAA does not
concur. Section 25.863 already applies
to non-rechargeable lithium batteries
since they contain electrolyte that is a
flammable fluid. Since § 25.863 has
historically been applied to flammable
fluids related to propulsion and
hydraulic systems, the FAA is including
special condition no. 4 to ensure that
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there is no misunderstanding that
§ 25.863 also applies to these batteries.
AmSafe recommended revising
proposed special condition no. 5 to
prohibit damage to surrounding
structure or adjacent systems,
equipment, or electrical wiring from
corrosive fluids or gases that may escape
‘‘in such a way as to cause a hazardous
or catastrophic failure condition.’’ AIA
also recommended this revision. The
FAA intends for special condition no. 5
to be consistent with § 25.1309. So, we
added the words ‘‘. . . in such a way as
to cause a major or more-severe failure
condition.’’ The revised special
condition now reads, ‘‘. . . each nonrechargeable lithium battery installation
must not damage surrounding structure
or adjacent systems, equipment, or
electrical wiring from corrosive fluids or
gases that may escape in such a way as
to cause a major or more-severe failure
condition.’’ The FAA does not concur
with excluding major failure conditions.
AmSafe concurred with proposed
special condition no. 6.
AmSafe concurred with proposed
special condition no. 7 and
recommended revising proposed special
condition no. 8. However, the FAA
deleted these proposed special
conditions as explained in our response
to AIA’s comments in special conditions
no. 25–612–SC.
AmSafe recommended revising ‘‘safe
operation of the airplane’’ in proposed
special condition nos. 9 and 10 to
‘‘continued safe operation of the
airplane.’’ The phrase ‘‘continued safe
operation of the airplane’’ is used to
refer to safe operation of the airplane
after a failure has occurred. The phrase
‘‘safe operation of the airplane’’ is more
general and appropriate for these special
conditions. We did not incorporate
AmSafe’s proposed revision into these
special conditions.
The FAA has determined that
‘‘uncontrolled’’ in special condition no.
2 should be ‘‘uncontrollable’’ to more
accurately describe the concern. This
revision does not change the intended
meaning of this special condition.
Except as discussed above, the special
conditions are adopted as proposed.
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Applicability
As discussed above, these special
conditions are applicable to the Model
767–2C airplane. Should the applicant
apply at a later date for a change to the
type certificate to include another
model incorporating the same novel or
unusual design feature, or should any
other model already included on the
same type certificate be modified to
incorporate the same novel or unusual
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design feature, these special conditions
would apply to that model as well.
These special conditions are only
applicable to design changes applied for
after their effective date. The existing
airplane fleet and follow-on deliveries
of airplanes with previously certified
non-rechargeable lithium battery
installations are not affected.
These special conditions are not
applicable to previously certified nonrechargeable lithium battery
installations where the only change is
either cosmetic or relocating the
installation to improve the safety of the
airplane and occupants. The FAA
determined that this exclusion is in the
public interest because the need to meet
all of the special conditions might
otherwise deter such design changes
that involve relocating batteries. A
cosmetic change is a change in
appearance only, and does not change
any function or safety characteristic of
the battery installation.
Conclusion
This action affects only certain novel
or unusual design features on one model
of airplane. It is not a rule of general
applicability.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 25
Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting
and record keeping requirements.
The authority citation for these
special conditions is as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701,
44702, 44704.
The Special Conditions
Accordingly, the following special
conditions are part of the type
certification basis for the Boeing Model
767–2C airplane.
Non-Rechargeable Lithium Battery
Installations
In lieu of § 25.1353(b)(1) through
(b)(4) at Amendment 25–123, each nonrechargeable lithium battery installation
must:
1. Maintain safe cell temperatures and
pressures under all foreseeable
operating conditions to prevent fire and
explosion.
2. Prevent the occurrence of selfsustaining, uncontrollable increases in
temperature or pressure.
3. Not emit explosive or toxic gases,
either in normal operation or as a result
of its failure, that may accumulate in
hazardous quantities within the
airplane.
4. Meet the requirements of § 25.863.
5. Not damage surrounding structure
or adjacent systems, equipment, or
electrical wiring from corrosive fluids or
gases that may escape in such a way as
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57761
to cause a major or more-severe failure
condition.
6. Have provisions to prevent any
hazardous effect on airplane structure or
systems caused by the maximum
amount of heat it can generate due to
any failure of it or its individual cells.
7. Have a failure sensing and warning
system to alert the flightcrew if its
failure affects safe operation of the
airplane.
8. Have a means for the flightcrew or
maintenance personnel to determine the
battery charge state if the battery’s
function is required for safe operation of
the airplane.
Note: A battery system consists of the
battery and any protective, monitoring,
and alerting circuitry or hardware inside
or outside of the battery. It also includes
vents (where necessary) and packaging.
For the purpose of these special
conditions, a ‘‘battery’’ and ‘‘battery
system’’ are referred to as a battery.
Issued in Renton, Washington, on August
11, 2016.
Paul Bernado,
Acting Manager, Transport Airplane
Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.
[FR Doc. 2016–19991 Filed 8–23–16; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–13–P
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 95
[Docket No. 31093; Amdt. No. 528]
IFR Altitudes; Miscellaneous
Amendments
Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Final rule
AGENCY:
This amendment adopts
miscellaneous amendments to the
required IFR (instrument flight rules)
altitudes and changeover points for
certain Federal airways, jet routes, or
direct routes for which a minimum or
maximum en route authorized IFR
altitude is prescribed. This regulatory
action is needed because of changes
occurring in the National Airspace
System. These changes are designed to
provide for the safe and efficient use of
the navigable airspace under instrument
conditions in the affected areas.
DATES: Effective Date: 0901 UTC,
September 15, 2016.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Richard A. Dunham, Flight Procedure
Standards Branch (AMCAFS–420),
Flight Technologies and Programs
Division, Flight Standards Service,
SUMMARY:
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]]>Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 81, Number 164 (Wednesday, August 24, 2016)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 57758-57761]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2016-19991]
=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 25
[Docket No. FAA-2015-5391; Special Conditions No. 25-630-SC]
Special Conditions: The Boeing Company, Boeing Model 767-2C
Airplane; Non-Rechargeable Lithium Battery Installations
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Final special conditions.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: These special conditions are issued for the Boeing Model 767-
2C airplane. This airplane will have a novel or unusual design feature
when compared to the state of technology envisioned in the
airworthiness standards for transport-category airplanes. This design
feature is associated with non-rechargeable lithium battery
installations. The applicable airworthiness regulations do not contain
adequate or appropriate safety standards for this design feature. These
special conditions contain the additional safety standards that the
Administrator considers necessary to establish a level of safety
equivalent to that established by the existing airworthiness standards.
DATES: Effective April 22, 2017.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Nazih Khaouly, Airplane and Flight
Crew Interface Branch, ANM-111, Transport Airplane Directorate,
Aircraft Certification Service, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton,
Washington 98057-3356; telephone 425-227-2432; facsimile 425-227-1149.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Future Requests for Installation of Non-Rechargeable Lithium Batteries
The FAA anticipates that non-rechargeable lithium batteries will be
installed in other makes and models of airplanes. We have determined to
require special conditions for all applications requesting non-
rechargeable lithium battery installations, except the installations
excluded in the Applicability section, until the airworthiness
requirements can be revised to address this issue. Applying special
conditions to these installations across the range of all transport-
airplane makes and models ensures regulatory consistency among
applicants.
The FAA issued special conditions no. 25-612-SC to Gulfstream
Aerospace Corporation for their GVI airplane. Those are the first
special conditions the FAA issued for non-rechargeable lithium battery
installations. We explained in that document our determination to make
those special conditions effective one year after publication of those
special conditions in the Federal Register, and our intention for other
special conditions for other makes and models to be effective on this
same date or 30 days after their publication, whichever is later.
Background
On January 18, 2010, The Boeing Company (Boeing) applied for an
amendment to type certificate no. A1NM to include a new Model 767-2C
airplane. The Model 767-2C airplane is a twin-engine, transport-
category freighter derivative of the Model 767-200 airplane currently
approved under type certificate no. A1NM. This freighter has a maximum
takeoff weight of 415,000 pounds and can be configured to carry up to
11 supernumeraries.
The Model 767-2C airplane incorporates provisions to support
subsequent supplemental type
[[Page 57759]]
certificate (STC) modifications, which are intended to provide
additional mission capabilities, including provisions to support
conversion into an aerial refueling platform (i.e., tanker)
configuration.
Type Certification Basis
Under the provisions of Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations, (14
CFR) 21.101, Boeing must show that the Model 767-2C airplane meets the
applicable provisions of the regulations listed in type certificate no.
A1NM or the applicable regulations in effect on the date of application
for the change, except for earlier amendments as agreed upon by the
FAA. The regulations listed in the type certificate are commonly
referred to as the ``original type certification basis.'' The
regulations listed in type certificate no. A1NM are 14 CFR part 25,
effective February 1, 1965, including Amendments 25-1 through 25-37,
with exceptions listed in the type certificate. In addition, the
certification basis includes other regulations, special conditions, and
exemptions that are not relevant to these special conditions. Type
certificate no. A1NM will be updated to include a complete description
of the certification basis for this airplane model.
If the Administrator finds that the applicable airworthiness
regulations (i.e., 14 CFR part 25) do not contain adequate or
appropriate safety standards for the Model 767-2C airplane because of a
novel or unusual design feature, special conditions are prescribed
under the provisions of Sec. 21.16.
Special conditions are initially applicable to the airplane model
for which they are issued. Should the type certificate for that model
be amended later to include any other model that incorporates the same
novel or unusual design feature, or should any other model already
included on the same type certificate be modified to incorporate the
same novel or unusual design feature, these special conditions would
also apply to the other model under Sec. 21.101.
In addition to the applicable airworthiness regulations and special
conditions, the Model 767-2C airplane must comply with the fuel-vent
and exhaust-emission requirements of 14 CFR part 34, and the noise-
certification requirements of 14 CFR part 36.
The FAA issues special conditions, as defined in 14 CFR 11.19, in
accordance with Sec. 11.38, and they become part of the type-
certification basis under Sec. 21.101.
Novel or Unusual Design Features
The Boeing Model 767-2C airplane will incorporate non-rechargeable
lithium batteries.
A battery system consists of the battery and any protective,
monitoring, and alerting circuitry or hardware inside or outside of the
battery. It also includes vents (where necessary) and packaging. For
the purpose of these special conditions, a ``battery'' and ``battery
system'' are referred to as a battery.
Discussion
The FAA derived the current regulations governing installation of
batteries in transport-category airplanes from Civil Air Regulations
(CAR) 4b.625(d) as part of the re-codification of CAR 4b that
established 14 CFR part 25 in February 1965. We basically reworded the
battery requirements, which are currently in Sec. 25.1353(b)(1)
through (b)(4), from the CAR requirements. Non-rechargeable lithium
batteries are novel and unusual with respect to the state of technology
considered when these requirements were codified. These batteries
introduce higher energy levels into airplane systems through new
chemical compositions in various battery-cell sizes and construction.
Interconnection of these cells in battery packs introduces failure
modes that require unique design considerations, such as provisions for
thermal management.
Recent events involving rechargeable and non-rechargeable lithium
batteries prompted the FAA to initiate a broad evaluation of these
energy-storage technologies. In January 2013, two independent events
involving rechargeable lithium-ion batteries demonstrated unanticipated
failure modes. A National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) letter to
the FAA, dated May 22, 2014, which is available at https://www.ntsb.gov,
filename A-14-032-036.pdf, describes these events.
On July 12, 2013, an event involving a non-rechargeable lithium
battery in an emergency-locator-transmitter installation demonstrated
unanticipated failure modes. The United Kingdom's Air Accidents
Investigation Branch Bulletin S5/2013 describes this event.
Some known uses of rechargeable and non-rechargeable lithium
batteries on airplanes include:
Flight deck and avionics systems such as displays, global
positioning systems, cockpit voice recorders, flight data recorders,
underwater locator beacons, navigation computers, integrated avionics
computers, satellite network and communication systems, communication-
management units, and remote-monitor electronic line-replaceable units;
Cabin safety, entertainment, and communications equipment,
including emergency-locator transmitters, life rafts, escape slides,
seatbelt air bags, cabin management systems, Ethernet switches, routers
and media servers, wireless systems, internet and in-flight
entertainment systems, satellite televisions, remotes, and handsets;
Systems in cargo areas including door controls, sensors,
video surveillance equipment, and security systems.
Some known potential hazards and failure modes associated with non-
rechargeable lithium batteries are:
Internal failures: In general, these batteries are
significantly more susceptible to internal failures that can result in
self-sustaining increases in temperature and pressure (i.e., thermal
runaway) than their nickel-cadmium or lead-acid counterparts. The
metallic lithium can ignite, resulting in a self-sustaining fire or
explosion.
Fast or imbalanced discharging: Fast discharging or an
imbalanced discharge of one cell of a multi-cell battery may create an
overheating condition that results in an uncontrollable venting
condition, which in turn leads to a thermal event or an explosion.
Flammability: Unlike nickel-cadmium and lead-acid
batteries, lithium batteries use higher energy and current in an
electrochemical system that can be configured to maximize energy
storage of lithium. They also use liquid electrolytes that can be
extremely flammable. The electrolyte, as well as the electrodes, can
serve as a source of fuel for an external fire if the battery casing is
breached.
Special condition no. 1 requires that each individual cell within a
non-rechargeable lithium battery be designed to maintain safe
temperatures and pressures. Special condition no. 2 addresses these
same issues but for the entire battery. Special condition no. 2
requires that the battery be designed to prevent propagation of a
thermal event, such as self-sustained, uncontrolled increases in
temperature or pressure from one cell to adjacent cells.
Special condition nos. 1 and 2 are intended to ensure that the non-
rechargeable lithium battery and its cells are designed to eliminate
the potential for uncontrolled failures. However, a certain number of
failures will occur due to various factors beyond the control of the
designer. Therefore, other special conditions are intended to protect
the airplane and its occupants if failure occurs.
[[Page 57760]]
Special condition nos. 3, 7, and 8 are self-explanatory, and the
FAA does not provide further explanation for them at this time.
Special condition no. 4 makes it clear that the flammable-fluid
fire-protection requirements of Sec. 25.863 apply to non-rechargeable
lithium battery installations. Section 25.863 is applicable to areas of
the airplane that could be exposed to flammable fluid leakage from
airplane systems. Non-rechargeable lithium batteries contain
electrolyte that is a flammable fluid.
Special condition no. 5 requires each non-rechargeable lithium
battery installation to not damage surrounding structure or adjacent
systems, equipment, or electrical wiring from corrosive fluids or gases
that may escape. Special condition no. 6 requires each non-rechargeable
lithium battery installation to have provisions to prevent any
hazardous effect on airplane structure or systems caused by the maximum
amount of heat it can generate due to any failure of it or its
individual cells. The means of meeting these special conditions may be
the same, but they are independent requirements addressing different
hazards. Special condition no. 5 addresses corrosive fluids and gases,
whereas special condition no. 6 addresses heat.
These special conditions will apply to all non-rechargeable lithium
battery installations in lieu of Sec. 25.1353(b)(1) through (b)(4) at
Amendment 25-123. Sections 25.1353(b)(1) through (b)(4) at Amendment
25-123 will remain in effect for other battery installations.
These special conditions contain the additional safety standards
that the Administrator considers necessary to establish a level of
safety equivalent to that established by the existing airworthiness
standards.
Discussion of Comments
Notice of proposed special conditions no. 25-16-01-SC, for the
Boeing 767-2C airplane, was published in the Federal Register on
January 27, 2016 [81 FR 4596]. We received four substantive comments.
The Aerospace Industries Association (AIA) provided several
comments that were identical to their comments for special conditions
no. 25-612-SC, which we issued to Gulfstream Aerospace Corporation for
non-rechargeable lithium battery installations on Gulfstream GVI
airplanes. The FAA responded to each of these comments in that final
special conditions document. We incorporated the same revisions into
these Boeing 767-2C special conditions that we incorporated into the
Gulfstream GVI special conditions as a result of AIA's comments.
Boeing commented that they fully support AIA's comments.
Boeing requested that the FAA provide adequate time before non-
rechargeable lithium battery special conditions become effective to
support validation activities by foreign civil airworthiness
authorities (FCAA) and to not adversely impact future airplane
deliveries by all applicants. The FAA considered this same comment from
Boeing for special conditions no. 25-612-SC and provided a detailed
response in that document. We determined the effective date for these
Boeing 767-2C special conditions based on Boeing's comment and other
factors stated in special conditions no. 25-612-SC.
Boeing commented that the FAA needs to clearly define the
applicability of these special conditions. Boeing's comment is similar
to their comment on special conditions no. 25-612-SC. We provided a
detailed response in special conditions no. 25-612-SC and have clearly
defined the applicability for these Boeing 767-2C special conditions.
One aspect of Boeing's comment that we did not address in special
conditions no. 25-612-SC is that some design changes may not change a
lithium battery installation but affect it, which results in these
special conditions being applicable. For example, adding a heat source
next to a lithium battery can increase its possibility of entering into
thermal runaway. Lithium battery installations affected by design
changes must meet these special conditions. Some examples of changes
that affect lithium battery installations are those that:
Increase the temperatures or pressures in a battery,
Increase the electrical load on a battery,
Increase potential for imbalance between battery cells,
Modify protective circuitry for a lithium battery,
Increase the airplane level risk due to the location of an
existing lithium battery. An example is installation of a new oxygen
line next to an existing part that has a lithium battery. The airplane
level risk may increase due to the potential hazard of a lithium
battery fire in the proximity of oxygen.
Gulfstream Aerospace Corporation commented that they agree with
Boeing's comments and requested that the FAA consider incorporating
their proposed changes into this document.
AmSafe recommended that the FAA state in the preamble that design
mitigation or analysis at the airplane level may be applied to show
that designs meet these special conditions. The FAA has determined that
these special conditions are to require the battery to be designed to
minimize the potential of uncontrollable failure, and to not only rely
on mitigation of a battery failure at the airplane level. Therefore, we
have not incorporated the proposed revision into the preamble of these
special conditions.
AmSafe commented that they concur with proposed special condition
no. 1 with an understanding that ``foreseeable operating conditions''
equates to the full normal operating envelope of the airplane. However,
this is not a correct understanding of proposed special condition no.
1. The FAA intends for the term ``foreseeable operating conditions,''
in these special conditions, to apply at the cell level and not only at
the airplane level. In addition, ``foreseeable'' includes anticipated
abnormal operating conditions.
AmSafe recommended revising proposed special condition no. 2 to
read, ``Battery installation and/or equipment containing any non-
rechargeable lithium battery must preclude the occurrence of, or
mitigate the effect of self-sustaining, uncontrolled increases in
temperature or pressure.'' Amsafe's rationale was based on their
recommendation that design mitigation or analysis at the airplane level
be acceptable. As explained above, the FAA has determined that these
special conditions are to require the battery to be designed to
minimize the potential of uncontrollable failure, and to not only rely
on mitigation of a battery failure at the airplane level. The FAA has
not incorporated the proposed revision into special condition no. 2.
AmSafe recommended adding the phrase ``. . . failure which is not
shown to be extremely remote . . .'' to proposed special condition no.
3. The FAA responds that service history shows that battery failure is
not extremely remote. Therefore, to ensure that failures are properly
anticipated and accounted for, we have not revised proposed special
condition no. 3 to include these words.
AmSafe recommended deleting Sec. 25.863(c)(d) from proposed
special condition no 4. The FAA does not concur. Section 25.863 already
applies to non-rechargeable lithium batteries since they contain
electrolyte that is a flammable fluid. Since Sec. 25.863 has
historically been applied to flammable fluids related to propulsion and
hydraulic systems, the FAA is including special condition no. 4 to
ensure that
[[Page 57761]]
there is no misunderstanding that Sec. 25.863 also applies to these
batteries.
AmSafe recommended revising proposed special condition no. 5 to
prohibit damage to surrounding structure or adjacent systems,
equipment, or electrical wiring from corrosive fluids or gases that may
escape ``in such a way as to cause a hazardous or catastrophic failure
condition.'' AIA also recommended this revision. The FAA intends for
special condition no. 5 to be consistent with Sec. 25.1309. So, we
added the words ``. . . in such a way as to cause a major or more-
severe failure condition.'' The revised special condition now reads,
``. . . each non-rechargeable lithium battery installation must not
damage surrounding structure or adjacent systems, equipment, or
electrical wiring from corrosive fluids or gases that may escape in
such a way as to cause a major or more-severe failure condition.'' The
FAA does not concur with excluding major failure conditions.
AmSafe concurred with proposed special condition no. 6.
AmSafe concurred with proposed special condition no. 7 and
recommended revising proposed special condition no. 8. However, the FAA
deleted these proposed special conditions as explained in our response
to AIA's comments in special conditions no. 25-612-SC.
AmSafe recommended revising ``safe operation of the airplane'' in
proposed special condition nos. 9 and 10 to ``continued safe operation
of the airplane.'' The phrase ``continued safe operation of the
airplane'' is used to refer to safe operation of the airplane after a
failure has occurred. The phrase ``safe operation of the airplane'' is
more general and appropriate for these special conditions. We did not
incorporate AmSafe's proposed revision into these special conditions.
The FAA has determined that ``uncontrolled'' in special condition
no. 2 should be ``uncontrollable'' to more accurately describe the
concern. This revision does not change the intended meaning of this
special condition.
Except as discussed above, the special conditions are adopted as
proposed.
Applicability
As discussed above, these special conditions are applicable to the
Model 767-2C airplane. Should the applicant apply at a later date for a
change to the type certificate to include another model incorporating
the same novel or unusual design feature, or should any other model
already included on the same type certificate be modified to
incorporate the same novel or unusual design feature, these special
conditions would apply to that model as well.
These special conditions are only applicable to design changes
applied for after their effective date. The existing airplane fleet and
follow-on deliveries of airplanes with previously certified non-
rechargeable lithium battery installations are not affected.
These special conditions are not applicable to previously certified
non-rechargeable lithium battery installations where the only change is
either cosmetic or relocating the installation to improve the safety of
the airplane and occupants. The FAA determined that this exclusion is
in the public interest because the need to meet all of the special
conditions might otherwise deter such design changes that involve
relocating batteries. A cosmetic change is a change in appearance only,
and does not change any function or safety characteristic of the
battery installation.
Conclusion
This action affects only certain novel or unusual design features
on one model of airplane. It is not a rule of general applicability.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 25
Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting and record keeping
requirements.
The authority citation for these special conditions is as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701, 44702, 44704.
The Special Conditions
Accordingly, the following special conditions are part of the type
certification basis for the Boeing Model 767-2C airplane.
Non-Rechargeable Lithium Battery Installations
In lieu of Sec. 25.1353(b)(1) through (b)(4) at Amendment 25-123,
each non-rechargeable lithium battery installation must:
1. Maintain safe cell temperatures and pressures under all
foreseeable operating conditions to prevent fire and explosion.
2. Prevent the occurrence of self-sustaining, uncontrollable
increases in temperature or pressure.
3. Not emit explosive or toxic gases, either in normal operation or
as a result of its failure, that may accumulate in hazardous quantities
within the airplane.
4. Meet the requirements of Sec. 25.863.
5. Not damage surrounding structure or adjacent systems, equipment,
or electrical wiring from corrosive fluids or gases that may escape in
such a way as to cause a major or more-severe failure condition.
6. Have provisions to prevent any hazardous effect on airplane
structure or systems caused by the maximum amount of heat it can
generate due to any failure of it or its individual cells.
7. Have a failure sensing and warning system to alert the
flightcrew if its failure affects safe operation of the airplane.
8. Have a means for the flightcrew or maintenance personnel to
determine the battery charge state if the battery's function is
required for safe operation of the airplane.
Note: A battery system consists of the battery and any protective,
monitoring, and alerting circuitry or hardware inside or outside of the
battery. It also includes vents (where necessary) and packaging. For
the purpose of these special conditions, a ``battery'' and ``battery
system'' are referred to as a battery.
Issued in Renton, Washington, on August 11, 2016.
Paul Bernado,
Acting Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification
Service.
[FR Doc. 2016-19991 Filed 8-23-16; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P
