Sunshine Act Meeting, 44050-44051 [2016-16091]
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Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 129 / Wednesday, July 6, 2016 / Notices
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and that a final hearing ‘‘has yet to be
scheduled.’’ Id. (citation omitted).
Respondent admits that she is not
currently authorized to prescribe any
medications in Texas. Id. at 3. She
contends, however, that because the
temporary suspension ‘‘is not a final
order’’ of the Board, DEA’s authority
under 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(3) must be
considered in light of the its authority
under subsection 824(d), the provision
which authorizes the Attorney General
to suspend a registration based upon a
finding of imminent danger to public
health or safety. Id. Respondent thus
argues that because a suspension under
section 824(d) ‘‘runs until the
conclusion of such proceeding,
including judicial review, . . . the
principle of comity . . . suggest[s] that
while a suspension of [her] registration
may be appropriate [contingent on the
outcome of the Board proceeding], a
revocation is not appropriate.’’ Id.
Discussion
Pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(3), the
Attorney General is authorized to
suspend or revoke a registration issued
under section 823 of this title, ‘‘upon a
finding that the registrant . . . has had
[her] State license . . . suspended . . .
by competent State authority and is no
longer authorized by State law to engage
in the . . . dispensing of controlled
substances.’’ Also, DEA has long held
that the possession of authority to
dispense controlled substances under
the laws of the State in which a
practitioner engages in professional
practice is a fundamental condition for
obtaining and maintaining a
practitioner’s registration. See, e.g.,
Frederick Marsh Blanton, 43 FR 27616,
27617 (1978) (‘‘State authorization to
dispense or otherwise handle controlled
substances is a prerequisite to the
issuance and maintenance of a Federal
controlled substances registration.’’);
James L. Hooper, 76 FR 71371 (2011),
pet. for rev. denied, 481 Fed. Appx. 826
(4th Cir. 2012).
This rule derives from the text of two
provisions of the Controlled Substances.
First, Congress defined ‘‘the term
‘practitioner’ [to] mean[ ] a . . .
physician . . . or other person licensed,
registered or otherwise permitted, by
. . . the jurisdiction in which [s]he
practices . . . to distribute, dispense,
[or] administer . . . a controlled
substance in the course of professional
practice.’’ 21 U.S.C. 802(21). Second, in
setting the requirements for obtaining a
practitioner’s registration, Congress
directed that ‘‘[t]he Attorney General
shall register practitioners . . . if the
applicant is authorized to dispense . . .
controlled substances under the laws of
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the State in which [s]he practices.’’ 21
U.S.C. 823(f). Because Congress has
clearly mandated that a practitioner
possess state authority in order to be
deemed a practitioner under the Act,
DEA has long held that revocation of a
practitioner’s registration is the
appropriate sanction whenever she is no
longer authorized to dispense controlled
substances under the laws of the State
in which she practices medicine. See,
e.g., Calvin Ramsey, 76 FR 20034, 20036
(2011); Sheran Arden Yeates, M.D., 71
FR 39130, 39131 (2006); Dominick A.
Ricci, 58 FR 51104, 51105 (1993); Bobby
Watts, 53 FR 11919, 11920 (1988).
This is so even where, as here, the
state board has imposed a suspension of
a practitioner’s dispensing authority
prior to providing a hearing and the
practitioner has yet to be afforded the
opportunity to challenge the basis of the
state board’s action. See, Ramsey 76 FR
at 20036 (citations omitted). As the
Agency previously explained: ‘‘Under
the CSA, it does not matter whether the
suspension is for a fixed term or for a
duration which has yet to be determined
because it is continuing pending the
outcome of a state proceeding. Rather,
what matters—as DEA has repeatedly
held—is whether Respondent is without
authority under [state] law to dispense
a controlled substance.’’ Bourne
Pharmacy, Inc., 72 FR 18273, 18274
(2007) (citation omitted). Cf. James L.
Hooper, 76 FR 71371 (2011) (collecting
cases); Blanton, 43 FR 27616 (1978)
(revoking registration of physician
whose medical license had been
suspended for one year, but thereafter,
would have his license restored subject
to probationary conditions; ‘‘[a]s a result
of the suspension of his medical license,
the [r]espondent is no longer authorized
to dispense or otherwise handle
controlled substances under the laws of
Florida. Accordingly . . . the
[r]espondent’s DEA registration must be
revoked’’). See also Rezik A. Saqer, 81
FR 22122, 22126 (2016).
Because the CSA clearly makes the
possession of state authority a condition
for maintaining a practitioner’s
registration, it is of no consequence that
the Texas Board’s temporary suspension
order is not a final order of the Board.
As for her contention that the principle
of comity suggests that I should impose
a suspension rather than a revocation,
revoking her registration in no manner
interferes with the Texas Board’s
authority to adjudicate the allegations it
has raised against her.1 Respondent
1 Respondent’s invocation of 21 U.S.C. 824(d)
provides no support for her contention that comity
suggests that I suspend rather than revoke her
registration. That provision governs the exercise of
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remains free to challenge the allegations
raised by the State before the Board, and
in the event she prevails, she can
immediately apply for a new DEA
registration.
Accordingly, because it is undisputed
that Respondent’s Texas Advanced
Practice Nursing License and
Prescription Authority remains
suspended, I find that she no longer has
authority under the laws of Texas, the
State in which she is registered, to
dispense controlled substances.
Therefore, she is not entitled to
maintain her DEA registration.
Accordingly, I will order that her
registration be revoked and that any
pending applications be denied.
Order
Pursuant to the authority vested in me
by 21 U.S.C. 823(f) and 824(a), as well
as 28 CFR 0.100(b), I order that DEA
Certificate of Registration MB1907611,
issued to Prianglam Brooks, N.P., be,
and it hereby is, revoked. I further order
that any application of Prianglam
Brooks, N.P., to renew or modify this
registration, be, and it hereby is, denied.
This Order is effective immediately.2
Dated: June 27, 2016.
Chuck Rosenberg,
Acting Administrator.
[FR Doc. 2016–15955 Filed 7–5–16; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410–09–P
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Foreign Claims Settlement
Commission
[F.C.S.C. Meeting and Hearing Notice No.
6–16]
Sunshine Act Meeting
The Foreign Claims Settlement
Commission, pursuant to its regulations
the Agency’s authority to immediately suspend a
DEA registration, ‘‘simultaneously with the
institution of proceedings under’’ section 824(a),
based upon a finding that a registrant poses ‘‘an
imminent danger to public health or safety.’’ The
provision says nothing about the Agency’s authority
where a registrant’s state authority has been
suspended prior to hearing. Section 824(a) does,
however, and while it provides the Attorney
General with discretionary authority to suspend or
revoke upon making one or more of the five
enumerated findings, for the reasons explained
above, the specific provisions that apply to
practitioners establish that a registrant who loses
her state authority no longer meets the definition
of a practitioner and cannot retain her registration
even in a suspended status.
2 For the same reasons which led the Nursing
Board to conclude that the continued practice of
nursing by Respondent constitutes ‘‘a continuing
and imminent threat to public welfare’’ and to order
the summary suspension of Respondent’s licenses,
I conclude that the public interest necessitates that
this Order be effective immediately. 21 CFR
1316.67.
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Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 129 / Wednesday, July 6, 2016 / Notices
(45 CFR part 503.25) and the
Government in the Sunshine Act (5
U.S.C. 552b), hereby gives notice in
regard to the scheduling of open
meetings as follows:
Wednesday, July 13, 2016: 10:00
a.m.—Issuance of Proposed Decisions in
claims against Iraq.
11:00 a.m.—Issuance of Proposed
Decisions in claims against Libya.
Status: Open.
All meetings are held at the Foreign
Claims Settlement Commission, 600 E
Street NW., Washington, DC. Requests
for information, or advance notices of
intention to observe an open meeting,
may be directed to: Patricia M. Hall,
Foreign Claims Settlement Commission,
600 E Street NW., Suite 6002,
Washington, DC 20579. Telephone:
(202) 616–6975.
Brian M. Simkin,
Chief Counsel.
[FR Doc. 2016–16091 Filed 7–1–16; 4:15 pm]
BILLING CODE 4410–ba–P
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
ehiers on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
Notice of Lodging of Proposed Partial
Consent Decree Under the Clean Air
Act
On June 28, 2016, the Department of
Justice lodged a proposed Partial
Consent Decree with the United States
District Court for the Northern District
of California in the lawsuit entitled In
re: Volkswagen ‘‘Clean Diesel’’
Marketing, Sales Practices, and
Products Liability Litigation, Case No:
MDL No. 2672 CRB (JSC), partially
resolving Clean Air Act and various
California claims (including under the
California Health and Safety Code)
against Volkswagen Group of America,
Inc., and others, concerning certain
noncompliant 2.0 liter diesel vehicles.
In addition, the Federal Trade
Commission (‘‘FTC’’) filed a related
proposed Partial Stipulated Order for
Permanent Injunction and Monetary
Judgment with Volkswagen (‘‘FTC
Order’’), and the private Plaintiffs’
Steering Committee (‘‘PSC’’) filed a
proposed Consumer Class Action
Settlement Agreement and Release
(‘‘Class Action Settlement’’) with
Volkswagen with respect to the 2.0 liter
diesel vehicles on the same date. The
three settlements resolve separate
claims but offer coordinated relief.
On January 4, 2016, the United States,
on behalf of the Environmental
Protection Agency (‘‘EPA’’) filed a
complaint against Volkswagen AG,
Volkswagen Group of America, Inc.,
Volkswagen Group of America
Chattanooga Operations, LLC, Audi AG,
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Dr. Ing. h.c. F. Porsche AG, and Porsche
Cars North America, Inc. alleging that
the defendants violated Sections
203(a)(1), (2), (3)(A), and (3)(B) of the
Clean Air Act (‘‘Act’’), 42 U.S.C.
7522(a)(1), (2), (3)(A), and (3)(B), with
regard to approximately 500,000 model
year 2009 to 2015 motor vehicles
containing 2.0 liter diesel engines (2.0
Liter Subject Vehicles) and
approximately 80,000 model year 2009
to 2016 motor vehicles containing 3.0
liter diesel engines (3.0 Liter Subject
Vehicles). The United States’ complaint
alleges that each 2.0 and 3.0 Liter
Subject Vehicle contains computer
algorithms that are prohibited defeat
devices that cause the emissions control
system of those vehicles to perform
differently during normal vehicle
operation and use than during
emissions testing. The complaint alleges
that the defeat devices cause the
vehicles, during normal vehicle
operation and use, to emit levels of
oxides of nitrogen (‘‘NOX’’) significantly
in excess of EPA-compliant levels. The
complaint seeks, among other things,
injunctive relief to remedy the
violations, including mitigation of
excess NOX emissions, and civil
penalties.
On June 27, 2016, the People of the
State of California (‘‘California’’), by and
through the California Air Resources
Board (‘‘CARB’’) and the California
Attorney General filed a complaint
against defendants alleging that
defendants violated Cal. Health & Safety
Code §§ 43106, 43107, 43151, 43152,
43153, 43205, 43211, and 43212; Cal.
Code Regs. tit. 13, §§ 1903, 1961, 1961.2,
1965, 1968.2, and 2037, and 40 CFR
Sections incorporated by reference in
those California regulations; Cal. Bus. &
Prof. Code §§ 17200 et seq., 17500 et
seq., and 17580.5; Cal. Civ. Code § 3494;
and 12 U.S.C. 5531 et seq., with regard
to approximately 71,000 model year
2009 to 2015 motor vehicles containing
2.0 liter diesel engines and
approximately 16,000 model year 2009
to 2016 motor vehicles containing 3.0
liter diesel engines, for a total of
approximately 87,000 motor vehicles.
The California complaint alleges, in
relevant part, that the motor vehicles
contain prohibited defeat devices and
have resulted in, and continue to result
in, increased NOX emissions from each
such vehicle significantly in excess of
CARB requirements, that these vehicles
have resulted in the creation of a public
nuisance, and that defendants engaged
in related conduct that violated unfair
competition, false advertising, and
consumer protection laws.
This Partial Consent Decree
(‘‘Decree’’) is entered into between the
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44051
United States, California, and certain of
the defendants, namely, Volkswagen
AG, Volkswagen Group of America, Inc.,
Volkswagen Group of America
Chattanooga Operations, LLC, and Audi
AG (collectively, ‘‘Volkswagen’’). The
Decree partially resolves the
governments’ claims for injunctive relief
with respect to the 2.0 Liter Subject
Vehicles, by providing remedies for the
cars on the road and the environmental
harm from the violations. It does not
address the governments’ claims, inter
alia, for prospective injunctive relief to
prevent future violations of the same
type that are alleged in the complaints,
claims for civil penalties, or claims
regarding the 3.0 liter Subject Vehicles.
Because the Decree only addresses 2.0
Liter Subject Vehicles, and the Porsche
defendants only manufacture 3.0 liter
diesel vehicles for the United States
market, no claims against the Porsche
defendants are settled under this
Decree.
Under the Decree, Volkswagen must
offer all Eligible Owners and Lessees of
Eligible Vehicles (all as defined in
Appendix A to the Decree) the option to
have Volkswagen buy back their cars or
to terminate their leases at no cost. In
addition, the Decree permits
Volkswagen to submit for EPA and
CARB review and approval, a proposal
for modifying the 2.0 Liter Subject
Vehicles to reduce emissions. If EPA
and CARB approve an emissions
modification for any category of the 2.0
Liter Subject Vehicles, Volkswagen
must also offer all Eligible Owners and
Lessees of an Eligible Vehicle the
additional option of receiving an
emissions modification in lieu of a
buyback. Volkswagen must achieve a
recall rate (through the buyback, lease
termination, scrapped vehicles, and the
emissions modification option, if
approved) of 85% by June 30, 2019. If
it fails to do so, Volkswagen must
augment the mitigation trust fund
discussed below by $85 million for each
1% that it falls short of the 85% rate.
Volkswagen must also achieve a
separate 85% recall rate for vehicles in
California, and must pay $13.5 million
to the mitigation trust (solely for
mitigation projects in California) for
each 1% that it falls short of this target.
See Decree Section IV.D and
Appendices A and B.
In connection with the buyback,
Volkswagen must pay Eligible Owners
no less than the cost of the retail
purchase of a comparable replacement
vehicle of similar value, condition and
mileage as of September 17, 2015, the
day before the existence of the defeat
devices was made known to the public
(‘‘retail replacement value’’). The Decree
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]]>Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 81, Number 129 (Wednesday, July 6, 2016)]
[Notices]
[Pages 44050-44051]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2016-16091]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Foreign Claims Settlement Commission
[F.C.S.C. Meeting and Hearing Notice No. 6-16]
Sunshine Act Meeting
The Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, pursuant to its
regulations
[[Page 44051]]
(45 CFR part 503.25) and the Government in the Sunshine Act (5 U.S.C.
552b), hereby gives notice in regard to the scheduling of open meetings
as follows:
Wednesday, July 13, 2016: 10:00 a.m.--Issuance of Proposed
Decisions in claims against Iraq.
11:00 a.m.--Issuance of Proposed Decisions in claims against Libya.
Status: Open.
All meetings are held at the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission,
600 E Street NW., Washington, DC. Requests for information, or advance
notices of intention to observe an open meeting, may be directed to:
Patricia M. Hall, Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, 600 E Street
NW., Suite 6002, Washington, DC 20579. Telephone: (202) 616-6975.
Brian M. Simkin,
Chief Counsel.
[FR Doc. 2016-16091 Filed 7-1-16; 4:15 pm]
BILLING CODE 4410-ba-P
