Denial of Motor Vehicle Defect Petition, 51650-51654 [2015-20949]
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Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 164 / Tuesday, August 25, 2015 / Notices
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William D. Jackson,
Deputy Assistant U.S. Trade Representative
for the Generalized System of Preferences,
Office of the U.S. Trade Representative.
[FR Doc. 2015–21067 Filed 8–24–15; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3290–F5–P
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
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Office of the United States
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of eligible products from Curacao
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qualify for the enhanced trade benefits
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DATES: Effective date: August 18, 2015.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Mary Estelle Ryckman, Senior Advisor,
Office of the United States Trade
Representative, (202) 395–9585.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The
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(Title II of the Trade and Development
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In Proclamation 9072 of December 23,
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SUMMARY:
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the Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS)
of the United States.
Based on information and
commitments provided by Curacao to
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date, I have determined that Curacao
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satisfies the requirements of section
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the implementation of procedures and
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the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the
United States by adding in alphabetical
sequence ‘‘Curacao,’’ and (ii) modifying
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U.S. note 1 to subchapter XX of chapter
98 by inserting in alphabetical sequence
‘‘Curacao,’’, effective with respect to
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articles entered, or withdrawn from
warehouse, on the date of this notice.
Michael B.G. Froman,
United States Trade Representative.
[FR Doc. 2015–20921 Filed 8–24–15; 8:45 am]
defect that relates to motor vehicle
safety. 49 U.S.C. 30162(a)(2); 49 CFR
552.1. Upon receipt of a properly filed
petition, the agency conducts a
technical review of the petition,
material submitted with the petition,
and any additional information. 49
U.S.C. 30162(c); 49 CFR 552.6. The
technical review may consist solely of a
review of information already in the
possession of the agency, or it may
include the collection of information
from the motor vehicle manufacturer
and/or other sources. After considering
the technical review and taking into
account appropriate factors, which may
include, among others, allocation of
agency resources, agency priorities, the
likelihood of uncovering sufficient
evidence to establish the existence of a
defect, and the likelihood of success in
any necessary enforcement litigation,
the agency will grant or deny the
petition. See 49 U.S.C. 30162(d); 49 CFR
552.8.
BILLING CODE 3290–F5–P
2.0
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration
Denial of Motor Vehicle Defect Petition
National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration, (NHTSA),
Department of Transportation.
ACTION: Denial of a petition for a defect
investigation.
AGENCY:
This notice sets forth the
reasons for denying a petition submitted
to NHTSA, 49 U.S.C. 30162, 49 CFR part
552, requesting that the agency open
‘‘an investigation into low-speed surging
in different models of Toyota
automobiles in which the car starts
accelerating and the engine RPM
increases even when the accelerator
pedal is not depressed.’’
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr.
Stephen McHenry, Vehicle Control
Division, Office of Defects Investigation,
NHTSA, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE.,
Washington, DC 20590. Telephone 202–
366–4883. Email stephen.mchenry@
dot.gov.
SUMMARY:
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
1.0
Introduction
Interested persons may petition
NHTSA requesting that the agency
initiate an investigation to determine
whether a motor vehicle or item of
replacement equipment does not
comply with an applicable motor
vehicle safety standard or contains a
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Petition Background Information
In a letter dated June 19, 2015, Dr.
Gopal Raghavan (the petitioner)
requested that NHTSA open ‘‘an
investigation into low-speed surging in
different models of Toyota automobiles
in which the car starts accelerating and
the engine RPM increases even when
the accelerator pedal is not depressed.’’
Dr. Raghavan based his request on his
analysis of EDR data from an accident
involving his wife and from two other
accidents in Toyota vehicles. NHTSA
has reviewed the material cited by the
petitioner. The results of this review
and our evaluation of the petition are set
forth in the DP15–005 Petition Analysis
Report, published in its entirety as an
appendix to this notice.
After a thorough assessment of the
material submitted by the petitioner, the
information already in NHTSA’s
possession, and the potential risks to
safety implicated by the petitioner’s
allegations, it is unlikely that an order
concerning the notification and remedy
of a safety-related defect would result
from any proceeding initiated by the
granting of Dr. Raghavan’s petition.
After full consideration of the potential
for finding a safety related defect in the
vehicle, and in view of NHTSA’s
enforcement priorities, its previous
investigations into this issue, and the
need to allocate and prioritize NHTSA’s
limited resources to best accomplish the
agency’s mission, the petition is denied.
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Appendix—Petition Analysis—DP15–
005
1.0 Introduction
On June 29, 2015, the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA)
received a June 19, 2015 letter from Dr. Gopal
Raghavan, Ph.D. EE (the petitioner),
petitioning the agency ‘‘for an investigation
into low-speed surging in different models of
Toyota automobiles in which the car starts
accelerating and the engine RPM increases
even when the accelerator pedal is not
depressed.’’ In support of this request, the
petitioner provides his analysis of Event Data
Recorder (EDR) data from three accidents,
which he alleges, ‘‘shows a troubling
similarity amongst EDRs of Toyota cars
showing sudden acceleration.’’
2.0
Petition Analysis
2.1 EDR Pre-Crash Data
Since the petition is based on several
misconceptions about Toyota EDR pre-crash
data, a short background of this system is
provided. The Toyota EDR collects pretrigger data (vehicle speed, engine speed,
brake switch status, and accelerator pedal
position sensor #1 voltage) from the vehicle’s
High Speed Controller Area Network (HS–
CAN), which is refreshed either periodically
or immediately by the respective control
modules.
TABLE 1—EDR PRE-CRASH PARAMETERS, BY REFRESH RATE 2
Parameter
Refresh rate
Resolution
Brake Switch ...........................................................................................
Engine RPM ............................................................................................
Vehicle Speed .........................................................................................
Accelerator Rate ......................................................................................
Immediately ...................................
24 ms .............................................
500 ms ...........................................
512 ms ...........................................
On/Off.
400 RPM.1
2 km/h.2
0.039 volts.
signals. Any analysis of EDR data for Toyota
vehicles should apply these data time
tolerances and resolutions at each of the precrash data points.
In 2010, NHTSA’s Vehicle Research and
Test Center (VRTC) conducted testing to
validate the EDR pre-crash data used in
NHTSA field investigations.4 Figure 1 shows
accelerator pedal sensor voltage data from
one test performed by VRTC in the validation
testing.5 As the figure shows, the EDR does
not necessarily capture all accelerator pedal
applications during an event and the
accelerator pedal voltage recorded at each
EDR time interval may not be the actual
accelerator pedal voltage at that interval.
Subsequent studies have confirmed the
limitations of stored EDR pre-crash data in
capturing the entire crash event due to the
data refresh rates, data resolutions and EDR
sampling rates.6 7 8
The Bosch CDR report provided with the
petition clearly notes these issues in the first
two items of Data Limitations section on page
one of the report:
• Due to limitations of the data recorded
by the airbag ECU, such as the resolution,
data range, sampling interval, time period of
the recording, and the items recorded, the
information provided by this data may not be
sufficient to capture the entire crash.
• Pre-Crash data is recorded in discrete
intervals. Due to different refresh rates within
the vehicle’s electronics, the data recorded
may not be synchronous to each other.
1 EDR recorded data are rounded down in the
indicated resolution increments.
2 These values apply to ES350 and Camry
vehicles involved in two of the incidents identified
by the petitioner. The third vehicle, a 2010 Toyota
Corolla, has a slower refresh rate for Engine RPM
(524 ms).
3 An event is triggered by detection of a
deceleration of approximately 2 g’s.
4 ‘‘Event Data Recorder—Pre Crash Data
Validation of Toyota Products,’’ NHTSA–NVS–
2011–ETC–SR07, February 2011.
5 ‘‘Event Data Recorder—Pre Crash Data
Validation of Toyota Products,’’ NHTSA–NVS–
2011–ETC–SR07, February 2011, page 13.
6 Brown, R., White, S., ‘‘Evaluation of Camry HS–
CAN Pre-Crash Data,’’ SAE Technical Paper 2012–
01–0996, 2012, doi: 10.4271/2012–01–0996.
7 Brown, R., Lewis, L., Hare, B., Jakstis, M. et al.,
‘‘Confirmation of Toyota EDR Pre-crash Data,’’ SAE
Technical Paper 2012–01–0998, 2012, doi: 10.4271/
2012–01–0998.
8 Ruth, R., Bartlett, W., Daily, J., ‘‘Accuracy of
Event Data in the 2010 and 2011 Toyota Camry
During Steady State and Braking Conditions,’’ SAE
Technical Paper 2012–01–0999, 2012, doi: 10.4271/
2012–01–0999.
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2.2
Crashes Cited by Petitioner
2.2.1
2009 Lexus ES350
The first incident identified by the
petitioner involved a sudden acceleration
accident experienced by his wife as she
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The EDR continuously performs 1 Hz
sampling of HS–CAN pre-trigger data and
stores the data in a temporary buffer. The
EDR only saves this data, along with the
trigger data, when it detects a triggering event
such as a crash.3 Table 1 shows the refresh
rates and resolutions for the pre-crash data
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attempted to park the family’s 2009 Lexus
ES350 on Friday, February 13, 2015 (VOQ
10732103). When interviewed by ODI, Mrs.
Raghavan stated that the engine roared as she
was coasting into a parking space. She stated
that the surge occurred before she applied the
brake and that when she applied the brake
there was no response or braking action. The
vehicle accelerated up onto a sidewalk and
into some bushes and a fence. On February
24, 2015, a Toyota representative inspected
the vehicle, including a download of EDR
data (Table 2).
TABLE 2—PRE-CRASH DATA FOR VOQ 10732103
Time (sec)
¥4.6
¥3.6
¥2.6
¥1.6
¥0.6
Vehicle Speed (MPH [km/h]) .......
Brake Switch ...............................
Accelerator Rate (V) ....................
Engine RPM (RPM) .....................
3.7 [6] ..............
OFF .................
0.78 ..................
400 ...................
3.7 [6] ..............
OFF .................
0.78 ..................
400 ...................
3.7 [6] ..............
OFF .................
0.78 ..................
400 ...................
3.7 [6] ..............
OFF .................
0.78 ..................
800 ...................
5 [8] .................
OFF .................
2.38 ..................
1,600 ................
According to the EDR data, immediately
prior to impact (t = 0.6 s) the brake pedal was
not applied and the accelerator pedal was
depressed to approximately 71 percent of full
apply.9 Based on the recorded vehicle speeds
at this time, the vehicle was inside the
parking space when the acceleration
occurred. At this time and distance from
impact, the driver should be applying the
brake and not the accelerator to safely stop
the vehicle and avoid the collision. Although
the driver alleged that the brakes were not
effective during the incident, the brakes had
no prior history of malfunction and the postincident inspection did not identify any
issues with the brake system. Based on the
available information, this incident is
consistent with pedal misapplication by the
driver and provides no evidence of a vehicle
defect.
2.2.2 2010 Toyota Corolla
The second incident identified by the
petitioner involved a MY 2010 Toyota
Corolla that accelerated into a parked vehicle
during an attempted curbside-parking
maneuver in a residential neighborhood on
June 8, 2014 (VOQ 10637908). NHTSA
examined this incident in Defect Petition
DP14–003, which the agency closed on April
29, 2015.10
0 (TRG)
8.7 [14].
ON.
0.78.
1,600.
In the police report for this accident, the
driver states that she stopped at an
intersection with the intention of turning
right and parking along the curb behind a
parked vehicle. When interviewed by ODI,
the driver indicated that as she applied the
brakes during the incident, the car responded
by accelerating. She stated that it did not
slow down, and it continued to increase in
speed until it hit the back of the parked
vehicle. Similar to the current petitioner’s
incident, the EDR data for this incident
(Table 3) shows no recorded service brake
application until the airbag module trigger
point (t = 0s).
TABLE 3—PRE-CRASH DATA FOR VOQ 10637908
Time (sec)
¥4.8
¥3.8
¥2.8
¥1.8
¥0.8
Vehicle Speed (MPH [km/h]) .......
Brake Switch ...............................
Accelerator Rate (V) ....................
Engine RPM (RPM) .....................
3.7 [6] ..............
OFF .................
0.78 ..................
800 ...................
3.7 [6] ..............
OFF .................
0.78 ..................
800 ...................
3.7 [6] ..............
OFF .................
0.86 ..................
800 ...................
3.7 [6] ..............
OFF .................
0.78 ..................
800 ...................
5 [8] .................
OFF .................
0.78 ..................
800 ...................
Based on the vehicle speeds recorded just
prior to impact (t = ¥0.8 s), the Corolla was
less than a car length from the parked vehicle
and traveling 7 to 9 feet per second with no
indication of service brake application. At
this speed and distance, the driver should be
applying the brake to safely stop the vehicle
and avoid the collision. Although the
recorded accelerator rate voltages do not
show a pedal application corresponding with
the surge,11 VRTC simulation testing verified
that unrecorded accelerator pedal
applications could produce the increases in
vehicle speed and engine speed shown by the
EDR in the trigger data.12 In addition, VRTC
accumulated over two thousand miles of
testing of this vehicle during DP14–003 with
no problems noted in the throttle,
transmission or brake systems.13 As
previously determined by NHTSA, this
incident does not provide evidence of a
vehicle defect.
2.2.3
2009 Toyota Camry
The third incident identified by the
petitioner involved a MY 2009 Toyota Camry
0 (TRG)
7.5 [12].
ON.
0.78.
1,600.
that accelerated into a building when
attempting to park in a storefront facing
parking space on December 21, 2009 (VOQ
10299750). This incident was among 58
accidents investigated by NHTSA in 2010 as
part of the joint study with NASA. A
description of the incident, identified as Case
33 in the NHTSA study, was included as an
example of the 39 accidents classified as
pedal misapplications in a 2011 report
summarizing NHTSA’s field investigations.14
TABLE 4—PRE-CRASH DATA FOR VOQ 10299750, EDR TOOL VERSION 1.4.1.1
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Time (sec)
¥4.7
¥3.7
¥2.7
¥1.7
¥0.7
Vehicle Speed (MPH [km/h]) .......
Brake Switch ...............................
Accelerator Rate (V) ....................
Engine RPM (RPM) .....................
3.7 [6] ..............
OFF .................
0.86 ..................
400 ...................
3.7 [6] ..............
OFF .................
0.82 ..................
400 ...................
3.7 [6] ..............
OFF .................
0.98 ..................
800 ...................
9.9 [16] ............
OFF .................
0.78 ..................
1,600 ................
13.7 [22] ..........
OFF .................
3.71 ..................
3,200 ................
9 According to Toyota, an Accelerator Rate of 2.38
volts indicates an accelerator pedal application of
71 percent.
10 McHenry, S., ‘‘Denial of Motor Vehicle Defect
Petition,’’ DP14–003, May 2015.
11 The data do show a small accelerator pedal
application 2.8 seconds prior to the impact.
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12 Collins, W., Stoltzfus, D., ‘‘Evaluation of 2010
Toyota Corolla from DP14–003,’’ DP14–003WDC,
April 2015, pages 11–13.
13 Collins, W., Stoltzfus, D., ‘‘Evaluation of 2010
Toyota Corolla from DP14–003,’’ DP14–003WDC,
April 2015.
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0 (TRG)
19.9 [32]
OFF
1.37
4,400
14 ‘‘NHTSA Toyota Pre-Crash EDR Field
Inspections during March–August 2010,’’ NHTSA–
NVS–2011–ETC–SR10, February, 2011, pages 15–
16.
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As described in the 2011 report, the driver
had turned from a lane of traffic to enter a
parking space and was about to come to a rest
facing a shopping plaza storefront when the
vehicle lunged forward through the facade of
¸
a hair salon. The driver reported having his
foot on the brake when the acceleration
occurred. Table 4 shows the EDR pre-crash
data for this accident, as published in the
2011 report.15
The EDR data for this incident shows no
recorded service brake application during the
event. Immediately prior to impact and after
the vehicle had entered the parking space,
the driver pressed the accelerator pedal to the
floor when intending to apply the brake.16 As
noted in the 2011 report, this incident is
consistent with pedal misapplication by the
driver and does not provide any evidence of
a vehicle defect as suggested by the
petitioner.
2.3
Petitioner Claims and Misconceptions
2.3.1 ‘‘Strong Signature’’
According to the petitioner, ‘‘The fact that
all three cars were coasting at 3.7 mph when
the sudden-acceleration happened appears to
be a strong signature of a common issue.’’
However, even though the EDR data for the
three incidents may have reflected speeds of
3.7 mph before the acceleration occurred, the
vehicles may not have actually been
travelling the same speed. The common
speeds recorded in the three vehicles are
simply an artifact of the EDR vehicle speed
resolution of 2 km/h. In all three incidents,
the vehicles were travelling 6.0–7.9 km/h
(3.7–4.9 mph) prior to the accelerations,
which the Toyota EDR records as 6 km/h (3.7
mph). These are common speeds for lowspeed parking maneuvers.
The ‘‘glitch’’ in accelerator pedal voltage
that the petitioner alleges occurs after the 3.7
mph speed recording, is the voltage increase
resulting from the accelerator pedal
applications by the drivers. The petitioner
claims that the voltage spike suggests a
potential vehicle based cause, speculating,
‘‘the accelerator is either calculating an
incorrect accelerator value or receiving a
noise spike on the accelerator sensor.’’
However, such speculation ignores the facts
that the accelerator pedal has redundant
sensors and that NASA already thoroughly
examined this subject during the joint study.
The common pattern is that the ‘‘glitches’’
occur at the moments in the events when the
driver should be initiating braking, but no
braking has occurred.
Thus, the only common signature evident
in the incidents is that in all three the surges
occurred when the driver should have
initiated braking for a vehicle entering a
parking space at low speed. The fact that the
vehicles suddenly accelerated just as they
were beginning to enter their intended
parking spaces instead of braking to a stop as
intended is a signature of pedal
misapplication by the driver. NHTSA has
observed this signature in investigations of
sudden acceleration dating back to the first
such investigation that ODI opened in 1978.
It is not isolated to any particular makes or
models of vehicles or to any throttle design
technologies.
2.3.2 Engine RPM Increases
The petitioner claims that each of the
incidents he analyzed displays evidence of
engine speed increases without any
application of the accelerator pedal. For
example, in his analysis of his wife’s incident
he states, ‘‘by ¥1.6 seconds the engine RPM
has DOUBLED to 800 with no depression of
the accelerator.’’ This assertion reflects a
misunderstanding of the manner in which
the Toyota EDR samples and records precrash data as previously described in this
report and in prior reports published by
NHTSA.
First, as indicated in this report and in the
Data Definitions section on page two of the
Bosch CDR report attached to the petition,
the Toyota EDR records engine speed in 400
rpm increments (rounded down). For
example, a recorded value of 400 rpm
indicates that the measured engine speed was
between 400 and 799 rpm. Thus, an increase
in recorded engine speed from 400 to 800
rpm could result from a change in engine
speed of just 1 rpm.
Second, the nominal idle speed for a MY
2009 ES350 when the engine is warm, the
transmission is in gear (i.e., either Drive or
Reverse), and no accessory loads are
operating is approximately 600 rpm. Airconditioning use and steering input may
result in the idle speed increasing to 700 to
800 rpm to compensate for the additional
loads placed on the engine by the airconditioning compressor and power-steering
pump. Thus, the actual engine speeds
associated with the recorded values of 400
rpm were likely closer to 800 rpm than 400
rpm.17
Finally, it is not accurate to state that
engine speed increases did not result from
accelerator pedal applications based strictly
on the recorded EDR data, since the data do
not necessarily show all accelerator pedal
applications (see section 2.1 and Figure 1)
and because of the differences in refresh rates
for engine speed and accelerator rate.
Although actual engine speed will closely
follow accelerator rate, the recorded
accelerator rate may slightly lag behind
recorded engine speed due to the slower
refresh rate of the accelerator signal (see
Table 1). Thus, the increase in recorded
engine speed at ¥1.6 seconds prior to impact
could very well have resulted from the initial
stages of the large pedal application that the
EDR recorded at ¥0.6 seconds.
2.3.3
Case 33
The EDR data used by the petitioner for
Case 33 was from the initial readout ODI
performed with the original version of
software available from Toyota (Table 5).
This version converted accelerator pedal
sensor #1 voltages to an accelerator status of
OFF, MIDDLE or FULL. A supplemental
report to the NHTSA February 2011 report
included a copy of this readout.18 This
incident is one of many incidents from early
field investigations that ODI read a second
time after receiving an updated version of
Toyota software that provided a more precise
indication of accelerator pedal position.19
TABLE 5—PRE-CRASH DATA FOR VOQ 10299750, EDR TOOL VERSION 1.3 (ORIGINAL READOUT)
¥4.7
¥3.7
¥2.7
¥1.7
¥0.7
Vehicle Speed (MPH [km/h]) .......
Brake Switch ...............................
Accelerator ..................................
Engine RPM (RPM) .....................
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Time (sec)
3.7 [6] ..............
OFF .................
OFF .................
400 ...................
3.7 [6] ..............
OFF .................
OFF .................
400 ...................
3.7 [6] ..............
OFF .................
OFF .................
800 ...................
9.9 [16] ............
OFF .................
OFF .................
1,600 ................
13.7 [22] ..........
OFF .................
FULL ................
3,200 ................
0 (TRG)
19.9 [32]
OFF
OFF
4,400
Table 4 shows the data from the readout
obtained using the updated software. Rather
than maintaining a consistent voltage as may
be misinterpreted by the OFF accelerator
levels shown in Table 5, the accelerator pedal
rates in the updated readout in Table 4 show
that the driver was applying the accelerator
pedal at varying rates throughout the event.
Thus, the petitioner’s conclusions that the
vehicle was coasting and the driver had not
depressed the accelerator pedal when the
idle speed was increasing are incorrect and
do not provide evidence of a vehicle defect.
2.3.4
15 The petitioner based his analysis of this
incident on a different EDR readout reviewed later
in this report, in Section 2.3.3, ‘‘Case 33.’’
16 The recorded Accelerator Rate of 3.71 volts is
well beyond the accelerator rate needed for 100
percent throttle.
17 Engine speeds that drop below 500 rpm are
uncommon in motor vehicles and have been
associated with engine stall due to idle undershoot
in some ODI investigations of non-Toyota products.
18 ‘‘Toyota EDR Data from NHTSA Pre-Crash
Field Inspections,’’ NHTSA–NVS–2011–ETC–SR12,
February 2011.
19 ‘‘Toyota EDR Software Versions Used in
NHTSA Unintended Acceleration Field
Investigation Cases,’’ NHTSA–NVS–2011–ETC–
SR08, February 2011, page 8.
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NASA ‘‘High-Speed Study’’
The petitioner incorrectly characterizes the
joint NASA–NHTSA study as a ‘‘high-speed
study.’’ In fact, the joint study focused on all
potential vulnerabilities in the Toyota ETCSi system that were not associated with the
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floor mat entrapment or sticking accelerator
pedal conditions addressed by multiple
Toyota safety recalls in 2009 and 2010.20
Most such incidents examined during the
study involved allegations of sudden
acceleration in vehicles initially moving at
low speeds. The most common scenario for
the incidents was acceleration when
attempting to park. Thus, contrary to the
petitioner’s characterization, low-speed
surges were the primary focus of the study
by NHTSA and NASA in 2010.
The incidents analyzed by the petitioner
fall within the scope of prior work conducted
in the joint NHTSA–NASA study of Toyota
ETCS-i and, more recently, the analysis
conducted in evaluating Defect Petition
DP14–003. His claims appear to be based on
upon several misconceptions regarding the
manner in which Toyota EDR sample and
record data, as well as a misunderstanding of
the scope of and results from prior work
conducted by NHTSA, NASA and others
related to sudden unintended acceleration
and the use of EDR data in related field
investigations. The petitioner has presented
no new evidence or theories not already
considered by NHTSA that warrant
reconsideration of any of the analyses or
conclusions from that prior work.
3.0
Conclusion
In our view, a defects investigation is
unlikely to result in a finding that a defect
related to motor vehicle safety exists, or a
NHTSA order for the notification and remedy
of a safety-related defect as alleged by the
petitioner, at the conclusion of the requested
investigation. Therefore, given a thorough
analysis of the potential for finding a safety
related defect in the vehicle, and in view of
NHTSA’s enforcement priorities, its previous
investigations into this issue, and the need to
allocate and prioritize NHTSA’s limited
resources to best accomplish the agency’s
safety mission and mitigate risk, the petition
is denied. This action does not constitute a
finding by NHTSA that a safety-related defect
does not exist. The agency will take further
action if warranted by future circumstances.
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 30162(d); delegations
of authority at 49 CFR 1.50 and 501.8.
Frank S. Borris II,
Acting Associate Administrator for
Enforcement.
[FR Doc. 2015–20949 Filed 8–24–15; 8:45 am]
asabaliauskas on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
BILLING CODE 4910–59–P
20 The floor mat entrapment and sticking pedal
defect conditions were both ‘‘stuck throttle’’ type
defect conditions, which typically occur at higher
speeds when larger accelerator pedal applications
necessary to cause the entrapment are more likely.
VerDate Sep<11>2014
17:10 Aug 24, 2015
Jkt 235001
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Notice of Meeting of the Advisory
Council on Transportation Statistics
(ACTS) of the Office of the Assistant
Secretary for Research and
Technology (OST–R)
Bureau of Transportation
Statistics (BTS), U.S. Department of
Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Notice of meeting.
AGENCY:
This notice announces, pursuant to
Section 10(a)(2) of the Federal Advisory
Committee Act (FACA) (Pub. L. 72–363;
5 U.S.C. app. 2), a meeting of the
Advisory Council on Transportation
Statistics (ACTS). The meeting will be
held on Thursday, September 10th,
2015 from 8:30 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. EST at
the U.S. Department of Transportation,
Room E37–302, 1200 New Jersey Ave.
SE., Washington, DC. Section 52011 of
the Moving Ahead for Progress in the
21st Century Act (MAP–21) directs the
U.S. Department of Transportation to
establish an Advisory Council on
Transportation Statistics subject to the
Federal Advisory Committee Act (5
U.S.C., App. 2) to advise the Bureau of
Transportation Statistics (BTS) on the
quality, reliability, consistency,
objectivity, and relevance of
transportation statistics and analyses
collected, supported, or disseminated by
the Bureau and the Department. The
following is a summary of the draft
meeting agenda: (1) USDOT Welcome
and Introduction of Council Members;
(2) Update on Current BTS Issues; (3)
Discussion about Future Data Products;
(4) Program Review; (5) Public
Comments and Closing Remarks.
Participation is open to the public.
Members of the public who wish to
participate must notify Mr. D.Senay
Gales at d.senay.gales@dot.gov, not later
than August 31, 2015. Members of the
public may present oral statements at
the meeting with the approval of
Patricia Hu, Director of the Bureau of
Transportation Statistics. Noncommittee members wishing to present
oral statements or obtain information
should contact Mr. D.Senay Gales via
email no later than August 31, 2015.
Questions about the agenda or written
comments may be emailed to
D.Senay.Gales@dot.gov or submitted by
U.S. Mail to: U.S. Department of
Transportation, Office of the Assistant
Secretary for Research and Technology,
Bureau of Transportation Statistics,
Attn: Mr. D.Senay Gales, 1200 New
Jersey Avenue SE., Room #E34–429,
Washington, DC 20590, or faxed to (202)
366–3383. BTS requests that written
comments be received by August 31,
PO 00000
Frm 00124
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
2015. Access to the DOT Headquarters
building is controlled therefore all
persons who plan to attend the meeting
must notify Mr. Gales at 202–366–1270
prior to August 31, 2015. Individuals
attending the meeting must report to the
main DOT entrance on New Jersey
Avenue SE., for admission to the
building. Attendance is open to the
public, but limited space is available.
Persons with a disability requiring
special services, such as an interpreter
for the hearing impaired, should contact
Mr. D.Senay Gales at 202–366–1270 at
least seven calendar days prior to the
meeting.
Notice of this meeting is provided in
accordance with the FACA and the
General Services Administration
regulations (41 CFR part 102–3)
covering management of Federal
advisory committees.
Issued in Washington, DC, on the 18th day
of August 2015.
Rolf Schmitt,
Deputy Director, Bureau of Transportation
Statistics.
[FR Doc. 2015–20969 Filed 8–24–15; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–9X–P
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
Submission for OMB Review;
Comment Request
August 19, 2015.
The Department of the Treasury will
submit the following information
collection request to the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) for
review and clearance in accordance
with the Paperwork Reduction Act of
1995, Public Law 104–13, on or after the
date of publication of this notice.
DATES: Comments should be received on
or before September 24, 2015 to be
assured of consideration.
ADDRESSES: Send comments regarding
the burden estimate, or any other aspect
of the information collection, including
suggestion for reducing the burden, to
(1) Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs, Office of Management and
Budget, Attention: Desk Officer for
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Building, Room 10235, Washington, DC
20503, or email at OIRA_Submission@
OMB.EOP.GOV and (2) Treasury PRA
Clearance Officer, 1750 Pennsylvania
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20220, or email at PRA@treasury.gov.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Copies of the submission(s) may be
obtained by calling (202) 927–5331,
email at PRA@treasury.gov, or the entire
information collection request maybe
found at www.reginfo.gov.
E:\FR\FM\25AUN1.SGM
25AUN1
]]>Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 80, Number 164 (Tuesday, August 25, 2015)]
[Notices]
[Pages 51650-51654]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2015-20949]
=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
Denial of Motor Vehicle Defect Petition
AGENCY: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, (NHTSA),
Department of Transportation.
ACTION: Denial of a petition for a defect investigation.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: This notice sets forth the reasons for denying a petition
submitted to NHTSA, 49 U.S.C. 30162, 49 CFR part 552, requesting that
the agency open ``an investigation into low-speed surging in different
models of Toyota automobiles in which the car starts accelerating and
the engine RPM increases even when the accelerator pedal is not
depressed.''
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr. Stephen McHenry, Vehicle Control
Division, Office of Defects Investigation, NHTSA, 1200 New Jersey
Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590. Telephone 202-366-4883. Email
stephen.mchenry@dot.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
1.0 Introduction
Interested persons may petition NHTSA requesting that the agency
initiate an investigation to determine whether a motor vehicle or item
of replacement equipment does not comply with an applicable motor
vehicle safety standard or contains a defect that relates to motor
vehicle safety. 49 U.S.C. 30162(a)(2); 49 CFR 552.1. Upon receipt of a
properly filed petition, the agency conducts a technical review of the
petition, material submitted with the petition, and any additional
information. 49 U.S.C. 30162(c); 49 CFR 552.6. The technical review may
consist solely of a review of information already in the possession of
the agency, or it may include the collection of information from the
motor vehicle manufacturer and/or other sources. After considering the
technical review and taking into account appropriate factors, which may
include, among others, allocation of agency resources, agency
priorities, the likelihood of uncovering sufficient evidence to
establish the existence of a defect, and the likelihood of success in
any necessary enforcement litigation, the agency will grant or deny the
petition. See 49 U.S.C. 30162(d); 49 CFR 552.8.
2.0 Petition Background Information
In a letter dated June 19, 2015, Dr. Gopal Raghavan (the
petitioner) requested that NHTSA open ``an investigation into low-speed
surging in different models of Toyota automobiles in which the car
starts accelerating and the engine RPM increases even when the
accelerator pedal is not depressed.'' Dr. Raghavan based his request on
his analysis of EDR data from an accident involving his wife and from
two other accidents in Toyota vehicles. NHTSA has reviewed the material
cited by the petitioner. The results of this review and our evaluation
of the petition are set forth in the DP15-005 Petition Analysis Report,
published in its entirety as an appendix to this notice.
After a thorough assessment of the material submitted by the
petitioner, the information already in NHTSA's possession, and the
potential risks to safety implicated by the petitioner's allegations,
it is unlikely that an order concerning the notification and remedy of
a safety-related defect would result from any proceeding initiated by
the granting of Dr. Raghavan's petition. After full consideration of
the potential for finding a safety related defect in the vehicle, and
in view of NHTSA's enforcement priorities, its previous investigations
into this issue, and the need to allocate and prioritize NHTSA's
limited resources to best accomplish the agency's mission, the petition
is denied.
[[Page 51651]]
Appendix--Petition Analysis--DP15-005
1.0 Introduction
On June 29, 2015, the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration (NHTSA) received a June 19, 2015 letter from Dr.
Gopal Raghavan, Ph.D. EE (the petitioner), petitioning the agency
``for an investigation into low-speed surging in different models of
Toyota automobiles in which the car starts accelerating and the
engine RPM increases even when the accelerator pedal is not
depressed.'' In support of this request, the petitioner provides his
analysis of Event Data Recorder (EDR) data from three accidents,
which he alleges, ``shows a troubling similarity amongst EDRs of
Toyota cars showing sudden acceleration.''
2.0 Petition Analysis
2.1 EDR Pre-Crash Data
Since the petition is based on several misconceptions about
Toyota EDR pre-crash data, a short background of this system is
provided. The Toyota EDR collects pre-trigger data (vehicle speed,
engine speed, brake switch status, and accelerator pedal position
sensor #1 voltage) from the vehicle's High Speed Controller Area
Network (HS-CAN), which is refreshed either periodically or
immediately by the respective control modules.
Table 1--EDR Pre-Crash Parameters, by Refresh Rate 2
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Parameter Refresh rate Resolution
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Brake Switch.................... Immediately....... On/Off.
Engine RPM...................... 24 ms............. 400 RPM.1
Vehicle Speed................... 500 ms............ 2 km/h.2
Accelerator Rate................ 512 ms............ 0.039 volts.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ EDR recorded data are rounded down in the indicated
resolution increments.
\2\ These values apply to ES350 and Camry vehicles involved in
two of the incidents identified by the petitioner. The third
vehicle, a 2010 Toyota Corolla, has a slower refresh rate for Engine
RPM (524 ms).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The EDR continuously performs 1 Hz sampling of HS-CAN pre-
trigger data and stores the data in a temporary buffer. The EDR only
saves this data, along with the trigger data, when it detects a
triggering event such as a crash.\3\ Table 1 shows the refresh rates
and resolutions for the pre-crash data signals. Any analysis of EDR
data for Toyota vehicles should apply these data time tolerances and
resolutions at each of the pre-crash data points.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ An event is triggered by detection of a deceleration of
approximately 2 g's.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In 2010, NHTSA's Vehicle Research and Test Center (VRTC)
conducted testing to validate the EDR pre-crash data used in NHTSA
field investigations.\4\ Figure 1 shows accelerator pedal sensor
voltage data from one test performed by VRTC in the validation
testing.\5\ As the figure shows, the EDR does not necessarily
capture all accelerator pedal applications during an event and the
accelerator pedal voltage recorded at each EDR time interval may not
be the actual accelerator pedal voltage at that interval.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ ``Event Data Recorder--Pre Crash Data Validation of Toyota
Products,'' NHTSA-NVS-2011-ETC-SR07, February 2011.
\5\ ``Event Data Recorder--Pre Crash Data Validation of Toyota
Products,'' NHTSA-NVS-2011-ETC-SR07, February 2011, page 13.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TN25AU15.003
Subsequent studies have confirmed the limitations of stored EDR
pre-crash data in capturing the entire crash event due to the data
refresh rates, data resolutions and EDR sampling
rates.6 7 8
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Brown, R., White, S., ``Evaluation of Camry HS-CAN Pre-Crash
Data,'' SAE Technical Paper 2012-01-0996, 2012, doi: 10.4271/2012-
01-0996.
\7\ Brown, R., Lewis, L., Hare, B., Jakstis, M. et al.,
``Confirmation of Toyota EDR Pre-crash Data,'' SAE Technical Paper
2012-01-0998, 2012, doi: 10.4271/2012-01-0998.
\8\ Ruth, R., Bartlett, W., Daily, J., ``Accuracy of Event Data
in the 2010 and 2011 Toyota Camry During Steady State and Braking
Conditions,'' SAE Technical Paper 2012-01-0999, 2012, doi: 10.4271/
2012-01-0999.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Bosch CDR report provided with the petition clearly notes
these issues in the first two items of Data Limitations section on
page one of the report:
Due to limitations of the data recorded by the airbag
ECU, such as the resolution, data range, sampling interval, time
period of the recording, and the items recorded, the information
provided by this data may not be sufficient to capture the entire
crash.
Pre-Crash data is recorded in discrete intervals. Due
to different refresh rates within the vehicle's electronics, the
data recorded may not be synchronous to each other.
2.2 Crashes Cited by Petitioner
2.2.1 2009 Lexus ES350
The first incident identified by the petitioner involved a
sudden acceleration accident experienced by his wife as she
[[Page 51652]]
attempted to park the family's 2009 Lexus ES350 on Friday, February
13, 2015 (VOQ 10732103). When interviewed by ODI, Mrs. Raghavan
stated that the engine roared as she was coasting into a parking
space. She stated that the surge occurred before she applied the
brake and that when she applied the brake there was no response or
braking action. The vehicle accelerated up onto a sidewalk and into
some bushes and a fence. On February 24, 2015, a Toyota
representative inspected the vehicle, including a download of EDR
data (Table 2).
Table 2--Pre-Crash Data for VOQ 10732103
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Time (sec) -4.6 -3.6 -2.6 -1.6 -0.6 0 (TRG)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Vehicle Speed (MPH [km/h])...... 3.7 [6]........... 3.7 [6]........... 3.7 [6]........... 3.7 [6]........... 5 [8]............. 8.7 [14].
Brake Switch.................... OFF............... OFF............... OFF............... OFF............... OFF............... ON.
Accelerator Rate (V)............ 0.78.............. 0.78.............. 0.78.............. 0.78.............. 2.38.............. 0.78.
Engine RPM (RPM)................ 400............... 400............... 400............... 800............... 1,600............. 1,600.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to the EDR data, immediately prior to impact (t = 0.6
s) the brake pedal was not applied and the accelerator pedal was
depressed to approximately 71 percent of full apply.\9\ Based on the
recorded vehicle speeds at this time, the vehicle was inside the
parking space when the acceleration occurred. At this time and
distance from impact, the driver should be applying the brake and
not the accelerator to safely stop the vehicle and avoid the
collision. Although the driver alleged that the brakes were not
effective during the incident, the brakes had no prior history of
malfunction and the post-incident inspection did not identify any
issues with the brake system. Based on the available information,
this incident is consistent with pedal misapplication by the driver
and provides no evidence of a vehicle defect.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ According to Toyota, an Accelerator Rate of 2.38 volts
indicates an accelerator pedal application of 71 percent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2.2.2 2010 Toyota Corolla
The second incident identified by the petitioner involved a MY
2010 Toyota Corolla that accelerated into a parked vehicle during an
attempted curbside-parking maneuver in a residential neighborhood on
June 8, 2014 (VOQ 10637908). NHTSA examined this incident in Defect
Petition DP14-003, which the agency closed on April 29, 2015.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ McHenry, S., ``Denial of Motor Vehicle Defect Petition,''
DP14-003, May 2015.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the police report for this accident, the driver states that
she stopped at an intersection with the intention of turning right
and parking along the curb behind a parked vehicle. When interviewed
by ODI, the driver indicated that as she applied the brakes during
the incident, the car responded by accelerating. She stated that it
did not slow down, and it continued to increase in speed until it
hit the back of the parked vehicle. Similar to the current
petitioner's incident, the EDR data for this incident (Table 3)
shows no recorded service brake application until the airbag module
trigger point (t = 0s).
Table 3--Pre-Crash Data for VOQ 10637908
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Time (sec) -4.8 -3.8 -2.8 -1.8 -0.8 0 (TRG)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Vehicle Speed (MPH [km/h])...... 3.7 [6]........... 3.7 [6]........... 3.7 [6]........... 3.7 [6]........... 5 [8]............. 7.5 [12].
Brake Switch.................... OFF............... OFF............... OFF............... OFF............... OFF............... ON.
Accelerator Rate (V)............ 0.78.............. 0.78.............. 0.86.............. 0.78.............. 0.78.............. 0.78.
Engine RPM (RPM)................ 800............... 800............... 800............... 800............... 800............... 1,600.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Based on the vehicle speeds recorded just prior to impact (t = -
0.8 s), the Corolla was less than a car length from the parked
vehicle and traveling 7 to 9 feet per second with no indication of
service brake application. At this speed and distance, the driver
should be applying the brake to safely stop the vehicle and avoid
the collision. Although the recorded accelerator rate voltages do
not show a pedal application corresponding with the surge,\11\ VRTC
simulation testing verified that unrecorded accelerator pedal
applications could produce the increases in vehicle speed and engine
speed shown by the EDR in the trigger data.\12\ In addition, VRTC
accumulated over two thousand miles of testing of this vehicle
during DP14-003 with no problems noted in the throttle, transmission
or brake systems.\13\ As previously determined by NHTSA, this
incident does not provide evidence of a vehicle defect.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ The data do show a small accelerator pedal application 2.8
seconds prior to the impact.
\12\ Collins, W., Stoltzfus, D., ``Evaluation of 2010 Toyota
Corolla from DP14-003,'' DP14-003WDC, April 2015, pages 11-13.
\13\ Collins, W., Stoltzfus, D., ``Evaluation of 2010 Toyota
Corolla from DP14-003,'' DP14-003WDC, April 2015.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2.2.3 2009 Toyota Camry
The third incident identified by the petitioner involved a MY
2009 Toyota Camry that accelerated into a building when attempting
to park in a storefront facing parking space on December 21, 2009
(VOQ 10299750). This incident was among 58 accidents investigated by
NHTSA in 2010 as part of the joint study with NASA. A description of
the incident, identified as Case 33 in the NHTSA study, was included
as an example of the 39 accidents classified as pedal
misapplications in a 2011 report summarizing NHTSA's field
investigations.\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ ``NHTSA Toyota Pre-Crash EDR Field Inspections during
March-August 2010,'' NHTSA-NVS-2011-ETC-SR10, February, 2011, pages
15-16.
Table 4--Pre-Crash Data for VOQ 10299750, EDR Tool Version 1.4.1.1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Time (sec) -4.7 -3.7 -2.7 -1.7 -0.7 0 (TRG)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Vehicle Speed (MPH [km/h])...... 3.7 [6]........... 3.7 [6]........... 3.7 [6]........... 9.9 [16].......... 13.7 [22]......... 19.9 [32]
Brake Switch.................... OFF............... OFF............... OFF............... OFF............... OFF............... OFF
Accelerator Rate (V)............ 0.86.............. 0.82.............. 0.98.............. 0.78.............. 3.71.............. 1.37
Engine RPM (RPM)................ 400............... 400............... 800............... 1,600............. 3,200............. 4,400
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[[Page 51653]]
As described in the 2011 report, the driver had turned from a
lane of traffic to enter a parking space and was about to come to a
rest facing a shopping plaza storefront when the vehicle lunged
forward through the fa[ccedil]ade of a hair salon. The driver
reported having his foot on the brake when the acceleration
occurred. Table 4 shows the EDR pre-crash data for this accident, as
published in the 2011 report.\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ The petitioner based his analysis of this incident on a
different EDR readout reviewed later in this report, in Section
2.3.3, ``Case 33.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The EDR data for this incident shows no recorded service brake
application during the event. Immediately prior to impact and after
the vehicle had entered the parking space, the driver pressed the
accelerator pedal to the floor when intending to apply the
brake.\16\ As noted in the 2011 report, this incident is consistent
with pedal misapplication by the driver and does not provide any
evidence of a vehicle defect as suggested by the petitioner.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ The recorded Accelerator Rate of 3.71 volts is well beyond
the accelerator rate needed for 100 percent throttle.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2.3 Petitioner Claims and Misconceptions
2.3.1 ``Strong Signature''
According to the petitioner, ``The fact that all three cars were
coasting at 3.7 mph when the sudden-acceleration happened appears to
be a strong signature of a common issue.'' However, even though the
EDR data for the three incidents may have reflected speeds of 3.7
mph before the acceleration occurred, the vehicles may not have
actually been travelling the same speed. The common speeds recorded
in the three vehicles are simply an artifact of the EDR vehicle
speed resolution of 2 km/h. In all three incidents, the vehicles
were travelling 6.0-7.9 km/h (3.7-4.9 mph) prior to the
accelerations, which the Toyota EDR records as 6 km/h (3.7 mph).
These are common speeds for low-speed parking maneuvers.
The ``glitch'' in accelerator pedal voltage that the petitioner
alleges occurs after the 3.7 mph speed recording, is the voltage
increase resulting from the accelerator pedal applications by the
drivers. The petitioner claims that the voltage spike suggests a
potential vehicle based cause, speculating, ``the accelerator is
either calculating an incorrect accelerator value or receiving a
noise spike on the accelerator sensor.'' However, such speculation
ignores the facts that the accelerator pedal has redundant sensors
and that NASA already thoroughly examined this subject during the
joint study. The common pattern is that the ``glitches'' occur at
the moments in the events when the driver should be initiating
braking, but no braking has occurred.
Thus, the only common signature evident in the incidents is that
in all three the surges occurred when the driver should have
initiated braking for a vehicle entering a parking space at low
speed. The fact that the vehicles suddenly accelerated just as they
were beginning to enter their intended parking spaces instead of
braking to a stop as intended is a signature of pedal misapplication
by the driver. NHTSA has observed this signature in investigations
of sudden acceleration dating back to the first such investigation
that ODI opened in 1978. It is not isolated to any particular makes
or models of vehicles or to any throttle design technologies.
2.3.2 Engine RPM Increases
The petitioner claims that each of the incidents he analyzed
displays evidence of engine speed increases without any application
of the accelerator pedal. For example, in his analysis of his wife's
incident he states, ``by -1.6 seconds the engine RPM has DOUBLED to
800 with no depression of the accelerator.'' This assertion reflects
a misunderstanding of the manner in which the Toyota EDR samples and
records pre-crash data as previously described in this report and in
prior reports published by NHTSA.
First, as indicated in this report and in the Data Definitions
section on page two of the Bosch CDR report attached to the
petition, the Toyota EDR records engine speed in 400 rpm increments
(rounded down). For example, a recorded value of 400 rpm indicates
that the measured engine speed was between 400 and 799 rpm. Thus, an
increase in recorded engine speed from 400 to 800 rpm could result
from a change in engine speed of just 1 rpm.
Second, the nominal idle speed for a MY 2009 ES350 when the
engine is warm, the transmission is in gear (i.e., either Drive or
Reverse), and no accessory loads are operating is approximately 600
rpm. Air-conditioning use and steering input may result in the idle
speed increasing to 700 to 800 rpm to compensate for the additional
loads placed on the engine by the air-conditioning compressor and
power-steering pump. Thus, the actual engine speeds associated with
the recorded values of 400 rpm were likely closer to 800 rpm than
400 rpm.\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ Engine speeds that drop below 500 rpm are uncommon in motor
vehicles and have been associated with engine stall due to idle
undershoot in some ODI investigations of non-Toyota products.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, it is not accurate to state that engine speed increases
did not result from accelerator pedal applications based strictly on
the recorded EDR data, since the data do not necessarily show all
accelerator pedal applications (see section 2.1 and Figure 1) and
because of the differences in refresh rates for engine speed and
accelerator rate. Although actual engine speed will closely follow
accelerator rate, the recorded accelerator rate may slightly lag
behind recorded engine speed due to the slower refresh rate of the
accelerator signal (see Table 1). Thus, the increase in recorded
engine speed at -1.6 seconds prior to impact could very well have
resulted from the initial stages of the large pedal application that
the EDR recorded at -0.6 seconds.
2.3.3 Case 33
The EDR data used by the petitioner for Case 33 was from the
initial readout ODI performed with the original version of software
available from Toyota (Table 5). This version converted accelerator
pedal sensor #1 voltages to an accelerator status of OFF, MIDDLE or
FULL. A supplemental report to the NHTSA February 2011 report
included a copy of this readout.\18\ This incident is one of many
incidents from early field investigations that ODI read a second
time after receiving an updated version of Toyota software that
provided a more precise indication of accelerator pedal
position.\19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ ``Toyota EDR Data from NHTSA Pre-Crash Field Inspections,''
NHTSA-NVS-2011-ETC-SR12, February 2011.
\19\ ``Toyota EDR Software Versions Used in NHTSA Unintended
Acceleration Field Investigation Cases,'' NHTSA-NVS-2011-ETC-SR08,
February 2011, page 8.
Table 5--Pre-Crash Data for VOQ 10299750, EDR Tool Version 1.3 (Original Readout)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Time (sec) -4.7 -3.7 -2.7 -1.7 -0.7 0 (TRG)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Vehicle Speed (MPH [km/h])...... 3.7 [6]........... 3.7 [6]........... 3.7 [6]........... 9.9 [16].......... 13.7 [22]......... 19.9 [32]
Brake Switch.................... OFF............... OFF............... OFF............... OFF............... OFF............... OFF
Accelerator..................... OFF............... OFF............... OFF............... OFF............... FULL.............. OFF
Engine RPM (RPM)................ 400............... 400............... 800............... 1,600............. 3,200............. 4,400
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 4 shows the data from the readout obtained using the
updated software. Rather than maintaining a consistent voltage as
may be misinterpreted by the OFF accelerator levels shown in Table
5, the accelerator pedal rates in the updated readout in Table 4
show that the driver was applying the accelerator pedal at varying
rates throughout the event. Thus, the petitioner's conclusions that
the vehicle was coasting and the driver had not depressed the
accelerator pedal when the idle speed was increasing are incorrect
and do not provide evidence of a vehicle defect.
2.3.4 NASA ``High-Speed Study''
The petitioner incorrectly characterizes the joint NASA-NHTSA
study as a ``high-speed study.'' In fact, the joint study focused on
all potential vulnerabilities in the Toyota ETCS-i system that were
not associated with the
[[Page 51654]]
floor mat entrapment or sticking accelerator pedal conditions
addressed by multiple Toyota safety recalls in 2009 and 2010.\20\
Most such incidents examined during the study involved allegations
of sudden acceleration in vehicles initially moving at low speeds.
The most common scenario for the incidents was acceleration when
attempting to park. Thus, contrary to the petitioner's
characterization, low-speed surges were the primary focus of the
study by NHTSA and NASA in 2010.
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\20\ The floor mat entrapment and sticking pedal defect
conditions were both ``stuck throttle'' type defect conditions,
which typically occur at higher speeds when larger accelerator pedal
applications necessary to cause the entrapment are more likely.
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The incidents analyzed by the petitioner fall within the scope
of prior work conducted in the joint NHTSA-NASA study of Toyota
ETCS-i and, more recently, the analysis conducted in evaluating
Defect Petition DP14-003. His claims appear to be based on upon
several misconceptions regarding the manner in which Toyota EDR
sample and record data, as well as a misunderstanding of the scope
of and results from prior work conducted by NHTSA, NASA and others
related to sudden unintended acceleration and the use of EDR data in
related field investigations. The petitioner has presented no new
evidence or theories not already considered by NHTSA that warrant
reconsideration of any of the analyses or conclusions from that
prior work.
3.0 Conclusion
In our view, a defects investigation is unlikely to result in a
finding that a defect related to motor vehicle safety exists, or a
NHTSA order for the notification and remedy of a safety-related
defect as alleged by the petitioner, at the conclusion of the
requested investigation. Therefore, given a thorough analysis of the
potential for finding a safety related defect in the vehicle, and in
view of NHTSA's enforcement priorities, its previous investigations
into this issue, and the need to allocate and prioritize NHTSA's
limited resources to best accomplish the agency's safety mission and
mitigate risk, the petition is denied. This action does not
constitute a finding by NHTSA that a safety-related defect does not
exist. The agency will take further action if warranted by future
circumstances.
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 30162(d); delegations of authority at 49
CFR 1.50 and 501.8.
Frank S. Borris II,
Acting Associate Administrator for Enforcement.
[FR Doc. 2015-20949 Filed 8-24-15; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-59-P
